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Pacifism

TRISTIN S. HASSELLDepartment of Philosophy, Oakland University,Rochester, MI, USA

Pacism, as broadly conceived, is a commitment to the

making of peace. Pacism is rooted in the Latin word pacicus , which is a synthesis of pax (peace) and facere (to make). Therefore, pacism ought not to be confusedwith passivism. Passivism is dened by inactivity. Paci-sm, on the other hand, requires an activity – the pursuitof, labor toward, or institution of, peace. Yet, pacism isnot a homogeneous concept. There are as many kinds of pacism as there are denitions of peace, strategies formaking it, and adherents to it.

The moral worth of peacemaking as an activity has historical roots in religion. In the West, pacismoriginates in Christianity with Jesus’ claim in his Sermonon the Mount: blessed are the peacemakers (pacists). Theword used by Jesus in the gospel of Matthew is the Greek word eirenopoios , which is a synthesis of eirene (peace) and poiesis (to make). In the East, pacism is rooted in theIndian notion of ahisma , which translates as avoid vio-lence. From its advent in the Vedas (a body of ancientIndian sacred texts), the notion of ahisma (nonviolence)has had a lasting impact on Hinduism, Buddhism, andJainism and the cultural locations of each. Yet, Jesus’exhortation to peacemaking and the Vedic virtue of non-violence raise similar problems of denition. In the rst

case, one needs to dene the peace that must be made;in the second case, one needs to dene the violence thatmust be avoided. The problem with these terms (andindeed all words) is that they only make sense withina specic cultural and linguistic context.

A moral commitment to nonviolence requires astandard by which to judge what is moral, and a reasonthat violence contravenes that standard. Furthermore, it isnot at all clear what constitutes violence. How cana person avoid violence if one does not know what it is?Indeed, the philosopher and psychoanalyst Slavoj Z ˇ ižek

has argued that everything is violence (i.e., somethingwhich causes injury or harm). According to Zˇ ižek, thereare three types of violence: objective, subjective, andsymbolic. Symbolic violence is the coercive and dominat-ing power of language – its internal bias. Subjective vio-lence is the murder, rape, war, or revolution – the obviousand visible violence. Objective violence is the invisibleviolence of the normal. It is the violence of the statusquo – the ordinary violence that sustains division,

inequality, and weakness. While subjective violence isa response to and an eruption out of objective violence,it is a violence nonetheless. If Žižek is correct and every-thing is violence, then there are two questions that must beasked: (1) how can a person begin to avoid it? and (2) is allviolence equal? If everything is violence then violence isunavoidable; yet, for most people the prohibition againstviolence is the prohibition against unjust violence. Thecommitment to nonviolence does not exist in a vacuum.Not only does nonviolence require a prior denition of violence, but also a standard of moral judgment; indeed,the exhortation to nonviolence is both afrmed andqualied by a prior conceptuality of justice. It is precisely for this reason that not all violence is equal. There isa difference between a stght, a war, and a genocide.A distinction that is both quantitative and qualitative.While a stght, a war, and a genocide differ in degree(i.e., how much violence is occurring), they also differ inkind (i.e., the nature of the activity which is causingharm). In a stght, one might talk about intentions anddesert; in the case of war, whether it is just or unjust; yet,there is no viable account of a just or deserved genocide.

Similarly, there is linguistic and conceptual confusion

over what constitutes the peace that pacists are trying tomake. There are four different notions of peace that pro-vide varying accounts of what the possibilities and limita-tions of peacemaking are: peace as enslavement, peace asexhaustion, peaceas satisfaction, and peaceas being. Peaceas enslavement is the peace that results from subjugation.This kind of peace is the result of nonresistance to tyranny,that is, pacication. Historical examples of this are the Pax Romana (the period of peace that followed military dom-ination by the Roman empire) and the idea of the “goodslave” in the antebellum United States. Similarly, peace as

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exhaustion requires prior violent conict. In this deni-tion of peace, enemies have either: inicted sufcientharm on one another, making conict no longer sustain-able, or they have been forced to reject conict becauseits continuation would result in mutual annihilation. Inboth cases, violence is abandoned but the desire (or inten-tion) to harm the other party remains. The tentativenature of this peace has been described as a “cold war,”which is the designation given to the pseudo-peaceableconict that occurred between the United States and theSoviet Union, beginning in the 1940s and lasting until theearly 1990s. Conversely, peace as satisfaction describesa situation in which the desires of society (and the indi-viduals in it) have been realized. Yet, violence, and indeedwar, can be justied on this approach as a means of securing that satisfaction – a position known as just polic-ing. If the desires of all the members of society have beensatised, then society is assumed to be just. A person whoinfringes upon the desires of others in such a society is unjust and in need of correction (i.e., justication).Finally, peace as being is rooted in religious accounts of the transcendent, claiming that peace is something morethan the absence of violence – it claims that peace hasa positive ground in reality. In Judaism peace is rest,a participation in God’s Sabbath; in Buddhism peace isthe habitual process by which a person transforms theirbeing from struggle to tranquility; in Christianity it isparticipation in the very being of a God who is innite

peace. In each of these religions, peace is conceptualizedas the result of getting beyond the violence and limitationsof the material in order to transform the possibilitiesof existence.

The variety of pacisms mirrors the diversity of nor-mative theories about moral judgment making: conse-quentialist, deontological, and virtue-based; moreover,the varieties of pacism and nonviolence each adoptsa peculiar denition of justice, violence, and peace, andall are forced in to answering questions about who it isthat pacism applies to and under what circumstances. Isthe commitment to make peace (or avoid violence)a universal obligation, or is it something which individualshave a choice about? Religious persons and conscientiousobjectors sometimes take vows to renounce violence, yetsuch promises are individually elected. Critics of voca-tional pacism ask: if pacism is correct for one shouldit not be considered correct for all? Another set of ques-tions that the pacisms must answer has to do with apply-ing the general concept “peacemaker” to concrete placesand times. Are there times when violence as a last resort isallowable (for instance, in the preservation of one’s own

life)? Who gets to decide this, and what is the standard formaking such a judgment? Are certain kinds (or degrees) of violence off limits? Just war theorists and pacists usually disagree on how to answer these questions; however, onecommon exception to this has to do with the use of nuclear weapons. For many just warriors and pacists,nuclear weapons are too uncontrollable and indiscrimi-nate to use, even as a last resort. Similarly, some pacistsmake exceptions when it comes to protecting the weak,themselves, or their families. For such pacists, defendingthe weak does not create violence; it ends violence.

Consequential pacism begins with an objective study of individual cases. In this approach, one is concernedwith making judgments based on necessity and efciency rather than justice or an absolute commitment to peace.Whether some violence is just, or whether peace is onto-logically better than violence never enters the moral cal-culus. This kind of pacism is not the starting place of moral decision making, but the result of such decisions.When one calculates the consequences of violence versuspeace in situation X, the consequential pacist will arguethat pacism effectively generates better outcomes thandoes violence. Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. areoften cited as examples of effective peacemakers whowere able to organize their followers around a commit-ment to nonviolence, thereby creating positive socialchange. Furthermore, the consequential pacist arguesthat any short-term benets of violence are usually

overshadowed by long-term harms. Often pacism isadopted as a rule for sustainable social change. Yet, it isalways conceivable to the consequential pacist that situ-ations will occur in which violent exceptions need to bemade in order to expedite preferred outcomes. An exam-ple of this will be the pacist who believes that ghtingfascism in WWII was necessary, albeit distasteful. Criticsof this position ask what the criteria for judging best out-comes is, and whether objectivity in such decision makingis ever possible.

Conversely, absolute pacism grounds itself in acommitment to the sanctity of life and the moral statusof persons. This view, following Kant, argues that allpersons have a duty, obligation, or universal imperativeto treat all persons as ends and never simply as the meansto an end. Whereas consequential pacism began witha prior conception of what constituted a good outcome,absolute pacism begins with a prior conception of whatconstitutes a person. The absolute pacist believes thatviolence has at least the potential to destroy personhood,and so must be absolutely rejected. Absolute pacism isoften couched in the language of natural human rights, or

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divine command. Sometimes, distinctions are madebetween kinds of violence. A maximum version of abso-lute pacism would reject all coercion and violence, oftenincluding the killing or mistreatment of animals, andharm done to the environment. Minimal versions of abso-lute pacism reject in every case only violences that irrev-ocablydestroy human persons: murder, war, genocide, etc.

