fo b5 public hearing 4-13-04 fdr- tab 6- suggested questions for cofer black and tom pickard 742

8/14/2019 FO B5 Public Hearing 4-13-04 Fdr- Tab 6- Suggested Questions for Cofer Black and Tom Pickard 742

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SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FORCOFER BLACK AND TOM PICKARD*Designated Commissioners: John Lehman and Tim Roemer

1) Heightened Threat Period prior to 9/11. Our previous s ta f f s t a tementdescribes the atmosphere of heightened threat during the summer of 2 0 0 1 .a. When did the heightened threat period begin?b. When were you most worried about an attack?c. When did the level of "chatter" die down?d. What were your thoughts and your agencies' views about the decreasein "chatter?" Did you think that the threat had subsided at that point ordid it just plateau? Did analysts agree or disagree?

2) The Nature of the Threat. Within the intelligence community there seemedto be a general consensus t ha t the threat from a l Qaeda to U.S. interests wa smos t prominent overseas during this period.

a. Where did you and other law enforcement and intelligence communityofficials think that the U.S. was likely to be attacked? Was anycredible threat reporting related to a possible attack within the UnitedStates? Which agencies were involved in the threat analysis? Didanyone seriously consider that the chatter was part of a denial anddeception campaign?b. In retrospect, what do you think accounts for the understanding thatthe primary threat to U.S. interests was overseas? Was it based on anytype of bias against the possibility of an attack occurring in the UnitedStates? Did the analysis adequately consider the threat of an attackwithin the United States?

For Pickard:c. Did the FBI conduct any independent analysis to examine the extent of

the threat and the likely location of attack? Did you request that FBIanalysts conduct their own analysis during the summer of 2001 as tothe extent of the threat and whether an attack might occur in the U.S.or overseas? If not, why not?

For Black:d. What was the FBI's role in analyzing the threat? W as informationdeveloped by the FBI included in the information analyzed by theCIA/Counterterrorist Center (CTC)?

3) Communication on the Threat. Th e previous s ta f f s t a tement demonstratest h a t communicationof threat information between the CIA and FBI during thesummer of 2 0 0 1 was inadequa te given the heightened threat.

* Questions can be directed to both witnesses unless otherwise indicated.


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a. As of the summer of 2001, how complete an understanding didintelligence agencies, and in particular the FBI, have of al Qaeda'spresence and activities within the United States?

b. What coordination efforts were there between CTC and the FBI duringthe summer of 2001 to address the heightened levels of threatreporting?

c. Many have discussed the problems caused by the domestic/foreigndivide between CIA/FBI responsibilities. What steps did the FBI andCTC (Bin Ladin Station) take to ensure that there was a seamlesshandoff of responsibilities when threats/operations bridged therespective areas of responsibilities?d. What efforts did you make to ensure that the swap of FBI and CIApersonnel at the headquarters level had the desired results, given thatthere are no MOUs in place describing their respective roles?e. During the summer of 2001, did you issue any special directives eitherto Headquarters or field personnel to ensure that you were kept abreastof important International Terrorism developments?

f. Did you issue any directives to the FBI field offices/CIA stationsduring the summer of 2001, informing them of the heightened threat,and ordering them to take any specific action?g. Do you believe that the field offices/stations were adequately focusedon international terrorism matters during that summer, and if not, whynot?

For Pickard:h. Dick Clarke has stated publicly that when he visited FBI field offices

with Dale Watson prior to September 11, 2001, he received blanklooks when he spoke about al Qaeda. Do you think that this is a faircriticism, and if not, why not?

i. Former National Security Advisor Berger has testified that he did notreceive information from the FBI, only assurances that they had theterrorist presence in the U.S. "covered." Is this a fair criticism? Didthe FBI assure Berger that they had the presence covered, and did theFB I have this type of confidence that they had the al Qaeda threat"covered?" What do you believe were the factors behind any gaps inthe FBI's understanding?

