fo b6 public hearing 6-17-04 1 of 2 fdr- tab 4 entire contents- myers- leidig- eberhart- arnold-...

8/14/2019 FO B6 Public Hearing 6-17-04 1 of 2 Fdr- Tab 4 Entire Contents- Myers- Leidig- Eberhart- Arnold- Withdrawal Notice

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IMPROVISING A HOM ELAND DEFENSEPANEL: MILITARY RESPONSE ON 9/119:15 a.m. - 11:30 a.m., Thursday, June 17

Designated Commissioners: Lehman and Gorelick

1 - Suggested Questions forMyers andLeidig2 - General Myers Biography. MFR

Prepared Testimony Invitation Letter

3 - Admiral (select) Leidig Biography MFR Invitation Letter

4 - Suggested Questions forEberhart andArnold5 - General Eberhart Biography. MFR

Prepared Testimony Invitation Letter

6 - General Arnold Biography MFR Invitation Letter


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DAY OF 9/11Suggested Hearing Questions

I. Pentagon Witnesses (National Military Command Center)Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Myers: On the morning of9/11, Chairman Myers (then Vice Chairman) was at a meeting on Capitol Hill.Sometime after the second strike on the World Trade Center, Chairman Myerswas notified of the situation and spoke briefly with General Eberhart beforeleaving Capitol Hill. Myers saw the Pentagon on fire as he was returning to thePentagon; we estimate he arrived in the NMCC around 9:55 a.m.Captain (Admiral-select) Charles Joseph Leidig: At 8:30 a.m. on the morningof 9/11, Captain Leidig "took over the watch" from the on-duty director ofoperations (General Winfield), who was scheduled to attend a meeting elsewherein the building. Captain Leidig was the NMCC's administrative director, but hewas also fully trained as a director of operations. Captain Leidig directed theoperations team and the Air Threat Conference Call until General Winfieldreturned to the NMCC, at approximately 10:15 a.m.1. Chairman Myers' Experience as CINC NORAD. Chairman Myers served asthe commandero f NORAD from August o f 1998 until February 2000.(a) While you were commander of NORAD, was there any discussion ofchanging NORAD's mission to take account of new, emerging threats? If not,why not?(b) When yo u assumed the post of CINC NORAD in 1998, the number of alertsites had already been reduced to seven. Did you believe seven alert sites weresufficient to perform the air sovereignty mission?(c) During your tenure as CINC NORAD, what were the air threats you preparedfor and trained against? Did NORAD ever train to shoot down a civilian aircraft?If so, was the FAA involved in those exercises?(d) How would you describe the relationship between NORAD and the FAA priorto 9/11? Did you ever talk to the FAA Administrator or Deputy? Was there anyinteraction between the two agencies? If so, on what kinds of issues? What wasthe division of responsibility between the agencies with respect to hijackings?2. Planes as Weapons & Suicide Hijackings.(a) To your knowledge, prior to 9/11 did DoD ever consider the threat to thehomeland posed by a suicide hijacking? [Myers]


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(b) We have heard from a number of DoD officials that prior to 9/11 hijackingswere considered a law enforcement issue, and DoD was only to play a supportingrole if called upon. What assets were available to law enforcement to shoot downan aircraft with a suicide hijacker in control? How could the task of responding toa suicide hijacking be assigned to anyone but the military? [Myers](c) Prior to 9/11, were you aware that the Secret Service had requested DoD'sassistance in developing air interdiction capabilities around the National CapitolRegion? What was DoD's response to these requests? [Myers](d) Last April, the press reported on a pre 9-11 military exercise - Positive Force -- in which NORAD planners suggested a scenario involving a plane crashing intothe Pentagon. The scenario was rejected and not included in the final version ofthe exercise. Can you explain for us what this exercise was about, and whatintelligence - if any- was behind thedevelopment of theNORAD scenario?[Myers or Eberhart](e) Secretary Rumsfeld has been quoted as saying that shortly before 9/11 thesubject of homeland defense had been elevated to the top of DoD's priority list.What threats to the homeland were envisioned before 9/11? What were thepriorities? What actions were being taken in this regard? [Myers][NB: "We had been engaged in what was called the Quadrennial Defense Review.So, well prior to September 11 we had been talking about the defense of thehomeland and discussing how we were going to be able to deal with that problem.We had elevated it to the top of our priority list." Secretary Rumsfeld, December23 , 2002, Interview with DoD Historian.]3 . From 9:03 a.m. to 9:38 a.m. During this time Myers was on Capitol Hill andLeidig was in the N M C C . The Significant Event Conference convened at 9:29a.m.; the Air Threat Conference at 9:37 a.m.(a) What decisions were made at the Pentagon between the time of the secondstrike on the World Trade Center (9:03 a.m.), and the time the Pentagon was hit(9:38 a.m.)? [Myers or Leidig](b) During this window of time did you believe there was a threat to a nation'scapital, or did you think the attack was limited to the New York area? [Myers orLeidig](c) From the staff statement this morning we learned that information about anaircraft inbound to Washington - mistakenly thought to be Flight 11 - wasannounced over the air threat conference 8 minutes before the Pentagon wasstruck. Please help us understand what specifically the NMCC knew about thisplane ~ or any other plane thought to be headed to Washington before the


