folk moral relativism (m&l) · of moral relativism?1 prior work regardless of the position...
TRANSCRIPT
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FolkMoralRelativism
[ForthcominginMind&Language]
HagopSarkissian1,JohnPark2,DavidTien3,JenniferColeWright4andJoshuaKnobe5,6
1DepartmentofPhilosophy,BaruchCollege;2DepartmentofPhilosophy,DukeUniversity;3DepartmentofPhilosophy,NationalUniversityofSingapore;4DepartmentofPsychology,CollegeofCharleston;5Programin
CognitiveScience,YaleUniversity;6DepartmentofPhilosophy,YaleUniversity
ABSTRACT: It has often been suggested that people’s ordinary folk understanding ofmorality involvesarejectionofmoral relativismandabelief inobjectivemoral truths.Theresultsofsixstudiescall thisclaim intoquestion.Participantsdidofferapparentlyobjectivist intuitionswhenconfrontedwithquestionsaboutindividualsfromtheirownculture,buttheyoffered increasinglyrelativist intuitionsastheywereconfrontedwithquestionsaboutindividualsfromincreasinglydifferentculturesorwaysoflife.Inlightofthese data, the authors hypothesize that people do not have a fixed commitment tomoralobjectivismbutinsteadtendtoadoptdifferentviewsdependingonthedegreetowhichtheyconsiderradicallydifferentperspectivesonmoralquestions.
Supposethattwoindividualsarediscussingmathematics.Oneofthemclaimsthatthenumber
2,377isprime,whiletheotherclaimsthatitisnotprime.Inacaselikethis,itisusuallyassumedthat
oneofthetwoindividualsmustbewrong.Thereisafactofthematteraboutwhether2,377isprime,
andanyonewhoholdstheotheropinionhastobemistaken.
Butnowsupposeweswitchtoadifferenttopic.Twoindividualsaretalkingabouttheseasons.
OneofthemclaimsthatJanuaryisawintermonth,whiletheotherclaimsthatitisasummermonth.
Facedwiththislattercase,wemightwellreachadifferentconclusion.Thereisnosingleobjectivefact
aboutwhetherJanuaryisawintermonthorasummermonth.Rather,itcanonlybeawintermonthor
asummermonthrelativetoaspecifichemisphere.Soifoneofthemistalkingaboutthenorthern
hemisphereandtheotheristalkingaboutthesouthernhemisphere,theycanmakeseeminglyopposite
claimsbutstillbothbecorrect.
Whataboutmoralclaims?Supposethattwoindividualsaretalkingaboutthemoralstatusofa
particularaction.Oneclaimstheactionismorallybad,whiletheotherclaimsitisnotmorallybad.Must
oneoftheseindividualsbewrong,orcoulditturnoutthattheyarebothright?
Withinthephilosophicalliterature,thisquestionremainscontroversial.Somephilosopherssay
thatthereisasingleobjectivetruthaboutwhetheraparticularactionismorallybad,sothatiftwo
individualsholdoppositeopinions,oneofthemmustbemistaken(Railton,1986;Shafer‐Landau,2003;
Smith,1994).Otherphilosopherssaythatmoralclaimscanonlybeassessedrelativetoaparticular
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moralframeworkorsetofvalues,sothatdifferentmoralclaimscouldberightwhenassertedby
differentindividuals(Dreier,1990;Harman,1975;Pinillos,2010;Prinz,2007;Wong,1984;2006).The
debatebetweenthesetwoviewshaspersistedatleastsincetheancientGreeksandshowsnosignof
lettingup.
Ouraimhereistoexplorewhatordinarypeoplethinkaboutthisage‐oldphilosophicalquestion.
Dopeoplebelieveinobjectivemoraltruth,ordotheyacceptsomeformofmoralrelativism?1
PriorWork
Regardlessofthepositionbeingdefended,theusualassumptionwithinthephilosophical
literatureisthatpeoplesubscribetosomeformofmoralobjectivism.Forexample,MichaelSmithwrites
thatordinaryfolk
seemtothinkmoralquestionshavecorrectanswers;thatthecorrectanswersaremade
correctbyobjectivemoralfacts;thatmoralfactsarewhollydeterminedby
circumstancesandthat,byengaginginmoralconversationandargument,wecan
discoverwhattheseobjectivemoralfactsdeterminedbythecircumstancesare.(Smith,
1994,6).
Thisclaimthatordinaryfolkaremoralobjectivistsenjoysasurprisingdegreeofconsensusinmoral
philosophy,andcanbefoundintheworksofadiverserangeofmoralphilosopherswithdisparate
theoreticalcommitments(e.g.Blackburn,1984;Brink,1989;Mackie,1977;Shafer‐Landau,2003;Smith,
1994).Ofcourse,philosophersholdverydifferentviewsabouthowthestudyoffolkintuitionscan
contributetomoralphilosophy(Appiah,2008;Kagan,2009;Kauppinen,2007;Knobe&Nichols,2008;
Ludwig,2007),andevenaboutwhetherfolkintuitionshaveanyrelevanceatall(Singer,1974;2005).
Yetinspiteoftheseimportantdifferences,theclaimthatthefolkbelieveinsomeformofmoral
objectivismiswidespreadinmoralphilosophy.
1Noteonterminology:Theword‘relativism’isusedindifferentwaysindifferentdisciplines.Inmoralphilosophy,itisusedbroadlytodescribeanyviewaccordingtowhichmoralclaimscanonlybeassessedrelativetoaparticularcultureorsystemofvalues(e.g.Harman,1975;Wong,1996;2006),whereasinformalsemantics,itisusedtopickoutoneveryspecificwayofunderstandingthisrelativity(e.g.MacFarlane,2007).Wewillbeusingtheterminthebroader,non‐technicalsenseinwhichitappearswithinmoralphilosophyandwillnotbeexploringthemorespecificquestionsthatarisewithinformalsemantics.
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Now,thisclaimoffolkmoralobjectivismis,onthefaceofit,anempiricalclaim—onethatis
amenabletosystematicinvestigation.Researchershaveforsometimebeenexploringthisvery
question,andthetraditionalphilosophicalviewhasenjoyedconsiderableempiricalsupport.Resultsof
manystudieshavethusfarsuggestedthatpeoplerejectrelativismaboutmorality,andbelieveinstead
insometypeofabsolutemoraltruth.
Forexample,inapioneeringstudy,Nichols(2004)presentedparticipantswithastoryabouttwo
individuals—JohnandFred–whoappearedtoholddifferentmoralviews.Johnsays,“It’sokaytohit
peoplejustbecauseyoufeellikeit,”andFredsays,“No,itisnotokaytohitpeoplejustbecauseyoufeel
likeit.”Participantswerethenaskedtochoosewhichofthefollowingoptionsbestrepresentedtheir
ownviews:
1. Itisokaytohitorshovepeoplejustbecauseyoufeellikeit,soJohnisrightandFrediswrong.
2. Itisnotokaytohitorshovepeoplejustbecauseyoufeellikeit,soFredisrightandJohnis
wrong.
3. Thereisnofactofthematteraboutunqualifiedclaimslike“It’sokaytohitorshovepeoplejust
becauseyoufeellikeit.”Differentculturesbelievedifferentthings,anditisnotabsolutelytrue
orfalsethatit’sokaytohitpeoplejustbecauseyoufeellikeit.
