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In this report Sam Gardiner examines one possible outcome of the Iran-West

controversy. If Israel were to decide that it had no choice but to strike Iranian

nuclear facilities, what would be the consequences? With some justication,

Israel seems to be losing condence in the commitment of the Obama

Administration to protect its interests with respect to Iran, writes Gardiner.

Israel is therefore seen to be pushed in a direction that could lead to an

attack against Iran. The Israel Defence Forces are assessed to have the

military capability to damage and to set back the Iranian nuclear program.

Immediately after an Israeli attack, the United States would likely begin

signicant defensive deployments to the region, according to Gardiner. Soon

thereafter, the Administration in Washington is assumed to choose to nish

the job, eliminating Irans nuclear facilities. As the conict moves forward,

the United States would want to end it as quickly as possible. However,

assessments of Iranian action along with a visible opposition inside Iran,would likely lead the Administration to expand the conict, making regime

elimination the new objective.

Gardiner concludes that Iran is the only country with the capacity to

prevent the seemingly inevitable movement towards what would be a

disaster for itself, for the region, for Europeans, and for the United States.

This is the second report on consequences of military actions against

Iran published by the Asia Security Studies Programme at the Swedish

Defence Research Agency. The rst report, Consequences of Military Actions

Against Iran, was published in 2008. Both reports are available for download

at www.foi.se/asia.

ISBN: 978-91-7056-126-9

The Israeli ThreatAn Analysis of the Consequences

of an Israeli Strikeon Iranian Nuclear Facilities

Sam Gardiner, Colonel, usaf (Retired)

special report

march 2010


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For more information visit us at www.foi.se.

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FOI Special Reports are monographs on contemporary issues

of particular policy relevance authored by FOI researchers or

by outside individuals. Papers are chosen and commissioned

by FOI research teams on account of their quality and contri-

bution to policy formulation and debate.

Drafts are normally reviewed by several experts from FOI

and other institutions. Responsibility for views expressed in

the monographs lies exclusively with authors.

About the Author

Sam Gardiner is a retired United States Air Force colonel.

He has taught strategy at the U.S. National War College,

Air War College and Naval War College. He has also been

a visiting scholar at the Swedish National Defence College.

He has participated in various projects with the Swedish

National Defence Research Organization for the past 20 years.

He has written extensively on military options for Iran,

and has conducted numerous war games to examine military

options and possible outcomes. One of these games was done

for Atlantic Monthly to gauge how a U.S. President might re-

spond, militarily or otherwise, to Irans rapid progress toward

developing nuclear weapons. He lives in Arlington, Virginia.


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The Israeli ThreatAn Analysis of the Consequencesof an Israeli Strikeon Iranian Nuclear Facilities

Sam Gardiner, Colonel, usaf (Retired)

special reportmarch 2010

ISBN: 978-91-7056-126-9


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Foreword

The controversy over Irans nuclear programme is in its eighth

year and no satisactory resolution seems possible in the near

uture. Despite broad international critique Iran continues itsnuclear quest. Stakes have constantly been raised as Iran per-sists in taking urther uranium enrichment steps. Coupled withthe accelerated ballistic missile programme and revelations o

covert nuclear acilities observers cannot but conclude that Iranis marching towards a de acto nuclear weapons capability.

In its legitimate quest to prevent Iran rom acquiring nuclearweapons capability, the West has used a mix o sanctions

and diplomatic negotiations in eorts to dissuade Iran rom

continuing down the nuclear route. Western diplomacy hasall but ailed in these attempts. Tis ailure hinges on a ewkey actors. Due to diering objectives and approaches theU.S. and Europe have had diculties in closely coordinating

their eorts. Lack o coherence and coordination has also beenevident within Europe. In 2003, Europe as a whole seemed tobe taking the role o mediator but by 2005 the EU had swungcloser to the U.S. position. Some European countries werequick to take a tough stance. Others kept a cautious approach

ocusing on maintaining lucrative economic relations while not

deying the U.S. too much. Tis has lead to a collapse o Euro-pean unity. What little trust and condence there was betweenIran and Europe has withered away, urther undermining andlimiting diplomatic progress.

Failure to approach Iran in a comprehensive way includingon issues that are core Iranian concerns, is another likely reasonor the lack o any solution. Te U.S. and to a large extent

Europe have thus ar taken an uncompromising approach,conditioning most negotiations and suggested deals on the sus-pension o enrichment. A mix o real concerns and negotiationtactics have pushed the Iranian regime to rame the problemdierently. Te issue o primary importance or Iran remains

the question o Gul security and the regional strategic balance.Iran puts great importance on historic legacies, which drivesit to seek its normal place as steward o Gul security. At thesame time the encirclement o Iran by adversaries constitutesa real and acute security risk. Tus the lack o a common ram-

ing o the problem has made a solution more dicult.

Te key adversaries in this controversy, the U.S. and Iran,also lack the knowledge and tools to understand one another


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well enough. Diplomatic and scholarly interaction has beenvery limited or more than 30 years. Tis makes miscalcula-

tions and misconceptions o the other partys behaviour andpolitical signals a act urther limiting possible diplomatic

solutions.Western eorts have resulted in UN sanctions against Iran.

Up until now these sanctions have had symbolic importancebut done little to infuence Iranian behaviour. Society at largehas suered but the Iranian regime has been able to stay its

nuclear course.

The lack of diplomaticprogress has uelled speculations onsolutions other than diplomactic. One central tenant in the

media has been that o military attacks against Iran. Such at-

tacks present a possible alternative to diplomacy and evidencesuggest that the U.S. and Israel may have made plans or suchattacks. Speculations have been urther uelled by periodicleaks hinting at actual preparation or attacks. Such leaks have

oten been traced back to governments in el Aviv or Washing-ton when they have wanted to send clear signals demonstratingthe seriousness with which they see the issue.

Tis conundrum is the backdrop to Sam Gardiners scena-rio describing a possible uture ollowing an Israeli attack on

Irans nuclear installations. Mr. Gardiner convincingly showsus how U.S. policy under the Obama administration has gonethrough a policy shit. Outside observers, and especially Israel,are likely to interpret this shit as a move towards accepting anuclear Iran. Mr. Gardiner reminds us that in the past, Israel

has not hesitated to take whatever measures it nds suitable toensure its own security let alone survival. Te report puts intoperspective and encourages the reader to think through theobvious question whether Israel has the choice not to attackIran should the situation carry on as it has. It also makes clear

that consequences o such an attack would be widespread andserious but perhaps not devastating or Israel, making the plau-sible argument stronger.

Stockholm February 24, 2010

John Rydqvist

Programme ManagerAsia Security Studies ProgrammeSwedish Deence Research Agency. www.oi.se/asia


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Contents

Executive Summary

Setting the Stage An Israeli AttackU.S. ResponsesTe Implications or U.S. Policies and the Region

Introduction

Background to the Strike

Israel More and More on Its OwnIrans Focus on Israel

Israeli Grand Strategy

Planning The Strike

Getting the Israeli Strike Package to IranargetingTe rigger

Zank: GoPrior to and During the Attack

Zank H+12: Twelve Hours After the Strike

Immediate Global Reaction Ater the StrikeIsraeli ActionsInside IranTe First Meeting o the U.S. National Security eam Ater the StrikeDamage AssessmentBeginning the ough DecisionsTe First DecisionsDeployment o Forces to the RegionInside Iran

Zank H+24: Twenty-Four Hours After the Strike

Another Meeting o the U.S. National Security eam

Zank D+14: Two Weeks After the Strike

Te U.S. National Security eam with New Issues

Back to the Present

Preventing an Israeli Strike

SummaryReferences


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Executive summary

In march 2008, the Swedish Deence Research Agencypublished a report, Consequences o Military Actions Against Iran

(FOI-R-2511-SE), which examined the consequences i theUnited States were to decide to resort to the use o orce against

Iran. Tat report pointed to ar-reaching consequences whetheror not the strike itsel was considered a success or ailure.

Tis report is a companion piece. It addresses a questionthat seems to be emerging in light o the unsuccessul attemptsby the new U.S. Administration to engage Iran on its nuclear

program.Te core question in the report is:

I Israel were to decide that it had no choice but to strike Ira-nian nuclear acilities, what would be the consequences?

Setting the Stage An Israeli Attack

With some justification, Israel seems to be losing condence

in the commitment o the Obama Administration to protect itsinterests with respect to the Iranian nuclear program. el Avivmakes the assessment that:

Te United States and the rest o the world are occupiedwith issues other than a nuclear Iran.

Te Americans seem to be gradually moving to acceptingthe notion o containing a nuclear Iran rather than preventingone.

As described in the analysis, Israel has the military capabilityto damage and to set back the Iranian nuclear program, and Is-

rael is being pushed in a direction that could lead to an attack.

U.S. Responses

Immediately after an attack by Israel, and even with noIranian response, the United States is likely to begin signicantdeensive deployments to the region.

Its attempts over a period o a year to negotiate with the

Iranians make the Obama Administration more vulnerableto domestic pressures to be strong in its reaction to an Israelistrike.

