fo b6 public hearing 6-17-04 2 of 2 fdr- tab 6-17- jeff griffith- bio- mfr- testimony request

8/14/2019 FO B6 Public Hearing 6-17-04 2 of 2 Fdr- Tab 6-17- Jeff Griffith- Bio- MFR- Testimony Request

1/15

Jeff Griffith

Jeff Griffithis currentlyth e Vice Presidentof theAviation Groupfor TheWashingtonConsulting Group, Inc. He is responsible for programs in system development for airtraffic controland airspace managem ent solutions. This includes developmentofoperational concepts, system architecture, procedures and training, as well as evaluationof operational systems.

He retiredfrom the Fede ral Aviation Administration in J anuary,2003. His last positionwas Deputy Directorof Air Traffic (2001 - 2003). He was responsiblefor the day-to-dayoperation of the National Airspace System, managing a workforce of more than 24,000people with an operations budget of $3.4 billion. He provided leadership for thirteensenior e xecutive direct reports to insure a team approach to customer service and apositive approach in working with other government agencies.

From 1996-2001,he wasProgram Directorfor AirTrafficPlanningand Procedures,Operations, Airspace Managem ent.He wasresponsiblefo r development, transitionandoperationof new airtraffic control technologyand procedures intoth e U.S. NationalAirspace System.

From 1980-1996,Griffithservedin variousfield and regional managem ent positions withincreasing levels of responsibility. All assignments were inhigh density airtrafficoperational environments. Prior to that,Griffithserved as an airtraffic controller andsupervisor in several airtraffic control facilities with various levels of com plexityincludingAtlanta,Tower/ApproachControl.

From 1966-1970,Griffithservedas an airtraffic controllerfor theU.S. Air ForceatMoody Air Force Base, G eorgia and Phu C at Air Base, Republic of Vietnam.


2/15

UNCLASSIFIEDCOMMISSION SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Jeff Griffith,Former FA A Assistant Director of AirTraffic Control

Type: Interview

Date: March31,2004

Special Access Issues: No ne

Prepared By: Lisa Sullivan

Team: 8

Participants (non-Comm ission): None

Participants (Commission): Lisa Sullivan, Miles Kara, John Farmer, D ana Hyde,an d

John Azzarello

Location: G SA Conference Room

Background

Griffith spent 36 years in the FAA. He retired from the FAA inNovember 2002.Currently,he is consulting on airtraffic management in foreigncountriesincluding Chinaand Columb ia. He enlisted in the U.S. Air Force in1966 and was trained as airtrafficcontroller. Hespent a year in Vietnam. In Januaryof 1970 he was discharged and wentto the FAA as controller. He as stationed in Georgia; then in 1976 he went into

management; in1990, he became the m anager at IndianapolisCenter; he managedChicago O'Hare for several years; he went to Great LakesRegion;in 1999 or 2000, hewas selected as deputy directorof air traffic (AT-2) - that was his position on 9-11.

Th e operations budget was 3.5 billion dollars to operate all the A TC facilities on day today basis (500 plus). Th e director of AirTraffic (his boss) was BillPeacock. PeterChallenwas theassociate; then Steve Brown; then Monte Belger; then JaneGarvey.

15 people reported directly toGriffith including nine regional division managers and acouple ofstaff people.

On a day to day basis, he reviewed the previousday's operations. They experienced onaverage ten break downs and problem s in the system. He alsoreceived daily briefingsfrom the Command Center on delays andcongestion,runway incursions-anythingthataffected safety.

He had meetings to go to onbudget/modernizationof the airtraffic system - strategymeetings- meetings withthe NTSB on closing out certain recom mendations- they were

UNCLASSIFIED 1COMMISSION SENSITIVE


3/15


constantly looking at more efficient use of money, and they were always answeringto theCongress on this. Therewas a lot of IGactivity.

Primary radar capab ilities

The FAA had issued a paper a decision docum entto decommission them. However

many there were they are very expens ive to maintain. Some were 30 to 40 years old ASR1 and 2 radar systems. The quality wasn't that great.