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Pentagon was hit? Was there any location information? Were forceprotection measures ordered for the building? If not, why not? [Myers or Leidig](d) What was Secretary Rumsfeld doing at this time? Were you in contact withhim before the Pentagon was struck? [Myers]4. Communications with the FAA on 9/11. On 9/11 the FAA was notapre-setparticipant in any of the teleconferences the NMCC used to manage crisissituations. At the outset of the Air Threat Conference, Captain Leidig askedN M C C operators to include the FAA in the conference. NMCC operators firsthad difficulty locating secure phone numbers for the FAA, and then because o fequipment problems had difficulty maintaininga secure connection between thetwo agencies. The FAA was ultimately added to the conference at 10:17, afterrepeated requests by NORAD.(a) Why was the FAA not connected to the Air Threat Conference until 10:17?Short of bringing them into the conference, was anyone speaking to the FAA on aseparate line? Why not? [Leidig](b) At any point in the morning did you pick up the phone and say, get me theFA A administrator, so I can understand who in the FAA has the best awarenessabout which planes are hijacked? Help us understand why ~ on a leadership level~ this didn't happen early on in the hijackings? [Myers]5. Command and Control on 9/11.(a) Chairman Myers, from a command an d control perspective, who was in chargeof the air defense operation on 9/11? At the Pentagon, who was in charge of thesituation before you arrived at the NMCC shortly before 10:00?(b) Do you recall hearing the shoot down order conveyed on the Air ThreatConference? What was your reaction? From a command and control perspective,did you believe the communication from the Lt. Colonel in the PEOC wassufficient to "pass" the order? Did you follow up with General Eberhart oranyone in NORAD to understand how they were interpreting and executing theorder? If so, when? [Myers & Leidig](c) The Langley pilots never received the shoot down order. On the morning of9/11, did you think the pilots had the order? Did you think there might beconfusion about what was expected of the pilots? Is it correct that around 10:15yo u were trying to track down who was in communication with the pilots? If so,why were you seeking to talk to those in communication with the pilots? [Myers](d) Captain Leidig, can you describe for us the moment in the NMCC when thevice president's authorization to engage hijacked aircraft was conveyed over theAir Threat Conference? What actions were taken at that time?


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6. Force Protection and Defense Condition Defcon 3. The order to increaseforce protection levels (to Delta) was announced on the Air Threat Conference at10:25; the order to go to Defcon 3 wa s first announced on the Conference at10:43, an d confirmed at 10:46.(a) How were these decisions made and by whom? Why were these orders given90 minutes after the second strike on the World Trade Center, if the assumptionafter the second strike was that it was a terrorist attack?7. After-Action Reports. The NM CC prepared a detailed after-action reportthat is concise, classified (Secret), and worth reading. The report is included inthe classified Commissioner briefing binder available at K Street.8. Preparedness today. In our interview with General Myers he stated that ou rair defense posture today against suicide aircraft is "very good" with somenotable exceptions. (See classified version of Myers MF R at K Street).(a) How do you rate America's air defense capability today? What still needs tobe done in this area? [Myers](b) How is DoD preparing today for the next unknown or unforeseen threat?What systems are in place today in terms of identifying ne w threats that werenot in place on 9/11? [Myers](c) What do you see as the changes to the Defense Department - not in terms ofreadiness but in terms of mindset or philosophy - caused by the events of 9111 ?Has DoD fully embraced the mission of homeland defense? [Myers]


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General Richard B. MyersGeneral Richard B. Myers became the fifteenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff onOct. 1, 2001. In this capacity, he serves as the principal m ilitary advisor to the President,the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. Prior to becomingChairman, he served as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff fo r 19 months.General Myers was born in Kansas City, Missouri. He is a 1965 graduate of Kansas StateUniversity, and holds a Masters Degree in Business Administration from AuburnUniversity. The General ha s attended the Air Command an d Staff College at Maxwell AirForce Base, Alabama; the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania;and the Program fo r Senior Executives in National and International Security at the JohnF. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.General Myers entered the Air Force in 1965 through the Reserve Officer Training Corpsprogram. His career includes operational command an d leadership positions in a varietyof Air Force an d Joint assignments. General Myers is a command pilot with more than4,100 flying hours in the T-33, C-37, C-21, F-4, F-15 and F-16, including 600 combathours in the F-4.As the Vice Chairman from March 2000 to September 2001, General Myers served as theChairman of the Joint Requirements O versight Council, Vice Chairman of the DefenseAcquisition Board, and as a member of the National Security Council DeputiesCommittee and the Nuclear Weapons Council. In addition, he acted for the Chairman inall aspects of the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System including participationin the Defense Resources Board.From August 1998 to February 2000, General Myers was Co mm ander in Chief, NorthAmerican Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Space Command; Commander, AirForce Space Command; and Department of Defense manager, space transportationsystem contingency support at Peterson Air Force Base, C olorado. As com mander,General Myers was responsible for defending Am erica through space and intercontinentalballistic missile operations. Prior to assuming that position, he was Com man der, PacificAir Forces, Hick am Air Force Base, Hawaii, from July 1997 to July 1998. From July1996 to July 1997 he served as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, thePentagon; and from Novem ber 1993 to June 1996 General Myers was Com mander ofU.S. Forces Japan and 5 th Air Force at Yokota Air Base, Japan.General Myers and his wife have three children, two daughters and a son.


