INSURA CEII\lSTITUTE

FORHIGHWAY

SAFITY

Vol. 27,No. 5

Assessing theA88essments

Has NCAP,the federalNew-Car As­sessmentProgram, beena success? The shortanswer is yes. CAP haschanged very little since Itsinception and is overdue forsome improvements. Stl11, "suc­cessful does describe NCAP.which has been especially good atprompting automakers to improvethe occupant crash proteetion af­forded by their vehicles.

Established as a consumer program,NCAP now Is poised to become more in­fluential than it has been in the past overcar buyers' choices of vehicles. In fact,auto dealers may soon be providingprospective buyers with Information tocompare cars on the basis af safety andthe amount and cost of damage they sus­tain In crashes. The latter information willcome from the Highway Loss Data Insti­tute, and the Information about how weDor poorly cars protect their occupantswiD come from NeAP.

This new development follows settle­ment of a Consumers Dolon lawsuit, un­der which the National Highway TrafficSafety AdmJnlstration (NHTSA) has pro­posed requiring automobile dealers todIstribute information on how much dam­age specific car models sustain in high­way crashes and how well they protecttheir occupants. (See Status Report, Vol.26, No. 10, Nov. 30, 1991.)

Recap ofNCAPinIts 15thYear ofTesting

rIIl8, 1992

NCAP funds have been Increased inpart to ensure that its inIormation is more

easily understandable to consumersand more useful as a market incen­

tive. Now that this program Is on thebrink of getting- a higher profile, U's agood time to assess it and presentsome cumulative results in the 15thyear of crash testing.

What NCAP Is and Im't Begun in 1978as part of an information rating system or­dered by Congress in 1972, NCAP involves

frontal crash tests into a Oat barrier at 35mph. This is 5 mph faster than the

speed specified for tests to de­termine compliance with federalmotor vehicle safety standards.

The 5 mph difference inspeed, which amounts to a 36percent increase In the crashenergy, Is the most obviousdifference between the gov­

ernment's NCAP andcompliancetests. But

the differencesgo deeper.NCAP began

dynamic testingwith instrumented dummJes back whenvirtually all cars were equipped with onlymanual belts, and the only belt testing re­quirements for compliance with federalstandards were static. By Introducing aprogram of dynamic crash testing using in­strwnented anthropomorphic dummies,NCAP truly was innovative.

IJleach 35 mph NeAP crash test Into aIrontal barrier, two 50th pertentile maletest dummies are seated In the driver andright front-seat passenger positions, Fe-

2-1IH. latus Report, VoL 27, No.5, April 18 1992

From NCAP test film: h's a measure of NCAP's influence on automakers that when cars scorepoorly their designs are often changed to produce beUer scores. Toyota' 1989 Cressida; for exam­ple, scored a substanlially lower driver Head Injury Criterion than the 1981 Cressida. Similarly,the Ford Tempo' driver HIC improved a lot between the 1984 and' modelyears.

trained by safety belts and, if they re avail­able. air bags. Measurements are taken fromeach Instrumented dummy's head chest,and upper legs to indicate "the likelihood oferlous injury, and thereby the relative

crashworthiness of the vehicle in a severefrontal Impact,· NHTSA expJains.

But there are limitations. NHTSA cautionsthat .. CAP results are not a basis for con­cluding that a vehicle is safe or unsafe." Infact, NeAP results allow for comparisons on-

Iy amongvehicles of the same type and sim­ilar weight - within about 500 pounds ofeach otbet So results cannot be usedto compare large heavy cars with small,light cars. They can be used only to co~

pare cars of similar size and weightThese Ilmitations often are overlooked

when CAP results are reported. Fm ex­ample, this month's Issue of Consumer Re­ports states that Mthe most meaningful[NCAP) comparison is within size cate-

gories.· uch a comparison is, In fact, theonly meaningful one. Comparisons acrosssize categories aremeaningless because afront-into-barrier crash is equivalent to ahea<k>n crash with an identical car anddoesn't reflect the fact that many on-lhe­road crashes involve vehicles of dis imi­lar Weights.

This doesn't mean CAP test re ultshave no value, though. They provide use­ful comparisons of how vehicles of slmJlarsize perfonn In frontal crashes - the kindthat cause about hal[ of all occupantdeaths and serious injuries.