Approximately78%ofparticipantschoseeitherthefirstorsecondoption.Inotherwords,themajority
ofparticipantsseemedtorejecttheideathat,e.g.,hittingorshovingmightbebothgoodandbad—
goodrelativetoonepersonyetbadrelativetoanother.Onthecontrary,theyappearedtosuggestthat
therewassomedefinitefactofthematterastowhetherhittingorshovingwasmorallygoodorbad,
andthatanyonewhoheldtheoppositeopinionmustbemistaken.
Inasubsequentstudy,GoodwinandDarley(2008)providedparticipantswithalargenumberof
statementspurportingtomakeclaimsabouthowthingsareinfactualmatters(“theearthisnotatthe
centeroftheknownuniverse”),moralmatters(“consciouslydiscriminatingagainstsomeoneonthe
basisofraceismorallywrong”),conventionalmatters(‘talkingloudlyandconstantlytothepersonnext
toyouduringalectureisapermissibleaction’),andmattersoftaste(“classicalmusicisbetterthanrock
music”).Afterbeingaskedwhethertheyagreedwiththesestatements,participantsweretoldthat
noneofthestatementshad,infact,elicitedfullagreement;whateverjudgmenttheyhappenedtohold,
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therewassomefellowparticipantholdingtheoppositeview.Onceagain,participantswereaskedhow
theywouldinterpretsuchdisagreements.Thistime,theoptionswere:
1. Theotherpersonissurelymistaken.
2. Itispossiblethatneitheryounortheotherpersonismistaken.
3. Itcouldbethatyouaremistaken,andtheotherpersoniscorrect.
4. Other.
Inthemoralcases,70%ofparticipantsansweredthattheotherindividualhadtobeincorrectinher
moraljudgments(option1).ForGoodwinandDarley,thissuggeststhatpeoplearehighlyobjectivist
aboutmanycanonicalmoraltransgressions—indeed,onlysomewhatlessobjectivistthantheyareabout
factualquestions(suchaswhethertheearthisatthecenteroftheknownuniverse).
Importantly,thissameresulthasbeenfoundacrossdifferentagegroups.Wainryband
colleagues(2004)presentedchildrenages5,7,and9withcasesofdisagreementinanumberof
domains,includingthemoraldomain.Forexample,subjectsweretoldthatSarahbelievesit’sokayto
hitandkickotherchildren,whereasSophiebelievesitisnotokaytohitandkickotherchildren.They
werethenaskedwhetherbothSarahandSophiecouldbecorrectand,ifnot,whichofthetwowas
correctandwhy.Theresultsstronglysupportedtheviewthatpeopleareobjectivistsaboutmorality:
100%ofthe5and7yearoldsand94%ofthe9yearoldsthoughtthat,incasesofsuchdisagreement,
onlyoneoftheindividualscouldbecorrect.Infact,childrenwereasobjectivistaboutmoral
disagreementsastheywereaboutpurelyfactualdisagreements(e.g.,disagreementaboutwhether
pencilsfalldownorshootupwhenyoudropthem).
Acrossallthesestudies,thesamemethodhasrevealedthesameresult,timeandagain.It
seemsthatordinary,pre‐philosophicalfolkrejectthenotionthatmoraldisagreementscanadmitof
manydifferentanswers,eachofthemcorrectrelativetothepersonwhoismakingthejudgment.
Rather,thefolkappeartobelievethatwhenindividualsholdoppositeopinionsaboutamoralquestion,
onlyoneofthoseindividualscanbecorrect.
ANewHypothesis
Inourview,however,theappearancesherearedeceiving.Itistruethatexistingstudieshave
consistentlyelicitedapparentlyobjectivistresponses.However,wewillarguethatthispatternonly
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arisesbecauseofaparticularfeatureoftheexistingexperimentalprocedures.Whenthestudiesare
conductedinaslightlydifferentway,amorecomplexpatternofresponsesbeginstoemerge.
Togetabettersensefortheissuehere,considerpeople’sordinarywayoftalkingaboutthe
seasons.Manypeopleunderstandthatatatimeofyearitcanonlybesaidtobeaparticularseason
relativetoagivenhemisphere.Sotheyunderstandthatifindividualsfromdifferenthemispheresmake
seeminglyoppositeclaimsabouttheseasons,thereisnoreasontoconcludethatoneofthese
individualshastobewrong.Itisalwayspossiblethatbothofthemaresayingsomethingperfectlytrue.
Nowsupposewedecidedtostudypeople’sattitudestowardtheseasonsusingafairly
straightforwardexperimentaldesign.Participantswouldbetoldthatoneindividualsays‘Januaryisa
wintermonth’whileanothersays‘Januaryisnotawintermonth.’Howmightparticipantsrespondina
caselikethat?Wouldtheysaythatoneoftheseindividualshadtobewrong,orwouldtheysaythat
bothcouldactuallyberight?
Well,itdepends.Dotheparticipantsassumethatthetwoindividualsareindifferent
hemispheres,ordotheyassumethattheyarebothinthesamehemisphere?Aslongasexperimental
materialsaredesignedinsuchawaythatparticipantstendtothink,e.g.,thatbothindividualsareliving
intheUnitedStates,theywillpresumablyconcludethatoneoftheindividualshastobewrong.Yetsuch
aresponsewouldnotshowthatpeopleareobjectivistsabouttheseasons—thattheythinkthereis
someobjectivetruthaboutwhatseasonitisatanygiventime,fullstop.Rather,thelessontodraw
hereisthatpeople’sdeeperunderstandingoftherelativityabouttheseasonswillonlycomeoutclearly
iftheyareencouragedtotakeabroaderviewandconsideranumberofpossibleperspectives—for
example,iftheyareaskedaboutacaseinvolvingbothAmericansandAustralians.
Orconsideramoreextremeexample.Supposeweaskedpeopleabouttheclaimthatthereare
twenty‐fourhoursinaday.Facedwithacaselikethis,peoplemightinitiallythink,‘Thatclaimis
objectivelytrue,andanyonewhoholdstheoppositeopinionmustsurelybemistaken.’Butnow
supposewetriedtobroadentheirperspective.Supposeweencouragedthemtothinkaboutother
planets,emphasizingthatdifferentplanetstakedifferentamountsoftimetorotatearoundtheiraxes,
withsometakinglessthantwenty‐fourhoursandsometakingmore.Peoplemightthenbegintohavea
differentintuition.Theymightbegintothink,‘Iguesstherejusthappentobetwenty‐fourhoursinaday
onthisparticularplanet,butifthereareindividualsonotherplanets,theymightbeperfectlyrightto
saythatthenumberofhoursinadaywashigherorlower.’
Wewanttosuggestthatasimilareffectarisesinthedomainofmorality.Peopledosometimes
displaywhatappeartobeobjectivistintuitionsaboutmorality,butitwouldbeamistakejustto
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concludestraightawaythatpeoplearemoralobjectivists.Themoreaccuratethingtosayisthatpeople’s
intuitionsdependontheprecisewayinwhichtheyarethinkingofthequestion.Aslongastheyare
thinkingonlyaboutindividualswhoarefairlysimilartothemselves—say,individualsfromtheirown
culturalgroups—theirintuitionsmightlookmoreorlessobjectivist.Butwewillarguethatpeople’s
intuitionsdonotalwayshavethisobjectivistcharacter.Onthecontrary,people’sintuitionsundergoa
systematicshiftastheybeginconsideringdifferentsortsofindividuals.Soastheycometothinkmore
andmoreseriouslyaboutindividualswhoaredeeplydissimilar—individualswithradicallydifferent
cultures,values,orwaysoflife—theirintuitionsmovesteadilytowardakindofrelativism.They
graduallycometofeelthateveniftwoindividualshaveoppositeopinionsonsomemoralquestion,it
couldstillturnoutthatneitheronewouldhavetobewrong.