j. While you were the Deputy Director and acting Director how did youensure that the FBI field offices devoted adequate attention toInternational Terrorism matters? Did the field managers understandthe extent of the terrorist threat within the U.S.? If not, why not? Didyou encounter resistance from some field managers in efforts to ensurethey were adequately focused on al Qaeda and InternationalTerrorism?k. More generally, what deficiencies did you observe in the FBI'sInternational Terrorism program while you were serving as either theDeputy Director or the acting Director of the FBI? What efforts didyou make to address these deficiencies? How successful were your


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efforts? What, in your opinion, was preventing the reforms fromtaking hold?For Black:1 . To what extent did the Intelligence Community consider theposs ibility o f dome stic attacks?m. What type of information did you receive from the FBI? To whatextent did you receive inform ation that the FBI had developed in itscounter-terrorism investigations? Did the level of inform ation shareddiffer, depending on whether it was a criminal or intelligenceinvestigation? What do you believe were the factors behind any gapsin the FBI's understanding?n. Mo re generally, what deficiencies did you observe in the FBI'sInternational Terrorism pro gram while you were serving as the head ofthe CTC?o. What efforts did you make in the CTC to improve your understandingof the al Qaeda threat w ithin the United States, and how successful

were you in these efforts?p. Mo st of the CIA's dedicated counterterrorism resources are atHeadquarters. What impact did this have on yo ur ability to ensure thatcounterterrorism efforts in the field were given enough attention whenthe field resources w ere not dedicated to counterterrorism wo rk?q. How we re the operational priorities of CTC and the Bin Ladin Stationcommunicated to and enforced in the field?r. Everyo ne knew that Bin Ladin and al Qaeda worked on long planningcycles for attacks, some lasting many years. Yet the Bin Ladin Stationseemed focused on short term, hoping fo r quick results type soperations. H ow did you and the Bin Ladin Station attempt to addressthe long term planning cycle as opposed to merely jumping from threatto threat to threat?s. We heard evidence that if the Bin Ladin Station pushed too hard on astation regarding requested operations o r actions, the stationscomplained to Jim Pavitt, the De puty Director for Operations, and theBin Ladin Station was forced to back off. Indeed, a witness hassuggested that the dropping of the Hazmi and Mihdhar trail after theywent to Bangkok was due to the Bin Ladin Station's unwillingness topressure Bangko k to use resources to pick up the lost trail. What ro ledid yo u play in ensuring that efforts directed by the Bin Ladin Stationwere viewed as high priority in the field?t. There is significant evidence that there w ere tensions regarding theassignment of FBI personnel to the Bin Ladin Station, particularlythose who were supposedly to serve in a managerial or inform ationsharing role. This was true even after these tensions contributed to theremoval of one CIA manager. What, if anything, did you do to ensurethat Agency personnel understood the respective roles of the detaileesand that the detailees w ere part of a coordinated effort to benefit theU.S. Government's efforts against the counterterrorism threat?


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u. One of the key components in the creation of the Bin Ladin stationwas its analytical unit that was supposed to provide the strategicanalysis required to focus the station's efforts. Yet witnessesrepeatedly indicated that the station's analytical unit was extremelyweakits work described as merely repeating what was alreadycontained in Station cables weeks earlier. Were you aware of theseproblems prior to 9/11 ? If so, what if anything did you do to try andremedy the problems?

v. A number of witnesses complained that the managers of the Bin LadinStation were more concerned with briefing the Director regarding thelatest threat as opposed to managing the Station's activities, includingsupervising operations, setting priorities, developing a strategy to dealwith the threat from Bin Ladin. Did you provide guidance to orsupervision of the Bin Ladin Station to ensure that it had anappropriate strategy and properly prioritized its efforts?w. In devising its counterterrorism strategies, including what has beendescribed by Director of Central Intelligence Tenet as "The Plan," didthe CTC adequately include other agencies such as the FBI, to ensurethat the threat within the United States was adequately addressed?x. Was part of the CTC's role to ensure that other U.S. Governmentagencies, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service and theFederal Aviation Administration were aware of the threat andresponding appropriately? If so, why do officials from the INS andFAA maintain that they were so out of the loop on these matters?

