by John McHale

Forecasting and Futures Research In much futures work, a diffuse value indictment of modern society persists.

B y regarding forecasting as one of the main ob- jectives of futures research or, in some cases, by assum-

ing that the terms are interchangeable, forecasting in itself has been overemphasized. Forecasting is not identical to futures research, nor need it be its primary objective. There are some important differences between the two areas. In forecasting it is assumed that there is a given set of definable causal relationships between events which might enable one to predict their future state---within varying degrees of prob- ability. It does not usually extend to questions regarding structural premises or implicit assumptions about the world which might underlay the basis for forecasting, and in which the nature of causality itself may be a prime focus for en- quiry. These questions are within the larger province of futures research.

In more specific terms, the relative importance of"predic- five" forecasting in futures research should be considered. For some areas of work, such as short-term economic or technological forecasting, it is critically important even in the external predictive sense. In other areas, like environ- mental planning, it may be less important as prediction than as "projected alternatives" and for social and cultural pro- jection, it may not only be hazardous but counterproductive.

In short-term forecasting for specific purposes, the methodologies for projecting costs and benefits of alternative directions may he relatively well-advanced and provide val-

uable inputs to decision making and policy formation. The hazard is that when the same methods are applied to longer range social forecasting, they tend to place the emphasis on similar deterministic means of forecasting, on what will be under some set of given conditions rather on what couM be--given the appropriate range of human choice and inter- vention. The use of the te rm" forecasting" here, even in the normative sense, may be counterproductive to the human ends of the enquiry.

The central function of futures studies is not to predict what a future or the future will be, but to explore various alternative futures states resultant upon our individual and collective actions and which may be accessible to our choice. Another way to gauge the position of forecasting is to look at two examples of the extreme wings of futures work as rep- resented by de Jouvenel's The Art of Conjecture and Kahn and Wiener's The Year 2000. The former contains little that might be labeled as forecasting in the predictive sense; the latter, though ostensibly predictive, is subtitled A Framework for Speculation. Somewhere in the middle ground, in work on technological and economic futures, forecasting is used as a specific mode of predicting outcomes of various alternative projections of quantifiable parameters.

The relative functional importance of forecasting in fu- tures research would lie with: (a) The particular class or method of forecasting, which runs

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the gamut from directly extrapolative to Delphi and cross-impact techniques to simulation/gaming and intu- Rive projection.

(b) The influence of the operative sector, whether it be technological, economic, social or cultural, upon the choice and viability of forecasting method.

(c) The range of futures projection--short, medium, long--which also influences the choice and validity of method.

(d) The reflexive effects of forecasts as a variant of the observer/observed relationship, where forecasts func- tion as self-fulfilling prophecies or as image construc- tions which influence attitudes, decisions and actions in many different ways.

Rapid Growth

In reviewing the range and subject areas of forecasting, it may be useful to emphasize the recent and rapid growth of the field. One indicator of this is the increase in futures confer- ences and meetings. The growth in size of official world congresses has been marked. Between 30 to 40 people at- tended the first Oslo meeting in 1967; over 200 came to Kyoto in 1970 and the third congress in Bucharest drew even more. The Rome Conference in 1974 attracted over 100 people on a partially restricted basis, while the World Future Society Washington Congress drew over 2,000 participants in 197 I. This kind of growth in itself should not lead to the assumption that we are dealing with a large well-organized and well-supported field of disciplined enquiry. In some cases, it is the reverse.

In 1969-70, and again in 1971-72, surveys of futures research in the United States and some pilot surveys on the world scale were conducted by this author. These were concerned essentially with who was doing what, for whom and why. One interesting observation which emerged in relation to field growth over that period was that the actual numbers of persons engaged full-time in formally defined programs of futures research had not expanded significantly in comparison with the vast increase in the numbers of people now "involved with the future" in various ways. The con- clusion was that the field had moved from being a relatively small disciplinary enclave toward being a part of a larger social movement. This may have an important beating on the changing emphasis of forecasting areas. A summary of the first survey conducted is given in Table 1.

In general objectives and orientation of work, the first survey ranked economic, technological and social forecast- ing in that order, with technological and economic being appreciably higher than social. In the second survey, con- ducted approximately two years later in sampling time, the forecasting had shifted as indicated in Table 2.