There are two kinds of virtue-based pacism: thosethat identify nonviolence as a virtue, and those that seepeacemaking as the telos (the purpose or end) towardwhich all other activities are directed. Both virtue theoriesare primarily concerned with the character of the personswho act, and only secondarily, with what actions thosepersons do. In the former approach, pacism is a virtue,an attribute that helps persons attain the goal of theirlife. The telos of a knife is to cut and a good knife cutswell; the virtue that helps the knife make this possible issharpness. For Buddhists, nonviolence ( ahisma ) is a virtuethat makes Enlightenment possible. In the latter approach,peacemaking is not a virtue it is the telos – the positive goaltoward which human life is directed. On this approach,much time is spent uncovering what virtues are necessary if persons are to be good peacemakers. Once the characterof a good peacemaker is uncovered, the means for trainingindividuals to be that kind of person needs to be devel-oped. Alasdair MacIntyre (following Aristotle) argues thatthis process is only possible within specically denedcommunities, and occurs through the telling of stories,

the sharing of practices, and the location of oneself within the historical tradition from which one’s telos arises. For MacIntyre, people do what they do out of habit, rather than by choice, and so a person needs to beeducated in which habits are the right kind of habits tohave. A practical example of the kind of education thatMacIntyre describes is the catechism, apprenticeship,or boot camp that seeks to make possible new kinds of persons – the Christian, bricklayer, and soldier, respec-tively. Examples of the kind of virtue pacism that assertspeacemaking as telos are the historical (and sometimescontemporary) Anabaptists (Amish, Hutterites, Menno-nites, Bruderhof, etc.) and Quakers.

The variety of pacisms corresponds not only to nor-mative theories of ethics, but to normative theories of social and global justice: retributive, restorative, and dis-tributive. In the case of retributive justice, the pacistunderstands penalization as a strategy for peacemakingby its inverse, deterrence. Rather than focus on justice asmeasure-for-measure ( lex talionis ) redress, the pacisthopes that appropriate retribution will secure a futuresocial peace by deterring violence in the rst place.

Of particular interest to pacists are nonviolent forms of retribution such as the use of economic sanctions on theglobal stage, the most famous case of which is the USembargo of Cuba as punishment for its failure to pursuefree-market capitalism and democratization. In the case of restorative justice, the pacist hopes to heal the wound of a prior violence. This therapeutic approach focuses onmediating the harms of injustice (between offenders andvictims) rather than policing an impersonal social con-tract. An example of restorative justice at work is SouthAfrica’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission set up by Nelson Mandela as a response to injustices of apartheid,the purpose of which was to expose the scope and variety of racial injustice in order to avoid historical revision, andthereby ensure that such violences never recur. Anotherarea in which pacists have contributed to conversationsabout global restorative justice is in the condemning of discrimination based upon gender, sex, sexualorientation,and disability, as unacceptable social violences that mustbe exposed and rejected in the interest of justice andpeacemaking. Distributive justice deals primarily withthe allocations of goods within society and between soci-eties. Here the pacist is concerned primarily with theproblems and possibilities of economic violence. The pac-ist often focuses not simply on the equality of distribu-tion, but the reason and method by which inequality exists. As in other theories of global justice, the pacist’sinterest in just distribution is not simply intranational but

international; for instance, growing skepticism over theviability of for-prot health care in the USA (in lieu of vast disparities in wealth) mirrors global skepticism overwhether free-market capitalism can reconcile disparitiesin the quality, and availability, of health care between richcountries and poor countries. Finally, it should be notedthat pacists understand peacemaking not simply inmoral and personal terms, but as a crucial component toany constitution of global justice, which rejects violence asthe ground of social relation.

Related Topics▶ Collective Responsibility ▶ Gandhi, Mahatma▶ Global Contractarian Justice▶ Global Distributive Justice▶ Human Rights▶ King, Martin Luther, Jr.▶ Punishment▶ Retributive Justice▶ Truth Commissions▶ War, Just and Unjust

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ReferencesKant I (2009) Fundamental principles of the metaphysics of morals (trans:

Abbott TK). Merchant Books, New York Macintyre A (1984) After virtue, 2nd edn. University of Notre Dame,

SouthbendYoder JH (1992) Nevertheless: the varieties of religious pacism (revised

and expanded edition). Herald, WaterlooŽižek S (2008) Violence. Picador, New York

Pandemics

WAYNE B. HANEWICZDepartment of Humanities/Philosophy, Utah Valley University, Orem, UT, USA

Overview: What Is a Pandemic and WhatAre the IssuesPandemics are, and will continue to be, global! Commu-nication, transportation, multinational research, technol-ogy development, and multinational or multiculturalconict assure that we will all suffer together if we donot understand the inherent global nature of pandemicsin the twenty-rst century. The very idea of a pandemicseriously challenges our notions of sovereignty andnationalism, the conditions for human freedom, and theresponsibilities and liberties necessary for human growth

and happiness. It is by no means assured that democraticideals and democratic governance itself will survive theordeal of a pandemic.

A pandemic (from Greek pan “all” + demos “people”)refers to an infectious or contagious, not necessarily com-municable, disease that spreads across extensive andnational geography, and whose growth curve over timeexceeds normal expectations. The World Health Organi-zation (WHO) identies three conditions necessary forthe existence of a pandemic:

● Emergence of a disease new to a population● Agents infect humans, causing serious illness● Agents spread easily and sustainably among humans

The Black Plague, smallpox, tuberculosis, the SpanishFlu of 1918–1919, and more recently HIVand the 2009 upandemic are representative examples; there remainssome disagreement over the pandemic nature of canceror heart disease.

The Major IssuesIn addition to the obvious administrative, technological,economic, and social problems presented by pandemics,

there is a wide range of ethical issues endemic to pan-demics, including:

● Prevention, paternalism, and collective safety ● Quarantine policy, individual freedom, and collective

protection● Information privacy, transparency, and an informed

collective● Proportionality and equity ● Protecting communities from unjustied

stigmatization

The allocation of limited resources is virtually unavoid-able in pandemic circumstances, and it is the foundationfor most of the moral issues related to pandemics. It isinevitable that society in general, and individual health-service providers in particular, will have to make hardmoral decisions regarding theallocation and use of limitedresources.

An inuenza pandemic, which would last from weeksto months, will most certainly demand decisions regard-ing personnel and material resource allocation wellbeyond the point of triage; health-service providers willbe affected in ways for which they may not have pre-pared . Many of them may know the general principlesof mass casualty triage but have insufcient training orexperience in applying ethical reasoning or value assump-tions to clinical situations with individual people(pandemicethics.org ).

Most people are of the opinion that society hasa duty to plan for such disasters by assuring that thereis sufcient equipment, supplies, and trained personnelto address the enormous demands that a pandemicwill present and to provide the range of servicesnecessary to minimize the collateral damage from apandemic. The demands on the all public service systemswill be enormous and, for the most part, outside theexperience of many providers. Medical rst-respondersand emergency room personnel are typically practicedin the operational and ethical judgments involved inmass casualty plans, but many who work in health-care policy and planning lack such familiarity andexperience.

While there may be disagreement over the classica-tion of the recent Swine Flu as a full-blown pandemic,the world nevertheless experienced the same shortageof vaccine, availability of adequate health facilities andservices, disruption in distribution, worker illness, andtravel restrictions that a more “classical” pandemicwould present. Such circumstances fuel public panic andcivil disorder that will exacerbate a service system already laden with unexamined moral assumptions.