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General Richard M yers, USAFMem orandum from Commission Interview

(In Classified Binder)


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H. Kean

H . HamiltonC H A I RBen-V eniste

F. FieldingGorelick

GortonKerrey

F. LehmanJ . Roemer

R . Thompson

. ZelikowIT IVE D I R E C T O R

th Street SW, Room 5125DC 20407

F 202.296.5545lcommission.gov

May 27,2004

General Richard B. MyersChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff9999 PentagonWashington, DC20318Dear Chairman Myers:The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States willhold its twelfth public hearing on June 17,2004, in Washington, DC on thetopic of National Crisis Management. You are invited to testify at theseproceedings at 11:00 -1:00 p.m. on Thursday, June 17.This session will be the seventh and last hearing hi the Commission's 2004investigative hearing schedule, which will collectively advance theCommission's efforts to produce an authoritative account of the facts ofcircumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. At thishearing, the Commission's objective is to present the definitive account of ournation's response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Aspects of the hearing willspecifically address the response of the military, the Federal AviationAdministration (FAA), and senior levels of the Executive branch.We look forward to your testimony on the following topics: The role played by the National Military Command Center (NMCC) on

the morning of 9/11 in response to the attacks, including significantactions taken on 9/11 by both the NMCC and senior DoD officials(civilian and uniformed) at the Pentagon;

Coordination and communications between theNMCC, NORAD, FAA,and the White House relevant to fully understanding the response to theattacks;

9/11 "Lessons Learned" from the DoD's perspective; Post-9/11 changes, or reforms, made within DoD to improve the nation's

homeland defenses; andOutstanding challenges that exist in maintaining and improving thenation's air defenses, and ways in which D o D is addressing thechallenges.

26 Federal PlazaSuite 13-100New York, NY 10278T 212.264.1505 F 212.264.1595


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General Richard B. MyersMay 27,2004Page 2

We ask that you submit comprehensive written testimony and provide yourstatement via e-mail to Lisa Sullivan at lsullivan@9-l lcommission.gov by9:00 a.m. on June 9,2004. Your full statement will be made part of the recordand carefully studied by the Commission.We would also ask that you limit your oral remarks to ten minutes, so that wemay highlight what we expect will be a highly fruitful interchange with you.All witnesses at this Commission hearing will be asked to testify under oath.Please contact Kevin Shaeffer at (202) 401-1614 with any questions you mayhave. We look forward to your participation in this important public forum.

With best regards,

Thomas H. Kean Lee H. HamiltonChair Vice Chan-

ce: Pat Downs, U.S. Departmentof DefenseDan Levin, U.S. Department of Justice


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Captain C harles J. Leidig, Jr.Captain Leidig became the 80th Commandant of Midshipmen in September 2003.Captain Leidig, from Baltimore, M aryland, graduated with distinction from the U.S.Naval Academ y in 1978 with a Bachelor of Science in Mathem atics.His operational tours include service in both attack and ballistic missile submarines. Heserved as Reactor Controls Assistant and Communications Officer on USS HENRY L.STIMSON (SSBN 655), as Engineer Officer on USS SAM RAYBURN (SSBN 635), asNavigation and O perations Officer on USS STONEW ALL JACKSO N (SSBN 634), andas Executive Officer on USS POGY (SSN 647).His comm and tours include service as Commanding Officer of USS CAVALLA (SSN684) from 1994-1997, where he led the Navy's first unclassified science mission to theArctic O cean, and twice deployed to the W estern Pacific. Under his comm and USSCAVALLA set the Pacific Fleet endurance record of 63 consecutive days of A rcticunder-ice operations, earned two Meritorious Unit Commendations and in 1996 wasawarded theNavy Battle Efficiency 'E', Engineering Excellence 'E', and TacticalOperations Excellence 'T'. He subsequently served as Commander, SubmarineDevelopment Squadron Five from 1999-2001 where he was the operational commanderfor the Navy's Deep Submergence Program and the Tactical Development Authority forthe Submarine Force's off-hull sensors, Arctic warfare an d submarine rescue an d escapeprograms.Captain Leidig's staff assignments include service as an instructor at the U.S. NavalAcademy, as Material Officer on the staff of Submarine Squadron Eleven, as SeniorMem ber of the Nuclear Propulsion Exam ining Board for Commander-in-Chief, U.S.Atlantic Fleet and on the Joint Staff as Assistant Deputy Director for Regional Operationsin the Operations Directorate and as Executive Assistant to the Director of the Joint Staff.He served as the Deputy Commandant of Midshipmen from June to September 2003.Captain Leidig received the David Lloyd L eadership Award and the L. Y. Spear Awardupon completion of the Submarine Officer Advanced Course in 1985. He earned aMaster's Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College,graduating with distinction in 1994, and subsequently completed the National SecurityManagement Program at the Syracuse University Maxwell School of Citizenship andPublic Affairs in 2001.Captain Leid ig has been aw arded the Defense Su perior Service Med al, the Leg ion ofMerit (two awards), the Meritorious Service Medal (two awards), the Joint ServiceCommendation Medal, the Navy Commendation Medal (four awards), and the NavyAchievement Medal along with other unit and service awards.