How to Read the Results NHT Aputs about 30 vehicles per year throughNCAP tests and, for each vehicle, recordsthree scores. One score measures theforces the buman head experiences in acrash and, hence, the potential for beadinjury. Another measures the potential forchest injury. The third score- sbo femur(thigh) loading.

Thre holds are pectfied. for eachscore, that match the thresholds for com­pliance with federal motor vehicle safetystandards In 30 mph crash tests. Thethreshold for the Head Injury Criterion(HIC) Is tOOO. For chest injury, It's 60. Andfor femur loading, 2250. However, thesearen't magic numbers. The H1C threshold,for example, does nor indicate that headinjury will definitely occur at 1001 or, bythe same token, won't occur at 999. Rather,1000 is meaningful as tbe risk thresholddesignated for compliance with FederalMotor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, Occu­pant Crash Protection, in 30 mph tests.

In comparing CAP scores the impor­tant point Is that cars with very lowscores can be expected to provide morecrash protection, compared with cars withvery high scores. The lower the score. thebetter. mc of 225 is better than 1025.However, relatively small differences be­tween me scores - 200 points or less ­don't carry a lot of meaning because oftest-to-test Variability. Acar with a 1000HIC probably Isn't much different fromone with aHIC of 900.

I1IL5 Status Report, 101. 27, No. ~ April 1& 1992-3

NEW CAR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM RESULTSModel Clccupant Test Weight Wheelbase Head Injury Criteria ChestGs

Car Year Protection (pounds) (inches) Driver Pass. Driver Pass.-- ----

Gao Metro 20 Hatchback \992 Nonmotorlzed Belts 2030 89 860 870 57 39Toyota Tercel 40 Sedan \99\ Nonmotorized Belts 2470 94 1138 729 57 5\

Toyola Paseo 20 Sedan \992 f'.kmmotorized Belts 2500 94 \006 797 43 ..Mazda Miata 20 Convertible \990 Driver AS -+ Belts 2570 89 920 53\ 59 42Hyundai Scoupe 20 Sedan \99\ Nonmotorized Belts 2628 94 870 6\8 45 42Goo SIorm20_ \991 Dnver AB t Bells 2640 97 417 98\ 47 45HylXtdai Excel 20 HaIcI'lbadt \990 ~ .... 2Q;() 94 696 419 'I 39lsuzu Stytus 40 Sedan '991 Dnvef AS ... Belts 2753 97 580 57 ..Ford Escort 20 HaIchbac:k 1991

_....2764 98 434 450 42 39

Mrtst.tishi Mirage 40 sedan 1909 Mobized Behs 2790 97 980 m 42Toyota Corolla 4D Sedan 1991 NoclilOlOl ized Belts 2830 96 1238 6\3 54Nissan 5entra 40 Sedan 199\

_....2831 96 583 681 .. 45__40Sedan

1991_....

2836 98 779 612 57 51Saturn St2 40 Sedan 199\

_....2901 102 918 1018 44 ..

Acura Integra 40 Sedan 1990 Mo!ortzed Belts 29\5 102 58S 637 42Mitsublshl Eclipse 20 Hatchback \990 Motorized Belts 29n 97 m 8\2 44 40Toyola Celica 20 Sedan \990 Dnver AS + Belts 2980 99 634 685 50 37

Chevrolet Cavalier 40 Sedan \990 Nonmotorized Belts 3060 10\ no 4S5 49 37Ford Tempo 40 Sedan \988 Motorized Be/ls 3080 100 721 470 47 50SubaN Legacy 40 Sedan 1990 - .... 3OIlO 102 \007 875 52 44Nissan 240SX 20 Hn:t1bac:k 1909

_....3120 97 407 525 41 44

ChewdM a..aa 2D sedan 199\ Onver AS .. BeIta 3128 103 343 739 37 35Dodge Shadow 40 Halchback. \99\ 0r1vef AS .. Belts 3160 97 503 457 42 39Ford Probe 20 Hatchback 199\

_....3210 99 550 418 42 45

Nissan Stanza 40 5edan 1991 - .... 3210 100 546 56Mitsubishi GaI8nI 40 Sedan 1991