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Balancing provider loyalties to family versus provider duties to citizens and communities is unavoidable. The twogroups that typically are assigned highest priority toreceive drugs and similar support are patients with thegreatest clinical need and providers with the greatest risk of exposure. At the onset of an inuenza pandemic, pro-viders would face a very personal ethical decision abouttheir duty to serve contagious patients versus their con-cerns for personal safety and duties to their own familiesand others for whom they have responsibility. The distinc-tion between “us” and “them” is a boundary that canlead to vulnerability and abandonment of those most inneed (Ameisen). How do we avoid the morphing of thisdistinction into a strategy of exception that justiesarbitrariness? In a social context where individualism,suspicion, and deance prevail, nothing allows us to beassured of a unanimously shared concern for the commongood (Hirsh).

If care providers do not understand or are unclearabout the ethics behind mass casualty plans, the serviceprovision process may either slowdown or even break-down. Ultimately, if a mass casualty response plan getscaught up in ethical conicts at the bedside, it risks losingthe very efciency for saving lives that is the reason foraltering triage and care practices in the rst place.

How do we decide who should get what, and for how long, under conditions of limited resources? The most glar-ing ethical decisions would surface when considering

how to treat overwhelming numbers of patients withscarce and diminishing medical resources. With insuf-cient resources, potentially life-saving treatments such ashighly specialized drugs (e.g., antiviral) or ventilatorswould have to be allocated to fewer than the number of patients who would need them.

The shortage of mechanical ventilators can be a par-ticularly troublesome issue. The withholding or with-drawing of a ventilator usually indicates a decision withimmediate life-and-death consequences. Should olderpatients be deprived of this technology in favor of youngerpatients? How do we choose which critically ill patientswould be given a chance for survival on a ventilator andwhich would be consigned to a high likelihood of dying ina very short time?

Even that decision, however, does not meet the pros-pect of removing a patient from a ventilator – perhapsagainst the patient’s or the family’s wishes – merely because he or she is not improving rapidly or benetingenough to justify continued use of a scarce resource. Dowe treat patients as ends in themselves or do we maximizethe odds of another’s survival whose prognosis is already more optimistic? Which is “the greater good”?

The problem can be conceived broadly in terms of distributive justice: What is the just – or the most just –way to distribute scarce resources? It can also be conceivedmore narrowly in terms of utilitarianism: How can I servethe most with the fewest resources? The “common good”is often perceived as a relatively weak abstraction com-pared to the “real” life and death struggles of a specicindividual. The driving goal of mass casualty responseplans is to save the largest number of lives with theresources available. These plans are based upon utilitarianethics and focus on the “big picture,” on serving a “greatergood,” which may not be in the best interests of any one person.

On the other hand, in the heat of the moment oneor another form of moral absolutism, including variationsof religious absolutism, may provide the motivationfor a particular decision regarding a particular personat a particular moment. For example, a utilitarian ethicfoundation for mass casualty plans characteristically allows for patients who either demand an excess of pre-cious resources, or who will likely die regardless of theresources devoted to their care, to be given low priority for treatment or even set aside to die. Yet, this course of action would be morally reprehensible to any clinician (orpatient or family) in the mindset of normal standard-of-care circumstances.

How to prepare providers for such a judgment?Where, if any, can we nd room for any kind of Kantian,

or deontological, ethics? What would the Kantian moralimperative specically require? Loyalty? Integrity? Equity?Transparency? Citizen Empowerment? How do weaccount for global variations in cultural values whensuch values are founded on different, even competing,moral theories?

What can we expect in the short- mid-term future? Even as I write this entry we are witnessing yetanother very powerful earthquake in Chile (just a few months after a similar event in Haiti), and the world isstill recovering from the enormous tsunami off thecoast of Japan. These incidents will be instructive to usas we work to provide adequate social services andhealth care.

Currently, another “Bird Flu” virus (H5N1) showspotential for pandemic lethality. It has moved fromSoutheast Asia to Central Asia, the Middle East,Africa, and Europe (including Great Britain). Humans inclose contact with birds have contracted the virus,and human-to-human transmission appears already tobe possible.

Future pandemic threats may come from either unfa-miliar or ill-considered sources, including:

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placement of a landll (where garbage providers may needto compensate landll neighbors) to international alloca-tion of the benets of trade liberalization (where nationsbenetting from lower trade barriers may need to com-pensate nations hurt by lower barriers).

Similarly, the search for Pareto optimal allocationsrequires systems to account for market-distorting exter-nalities, such as environmental pollution of the globalcommons. For example, pollution taxes and sheries reg-ulation may improve market efciency and help achievePareto optimality.

Finally, there is an important distinction to be drawnbetween Pareto optimality as a tool and as a value judg-ment. Used properly, Pareto optimality is excellent atidentifying situations in which all available value hasbeen captured. However, the fact that a given allocationis Pareto optimal does not mean that it satises normativeconditions of fairness or justice. Thus, highly unbalancedwealth distributions may be Pareto optimal, if there is noway to make the poor better off without diminishing thewealth of the rich, but this provides the starting point fora normative debate on maximizing social and global wel-fare, rather than the end point.

Related Topics▶ Free Trade▶ Global Justice▶ Sen, Amartya

ReferencesChapman B (1982) Individual rights and collective rationality: some

implications for economic analysis of law. 10 Hofstra Law Review 455. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1156881

Olson M (2000) Power and prosperity: outgrowing communist andcapitalist dictatorships

Parsons T (1937) The structure of social action, Vol. 1. Marshall, Pareto,Durkheim

Paris Peace Conference

HARRISON HIBBERTDepartment of Philosophy, Purdue University, WestLafayette, IN, USA

Following the armistice of World War I, the Paris PeaceConference comprised a number of meetings held among

the Allied and Associated Powers, beginning in January 1919 and leading up to the Treaty of Versailles in June. Thenegotiations were not only to determine what measuresshould be taken against the Central Powers but also toestablish an international political structure with a view toward peaceable global relations such that future warsmight be prevented. While many have since criticizedcertain ideological and political aspects of theproceedings,particularly in hindsight of the failure to prevent or ade-quately respond to circumstances leading up to WorldWar II, scholars also recognize the Peace Conference asa decisive moment in world politics and likewise in thediscourse of global justice. Two points in particular bearthis out.

The rst of these concerns the creation of the Leagueof Nations. The situation in postwar Europe presentedthe leaders of the Allied and Associated Powers an oppor-tunity to actualize the idea of an international commu-nity whose unifying doctrine would be one of mutualrecognition with respect to the self-determination of peoples and nations. Accordingly, the foremost princi-ples of the League were collective security for membernations and the protection of state sovereignty, bothof which depended equally on multilateral cooperationand communication. By emphasizing the authority of peoples more so than that of governments, as regardsthe political determination of their respective terri-tories and affairs, the League of Nations advanced legal

and moral principles of an unprecedented transnationalorder.The second point has to do with the role afforded to

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the proceed-ings of the Conference. Among the rules of the confer-ence, which were drawn up at the plenary meeting onJanuary 18, 1919, there was included for private groupsand individuals to present petitions which, after beingcompiled by the Secretariat General, were then to bedistributed among government delegates. The inuenceof NGOs at the Peace Conference was of greater accountin some domains than it was in others – the InternationalLabour Organization (ILO), for instance, provided fullparticipation rights for NGO delegates – but what standsout as most noteworthy here is that international coop-eration among sovereign states undertook to representinterests of non-state actors.

M. Clemenceau, honoring the words of U.S. PresidentWoodrow Wilson, said of the Peace Conference in hisplenary address, “this is the rst occasion on whicha delegation of all civilized peoples of the world has beenseen assembled.”

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Related Topics▶ Democratic Nation Building▶ Democratic Peace Theory ▶ Foreign Policy ▶ Global Democracy ▶ Global Governance▶ League of Nations▶ Liberal Internationalism▶ Political Autonomy

ReferencesCharnovitz S (2003) The emergence of democratic participation in global

governance (Paris, 1919). Ind J Glob Leg Stud 10:45–77Macmillan M (2003) Paris 1919. Random House, New York

PartialitySTEPHEN NATHANSONDepartment of Philosophy, Northeastern University,Boston, MA, USA

Partiality appears to be the primary obstacle to global justice. Advocates of global justice appeal to an impartialperspective that emphasizes the moral equality of allhuman beings. They see this equality as the basis for

a moral duty to give equal consideration to the needsand interests of all people. This impartialist perspective,however, ies in the face of the immense psychologicalpower of partiality, which is evident in the widespreadtendency to care more about some people rather thanothers and the normally greater motivation to act onbehalf of people and groups we care most about ratherthan people and groups who are distant strangers. Thispartiality is not only psychological; it is also supported by common moral beliefs, according to which people haveboth a special right and a special duty to act on behalf of those whom they love and care about.