At an early stage ater an Israeli attack, the United Sta-tes would be aced with deciding whether to passively await


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casualties or to attack Iranian military capabilities on its own.Te United States would probably decide to nish the job on

Iranian nuclear acilities and destroy as much as possible oIrans capability to project combat power.

hypothesis:

Te Presidents Speech at the End o the Meeting with KeyCabinet Ocers.

I cannot wait or Iranians to kill American men and womenin uniorm and American civilians. I have a responsibility to pro-tect our people. Te Iranians have said they will attack us. I havea responsibility to stop the attacks beore they can take place. Tosein Iran who are seeking the blessings o reedom are crying out orus to do something.

In addition, I cannot sit idly by and watch Iranians kill in-nocent Israel citizens.

Te drain on U.S. resources would thrust Aghanistan on tothe back burner.

As a confict moved orward, the United States decisionmakers would want to end it as quickly as possible, an objective

not necessarily shared by the Iranians. Tat pressure, alongwith a visible opposition inside Iran, would likely lead to thedecision to make regime elimination the objective.

The Implications for U.S. Policies and the Region

Having considered the way in which events might unold ateran Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear acilities, there are someimplications or United States policy.

Although there are some leverage points or the UnitedStates on Israel, they are limited to punishment, and do notinclude prevention.

Washington is likely to assess that the United States will beput at a disadvantage i it waits until ater an Israeli strike to

deploy air and naval orces into the region.United States interests will be damaged less i it moves

orward with a combined IsraelU.S. operation and i initialtargeting by the orces o the two countries is on Irans general

military capabilities as well as the nuclear sites.From this analysis, Iran is the only country with the capacity

to prevent the seemingly inevitable movement towards what

would be a disaster or itsel, or the region, or Europeans, andor the United States.


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1. 92. Press Conference Following

Israel Air Force Att ack on PLObase in Tunis, 1 October 1985,Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs,URL:http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/1984-1988/92%20Press%20Conference%20Following%20Is-rael%20Air%20Force%20Att

2. John Pomfret and Joby Warrick,Chinas Backing on Iran FollowedDire Predictions, WashingtonPost, November 26, (2009).

3. Barak Ravid and Matasha

Mozgovaya, Obama Told China: ICant Stop Israel Strike on Ir an,Haaretz.com, December 17, (2009).

Introduction

Israel is an independent state where taking steps vital to our secu-rity is concerned We inormed the Americans as we did others,

only ater the completion o the actual operation.

Israel Deense Minister RabinOctober 1, 19851

This statement was made ater an attack on headquarters othe Palestine Liberation Organization in unis in 1985. Tis

strike is part o a pattern. When Israel identies a national

security threat, it will strike, and will strike at great distances.Te problem or Israel is not just the developing nuclearcapabilities o Iran. Israel also has problems with the UnitedStates. During the Bush Administration, Israel could count

on the U.S. taking a hard line with Iran. Te Israeli leadershipcannot be so certain with the Obama Administration. Pre-sident Obama is not the riend o Israel that President Bush

was. Te Obama Administration openly and harshly criticizesIsrael or expanding settlements in the Gilo neighborhood o

Jerusalem. Te U.S. President wants to negotiate with Iran. He

reaches out to the Iranians. Te U.S. does not seem to be in ahurry to stop Iran enriching uranium. Te U.S. President saysto the world that we need to give the Iranians space to maketheir decisions.

What has evolved since the Obama Administration tookoce is ironic. Te argument has acquired a new dimension.

According to the New York imes, beore the U.S. Presidentvisited Beijing, ocials visited China with a message. Tese

ocials carried the argument we have heard that Israel seesIran as an existential threat but they took it to a new level.Tey told the Chinese that when Israel sees an existentialthreat, it takes matters into its own hands. Israel could attackIran, and everyone knows what the consequence o that would

be. Because o what Israel could do, these ocials told the Chi-nese, China should support the United States to put pressureon Iran. In other words, Israel is the serious threat to Iran. 2

An Israeli press source reported that President Obama pas-sed a similar message to Chinese President Hu during his visit

to China in November 2009. He is reported to have warned

that the United States would not be able to keep Israel romattacking Iranian nuclear acilities or much longer.3


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4. I have used hypothesizeddialogue in parts of the paper.Obviously, this is not a conventio-nal approach to strategy or policyanalysis. In most cases when Iuse that technique, I am repeatingwhat I have heard many times indecision simulations of the issuesor I am basing it on previousIsraeli operations. I footnote thesource.

5. ElBaradei Warns Against AnyIsraeli Attack on Iran, News.az,November 6, (2009).

6. David Ignatius, Who Losesthe Iran Game, Washington Post,December 6, (2009).

A dicult policy dilemma emerges or the United Statesand Europeans. Israel does not turn over its security to others.

What i Israel were to decide it had to deal with the Iraniannuclear program by itsel? What i, as it has threatened, Israellaunched an attack on Iranian nuclear acilities? How would

the United States and the West react to an Israeli attack? I wehave a sense o how it would turn out, what kind o policy do

we need now? Can a unilateral Israeli attack be prevented?Tis paper is an examination o these policy questions. It is

an analytical paper ocusing on the details o probable utureevents. Tose probable utures are ormulated rom the wayin which Israel has dealt in the past with similar threats to its

security and rom the authors own work with decision simula-tions on Iran issues in the United States and Europe.4

Details o what the uture might look like are important orpolicy makers. Tese details give substance to vague predic-

tions. Te head o the International Atomic Energy Agency,Mohamed ElBaradei, has said that an Israeli attack on Iran

would turn the Middle East into a ball o re.5 He may havehad some notion o what that means, but it is hard to believethat many who argue or the hard line against Iran do. Policy

tends to be made rom the present into the uture. Lets dosanctions and see how Iran reacts. I they dont stop enriching,

well decide what to do then.

One attempt to understand possible utures was made inDecember 2009 when Harvards Kennedy School o Govern-

ment hosted a diplomatic simulation ocused on the dynamicso the Iran issues. Players took the roles o the U.S. Presidentand the Israeli Prime Minister as well as other power centersinvolved in the back and orth we are likely to see in 2010. Asone summary o the game put it, Iran will be closer to having

the bomb, and America will ail to obtain tough U.N. sanc-tions; diplomatic relations with Russia, China, and Europe willbe strained; and Israel will be threatening unilateral militaryaction.6

Tis paper picks up towards the end o the prognosis where

the Harvard simulation let o. It will address the conditionsthat are likely to push Israel to decide that it has to take actionon its own. Potential triggers or a strike will be explored. Tepaper will then examine the atermath, the situation that is li-

kely to conront U.S. decision makers in the rst twelve hours,then the likely situation twenty-our hours ater a strike, andnally, the situation ater two weeks.


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7. Dieter Bednarz, Erich Follah andChristoph Schult, Israels Patiencewith Tehran Wearing Thin, DerSpiegel, December 2, (2009).

8. Bolton on Irans Latest Provo-cation, National Review Online,December 2, (2009).

Background to the strike

Israel More and More on Its Own

According to Der Spiegel, the Institute or National SecurityStudies in el Aviv recently ran a decision simulation. It unol-

ded in the way Prime Minister Netanyahu may have expected.Iran continued to stall and reject compromises on its nuclearprogram. Heavy sanctions ollowed. Iran did not change. Israel

was let with the attack option and no other.7

Inside Israel there is a current that is orcing the gap between

Washington and Jerusalem. Te Obama Administrations pres-sure on Israel to reeze settlements in the West Bank is being

resisted inside Netanyahus own Likud party. Te Prime Minis-ter is caught between a crisis with Washington and a crisis with

the settlers.Meanwhile, Iran continues to move orward with enrich-

ment. Te Obama Administration argues that ehran needsspace to accept oers. Israels security continues to seem to takesecond place to Washingtons interests in the Middle East.

At the same time the United States seems to be movingtoward containment. Tere is more and more talk in the Uni-ted States about how to deter Iran i it had nuclear weapons.

John Bolton, the ormer U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., refec-ted the concern in Israel when he said, reerring to the Obama

Administration:

Teyre saying all o the right things, but there is a school othought among many that an Iran with nuclear weapons can becontained and deterred. Tey, o course, preer that Iran doesnt gonuclear, but they dont see that as a dramatically negative outcome.Teyre going through the motions. Deep in their hearts, a nuclearIran is not ideal, but not extremely negative.8

In discussing a nuclear-armed Iran at a conerence, retired

General John Abizaid, the ormer head o U.S. Central Com-mand, has said, Te historical evidence would suggest thatIran is not a suicide state. He went on, So, it is my militarybelie that Iran can be deterred.

In the recent Harvard simulation, the tension between theU.S. and Israel and the dynamics pushing the United Statesin the direction o containment was in evidence. As one o the

players was quoted as saying, Te U.S. is moving away rompreventing an nuclear Iran to containing a nuclear Iran with


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9. Ignatius, op. cit..

10. According to a press item, a de-cision simulation was conducted atHarvard Universit y on December 5,2009. As described to this repor-ter, in the simulation the UnitedStates failed to keep Iran from ac-quiring nuclear weapons and thenmoved to preventing the use ofnuclear weapons. Not surprisingly,

this became a source of tensionbetween the United States andIsrael in the hypothetical world.See Harvard Simulation: U.S. WillFail to Stop Iran Nucs, IsraelNN.com, December 6, (2009).