_....3236 102 \024 711 61 53

ChevroIel Corsica 40 Sedan 1991 Driver AS + Betts 3300 103 493 956 41 44Ptymouttl Acdalm 40 Sedan 1991 Driver AS -+ Betts 3300 104 762 446 55 43Dodge Daytona 20 Hatchback \989 Driver AS -+ Belts 3320 97 399 297 39 32Volkswagen Passat 40 Sedan \990 Motorized Belts 3420 \03 1162 604 59 ..Buick Century 40 Sedan 1991 Nonmotorized Belts 3475 \OS 815 1144 47 40

Volvo 740 40 sedan \988 Oflver AS + Betts 3550 \09 519 445 42 42BMW 3251 40 Sedan 1992 Driver AS + Belts 3580 106 705 698 48 40CheYroIet Camara 20 Hatchb8ck 1991 Driver AS + Belts 3611 101 585 583 39 42Ford Taurus 40 S8dan 1990 Onver AS + Belts 3620 106 735 609 .. 40Chevrolet lumina 40 Sedan 1990 NolIR1CJb ized Beis 3632 \08 \200 58Honda Aooofd 40 Station Wagon 1991 Driver AS + Bells 3680 107 562 539 45 43..... _2OSedan 1988 ~ .... 3710 108 880 535 50 33Nlssan 300 ZX 20 HaIchbed< 1991 Drivef AS + Belts 3733 97 765 54 47Oldsmobile B8 40 Sedan 1992 Driver AS + Belts 3800 111 473 629 49 47Infinili M30 20 Sedan 1990 Driver AS + Belts 3840 103 - 443 43 45MltsobishJ Diarnant8 40 5edan 1992 Driver AS + Belts 3840 107 679 765 48 ..Ford Mustang 20 Convertible 1990 Driver AS + Belts 3865 101 651 438 42 50Ford Taurus 40 Station Wagon 199\ Driver AS + Belts 3910 106 480 258 44 38Toyota Creaslda 40 Sedan 1989 Motorized Belts 3940 \06 790 544 51 51

cadillac DeVille 40 Sedan 1990 Driver AS + Belts 4000 114 423 39 ..Dodge Caravan van 1992 Driver AS + Belts 4060 112 407 427 50 39Ford Thunderbird 20 Sedan 1989 Motorized Belts ..110 113 541 496 44 40UncoIn ContJnenIaI 40 Sedan 1909 Dual AS .. Belts 4240 109 683 492 48Chevrolet C8price 40 Sedan \99\ Dnver AS + Belts 4S2O 116 533 1'01 54 48UncoIn Town car 40 8edan 1990 Dual AB + Belts "'0 117 471 40 36

Resub: 1992 rnodllIIs or 8Ider mcQ!JI8 wiIlh : I I6aIy UI detged designs.. Driver AB: driYer-side,. beg.. Dual AB~ driver &I B IQ8l 8ir begs.- - - - - - - ~ - ~ - ~ - - - - -

4-lJHS tatus Report, Vol. 27, No.5, April/B, /992

From NeAP IeJI film: Alterthe Ovic seotedQ hif1J driverHJC in early NeAP tests, H0n­da modified the steering column, tmd the HJC imptooed nrm1ledIy. Bu~ at 35 mph, theheads ofmany driver dummies restmined only by a safety belt hit the steering wheel.Especially high HlCs ocauwhen /reads hit the w/reel hub instead ofthe rim,

Impad on Aotomaken WhenFord introduced the Taurus in 1986 It ap­peared to have an the attributes of an ad­vanced auto design, and it promised to per­form well in terms of protecting its occu­pan In crashes. Then something hap­pened that Ford didn't count on - Its firsttime out, the Taurus scored a 1209 driver(695 lront-seat passenger) HIe in CAPtests. Concerned about the high scores,Ford made some changesand requested a retest Inthe subsequent test, the1988 Taurus earned one01 the best sets ot Hiescores (707 driver, 359passenger) among allcars tested that yea!