Although both individual and organizational profiles ranked social forecasting high, it should be noted that when this and other categories were regrouped together the ba- lance was slightly different. (See Table 2A.)

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

TAgLE 1 Summary of First Phase Survey, 1969-70

Objectives of work. Two-thirds reported major economic and technological focus to their work. Others ranked social, political and environmental loci in that order, with concern for the individual occurring very ~ow in the scale.

Range of forecastJng. Major concentration was on the short-range (next decade), medium, concentration was on the next thirty years, about 1 percent was on the long-range, i.e., beyond the next thirty years. (Forecasting is used here to indicate general range of concern or interest, rather than as prediction per se.)

Funding support. Inversely related to length of forecasting~most was for a very short-term; least was for long-term. Allocation by sectors was approximately as fol- lows:

Government (in house and contractual) 50 percent Corporate (mainly internal) 30 percent Academic 10 percent Foundations and other agencies 10 percent

Maior support was allocated to client-defined work in the short-range with specifically focused objectives.

Disciplinary profile of workers. Dominated by engineering, economics, physics, chemistry and political science.

Age profile. Concentrated between 36 and 45 years, sug- gesting professionals whose major work had been accom- plished in their defined fields before moving into the futures research area.

Sex. Almost 90 percent male, with remainder including nonprofessional "support" staff.

7. Generalized conclusions (a) Apart from a few established institutions, most of the

significant work in the field was done by individuals--not necessarily tied to their institutional setting.

(b) Major emphasis and funding were allocated to short- range economic and technological forecasting.

(c) Lack of adequately supported work in terms of "whole system(s)" and multivariate approaches to national and world problems.

(d) Little systematic research on values and other areas of sociocultural change.

(el Weak linkage of futures research to actual policy plan- ning process and to action.

When questioned as to more specific foci of work (see Table 3), the divergence between individual and organiza- tional forms becomes somewhat clearer. Some evidence suggests that although the general objectives may have shifted toward more explicit social and cultural concerns, the forecasting methodologies remain somewhat biased toward technological, economic and other more objectively deter- ruinable measures.

It would seem that the major shift has been from predictive forecasting toward the more normative mode of exploring

July/August 1975 23

TABLE 2 Orientation of Work (General)

(in Percentage) Individuals Organizations

Forecasting Social 1 7.6 Social 12.9 Technological 13.3 Economic 11.8 Economic 10.2 Technological 11.8 Cultural 9.8 Cultural 9.9 Educational 8.2 Educational 8.9 Resources 7.2 Market 7.8 Market 7.0 Scientific 7.0 Scientific 7.0 Resources 7.0 Ecological 6.3 Ecological 5.9 Manpower 3.9 Manpower 5.7 Military 3.3 Population 5.7 Population 3.1 Military 3.2 Other 3.1 Other 2.8

Research Alternative futures 14.4 Alternative futures 11.9 Social impacts/ Social impacts/

technology 12.0 technology 10.9 Value systems 10.9 Social priorities 10.6 Futures methodology 10.2 Policy research 10.6 Social priorities 9.7 Value systems 9.8 Policy research 8.8 Environmental 9.3 Individual in future 7.5 Futures methodology 8.5 Environmental 6.4 Resources utilization 7.1 Resource utilization 4.5 Individual in future 5.3 Family in future 4.2 Population 4.4 Manpower 3.6 Ma npower 4.1 Population 2.9 Family in future 3.9 Consumer affairs 2,1 Consumer affairs 2.8 Other 2.8 Other 0,8

Planning Social 15.0 Educational 12.0 Technological 12.0 Social 11.8 Educational 11.3 Corporate 11.1 Corporate 8.8 Technological 10.6 Urban 8.5 Urban 9.3 Scientific 7.5 Regional 8.6 Political 6.8 Resources 7.6 Resources 6.8 Scientific 7.2 Regional 6.3 Ecological 5.8 Ecological 5.5 Political 5.6 Architecture/design 4.6 Architecture/design 3.2 Military 2.8 Military 2.3 Labor 1.3 Labor 2.3 Other 2.8 Other 2.6

Social Cultural Educational Ecological Population

TABLE 2A Balance of Categories

Percent Percent

17.4 Technological 13.3 9.8 Economic 10.2 8.2 Market" 7.0 6.3 Resources 7.2 3.1 Military 3.3

Scientific 7.0

44.8 48.0

alternative futures in both general and specific senses. Obvi- ously, there will be a blending of both predictive and norma- tive modes which might increase in sophistication as they are applied in areas of technology assessment, social accounting and other policy-oriented work. The current emphasis on alternatives as such may simply be a catchword like systems or participatory.