Study1
Asaninitialtestofthishypothesis,weconductedastudyinwhichparticipantsrandomly
receivedeitherastraightforwardcaselikethoseusedinearlierstudies,oracasethatspecifically
encouragedthemtoconsiderdifferentculturesandwaysoflife.
Allparticipantsreadvignettesthatdescribedanagentperformingabehaviorandother
individualsjudgingthatbehavior.Thedifferencebetweenconditionslayonlyinthedescriptionofthe
individualsjudgingthebehavior.SomeparticipantsweretoldthattheindividualswereAmericansmuch
likethemselves;othersweretoldthatoneoftheindividualswasfromaverydifferentsortofsociety
witharadicallydifferentformoflife.(Insteadofsimplystatingthattheindividualwasfromadifferent
society,thestimulusmaterialsweredesignedtopresentthisothersocietyinasvividandcompellinga
wayaspossible.)Thehypothesiswasthataspeoplewereencouragedtothinkaboutevermoredistant
formsoflife,theywouldcometohaveevermorerelativistintuitions.
Methods
Participants.Twohundredtwenty‐threestudents(112females)takingintroductoryphilosophy
coursesatBaruchCollegevoluntarilycompletedaquestionnaireafterclass.
MaterialsandProcedure.Eachsubjectwasrandomlyassignedtooneofthreeconditions:same‐
culture,other‐cultureorextraterrestrial.
Participantsinthesame‐cultureconditionwereaskedtoimagineapersonnamedSam.They
weretoldthatSamwasafairlyordinarystudentattheirowncollegewhoenjoyedwatchingcollege
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footballandhangingoutwithfriends.TheywerethenaskedtoconsiderSam’sopinionsabouttwo
moraltransgressions.Foroneofthesetransgressions,theyweregiventhesentence:
Horacefindshisyoungestchildextremelyunattractiveandthereforekillshim.
TheyweretoldtoimaginethatoneoftheirclassmatesthinksthatthisactismorallywrongbutthatSam
thinksthattheactismorallypermissible.Theinstructionsthenwere:
Giventhattheseindividualshavedifferentjudgmentsaboutthiscase,wewouldliketoknow
whetheryouthinkatleastoneofthemmustbewrong,orwhetheryouthinkbothofthem
couldactuallybecorrect.Inotherwords,towhatextentwouldyouagreeordisagreewiththe
followingstatementconcerningsuchacase
SinceyourclassmateandSamhavedifferentjudgmentsaboutthiscase,atleastoneofthem
mustbewrong.
Responsestothisquestionwererecordedonascalefrom1to7.Totestthegeneralityoftheeffect,we
alsoincludedasecondtransgression:
Dylanbuysanexpensivenewknifeandtestsitssharpnessbyrandomlystabbingapasserbyon
thestreet.
Instructionsforthissecondtransgressionwereexactlythesameasforthefirst.(Wedidnotpredictany
significantdifferencesbetweenthetwotransgressions.)
Participantsintheother‐cultureconditionwereaskedtoimagineanisolatedtribeofpeople
calledtheMamilons.TheyweretoldthatthistribelivesintheAmazonrainforestsandhaspreserveda
traditionalwarriorculture,withquitedifferentvaluesfromthoseofthepeopleinthesurrounding
society.Participantsinthisconditionthenreceivedexactlythesametwoquestionsasthosereceivedby
participantsinthesame‐culturecondition,exceptthattheywereaskedtoimaginethattheindividual
regardingthetransgressionsasmorallypermissiblewasaMamilon.
Finally,participantsintheextraterrestrialconditionwereaskedtoimaginearaceof
extraterrestrialbeingscalledPentars.TheyweretoldthatthePentarshaveaverydifferentsortof
psychologyfromhumanbeings,thattheyarenotatallinterestedinfriendshiporloveandthattheir
maingoalissimplytoincreasethetotalnumberofequilateralpentagonsintheuniverse.These
participantsthenreceivedthetwoquestions,thistimewithaPentarastheindividualwhoregardsthe
transgressionsaspermissible.
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Results
Thedatawereanalyzedusingamixed‐modelANOVA,withconditionasabetween‐participants
factorandtransgressionasawithin‐subjectfactor.Therewasnomaineffectoftransgressionandno
interactioneffect.However,therewasasignificantmaineffectofcondition,F(2,218)=20.7,p<.001,
η2=.16.
Ratingsforthetwotransgressionswerehighlycorrelated(r=.82,p<.001)andcouldtherefore
beaveragedtoformascale.ThemeanforeachconditionisdisplayedinFigure1.
Figure1.Meanagreementwiththeclaimthat‘Atleastonemustbewrong’
bycondition.ErrorbarsshowSEmean.
Participantsinthesame‐cultureconditiontendedtoagreethatatleastonepersonhadtobe
wrong(M=5.4,SD=2.15),thoseintheother‐cultureconditionwereapproximatelyatthemidpoint(M
=4.4,SD=2.05),andthoseintheextraterrestrialconditiontendedtosaythatbothcouldactuallybe
right(M=3.2,SD=2.28).Post‐hocTukey’stestsshowedsignificantdifferencesbothbetweenresponses
intheother‐cultureconditionandthesame‐culturecondition(p<.05)andbetweenresponsesinthe
extraterrestrialconditionandtheother‐culturecondition(p<.01).
Discussion
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Theresultsofthisfirstexperimentallowustolocatetheresultsfromearlierstudiesinabroader
framework.Thoseearlierstudiesdemonstratedthatwhentwoindividualsholdoppositemoralviews,
peoplethinkthatatleastoneofthoseindividualshastobewrong.Thepresentstudyreplicatesthat
basicfinding,butalsoshowsthatitonlyarisesundercertainquitespecificconditions—namely,when
theindividualsarefromthesameculture.Astheindividualsunderdiscussionbecomeevermore
dissimilar,peoplebecomelessandlessinclinedtoagreewiththeclaimthatoneofthemhastobe
wrong,sothatwhenthetwoindividualsbecomedissimilarenough,peoplewerefarmorewillingtosay
thatbothofthemcanberight.
Overall,then,theresponseswefindinthesame‐cultureconditiondonotappeartoreflectany
kindofgeneral,across‐the‐boardcommitmenttomoralobjectivism.Onthecontrary,itseemsthat
people’sintuitionsarehighlysensitivetothenatureofthequestionposed.Themorepeopleare
encouragedtoconsiderradicallydifferentculturesandwaysoflife,themoretheyaredrawntomore
relativistresponses.
But,ofcourse,itwouldbeabigmistaketodrawanyfar‐reachingconclusionsfromjustthisone
experiment.Theonlywaytogetaproperunderstandingofwhattheseresultsmeanistoconduct
follow‐upstudiesdesignedtoexaminespecifichypothesesaboutthenatureoftheeffectobservedhere.
