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FM 71-123

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PREFACE

NOTE: Users of this field manual must first read and understand the doctrinal field manuals:FM 71-3 (brigade), FM 71-2 (battalion), and FM 71-1 (company). This manual DOES NOT replacethe doctrinal manuals; rather, it supplements them with tactics and techniques for heavy, combined-arms forces at brigade, battalion, and company levels. Plans call for the tactics and techniques to beincorporated into the three doctrinal manuals as they are revised.

FM 71-123 represents a departure from existing field manuals. Many current Army manuals are written interms of execution, but FM 71-123 reflects the way we fight. Troop-leading procedures provide a thread ofcontinuity, leading the reader chronologically through each mission. Planning, preparation, and execution areaddressed in turn to reinforce the staff planning process and illustrate the interaction necessary betweencommanders and staff. Accordingly, planning, preparation, and execution of each mission are further de-scribed in terms of the seven battlefield operating systems (BOS). This structure gives the manual a uniquecombined arms perspective, encapsulating the activities of each arm and BOS as well as its relationship tothe overall operation.

The manual encompasses three echelons: brigade, battalion, and company. This approach allows the readerto understand relationships among the three echelons within the context of the higher headquarters intent. Inaddition, each operation is couched in terms of its corresponding threat; for example, an enemy MRP or tankplatoon defense may serve as the point of departure for discussion of the companys role in a battaliondeliberate attack.

NOTE: Terms such as "Soviet" and "Warsaw Pact," used in previous drafts of FM 71-123 in discus-sions of threat organization, tactics, and equipment, have been changed, predominantly to "Soviet-style," to reflect recent world events. Most of these discussions are again included in this edition,however, because many potential adversaries of the United States still base their tactics on the war-fighting doctrine of the former Soviet army.

Another purpose of FM 71-123 is to bridge the gap between doctrinal publications, which present con-cepts, and ARTEP MTPs, which outline training strategies and use standardized checklists to evaluate unitperformance of specific tasks. Both doctrinal and MTP publications are written to address "what" rather than"how to," FM 71-123 supplements doctrine and bridges the "how to" void. It presents tactical considerationsand techniques to make planning, preparation, and execution easier and describes other "tricks of the trade"that can be incorporated into the tactical plan.

Designed as a thought-provoking professional resource, FM 71-123 will be a primary reference for com-bined arms soldiers throughout their careers. It may, for example, serve as a point of departure for officerprofessional development classes one day and as a basis for unit training the next. Above all, it is a living

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document, to be read and improved upon as soldiers in the field develop new and innovative techniques.Comments and suggestions are encouraged.

The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to Commandant, USAARMS,ATSB-CSC, Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121-5200.

Unless otherwise stated, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

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CHAPTER 1

COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATION

CONTENTSPage

SECTION I. Organization and Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 1-2General Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2Brigade Command, Control, and Communication Facilities . . . . . . . . . . 1-4Battalion Task Force Command, Control, and CommunicationFacilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

Company Team Command, Control, and Communication Facilities . ..1-11SECTION Il. The Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ..1-11

Troop-Leading Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...1-11Abbreviated Decision-Making Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...1-39Application of Troop-Leading Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-40

SECTION III. Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...1-41General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... .1-41Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...1-41Means of Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..-..1-41Communications Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..1-42Communications Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...1-42

SECTION IV. Command Post Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..1-43Brigade Tactical Operations Center Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...1-43Battalion Command Post Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...1-43Company Command and Control Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...1-43Command Post Operation Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...1-43

SECTION V. Command Post Survivability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..1-47Positioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..1-47Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................1-47Displacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-48

To be successful in battle, commanders must be able to make good decisions quickly. Staffs must be ableto assist commanders in making those decisions and translating them into action faster than the enemy. Unitsmust be able to respond quickly to changing situations. Through command and control (C2), commanderswill seize the initiative from the enemy and defeat it.

To make C2 happen, it must be properly organized in functionally operating facilities. Staffs must be welltrained. Commanders and staffs must practice the C2 process regularly so that the procedures are instinctive.

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The C2 process comprises Coordination. Planning. Directing. Controlling.The C2 process is executed through Leadership. C2 facilities. The planning process. Communication.The leadership environment effects the success of C2. In modern war, the enemy will seldom conform to

our expectations. Beating the enemy demands bold, aggressive, risk-taking leaders. Leaders must be willingto take responsibility and use their initiative, guided by their commanders intent. Leaders must be able tothink clearly and quickly. Speed and decisive action are essential.