Ford isn't alone. Be­cause of CAP, automak­ers have been runningtheir own 3S mph testsfor years - aD the wbiIecomplaining about NCAP- and they've been ad­l\lStmg their engineeringdecl ions based on theresults. there's across­the-board Improvement.with Hies providing goodexamples. Average driverand passenger HlC scores for 1980 modelcars In NCAP tests were about 1300. Thesedeclined to an average of 800 In modelyear 1990 and to about 700 in 1991.

The CAP IDes contain numerous exam­ples, besides the Taurus of specific carsthat underwent dramatic Improvement af­ter faring poorly in CAP tests. The 1979\blvo OCs driver HIC score of 1782 for ex­ample dropped to 550 in the 1982 modelyear. The 1979 Ronda Civics driver HIC

ore 012030 declined to S63 in 1984. The1 1Toyota Cressida went from a driverHIC score of 1980 to 790 in 1989. And the1984 Ford Tempo's driver HIC of 2955 im­proved to 721 in the 1988 model year.

The design changes that led to theseImproved scores were frequently as sim­ple as changing the safety belts so they

don't "spool out" excessively in crashesallowing too much occupant movement.In other cases the cbanges bave beenmOle complex. ADumber of Japanesemanufacturers for example, had prob­lems in early tests when the steer­ing columns of their cars moved upwardwith great force into the laces of dum­mies. Honda modified the steering col­umn in Civics after this happened - as

did other Japanese automakers with simi­lar steering wheel problems - and subse­quent Civics performed much better.

NCAP Problems CAP Is supposed tobe a consumer InformatJon program firstand foremost, but how many consumersare savvy enough to factor into their inter­pretation of the scores the kind of dummytbats used to test the cars? Different dum­mies are, in tact, used to test different carsand this variation does affect test results.

Instead of specifying a single dummyfor CAP tests, NHTSA uses whicheverone an automaker uses for compUaocetesting. The two dummies In current use,called Hybrid II and Hybrid 01, can pro­duce quite different results In the sametest. The newer Hybrid moffers greaterbiofideJity. It's capable of assessing add!-

tional injury indicators, such as chestcompression and forces on the lower leg,that cannot be measured with the olderHybrid II. These are definite improve­ments but, because IOCs are often higherin tests with Hybrid ms, manufacturers us­ing the superior dummy for developmentand compliance testing are, in effect, pe­nalized for their choice in CAP testing.

Besides the dummy that's used, NHTSAallows automakers to spec­ify other NCAP test param­eters - parameters thatcan lofluence the results.For example, test proce­dures specify that frontseats be positioned mid­way along their tracks, re­gardless of whether thesepositions realistically re­Oect where drJvers wouldchoose to position them­selves. By shortening orleogtheoiog seat tracks ­a move that has little to dowith crashworthlness ­automakers can changethe test dummy's head Im­pact points and substan­tially influence the mea­surements of Injury.

Similarly, automakers specify seat backangle positions for NCAP tests. Differentangles change the dummy kinematics dur­Ing the tests but - and this Is the Impor­tant part - the changes affect only dum­mies because real drivers adjust theirseats for mulmum comfort. The seat 1»sltlons and bact angles in CAP testsshould reflect realistic driving positions ­not auto manufacturers' choices that canlnOuence the test results.

t' ext for CAP? Despite Itsoverall success in providing Informationabout how well or how poorly passengervehicles protect their occupants in crash­es, CAP Is overdue for some improve­ments. One change in the program thatNHTSA should make right away is to spec­Ify a single dummy for the tests - and the

IlHS Status Report, ~L 27, No.5, April 18, 1992-5

Even in low-severity side impacts, serious occupant injuries may occur, especially to drivers onthe struck side of the vehicle. The Plymouth (shown top) was struck on the side at a relativelylow speed but the driver. who was using Q lap/shoulder belt, suffered multiple rib fractures andother injuries. In severe side impacts, even worse injuries often occur. The passenger in theOreurolet (shown above) was tropped in the car after this crash and subsequenlly was hospital­ized for seven days with injuries. It's because of the seriousne.s! of injuries that occur in suchcrashes thai N1f1'SA plans to add side impact tesIs to NeAP.

dummy it speclf1es shouJd be the HybridlIl. Objective dummy positioning proce­dures also should be adopted, at least forthe driver.