On top of the radar dish is a secondary radar. It is getting similar informationas theprimary radar. Secondary radar doesno t pick up "skin paint;" it takes all thedata/electronicallytransmitted info rmationon the aircrafts. The secondary radaris muchcheaper for this reason. The decision was made the primary radar was no longer neededin some environments.

Primary was needed in the terminal environment- a range of 60 miles from the airport -there are about 200 of them. The likelihood of a collision below 20,000feet was greater

that vicinity.

Griffith thought eliminating primary radar outsideof the terminal environment w ouldnotcompromise safety.

The actual decomm issioning of ASR 1 and 2 models was to be enacted by tu rningoff thehi-voltage atselected sites. The decommissioningof the models meant thatthe supplyparts andpersonnel requiredto maintain the systems couldbe sent elsewhere. It wasn't aphase out - secondary radar w ould stillbe at the sites. The date of decommissionhad notbeen set as ofSeptember 11.

NTSB had issues with theFAA's plan. "The NTSB was obsessed with notion that anaircraft without transponder would collide witha plane full of people." A plane as aweapon, or a purposeful turning off of the transponder, was not thought of; it was only amechanical malfunction they were concerned about.

In the last 15 years, Griffith doesn't recallan aircraft losing transponder capability above15,000 feet. If radar capabilityis lost, the controller's responseis to protect the routefrom point topoint and the altitude. It was very typical to lose radio for a period of time.The loss of transponder was"unusual, but it happened". When it occurred, it was neverfor an extended periodof time.

If an aircraft lost a transponderfor the durationof a transcontinentalflight, that would bevery unusualand it would be reported up to HDQTs. Each facility keepsa log daily thatis reported up to Command Center.

Relationship with th e Military

UNCLASSIFIEDCOMM ISSION SEN SITIVE


4/15


A Joint M ilitaryan d Civilian Group lookedat the uses of the common operatingfacilityand was led by General Eberhardt from the military side and Jim Washington from FAAside (Director of Requirements). There were a lot of people w orking on that.

The military wanted a 3-D display and a one-second update rate on the newest radar theyinvested in. G riffith 's opinion is that the FAAdidn't need that level of definition to

separate airplanes. "You do n't w ant to put this in operational environmen t because of theservicing issues." He wa sn't on the team that was discussing these issues with themilitary (through the Joint Military and Civilian Group).

Lack of Radar Coverage

We had coverage charts we kn ow all the gaps. Mou ntainou s terrain causes loss ofprimary and secondary radar. In the eastern US there were some gaps, including PA.Griffith thought that gapsin radar coverage were com monly know n information,and hefelt certain that the con troller in the geographic region w ould h ave received training at thecenter on any gaps in coverage that existed.

Regional offices maintain the coverage charts. The idea was to provide theinformationto the facility in non-technical format. W e didn't want them interpretingthe informationat the centers themselves.

AAL77

The controller was trained to separate everything in front of that aircraft. Theaircraft hasalways continued to a destination o r a planned rou te offlight. That was the scenario theytrained for. If the controller knewa lost targetwas in thesystem, the controller wo uldlook ahead. Meanwhile, the plane turned around and went the other way.

The AAL 77controllerdid not seeanythingto the front or to theright of the track afterthe hijacker turned the transponder off. There was no primary radar coverage, so he wasunable to see it.Griffith doesn't know thatto be true.

Every ga p should be memorializedand made clearto the controller. He recalls a generalknowledgethat someof these planes werenot seen on primary radar,but he cannotverify.

Controllers werenot trained - there was no training for radar environment with bothprimary andsecondary radarsin use.

The controllers are able to track it at both ZBW (Boston C enter) and ZNY (New YorkCenter).

The controllers in Indy working AAL 77 had the same equipment as ZBW and ZNY. Heknows how the system works.



5/15


It is di ff i cu l t for Griffith to accept that the controller in Indy Center that handled AAL 77could not "see" the prim ary target.

In the Event of Aviat ion Accidents

When there is a crash in the system, Griffith will learn aboutit within a few minutes. The

notification process is very disciplined . Text pagers w ere with themat all times. Thepage was sent to many, includingBil l Peacock an d him. It was their job to get all theinformation and begin briefingthe Administrator.