Commanders must be determined to see their intent carried out. They should issue mission-type ordersthat impose restrictions on subordinates only to assure the coordinated action of the command. Terminologymust be widely understood. The commanders intent will guide subordinate commanders in pursuit of thecommon goal in the absence of communications. The commander must be forward, monitoring the progressof the battle. He intervenes only when necessary.

Commander-subordinate relationships must be characterized by mutual trust and respect. Commandersand subordinates must know how the other thinks. Commanders must teach subordinates not what to think,but how to think. They must decentralize authority to their subordinates, allow freedom of action, andencourage the use of their initiative.

SECTION I. ORGANIZATION AND FACILITIESGeneral Organization

Command

ResponsibilitiesThe commander is responsible for all his unit does or fails to do. He cannot delegate this responsibility..

The commander is responsible to both his superiors and his subordinates. The commander delegates to hissubordinates the authority to accomplish their missions. He increases the effectiveness of the organization bydelegating authority, holding subordinates responsible for their actions, and fostering a climate of mutualtrust, cooperation, and teamwork.Planning and Execution

Commanders fight the AirLand battle by synchronizing the execution of the close, deep, and rear fights.AirLand battle will be conducted at a greatly accelerated pace. This involves split-second response to ordersand fast, violent execution. The commander must make his decisions based on his ability to see the battle-field. He must be present at the decisive point and take advantage of accurate, timely reports. The planningand execution cycle must be accelerated so the enemy continually finds itself attempting to react to newoffensive operations against its flanks and rear. The challenge is to streamline C2 procedures to anticipateand execute immediately.

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IntentIntent is the commanders stated vision which defines the purpose of an operation and the end state with

respect to the relationship among the force, the enemy, and the terrain. The intent does not summarize theconcept of the operation nor does it describe subunit missions. The commanders intent must be clear tosubordinates to allow them to take the initiative in the absence of detailed orders. Leaders must understandthe intent of commanders two levels above them. This contributes to swift, coordinated, effective action bythe unit.Chain of Command

The commander issues orders and receives information through the chain of command. He issues allorders to the commander of the next lower unit. Bypassing commanders should occur only in urgent situ-ations. In such instances, the bypassed commander should be notified by the commanders involved as soonas possible.

The StaffStaff Functions

Staff officers assist their commander in accomplishing the mission. They help the commander makedecisions by acquiring, analyzing, and coordinating information. Staff officers present critical informationand a recommendation to the commander so he can make good decisions. Common staff functions are

Providing information. Staff officers collect, analyze, and disseminate information. They ensure thecritical facts are at hand for the commander.

Making estimates. Making recommendations. Preparing plans and orders. Supervising the execution of decisions.

Staff Responsibility and AuthorityStaff officers are assigned functional areas of interest and responsibility. Normally, the commander dele-

gates authority to the staff to take final action on matters within command policy. The assignment of staffresponsibility does not connote command authority over other staff officers or over any other commandelement.Relationship with Subordinate Commands

Staff officers must understand the situations of the commands units. They must support subordinate unitsand establish good working relationships with subordinate commanders and staffs. The staff should makerecommendations and offer advice to subordinate commanders; they may not, however, deny or refuse asubordinate commanders request, except in those areas where the commander has delegated authority forthem to do so. Staff officers will contact a subordinate command only in the commanders name to transmitorders or instructions, but they may offer assistance or exchange information in their own or in the com-manders name. If a staff officer determines a subordinate command is not complying with the commandersdirectives, the staff officer advises the subordinate commander or his staff of the noncompliance. The staffofficer then reports his observation and recommendation to his commander. Staff officers normally honorin format requests for information from the higher level staff; they should be open for suggestions fromsubordinate units.Command and Staff Communications

The command channel is the direct, official link between echelon headquarters and commanders. Ordersand instructions to subordinate units pass on this channel. Within their authority, staff officers may usecommand channels when acting in the commanders name. The staff channel is the staff-to-staff link betweenheadquarters for coordination and transmission of information. The technical channel carries technical in-structions between commands.