Study2
Tobeginwith,theparticipantsinStudy1wereallAmericanundergraduates.Itmighttherefore
besupposedthattheseinitialresultsarenotrevealinganythingimportantaboutthenatureofmoral
cognitionpersebutaresimplyshowingussomethingabouttheidiosyncrasiesofcontemporary
Americanculture.(Forexample,Americanstudentsmightthinkitwouldbepoliticallyincorrecttopass
judgmentsonindividualsfromotherculturesanddeclaretheirmoraljudgmentstobewrong.)To
addressthisworry,weconductedafollow‐upexperimentwithapopulationofsubjectsfromadifferent
culture,onethatfocuseslessonindividualsandmoreongrouplevel,communalnorms.
Methods
Participants.Onehundredandfifty‐onestudents(71females)takingintroductoryphilosophy
coursesatNationalUniversityofSingaporevoluntarilycompletedaquestionnaireatthestartofclass.
Materialsandprocedure.ThematerialsandprocedurewerethesameasusedinStudy1.
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Results.Amixed‐modelANOVAwasrun,withcultureofthesubjectasabetween‐subjects
factorandtransgressionasawithin‐subjectfactor.Therewasasignificantmaineffectofthecultureof
thesubject,F(2,146)=3.1,p=.05,η2=.04.Therewasnosignificantdifferencebetweentransgressions
andnosignificantinteractioneffect.ThemeansperconditionarereportedinFigure2.
Figure2.Meanagreementwiththeclaimthat‘Atleastonemustbewrong’
bycondition.ErrorbarsshowSEmean.
Discussion
ThepatternofresponsesinthisSingaporeansamplemirroredthepatternofresultsfoundwith
Americans.Hereagain,themoreparticipantswereencouragedtothinkaboutindividualswithvery
differentculturesorwaysoflife,themoretheywereinclinedtoendorserelativistclaims.
Ofcourse,thefactthatthissamepatternemergedintwodifferentculturesshouldnotbetaken
asproofthatthepatternissomesortofcross‐culturaluniversal.Itispossible,andindeedquitelikely,
thatdifferentcultureshavequitedifferentintuitionsabouttheobjectivityofmoralclaims.Still,the
presentresultsdoprovidestrongreasontosuspectthatthepatternobtainedhereisnotsimplya
reflectionofsomeidiosyncraticfeatureofcontemporaryAmericanculture.Itappearsthatweactually
aregettingatsomethingofimportanceaboutmoralcognition.
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Study3
Inthesefirsttwostudies,participantsgavedifferentresponsesdependingonwhetherthey
receivedthesame‐culture,other‐cultureorextraterrestrialcases.Wenowwantedtoknowwhether
participantswouldcontinuetoshowthiseffecteveniftheyreceivedallthreecasesside‐by‐side.
Previousresearchhasshownthatincaseswherepeoplethemselvesregardanaspectoftheirmoral
judgmentsasakindof‘bias’or‘error,’differencesbetweenconditionsdisappearwhenparticipantsare
abletoseealloftheconditionsatonce(Hsee,Loewenstein,Blount&Bazerman,1999).Wewantedto
knowwhetherasimilarpatternwouldarisehereorwhetherparticipantswouldaffirmthedifference
betweenconditionsevenwhentheywerepresentedwithallthreeatthesametime.
Methods
Participants.61students(52females),takingIntroductiontoPsychologicalSciencecoursesat
theCollegeofCharlestonsignedupforthestudyforresearchparticipationcredit.
Materials&Procedures.Participantsinthisstudyreceivedallthreeconditions(same‐culture,
other‐culture,andextraterrestrial)incounterbalancedorder(1:Sam/Mamilon/Pentar,2:
Mamilon/Pentar/Sam,3:Pentar/Sam/Mamilon).Otherwise,thestoriesandquestionswereidenticalto
thoseusedinStudy1.Studentssignedupforthestudyandthenweresentanonlinesurveylinktothe
questionnaires,whichtheywereinstructedtocompleteontheirowninaquietsetting.
Results
ThemeanresponsesforeachculturalconditionarereportedinFigure3.
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Figure3.Meanagreementwiththeclaimthat‘Atleastonemustbe
mistaken’bycondition.ErrorbarsshowSEmean.
Thedatawereanalyzedusingamixed‐modelANOVA,withculturalconditionandtransgression
aswithin‐participantfactorsandcounterbalancingorderasabetween‐participantsfactor,revealinga
significantmaineffectforculture,F(2,116)=22.3,p<.001,η2=.28.AsinStudy1,participantswere
significantlymorelikelytogiveanobjectivistresponse(atleastoneofthejudgmentshadtobewrong)
inthesame‐culturecondition(M=5.2,SD=2.02)thanintheother‐culturecondition(M=4.3,SD=
2.11)andevenlesslikelyintheextraterrestrialcondition(M=3.7,SD=1.97).
Discussion
Evenwheneachparticipantreceivedallthreecasesside‐by‐side,theycontinuedtooffer
differentresponsesdependingonwhichsortofindividualtheywereconsidering.Justasinthetwo
earlierstudies,participantsweremoreinclinedtorejecttheclaimthatatleastoneindividualmustbe
wrongastheymovedtowardindividualswhoweremoredeeplydifferentintheircultureorwayoflife.
Theseresultsshowussomethingimportantaboutthenatureoftheeffectunderstudyhere.Itis
notjustthatpeopleresponddifferentlyinthedifferentconditions;theyseemactuallytothinkthatitis
righttoofferthesedifferentresponses.So,evenaftertheyhavegivenaclearlyrelativistresponsein
onecondition,theyarehappytosayinanotherconditionthatifthetwoindividualsholdopposite
opinions,oneofthemhastobewrong.
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Study4
Theexperimentalresultsthusfarseemtoindicatethatparticipants’intuitionschangeasthey
begintoconsiderindividualswithradicallydifferentculturesorwaysoflifejudgingasinglemoral
transgression.However,somemightwonderwhetherimportantdetailsareleftoutofthedescriptions
ofthetransgressionsthemselves.Afterall,therearetwocharactersinourvignettes.First,thereisthe
agent,theindividualwhoactuallycommitsthemoraltransgression(e.g.,Horace,whokillshisown
child).Then,second,thereisthejudge,theindividualwhomakesajudgmentaboutwhethertheagent’s
actionwasmorallybadormorallypermissible(e.g.,theMamilon,anAmazoniantribesman).Sofar,
we’veonlyaskedpeopletoconsiderthelatterofthesetwo.But,detailswithrespecttotheformer
couldarguablyberelevanttopeople’smoraljudgmentsaswell.Forexample,whereisHoracelocated?
Mightpeople’sjudgmentschangeiftheyaretoldthatHoraceisamemberoftheirownculture—
perhapsevenapeer?Mightpeopleholdeveryonetothesamemoralstandardswhenjudginganact
takingplaceintheirowncultureorbackyard?Conversely,wouldpeopleapplyverydifferentstandards
whenjudgingasimilaractiftookplacefaraway,onanothercontinentandinadifferentcultural
context?Ourclaimhasbeenthatparticipants’intuitionsabouttherightnessorwrongnessofa
judgmentmightactuallydependontheidentityofthejudge,sothatdifferentjudgescouldrightlyarrive
atdifferentjudgmentsoftheverysameagent.Butwhatabouttheidentityoftheagent?Couldthis
swaypeople’sintuitions?