Other CAP changes, including thoseneeded to reflect the proliferation of alrbags, will take time. Present NCAP testsmight, for example, record equal chest de­celerations for cars equipped with airbags and with manual safety belts only.But these measurements aren't reallyequi alent because the forces experi­enced by the dummy with the belt onlyare concentrated, and therefore more like­I to produce injury. while those for thedummy with the alr bag are spread acrossthe occupant's chest.

Crash forces are thus distributed dif­ferenUy with air bags than with safetybelts only, and NCAP's Injury criteriahouJd be changed or modified to reflect

this difference. Measures of chest deflec­tion, for example, could be added usingHybrid ill dummies. Otherwise. some ofthe safety advantages offered by air bagscan be obscured.

Other injury criteria might also beadded. Although not usually consideredcritical in themselves, lower leg Injuriesadd enormously to the costs and disabili­ties resulting from motor vehicle crashes.The potential for both lower leg andchest Injuries could be assessed withHybrid ill dummies.

Then there's the inherent limitation ofall nat-barrier crash tests. These basictests were established In the late 1960sand. almost since then, researchers havebeen debating their relevance to on-the­road crashes. ercedes-Benl for exam­ple, has been arguing that offset-barriertests, in which only part of the front ofthe car contacts the barrier, more closelyslmuJate the kinds of real frontal crashesthat frequently produce deaths and seri­ous injuries. Plus, Mercedes has demon­strated that cars that perform well Infront-lnt(}ftat-barrler tests, like the CAPtests, don't necessarily perform well inoffse crash tests.

AGerman auto magazine bas takenCAP s lead and is conducting tests of

new cars sold in Europe at 56 kph (35mph) to assess their crashworthiness.But, unlike CAP, offset tests are beingused. As the Australian government devel­ops its own program. along the lines ofNCAP, to test new car crashworthiness,both offset and Oat-barrier tests are beingconsidered. This is an issue NHTSA should

be looking at - whether other kinds oftests would improve NeAP.

Side impact tests already are being COD­

sidered. Barry Felrice, associate adminis­trator for NHTSA ruJemaking, says prelimi­nary side Impact tests for NCAP are sched­uled for 1992-93. Depending on the resultsand on agency priorities In the next fewyears side impact results could be part of

CAP by the 1994 model year, Felrlee says.

6-lIHS Status Repo1t, \bI. 27, No.5, April/B, /992

"Technologwromoting regulations wiDprovide u.s. manufacturers with an incen­tive to increase their competitiveness bydeveloping new, wor1d.cJass technologythat can be adopted here and marketedabroad," the Institute told the NationalHighway Traffic Safety Administration(NHTSA) last month.

The comments came as NHTSA beginsto carry out President BushIS request forreview of existing and proposed regula­tions with an eye toward Identifying thosethat aren't cost effective or that reduce thecompetitiveness of American industry.

Using the federal automatic restraintstandard as an example, the Institute notedthat -In addition to reducing deaths and in­juries and their resulting societal costs, ef.fectIve federal regulation can enhance U .competitiveness. The strong automatic re­straint requirements adopted In the mid19805 encouraged new technology, the In­stitute pointed out, so that "U.s. manufac­turers led the world in developing and im­plementing the mass production of air bagtechnology. By 1995, between 40 and 50mUllon vehicles on the road will have airbags, and the United States has the bulk ofthe air bag supply Industry for the world."

In contrast, a weak regulatory ap­proach hurts domestic Industry. NlfI'SNsantiloc brake standard for heavy vehi­cles, which took effect in 1975, Initially·spurred U.s. manufacturers so that, In the!ale 19705, U.s. industry led the world inantiIock brake technology - a technolo­gy that the rest of the world then li­censed.· But, the Institute said, "when theantI10ck tandard was subsequently over­turned, domestic manufacturers and su~

pliers lost their competitive edge on an­tilock brake systems and have been forcedto catch up with foreign competitors InImplementing a technology we developedand then abandoned."

] 0 ogy-Promo-de Safety

erlean Ind1n....,-v

safety standards. This includes 25,000lives saved by the use of belts mandatedby Federal otor Vehicle Safety Standard208. Another 6,000 bves ere saved be­cause of federal braking standards.