Because there are many different objects of partialistfeelings, there are many different forms of partiality. Ego-ists are partial to themselves, while parents may be partialto their children, racists partial to members of their own

race, and patriots and nationalists to their own country.All forms of partiality, however, stand together in rejectingthe extreme impartiality that globalism seems to require.

Globalism, however, is not the only perspective that isin tension with partiality. Each of the many partialistattitudes can clash with the rest. Some of these competingforms of partialism appear in Table 1.

Apart from theextreme poles of egoism and globalism,all of the other partialities face criticism from two sides,those who say they are too narrowly partialistic and thosewho say they are not partialistic enough.

The importance of the contrast between partiality andimpartiality is highlighted in the title of Thomas Nagel’sbook Equality and Partiality . According to Nagel, we lack morally acceptable political ideals because we do not know how to reconcile two separate, competing perspectiveswithin ourselves. The rst perspective is impersonal andleads to an impartial view of all people as having equalmoral status. The second is personal and gives rise tostrongly partialist motivations to favor ourselves and peo-ple with whom we have special relationships. According toNagel, we cannot reject either of these perspectives, but wedo not know how to do justice to both of them.

Nagel’s powerful formulation of the partiality/impar-tiality problem is misleading in two respects. First, itunderstates the great psychological power of partiality.Nagel sees partialist and impartialist motivations asroughly equal, competing human tendencies. Typically,

however, partiality is a stronger motivator of humanbehavior. Second, Nagel overlooks the fact that partiality can vary in both scope and intensity. The partiality of theegoist differs from that of the patriot because the egoist’sconcerns are narrower in scope, focusing only on theinterests of the self. Patriots, by contrast, care for themembers of a national group, but their concern for thesepeoplevaries in intensity. Patriots arenot equally partial toall of their fellow citizens; they generally care more abouttheir friends and family than about fellow citizens who arenot “near and dear.”

These variations among types of partiality provide aclue to resolving the problem of doing justice to thecompeting visions that arise from the impersonal andthe personal perspective. What is needed is a view thatallows us to retain our personal, partialist concerns while

Partiality. Table 1

Egoism Near-and-dear-ism Racism and/or religionism Patriotism/nationalism Globalism

Partialityto self

Partiality to loved ones,family, and friends

Partiality toward groups based onmembership and emotional ties

Partiality toward one’s stateor national group

Impartial concernfor all people

810 P Partiality

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also acting in accord with the impartial recognition of theequal worth of all.

Globalists often aim not for reconciliation but forthe rejection of partiality. This can be seen in the criti-cisms of patriotism made by the Russian writer andthinker Leo Tolstoy. Tolstoy strongly denounced patriot-ism, charging that patriotism cannot be a virtue becauseit is contrary to the central values of religion and moral-ity. Patriotism, he says, denies the equality of all peopleand promotes the goal of one nation (one’s own) dom-inating all others. Patriotic partiality is a vice andshould give way to impartial concern for all people.This view is echoed in Peter Singer’s call for a global,antinationalist ethic. Singer argues that our current,twenty-rst century problems are so intertwined thatthey cannot be resolved by a system of nation-states, inwhich citizens give near-exclusive loyalty to their ownnation-state and ignore the needs, interests, and claims of people in the larger global community.

Most people, however, see themselves as having specialduties to their own country and will reject globalism if itrequires forsaking patriotic loyalty. The only thing thatpatriots and globalists seem to agree on is that patrioticloyalty and concern for global justice are incompatiblewith one another.

This either/or view rests on the assumption thatpatriotic partiality and globalist impartiality cannot bereconciled. As a result, we have no choice but to opt for

one of the two attitudes displayed in Table 2.While global universalism seeks to promote the goodof all people, patriotism, as described in Table 2, requiresexclusive concern for one country and its people. Animplication of this exclusive concern is that “anythinggoes” in the pursuit of the nation’s well-being. Whether itis in the context of war or economic competition, this formof patriotism aims to make the nation as well off as possiblewhile showing no regard for other nations or people.

While this attitude is not uncommon, especially intimes of crisis, it is not the attitude of most patrioticpeople. Most people recognize the humanity of people inother countries. When there are natural disasters, bothindividuals and nations often respond in a humane way,providing assistance for others in dire need. In addition,

many people are horried by acts of war, such as massivekilling and raping of innocent civilians, and they do notwant their own countries to engage in these actions.

These facts show that any adequate description of patriotism must recognize that there are different formsof patriotism. Table 3 distinguishes between two forms of patriotism. What Table 2 labeled “patriotism” is now called “extreme patriotism,” and an additional form of patriotism that incorporates some degree of impartiality is labeled “moderate patriotism.”

According to the moderate patriotic view, there isnothing wrong with partiality toward one’s own country,but how one acts on this felt partiality is morally constrained by a recognition of the equal humanity of others. The upshot is that patriots can be specially concerned to promote their country’s good while acknowl-edging that promoting the nation’s interests must bedone in morally acceptable ways. They reject the extremepatriot’s view that the national interest can be pursued ina completely unconstrained manner.

Moderate patriotism seeks to solve the reconciliationproblem by rejecting both global universalism’s pureimpartialism as well as the excessive partiality of extremepatriotism. What it accepts is a form of limited orconstrained partiality that gives special status to pursuingthe good of one’s own nation while showing respect andconcern for non-compatriots. It does this, for example, by recognizing moral limits on how wars are fought and by

helping people in other countries who face naturaldisasters or other forms of extreme deprivation.Moderate patriotism’s reconciliation effort faces criti-

cism from both sides. Extreme patriots, communitarians,and others with intensecommitments to particular groupscriticize its effort to balance partiality with universality.These critics argue that moderate views dangerously weaken the strong commitment that people should haveto their own country. Global universalists are equally

Partiality. Table 2

Patriotism Global universalism

Exclusive concern for one’sown country and its citizens

Equal concern for allpeople

Unconstrained promotion of the national good

Promotion of the good of all people, not countries

Partiality. Table 3

Extremepatriotism

Moderatepatriotism

Globaluniversalism

Exclusive concernfor one’s owncountry and itscitizens

Special (but notexclusive) concernfor one’s owncountry and itscitizens

Equal concernfor all people

Unconstrainedpromotion of thenational good

Promotion of thenational good bymorally acceptablemeans

Promotion of thegood of allpeople, notcountries

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critical. They claim that once moderate patriots acknowl-edge the equal value of all persons, they no longer have any basis for partiality and cannot justify any specialcommitment to promoting the good of their own country rather than the good of all people.

Moderate patriots respond to critics by arguing thatall of these various views must be evaluated so as to seewhich is most reasonable, and they stress that there isno reason to be limited to a choice between the mostextreme positions. This overall strategy is strengthenedby noting that global universalism can also take extremeand moderate forms. Table 4 shows a broader range of choice by adding a moderate globalist option.

It illuminates several points. First, it shows that bothextreme globalism (as described here) and extreme patri-otism share common aws. While extreme patriotism failsto recognize any moral obligations to anything but thenation and its citizens, extreme globalism fails to recognizeany legitimacy to patriotic partiality and rejects any con-straints on the pursuit of its impartialist goals. As a result,its stated commitment to the rights of all people couldcoexist with the use of brutal, unconstrained meansagainst people who oppose globalism’s goals.

Second, the table highlights the features that moderatepatriotism and moderate globalism share. Just as mod-erate patriots recognize constraints on the pursuit of national goals, moderate globalists recognize that peoplewho value their own communities can have a legitimate

interest in preserving them. For this reason, as they pursue their globalist vision, moderate globalists willnot ruthlessly destroy these communities or their sharedforms of life and will accept moral constraints on themeans by which they promote their goals.