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CoordinationCoordination is critical to the commanders synchronization of the battle. It must occur internally with

combat, CS, and CSS units and externally with higher and adjacent units. It prevents the enemy from exploit-ing unit boundaries and enables the commander to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisivetime and place.

Brigade Command, Control, and Communication FacilitiesBrigade Command Group Functions

The brigade command group has the following functions (see Figure 1-1 for a diagram of the TAC CP): Observe the battlefield. Influence the battle with personal presence. Control (synchronize) the battte-close, deep, and rear. Provide planning guidance.

Brigade Tactical Command Post FunctionsThe brigade TAC CP has the following functions (see Figure 1-1 for legend of terms, equipment and a

diagram of the facility): Conduct ongoing close operations. Provide the commander with combat critical information. Disseminate the commanders decisions.

Brigade Main Command Post FunctionsThe brigade main CP has the following functions (see Figures 1-2, 1-3, and 1-4 for diagrams of the

facility): Assist the brigade and TF commanders. Monitor the close fight. Synchronize (coordinate) CS and CSS. Execute planned deep attacks. Coordinate operations throughout brigade sector. Fight rear operations. Plan future operations. Keep higher headquarters informed.

Brigade Rear Command Post FunctionsThe brigade rear CP has the following functions (see Figure 1-5 for a diagram of the facility): Sustain current operations. Forecast future CSS requirements. Conduct detailed CSS planning. Serve as entry point for units entering brigade rear area. Coordinate with FSB CP (collocate). Serve as alternate main CP.

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Figure 1-1. Brigade tactical command post with command group.

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Figure 1-2. Brigade main command post.(See Figure 1-1 for legend of terms and equipment.)

Figure 1-3. Brigade main command post with SICPS (T configuration).

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Figure 1-4. Brigade main command post with SICPS (H configuration).

Figure 1-5. Brigade rear command post.(See Figure 1-1 for additional legend of terms and equipment.)

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Battalion Task Force Command, Control, and Communication Facilities

Battalion Task Force Command Group FunctionsThe battalion task force command group has the following functions (see Figures 1-6 and 1-7 for the

organization of armor and mechanized infantry task force command groups): Synchronize combat assets in support of close operations. Control close operations. Maintain current operation situation. Provide close situation information to the main CP.

Figure 1-6. Armor task force tacticalcommand post.

Figure 1-7. Mechanized infantry task forcetactical command post.

NOTE: Based on factors of METT-T, other elements, such as the engineer element, may be in-cluded in the task force TAC CP.

Battalion Task Force Main Command Post FunctionsThe battalion task force main CP has the following functions (see Figures 1-8 and 1-9 for diagrams of the

facility): Synchronize close operations by integrating CS and CSS into the maneuver plan. Plan future operations. Serve as alternate for the command group. Keep higher headquarters informed.

Battalion Task Force Combat Trains Command Post FunctionsThe battalion task force combat trains CP hsa the following functions (see Figure 1-10 for a diagram of

the facility): Plan and coordinate sustainment for tactical operations. Serve as alternate for the main CP.

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Figure 1-8. Battalion task force main ommand post with standard M577 extensions.

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Figure 1-9. Battalion task force main command post with SI CPS.

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Figure 1-10. Battalion task torte combat trains command post.

Battalion Task Force Field Trains Command Post FunctionsThe battalion task force field trains CP executes sustainment for tactical operations (see Figure 1-11 for a

diagram of the facility).

Figure 1-11. Battalion task force field trains command post.

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Company Team Command, Control, and Communication FacilitiesFigures 1-12 and 1-13 illustrate the vehicles used by mechanized and armor company team command

groups.

Figure 1-12. Mechanized company team Figure 1-13. Armor company teamcommand group. command group.

SECTION Il. THE PLANNING PROCESSThe planning process is a systematic approach to formulating tactical plans. Processes used are troop-

leading procedures, the estimate of the situation, METT-T, and IPB. These processes are interrelated. Theyare accomplished based on the amount of time and other resources available. The following pages explaincomprehensively how troop-leading procedures are conducted. They include a discussion of commander andstaff actions during troop-leading procedures. They also describe how the estimate, METT-T, and IPB areintegrated into the troop-leading procedures.