11. Yossi Melman, Experts SayIran Has Clear Path to NuclearWeapons, Haaretz.com, December10, (2009).

12. Unitedagainstnucleariran.com

13. These points are from theAmerican Israel Public Affairs Com-

mittee Memo, Continuing IranianDefiance Demands Crippling Sanc-tions, December 7, (2009).

deterrence based upon the Cold War experience.9 Containme-nt is not a policy option rom the Israeli perspective. Te more

it becomes a serious policy option or the United States, themore Israel will be pushed to take matters into its own hands.10

Te Israeli press reported more detail than the U.S. press on

what was supposed to be the secret Harvard decision simula-tion. Dore Gold, the ormer Israeli Ambassador to the Uni-

ted Nations, played Netanyahu. Interestingly the report wassomewhat o a summary o what the Israelis already believe.

According to Haaretz:

Te game made it clear: Iran will not stop on its path to producingnuclear weapons. Te United States will not embark on a militaryaction and will nd it dicult to enlist support at the United Na-

tions or imposing more severe sanctions, while relations betweenIsrael and the United States will deteriorate.11

Groups in the United States supporting the Israeli positionon Iran have attempted to raise the level o concern about thethreat among the American public. One o these groups isUnited Against a Nuclear Iran. Its Advisory Board is a long

list o individuals who are ound on the Israeli side o issues,including the ormer Director o the Central Intelligence

Agency, Jim Woolsey. One o the videos this group is distribu-

ting is called Shame. Its essence is the message that PresidentObama should be shamed by unclenching his st and wanting

to negotiate with the Iranian regime.12

Te American Israel Public Aairs Committee, the mostimportant group in the United States that supports Israel, hasadopted Iran-as-a-threat as one o its main strategic commu-nications themes. Te group calls itsel Americas Pro-Israel

Lobby. During their annual meeting in Washington in 2009members made an eort to see every member o the Congressor a discussion o the Iran threat. Frequent memos to the U.S.press contain a consistent theme:

Iran has not stopped enrichment. Iran has enough enriched uranium or two bombs.

Iran has secret enrichment acilities.

Iran continues to advance its missile technology.13

Te dilemma or Israel is that the ocus o the leadershipin the United States has been on other issues. Washington is

ocused on health care. Washington is ocused on Aghanis-tan. Washington is ocused on unemployment. Washington


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14. Using one day of press covera-ge as an example, on December 8,2009 doing a Google comparison,22,000 articles covered Iran nu-clear; 83,000 on unemployment;80,000 on the defici t; 152,000

on Afghanistan; and 165,000 onhealth care.

15. The data for this graph comefrom a daily, early-morning(between 05:00 and 08:00)Google search for news articlesthat contain the terms Iran andnuclear.

16. More was written about SarahPalin than about Irans nuclearprogram from November 22 toDecember 2, 2009 during the earlypart of her book-selling bus tour.

17. Our Goal is to Defeat Al-Qaidaand Its Extremist All ies, SpiegelOnline, November 15, (2009).

is other-focused. Te U.S. President, Secretary of State and

Secretary of Defense talk very little publicly about the issues of

Iran. By the measure of coverage, it is also clear that the world

press have not embraced Iran as a threat.14

Figure 1. Number of English-Language Articles on Iran Nuclear

in 200915

Sarah Palin and iger Woods when measured by the

number of articles produced by a Google news search are more

important than the Iranian nuclear program.16 Israel has reasonto be concerned about the commitment of the Americans.

Te Europeans are just as other-focused as the Americans.

Te problem of Iran is far down the list of pressing topics.

Climate change is more important. Te United States is pres-

sing NAO countries on Afghanistan. In the U.K. there is the

general election and the finger pointing over the invasion of

Iraq. Tere are the economic problems of Ireland, Greece and

Spain. France is engaged in self-examination of its national

identity. Te theme of Israels message has been that Iran is a

problem for the world. Israel has reason to be concerned that

the message is not reaching the Europeans with suffi cient force.

In an interview with Der Spiegelin mid-November 2009,

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the U.S. had

no intention of taking the military option off the table.17 For

Israel, the recent U.S. decision to deploy over 30,000 more

troops to Afghanistan is a real demonstration of U.S. strategic

priorities.

One of the concerns people have is that Israel might do it withoutbeing asked given the fact that Iran has a stated policy that

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18. EU Urges Israel to ShareJerusalem, Reuters, December 8,(2009).

19. As an example of this concern,a recent article accus ed U.S. ana-lysts of planning the unthinkable.See Tovah Lazarof f, Interview:Planning for the Unthinkable ANuclear Iran, Jerusalem Post,November 19, (2009).

20. State of the Union MessageTranscript, White House, January28, (2010).

21. Iran Drills Simulate Defense ofNuclear Sites, Payvand Iran News,November 23, (2009).

their objective is the destruction o Israel, the Israelis might welldecide to act rst, and let the rest o the world worry about clea-ning up the diplomatic mess aterwards.

Vice-President Richard Cheney

MSNBC Interview, January 2005

Te isolation o Israel can also be ound in other issuesnot directly related to Iran. Te E.U. oreign ministers, orexample, have urged Israel to share Jerusalem with the Pales-tinians.18 Tis position is directly opposed to Prime MinisterNetanyahus position that Jerusalem should be an undivided

capital.Beyond these specics, there is more and more discussion

in the American and European press on the need or a generaldiplomatic separation o the U.S. rom Israel. Clearly, Israel has

reason to be concerned about the commitment o the Ameri-cans.19

I el Aviv had any doubts that Washington was not veryocused on Iran, it need look no arther than the U.S.Presidents State o the Union Message on January 27, 2010.

His speech was primarily about jobs and the U.S. economy.Very little was on oreign policy issues. Although he did men-tion Iran there was only in a single sentence in the speech. In

what parallels the many years o vague threats, he said, asIrans leaders continue to ignore their obligations, there should

be no doubt: Tey, too, will ace growing consequences.20All o this is part o the message Israel is getting that it has

to take care o its own security interests. aking care o its ownsecurity interests more and more has to do with destroying theIranian nuclear acilities and reducing Irans infuence in the

region.

Irans Focus on Israel

The Iranians seem to have become more concerned about thepossibility o an Israeli strike on their nuclear acilities. At theend o November 2009, Iran conducted a ve-day air deenseexercise. On the rst day o the exercise, a general in the

Revolutionary Guard said, even i Israeli warplanes evadeIranian deenses, Iran will launch surace-to-surace missiles todestroy Israeli air orce bases.21 He was clear. He sees a threat

rom Israeli warplanes.


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22. He said this in a speech tothe Knessets Foreign Affairs andDefense Committee. See RebeccaAnna Stoil, Iran Can Now Producea Nuclear Bomb, Jerusalem Post,September 9, (2009).

23. Hezbollah Threatens WeaponBuildup, Wall Street Jour nal,November 30, (2009).

24. Steve Weizmann, Israel SaysMajor Cities in Hezbollah RocketRange, Associ ated Press, Novem-ber 10, (2009).

25. The argument for this strategicchange can be found in HowardSchneider, Hezbollahs Relocationof Rocket Sites to Lebanons Inte-rior Poses Wider Threat, Washing-ton Post, Januar y 23, (2010).

26. There was a serious rumor in2006 in Washington that Vice-Pre-sident Dick Cheney encouraged orat least withheld open oppositionto the attack into Lebanon becauseof this same str ategic view. An at-tack on Iran requires a neutralizedHezbollah. Get Lebanon done first.

27. Israel May Begin New Warin Lebanon in Spring 2010, RIA-NOVOSTI, November 6, (2009).

Israeli Grand Strategy

Israel has always had the problem o a multi-ront confict.Te Israeli planners have to be concerned in their strategiccalculations or a strike on Iran about other ronts.

Hezbollah is the most serious threat on other ronts. IsraeliPrime Minister Netanyahu has been saying recently that Israelused to consider Hezbollah as a militia, but he says they nowmust think o Hezbollah as the real army o Lebanon.22 Teplanners have to take seriously the threat by Hezbollah to at-tack Israel i Iran is hit. Te threat is made more serious by the

increasing ranges and number o Hezbollah weapons. Fromrecent statements, the Hezbollah leader made it clear that hehas no intentions o giving up the groups weapons as required

by the U.N. resolution ater the 2006 ghting with Israel.23

Hezbollah is now a more serious threat than it was in 2006.

It most likely possesses missiles capable o reaching majorIsraeli cities.24 In addition, its major deensive positions are nownorth o the Litani River. Te consequence o the increasedrange o the weapons and the movement outsidesouthernborder areas is that any uture confict would be broadened.25Israel would have to go deeper into Lebanon to deal with thethreat.

From a strategic perspective, it would be more desirable to

get the threat rom Lebanon out o the way beore an attack onIran, but the hangover rom the 2006 confict is probably toogreat or Israel to get support at home or a pre-emptive strikeagainst Hezbollah beore an Iran operation.26

Countries in the region that would tacitly support an Israelistrike on Iran, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, would nd it hard

to support another Israeli invasion o Lebanon i it were donesimultaneously with the attack on Iran. Tis most likely leavesIsrael with being prepared to invade Lebanon but waiting ora Hezbollah provocation. Israel is let with a deensive andincident-based strategy, continuing to deploy systems to deend

against Hezbollah rocket attacks and being ready to attack intoLebanon i there is a compelling enough incident either beoreor ater its attack on Iran.