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Admiral (select) Charles Joseph Leidig, USNMemorandum from Commission Interview



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H- Kean

Hamil tonC H A I Richard Ben-Veniste

F. FieldingS. GorelickGorton

b KerreyF. Lehman

J. RoemerR . Thompson

D. ZelikowD I R E C T O R

May 27,2004

Captain Charles Joseph Leidig, USN80th Commandant of MidshipmenUnited States Naval Academy121 Blake Ro adAnnapolis, MD21402-5000Dear Captain Leidig:The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States willhold a public hearing on June 17,2004, in Washington, DC on the topic ofNational Crisis Management. You are invited to testify at these proceedingsat 11:00 - 1:00 p.m. onThursday, June 17.This session will be the seventh and last hearing in the Commission's 2004investigative hearing schedule, which will collectively advance theCommission's efforts to produce an authoritative account of the facts ofcircumstances surrounding the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks. At thishearing, the Commission's objective is to present the definitive account of ournation's response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Aspects of the hearing willspecifically address the response of the military, the Federal AviationAdministration (FAA), and senior levels of the Executive branch.We look forward to your testimony on the following topics: The role played by the National Military Command Center (NMCC) on

the morning of 9/11 in response to the attacks, including significantactions taken on 9/11 by both the NMCC and senior DoD officials(civilian and uniformed) at the Pentagon;

Coordination andcommunications between theNMCC, NORAD, FAA,and the White House relevant to fully understanding the response to theattacks;

9/11 "Lessons Learned" from DoD's perspective; Post-9/11 changes, or reforms, made within DoD to improve the nation's

homeland defenses; and

th Street SW, Room 5125

202.331.4060 F 202.296.554526 Federal PlazaSuite 13400New York, NY 10278T 212.264.1505 F 212.264.1595


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DAY OF 9/11Suggested Hearing QuestionsII. NO RA D Witnesses

Commander of NORAD an d U.S. NorthCom, Ralph E. Eberhart: On themorning of 9/11 General Eberhart was in his office at Peterson Air Force Base inColorado. His office is approximately 30 minutes away from the NORADoperations center, located in Cheyenne Mountain. The highest ranking official atthe operations center was GeneralFindley, a Canadian officer. At 8:45 a.m. EDTGeneral Findley notified General Eberhart of the first reported hijacking. Gen.Eberhart remained in his office for the next hour or so; he told the Commission hearrived at the Mountain shortly after the shoot down order had been passed.Retired Commander of CONR an d First Air Force, Larry Arnold: GeneralArnold was in his office at Tyndall Air Force Base in Panama City, Florida whenhe received word of a real-world hijacking in progress. General Arno ld phonedthe commander of the Northeast Air Defense Sector, Col. Robert Marr. Col Marrinformed General Arnold that he had placed F-15 fighters from Otis AFB onbattle stations and wanted to scramble them to track the hijacked aircraft. GeneralArnold told Colonel Marr "[g]o ahead and scramble them and we'll get authoritieslater." In his Commission interview, Arnold acknowledged that his testimony inMay 2003 differed from the facts presented to him during the course of theinterview. He explained that his briefing for the M ay 2003 testimony wascompiled by Col. Scott based on NEADS data, the validity of which Arnold hadaccepted at that time.1. Evolution of the NORAD Mission and the Posture of NORAD on 9/11.When Gen eral Eberhart took command of NORAD in 2000, he stated h ispriorities were to: 1) increase radar capabilities; 2) improve th e ballistic m issiledefense; and 3) find a "way-ahead" for cruise missile defense. Gene ral Eberhartalso told us th e post Cold W ar threat was determined to be ICBMs and not longrange aviation. The alert sites and air defense assets decreased accordingly.General Eberha rt stated air superiority was important, bu t there was a "ragingdebate "during th e 1990 's over th e mission's relevance. Gen eral Eberhartexplained that he had some concerns about th e act th e radar picture available toth e FAA was in a steady state of atrophy prior to 9/11. During h is interview withCommission s t a f f , Ge neral Arnold discussed th e impact of th e reduction of alertsites on the mission of NORAD. Specifically, Gen eral Arnold stated that NORA Dcould provide only "token air sovereignty "once the number of alert sites we rereduced to seven. With only seven alert sites, he believed th ere w ere portions ofth e coun try, particularly a long th e southern border, that were vulne rable to airthreats.(a) Given its posture on 9/11, did you believe NORAD was prepared to defend thecountry against all airborne threats? If not, then did you voice your concerns