Peacock, Challen, Brown and he were a team to work issues together. The data forreconstructing the accident wouldbe sent to the evaluations department. A team wasusual lypu t together to go to the site in support of NTSB. It was standard proced uretoreview the equipment, the tapes, interviewsof controllers in order to root ou t causes andmistakes that might gave leadto the crash.

Protocol for Hijacking

Hijack-people w ou ld convene in the WOC. FBI has the lead so they wou ld beim med iately brought on board. Keep airplanes out of the way. B ring it to some sort ofresolution.

What about enlisting th e mili tary?

Notification capabi l i tyincluded DOD. In his group, senior mil officers were at thebui ld ingan d they reported to him. If a plan was in the works that involved the military, itwas done at a high level throughthe people in the WOC.

FAA History - Mil i ta ry background

The FAA was set up tosupport the mili tary. A series of agreements about differentco mm and s set up protocol and put processes and procedu res in place for join t use of theair space.

I |was a mili tary liaison stationed at the FAA. She reported to him and Bil l/ Peacoc k. People that reservedai r space for military exercises wereat a lower level. It

would be brought to her attention onl y if there was a problem.

/ Military liaisonsfor the FAA were also locatedat Tyndall, Griffiths,NEADs, SEADs/ West Air Defense Sector, CheyenneMtn - they were requiredto report back to FAA.

W OC (Washington Operations Center) people asked about gettingDOD on the line. The/ person in charge was Eberhardt at Cheyenne Mtn. Belger or the Ad ministrator wo ul d; have had to call him and give the coordinates and the status of the hi jac kin g inprogress.

He wou ld order the fighters to launch. It was ahigh level decision. That is the way it

/ UNCLASSIFIED 4/ COMMISSION SENSITIVE

9/11 Working-level Employee


6/15


should have been done"by the book". Tabletop exercises were practiced annuallyat anundisclosed location.

FAA supervisors an d managers followed rule "7210.3" on hijackings. "7110.65" is thehijack protocol fo r controllers.

In the event of ahijacking, all the centers callthe regional operationscenter. The regionsets up a bridge an d tells the Washing ton Op erations Center. They also call the local FBIand local law enforcem ent and the airport manag er. Centersnotified the CommandCenter in Herndon, VA.

O n 9-11

He was in theoffice on the tenthfloor. Peacock was aw ay. The first thing he recalls isDave C anoles on the phone saying "we had anaircraft that hit the Wo rld TradeCenter."Not long after that, he showed up in the office (he was themanager of evaluation staff).The assumption w as it was as small aircraft. They were pulling the tapes, etc. Hecan't

remember a lot of detail after that.

He turned the TV in theoffice to CNN. He saw that people were sayingit was anairliner. He headed dow n the hall a few minutes later. He went into the ACC room(Aviation Crisis Center).

He was next to Lee Longm ire and he had the Com mand Center on the phone. He startedthe dialogue: "what do we know whatare we doing?"

Lee was setting up the SVTs an d pullingthe security people together.The White Housewanted information.

Wh en he walked in the Crisis C enter he was still hearing"crash," not "hijack". It mayhave been after the second one hit the tower that he went into the room.

Early into this, he was prima rily with Belger and JaneGarvey.

He doesn't remem ber an ything about a page or receiving notification in thestaff meetingabout a transponder being turned off (this was in Shirley M iller's statement). Hedistinctly remembers being in hisoffice when he first learned about it.

He remembers telling Canolesto set up asituation linebefore leaving his office for the

Aviation Crisis Center: "Get peo ple together collecting data". He knew a lot of peoplewould want to know what happened. He wanted Canoles to get EVERY BOD Y on theline. In his mind, that was go ing to be his vehicle for getting inform ation. It ended up,he sent runners down to the ACC to get updates.

When did ZBWcall the region to report a second plane?



7/15

9/11 Work ing - l eve l Employee

W \D\S ION SENSITIVE

,- - V ,\ , He does not know.

, W ho should have they been call ing?W ho should th e region have talkedto at theWOC?

.The dutyofficer on duty that day .