Beginning in late October 2009, reports suraced in theMiddle East and France that Israel was planning the next ope-

ration into Lebanon, and it would take place in the spring o2010. According to the Jordanian daily newspaper Ad-Dustour,the operation was discussed with U.S. and French military

experts at a meeting in France.27

In a more concrete indication,Lebanons Ambassador to the U.N. in a note to the Secretary-


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28. Lebanon Envoy Warns U.N.of Possible Israeli Att ack, RIA-NOVOSTI, October 31, (2009).

29. Hamas Says Will Unite withIran if Israel Attacks , Reuters,December 15, (2009).

30. Israel has periodically (anduncharacteristically) releasedelements of a plan. Taking Aimat Iran, Sunday Times (London),March 13, (2005), is the best illus-

tration I have found. When Israelleaks information like this, is Iranmeant to be the audience, or is theUnited States the target?

31. Michael Gordon and EricSchmitt, U.S. Says Exercise byIsrael Seem Directed at Iran, NewYork Times, June 20, (2008).

32. Israel probably ranks amongthe top five nations with capa-bilities to project combat power.Others in the groups are theUnited States, Russia, the U.K.and France. Although China

would be ranked high in combatpower, it does not have a legacyof power projection.

General warned that there were signs that Israel is preparing oran attack into Lebanon.28

Te Hamas leader has said, All Islamic militant groups willorm a united ront with Iran against Israel i it attacks Iran.29Te Israeli eort to negate the Hamas threat is included in thecontinuous Israeli eorts to bomb tunnels. In addition, theU.S. and French are helping Egypt on their side o the border

to prevent tunneling.Te Syrian threat, meanwhile, although not really very

serious, is undamentally negated by the oer o negotiationsand by the United States eorts to improve relations withDamascus.

Planning the strike

Getting the Israeli Strike Package to Iran

The Israelis say the attack would resemble the kind ooperation they used against Egypt in 1967. Tey say the planinvolves more than just air strikes rom the Hammers o 69

Squadron: it would include Shaldag commando teams, perhapssome version o sea-launched missiles, and perhaps explosive-

carrying dogs that would penetrate the underground acili-ties.30

Israel has conducted an open exercise o the kind o strikepackage it might send to Iran, 100 aircrat, F-16s and F-15s.

Te package few a round-trip simulated mission to Greece.Air reueling aircrat and rescue helicopters supported theoperation.31

Israel is one o the countries that are most capable o projec-ting power in the world.32 Te best way to grasp its capabilities

to launch an attack on Iranian nuclear acilities is to look atprevious operations. Israel has a history o projecting combatpower at greater distances and in more complex operationsthan it would ace with the Iran eort.

Entebbe. In 1976 Israel reed a group o hostages at theEntebbe airport in Uganda. Four C-130s and two Boeing 707sfew 4,000 kilometers to conduct this combat operation, over

twice the distance to the Iranian nuclear acilities. In order tocover the raid, the 707s few as disguised as fights o the Israeli


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33. William Stevenson, 90 Minutesat Entebbe (New York: BantamBooks, Inc, 1976), p. 127.

34. Prime Minister Begin saidduring the press conference afterthe Osirak attack that had Israelinot done it another Holocaust

would happen. See Begin SaysIsrael Would Attack Again, Wash-ington Post, June 10, (1981). In hisspeech on Holocaust RemembranceDay 2009, Prime Minister Netanya-hu said, Holocaust deniers cannotcommit another Holocaust againstthe Jewish people. See IsraelPledges to Protect Itself fr om aNew Holocaust Threat Posed byIrans Nuclear Programme, DailyTelegraph, April 21, (2009).

35. Dan McKinnin, Bullseye OneReactor: The Story of IsraelsBold Surprise Air Attack That

Destroyed Iraqs Nuclear BombFacility (San Diego, CA: Houseof Hits, 1987), p. 5.

Figure 2. Israeli Power Projection: Comparing Earlier Strikes to

an Attack on the Iranian Nuclear Enrichment Facility at Natanz

airline, El Al. El Al acilities and personnel were used to servicethe aircrat on the mission.

Te United States has told Israel that it must be inormedo a strike on Iran. In 1976, Israel inormed the United States.

Te Israeli Ambassador in Washington contacted HenryKissinger as operation Tunderbolt was underway, in what wasto become a pattern in this kind o strategic operation.

A major mission o Israeli commandos is to accumulate in-telligence on military systems Israel might encounter in uture

operations. Tat was being done even in this hour-long stay atEntebbe. A portion o the orce that landed went ater the hos-tages in the terminal, another guarded the gate to prevent theUgandan military rom reinorcing their troops at the airport,and a third went to the Russian radar acility to get critical

equipment to take back to Israel.Describing what he called surgical operations, the Com-

mander o Tunderbolt said, I we can do this in Arica, wecan do it anywhere.33

Osirak. Te 1,200-kilometer 1981 Israeli attack on the Iraqinuclear acility at Osirak has other aspects in addition to whatcould be the components o an Iran operation. It had im-portant political and operational dimensions.

In his justication or the attack, Prime Minister Beginargued that without the strike Israel would have been con-ronted with the possibility o another Holocaust, the same

argument Prime Minister Netanyahu uses about Iran.34

In hisspecic justication or pre-emption, Begin said it was a mo-

0 500 1 000 1 500 2 000 2 500 3 000 3 500 4 000

Entebbe

Osirak

Tunis

Syria

Natanz in Iran

Munitions Convoy in Sudan


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36. A description of the attack canbe found in William E. Smith and

John Borrell, Middle East Israels

1,500-Mile Raid, Time, October14, (1985).

37. The Time piece on the attackcited above put the number ofcasualties at 60 kill ed and 100wounded. At the press conferenceheld by the Israeli Defense Minis-ter, the casualties were describedas between 30 and 50 killed, anda large number wounded. See:Press Conference Following IsraelAir Force Attack on PLO Base in Tu-nis 1 October 1985, Israel Ministryof Foreign Affairs.

38. How Israel Foiled an ArmsConvoy Bound for Hamas, Time,March 30, (2009).

rally supreme act o national sel-deense.35 It is certainly easyto imagine Netanyahu making the same kind o statement theday ater an Israeli attack on Iran.

Tunis. Te range was 2,000 kilometers when Israel struck the

headquarters o the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1985.It was again a package o F-16s and F-15s, the F-16s doing thebombing and the F-15s standing ready to protect the strikepackage.36

With an element one could expect to see in a uture attack,an Israeli ship was nearby in support o the air operation. Inaddition, any thought that Israel might be concerned aboutcivilian casualties in a strike on the Iranian nuclear acilities

nds a counter-example in the unis eort. Sixty Palestinians

and unisians were killed, and the Israeli bombs injured over100 while only several Araat bodyguards were killed.37

Munitions convoy. Te most recent power projection opera-

tion was against a convoy o trucks in Sudan reported to becarrying munitions rom Iran to Hamas in January 2009. Isra-eli F-16s and F-15s few 2,800 kilometers to conduct the strike,again a much greater distance than a similar operation againstIran would involve.

A new component o this operation was the use o remotely pi-

loted vehicles to provide real-time assessment o battle damage.38

The middle east. Map Courtesy o the University o exas

Libraries, Te University o exas at Austin.Source: C.I.A. Factbook


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39. Arnaud De Borchgrave, Israelof the Caucasus, UPI, Septem-ber 2, (2008).. According to thisauthor, In a secret agreementbetween Israel and Georgia, twomilitary airfields in southern Geor-gia had been earmarked for use ofIsraeli fig hter-bombers in the event

of pre-emptive attacks againstIranian nuclear installat ions..

40. Gwen Ackerman and PatrickDonahue, Israel Denies Report ofIraq Military Exercises, Bloom-berg.com, July 11, (2008).

41. Tim Butcher, Israel Willing toGo It Alone on Iran Attack, DailyTelegraph, December 4, (2008).

42. Erdogan Warns Israel Over theUse of Turkish Airspace to AttackIran, Al Bawada, December 12,(2009).

43. Uzi Mahnaimi and SarahBaxter, Saudis Give Nod to Israelon Iran, Sunday Times, July 5,(2009). According to this article,The head of Mossadhas assuredBenjamin Netanyahuthat SaudiArabia would turn a blind eye toIsraeli jets f lying over the kingdomduring any future raid on Iransnuclear sites. It goes on to quotea diplomatic source, The Saudishave tacitly agreed to the Israeliair force flying through its airspaceon a mission that is supposed tobe in the common interests of bothIsrael and Saudi Arabia.

44. Zaheerul Hassan, Indian AirBases and Israeli Strike AgainstIran, China Daily: China Forum,

July 7, (2009). The article s ays thatfor an Israeli strike on Iran, Indiawill provide air bases for refuelingand other administrative supportto Israel.