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about any perceived deficiencies? Did you think NO RA D was prepared to defendagainst asymmetric threats to the US? If not, why not? What about theasymmetric threat of attack from terrorists? If not, why not? [Gen. Eberhart orGen. Arnold](b) On 9/11, what did you perceive to be the greatest airborne threats to the US?Did you think NORAD was sufficiently postured to meet these threats? If not,why not? [Gen. Eberhart or Gen. Arnold]2. Pre-9/11 Contemplation of Use of Hijacked Aircraft as a W eapon. GeneralEberhart told Commission staff that, prior to 9/11, NORAD did not postulateterrorists controlling an aircraft. They believed the pilot in control of the aircraftwould no t comply with terrorist demands to use the aircraft as a weapon.According to General Eberhart, to the extent NOR AD considered aircraft asweapons, the threat was alway s perceived as an external threat entering the U.S.from overseas. Under this scenario, NOR AD would have m ore time to react tothe airborne threat.(a) Prior to 9/11, was there any discussion within NORA D regarding the threat ofhijacked aircraft as weapons? If so, can you explain who was involved in thosediscussions and what the analysis of the threat was? Did NO RAD receive anyintelligence information prior to 9/11 related to the use of aircraft as weapons?[Gen. Eberhart or Gen. Arnold](b) If NO RA D knew that terrorists had entered our country and establishedsupport networks p rior to 9/11, would that information have changed NOR AD'sview regarding the threat of hijacked aircraft as weapons? [Gen. Eberhart or Gen.Arnold](c) If NO RA D had learned that terrorists were taking lessons in the US to learnhow to fly commercial aircraft, would that informa tion have changed NORAD'sview regarding the threat of hijacked aircraft as weapons? What actions might thathave prompted NORAD to take? W ould NO RAD have sought to enhance itsradar coverage? [Gen. Eberhart or Gen. Arnold]3. NORAD's Training and Exercises Prior to 9/11. General Eberhart toldCommission staff it was "tough "to get the FAA to participate in NORAD'straining and exercises before 9/11. He said the FAA lacked the manpower toparticipate. General Eberhart also told us there were pre-9/11 exercise scenariosthat exercised the Rules of Engagement ("ROE") against hijacked commercialaircraft up the chain of National Command Authority for shoot-downauthorization. He further explained these exercises alway s contemplated therewould be plenty of time to obtain the authorization and the hijacked aircraft waspresumed to have a transponder code giving the aircraft's location. GeneralEberhart also stated there was no air defense training or the National Capital


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Region prior to 9/11, and that NORAD did not have standing protocols for NCRCombat Air Patrols (CAPs) because all air threats w ere perceived to be external.(a) Did NOR AD ever engage in joint exercises with the FAA prior to 9/11? If so,when was the last joint exercise? What w ere the lessons learned from any pre-9/1 1joint exercises? Were there any issues that surfaced concerningcommunications, tracking the aircraft or radar capabilities? If so, how w ere thoseissues addressed? [Gen. Eberhart or Gen. Arnold](b) By now, m ost of us have heard about the real w orld examples cited to in theJoint Inquiry report by Congress concerning the use of aircraft as weapons priorto 9/11. If NO RAD training includes preparation for the worst case scenario, thenwhy were there no exercises that contemplated the need for immediate NCAapproval to shoot down a commercial aircraft? [Gen. Eberhart or Gen. Arnold](c) When there were real world events prior to 9/11 that presented an increasedthreat against the National Capital Region, like a Presidential Inauguration, didNORA D provide an air defense for such an event? If not, why not? If yes, thenwas there any discussion concerning a NCR defense in light of the inform ationduring the spring and summer of 2001 about an increased threat to the US? [Gen.Eberhart or Gen. Arnold](d) In the planning phases of Exercise Positive Force 01 (PF-01), NORADreportedly proposed an event that included an aircraft crashing into the Pentagon.Were you aware of the NO RAD proposal when it was made? If no, are youfamiliar today with the details of the PF-01 proposal?(e) According to a person with knowledge of the Positive Force exercises,NORAD personnel usually do not "come out of the blue [with threat scenarios],they usually have som e basis." W as the proposal tied to any real worldintelligence or threat reporting?(f) Were you inform ed that the proposal was rejected? If so, what was yourreaction? [Gen. Eberhart]4. Day of 9/11.(a) While you were at NO RAD Headquarters in Colorado Springs what was yoursituational awareness of the events that were unfolding? What were your prim arysources of information? Who were yo u com m unicating with? What noteworthyactions or decisions do you recall m aking while you were still at youHeadquarters office in Colorado Springs?(b) What tim e did you depart for the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center(CMOC)? What tim e did you arrive? Did you have adequate com m unications


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during your transit to CMOC? Do you recall making any noteworthy decisionsduring your transit?(c) When you arrived at the CMOC, what noteworthy actions or decisions did youmake?5. Shoot Down Order on 9/11. General Eberhart told the staff he thinks th eshoot down order wa s passed shortly before he arrived a t Cheyenne Mountain.He reacted that to shoot down a n aircraft based on its location w a s a n extremeact . He communicated to CONR that th e pilots would still need to look or a"hostile "act.(1) When and how was the order authorizing the shoot down of commercialpassed to NORAD? Once the order was received, how was it transmitted downthe chain of command within NORAD? Were you involved in the chain ofcommand at that time? [Eberhart & Arnold](2) On the morning of 9/11, did you think the shoot down order had been passedto the pilots patrolling Washington DC? When did you first become aware thatthe order was not passed to the pilots? What was your reaction? [Eberhart &Arnold][NB: General Eberhart told the staff in March that he assumed the VicePresident's direction was passed all the way down to the pilots, and that it wouldhave been "most important" for them to have known. He added, "Rules ofengagement are only good if those engaged know the rules." However, intestimony before Congress in October of 2001 General Eberhart stated, "[T]he[shoot down] authority was from the National Command Authority. W e neverpassed that authority, so we never gave a pilot that authority because we did notsee that situation ~ I hate to use the word opportunity, but we didn't see thatnecessity to do that." See Transcript of Senate Armed Services Hearing, October25,2001.](3) Did you speak with the Secretary of Defense or the Vice Chairman about theshoot down order on the morning of 9/11? If so, when and can you describe theconversation?(4) On the morning of 9/11 did you know that there were other National Guardpilots patrolling Washington that had very different rules of engagement? Whendid you become aware of this? What coordination -- if any was there betweenNORAD and the commanders at Andrews Air Force Base on 9/11?(5) General Eberhart, prior to 9/11 did NORAD conduct training exercises thatinvolved the possible shoot down of commercial aircraft? If so, what was thethreat envisioned in those exercises?