He does not remem ber whe n he first heard a plane was hijacked. First, he learned anaircraft hit the trade center.Then, he learnedit was acomm ercial aircraft. Then,th e

\d aircraft,hit. At this time, hegoes to ACC and talks to John Wh ite on the pho ne atthe Comm and Center. "We were getting ready to get on the SVTs to brief up the chain of

.command,"

\h was hearingfalse reports (that early?). Som eonesays, "Hey an airplane just hitth e Pentagon.'1 feot on the phon e. He was gettingreports of people closingdown ATC centers. He had to beable to talk to Lee andLynn Osmusin the corner in the

\t of theroom. It got busy;! phowed up .

.Peop lewere saving. "Mo nte we have to shut this thing down," m ean ing the air space.I \ said that Com mand Center was saying, "We ll, we already didthat."

SVTs \h w a? on the SVTS calls. W henever they w antedto know operational things he

was giving information. The Justice D epartment, FBI,th e Adm inistrator wereon theSVTs. H e doesn't remember whenor for howlong th e W hite Housewas on theSVTs.Griffithswas on there quitea bit.

The group up there in the corner (LeeLongmireand Lynn Osmus primarily)was thesource of his informat ion thathe relayedon the SVTs.

Delta 1989

He was w riting all the planes reported suspicious on his pad. He reported on the SVTsabout th e De lta potential hijacking. Thatwas beforewe figured out it was not aproblem.

AAL 11 as still airborne -

Griffith doesn't remembeJ {announcingto the aviation crisis center that AAL11 was still airborne and heading to DC. Hedoesn't recall the particular piece ofinformation.

The purposeof Canolessettingup the telcon from the ATC Suitewas to getinformationout to the AT Div isio n managers and the 500s (that is the regional leve l). That w asimportantto h im. H e ended up with th e centersand some of the tracons on thereand thatwas really to get the system back up.



8/15

11 Working-level Employee

N S E N S IT I V E

\ After the twocrashes,he neededto know whatwas outthere,so he hadJohn W hite fromCommand Center stay on the phone and told him not to hang up.

He recalled that the W hite House wante d to know wh at the situation was at the time .John White toldhim thecall signs, pointof arrivalan d departures, times, etc.H e wroteitdown and went in to theSVTs it was already video andspeakingto them.

He was onthere for 5, 10, 7 minutes. Periodicallyhe went in and briefed.It wasn't thiscontinuousth ing. It wasn't up thewhole t ime .

Did youhear a conversation about scrambling military aircraft?

Yes. That conversation cameup laterin the dayoutsideth e SVTs.

Do youremembera mil i taryaircraft being discussedin the SVTs?

\.

\ t some point,he reportedon theSVTs about ground ingth e planes.

\7

\ didn't thinkhe reportedon AA L 77 to theSVTs. We had determinedby this time\t th e trade centers we rehit by UA L175 and AA L11. Th e moderatorof the SVTS

was "squished." DOD was on there- the JCs were on - he didn 't recognize themat thetime.

I | told Griff i thabout AAL 77around 9:30 a.m.. Thatwas the first knowledgehe had of it.

Com mission staff toldGriff i ththat th e real-time count downof AAL 77plowingin to thePentagonwas reported on Canoles telcon. The call wasactuallyserving as a center forinformation.

There was a fast-mover 30 m iles west of Du lles mov ing east bound - he did not know itwas AA L 77 at thetime. Griffithsaid he got theinformationon flight 77. Herecalls thathe had this inform ation and he shared it with the peop le in the AC C. Hedoesn'tknowwhere the information came from. Herecalls that there is a requirem ent at W ashingtonNationalAirportto report al l unusualaircraft situationsto Secret Service. Someo ne toldhim we didcontact th e Secret Service,so he wassatisfied. [Miles Kara though tthat th ereport:"Fast mover west of Dulles 30milesout" m ay have been reported earlier than

9:30, an d could have beenin referenceto UA L 93. D anDiggins thoughti t was UA L93.]Then Griff i thheard aboutth e C-130reportingth e crash at thePentagon,so he associatedthe fast mover wi thth e Pentagon hit .

UNCLASSIFIED 7COM MISSION SEN SITIVE


9/15

9/11 Working-level Employee\. UNCLASSIFIED

,. COMMISSION SENSITIVE

There was confusion forhours abou t which plan ehit the Pentagon. He had noreport it. was AAL 77that went.intothe Pentagon. His list of missing planesat that time includedAAL 11 and UAL 175 andDelta, Continental . . .