THE ONE-THIRD/TWO-THIRDS RULEPlanning time for a given headquarters should not exceed one-third of the total planning time

available. This one-third lasts from receipt of the order from higher headquarters throughbriefbacks from subordinates immediately following issuance of the OPORD.

Troop-Leading ProceduresTroop-leading procedures, although continuous, are not a cut-and-dried process. There are no distinct start

and stop points. The eight steps arc not always performed sequentially; some can occur simultaneously.Although this is a lengthy, comprehensive discussion, applicable to all levels of command, troop-leadingprocedures can be adjusted to fit the tactical situation. For example, the less time a unit has, the more it mustabbreviate troop-leading procedures.

The collection, analysis, and distribution of information is a continuous staff requirement. Informationanalyzed by a staff section is exchangcd with other staff sections and used to update situation statuses.Periodic staff huddles, are useful. To successfully execute the mission, the staff must focus on the informationthe commander needs.

NOTE: The following discussion of the eight steps in troop-leading procedures is presented in anoutline format to allow the reader to track the staff and commander actions and processes with theentries in Figure 1-14, located on the foldout, next page. The outline format also corresponds withthe formats for a WO, command estimate, and IPB, which arc part of the troop-leading procedures.The foldout is designed to be left open, so the reader may continue referring to it while reading thepages throughout this section.

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Step 1. RECEIVE THE MISSIONTroop-leading procedures begin with the receipt of a new mission. A unit normally learns of a new

mission through a WO from higher headquarters, followed later by an OPORD. A mission could also beannounced in a FRAGO as a change to the current operation, or it could be deduced by the commander as aresult of ongoing operations. A unit should begin planning as soon as possible. For example, a units LO atthe higher headquarters CP may receive information on the units missions and area of operations. By pass-ing on this information, the LO enables the commander and staff to begin their estimates and reconnaissancebefore higher headquarters issues its order.

Higher headquarters should take no more than one-third of the available time it has to issue its order to itsunits. Each successive unit likewise has the same obligation to issue its order in a timely manner. Wheneverpossible, orders should be issued to subordinates within one-third of the available time.

a. Initial Warning Order. As soon as the staff learns of a new mission, it should issue an initial WO tosubordinate units. The initial WO should inform them about the nature and timing of the new mission.

b. Mission Analysis.

(1) When analyzing the mission, the order (if written) should be studied in front of a mapwith the overlays posted. This will allow a better understanding of the terrain on which theoperation will take place. It will also allow implied tasks to be more readily identified. (SeeFigure 1-15 for an example mission analysis.)

(2) It is a good idea to list all identified tasks on paper. The list can be checked later toensure that all tasks have been addressed in the plan.

(3) The following should be identified during the mission analysis:(a) Specified tasks: the tasks stated in the order. Most specified tasks are found in paragraphs 2

and 3, but may be found elsewhere in the order.(b) Implied tasks: the tasks not stated in the order that must be accomplished to satisfy the overall

mission or to satisfy any of the specified tasks.(c) Essential tasks: the tasks from the list of specified and implied tasks that must be accomplished

to complete the overall mission. These tasks go into the restated mission for the unit.(d) Limitations: the restrictions on the freedom of action of the friendly force. Restrictions prohibit

the commander from doing something specific. Statements such as be prepared to . . . and "not earlier than. . ."are limitations. Radio-listening silence and time are also examples of limitations.

(e) Higher commanders intent, including1 Purpose of the operation.2 End state. How the battlefield, in terms of the enemy and friendly forces, will look after the

operation is over.3 Intent of the commanders two levels up. Knowledge of the intent provides a framework for

commanders to make decisions that support the overall operation.4 Acceptable levels of risk.

(4) The restated mission contains the elements of WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, andWHY. It is developed from the list of essential tasks identified earlier. Multiple tasks are listedin the sequence in which they will occur. Tasks should be whole-unit tasks. The mission state-ment must be able to stand alone. It should, therefore, contain grid locations of critical locations.On-order missions identified as critical are included because the unit can be fairly certain it willexecute the mission. Be-prepared missions, on the other hand, are not considered essential be-cause the unit may or may not execute them; they should not be included in the restated mission.

Figure 1-14. Troop-leading procedures.