The strategy of moderating and constraining bothpartialist and impartialist perspectives opens up the pos-sibility of reconciling partiality and impartiality. In doingso, it raises new challenges that require specifying moreconcretely the implications of these moderate positions.Responding to these challenges reveals that moderate

patriotism itself can be divided into different forms, thusgiving rise to subspecies of moderate patriotism.

All forms of moderate patriotism recognize some obli-gations to people who are not compatriots. By acceptingmoral constraintson how their country pursues thenationalinterest, they recognize at least some negative duties towardnon-compatriots. These negative duties forbid the killing,injuring, enslaving,or plundering of other peoples as meansof promoting the national interest. Thus, they rule out warsof aggression and conquest as legitimate.

Moderate patriots may differ among themselves, how-ever, on the subject of whether they have positive moralduties to non-compatriots. Some moderate patriots willrecognize positive duties to people who are victims of natural or social disasters or who suffer severe deprivationbecause of weak economic development. Other moderatepatriots will accept only negative duties to other countriesand their people. In their view, they have a negative duty not to harm non-compatriots, but they have no positiveduty to provide aid or assistance to them.

Moderate patriots may also disagree about thestrength of these duties. Some moderate patriots mightbelieve that these duties apply only when compliancerequires little or no sacrice. Others may think that dutiesto non-compatriots continue to apply even when compli-ance requires a high degree of sacrice.

The differences between these views can be seen by applying them to environmental issues, global poverty,

and war. Moderate patriots who hold the “little or nosacrice” view will not accept environmental policiesthat do any harm to their country economically, even if rejecting these policies willcause serious harm to people inother countries. They will also favor global economicassistance only if it is at a very low cost for their country,and they will reject compliance with humanitarian laws of war if compliance makes it more difcult for their country to achieve victory in a war.

Moderate patriots who accept that acting morally toward non-compatriots may come at a high price will

Partiality. Table 4

Extreme patriotism Moderate patriotism Moderate globalism Extreme globalism

Priorities Exclusive concern for one’sown country and itspeople

Higher priority forone’s own country;genuine but lesserconcern for others

Equal concern for all people butrecognition of legitimatepartiality for one’s own countryand its citizens

Equal concern for all peopleand hostility to any type of partiality toward one’s ownnation and its citizens

Constraints on pursuitof goals

No moral constraints onthe pursuit of nationalgoals

Morally constrainedpursuit of nationalgoals

Morally constrained pursuit of globalist goals

No moral constraints on thepursuit of globalist goals

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favor compliance with global duties even if requiressignicant economic sacrices or increases the chancesof being defeated in a war. They might even believe thattheir country should lose a war if the only way to winrequires large-scale attacks against enemy civilians orother serious violations of human rights.

These examples make clear that distinguishing betweenextreme and moderate views is only the rst step towarddeveloping a full ethic of limited partiality. Different peoplewill want to balance the demands of partiality and impar-tiality in different ways, even if they agree that the extremepartialist and impartialist views are defective.

This gives rise to a question about the method thatmight be used to determine the strength of the duties thatmoderate patriots have to non-compatriots. Is there a way to tell which of these different “moderate” views is correct?How can progress be made toward greater specicity inunderstanding of the ethic of moderate patriotism andother forms of partiality that aim to operate in morally legitimate ways?

One strategy for determining the limits of moderatepatriotic partiality is to step backward and to ask why patriotic partiality is justied at all. One answer starts by accepting an impartialist moral perspective that recog-nizes the equal worth of all people. It then claims that itis in the interests of all people to have various forms of partiality recognized and permitted. For example, virtu-ally everyone would agree that human life would be much

less good if partiality toward friends and family wereforbidden. These forms of partiality are morally permittedbecause of their widespread benets to all people.

Cana similar claim be made about countries? Arepeoplegenerally better off if partiality toward national groups ispermissible? This question could be approached froma variety of philosophical perspectives. Social contract theo-rists might ask whether rational people selecting rules of behavior would support the permissibility of acting par-tially toward one’s own country. Kantians might ask whattype of patriotism is consistent with viewing all people asmembers of a kingdom of ends. Rights theorists might ask what rights people have to act on behalf of groups theycareabout, and rule utilitarians could ask whether recognizinga moral code that allows people to be specially concernedabout their own countries would lead to greater overallgood for everyone. Each of these approaches would beginwith impartial moral standards in order to determinewhether rules that justify partiality are justied.

A description of a rule utilitarian approach will illus-trate how such methods might be pursued. Utilitariansbegin with an impartial commitment to giving equalweight to the interests of all people and to achieving the

greatest overall good for people, whatever nation they might belong to. They then argue that accepting moderatepatriotic principles is a reasonable way to implement thisglobalist ideal because these principles create an efcient“division of labor” approach. This strategy rests on theidea that more good can be done overall if people focus onsmaller units rather than trying to benet all of humanity.One reason to follow the slogan “think globally, actlocally” is that people’s knowledge of societies in distantplaces with different customs and values is limited. By contrast, people can deal more effectively with problemsthat are closer to home because they understand thembetter. Second, even if everyone were purely benevolent,multiple attempts to benet everyone are likely to conictwith one another. As a result, benevolent, would-behelpers will get in each other’s way.

Robert Goodin calls this approach the “assignedresponsibility” model for justifying patriotic duties. Patri-otic duties are justied not because one’s own “country-men” are more important or superior to others but ratherbecause global goals can best be achieved by dividing thetask. Partiality, according to this view, is justied becausethe division of labor is an effective means of achievinga general goal.

This rule utilitarian argument provides both a justi-cation for patriotism as well as a criterion for setting limitson the extent of permissible partiality. It rules out, forexample, the partiality of extreme patriotism because that

form pursues the national interest at the expense of others.More concretely, this approach rules out the extremepartialist view that “all’s fair in love and war.” Instead, itwill support rules of war that permit countries to defendthemselves while prohibitingwars forunjust causesand theuse of excessively destructive means of ghting.

The same point seems to follow about global eco-nomic concerns. While countries may promote theirown economic well-being, they may not be indifferent tothe impact of their economic policies on others. A form of patriotism that is justied by a rule utilitarian argumentwill not permit wealthy nations to be indifferent to theplight of poor ones because the goal of the division of labor is to achieve overall well-being. That goal will not beachieved by unconstrained pursuit of the national interest,whether in the conduct of war or the pursuit of economicprosperity. Nor will it be achieved by a morality thatfrees countries from moral duties whenever complianceresults in costs to a country’s well-being. As with personalmorality, the morality of nations sometimes will requirethat sacrices be made.

This argument sketch illustrates how one could beginwith a global, impartial goal of maximizing the well-being

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of all people, move then to a justication for partialistattitudes and institutions as the most effective way of achieving this goal, and then derive the positive and neg-ative duties to other peoples and nations that individualcountries and their citizens have. If this strategy succeeds,it would solve the problem of determining the limits of patriotic partiality and would reconcile partialist dutieswith the globalist’s impartial concern for all.

Finally, this reconciling approach claries the politicsof partiality and impartiality. The simplest translation of globalist attitudes into reality would be some type of worldgovernment. Yet, the prospect of such a government isdeeply threatening to many people. It raises the specterof a distant, all-powerful government over which individ-uals and current political groups have little control.

Reasonable globalists who support the idea of a worldgovernment will see the path toward this goal as a gradualprocess, one that involves the creation of some globalinstitutions that existing states will join or recognize. Aninstitution like the International Criminal Court, forexample, ts with global ideals because it makes it possibleto enforce restrictions on the powers of national ofcialsto violate universal human rights.

Since moderate patriots recognize moral limits on themeans by which countries may promote their interests,they too can support international laws that prohibithuman rights violations and international courts thatcan enforce these laws fairly. In fact, there are many policy

initiatives that globalists favor (e.g., efforts to combatglobal poverty, limit the dire effects of war, or preventdamage to the environment) that can be supported by moderate patriots. In this way, the reconciliation projectcan succeed both in theory and in practice.