He was, gettingai r traffic informationf r d r n j pnd Dave Canoles.

UAL 93 and Shoot Down Order

He didn' t have muchinformationaboutit .

Griffiths thought the Secretary of Defense was the one that should hav e decided to shootdown an airplane. This conversationwas taking placein a corner of the ACC. It was adiscussion about authority. Inhis m ind , there werefighters in the air andthey wereresponding to the situation an d there was n't any thing specific about shooting down UA L93. Part of that idea of defending themselveswas shutt ing downth e system.

Griffith thoughtit was not hisplace to give th e shoot down order.

Military Liaisons to the FA A

The mi litary liaisonsin thebuildingwere doing things. He knows thatbecause he sawthem. He never directed themto do anything.He told| | the mi litary liaisonwhateverinformation he had. He does not recallseekingher out to convey anyinformation. He knew thatshe wasreporting backto her people at thePentagon.

"Shooting downan airplane requires Rulesof Engagement,"Griffith said. They didn'texist at that point. His main concern: Civiliancontrollersdid not know how tovectorfighters tointercepta plane.

If they ar e talking about shooting dow naircrafts in a civil system, thenth e fighters weretalking to thecenters and they werein and they were talkin gto NORAD as well .

He doesn'trememberat what time,but hecalled General Eberhardtto tell him they were"shutting th is thingdown."Griffith thought thatat the time he placed th e call , they didn ' thave a strong link with th e militaryat this point.

Griffith said thathis "focal point"was General Larry Arnoldfrom CONR fo r 24-hoursaday, for a couple of days after that.

U A L 93

He did notnotify th e military aboutUAL 93. NEADS knew whatwas goingon at thispoint. Hisassumptionis that th e reps at GriffithsAFB/NEADS(Steve Culbertson)would be talking to Cleveland Center. He thinks this because he know s that Culbertsonis up there doingtheirjob. On any other day of the week, if NEADSsees something andthey decideto scramble; thenit's Culbertson'sjob tocoordinate with FAA .



10/15

/11 Working-level Employee.. . UNCLASSIFIED

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

^_ Griffith did not do anythingto ensure that UAL 93 informationwas given to anyone. He.. does not remember who pulled him away to talk about UAL 93 (as noted in an FAA

transcript of a recording from that day). He thinks that| [broadcast this report to theroom and other people were aware of the hijack ing of UAL 93.

John Azzarello Recap:

On AAL 11 , the Boston Center reached out d irectly to militaryassets. 6-8 min utesbefore the crash. \ n UAL 175, there is hot a realizationat ZBW that it is hijacked until 10 minutes before

the crash. They get notification on it though, too.

On AAL 77, ZDCreports to NEADS that it is lost a few minu tes beforeth e crash.

On UAL 93, ZOB told NEADS roughly4-5 minutes beforethe crash thatUAL 93 washijacked "bomb on board." But otherwise, ZOB told the Region at 9:39 AM. As early as9:34 AM, the Command Centerhad the information about"bomb on board" and so did

HDQTs.

Griffith does not disagree wi ththis assessment. The procedures should have allowedformilitary notification.If you go back to the other threeaircrafts an d apply th e writtenprocedures, thenif people had n't taken theirown initiative,similar things w ould havehappened with those aircraft as did with UAL93.

Are we to assumethat HDQTs though t the Center was contacting the military? TheCenters didn't havea procedure to contact themili tary.

He does not recall being on the AirThreat C onferen ce Call that day.

It was an assump tion of his that the militar y was in the loop; he was satisfiedthawas broadcasting information that all the people.

FAA and DOD Communications

The primary net sh ould have included theNMCC. The Air Threat Conference call,conversely, should have had FAA on it.

Were you aware that eitherof those netswas ineffective on 9-11?

"No, not unti l later," said Griff i th .

The FAA positions at NEADS and SEADS were both vacant before9-11. DanSchmeckel at NORAD was retiring, Griff i th felt they were important positionstomaintain,so went outsidehis orders to put the guys out there.