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[NB: In testimony before Congress in October of 2001, General Eberhartindicated that NORAD had trained for such a situation: "[W]e have thought ourway through this [shoot down of aircraft] in exercises and worked with ourlawyers and have decided over time that if we were convinced that the people onboard the aircraft were going to die ~ they're going to die regardless, and if weallow that airplane to continue others are going to die too, then we believe thatthat's persuasive."]5. Post-9/11 Reconstruction Efforts.(a) In the aftermath of 9/11, what steps did you take to learn what ha d happenedthat morning? Who was tasked with reporting to you on the events of 9/11? Didyou ever review any of the logs maintained at NORAD, CONR, or NEADS? Didyou direct anyone to review those logs? Did you ever receive an oral or writtenreport describing the substance of those logs? [Eberhart or Arnold](b) General Eberhart, did you visit either CONR or NEADS in the weeksfollowing 9/11? Do you recall meeting the Sgt. who was tasked with transcribingthe operational tapes at NEADS? Did you ever review the transcripts heprepared? Did you ever receive an oral or written report describing the substanceof those transcripts?(c) General Eberhart, in October 2001 you testified before the Senate ArmedServices Committee. What did you do to prepare for that testimony? Whatmaterial did you review? You stated, in essence, that the FAA reported toNEADS at 9:24 that American 77 had been hijacked, and that that reportprompted the scramble of fighters from Langley Air Force Base. The mostperfunctory review of the logs maintainedat your headquarters reveals, however,that the Langley fighters were scrambled in response to a report that American 11had not hit the World Trade Center but was heading south. Let me give you a fewexamples: NORAD's ow n Headquarters Intel Chat Log records at 9:24:39"original aa fi t hijack is now headed to Washington scrambled lfi,[i.e., Langley]"and then at 9:25:13 "2 acrft that hit wt bldg no t repeat not the original hjk aaacrft." Furthermore, the Air Warning Center log at NORAD, to which you referin your congressional testimony, records, at 9:27, that "The original hijack a/c isstill a/b and head for Washington, D.C. Otis Fl 5 are trying to intercept theflight." It then records, at 9:36, that CONR has advised of the scramble atLangley: "LFI A/B Quit 25/26/27 3 A/B at time 1333 [i.e., 9:33]." TheNORADHeadquarters chat log states, at 9:28: "R[eal] W[orld] Hijacking (originalnotification) assessed by Intel as headed to Washington DC/2XF-15s in tailchase." Why didn't you tell Congress about this report?

1. In preparing for your testimony, did you question the lack of anotification time for United 93? If so, what were you advised? Whydidn't you indicate a notification time for United 93?


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(d) General Eberhart, after your testimony, you submitted answers to questionsfor the record. You stated that: "The FAA notified the NEADS that AmericanAirlines Flight 77 was headed towards Washington, DC. NEA DS then passedthis information to NO RA D's Air Warning Center .... At 0925, theNMCCconvened a Significant Event Conference and during that conference, at 0933,NOR AD reported one more aircraft en route to Washington, DC." The wordingof this answer seems almost too careful. If you believed that the plane reportedon the Significant Event Conference was American 77, why is your answernonspecific? If you knew that the "one more aircraft" reported on the SignificantEvent Conference was the mistaken report about Am erican 11, why didn't youtell Congress abou t it?(e) General Arnold, in May of 2003 you testified before this Commission. Wh atdid you do to prepare fo r your testimony? Who prepared the timeline that youdiscussed? Did you look at any of the underlying logs, tapes, or transcriptsyourself, or accept the timeline that was presented to you?

1. Did any of the times listed raise questions in your mind aboutNO RAD 's response on 9/11? Specifically, did the 9:16 time fo rnotification of the hijacking of United 93 mak e sense to you? Were youaware that NO RA D's published timeline, issued September 18, 2001, didnot list any notification time for UAL 93? Were you aware that aSeptember 16, 2001 draft of that public timeline listed 9:16 as the time forUAL 93, but that this time had been removed from the final releasebecause NORAD had "lost confidence" in it? Were you aware that whenGeneral Eberhart testified before Congress in October 2001, the timelinehe presented did not list a notification time for UAL 93? When youprepared to testify, did you question the 9:16 time? Did you questionwhy, if this time was correct, Langley was not scrambled fo r nearly tenminutes after the notification?2. Of course, we now know that UAL 93 was not even hijacked at 9:16,and that it was not reported to NEA DS until 10:07, four minutes after ithad crashed. But in May 2003, you told the Commission that the reasonthe Langley fighters did not travel directly to Washington in response toAmerican 77 was that they w ere really responding not to American 77 butto United 93. Here's what you said: "9:24 was the first time that we hadbeen advised of American 77 as a possible hijacked airplane. Our focus -you have got to remember that there's a lot of other things going onsimultaneously here ~ was on United 93, which was being pointed out tous very aggressively I might say by the FAA. ... We were advised[American 77] was possibly hijacked. And we had launched almostsimultaneously with that, we launched the aircraft out of Langley to putthem over top of Washington, DC, not in response to American Airlines77, bu t really to put them in position in case United 93 were to head thatway." Given that the first report of the flight from the F AA d id not come