4) Phoenix EC, Moussaoui, al Hazmi, and al Mihdhar.a. Were you aware of Moussaoui's detention prior to September 11,

2001, and the FBI Minneapolis Office's concerns that he might havebeen part of a larger conspiracy?b. Were you aware that al Hazmi and al Mihdhar were in the country andthat the FBI's New York Office began searching fo r them on August23, 2001?c. If you were not aware of these incidents prior to September 11, why doyou think these matters were not brought to your attention? Shouldthey have been?d. If you had been aware of any of these matters prior to 9/11, would they

have shaped your thinking as to whether an attack might occur withinthe U.S.? How would you have responded had you been aware ofthese matters prior to September 11, 2001?

For P ickard:e. Do you believe that FBI Headquarters handled the Moussaoui

investigation in an appropriate fashion prior to September 11,2001?What else should have been done, both to further the investigation andto alert other U.S. government agencies on the situation?f. Do you believe that FBI Headquarters handled the Phoenix EC in anappropriate fashion, and if not, what else should have been done?


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g. Were you satisfied with the processes at the FBI to elevate informationto your attention while you were the Deputy Director and ActingDirector?

For Black:h. When a CIA employee rediscovered the Kuala Lumpur traffic and the

link of the Kuala Lumpur meeting to the Cole, who was responsiblefor ensuring that appropriate FBI employees had all the criticalinformation? Who was responsible for bringing all the relevant partiesto the table to discuss strategies and potential responses to this criticalnew information?

i. There were occasions in the Hazmi/Mihdhar chronology when keyinformation relating to the United States was not shared in a timelymanner with the FBIincluding visa information and information ontravel to the United States. Who at the CIA had the responsibility toensure that information of relevance to the FBI was promptly sharedwith the appropriate personnel?

j. From what you now know, do you believe the FBI handled the searchfor al Hazmi and al Mihdhar in an appropriate fashion, particularly interms of the resources and attention devoted to the search? Does itappear to you, from what you now know, that there was any sense ofurgency in the search for these two individuals? If there was not, whynot?

5) U.S. Government Response to Heightened Threat.a. How did your agency respond to the heightened threat? Who was

directing your agency's response? To what extent was your agency'sresponse coordinated with other U.S. Government agencies?

b. To what extent was the Intelligence Community's response beingdriven by the policymakers? Did you attend a July 5, 2001Counterterrorism Security Group meeting with representatives of thedomestic law enforcement agencies? If not, did you send a briefer tothis meeting? What was the purpose of the meeting? What directivesor guidance was provided to the CTC and to the domestic lawenforcement agencies? What actions did you take in response to thismeeting?

c. With the benefit of hindsight, what should the FBI/CTC have donedifferently during this period?d. With the benefit of hindsight, did you adequately convey to policymakers the seriousness of the threat and the necessity of a response? Ifso, do you believe that the policy makers took adequate action toaddress the threat?e. Did you think that senior White House officials were taking the threatseriously? Would more attention from the White House have made adifference in how the U.S. Government responded during the summerof2001?


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f. Would the hands on approach that occurred during the Millenniumcrisis have shaken loose critical information, for example on al Hazmiand al Mihdhar, or on Moussaoui, during the summer of 2001? Couldit have prevented the September 11,2001 attacks?