Togetatthisquestionmoredirectly,weconductedastudyinwhichweindependentlyvaried
theculturalidentityofboththeagentandofthejudge.Hence,theagentwhoperformedthe
transgressioncouldbeeitheranAmericanorsomeonefromanotherculture,andthejudgecouldbe
eitheranAmerican,someonefromanothercultureoranextraterrestrial.Thisdesignenabledusto
clarifywhatimpacttheagent’sidentitymighthaveonpeople’sintuitions(apartfromthejudge’s
identity).
Methods
Participants.Onehundredandeighteenstudents(91females)takingIntroductionto
PsychologicalSciencecoursesattheCollegeofCharlestonsignedupforthestudyforresearch
participationcredit.
Materials&Procedure.Participantsweregiventhesamewithin‐participantsquestionnaireasin
Study2(counterbalancingthethreejudges:same‐culture,other‐culture,andextraterrestrial),onlynow
theyweredividedintotwogroups:halfreceivedthelocalagenttransgressioncondition,inwhichthe
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child‐killerwasrepresentedasbeingAmericanandtheknife‐stabberwasrepresentedasbeingaCollege
ofCharlestonstudent,andhalfreceivedtheforeignagenttransgressioncondition,inwhichthechild‐
killerwasrepresentedasbeingAlgerianandtheknife‐stabberwasrepresentedasbeingUniversityof
Algiersstudent.
Results
Thedatawereanalyzedusingamixed‐designANOVA,withtheidentityofthejudge(same‐
culturevs.other‐culturevs.extraterrestrial)andtransgressionaswithin‐participantfactorsandthe
identityoftheagent(localvs.foreign)asbetween‐participantfactors.Therewasamaineffectforthe
identityofthejudge,F(2,224)=34.7,p<.001,η2=.24,butnomaineffectoftheidentityoftheagent.
Therewasalsoasignificantinteractioneffect,F(2,224)=3.1,p=.048,η2=.03.
ThemeansforeachconditionaredisplayedinFigure4.Inspectionofthesemeansindicatedthat
theinteractioneffectarosebecauseparticipantsgaveespeciallyobjectivistresponseswhenpresented
withthecaseinvolvingalocalagentandasame‐culturejudge.
Figure4.Meanagreementwiththeclaimthat‘Atleastonemustbe
mistaken’bycondition.ErrorbarsshowSEmean.
Discussion
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Althoughwefoundnomaineffectfromourmanipulationoftheidentityoftheagent,wedid
findamaineffectfromourmanipulationoftheidentityofthejudge.Inotherwords,thepatternof
intuitionsobservedheredoesnotseemtobearisingsimplybecausepeoplehavedifferentreactionsto
differentkindsofagents.Rather,itseemsthatpeoplecanhavedifferentreactionstojudgmentsabout
theverysameact,performedbytheverysameagent,solongaswevarytheidentityofthejudge.
Therewasasignificantinteractioneffect,yetthiswasdue,inlargepart,tothehighlevelsof
objectivistresponsestothelocalactortransgressionwhenjudgedbythetwoclassmates(inthesame‐
culturecondition).Thisresultisinlinewiththehypothesisofthispaper.Afterall,itismadeexplicit
thattheagentandthejudgesarelocatedinthesamelocationandwithinthesamemoralframework,
Whenthejudgesandtheactorareallwithinthesamemoralframework,itseemsreasonabletoassume
thatparticipantswouldbeleastlikelytoagreewiththeclaimthatthedifferingresponsesofthejudges
couldbothbecorrect.Itwouldbemorelikelytothinkthatinsuchasituationpeopleshouldbeheldto
thesamestandards,thatmoralnormsapplytothemallinthesameway.Whenframeworksalignin
suchafashion,itseemsnaturalforpeopletoassumethattherecanbeanobjectivefactofthematteras
towhethertheactor’stransgressionispermissible—relativetothatframework.
Thispatternofintuitionssuggeststhatpeopleareevaluatingeachmoraljudgmentrelativetoa
setofstandardsthatapplyspecificallytothejudgeinquestion,ratherthanthe(potentiallydifferent)set
ofstandardsthatapplytotheagentswhoacted.Suchafindingmayinitiallyseemabitpuzzlingor
bizarre,butworkinnaturallanguagesemanticshasshownsimilarsortsofeffectsinotherdomainsthat
havenothingtodowithmorality(Egan,Hawthorne&Weatherson,2005;Lasersohn,2009;MacFarlane,
2007;Stephenson,2007),anditseemsreasonabletosuspectthattheeffectsthatariseintheseother
domainsmightapplyinthemoraldomainaswell.
Agreatdealofcontroversyremainsabouthowexactlysucheffectsaretobeunderstood,and
wecannothopetoresolvethosedifficultissueshere.Nonetheless,thedatadoseemtobesuggesting
thatthesortsofeffectsthatariseconcerning,e.g.,judgmentsoftastecanalsobefoundwhenweturn
tomoraljudgments.Peopleappeartorejecttheideathatasingleabsolutestandardcanbeappliedto
allmoraljudgmentsofagivenagentandtooperateinsteadwithasystemthatappliesdifferent
standardstodifferentjudges.
Study5
Instudies1‐4subjectsappeartoberespondinginwayssuggestingthattheyareapplying
differentsetsofstandardstothepersonswithdifferingjudgmentsaboutthepermissibilityofagiven
16
action.Ourhypothesishasbeenthatthisisbecauseordinaryfolkmightbetacitlycommittedtomoral
relativism.However,itispossiblethatsubjectsinthesestudiesarenotexpressingarelativisticview
aboutmoralityinparticular.Instead,theymightbeexpressingamoregeneral,mad‐dogsortof
relativism—arelativismthatappliesnotonlytomoralquestionsbutalsotopurelydescriptivequestions,
suchasthosethatcomeupinscience,historyormathematics.
Inordertoascertainwhetherthefolkreallyarerelativistsinthismoreradicalsense,we
conductedafollow‐upexperimentthatmadeitpossibletocompareintuitionsaboutmoralclaimswith
intuitionsaboutnon‐moralclaims.
Methods
Participants.Eighty‐eightstudents(26females)takingintroductoryphilosophycoursesatDuke
Universityvoluntarilycompletedaquestionnaireattheendofclass.
MaterialsandProcedure.Surveymaterialsweredistributedforparticipantstofillout.All
participantswerepresentedwiththeOther‐CulturevignetteusedinStudy1.Participantswerethen
randomlyassignedtooneoftwoconditions.
ParticipantsinthemoralconditionwereaskedtoconsidertheMamilon’sopinionsabouttwo
moraltransgressions.Forthefirsttransgression,theyweregiventhesentence:‘Jasonrobshis
employer,theRedCross,inordertopayforasecondholidayforhimself.’Theywerethenaskedto
imaginethatoneoftheirclassmatesbelievedwhatJasondidwasmorallywrong,butthattheMamilon
thoughtwhatJasondidwasnotmorallywrong.Afterreadingaboutthesedifferentjudgments,they
wereaskedthesamequestionasinStudy1—namely,whethertheyagreedwiththestatement‘Since
yourclassmateandtheMamilonhavedifferentjudgmentsaboutthiscase,atleastoneofthemmustbe
wrong.’’Participantsratedthissentenceonascalefrom1(‘disagree’)to7(‘agree’).Forthesecond
transgression,participantsweregiventhesentence:‘EmilypromisestotakeMolly'ssickchildtothe
hospitalforanimportantsurgicalprocedure,butinsteaddecidesshe'drathergoshopping.’Instructions
forthisothertransgressionwereexactlythesameasforthefirst.Theorderoftransgressionswas
counterbalanced.