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Figure 1-15. Company team mission analysis (defensive).c. Initial Time Analysis. Time is analyzed to determine how much is available, how it should be allo-

cated, and how it will affect the command and control cycle.(1) The ability to analyze time is one of the most important qualities in a commander. Time

is vital to all operations. It drives planning and execution. The commander gets his first indica-tion of time available from the higher headquarters WO. The amount of time a unit has to pre-pare for or to execute an operation determines the amount of detail required in the planningprocess. For this reason, commanders must know the command and control process and have acommand and control organization, facilities, and communications to support it.

(2) The commander should use reverse planning to construct a timeline to accomplish troop-leading tasks. Reverse planning begins with the actions on the objective and works backwards tofind a start time for events. The following events must be accomplished at all levels: conductreconnaissance, plan, issue orders, and deploy forces. All are performed at the same time, ifpossible. If not, the events that take longest must be set in motion first. The commander alsoconsiders movement times from assembly areas or present positions to sectors, battle positions, orLZs. In the offense, he estimates time from crossing the LD to seizing the objective or specifickey terrain, then he plans the sequences of units and events associated with it. Other importanttime considerations include how long key terrain must be held and how long the enemy will taketo react.

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e. Commander's Restated Mission and Plannig Guidance.

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(3) Time factors should be conservatively planned. During operations, the unexpected oc-curs. Time-distance factors are only a guide. When synchronizing operations, commanders con-sider how the factors of METT-T affect their units.

(4) The time analysis produces a schedule of the activities that must occur. Since it driveseverything the unit does, the commander must approve this schedule.

(5) The orders spectrum shown in Figure 1-16 offers the commander several methods he canuse to develop an order. The spectrum ranges from the quickest methods (on the left end of thespectrum) to the most time-consuming (on the right end of the spectrum). The time a particularstaff requires to develop an order depends on many factors, including

Physical condition of the staff. Quality of command guidance.. Staffs level of training. Staffs level of cohesion.

d. Information to the Commander. This may be the first time the commander is able to meet with his staff.The information may be presented in a briefing to update the commander on the current situation. This isfollowed by the XOs recommendation of the restated mission.

(1) The commander approves or disapproves the restated mission recommended by the staff.and issues his planning guidance to the staff. The commanders planning guidance should consistof the following:

(a) Restated mission.(b) Higher commanders intents (two levels up).

Figure 1-16. Orders development spectrum.

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(c) His own (commanders) intent. Since he has not yet made a decision how to accomplish themission, his intent may not be complete. The intent is shaped by and continues to evolve throughout theplanning process. (A definition of intent is on page 1-3.)

(d) Courses of action for the staff to consider during estimates.(e) Time and place of the decision briefing.

(2) Step 5 of troop-leading procedures is conduct reconnaissance. However, the commandermay decide to conduct his reconnaissance at this time instead of later. Reconnaissance missionsto the units could also be issued at this time.

Step 2. ISSUE A WARNING ORDERThe staff should issue a WO to units immediately after the commander issues his planning guidance. The

WO should be brief, but contain enough information for the units to prepare for the operation. AdditionalWOs can be issued later to keep the units informed and allow them to begin their planning earlier.

WOs normally do not have a specified format, but some of the information that should be in a WOfollows (see Figure 1-17 for an example WO).

1. Subject. Use warning order.2. Situation. Use brief description of enemy and friendly situation.

Figure 1-17. Brigade warning order.

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3. Attachments and detachments. Changes to task organization are made as soon as possible so units canmove and link up with new units.

4. Earliest time of move. Identifying the earliest possible movement time is important so subordinateunits can begin their time analysis. Earliest movement time should correspond to the longest move that willbe made. There may also be OPSEC reasons as well as C2 reasons for restricting the movement of subordi-nate units.

5. Nature and time of the operation. Give enough detail to begin planning and reconnaissance.The re-stated mission may be included.

6. Time and place of the OPORD. State when and where the orders group will meet to receive theOPORD.

7. A/L. Include changes to support requirements.8. Acknowledgment. Ensure WO has been received by all addressees.

Step 3. MAKE A TENTATIVE PLANThe decision making that forms the basis for the whole operation is performed in this step. Although each

primary member of the staff perform an estimate, this discussion focuses only on the commanders (opera-tions officers) estimate. The discussion also addresses LPB.