For Pickard:g. How often did you meet with or brief NSC officials on the threat whileyou were serving as Acting Director? Did any FBI counterterrorismofficials conduct such briefings? What mechanisms were in place to

brief NSC officials?For Black:h. More generally, what actions did the CTC take in the summer of 2001

to respond to the possibility of an attack within the United States?Was this response coordinated with the FBI? What independentactions did the FBI take to respond to this threat?

i. We have heard from some CTC staff that they were frustrated duringthe summer of 2001 that the Administration's Counterterrorismstrategy was moving forward too slowly. This frustration was so greatthat one veteran counterterrorism officer told the Commission that heand a colleague considered resigning and going public with theirconcerns. Were you aware of this frustration? Did you share thisfrustration? If so, did you express your frustration to anyone?

6) Comparison to Millennium Response. The level of threat reporting prior tothe Millennium appears to have been similar to that during th e summer of2001. W e have learned that during the 1999period, the entire U.S.Government was mobilized to counter this threat, information sharing wasextensive, and several terrorist plots were disrupted.

a. Please compare the response during the summer of 2001 to the U.S.Government's response during the Millennium t imeframe. In whatways did the responses in these two time frames differ? Whataccounts for any differences?

b. To what extent did the Millennium experience shape the way youresponded during the summer of threat? In other words, what lessonslearned did you take from the Millennium experience that you appliedto the summer of 2001 response?

c. Do you believe that the U.S. Intelligence Community or the FBI wasable to prevent terrorist attacks during the Millennium time frame as aresult of these efforts? During the summer of threat as well?

d. What was the role of the NSC and the White House in coordinating theU.S. Government's response during the Millennium time frame? Didthe NSC or the White House issue any specific directives to the FBIfo r how to respond to the heightened threat?


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For Pickard:e. What information did the FBI share w ith policymakers oninternational terrorism matters during the Millennium period?For Black:f. During the Millennium resources were surged to CTC to address the

threat by, for example, conducting link analysis to identify particularindividuals of concern. W as there an y comparable surge of resourcesto CTC during th e summer of threat? If not, w hy not?Ahmed Ressam was arrested in December 1999 attempting to cross fromCanada into the United States. He later acknowledged to the FBI that hewas planning to take part in an attack on the Los Angeles InternationalAirport. He also provided valuable information on individuals associatedwith al Qaeda, and on al Qaeda training an d modus operandi.a I 9/11 Classified Information JHOW did

Ressam's arrest influence th e U.S. Government's thinking about apossible attack by al Qaeda inside the Un ited States? W as the Ressamarrest discussed in the Counterterrorism Security Group?7) Department of Justice's Focus on International Terrorism.

Fo r Pickard:a. How high a priority was international terrorism fo r Attorney GeneralJanet Reno? How w ould you describe her approach to internationalterrorism an d what did you see as the problems with this approach?How often did you or other senior FBI officials brief her oninternational terrorism when you were Deputy Director?b. How did Attorney General Ashcroft's approach to internationalterrorism differ from that of Reno? How high a priority w asinternational terrorism for Ashcroft? What were his top priorities priorto 9/11 and how did those differ from Reno's?c. Did the change in Presidential a dmin istrations have an impact on theFBI's Counterterrorism efforts prior to 9/11?d. How often did you meet with and/or brief Ashcroft when yo u wereDeputy Director an d then A cting D irector? Did these briefingsaddress international terrorism?e. Did you brief Attorn ey General Ashcroft about the heightened threatlevel during the summer of 2001 ? On how many occasions? What didyou tell the Attorney General specifically about the threat? Did youconvey a sense of urgency about the threats? What was his responseto these briefings?f. Do you believe that Attorney General Ashcroft shared the IntelligenceCommunity's sense of urgency about the potential threat of attacksduring th e summer of 2001 ?g. What was your reaction an d response to the May 10, 2001 memo fromAG Ashc roft outlining DO J's budget guidance? What was your


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reaction and response to the August 9,2001 memo from AG Ashcroftoutlining Department priorities?

h. What was Attorney General Ashcroft's reaction to the FBI's request inthe summer of 2001 for additional International Terrorism resources?What efforts did you or other FBI officials make to persuade AttorneyGeneral Ashcroft of the need for these resources?