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until 10:07, what did you mean when you said the flight was being"pointed out very aggressively" by the FAA beginning at 9:16?3. W hy didn't you tell the Commission that the Langley fighters werescrambled in response to the mistaken report that Am erican 11 had not hitthe Trade C enter but was heading south to W ashington? [cite to logs asnecessary]4. In the aftermath of 9/11, did you coordinate with the FAA in order toestablish when the FAA notified the military of the hijackings? Do yourecall having discussions with Jeff Griffith of FAA about this subject?What do you remem ber about these conversations? Do you recall tellinghim or anyone else from FAA that the military had not received notice ofthe hijacking of UAL 93, or that NEADS had never located or tracked theflight on radar? Do you recall having discussions in the immediateaftermath of 9/11 with G eneral Paul W eaver of the Air National Guard?Do you recall telling him that the military had received no notice ofUnited 93?

6. Current posture.(a) General Eberhart, what, in your view, were the lessons learned from 9/11?What measures have been taken since to assure (1) better communications withthe FAA, and (2) better execution of the air sovereignty m ission?(b) Has the hijacking protocol been changed?(c) In general terms, has the nature and quality of the intelligence you receivechanged since 9/11?(d) You have stated in the past that yo u believed the posse comitatus doctrine mayhave to be revisited in an age of terrorism. Do you still believe that? If not, whynot?(e) NORAD's mission p rior to 9/11 has been described repeatedly as one of"looking out" for external threats, rather than "looking in" for domestic threats.How would you describe the mission today?(f) How do you measure success in the war on terrorism? How will you knowwhen and if you have won?


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General Ralph E. EberhartGeneral Ralph E. "Ed" Eberhart is Commander, North American Aerospace DefenseCommand and U.S. Northern Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colo.General Eberhart entered the A ir Force in 1968 as a graduate of the U.S. Air ForceAcademy. His staff experience includes serving as Executive Officer to the Air ForceChief of Staff at Headquarters U.S. Air Force; Deputy Chief of Staff for Inspection,Safety and Security, Headquarters Tactical Air Comm and; Director for Programs andEvaluation, Headquarters U.S. Air Force; Director of Force Structure, Resources andAssessment, the Joint Staff; and Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations,Headq uarters U.S. Air Force. The general has also served as Vice Chief of Staff of theU.S. Air Force, Commander, Air Combat Com mand, Comm ander, Air Force SpaceComm and, and as Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Comm and.General Eberhart has comm anded a flight, squadron, wing, numbered air force and twomajor commands, as well as one sub-unified command, two unified commands and onebi-national command. While Commander of the 363rd Tactical Fighter Wing duringO peration Desert Shield, the unit established the theater's initial air-to-ground combatcapability from a forward operating location. General Eberhart's international awardsinclude the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Sacred Treasure, presented while serving asthe Co mm ander of U.S. Forces, Japan, by the Emperor of Japan, as well as the FrenchLegion of Honor. A command pilot, General Eberhart has logged more than 5,000 hours,primarily in fighter and trainer aircraft, including 300 combat missions as a forward aircontroller in Vietnam.


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General Ralph E. Eberhart, USAFMem orandum from Commission Interview



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Kean

amiltonC H A I R

F. FieldingS. GorelickGorton

b KerreyF.Lehman

J. RoemerR . Thompson

Zelikow

May 27,2004

General Ralph E. Eberhart, USAFCommander, North American Aerospace Defense CommandCommander, U.S. Northern Command250 Vandenburg Street, SuiteB106Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3801Dear General Eberhart:The National Commission onTerrorist Attacks Upon the United States will hold apublic hearing on June 17,2004, in Washington, DC on the topic of NationalCrisisManagement. You are invited to testify at these proceedings at11:00 - 1:00 p.m. onThursday, June 17.This session will be the seventh and last hearing in the Commission's 2004investigative hearing schedule, which will collectively advance the Commission'sefforts to produce an authoritative account of the facts and circumstancessurrounding the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks. At this hearing, theCommission's objective is to present the definitive account of our nation'sresponse to the terrorist attackson 9/11. Aspects of the hearing will specificallyaddress the response of the military, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),and senior levels of the Executive branch.We look forward to your testimony on the following topics: NORAD's military response on the morning of 9/11, including actions taken

by all NORAD components and air defense assets that directly responded tothe attacks;

Coordination andcommunication between NORAD, the National MilitaryCommand Center (NMCC), and the FAA hi response to the attacks;

9/11 "Lessons Learned" from NORAD's perspective; Post-9/11 changes, or reforms, made to improve the nation's airdefenses;and Outstanding challenges that exist inmaintaining and improving the nation's

air defenses, and ways in which NORAD is addressing the challenges.

1 7 th Street SW, Room 5125202.331.4060 F 202.296.5545

26 Federal PlazaSuite 13400New York, NY 10278T 212.264.1505 F 212.264.1595


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General Ralph E. EberhartMay 27, 2004Page 2

We ask that you submit comprehensive written testimony and provide yourstatement via e-mail to Lisa Sullivan at lsullivan@9-l lcommission.gov by9:00 a.m. on June 9,2004. Your full statement will be made part of the recordand carefully studied by the Commission.We would also ask that you limit your oral remarks to ten minutes so that we mayhighlight what we expect will be a highly fruitful interchange with you. Allwitnesses at this Commission hearing will be asked to testify under oath.Please contact Kevin Shaeffer at (202) 401-1614 with any questions you mayhave. We look forward to your participation in this important public forum.