If globalists seek to abolish states or prohibit givingany priority to one’s own nation, then moderate patriotswill oppose them. But many of the policies and institu-tional reforms that globalist promote do not require theabolition of states or the prohibition of national loyalties.This makes it possible for globalists and moderate patriotsto be political allies who are reconciled in practice even if they differ in theory.

Related Topics▶ Compatriot Partiality Thesis▶ Cosmopolitan Justice▶ Duties to Non-Compatriots▶ Global Egalitarianism▶ Global Impartiality Thesis▶ Global Justice▶ Liberal Nationalism▶ Nationalism

▶ Patriotism▶ Rule-Consequentialism▶ Singer, Peter

ReferencesBrock G, Brighouse H (eds) (2005) The political philosophy of cosmo-

politanism. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoodin R (1988) What is so special about our countrymen? Ethics

98:663–686MacIntyreA (1984) Is patriotism a virtue? In: Primoratz I (ed) Patriotism.

Humanity Books, BuffaloNagel T (1991) Equality and partiality. OxfordUniversity Press, New York Nathanson S (1993) Patriotism, morality and peace. Rowman &

Littleeld, LanhamNussbaum M (1996) For the love of country. Beacon, BostonPrimoratz I (ed) (2002) Patriotism. Humanity Books, BuffaloSchefer S (2001) Boundaries and allegiances. Oxford University Press,

New York Singer P (2002) One world. Yale University Press, New Haven

Tamir Y (1993) Liberal nationalism. Princeton University Press, PrincetonTolstoy L (1968) On patriotism. In: Tolstoy’s writings on nonviolence andcivil disobedience. New American Library, New York

Paternalism

JUDITH WAGNER DECEWDepartment of Philosophy, Clark University, Worcester,MA, USA

Paternalism is generally dened as a person or group, ormost commonly a government, restricting one’s individ-ual liberty for one’s own good, or to prevent one fromharming oneself. This liberty-limiting principle iscontrasted withJohn Stuart Mill’s famous Harm Principle,that a government is only justied in interfering withindividual liberty to prevent harm to others. Despite mul-tiple ambiguities associated with Mill’s harm principle,most endorse it in some form or another, whereas pater-nalism is a far more controversial principle.

John Stuart Mill famously rejects paternalism, except

in the case of children, minors, or those not yet with thematurity of their faculties. In the rst chapter of his book On Liberty (1859), Mill explicitly states his harm principleand then defends his anti-paternalistic stance on thesefollowing reasons:

1. The only purpose for which power can be exercisedover a person against his or her will is to prevent harmto others.

2. To exercise power over an adult person in a civilizedcommunity for the sake of the person’s own good,however understood, is not justied.

814 P Paternalism

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3. One can be persuaded or nudged for doing what isgood for that person, but one cannot rightfully becompelled to do it against one’s will.

Few have agreed with Mill that paternalism for adultsis always unacceptable. H. L. A. Hart and others haveendorsed some paternalism, although most concur it can-not be boundless. There are plenty of laws in the USA thatare justied by paternalistic reasoning, although many appear to have additional justications – such as to pre-vent harm to others and to prevent offense to others – andthus it is sometimes difcult to distinguish the mostcentral arguments for such laws. Examples of laws thatseem to have primarily paternalistic justications includelaws requiring the use of seat belts and motorcycle hel-mets, laws restricting suicide, laws requiring prescriptionsfor medications, laws forbidding swimming at publicbeaches when no lifeguards are on duty, among others.

Thus, most commentators agree that unrestrictedpaternalism gives governments far too much authority over individual decisions and liberty, and few wouldendorse restricting all risky behavior such as rock climbing, hang gliding, racing sports cars, and more,to protect one from harming oneself. The challenge,therefore, is to nd a principle or set of principles fordetermining when paternalism by government can bedefended and when it is unnecessary. In his well-known essay, “Paternalism ” (1971), Gerald Dworkin has

presented a thoughtful and provocative set of conditionsfor distinguishing those cases when paternalism is justi-ed, a proposal meant to strike a middle ground betweentotal rejection of paternalism and unrestricted paternalis-tic legislation that allows governments excessive powerover individuals.

Dworkin’s proposal is that paternalism can be justiedin three sorts of cases: (1) when decisions one is makingare such that they will produce irreversible harm, suchas decisions to take drugs that are physically or psycho-logically addictive and thus destructive of one’s mentaland physical capacities; (2) when one’s decisions aremade under extreme psychological and sociological pres-sure, such as decisions to commit suicide that are oftenmade when an individual is not thinking clearly andcalmly about the nature of the decision; and (3) whendecisions involve dangers not sufciently understood orappreciated by the decision-maker, such as smoking ciga-rettes when one is not adequately informed of the carci-nogenic dangers, or when one may know the facts buteither discounts them or is unable to resist in spite of them. Dworkin’s defense of these conditions for justifyingpaternalism is persuasive: he believes paternalism is

compelling in cases where it promotes an individual’sability to rationally carry out his or her decisions. Theunderlying idea, then, is to restrict individual liberty in decision-making only in cases where one is not ina fully rational state, in order to allow one to return tobeing a fully autonomous decision-maker with the free-dom to make one’s own decisions without governmentalinterference.

While Dworkin’s defense for his conditions forallowing paternalism is generally appealing, his descrip-tions of the three types of cases when paternalism is justied are ultimately both vague and malleable. Whatcounts as irreversible harm, and when is a decision dan-gerous enough to be destructive of one’s capacities? Whodecides when an individual is not thinking clearly andcalmly enough about his or her decisions? How does onedraw the line between decisions made when one fully comprehends and appreciates the dangers, and decisionswhere there is inadequate understanding? Nevertheless, itseems Dworkin’s general defense is sensible and his pointis correct, namely that paternalism seems justied only when used to restore an individual to a state where theindividual can be fully able to be a rational and autono-mous decision-maker.

The question then arises, how can this theory beapplied globally? When is a government justied inexercising paternalism beyond its own borders? If inter-national paternalism can be justied, then to what extent

is the practice acceptable? As in the case of governmentalpower over its own citizens, however, these questions aredifcult to answer because it is so hard to determine whenpaternalism is the only, or the foundational, basis forglobal paternalistic intervention. Some cases of interna-tional intervention are reasonably clear. Relief efforts inHaiti by the USA and other countries are largely justiedon grounds of benevolence rather than on the basis of doing what is best for the Haitian people – even if the latterpaternalistic argument is also true.

Other global intervention is more complicated, how-ever. It is common to hear that the wars in Iraq andAfghanistan are justied because the reason for warfareis for the good of the Iraqi and Afghan people, to helpthem restore stability in their countries by assisting themin setting up their own governments. Yet it is clear thatthese wars are also justied by national security interests,and that the US government believes more stability in theregions will lead, for example, to better control over ter-rorist activities aimed at the USA.

If Dworkin’s guidelines for justied paternalism areapplied globally, then it seems international paternalisticintervention is indeed justied when it is used to assist

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other countries to develop their own selected governmentand governing institutions so that they can make theirown autonomous decisions in global affairs. But the prob-lem remains whether it is possible to determine whichcases of intervention satisfy that criterion. The rhetoricsurrounding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan makes itclear that it is not uncommon for paternalistic argumentsto be given as lip service for global intervention. In otherwords, claims to be doing what will be in the best interestsof another country are offered repeatedly, when in factthe real justications for the global intervention arenational security or the desire for more global power forthe intervening nation.