45. The attack profile for Osirak isdescribed in Factfil e: How OsirakWas Bombed, BBC News, June 5,(2006). There is a trade betweenaltitude and fuel consumption ona mission. It would technically bepossible to fly the entire route

to Iran at very low altitudes, butfuel consumption would be toohigh. I can imagine a sophisticatedattitude management based uponintelligence on radar coverage inthe countries being transited.

46. I have found, in discussingan Israel attack on Iran, thatbackground is an important partof how others see the issue of howIsrael would get combat power toIran. Military audiences accept thata way could be found. Academicswant to argue that it could not bedone. In my class at the U.S. Natio-

nal War College, one of the opera-tions I used to have the studentsContinued on p. 20

Tis was a new dimension o the Israeli operations that wouldbe very helpul in an attack on Iran. A shoot-look-shoot tactic

maximizes the eectiveness o the munitions load carried onthe mission.

Te speculation on how Israel would get the strike package

to Iran is a tactical detail that is very oten discussed and muchwritten about. Imagination has spanned the entire Middle East

map and more.

At a period when the connection between Georgia and theIsraeli military industry was growing, there was specula-tion that Georgia had oered Israel the use o two o its air

bases or a strike on Iran.39

For a short period we were seeing articles reporting that

Israel aircrat were secretly using U.S. bases in Iraq, andthat this was in preparation or a strike on Iran.40

A ew years ago we were reading that urkey would turn ablind eye to overfights o its territory.41 Te improvementin relations between urkey and Iran and the souring ourkish-Israeli relations make this unlikely. In act PrimeMinister Erdogan has warned Israel that using urkish

airspace would have serious consequences.42

We have seen articles reporting that Saudi Arabia, becauseo its desire to stop the Iranian nuclear program, has secretly

oered to allow Israel to fy over its territory on a strike.43 One can even nd press reports that suggest that India

has oered Israel the use o some o its bases or operationsagainst Iran.44

Although the route to the target areas in Iran is important,radar coverage is more important than borders. For the Osirak

attack, the Israeli F-15s and F-16s few over portions o bothSaudi Arabia and Jordan below 400 eet, under radar coverage.Te strike package then descended even lower as it enteredIraqi airspace, below 100 eet.45 Te same tactic could be usedor striking Iran. Israel knows how to do this kind o operation.

A way into the target areas or the aircrat can be ound.46

hypothesis:

Te Discussion that akes Place When Israel Crosses into theIraq Air Deense Zone

Scene: Te Command Center in Iraq.Air Situation Duty Ocer to the Senior Ocer in the center:

Sir you need to take a look at this. We have a large ight oaircrat that have penetrated into Iraqi airspace rom Jordan at


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Continued rom p. 19examine was the 1980 U.S. attemptto rescue U.S. hostages in Iran.One could have made the sameargument for that operation. Howcould U.S. combat power get intoIran? The answer in the operationwas that helicopters met refuelingaircraf t on the ground in the opendesert, a technique that couldbe used by Israeli commandoson their way to attack a nuclearfacilit y. For the details of therescue mission, see Colonel JamesH. Kyle, USAF (retired), The Gutsto Try: The Untold Story of the IranHostage Rescue Mission by theOn-Scene Desert Commander (NewYork: Orion Books, 1990).

47. This hypothetic al conversationcomes from my own experienceduring the later stages of the

Vietnam War. I was stationed at anair base where the C.I.A. operated.We did not know what they didbut would often get a notificationof a special flight that was to beignored. The standing order wouldprobably be, when notified of sucha flight, just to ignore it and notinform Iraqi officials.

48. In the firs t Gulf War, the UnitedStates shut down 85% of Iraqselectricity-generating capacity.In a single attack on Serbia onMay 7, 1999, 70% of the lightsin the country went out. SeeCBU-94 Blackout Bomb, Global-

Security.org.

49. David E. Sanger, U.S. RejectedAir for Israeli Raid on IranianNuclear Site, New York Times,

January 11, (2009). According toSanger the covert U.S. program onwhich there has been intelligencesharing started in early 2008,[and] includes renewed Americaneffor ts to penetrate Irans nuclearsupply chain abroad, along withnew effort s, some of them expe-rimental, to undermine electricalsystems, computer systems andother networks on which Iran

relies. [changes needed, other-wise there is no main verb in thissentence].

low altitude. We had been inormed that there would be a specialmission tonight. As usual, we assumed it would be a single C-130at this time and on this heading.

Senior Ocer: Check the notication again.Air Situation Duty Ocer: Sir, it says single aircrat on a

special mission, radio silence. As you can see, this is not singleaircrat.

Senior Duty Ocer to General Ordiernos Executive Ocer,the colonel who operates as the trac policeman or the general:om, this is Bill in the Command Center. We have a situation.I think you need to wake the general.

Executive Ocer: He is awake. Hes on the phone to GeneralPetraeus. I think the Israelis are up to something. Stand by. Ill getback to you.

(15 minutes later)Executive Ocer calling the Command Center: Bill, Im notcertain whats going on here, but it has been all the way to General

Jones at the White House. Our orders are to ignore the ight, anddo not inorm the Iraqis.47

Targeting

Fundamental to the attack on Iranian nuclear acilities is

raming the strategic objective.Setting back the Iranian nuclear program can take orms

other than just the destruction o major acilities. One parti-

cularly eective means would be dropping carbon bers onpower lines. Te U.S. used this tactic extensively in the rstGul War and against Serbian targets in 1999. Te bers createarcs. Te result is extensive electrical damage to generatingcapacity.48

Irans vulnerability to the carbon ber weapon is obvious bylooking at Google Earth satellite images. Tree above-groundheavy power lines cross the open desert and terminate at theNatanz acility. Even images o the new tunnel enrichment

acility near Qom show a power line that parallels the accessroad to the area o construction.

One could expect other non-kinetic components o an Israelistrike on the Iranian nuclear acilities. According to the NewYork imes, the United States and Israel have been sharingintelligence on covert methods to disrupt the entire Iranian nu-clear system.49 Tis could take the orm o a computer network

attack in an integrated targeting plan.Israel has been improving its capabilities to conduct a strike


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50. The best technical analysisof an Israeli str ike I have foundis: Whitney Raas, Austin Long,Osirak Redux? Assessing IsraeliCapabilities to Destroy IranianNuclear Facilities, MIT Security

Studies Program Working Paper,April (2006). the IAF [Israeli AirForce], after years of moderniza-tion, now possesses the capabilityto destroy even well-hardenedtargets in Iran with some degreeof confidence. The operation ap-pears to be no more risky t han theearlier attac k on Osirak.

51. Catherine Philp, SecretDocument Exposes Irans NuclearTrigger, Timesonline, December14, (2009).

52. Julian Borger, Iran Tested

Advanced Nuclear Warhead Design Secret Report, The Guardian,November 5, (2009) and ibid.

on Iranian nuclear acilities. It has the capability to get there,and it has the capability to do serious damage to the Iranian

nuclear program.50

The Trigger

According to many Israeli ocials, Israel has had a plan or astrike on Iranian nuclear acilities or a long time. But mili-taries have lots o plans or lots o operations. Having a planis not a prediction o a uture event. What would trigger theexecution o the plan? Tat is the important question.

One possibility would be the overwhelming realization inIsrael that the United States and the rest o the world had no

stomach or being tough on Iran. Te path to this could beindirect. Iran continues to dey the international community.

In the U.S. more and more think tanks and ocials within theGovernment talk about containing a nuclear Iran. Te unwil-lingness to deal with Iran would be compounded by a weaksanctions package. Israel concludes that it has to be responsibleor its own security.

Another trigger could be a piece o intelligence. Israel mightreceive a report that suggests Iran is very close to building anuclear weapon, closer than everyone thought. It could receive

intelligence on a third, secret nuclear enrichment acility opera-ting more sophisticated centriuges than at the Natanz acility.

A trigger could be an event. According to press reports, theInternational Atomic Energy Agency has evidence that Iran hasexperimented with sophisticated nuclear warhead design.51 Na-tions rst uranium-based nuclear weapons are most oten theso-called gun-type design; a single shot into the uranium pit

produces the nuclear detonation. According to some reports,Iran has experimented with two-point implosion devices, atechnique or detonating a uranium device rom two directionsthat would produce a smaller warhead that could be put on itsmedium-range missiles.52

According to International Atomic Energy Agency docu-ments on testing that took place in 2003, Iran has a 400-meterdeep shat or testing. I Iran were to run a test o a two-pointimplosion device at its test acility at Parchin, it would indicate

a high degree o sophistication in warhead design. It wouldindicate that Iran is not only close to possessing a weapon butalso that it is close to a reduced-size weapon suitable or its

missiles. Such a test could probably be a trigger or Israel.Israel has said that the sale by Russia o the S-300 sophisti-


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53. An article i n the Tehran Times

on November 29, 2009 quotedIranian officials as saying theyhave assurances that the missilesystem will be delivered withintwo months. Russia Will DeliverS-300 to Iran in 2 Months, TehranTimes, November 29, (2009).Delivery dates promised by Rus-sia have to be treated with someskepticism.