In terms of the overall shift in emphasis, some of the main characteristics affecting this can be listed as follows: (a) The general change in social climate in the two-year

interval due to the rise of the environmental movement, with its emphasis on the social and environmental con- sequences of technology, and to the ethical and value questions arising from the youth, minorities and w a r protest movements. This change also has a direct effect on the futures field itself. For example, as the successive social movements and activist areas have peaked or burned out, many of their participants move on to the next course. This reflects itself in conference topics and general literature--and is critical when futures study becomes a social movement.

(b) The accompanying shift in funding and support patterns. This appeared to play a direct role in determining the organizational orientation of forecasting, e.g., in the first survey, funding levels were in inverse ratio to the length and scale of forecasting. Most long-range mul- tivariate work was done by individuals independent of their organizational locus and support structure. Organi- zational work leaned toward highly specific short-to medium-range forecasting.

(c) Fashionability may also play a considerable role, not only in terms of social, climate directly, but with the growth in visibility of futures in the mass media and the appearance of futures books on the best-seller lists. Academic and educational interest in futures grows as the "new field" defines itself, gains respec.tability and affords new outlets for courses, publications and careers.

(d) The "Future of X " syndrome, in which a great deal of relatively conventional work in various other fields is "futurized" by adding the prefix or by assembling mat- erial under the rubric o f "X in the year 2000" o r " . . , in the twenty-first century." Though associated with fashionability, this is a much more direct response to a larger social need---the search for reassurance in a period of diffuse social anxieties regarding change. Its relation- ship to the shift in forecasting emphasis is of great concern, but as a phenomenon, this would require much wider appraisal in a social context which includes re- newed popular interest in astrology, parapsychology and magic.

(e) Change of field personnel. The change in fields rep- resented in futures research was quite marked between the first and second surveys (see Table 4).

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Category Individuals Alternative futures Methodology Planning Social change (general) Institutional change Family Leisure Education Religion Health Law Values/ethics Politics Individual

TABLE 3 Specific Focus of Work

No. Category No. Organizations

19 Science and technology 21 forecasting 8 37 Resources 13 21 Food supply systems 1

6 Environmental quality 2 2 Transportation 2 2 Public service systems 1

38 Policy research 21 3 Business 43 6 Economic forecasting 5 2 Communications/media 13 7 National security 1 4 Military 7 1 Documentation 3

Science Fiction 2

TABLE 4 Academic Field of Respondent

First Survey (1969-1970)

Field No. Field No.

Engineering 36 Finance 4 Economics 24 History 4 Physics 16 Law 4 Political science 12 Statistics 4 Chemistry 11 Computer science 3 Psychology 11 English 3 Mathematics 9 Geography 3 Business administration 8 Medicine 3 Education 8 Humanities 2 Philosophy 7 Iournalism 2 Business 6 Landscape architecture 2 Social science 6 Management science 2 Architecture 5 Pharmacy 2 International relations 5 Psychiatry 2 Urban planning 5 Regional planning 2 Anthropology 4 Theology 2

The influx of social and behavioral scientists, humanists and educators may be due to some of the factors previously listed, and also to the more recent growth of interest in the future by specific field workers themsdves. For example, close to one-third of the survey respondents had entered the field less than three years ago.

Gaps and Weaknesses

Taking these various shifts in emphasis into account, sev- eral questions might be raised regarding the areas in which

forecasts are made, or the range of topics with which futures research is more broadly concerned. In a cursory review of the subject areas developed in the surveys, of conference literature and of the extraordinary growth of futures books, newsletters and journals of various kinds, it would seem that the entire range of human concern is covered. Accompany- ing this is the ancillary growth of bibliographies, documenta- tion centers, clearinghouses and networks.