Related Topics▶ Agency, Individual▶ Agent-Centered Prerogative▶ Free Trade▶ Global Resource Distribution▶ Humanitarian Military Intervention▶ Imperialism▶ Political Autonomy ▶ Self-Determination▶ Third World Resistance

ReferencesDworkin G (1971) Paternalism. In: Wasserstrom R (ed) Morality and the

law. Wadsworth, Belmont, pp 107–126Dworkin G (2009) Paternalism. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford

encyclopedia of philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/

Mill JS (1859) On liberty. Parker and Son, LondonPope TM (2004) Counting the dragon’s teeth and claws: the denition of

hard paternalism. Georgia State Univ Law Rev 20:659–722Suber P (1999) Paternalism. In: Gray CB (ed) Philosophy of law: an

encyclopedia, vol II. Garland, New York, pp 632–635

Patriarchy

GORDON A. BABSTDepartment of Political Science, Wilkinson College,Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA

Many say that there is really only one religion, and it ispatriarchy, because everywhere women’s status in allspheres is less than men’s. Patriarchy has evolved frombeing a term of primarily religious signicance, to onedenoting an overarching social system that privileges onegroup, men, and their interests, at the expense of another

group, women, and their interests. One commonality across connotations is that patriarchy refers to a form of rule by a privileged person or a group over others who aresubordinate to that one person or group.

Originally, patriarchy referred to the rule of fathers,the ancient patriarchs in the Abrahamic religious tradi-tions. While the biblical Adam and his rule is sometimesunderstood to be the original patriarchy, more commonly the age of the patriarchs refers to the three patriarchs of ancient Judaism, namely, Abraham, his son Isaac, andJacob, Isaac’s son, also named Israel, and from whom the12 tribes of Israel descended. The biblical tradition holds,or has been interpreted to hold that women stand ina different relation to God, who is widely referred to as“God the Father,” for reason of their responsibility for thefall of man owing to original sin, a concept often associ-ated with female sexuality and the weakness of men beforeit. Hence, the rule of men over women and the privilegingof the former both in the household and in the publicarena has been grounded in religious teaching, which hasin turn suggested the impossibility of human refutationand the irreverence of those who would alter a divinely ordained social structure. Women are to be loving andobedient wives to their husbands, good and dotingmothers to their children, their proper sphere being therealm of the family. And, women are to instill the sameunderstanding and respectfulness in their daughters. Thenontraditional reading of this history suggests that men

have always been envious of the mysterious and awesomepower of women’s reproductive capacity, and have soughtto control it and harness it for their own benet.

Patriarchy in modern usage has come to indicate notonly an unjustsocialsystembecause of itsgender hierarchy,but also the institutions and structures that maintain thatsystem. Generally, the important and fairly universal insti-tutions of marriage, where husbands are privileged overtheir wives; the military, which historically has excludedwomen from service altogether and so from citizenship orpolitical equality for reason of not being able to serve; andthe priesthood, which until recently has been an all-malebastion reecting religious teachings have all supported thediminution of women before men. Patriarchy, then, istranscultural and reasoning in the light of traditional socialstructures is bound to be tainted by it, or so feministscholars and others continue to argue.

In her groundbreaking work The Sexual Contract thepolitical theorist Carole Pateman argued that even inmodern advanced liberal democracies, the political struc-ture at its core mirrors the family structure, despite socialcontract liberalism’s apparent emphasis on equality, andthat for this to change all patriarchal relations will need to

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be transformed into free relations. That a person onaccount of being female is more likely to be subject tooppression, no matter how well grounded in cultureits justications may be, is predictably true in a way thatthe same statement about men cannot plausibly beentertained. It is often said that women’s work is eitherunpaid, or less well paid than men’s, and that wherescarcity obtains, women are the last to eat, and the leastempowered to improve their situation.

Related Topics▶ Equality ▶ Feminist Ethics▶ Gender Justice

ReferencesJónasdó ttir A, Brysono V, Jones K (eds) (2010) Sexuality,gender and power:

intersectional and transnational perspectives. Routledge, LondonLerner L (1987) The creation of patriarchy. Oxford University Press,

New York Millett K (1970) Sexual politics. Doubleday, New York Pateman C (1988) The sexual contract. Stanford University Press,

Stanford

Patriotism

KOSTAS KOUKOUZELISDepartment of Philosophy & Social Studies, University of Crete, Rethymno, Crete, Greece

Patriotism dened as “love for one’s own country” ismainly characterized by psychological traits of affection,a sense of identication, and special concern for the well-being of patria. It can involve pride in or endorsement of one’s own country’s virtues, although it can just meanaffection just because it is one’s own country. Patriotismcan be an important component of one’s sense of identity,and some even think that it is the only realistic scope of morality itself, undermining the possibility of any kind of universal or global community and ethics. Common senseopposes patriotic partiality that may come in conictwith moral or cosmopolitan impartiality, but as AlasdairMacIntyre observed, it is not easy to say, especially in ourtimes of globalization, whether patriotism is indeed avice or a virtue. However, patriotism has to be clearly distinguished from nationalism, although in most casesthe two have been confused and used interchangeably.Nationalism is usually connected to common ancestry,

race, ethnicity, or culture and strives to take a stateform. It can be aggressive, but it need not be so. On theother hand, patriotism as love for one’s own country does not by necessity imply, in the above mentionedsense, homogeneity of any sort, and it is the case thatsometimes a nation can lack a country of its own (e.g.,Israel for many years).

Patriotism had and still continues to undoubtedly have a number of erce critics who object to it as beingeither conceptually confused or simply deeply immoral.People that think patriotism is conceptually confusedargue that it is simply a constructed abstraction ora gment of imagination, which represents no real tiesbetween compatriots. Leo Tolstoy, the famous Russiannovelist, thought that patriotism is immoral, exactly because many times it calls for promoting one’s owncountry’s interests at the expense of all other countries,even if this would harm them in the long run. Morerecently, there have been a number of writers who sharethe same attitude equating patriotic favoritism to a kindof racism (Gomberg) – considerations regarding racismagainst black people can also be applied here. If peoplefavor, for example, compatriots in employment at theexpense of immigrants who enter the country becauseof international inequality, this discriminates againstthem in a morally objectionable way. Nevertheless, theessential question of how patriotism and moral universal-ism (or cosmopolitan impartiality) are related, if at all,

is primarily a question concerning the right conceptionof patriotism itself and on the related questions of global justice.

Let us now turn to certain conceptions of patriotismin order to clarify their connection to global justice,given that in moral philosophy the debate concerns thestanding of patriotism as a case of reconciling universalmoral claims with particular attachments.

Patriotism can be distinguished into its thick orcommunitarian and thin or more liberal versions. In itsextreme communitarian version, patriotism attaches toa kind of political realism that rejects morality in relationsamong countries in favor of mere patriotic self-interest –this having, arguably, its roots in Thucydides and Hobbes.In its less extreme, albeit robust version, MacIntyre arguesthat patriotism is not to be contrasted with morality because it is the very basis of morality itself, in the sensethat one can be a moral agent only within a certain com-munity. According to him, therefore, justice is fundamen-tally parochial, not global. On the thin or more liberalversions of patriotism, though people may defend specialties to their own country and to their compatriots, they need not do so on an exclusive basis. Morality allows for

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particular attachments and obligations by distinguishingbetween different levels. There is a legitimate level of partiality involved in our relationship with compatriots just as there is legitimate partiality in our relationshipswith family and friends, and we have impartial reasons forthat. Yet, this legitimate partiality to our compatriotsleaves room for moral concerns for the outsiders. Liberalpatriotism, for example, does not require the patriot topromote his or her country’s interests under any circum-stances. In relation to just war theory, liberal patriotismdoes not create the obligation for one to ght for one’scountry unless the war is just.

Scholars offer a number of reasons favoring patrioticbias over global impartiality. First, although one may haveequal concern for all humanity, certain considerations of efciency speak in favor of compatrioticbias. For instance,people have a better understanding of the needs of theirfellow citizens and aid can be provided more easily. Sec-ond, a cooperative system of mutual benet forms theground of a patriotic bias based on reciprocity. Third,a comprehensive morality of respect produces a strongduty for compatriots because it dictates an interest increating a framework of social trust. Fourth, special dutiesto compatriots are associative duties among equals thatshare responsibility in enacting coercive laws. Undueinequality on the domestic front interferes with commonbonds among citizens, curtailing the effectiveness of col-lective authority that imposes mutually coercive laws on

fellow citizens, something that does not exist in globalvoluntary associations.Immanuel Kant defends a certain version of “cosmo-

politan patriotism,” something that appeals to contempo-rary thinkers such as Anthony Appiah. In making an effortto reconcile patriotic duties to moral cosmopolitanism,Kant argues that there is no inherent conict between thetwo because:

1. Patriotic duties have to yield to our moral cosmopol-itan duties. For example, one should not procuremoney for paying taxes by stealing, because that

would be universally unjust.2. If people fulll their civic patriotic duties to theirown just republic, they are likely to further the causeof a league of states and promote perpetual peace.