54. Optimism about a course ofaction can undermine a rationaldecision. Decision makers tend tooverestimate their own capacityand underestimate uncontrollableconsequences. That dynamic would

probably be present in an Israelidecision to attack Ir an. See DanLovallo and Daniel Kahneman,Delusions of Success: How Opti-mism Undermines Executives De-cisions, Harvard Business Review,

July 1, (2003), pp. 2737.

55. Zank is Hebrew for jump. Itwas the go signal transmittedto the aircraft partic ipating in theraid on Entebbe. William Steven-son, op. cit., p. 99.

56. Angel was the call sign ofthe rescue helicopters on the

Osirak operation. A new call signwould most likely be used for thisoperation.

cated air deense missile system to Iran was a red line. Reports

o a sale o this air deense missile system have been aroundor over ve years. Although releases rom both Moscowand ehran say that a contract has been signed, delivery hasbeen delayed with both the United States and Israel trying

to convince Russia not to complete the contract.53 I deliverywere made, it would be as long as six months beore the systemwould be operational. Te delivery, however, could be a triggeror Israel.

Te decision to go with a military option has another aspect,

a component that makes the decision very nely balanced.Tis has to do with the Israeli leaderships assessment o thecondition o the regime in ehran. A belie that the regime isaltering, and it will not be long beore there is a change rom

within, would make a decision or a strike easier to make. Tisassessment counters the argument that i attacked Iran wouldmove even aster to a nuclear capability. Although the acts donot support it, the logic says that the program does not have tobe set back very long because Iran is on the verge o an internaldisruption that will bring a more moderate regime to power.54

Zank:55 Go

Twenty-four hours prior to the attack, the participatingIsraeli air bases would be locked down. Te Israeli military aregood at secrecy prior to an operation. Other nations would notknow what was about to happen. Attachs, whose job it is tond out when something like this is unolding, would be in the

dark. No opening would be there to turn events around.

hypothesis:

Brieng the Pilots.At the mission brieng, the Commander talks through ight

proles. He goes over call signs, take-of sequence, rst tankerrendezvous to top of tanks, routes and altitudes into Iran and theapproach to the targets. He reviews radio requencies and emer-

gency procedures.He talks about the rescue helicopters, call sign angel.56 Teir

take-of time is two hours beore the ghter package. Te CH-53swill be reueled by C-130s. He also shows the map o good loca-tions to eject in order to be picked up by U.S. troops.

Te airborne command post will also take of two hours beore

the ghters. It will transit into the region using an El Al ightnumber or the regularly scheduled commercial ight that services


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57. This technique of using El Alflight numbers to disguise militaryaircraf t was used in the Entebbeoperation.

58. The Commanders briefinghypothesized here builds on thebriefing given before the strike onthe Iraqi nuclear facilit y and thetechniques used in the attack on

the convoy in Sudan. The use ofthe airborne command post comesfrom the Entebbe operation.

India.57Ater the operation, the aircrat will recover in India.Te Commander describes supporting operations. Conventional

Jericho missiles will be launched to reach their targets inside Iranat the time the ghter package is entering Iranian airspace. Temissiles will target a ew key air deense locations, but their main

target is the nuclear acility at Arak and the processing acility atEsahan. Everything there is above ground; expect good results.

Well have UAV support over Natanz. Te airborne commandpost will be giving directions on our second passes or our aimpoints there. As you know, that worked well on the strike on themunitions convoy.

Although he only gives limited detail, the Commander mentionscommando and other covert operations that will be part o thestrike. Iranian command and control computer and radar systems

will be shut down by cyber-attacks. He says special techniques willbe used to neutralize the OR-M1 air deense system. He conclu-des this part o the brieng proudly: ehran will not know whathas hit them.

He wishes them good hunting. Te pilots quietly leave thebrieng room to go to the van to be taken to their aircrat. 58

Prior to and During the Attack

If history is any guide, the notication to other nations, par-ticularly the United States, would take place ater the launch.

As Israeli ocials are reported to have said about the operation

into Uganda, they did not want to give anyone a chance toobject or interere.

With the pattern set over 30 years ago, the Israeli Ambas-sador to Washington would call the U.S. National Security

Adviser, General James Jones. Because Israeli aircrat would

be operating near ongoing U.S. operations in the region, a callwould most likely also be made to General David Petraeus, theCommander o U.S. Central Command.

Israel would adhere to the letter o the relationship with the

United States, but would not give it any opening to stop theoperation. Overfying Iraq, i Israel decides to do that, wouldbe an embarrassment to the United States, but it would not berst time Israel has embarrassed the United States. Te UnitedStates would not shoot down Israeli aircrat.


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59. Text of U.N. Resolution onIsraeli Air St rike, New York Times,October 6, (1985).

Zank H+12: twelvehours after the strike

Immediate Global Reaction After the Strike

The united nations Security Council (U.N.S.C) would imme-diately meet to consider the Israel strike. Te drat submittedto members would most likely be similar to the resolution sub-mitted ater the Israel attack on unis in 1985. Te U.N.S.C:

CONDEMNS vigorously the act o armed aggression perpetra-ted by Israel in agrant violation o the Charter o the UnitedNations, international law and norms o conduct; 2. DEMANDS

that Israel rerain rom perpetrating such acts o aggression orrom the threat to do so; 3. URGENLY REQUESS the StatesMembers o the United Nations to take measures to dissuade Israelrom resorting to such acts against the sovereignty and territorialintegrity o all States59

Te United States would be under pressure by other nations

to support the resolution condemning Israel. I other nationsinsisted on this kind o language, the United States wouldabstain as it did in 1985.

Israel has been condemned beore by the U.N.S.C. andwould not ail to protect its security interests because it mightbe condemned again.

Immediately ater the strike in 1981 on the Iraqi nuclearacility, there were a great many public outcries by governmentleaders but almost no action to punish Israel or the strike. In

the wake o an attack on Iran, speechwriters could easily reusewhat was said ater the 1981 operations:

an act o international terrorism that cannot be accep-ted, Egyptian Foreign Minister.

Te Arab Republic o Syria has warned more than onceabout the Zionist enemy aggressions and its constantaggressive nature that constitutes a dangerous threat to the

Arab nations and peace in the region, a Syrian spokesman.

dismay and concerned about the attack, a (West)

German spokesman. Israeli actions cannot be justied under any circumstan-

ces, Japanese Foreign Minister.

a clear contravention o international law, U.N.Secretary-General.


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60. Dan McKinnen, Bullseye OneReactor (San Diego: House of HitsPublishing, 1987), pp. 192194.

61. Gwen Ackerman, Israel Army

Unit Waging Internet Battle AfterGaza Criticism, Bloomberg.com,December 3, 2009. This unit wasused heavily recently to get outthe Israeli mess age when a shipwas captured with munitions onboard, reportedly bound for Hez-bollah from Iran.

62. Israeli Prime Minister Olmertcalled Turkish Prime MinisterErdogan and asked him to passthe message to Syria that nomore strikes were planned. ErichFollath, Holger Stark, The Storyof Operation Orchard: How Israel

Destroyed Syri as Al Kibar NuclearReactor, Spiegel Online, Novem-ber 11, (2009).

enemies o world peace, Chinese Foreign Minister.

an act o international gangsterism, spokesman orPakistan.60

Immediately ater an Israeli strike, it would be clear that the

Obama Administrations Middle East peace eorts would bedamaged. In a similar way, in 1985 the Israeli strike on unisdamaged the peace process. Te risk o that happening did not

stop Israel then. It is hard to imagine that it would hold Israelback now.

Te strategic communications coalition in the United Statesthat supports Israel would move into high gear. Te story lineshave already been developed and would be replayed. Iran is not

just a threat to Israel; it is a threat to the world. Iran is the worlds

largest supporter o terrorism. Iran was close to possessing a nu-clear weapon. Israel has acted to prevent another Holocaust.An Israeli Army communications unit would verbally attack

the United States and Europe at once. In September 2009, the

Israeli Army ormed a special unit to wage the public relationsbattle or Israel on the Internet.61 Te unit maintains connec-tions with bloggers, Facebook, Youube and witter in orderto push a avorable slant or Israeli. Te Internet unit will bebrought into the ght.

Israeli Actions

Israel would most likely begin eorts to control escalation

immediately ater the strike. Ater the attack on the Syrianacility in 2007, Israel ound a channel to inorm the SyrianGovernment that it would not make an issue o the event iSyria did not.62 Israel would likely try to get the same kind o

message to ehran in this situation.Ater the Israeli strike on the Iraqi nuclear acility, Israel

hoped to have the United States announce the operation. I theannouncement had come rom Washington, it would appear asi there had been prior American approval. Te story began to

leak, however, and the Israeli Prime Minister gave the rst o-cial announcement. An eort to have the Americans announcethis strike would probably be made.


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63. I have done some decisionsimulations focus ed on under-standing how the Iranian SupremeSecurity Council addresses majorstrategic issues. What becomesobvious is that the process is

very slow. Slow would almostcertainly apply dur ing an unfoldingcrisis like this.

Inside Iran

Iran would most likely not decide on its strategic response

quickly ater the strike. Te decision process is very slow.Characteristically, meetings o the Supreme Security Council

chaired by the Supreme Leader are not even held until there isagreement on a course o action among the major players.63

Given the consequences o the presidential election o 2009

and events since then, the leadership in Iran could have some earo losing control o the domestic situation. Tat would become anarea o ocus, as well as the strategic response to the Israeli strike.