Participantsinthenon‐moralconditionwereaskedtoconsidertheMamilon’sopinionabout
twonon‐moralcases.Forthefirstcase,participantsweretoldthefollowing:‘Agroupofindividualsare
discussingwherepastacomesfrom.Alejandrothinkspastaismadebycombiningflour,water,and
eggs,whereasMaryathinkspastagrowsontreesandisharvestedbyspecialfarmerscalled
“Pastafarians”onceevery5years.’Theywerethenaskedtoimaginethataclassmateagreeswith
17
Alejandro,andthataMamilonagreeswithMarya.Afterreadingaboutthesedifferentjudgments,they
wereaskedthesamequestionasinthemoralcondition.Thesecondcasewasasfollows:‘Agroupof
individualsarediscussingthemilitarystrategiesofNapoleanBonaparte.AnitathinksthatNapolean
rodeintobattleonahorse,whereasFabiothinksNapoleanflewintobattleinahelicopter.’Theywere
thenaskedtoimagineaclassmateagreeswithAnita,whereasaMamilonagreeswithFabio.
Instructionsforthisothertransgressionwereexactlythesameasforthefirst.Theorderof
transgressionswascounterbalanced.
Results
Ratingsforthetwotransgressionswerehighlycorrelated,bothforthenon‐moralcases(r=.67,
p<.001)andforthemoralcases(r=.75,p<.001),andtherewerenosignificantdifferencesbetween
them.Theycouldthereforebeaveragedtoformascale.Themeanforeachconditionisdisplayedin
Figure5.
Figure5.Meanagreementwiththeclaimthat‘Atleastonemustbewrong’
bycondition.ErrorbarsshowSEmean.
Participantswerestronglyobjectivistwhenthedifferingjudgmentswereaboutnon‐moralcases
(M=5.5,SD=1.84)butweresignificantlymoreinclinedtoembracerelativismwhenthediffering
judgmentswereaboutmoralcases(M=3.3,SD=1.99),t(88)=5.3,p<.001.
18
Discussion
Participantsshowedtheusualtendencytoendorserelativismaboutmoralquestions,butthey
didnotshowthissametendencywhenconfrontedwithnon‐moralquestions.Instead,theirresponsesin
thenon‐moraldomaintookamoreobjectivistturn.Theytendedtoagreewiththeclaimthatiftwo
individualsheldoppositeopinionsabouthistoricalfacts,thenoneofthoseindividualshastobewrong.
Inshort,itdoesnotappearthatpeoplesubscribetoablanketrelativismthatappliesequallyto
allissues.Peopleseeminsteadtobedistinguishingbetweendifferentdomains,endorsingrelativist
claimsaboutmoralitybutnotaboutstraightforwardmattersoffact.
Study6
Finally,onemightworryabouthowpeopleareinterpretingthequestiontheyreceiveinthe
stimulusmaterials.Participantsinthesestudiesarepresentedwithstoriesabouttwojudgeswith
seeminglyoppositeopinionsandthenaskedwhethertheyagreewiththeclaimthatatleastoneofthe
judgesmustbe‘wrong’or‘mistaken.’Buthowexactlyareparticipantsunderstandingthewords‘wrong’
or‘mistaken’inthiscontext?Thusfar,wehavebeenassumingthatparticipantsunderstandthesewords
tomeanthattheopinionsofthejudgesarenottrue.Soourassumptionhasbeenthatwhenpeople
disagreewiththeclaim,theyaresayingsomethinglike:‘Eventhoughthetwojudgeshaveopposite
opinions,itcouldbethatbothoftheiropinionsaretrue.’Thisreallywouldbeanendorsementofmoral
relativism.
Butitseemsthattheclaimcouldactuallybeunderstoodinother,verydifferentways.For
example,onecouldinterpretthewords‘wrong’or‘mistaken’tomeansomethinglikenotareasonable
inference,giventheavailableevidence.Onthisalternativeconstrual,participantsarenotsaying
anythingdeeplycontroversialaboutthetruthofthejudges’opinions.Theyaresimplysayingsomething
straightforwardoftheform:‘Eventhoughthetwojudgeshaveoppositeopinions,itcouldbethatboth
havegoodreasontoarriveatthoseinferences,giventheavailableevidence.’Suchastatementwould
notamounttoanendorsementofgenuinemoralrelativism.(Inthejargonofphilosophy,itwouldbe
classifiedasapurely‘epistemic’claim.)
Toaddressthislastworry,weconductedastudyinwhichparticipantswereaskedbothabout
whetherthevariousjudges’beliefswere‘incorrect’andaboutwhethertheyhad‘nogoodreason’to
19
believewhattheydid.Thismethodmakesitpossibletodisentangleintuitionsaboutthetruthofthe
judges’opinionsfromintuitionsaboutwhetherthoseopinionswerereasonableinferencesfromthe
availableevidence.
Methods
Participants.Participantswereninetyundergraduatestudents(45females)takingintroductory
philosophycoursesatDukeUniversity.
MaterialsandProcedures.Surveymaterialsweredistributedforparticipantstofillout.Asin
Study5,allparticipantswerepresentedwiththeOther‐CulturevignetteusedinStudy1.Participants
werethenrandomlyassignedtooneoffourconditionsina2x2design.
Halfofthesubjectsreceivedoneoftwo‘truth’conditions.Intheseconditions,theyweregiven
eithertwomoralcases(therobbingandpromise‐renegingtransgressionsusedinStudy5)ortwonon‐
moralcases(theNapoleonandpastacasesusedinStudy5).Theywerethenaskedtoimaginethata
classmateandaMamilonhavedifferingjudgmentsaboutwhether,forexample,themoraltransgression
waspermissible,orwhetherNapoleanrodeahorseorahelicopter,andwereaskedtowhatextentthey
agreedwiththefollowingstatement:‘GiventhatyourclassmateandtheMamilonhavetheseparticular
beliefs,atleastoneoftheirbeliefsmustbeincorrect.’Participantsratedthissentenceonascalefrom1
(‘disagree’)to7(‘agree’).
Theotherhalfofthesubjectsreceivedoneoftwo‘justification’conditions.Intheseconditions,
theyweregiveneitherthesamemoralornon‐moralcasesfromthe‘truth’condition.Whentoldthat
theclassmateandtheMamilonhaddifferentjudgmentsaboutthecase,theyweregiventhefollowing
question:“Theseindividualshavedifferentbeliefsaboutthiscase.Wewouldliketoknowwhetheryou
thinkonlyoneofthemhasgoodreasontobelievewhatheorshedoes,orwhethertheybothhavegood
reasons.”Theywerethenaskedtowhatextenttheyagreedwiththefollowingstatement:“Giventhe
particularbeliefsthatyourclassmateandtheMamilonhave,atleastoneofthemmustnothavegood
reasontobelieveasheorshedoes.”Participantsratedthissentenceonascalefrom1(‘disagree’)to7
(‘agree’).