UNCLASSIFIEDCOMM ISSION SENSITIVE


11/15

/ 1 1 Working- leve l Employee

\\"'::::;:::^::-:::--.., - U N C L A S S I F I E D\ ' - - : : : ; - ' : : : ; ;- . . : : ; ; ; - - . . . . . . . . C O M M IS S IO N S E N S I T IV E

Carioles' line:was: administrative and the tac net was moreoperational-.!was trying tobe.4 hero but heclosed.his air space, which wasn't the thing to do.

Azzarello told Griffith that) .. . prom"Boston Center told the Commissionthat .after the first crash, he thought thatthe appearance of a new code squawkingon theirradar frequency mig ht possiblybe UAL 175. Griffith can't believe that! I

I I from TrafficManagement could have known thatin real time. Griffith wasfrustrated because the operational elemen t is where the mo n ey goes and inf orm ationshould be piped in there. "John White at the Command Centeris the guy that shouldknow everything.." Dave Canoles wanted toget! Ion the telcoh;(should havenot relayed operational informationon an administrative line.

"What can people in conferencerooms with speaker phones do about stoppingaircrafts?Nothing!"

There shoulda CARF or a military liaisonto the center at every center.Due to staffingcuts, the position w as eliminated.] berformed the role of m ilitary liaisonat ZBW and he did a good job that day. U sually, controllers at the centers have the MO Sresponsibilities as anadditional dutywithin the T M U .

He does not remember seeing John Flahertythat day (Secretary Mineta 's Chief of Staff).He did not interact with him.

He does not know if the Administrator or the Deputy Administrator was made aware ofUA L 93 before it crashed.

Jane Garveyan d Monte Belger lookedto both him and thesecurity people forinformation that day.

His focus was the operational elemen tso it was frustrating to him to find outotherinformation was shared through other avenues.

Post9-H After-Action

"It was like pull in g teeth" to getinformation after 9-11. Th e Centers weren't cooperative.Tony Ferrente worked nightand day forweeks to pull th e inform ation together. Finally,they g ot it together to the poi n t they could brief the FBI an d the SecretService. DickClark was present at the meeting , as were DO D people.

He went to a briefingat the W hite House abouta week later associated with protectingthe n ational capital region.Primarily, it was a Secret Service briefing.FAA had a part.

Mike Can avan briefed on security issues, andGriffith briefed on ATC issues. They wereconcerned about a plane taking off from W ashington National on runw ay 3-6 and hittingthe W hite House. They briefedon the exercise missile sights readyto shoot downairplanes aroundDC.



12/15

/11 Working-level EmployeeD

\ N SENSI TVE

j|. Dave Canoles briefed Griffith on the "9-11 Hijackings Summaryof Events". He got tonsof briefings -different iterations of it. There were also internal meetings at the FAA onwhat the FAA knew an d when ; an d what did they do with th e information.

Coordination with the mili tary?

"Larry Arnold (CONR) ma de surewe gotwhateverwe needed," Griffith said. He gave, , , Arnold whatever they wanted.

Griffith remembers that General Arnold, also an Alaskan General, and General Eberhardt, , received shoot down authority. ROEs w ere comm unicated to the FAA a s well.

]'\s tasked to come up with a review of coordination betweenthe FAAand th e mili tary.

He is hot aware of the W hi te House asking to be briefed on military and FAAcommunicationsfrom 9-11.

GeneralWayne Downingh ad meetingsby S VTs with the FAA and theWh ite House.Contents of discussion on the SVTs:

- \t of intelligence issues- .any issues regardingthe AT system

Agencies that participated in theSVTs sessions included: Secret Service, JCS,FBI, andCIA. Dick Clark was not on all themeetings (h e delegated th e staff). Any meetingsbetween FA A and Dick Clark were attended by G eneral Mike Canavan prior to9-11.

Hom eland Security'sc.olor coded system - FAA put togeth er a schem e of wh at actionswere required at each level.

Dave Canoles an d Tony Ferrente were th e principlepeople involved in the After Actionreview. They briefedth e Deputy and theAdministratorby on his summary of 9rllevents.