The problem here is one of critical evaluation; it is not enough to merely list what is being done. When we look beyond the often grandiose titles and into the content, it is, in

July/August 1975 25

all too many cases, insubstantial, repetitive and rhetorical. Though one might be a little less severe than Yehezkei Dror, his comments on the "Weak State of the Art" are worth repeating:

Careful perusal of futures studies, literature and even more so, of the proceedings of the four main international conferences---leads me, regretfully but unavoidably, to the conclusion, that the rate of innova- tion in futures studies---both in methodology and in substantive ideas---is on a marginally decreasing curve. Read three main books in methodology, read a dozen books of substantive ideas on the future and look over the proceedings of the Kyoto Conference--and you have nearly got it all!

The Problem Syndrome

Although there is a renewal of emphasis upon social and cultural themes, their treatment is still characterized by the conventional constraints and attitudes to change brought over from various parent disciplines. This is expressed most strongly in the problem syndrome of much of the work--in its preoccupations with increasing complexity in the tech- nological society, in the trends toward uniformity and anonymity of mass society, and in the breakdown of norms, values and traditions. These unexamined premises are pro- jected in sets of problem scenarios, or countered by advocacy of equally dubious and uncritical acceptance of needs for human potential, actualization, renewal of face-to-face community and preservation of the family.

This is not to suggest that many of these problems are not real, but there is little attempt, other than in such problem- oriented terms, to spell out specific social and cultural changes which might occur according to individual and col- lective choice or what the content of various kinds of indi- vidual social and cultural experiences may be in different future ranges and conditions. While eschewing the more technical approach of economic, technological or other forecasters, the substantive work of such forecasts has not been integrated in a manner which might inform and enrich the quality of social and cultural projection.

The major emphasis focuses almost entirely on macroso- cial change---changes in society and in organizations and institutions down to the small community level. The least emphasis and least attention is on the individual and the authenticity of his experience as contrasted with the abstract image of individual---other than as the overconstrained per- former of social roles determined by society. New styles of life reflecting changes in institutional forms tend to be oriented to their connotations of "deviance" contingent upon the breakdown of past and present norms. William Simon, in his explication of the "fallacy of sociomorphism" underlines this particular weakness which,

. . . imputes to the individual organism that which is properly a function of social life, [and] which allows us to accept uncritically as constants, as socio-cultural universals, or "natural laws" for social life that which may, in fact, represent little more than the outcome of the sociohistorical moment.

Treatment of new cultural forms is often so naive as to be considered a marginal component of futures work. Much of it suffers less from a failure of imagination about the future than from a lack of substantive knowledge about past and present. The closest approximation in attitude to today's cultural futurist is probably the late nineteenth-century pre- Raphaelite Brotherhood--rather than even the futurism of a Marinetti or Bocceoni in the early 1900s.

Disruption of Traditional Forms

Insufficient rigorous attention is paid to reexamining tradi- tional models and stereotypes. Much of our theory of social, economic., cultural and even political change, where it exists, is still overhung with earlier social science reactions to and misunderstanding of disruption of traditional forms and the social disorder attendant upon rapid change---plus an admis- sion of the specific social (and other) costs which change entails. Lurking behind the labels of much discussion are various models which lay claim to all sorts of universality and historical continuity--linked to sets of latent assump- tions regarding haman nature, needs for collective security, social health and pathology.

While it may be necessary to criticize the present on the way to the future, many value critiques offer only nostalgic forays into the past.

In much futures work a diffuse value indictment of modem society even persists in those studies which purport to be concerned with values in the future. While it may be neces- sary to criticize the present on the way to the future, many value critiques offer no more than nostalgic forays into the past. That the more valued elements in human social and cultural experience are associated with past periods of (ap- parent) stability and permanence may be comforting, even if largely illusionary.

One specific example of theoretical weakness, related to the orientation of past, present and future, is the assumption of time as an invariant and universal constant. It is empiri- cally evident that the ranges of experiential time and life space are highly variable and pluralistic among different societies, even for social groups and individuals. As Corinne Lathrop Glib suggests:

For any particular society, also to be explored are

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the variations, conflicts and similarities of the time and change imageries of men, women, different age and vocational groups, social and economic classes, and ethnic and other special groups. How have these dif- ferences helped to structure the institutions of the fam- ily, church, work, play, politics, economics, govern- ment and the law, and--in addition--what time and change images have these institutions had qua institu- tions.