Results
ThedataweresubjectedtoanANOVA,withquestiontype(truthvs.justification)andvignette
type(moralvs.non‐moral)asbetween‐subjectfactors,transgressionasawithinsubjectfactor,and
20
genderandnumberofpreviousphilosophycoursesascovariates.Therewasnomaineffectofeither
questiontypeofvignettetype.However,therewasasignificantinteractioneffectF(1,84)=10.4,p=
.002,η2=.11.
Inspectionofthemeansrevealedoppositepatternsofresponsesforthetwoquestiontypes
(seeFigure6).Onthequestionabouttruth,peopletendedtorejecttheclaimthatatleastoneofthe
judgeshadtobeincorrectinthemoralcases(M=2.93,SD=2.15)butnotinthenon‐moralcases(M=
4.67,SD=2.17),t(43)=2.7,p=.01.Bycontrast,onthequestionaboutjustification,peopletendedto
rejecttheclaimthatatleastoneofthejudgesmustnothavehadgoodreasoninthenon‐moralcases
(M=3.0,SE=1.98)butnotinthemoralcases(M=4.4,SD=2.08),t(43)=2.3,p=.03.
Figure6.Meanagreementwiththeclaimthatand‘atleastonemustbe
incorrect’(the‘truthquestion’)and‘atleastonemustnothavegood
reasontobelieve’(the‘justificationquestion’).ErrorbarsshowSEmean.
Discussion
Inthisfinalstudy,participantsshowedacleardistinctionbetweentheintuitionsabouttruthand
intuitionsaboutjustification.Onthequestionabouttruth,participantsshowedthesamebasicpattern
ofjudgmentstheydisplayedinStudy5:theywerelesswillingtosaythatatleastonejudgehadtobe
'incorrect'inthemoralconditionthantheywereinthenon‐moralcondition.However,onthequestion
aboutjustification,theyshowedexactlytheoppositepatternofjudgments:theywere
21
actuallymorewillingtosaythatatleastonejudgehad'nogoodreason'inthemoralconditionthanin
thenon‐moralcondition.Inotherwords,peopleseemtobewillingtograntthatpeoplefromdifferent
culturesmaylegitimatelyholddifferentmoralbeliefs—thatthesebeliefsneednotbeconsideredillicit
orfalse—yettheyarenotwillingtoacceptthatsuchbeliefsareequallyjustified—thatthereareequally
goodreasonssupportingthem.
Ofcourse,theprecisepatternofjustificationintuitionsdependsinpartonthenatureofthe
vignettesthemselves,andwecoulddoubtlesshaveobtainedaverydifferentpatternifwehadused
differentvignettes.Theimportantpoint,however,issimplythatparticipantsaredrawingaclear
distinctionbetweentruthandjustification.Hence,whenweseethatparticipantsdisagreewiththe
claimthatatleastoneofthebeliefsmustbeincorrect,wehavesomereasontoconcludethattheyare
infactexpressingtherelativistviewthattwojudgescanmakeoppositejudgmentwithouteitherof
themthinkinganythingfalse.
GeneralDiscussion
Thepresentstudiesofferacomplexpictureofpeople'sintuitionsaboutwhethermoralityis
objectiveorrelative.Peopledohaveapparentlyobjectivistintuitionsincertaincases,butourresults
suggestthatonecannotaccuratelycapturetheirviewsinasimpleclaimlike:'Peoplearecommittedto
moralobjectivism.'Onthecontrary,people'sintuitionstakeastrikinglyrelativistturnwhentheyare
encouragedtoconsiderindividualsfromradicallydifferentculturesorwaysoflife.
Overall,then,thepatternofpeople'sintuitionsaboutmoralityappearstoresemblethepattern
oftheirintuitionsabouttheseasons.Inthecourseofatypicalconversation,peoplemightgivelittle
thoughttotheideathatitcanonlybewinterorsummerrelativetoagivenhemisphere.Indeed,people
wholiveintheNorthernHemispheremightordinarilysupposethatacertaintimesimplyiswinterand
thatanyonewhothinksotherwisemustbemistaken.Butthispatternofordinaryintuitionswouldnot
necessarilymakeitrightforustodrawaconclusionoftheform:'Peoplearecommittedtoseasonal
objectivism.'Thethingtofocusonispeople'sability,whensuddenlyconfrontedwithanindividualfrom
anotherhemisphere,torecognizethatasingletimemightbewinteraroundherebutsummer
somewhereelse.
Ordinaryintuitionsaboutmoralityappeartoworkinmuchthesameway.Daytoday,people
mightgivelittlethoughttoissuesofrelativity.Itmightappeartothem,whentheywitnessatypical
transgression,thattheagenthasclearlydonesomethingmorallybadandthatanyonewhothinks
otherwisemustsurelybewrong.Yetthispatternofintuitionsisnotitselfsufficienttomakethemcount
22
asmoralobjectivists.Thekeyquestioniswhethertheyholdontothatvieweveninthefaceofradically
differentperspectives.Theresultsofthepresentstudiessuggestthattheydonot.
1.Relationtopreviouswork
Itmayinitiallyappearthatourchiefconclusionsareopposedtothosedrawnbyearlier
researchers.Afterall,earlierresearchersfoundthatmostparticipantsweremoralobjectivists,whereas
wearesuggestingthatmanyofthoseparticipantsmightactuallyhavehadatendencytowardmoral
relativism.
Ourownview,however,isthatthedisagreementhereisonlyasuperficialoneandthatthereis
adeepersenseinwhichourconclusionsareactuallyinharmonywiththoseofearlierresearchers.The
maingoalofresearchinthisareaisnottofigureoutpreciselywhatpercentageofpeoplearemoral
objectivistsormoralrelativistsbutrathertoreachabetterunderstandingofthepsychologicalprocesses
thatcanpullpeopleinthesedifferentdirections.Ourclaimhasbeenthatpeoplearedrawntoward
moralrelativismbyonespecifictypeofpsychologicalprocess:namely,activeengagementwithradically
differentperspectivesandwaysoflife.Sowhatwereallywanttoknowiswhetherpriorresearch
providesevidenceforthissamepsychologicalhypothesis.
Thoughearlierstudiesfoundthatamajorityofparticipantsgaveapparentlyobjectivist
responses,eachofthesestudiesalsofoundaminoritywhogaverelativistresponses.Correlationaldata
fromthesestudiescanthereforebeusedtogetasenseforthepsychologicaldifferencesbetweenthese
twogroupsofparticipants.Theresultsofferusaremarkablycoherentpicture.Relativistswerehigherin
thepersonalitytraitofopennesstoexperience(Cokely&Feltz,2010).Theyscoredhigheronameasure
of'disjunctivethinking,'whichistheabilitytounpackalternativepossibilitieswhenproblemsolving
(Goodwin&Darley,2010).Theyweremorelikelytofallinaparticularagerange–namely,intheir
twenties(Beebe&Sackris,2010).Theyweremoreabletoexplainalternativeviews(Goodwin&Darley
2010)andtobetolerantofpeoplewithoppositeopinions(Wright,Cullum&Schwab,2008;Wright,
McWhite&Grandjean,2010).Allinall,theseseparatestudiesseemtobeconvergingonasurprisingly
unifiedportraitofrelativistparticipants.Specifically,itappearsthattherelativistswerepreciselythe
peoplewhoweremostopentoalternativeperspectives.