Aminimum of 30 000 lives were savedby speed enforcement programs particu­larly enforcement of the national maximumspeed limit of 55 mph, in effect from 1974to 1987. DOT notes that 2,000 lives havebeen subtracted from its estimated savingsbecause of raising speed limits to 65 mphin most states after 1987 but, DOT says,continued enforcement of speed limits issaving 1,500 to 3,500 lives per yeat

Another 27,400 Uves were saved by alco­hol programs. According to OOT, "an inte­gral part of NH'J'S,6;s successful strategy ...since 1982 has been Its ability to inOoencestates to adopt tougher alcohoI1egisJatkn•

DOT puts the total cost for highway,traffic, and vehicle safety improvementsfrom federal programs since 1966 at 162billion. This money has not only savedhundreds of thousands of lives but alsowill pay further dividends through the

19905 as the public: continues to use thesafer cars and roads they have alreadypaid lor, DOT points out. "The benefits offederal expenditures also include in­creased productivity of pollee traffic ser­vices and emergency medical servicesthat conservatively are estimated to savehundreds of mllUons of dollars per year."

The Transportation Departmentsays child safety seals allllllCl1ly prevent the deaths of200 childrenup to five yem:s old. More lives could be saved ifall children were properly secured every trip.

ysBeneeral Programs

UUtweigh~

In Ught of President Bush's recent re­quest that all agencies review federal reg­ulatJons, the timing was propitious for the

.S. Department of Transportation's(DOT) recently published analysis of therisks of highway travel and benefits offederal highway, traffic, and motor vehiclesafety programs.

~If the highway fatality rate had re­mained at the level It was In 1966, twomillion people would have died in the In­tervening years," the DOT study notes.But safety improvements since then havehelped - 1.2 million people actually havedied. DOT programs, including those ofthe atlonal Highway Traffic Safety Ad­ministration (NIITSA) and Federal High-

ay AdmInistration. are beUeved to beresponsible for a large portion of the800,000 lives saved, the study says.

It wasn't possible to estimate the fulleffect of all federal programs on the m0­

tor vehicle crash fatality toll, but DOTanalyses have documented at least243,400 lives that have been saved as a re­sult of programs It has evaluated. DOT es­timated, for example, that more than100,000 lives were saved between 1966and 1990 through compUance with NHTSA

warned then EPA "might improve airquality but only by burning people inhighway crashes.~ (See Status Report, Vol22, No. 11, Oct. 17, 1987.)

More recently, RTSA told EPA that"the record Is clear 4Ild unambiBUous.lm­plementatlQIl of onboard refueling -Yap.or"recoyery systems, regardless of prototypedevelopment and technological evolution,will increase safety risks."

Viable alternatives to onboard vapor r(}

covery systems are so-called Stage]) can­troIs, which trap vapors at the gasolinepump. EPA says these "provide compara­ble emission control effectiveness" andraise "no guestion of increased saf risk."

In I1ght of Its findings regarding onboard.and Stage II eontrols, EPA concludes "thatonboard canister controls pose an unrea­sonable safety risk. Therefore/' the agen(lysays, it "has decided not to promulgatetheonboard requirements at this tlme."

The ruling came in time to avert judi­cial action. The Natural Resources De­fense Council, Center for Auto Safety, andothers filed suit earlier this ye~r in U.S.District Court to compel EPA to issue itsruling on onboar:d vapor recovery de­vices. Immediately after EPA did so onMarch 27, the Court dismissed the suit.

U.S. Appeals CourtIssues Ruling on SafetyVersus Fuel Economy

The U.S. Court of Appeals, District ofCoLumbia Circuit, ruled recently that theNational Highway Traffic Safety Adminis­traMon (NHTSA) is obliged to considersafety in determining appropriate fueleconomy standards for passenger cars.Suggesting an "overwhelming likelihood"that a rugher luel econOIl1Y standard "re­duces the supply of safe cars available toAmerican consumers," the Appeals CourtMted that "consumers who do not wantto be priced out of the market for larger,safer cars deserve better from their gov­ernment."