Overdependence on an idealized past and failure to recon- ceptualize ongoing changes in the present also leads to, for example, various fixed assumptions about the roles and cen- trality of core institutions (economic, political, military, etc.) and to their being held relatively constant in function and centrality for the future. Generally, there is an undue reliance on "structural certainties," which are assumed to persist as basic norms in regulating and modifying changes in society.

Present Demands and Future Needs

Social and cultural expectations and objectives are simi- larly held constant, or only marginally variable, so that the established interests and preoccupations of the present are projected, largely unexamined, into future forms. Expecta- tions, tastes, desires and objectives, both of societies and individuals, are highly variable over time. Projecting present demands into future needs may be relatively harmless in individual speculation. However, when linked to social and economic planning and to the commitment of present re- sources and energies to long-range purposes, it requires more vigilant questioning. It is not enough to free the present from the shackles of the past if, in turn, we sacrifice the present to supposed exigencies of the future. In almost all areas of forecasting and futures research, we must be more rigorous regarding implicit and explicit assumptions upon which we operate. Our assumptions preselect the questions addressed, the types of data used and predetermine to a considerable extent the kinds of futures projected.

Despite the influx of social and behavioral scientists into the field, the range of methodological skills is still relatively inadequate in monitoring indicators of change in the present and in assessing their importance for the future. This also selects and shapes the type and content of the forecasts and projections made.

There is still a strong tendency to rely upon "canonical" data, which is administratively convenient for and manipula- ble within conventional methodologies. We are still not very good at transferring quantitative data into qualitative changes in social and cultural forms. Most of our methods and monitoring skills are lacking in qualitative assessment of symbolic communication in various media, in the profusion of visual images and social metaphors through which social and cultural changes may be perceived and in whose terms they require projection.

Methods, in a latent hierarchical ranking, range from

"sof t" to "hard" in terms of rigor, enumeration and quan- tifiability. This does not recognize that just as much sophisti- cated expertise may be required to monitor and manipulate soft indicators of sociocultural change as to make technolog- ical or economic forecasts. Unfortunately, those most expert in the latter areas of hard analysis may be inept and un- skilled when confronted with data which is not couched in their traditional forms. Novels, movies, television, art, com- ics and ads are no less difficult to interpret and use than factorial matrices and computer models. The range of data admitted into wider concern in futures research is somewhat inhibited, which in turn leads to a considerable poverty of content in many social and cultural projections.

The institutional funding record in futures research is dismal, but continues to skew the field emphasis considerably.

The field of futures studies is polarized between the pro- fessionals and the activists. There is, on one hand, a drive for professional respectability and rigor via more formal organi- zation and on the other hand, a more vocal concern with widening the base of nonprofessional participation in futures work and linking futures studies more directly and actively with ongoing societal problems. The professionals tend to incline toward more highly defined and restricted forecasting within strong substantive frameworks of disciplinary exper- tise. The activists prefer to broaden the range of concerns so that they mirror current issues and needs of the widest par- ticipation; this makes for a richer set of topics, but is some- what thin in terms of substance. Joining both polar aspects is the pressure for more documentation, bibliographical ser- vices, academic programs and courses. At times it seems as if there is more documentation than there are useful documents to classify.

In order to reconcile both sides and to advance the state of the art, several measures are necessary. First, a futures criti- cal function, wherein substantive assessment and critical judgment of work could be conducted in ongoing fashion, must be established. To a certain extent, this critical evalua- tive apparatus has been most visible in science, but it also operates powerfully in the arts, i.e., in the function of the individual critic and the general field criticism afforded by colleagues and by public attention and evaluation. A clearer definition and discussion of the educational and public in- formation aspects of futures research is also needed. Both of these areas also bear upon the field emphasis question. The efflorescence of futures courses and academic programs has led to a proliferation of texts and papers designed for use in such courses and to a situation in which educational futures has become a variegated topic in its own right.