3. Finally, promoting justice in one’s own republic, onecan strive to make it more just in its dealings withother states.

In the context of our post-national era, and underpressures from multiculturalism and immigration owsthat de facto dismantle homogeneity, patriotism has toreinvent itself in order to survive. Such an effort includes

constitutional patriotism, most notably used by Habermaslately, but also related to the republican tradition (Viroli),which sees in the constitution the common liberty thatis made possible, enjoyed, and preserved by people’sunion. Constitutional patriotism became especially rele-vant in the discussions on the European political integra-tion project.

According to Charles Taylor, patriotism is especially needed nowadays in order to cure the alleged destructive-ness of the atomistic thinness that a certain strand of liberal cosmopolitanism brings to any form of politicalcommunity. According to him, patriotism provides aunity indispensable for creating solidarity among peopleand providing motivation to participate in and promotethe common good.

Related Topics▶ Associative Duties▶ Compatriot Partiality Thesis▶ Nationalism▶ Partiality ▶ Special Obligations

ReferencesAppiah A (1996) Cosmopolitan patriots. In: Nussbaum M et al. (1996)

For love of country: debating the limits of patriotism, ed. Cohen J.Beacon Press, Boston

Bader V (2005) Reasonable impartiality and priority for compatriots.

A criticism of liberal nationalism’s main aws. Ethical Theory Moral Pract 8:83–103

Gomberg P (1990) Patriotism is like racism. Ethics 101:144–150Goodin R (1988) What is so special about our fellow countrymen? Ethics

98:663–687Kleingeld P (2003) Kant’s cosmopolitan patriotism. Kant Stud

94:299–316Maclntyre A (1984) Is patriotism a virtue? The Lindley lectures, Univer-

sity of Kansas. In: Beiner R (ed) (1995) Theorizing citizenship.SUNY, Albany, pp 209–228

Miller R (1998) Cosmopolitan respect and patriotic concern. PhilosPublic Aff 27(3):202–224, Reprinted in Brock G, Brighouse H (eds)The political philosophy of cosmopolitanism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 127–147

Nathanson S (1993) Patriotism, morality and peace. Rowman & Littleeld, Lanham

Nussbaum M et al (1996) For love of country: debating the limits of patriotism, ed. Cohen J. Beacon, Boston

Primoratz I (2009) Patriotism. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford encyclo-pedia of philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/patriotism

Taylor C (1996) Why democracy needs patriotism. In: Cohen J (ed) Forlove of country. Beacon, Boston

Tolstoy L (1987) ‘On patriotism’ and ‘patriotism or peace?’ in his writingson civil disobedience and nonviolence. New Society, Philadelphia,pp 51–123, 137–147

Viroli M (1995) For love of country: an essay on patriotism and nation-alism. Oxford University Press, Oxford

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Pax Natura Foundation

R ANDALLTOLPINRUDPax Natura Foundation, Salt Lake City, UT, USA

While wars over the centuries among nations have rav-aged the human population, an undeclared war has alsobeen raging against the natural world. This conict,according to the Pax Natura Foundation, while complex and difcult to dene, in many ways now appears toconstitute a potentially far more serious threat to thelong-term survival of life on Earth as we know it. Reportsof mass destruction continue to come from ecologists,biologists, meteorologists, and concerned individualsfrom many disciplines. On the front lines of this conictare the decline of clean air and water, the relentlessrestructuring of the atmosphere and climate, the clearingof the rainforests, the destruction of the coral reefs, therandom restructure of natural gene pools, and a host of other violent acts against nature.

The Pax Natura Foundation promotes “peace withnature” by empowering local communities to preservethe environment while stimulating local economicgrowth. Pax Natura achieves this by directing capitalfrom industrialized nations to developing nations in aneffort to promote sustainable development by rewarding

good stewardship of tropical rain forest lands. The Foun-dation espouses a new bill of rights for the environment by acknowledging the sovereignty of natural law governingliving systems and our direct dependence upon thesesystems. Rather than building walls for conservation atthe expense of the poor in the developing world, theFoundation rewards indigenous peoples and local com-munities for the protection of natural systems so impor-tant to the preservation of life.

Ecology suggests that human rights are predicatedupon the rights of all living systems and until such recog-nition is institutionalized in human awareness, the sur-vival of species diversity, including the human, willremain in doubt. Pax Natura holds that the right to life,liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is not an ideal in theabstract. Fairness, as a denition of global justice, pre-supposes sustainability. The rights of future generationsto water, food, and shelter, if compromised by the presentgeneration’s destruction of these living systems, consti-tute an infringement and violation of basic human rights.But above and beyond the rights of human beings, therights of all species, foundational to life itself, must bebrought into the debate.

The collective congruency and history of public lifewithin the human family is inadequate as a model for any comprehensive theory of global justice. Climate changeand mass species extinction demand a reassessment of thisnotion. The ecological crisis shows that global justice orfairness cannot be limited to political and cultural bound-aries between peoples and nations. There are no bound-aries in the natural world. The Pax Natura example thussuggests that global environmental justice is the new uni-versal and philosophical moral imperative.

Sustainability, as a derivative of global environmental justice, has little to do with the natural resource asset baseof the planet preserved for future generations. Sustainabil-ity is the goal of development expressed within andthrough natural laws. Natural law is the system of nature,the universal law of causality. Pax Natura argues thathuman conduct in the pursuit of any type of sustainability only becomes possible when derived from the intrinsicrationality of the universe as a whole and not in opposi-tion to it. What is called the “green” development revo-lution, supported by Pax Natura, is a manifestation of this principle.

The debate on holism versus reductionism in modernphysical theory is illustrative of the challenges facing thisnew theory of justice. The discovery of ecology suggeststhat the system of nature is non-reductive and that partand whole are mutually inclusive in the natural world. Thewolf in Yellowstone, the ying bats in American Samoa,

the honeybee, or ubiquitous leaf-cutter ants in the tropics,each play pivotal roles in the web of life accordingto biologists. The Pax Natura theory of global justicetacitly recognizes the tapestry of this existence and theinherent rights and necessity of every stitch in its makingand continuation. Peace with nature is thus an idealfounded upon the growing scientic consensus of theinterdependence of all living systems.

Applying this theory of justice to perhaps one of themost challenging issues of our time, Pax Natura, in con- junction with the United Nations Framework Conventionon Climate Change (UNFCCC), recognizes and has quan-tied the environmental services that standing tropicalforests provide to the planet in regulating greenhousegas emissions, the principal driver of climate change. Asdeforestation primarily in the tropics accounts for nearly 20% of all global-warming emissions, stopping theirdestruction is essential to prevent further rising tempera-tures. By rewarding small to medium size landowners intropical countries for the environmental services theirforests provide to the planet as a whole, Pax Natura isacknowledging our mutual interdependence and demon-strating a new level of international cooperation in solving

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this challenge. Peace with nature, as this model suggests, isnow an imperative to insure not only our own survival butthe survival of countless life forms on planet Earth.

Related Topics▶ Basic Rights▶ Biodiversity ▶ Crimes Against Peace▶ Development Ethics▶ Environmental Justice▶ Environmental Sustainability ▶ Foreign Policy ▶ Global Citizenship▶ Global Justice▶ Indigenous Peoples▶ World Bank (WB)

ReferencesCaueld C (1991) In the rainforest. University of Chicago Press, ChicagoFONAFIFO: Over a Decade of Action (2005) A Costa Rican national

forestry nancing fund INAOTERRA Editores, S.A.Goodall J, Berman P (1999) Reason for