Te Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will push or a hardline against Israel and the United States. Making it very di-

cult to control escalation, the Revolutionary Guard might take

some actions on its own without waiting or a decision.Iran would probably not respond to the Israeli suggestionthat the strike be downplayed.

The First Meeting of the U.S. National Security Team

After the Strike

The pictures released while the White House was delibe-rating on the Aghanistan strategy could be released again

without change. All the participants are looking very serious,and the men still have their suit jackets on.

Te President is sitting at the end o the table. On his right

is Vice-President Biden; on the Presidents let is his NationalSecurity Adviser, General James Jones. Secretary o DeenseGates is next to Biden. Te Chairman o the Joint Chies oSta sits to Gates right. Secretary o State Clinton sits to Joneslet. Further down the table, leaning orward to catch the

Presidents words, we see the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., theDirector o National Intelligence, the Director o the C.I.A. andthe Presidents Chie o Sta. A ew staers sit in the chairs awayrom the table along the side o the room. On the wall acing the

President are our screens. One o the larger screens is showingGeneral Petraeus who is on a secure video link rom Florida.

In the normal course o considering strategic issues withinthe U.S. Government, there is a hierarchy o committees. TeDeputies Committee consists o the deputy Cabinet members

and is normally chaired by the Deputy National SecurityAdviser. Above the deputies is the Principals Committee. Tis

group is made up o the Cabinet members and would be chai-red by the National Security Adviser. Because o the gravity o


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the situation, the President himsel would be in the SituationRoom so as to be able to hear directly rom the Cabinet, as he

was during the discussion o the U.S. Aghanistan strategy.

Damage Assessment

The President asks to start with an update on the Israelstrike. Te Director o National Intelligence begins a short

brieng. His PowerPoint slides and satellite pictures appear onthe screen to the let o Petraeus image.

hypothesis:

First Assessment by the Director o National Intelligence

Mr. President, the DNI begins. Te results o the Israelistrike are mixed. He is telling what the assessment would havebeen had we known about the strike beore it took place. Sincemost o the acility was above ground, the heavy water plant at

Arak, as you can see rom this image, is very seriously damaged.He continues, Serious damage was done the above-ground

acilities at Esahan; two weapons were aimed at tunnel entrancesthere, but we do not believe there was serious damage.

Te damage assessment or the buried enrichment acility atNatanz is more dicult. Israel used the tactic o putting multiple

penetrating weapons on a single aim point, the same spot above thecentriuge chambers. From our own tests, we know this can causeserious damage even through the earth and concrete cover. Sincewe cant see inside, we cant be certain.

Te DNI concludes. Mr. President, we cannot say with certa-inty how much the Iranian nuclear program has been damaged,but it has been damaged.

As or intelligence on other aspects o the region, as in Iran,the reports would most likely suggest preparations but withoutclarity on uture actions. Hezbollah would be making militarypreparations. From signals intelligence sources, there wouldmost likely be reports o increased trac between Hezbol-

lah and its global cells. Tere would probably be reports thatthe Revolutionary Guard had been communicating with itspersonnel in southern Iraq and in Aghanistan. It would appeardangerous, but it would be dicult or intelligence analysts tosay exactly what was taking place.

Syria signed an agreement on strategic cooperation with Iran

in 2006, a military agreement in 2007, and another agreementon cooperation in 2009. None o these agreements is specic


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64. Khamenei Aide: Iran WouldAttack the Heart of Israel, Jerusa-lem Post, June 12, (2008).

about what Syria would actually do i Israel were to attack Iran;however, there would be most likely indications o military

preparations by Syria. Tis would probably be assessed as astrategic situation to be watched.

Te assessment o how Iran would react would also be given

with caveats. Te brieng chart on possible Iranian courses oaction would probably look something like this:

Iran could decide not to respond immediately and to ac-cept a period o victim status, gaining support within theMiddle East and the rest o the Muslim world.

Iran could respond with low-DNA attacks (not attributable

to itsel) against Israeli and U.S. interests. Iran could respond with ull and open military attacks.

Although the regime has publicly promised to conduct an

open military response, early ater an attack the United Statesintelligence community cannot know how Iran would respond.Iran will not have decided itsel. Te uncertainty, however,

would be an important actor in the early and tough decisionrom the U.S. leadership.

Te Director o National Intelligence would have to be morespecic. In his brieng, we could expect him to say:

Te Revolutionary Guard will most likely win the internalargument. Teir infuence in the regime has continued to

grow. Tis guardian o the revolution will have even moreinfuence now that Iran has been attacked.

Iran and the Revolutionary Guard have told the world howthey would respond i they were attacked by Israel. Until

we see evidence to the contrary, we have to take them at

their word.We have to expect that Iran will attack U.S. installations

in the region. One o the Supreme Leaders aides has saidthat i Iran were attacked it would respond and destroy32 U.S. bases in the region.64

We can expect oil fow out o the Gul to be disrupted bymines, small boats and land-based anti-ship missiles.

We can expect the Quds units o the Revolutionary Guardto support attacks on U.S. orces in Iraq and Aghanistan.

We can expect violence against Israel rom Hamas andHezbollah to increase.

Finally, and o most concern, it is possible that sleeper cells

inside the United States and Europe could conduct ter-rorist attacks.


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65. An Israeli Defense Ministr yresearcher, Dr. Moshe Vered,recently wrote a paper while onsabbatical in which he arguesthat an Israeli strike on Iran couldlead to a very long war not unlikeIrans eight-year war with Iraq.Amos Harel, Analysis: It Wontend in Six Days, Haaretz.com,August 11, (2009).

66. The Key to Dealing With Ir an:Press Ties Wit h the Opposition,Editorial, Washington Post, January

30, (2010); and Iran, After theDeadline, Editorial, New YorkTimes, January 30, (2010).

Even this early in the crisis, regime change might surace

or discussion. Te Director o the Central Intelligence Agencymight make a statement that the situation could unold intoa long confict despite U.S. desires to get it over with quickly.He might point out that Iran ought an eight-year war with

Iraq with over hal a million dead and that a real ceaserecame only ater it appeared that the regime in ehran mightbe in danger.65 He might conclude with a dramatic statementthat eventually the United States is going to have to considereliminating the regime in ehran. He might be challenged by

someone around the table who would say there was no waywould the United States send ground orces into ehran to dostability operations. He might respond that he was careul tosay regime elimination.

Te idea o doing away with the current leadership inehran would not be new to those sitting around the table inthe White House Situation Room. Ater the apparent ailure onegotiations, the U.S. press has increasing number o reerencesto the possibility o enorcing a dierent leadership in Iran.On one day, the Washington Postand New York imesbothcarried lead editorials suggesting that it was time to ocus on achange.66

At this meeting, the attendees would not consider thedomestic political component o the situation. It would be in

the back o their minds, however. Te echo o the conservativemessage would be in the room. Obama appeased the Iraniansand look at where it has gotten us. Obama has been dithering;now we have this situation. Lets hope he doesnt take threemonths to decide what to do this time. A subtle but real pres-

sure would be elt in the Situation Room. Tose present wouldbe aware o the likely trajectory o public opinion.

Beginning the Tough Decisions

Discussion of the potential damage and the Iranian optionswould continue around the table. As people begin to rehash thesame points, the Chairman o the Joint Chies o Sta mightspeak up. Mr. President, I have to underline my concern that

Iran still has all o its capabilities to strike at the United Statesand our allies in the region. In the homespun sort o talk hesometimes uses, Weve stirred up the bee, but he still has hissting.

Te President asks the Chairman o the Joint Chies o Staabout the Iranian capability to close the Strait o Hormuz.


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67. These are the words AdmiralMullen used in 2008 followinghis two-day visit to Israel. JimGaramone, Mullen DiscussesIran, Broader Middle East With

Israel, Armed Forces PressService, June 6, (2008).

68. The Secretary G eneral of OPEChas warned that the membercountries of the organizationwould be unable to replace theloss of oil if the United Statesor Israel were to strike Iran. Hesaid the prices would go unlimi-ted See OPEC Warns WarWith Iran Would Cause UnlimitedOil Price Hike, Associated Press ,

July 12, (2008).

69. Christopher Drew, High CostsWeigh on Troop Debate for Afghan

War, New York Times, November15, (2009).

70. The airlift of additional troopsinto Afghanistan began in mid-December 2009 and will be ongo-ing until the end of the summeror early fall of 2010, according toAdmiral Mullen. See Ed Homick,Chris Lawrence and Fred Pleitgen,Logistical Problems Could PlagueAfghanistan Troop Surge, CNN.com, December 3, (2009). Subse-quent statements by officials havesuggested the deployment couldlast into the fall because of the

problems of logistics.

71. Jim Garamone, op. cit.

He replies that the Iranians have the capability to endanger[hazard means to risk the loss o] the Strait, but I believe theability to sustain that is not there. 67

In addition, discussing the capability o the Iranians todisrupt the fow o shipping through the Gul, the participants

would have to address the other Iranian threats. On numerousoccasions, Iranian ocials have said that i either the UnitedStates or Israel were to attack them, the U.S. bases would be

hit. Tis would become a policy dilemma. Should the UnitedStates react based upon what the Iranians have threatened todo, or should it respond only on provocation?