The case arose when the CompetitiveEnterprise Institute and Consumer Alertpetitioned the Court to review NHTSA'sdecision to retain the current corporateaverage fuel economy requirement of 27.5mi\es per gaUon lnst~d of \owenng it byone mlle per gallOil, as automa:kers andothers requested. The petitioners arguedthat the current fuel econo~y standardforces automakers to produce smaller,less safe cars and that NHTSA has "ob­scured" this safety problem Instead of ad­dressing the tradeoff between fuel econo­my and safety head on.

NHTSA, the Appeals Court, and thetwo petiti'oners in this case agreed thatpassenger car size does have safety jmpl1­cations and, as the Court noted, "e.atinAk­ers respond to [corporate average fueleconomy] standards by reducing the.sizeof their fleets .... By making it harder forconsumers to buy largecars, the 27.5 mpgstandard will increase traffic fatalities if,as a general matter, small cars are lesssafe than big ones. They are, as NHTSA it­self acknowledges."

The COUTt ordered NHTSA to reconsid­er the matter of lowering present fueleconomy requirements and ~provlde agenuine explanation for whatever choiceit ultimately makes."

lTHS Status Report, Vol. 27, No.5, April 18, t9!J2-7

EPA Drops Plan for Vapor Recovery DevicesAfter five years of debate, the Environ­

mentai Protection Agency (EPA) has de­cided nat to require canisters on new carsand light trucks to control gasoline vaporsreleased during refueling. The final rule re­jecting the canisters states that "EPA findsreasonable and adopts [the National High­way Traffic Safety Administration's1can­elusion that onboard systems would haveanegative impact on safety."

The Institute, the NaUonal HighwayTraffic Safety Adminlstr~tlon (NHTSA),and the National Transportation SafetyBoard bave been vQcal in opposing theonboard systems the purpose of whichwould nave lJeen to improve air qualityby reducing ozone, a mlijor agent in urbansmog formation that has been blamed forrespiratory ailments. However, as high.way safety interests have pointed put, theonboard systems could Increase the rISKof vehicle fires.

EPA proposed the onboard technologyrule in August 1987 and held hearings ona number of technical issues. A.t thattime, the Institute told EPA about'the ap­praximately 1,200 fatal and 16,000 nonfa­tal motor vehicle crash fires that AlreadyoCCUl' each year. By regulring onboard va­por recevery systems, the In-stitute

Vol. 27, .5, AprIl 18, 1992

ripe for in its 15thyear of testing p.l

....... for 51 late model cars p.3

DOT tea beuefi.tlud COllI of Itssafety programs p.6

rlcan IDdutry benefitl from strongsafety rules, Institute tells NHTSA p.6

Appea1J Court lelia NKI'SA to factor safe­ty Into fuel economy considerations ......p.7

EPA dtes llfety to nix onboard vapor re-covery devices p.7

1005 North Glebe RoadArlington, V/l22201(703)2~7'1500 FAX (703) 2.7·1678

DIrector 01 Pub~{EdJtor. Anne FIemlngAssodate Editor: Rea Kerr HowarthWrIter Mula KaufmannEdItorial \stant: Cariene HugbuDesipIJProdIlClfon;SheIla Jac.bonCin:uIIJlan; SheIfy MaataomerY

The Iosunnce IDstItDte lor I:IIRIrnJ' SIfety all IslcIep&deal, IICllIIlftIlIt,DutlliI: and ..tJntIon.aI orpIiDIlGIL Ildedlared 0 ~udDI !be IosRs - deaths. 1IJIuries. IIliIproperty dIaIIae - resoIIiDB from cnshes 011 the Il1I:IOII'5

hI&IJways The IIlStItutt Is 5lIJlIIClfled by the Amer1eao In­5III'II1Ct Hlllb-ry Salay AssodIItOII lbe AmerkIn InsuJm~ Safety AIIIInce, !be NatiooII AssocIlllklIl 0/ bide­peDdent InAInn SaRtr.Assodltlan, IIliI • IIlIIIIber 0/~YlduailDsuraaceClllllJl&lks.

Contents may be republlsbed whole, or in part, with attrl­bution. Uyou~ not now reaMng StIlIw RtpOrt but wouldlike to, contact the Communications Department.

ISSN 0018·9B8X