Soperhapsitwillbepossibletodevelopasingleunifiedaccountthatexplainsthefullpatternof
data.Thebasicideawouldbethatpeople'sintuitionsareinfluencedbythedegreetowhichthey
activelyconsideralternativeperspectives.Onefactorthatleadspeopletoconsideralternative
23
perspectivesisthewordingofthequestionitself(asinthepresentstudies);anotheristhepersonality
traitsoftheparticipants(asinpriorstudies).Butregardlessofthefactorsthattriggerit,theimpactof
thispsychologicalprocessisalwaysthesame.Themorepeopleengagewithradicallydifferent
perspectives,themoretheyaredrawntomoralrelativism.
2.Relationtophilosophicalmetaethics
Asnotedattheoutsetofthispaper,manyphilosophersthinkboththatthefolkareobjectivists
aboutmoralityandthatthefolkviewbearsonthephilosophicaltruthaboutmorality.Inthewordsof
MichaelSmith,“thetaskofthephilosopherinmeta‐ethicsistomakesenseofordinarymoral
practice"—thatis,ordinaryfolkobjectivism(Smith,1994,5).Manyphilosophershaveexplicitlytriedto
fulfillthistask.
Forpresentpurposes,wecandividethewaysinwhichphilosophershavesoughttodischarge
thetaskintothreegeneralcategories:1)affirmthatthefolkaregenerallyright;2)explainwhythefolk
areentirelywrong;3)comewithsomemorecomplicatedinterpretationofwhatthefolkarecommitted
to.Eachoftheserepresentsanattempttoaccommodatefolkobjectivism.We'llexploretheminturn.
Onewaytoaccountforthepurportedfolkviewistosaythatthisviewisactuallycorrect:there
trulyaresuchthingsasreal,objectivemoralfacts.Philosopherswhoadoptthis‘realist’approachhave
sometimesclaimedthattheyhavealeguponopposingtheoriesbecausetheycanmoreeasilyaccount
forthephenomenonoffolkobjectivism(Brink,1989;Shafer‐Landau,2003).InthewordsofShafer‐
Landau,onlyanaccountofthisbasictype"straightforwardlypreservesordinarytalkofmoraltruth"
(Shafer‐Landau,2003,23).
Asecondapproachwouldbetodenytheexistenceofreal,objectivemoralfacts.Philosophers
whoadoptthisapproachmaintainthatthesortsofmoralpropertiespresupposedbyordinaryfolk
simplydonotexist,sothefolkerrinbeingobjectivistsaboutmorality(Joyce,2001;Mackie,1977).
Mackie(1977,33),forexample,arguedthatsuchabsolutemoralproperties–“notcontingentuponany
desireorpreferenceorpolicyorchoice”–aresimplynonexistent.Nonetheless,informulatinghis
theory,Mackieendsupaffirmingtheverysameclaimaboutordinaryfolkmorality.Hesaysthat
ordinarypeopletendto“objectifyvalues,”that“ordinarymoraljudgmentsincludeaclaimto
objectivity”(1977,35).
Finally,somephilosophershavetakenadifferenttack,proposingthatwecouldadoptamore
complexinterpretationofpeople'sordinarymoraldiscourse.Accordingtothisinterpretation,people's
24
ordinarymoralclaimsdon'tmeanpreciselywhattheymightappeartomeanonfirstglance.Thus,when
peopleordinarilymakeclaimslike:'Thatactionismorallybad,andanyonewhosaysotherwisemust
surelybemistaken,'theyarenotliterallysayingthatthereissomekindofobjectivemoraltruthinthe
waythat'moralrealists'havesupposed(Blackburn,1984;Gibbard,1992).Yetevenwhileofferingsucha
complexanalysis,thesephilosophersmaintaintheusualviewabouttheshapeofordinaryfolk
discourse,suggestingthatphilosophicaltheoriesmustendeavortoexplain"whyourdiscoursehasthe
shapeitdoes...toexplain,andjustify,therealistic‐seemingnatureofourtalkofevaluations—theway
wethinkwecanbewrongaboutthem,thatthereisatruthtobefound,andsoon"(Blackburn,1984,
180).
Eachofthesepositionstriestoaccommodatefolkobjectivisminonewayoranother:by
claimingtobestcaptureit,bydismissingitasriddledwitherror,orbyprovidinganuanced
interpretationofit.Buttheresultsofthepresentstudiesraisesomequestionsaboutwhetherthistask
isneededatall.Ifthefolkarenot,infact,moralobjectivists,thenperhapsthereissimplynoneedto
continueengaginginphilosophicalworkaimedatmakingsenseoffolkobjectivism.
Nevertheless,ataskremains.Philosophersareundoubtedlycorrectintheircommitmentto
makesenseofordinarymoralpractice;theonemistakewastosupposethatpeople’sordinarymoral
practiceisastraightforwardlyobjectivistone.Soperhapstherealphilosophicaltaskhereistomake
senseofadifferentsortofpractice:oneinwhichpeople’sviewsdifferdependingontheextenttowhich
theyexplorealternativeperspectives.
3.Conclusion
Recentexperimentalresearchhasinvestigatedpeople'sintuitionsaboutawholehostof
differentphilosophicalquestions–freewill,moralobligation,personalidentity,thenatureof
knowledge.Eventhoughthesequestionsareinmanywaysquitedifferent,theoutcomesofthevarious
experimentalresearchprogramshavebeensurprisinglyconvergent.Againandagain,wefindthatitis
notpossibletocapturethefullpatternofpeople'sintuitionsjustbyconstructingacoherent
philosophicaltheoryandthenclaimingthatthistheorycapturesthe'folkview.'Instead,ithasemerged
ineachcasethatpeople'sintuitionsshowcertainkindsoftensionsorcontradictions,withdifferent
psychologicalprocessespullingpeopleindifferentdirections.(Forafewrepresentativecases,see
Greene,2008;Nahmias,forthcoming;Nichols&Bruno,forthcoming;Nichols&Knobe,2007;Phelan,
2010;Phelan&Sarkissian,2009;Sinnott‐Armstrong,2008).Butperhapsthatisexactlywhatweshould
25
haveexpected.Philosophersdonotwriteaboutquestionswheretheanswerseemsobvious;theywrite
aboutissuesthatprovokeconflictorconfusion.Whattherecentexperimentalworkhasdoneis,inpart,
totracesuchconflictandconfusionbacktocertaintensionswithinpeople'sordinaryintuitions.
Theresultsofthepresentstudiesareverymuchinlinewiththisgeneraltrend.Itis,wethink,a
mistakejusttosaythatordinarypeoplesubscribetosomeformofmoralobjectivism.Peopledohave
objectivistintuitionsincertaincases,buttheseintuitionsaretheproductofpsychologicalprocessesthat
can,inothercases,leadtostrikinglyrelativistintuitions.Futureresearchmightproceednotbyasking
whether'peopleareobjectivists'or'peoplearerelativists'butratherbytryingtogetabettergriponthe
differentpsychologicalprocessesatworkhereandtheconflictsandtensionsthattheseprocessescan
create.
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