Tere is also a domestic component o the hard decision

making at this rst meeting. Te price o oil is likely to spikeimmediately.68 Te longer there is ghting or even the prospect

o ghting, oil prices will stay high. I prices were to stay highor a long time, President Obamas economic recovery planscould be dealt a serious blow. Tere is even the consequences

o higher oil prices on the Presidents Aghanistan strategy. Tecost o a gallon o uel delivered into Aghanistan is extremelyhigh. One estimate puts it at $400 per gallon.69 Te consequen-ces would be serious i the price o uel to support operationsin Aghanistan doubled. Tere would be intense pressure to get

this situation with Iran resolved quickly.It could be at this rst meeting, but soon ater the Israeli

strike the President is going to be asked to make a decisionon the surge deployments to Aghanistan. He will most likelyreceive a recommendation rom the Pentagon to put any addi-

tional troop movements to Aghanistan on hold. Tere wouldbe two reasons or the recommendation rom the U.S. military.Te rst would be the availability o airlit assets. Moving gh-ter squadrons and missile deense units to prepare or an Irancontingency is going to require everything that is available.70

Te other reason or the pressure to suspend deployments toAghanistan has to do with the U.S. strategic reserve, the orcesheld or those unanticipated contingencies. In July 2008, aterthe Chairman o the Joint Chies o Sta had spent two days

visiting Israel, he was asked about the military option or Iran.He said, From a military perspective, opening up a third rontright now would be extremely stressul on us71 I it werestressul then, it would be extremely stressul given the deploy-ment o over 30,000 additional troops to Aghanistan since.

Reocusing away rom the Aghanistan strategy would haveother, less observable components. For example, early in the

process, U.S. Central Command would probably decide toshit a major portion o its drone activity rom Aghanistan to


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72. Seymour M. Hersh, Preparingthe Battlef ield: The Bush Adminis-tration Steps Up Its Secret MovesInside Iran, New Yorker, July 7,(2008).

73. Dwight D. Eisenhower,

Waging Peace, 19561961 (NewYork: Doubleday & Company,Inc., 1965), p. 98.

Iran. Te C.I.A. would probably reocus Predators rom Pakis-tan to Iran. During the Bush Administration, U.S. special ope-rations orces, according to press reports, were operating insideIran.72 At a smaller session in the White House, the President

would be asked to approve additional C.I.A. operations inside

Iran and the insertion o special operations troops to gather in-telligence and to be prepared to conduct direct action missionsi ghting broke out between the United States and Iran.

Tree choices in the rst ew hours o the developing situa-

tion would seem to cover the strategic landscape.

It was Israel. Separate the United States and its policyrom the strike and then sanction Israel or its action.

Deend Deploy additional orces to the region but do not

conduct strikes against Iran unless there are attacks againstU.S. bases or troops in the region that can be traced toIran.

Finish the job Deploy additional orces to the region,and as soon as possible, initiate air strikes on the remaining

Iranian nuclear acilities and Irans retaliatory capabilities.

The First Decisions

After the Israeli attack on Iraqs Osirak reactor, the UnitedStates openly condemned Israel. A similar approach is a poten-tial major policy option in the wake o this Israeli attack. TeUnited States could make every eort to make the operation

appear to be Israel going it alone. Te United States could takeactions to underscore its disapproval as it did when it delayedthe delivery o some o the F-16s Israeli had purchased in 1981.

Another crisis with some o the same characteristics was theIsraeli attack against Egypt in October 1956. President Eisen-

hower, seeing the Suez crisis in a broader context, took actionsagainst Israel as well as the French and British who had col-luded. Te U.S. imposed sanctions on all three countries and

was successul in getting a U.N. ceasere resolution passed.Te U.S. Administration was so upset with the Israeli invasion,

Eisenhower refected in his memoirs o the crisis, that i Israelhad not withdrawn rom the territory it occupied, a blockadeo the country might have been initiated.73 However, unlike theoccupation o Egyptian territory, which could be undone, theair strike on Iran would be a completed action. Tere would be

no walking back.Another limitation o the It was Israel option is that it is


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74. Despite Rift, Obama KeepsIsrael Armed, UPI.com, January29, (2010).

75. Some degree of speeding up ofthe deployment of missile defenseassets to the Persian Gulf regionwas recently announced. See DavidE. Sanger, Eric Schmitt, U.S.Speeding Up Missile Defenses inthe Persian Gulf, New York Times,

January 31, (2010).

76. Clyde R. Mark, Israel-UnitedStates Relations, CongressionalResearch Service, September 26,(2002), p. 13.

77. Stefano Ambrogi, U. S. Says

Arms Shipment to Israel Not Linkedto Gaza, Reuters, January 10,(2009).

not likely to work. First o all, no matter how the U.S. tried to

make it appear and no matter what the reality, it would seemto the world that the United States permitted the attack eveni it was not directly involved. Second, even i the Israel-alonecampaign were successul on some level, an isolated IranIsrael

confict would seriously damage U.S. interests in the MiddleEast, and the U.S. would be conronted with a period o highoil prices as Israeli and Iranian moves and countermovesunolded. Finally and the most important reason why this isnot a good policy option Iran is unlikely to want to accept it

as Israel operating on its own. In the end, whether or not thesituation is an Israel-only aair, it is an Iranian decision. In theIranian calculation, and as the leadership has said or years, theGreat Satan and Israel would be one at this point.

Finishing the job on Iran is not the kind o policy decisionthat is likely to be made in the ace o not knowing how Iran isgoing to react. In addition, the military argument at this point

would most likely have the most infuence on the presidentialdecision. Moving air and naval orces into the region is thesame immediate decision i the United States were going to

prepare to nish the job or i the U.S. were only moving todeend its interests. Tere would be no need to decide to nishthe job now. Tat could wait. Get in place and get ready.

One o the Presidents early and dicult decisions would be

whether to deploy ground-based missile deense capabilitiesto Israel. Te United States has periodically deployed missiledeense units rom Europe and Fort Hood, exas to parti-cipate with Israel in an exercise called Juniper Cobra.74 Notknowing how Iran is going to react would make this a tough

call. Te President would be relieved when someone rom theDepartment o Deense speaks up and says that the UnitedStates can provide just as much missile deense capability, andbe less provocative, by moving an additional Aegis cruiser withits missile deense capabilities into the eastern Mediterranean.

Some missile deense deployments were started under the BushAdministration and continued under the Obama Administra-tion.75 Te decision would be to accelerate the moves. It wouldnot be a dicult decision.

Te President will most likely be conronted with another

decision on which he had not been brieed. Although this ismentioned very little in the open press, since 1990 the UnitedStates has had a stockpile o conventional munitions inside Is-rael,76 and in January 2009 at least 325 cargo containers-worth

o munitions were added to the stockpile.77

Te question orthe President would be whether the U.S. would allow Israel to


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78. Soldiers, Sailors Keep Nimitz

CSG in Line with Tactical Direc-tive, Navy News Service, Novem-ber 16, (2009).

withdraw rom drawn on ? [i.e. use some o] the stockpile. TePresident would probably again nd comort in the act thatthis decision could wait until later. With the single mission soar and with ghting not taking place yet in Lebanon, Israelcan wait or a decision.

hypothesis:

Te Presidents Speech at the End o the Meeting with KeyCabinet Ocers.

At this point we do not know how the Iranians are going toreact. I am convinced, however, that we must be prepared or anyeventuality. o that end, I am ordering the Department o Deenseto begin movement o appropriate air, naval and missile deenseassets to the region.

I want the State Department to work out a coalition and workwith the nations o the region or basing support or our aircrat.Im concerned about the impact o high oil prices on the

recovery. I want some recommendations on what we do about theStrategic Petroleum Reserve.

Deployment of Forces to the Region

This deployment to protect U.S. interests would not resem-

ble the six months o preparations or Desert Shield, and thepreparations will be much less visible than the movements tothe region in early 2003. For the most part this will not be aCNN event. Preparations will involve the quiet deploymento Air Force tankers to staging bases and ghters into bases in

countries that would preer little press coverage. U.S. Navy as-sets will move into the region without much anare.

On the other hand, the deployments will not be without di-culties or the U.S. Department o Deense. Even or the car-rier strike groups that do not have basing problems, it will take

time to get them in place. Te ongoing operation in Aghanis-tan involves one carrier group. Te single carrier has been pro-viding approximately 30% o the close support o operationsin Aghanistan.78 As part o strategic reocusing, this means adecision must be made on whether Iran or Aghanistan is the

priority or these air assets.Te surge in additional carrier strike groups would take

some time. Te status o the U.S. feet at one point in mid-November 2009 illustrates the problem. Te U.S.S. Nimitz

was supporting operations in Aghanistan. Te Reagan hadjust returned to San Diego rom a deployment. Te ruman


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79. Jay Soloman, Turkey Balksat Iran Sanctions, Wall Street

Journal, July 12, (2009).

80. F-22s, F-16s deploy toUAE, Air Force Times, November18, (2009).

was doing deployment certica

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