8) FBI Investigative Strategy in the Aftermath of the Attacks.For Pickard:a. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11,2001 attacks, what

actions did the FBI take in an effort to prevent follow up attacks? Towhat extent were these actions driven primarily by the FBI'sleadership?

b. What guidance, instructions or directives did you receive from theAttorney General in this regard? To what extent were the FBI'sactions in the immediate aftermath driven by the Department ofJustice?

c. What guidance, instructions or directives did you receive from theWhite House in this regard? To what extent were the FBI's actions inthe immediate aftermath driven by the White House?

d. Do you believe that the actions in the immediate aftermath, such as thenumerous detentions, were instrumental in preventing any additionalattacks? With hindsight, do you believe additional attacks or a"second wave" was underway in September, 2001?

e. Did the FBI change its approach to counterterrorism intelligenceinvestigations after the September 11 attacks, for example, byconfronting subjects instead of simply conducting surveillance? Didany of the post-September 11 investigation of these subjects, lead toany of the so called "9/11 detainees?"f. Who issued the directive that all 9/11 detainees be "held until cleared"and when? What role did you play in overseeing the clearance of the9-11 detainees?

g. What intelligence benefit do you believe the 9/11 detentions provided?9) FBI Reforms.

For P ickard:a. Director Freeh has been critical of the decision to run the PENTTBOM

investigation from Headquarters, arguing that the field offices shouldbe responsible for investigations. Do you agree with this criticism?

b. More generally, do you agree with the FBI's current effort tocentralize its counterterrorism investigations and counterterrorismprogram? What are the problems with this approach? What are thebenefits?

c. More generally, do you believe that the U.S. Government's approachto the war on terror has or will prove to be an effective strategy to


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combating terrorism? What problems have yo u observed in thecurrent approach? What strengths?d. Do you believe that th e current approach to combating terrorism takesadequate steps to ensure the protection of civil liberties? Whatproblems have you observed with the current approach?

10) Saudi Flights. W e have reviewed the records of six flights of Saudi citizensthat departed th e U.S. in the weeks after 9/11, beginning on 9/14/01 an dending on 9/24/01, including th e so-called Bin Laden flight on September 20,in which several mem bers of the Bin Ladin fam ily departed th e United States.Richard Clarke has stated that th e FBI played a role in clearing these flightsfor departure, and the records do reflect that the FBI investigated th epassengers on these flights, in varying degrees, before they departed.For Pickard:a. Can you tell us who from the FBI was involved in the decisions abouthow to screen these flights and whether they should be allowed to

depart?11) Twenty-Day Hold and Condor. Shortly after 9/11, the Justice Departmenturged the State D epartment to slow th e issuance of visas to individuals fromMuslim countries. At Justice's request, State delayed the issuance of visas tocertain countries for twenty days. Justice then developed th e Condor programunder which individuals from certain countries would be subject to extra F BIand CIA backgroun d checks. This program was instituted in January 2002.

For Pickard:a. What role did the FBI play in the development of these programs?It is our understanding that these programs led to significant backlogs of visaapplications in the spring, summ er and fall of 2002 because the FBI could notprocess th e checks in a timely fashion.

For Pickard:b. What do you know about this backlog? It is our understanding thatCondor led to the denial of no visas and had no counterterrorismbenefit, do you agree with that statement?12) Counterterrorism Policy. These are follow-up questions from the March

hearing.F or Black:a. Without going into specific operations, were the CIA's efforts againstBin Ladin an d al Qaeda in the first eight months of the BushAdministration effectively different from what it had been doingduring the Clinton administration?


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b. Specifically, how different was the Bush administration's covert actionstrategy developed before 9/11 from what the CIA had already beenpursuing?

c. If implemented before 9/11, how effective do you think this strategywould have been in reducing the terrorist threat?

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fo b5 public hearing 4-13-04 fdr- tab 6- suggested questions for cofer black and tom pickard 742

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