John Azzarello spent sorrie time comparingth e information in the briefing materials"summary on9-11" that differs from one of the original NEA DS logs withGriffiths.

Azzarello pointed out theunlikelihoodthat one of the NEADS logs lists the tail numberof the firsthijacked planes. Griffith affirmedthat havinga plane by tail number is odd,so soon after the event.

Griffith doesn't knowwhat happened to l |s after-action work.She putthe report togeth er. It was a topico.f hotHebateamong FAA employees. He knew peoplewere saying that FAA andmilitary notificationtimes w ere inconsistent."Everyone waspointing fingers." Larry and he approached it pragm atically, G etting the people andacneo it pra

nj |wetting thelogs was the firststep; thenj [was asked to go find out on the FAAside.



13/15

9/11 Working-level Employee. . . . . UNCLASSIFIED

.... COMMISSION SENSITIVE

The NEADS logs were given to FAA. j [screened the logs provided by HEADS.

Azzarello pointed out to Griffiths that notification times for the other flights are listed asunknown, according to the log. Griffiths assured staff that the military got theinformation;he said he is confidentabout that.

Larry and he ha d a lot of heated conversations. "Larry and I agreed we wanted the truthon the issue.' r |~" from CONR also coordinated with FAA.

The DOD testimony to Congress was wrong. Griffith confirmed this. He and LarryArnold did not talk in great detail about the times. They talked about the bosses fightingover head. The DEN addressed these concerns.

Griffith d idn ' t have any information on the FAA press release that addressed the issue ofnotificationsto the military on 9-11 . They probably asked hi m about it. It is a timeline ofFAA events on 9-11.



14/15

Thomas H. KeanC H A I R

Le e H. HamiltonV I C EC H A I R

R ichard Ben-Vniste

Fred F. Fielding

Jamie S. Gorelick

Slade Cotton

Bob Kerrey

John F. Lehman

Timothy J . Roemer

James R.Thompson

Philip D. ZelikowE X E C U T I V ED I R E C T O R

/9/11 Personal Privacy

May 27, 2004

M r. Jeff Griffith

Dear M r. Griffith:

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States willhold a publichearing on June 17, 2004, in Washington, DC on the topic ofNational Crisis Management. You are invited to testify at these proceedingsat 9:15 - 11:00 a.m. on Thursday, June 17.

This session will be the seventh and last hearing in the Commission's 2004investigative hearing schedule, which will collectively advance theCommission's efforts to produce an authoritative account of the facts ofcircumstances surroundingthe September 11,2001, terroristattacks. At thishearing, the Commission's objective is to present the definitive account of ournation's response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Aspects of the hearing willspecificallyaddress the response of the military, the Federal AviationA dministration(FAA), and senior levels of the Executive branch.

W e look forward to your testimony on the following topics:

FAA Headquarters' response on the morning of 9/11, including anunderstanding of the major actions taken by other FAA facilities;

Coordination and communication between the FAA, NORAD, theNational Military Command Center (NMCC), and the White Houserelevant to fully understanding the response to the attacks;

9/11 "Lessons Learned" from FAA's perspective; and

Post-9/11 changes, or reforms, made to improve the FAA's role inresponding to future security breaches.

Given time constraints, you will not be asked to give introductory oraltestimony, as others on your panel have been asked to give a brief openingstatement. However, we ask that you submit a comprehensive writtentestimony and provide your statement via e-mail to Lisa Sullivan [email protected] by 9:00 a.m. on June 9, 2004. Your full

Street SW, Room 5125Washington,DC 20407

202.331.4060 F 202.296.5545www.9'11commission.gov

26 Federal PlazaSuite 13-100

New York, NY 10278T 212.264.1505 F 212.264.1595


15/15

M r. Jeff Griffith

May 27,2004Page 2

statement will be made part of the record and carefully studied by theCommission. All witnesses at this Commission hearing will be asked totestify under oath.

Please contact John Azzarello at (212) 264-1588 with any questions you mayhave. We look forward to your participation in this important public forum.

With best regards,

Thomas H. Kean Lee H. HamiltonChair Vice Chair

fo b6 public hearing 6-17-04 2 of 2 fdr- tab 6-17- jeff griffith- bio- mfr- testimony request

Documents