The "Future of X" syndrome suggests that at this de-

July/August 1975 27

velopmentai point in the field, it might be useful to convene representatives from different fields in order to discuss the future of their disciplines as a possible focus for their own research and teaching, and as field contribution to the study of the future. This is already occurring to some extent in sociology, anthropology and several other areas.

Futures research, futurology or futuristics is peculiarly self-defined as a field in itself. Recent expansion has rein- forced that self-definition to a degree which may be hazard- ous for its own future development. It would be misleading to gauge the substantive balance and character of the field solely on the basis of the number of entries or studies listed in various surveys and directories. Closer acquaintance with the content of such listings and more rigorous evaluation is also necessary.

There is also an acute ahistorical tendency within the field itself which leads to the neglect (or lack of knowledge) of earlier work in the area not labeled appropriately as futures. For example, apart from literary utopianists and other theoreticians, one could point to a large body of work pro- duced by various legislative committees, independent com- missions and individual workers, which projects and ex- plores future needs and requirements in many areas. Pres- ently, much more work than is generally recognized is being done outside the futures field as now defined. Some of the more obvious examples are in the field of social indicators, in certain areas of national and international planning, in criti- cal work on communications, arts, cultural development and historical reassessment.

The funding and support structure has been an important influence upon the organization of futures research and will obviously continue to be. One interesting point which emerged in the first survey was that the bulk of the pioneering work in large-scale, long-range and multivariate futures pro- jection was done by individuals and groups who were not in institutionalized programs of futures research. They were not primarily supported for this work, but "bootlegged" the time from other activities. This still holds true, but whether it will continue to be so in the future is questionable.

As the field gains fashionability and wider interest, the individual's position becomes more difficult. In order to retain access to necessary materials and tools and to keep apace of field growth, such workers have had to become more institutionally bound (institutions fund institutions, not individuals). Meanwhile, the larger institutions who failed to support such longer range, large-scale exploration when it was unfashionable, now move into the area with greater resources and personnel, but, most often, still lacking the essential insights and vision of the individual. The latter gets squeezed out progressively just as the work which he pioneered gains wider validation and support. Thus we face a kind of institutional imperialism in which large intellectual conglomerates come in at a specific point in field evolution to develop large-scale, well-funded projects--whose substan- tive merit and accomplishment usually fails short of the

rhetoric with which they are proposed and reported. The institutional funding record in futures research is

rather dismal, but continues to skew the field emphasis considerably. The funding agencies have been characterized by timidity and lack of foresight. While evincing due concern for original, innovative and exploratory work, they then set up elaborate constraining conditions for its support and con- duct. This would have been like asking Lewis and Clark to draw up a set of state highway maps before they started out.

Those who conduct initial explorations in an area are seldom able to clearly lay out detailed rationales, objectives and plans which funding agencies require. When unsup- ported work is published, however, it is all too easy for the less innovative individual or institution to pick out the more immediately fundable ideas for elaborate proposal writing. This may be defensible in that the overall work is thereby advanced, but the more creative and original workers are pushed successively into more marginal positions in relation to support, and the substantive field contributions are corres- pondingly diluted. Such a process is not confined to futures research, but the peculiar nature of the field intensifies it considerably.

The range of data in futures research is inhibited, which leads to poverty of content in many social and cultural projections.

Integration of Forecasts

As in other fields, futures research suffers from an imbal- ance between analysis and differentiation---and synthesis and integration. One reason may be that the disciplinary training of most people has favored the former rather than the latter. In a field and a period, however, when the cross- impact and whole system effects of change arc critically important, it would seem necessary to redress the balance. A key item on the research agenda for futures research would be the substantive assessment, interrelated synthesis and inte- gration of forecasts and projections as a more central activity. Of necessity this kind of exercise would require some hind- sight work on the validity of past forecasting as well as ongoing inputs from the futures critical function.

Only through the development of such integration on a fairly large scale and on a continuous basis can there be an ongoing review of the areas in which substantive forecasts arc being made. To attempt such comparative review in terms of individual forecasts would be less rewarding than gauging their interrelated effectiveness within a more holistic context. Through such a series of linked activities, we should also be able to monitor the changing emphases, weaknesses and strengths of the overall futures research field over time.

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