With best regards, /""""}a^Thomas H. Kean Lee H. Hamilton

Chair Vice Chair

cc: Pat Downs, U.S. Departmentof DefenseDan Levin, U.S. Departmentof Justice


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Major General Larry K. ArnoldMajor General (Ret) Larry K. Arnold is President of The Arnold Group, LLC and aconsultant in the D efense Industry. He retired from the United States Air Force onOctober 1,2002.On September 11, 2001, Major General Larry K. Arnold was Commander of 1st AirForce and of the C ontinental U.S. NORAD Region, headquartered at Tyndall Air ForceBase, Fla. During and after the terrorist attack on the W orld Trade C enter and thePentagon, General Arnold launched hundreds of fighter, tanker and A W AC S aircraft tothwart additional potential attacks. For Opera tion Noble E agle (the United StatesM ilitary response to the,9-l 1, terrorist attacks), General Arnold was designated thecommander of all military aircraft involved in restoring control of America's skies, andover the next year, his Co m m and flew over 25,000 sorties, in executing Operation NobleEagle.General Arnold is a combat veteran of the Viet Nam war during which he flew 153combat missions in the F-4C Phantom. In 1973 he separated from active duty an d joinedthe 177th Fighter Interceptor G roup of the New Jersey Air National Guard. In 1986 hereturned to a ctive duty as the Air National Guard adviser to Air U niversity and served asan instructor at the Air W ar College. In 1988 he becam e the C om m ander of the 147thFighter Interceptor Group in Houston, Texas. In 1989 the general becam e theCommander of the Air National Guard Readiness Center at Andrews Air Force Base,M aryland where he served until his reassignment in 1995 to the National Guard Bureauat the Pentagon as the Assistant to the Director of the Air National Guard. In 1997,General A rnold becam e the Commander of 1st Air Force at Tyndall Air Force Base,Florida where he served until his retirem ent. General Arnold is a com m and pilot withmore than 4,500 flying hours in ten types of aircra ft, m ost recently the F-16 and F-15.General Arnold and his wife, Linda, live in Mt. Vernon, Virginia and have two grownchildren, Leslie and David.


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WITH D R A W A L N O T I C ERG: 148Box: 00001 Folder: 0002 Document: 38Series: Front Office FilesCopies: 1 Pages: 8

ACCESS RESTRICTEDThe item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Public Hearing, 6/17/2004 [1 of 2]Document Date: 02-03-2004Document Type: Memo of ConversationFrom:To :

Subject: NORAD Site Visit MFR

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it isrestricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated ingeneral and specific record group restriction statements which are availablefo r examination.

NND: 241Withdrawn: 03-06-2008 by: ^RETRIEVAL #: 241 00001 0002 38


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/9/11 Personal Privacy

H. Kean

CHAIRBen-Veniste

F. FieldingS. GotelickGorton

ob KerreyF. Lehman

J. RoemerR. Thompson

D. Zelikow

May 27,2004

Major General Larry K. Arnold, USAF (Ret.)

Dear General Arnold:The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States will hold apublic hearing on June 17,2004, in Washington, DC on the topic of NationalCrisis Management. You are invited to testify at these proceedings at11:00 - 1:00 p.m. onThursday, June 17.This session will be the seventh and last hearing in the Commission's 2004investigative hearing schedule, which will collectively advance the Commission'seffort to produce an authoritative account of the facts an d circumstancessurrounding the September 11,2001, terrorist attacks. At this hearing, theCommission's objective is to present the definitive account of our nation'sresponse to the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Aspects of the hearing will specificallyaddress the response of the military, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),an d senior levels of the Executive branch.W e look forward to your testimony on the following topics: Continental United States N O R A D Region's (CONR's) military response onthe morning of 9/11, including actions taken by all CONR components and air

defense assets that directly responded to the attacks; Coordination and communication between CONR, theNational Military

Command Center (NMCC), and the FAA in response to the attacks; 9/11 "Lessons Learned"from NORAD/CONR perspective; Post-9/11 changes, or reforms, made to improve the nation's air defenses; and Outstanding challenges that exist in maintaining and improving the nation'sair defenses, an d ways, in which NORAD/CONR is addressing the challenges.

th Street SW, Room 512520407

202,331.4060 F 202.296.5545commission.gov

26 Federal PlaraSuite 13-100New York, NY 10278T 212.264-1505 f 212.264.1595


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Major General Larry K. Arnold, USAF (Ret.)May 27,2004Page 2

Given time constraints, you will not be asked to give introductory oral testimony,as others on your panel have been asked to give a brief opening statement.However, we ask that you submit a comprehensive written testimony and provideyour statement via e-mail to Lisa Sullivan at lsullivan@9-l lcommission.gov by9:00 a.m. on June 9,2004. Your full statement will be made part of the recordand carefully studied by the Commission. All witnesses at this Commissionhearing will be asked to testify under oath.Please contact Kevin Shaeffer at (202) 401-1614 with any questions you mayhave. We look forward to your participation in this important public forum.

With best regards,

Thomas H. Kean Lee H. HamiltonChair Vice Chan-

Dan Levin, U.S. Department of JusticePat Downs,U.S. Department of Defense

fo b6 public hearing 6-17-04 1 of 2 fdr- tab 4 entire contents- myers- leidig- eberhart- arnold-...

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