The time factor is a major influence on how the estimate is performed. If there is enough time, the staffcan provide a formal decision briefing to the commander. There may only be enough time, however, for theS3 and the commander to briefly discuss courses of action over a map. Commanders and staffs must beflexible enough to use the available time wisely when performing their estimates.

a. Command Estimate (commander's/operations officer's estimate).The estimate process is explainedbelow. Included in this discussion is one example of an IPB technique. For a detailed review of the IPBprocess, refer to FM 34-130. See Figure 1-18 for a summary of the command estimate.(1) MISSION. This paragraph is the commanders restated mission, which resulted from mission analysisconducted earlier.(2) SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION.

(a) Analysis of the Situation. The situation is analyzed using METT-T. The factors of METT-T composethe total tactical environment in which military units are employed. Mission was analyzed during step 1 ofthe troop-leading procedures, receive the mission. Enemy, terrain, and weather are analyzed during the IPB,The analysis of troops (or the friendly situation) follows IPB. Finally, an analysis of the time needed toexecute the mission is conducted. Keep in mind that a time analysis has already been accomplished duringstep 1 of the troop-leading procedures. Since the mission has been analyzed, the next item of discussion forMETT-T is IPB.

1 Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. IPB is a systematic and continuous process ofanalyzing the enemy, weather, and terrain in a specific geographical area. The IPB process inte-grates enemy doctrine with weather and terrain to determine how the weather and terrain willinfluence the enemys fight.

a IPB is a commanders business. It is integral to the command estimate. The commander and allmembers of the staff participate in the IPB process. The S3 uses the IPB to analyze the enemy, terrain, andweather in his estimate. He must know the IPB process. He must also be able to evaluate the quality of theS2s work. The S1 and S4 use the IPB to determine the impact of enemy, terrain, and weather on personneland logistical operations. The CS staff uses the IPB in a similar manner for their operations.

b IPB is a lengthy process. The S2 must start the IPB process at the earliest possible moment.Early identification of the area of operations will enable the S2 to start the terrain analysis. As a minimum,the situation template should be finished when the S3 begins his analysis of the situation.

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Figure 1-18. Command estimate

Some of the techniques provided in the following discussion will assist staffs at both brigade andbattalion level in performing the IPB. Figure 1-19 illustrates the IPB process.

NOTE: The IPB, the first step in the analysis of the situation in the command estimate, is discussedon pages 1-18 through 1-27. The second step (own situation) begins on page 1-27.

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Figure 1-19. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield.a. BATTLEFIELD AREA EVALUATION (Overlay #1: Combined Obstacles Overlay).

(1) Identify the area of operations. This is the geographical area assigned by the higher headquarters anddefined on the higher headquarters operations overlay (see Figure 1-20).

(2) Identify the area of interest. This is determined by the commander. It contains enemy forces that couldaffect future operations. In the absence of guidance from the commander, make the area of interest at leasthalf again the size of the area of operations (see Figure 1-20). Outline the area of interest on the combinedobstacles overlay (see Figure 1-21 for an example combined obstacles overlay).

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Figure 1-20. Areas of operations and interest (battalion level).b. TERRAIN ANALYSIS (Overlay #l, Combined Obstacles Overlay). The terrain is analyzed using the

five military aspects of terrain (the sequence may vary according to the way IPB is developed):Obstacles.Cover and concealment.Observation and fields of fire.Key terrain.Avenues of approach.

(1) Identify NO-GO terrain. Use green crosshatch markings. NO-GO terrain hinders ground movement inall directions. It substantially reduces the speed of movement. It is also a function of the type of force thatwill move through that terrain. The following define NO-GO terrain features:

(a) Built-up areas 500 square meters or larger. Built-up areas can be smaller if surroundingterrain makes them difficult to bypass.

(b) Hydrology. Water features that cannot be forded or spanned by an AVLB.(c) Slopes. Slopes of 45 percent or greater uphill (directional).(d) Vegetation. Trees 6 to 8 inches thick and with less than 20-foot intervals (armor only).(e) Elevation. Terrain with elevation changes of 200 to 400 meters per kilometer.(f) Roads and trails. Wooded areas with one trail per kilometer and no hard surface roads

(armor only).(g) Man-made obstacles.

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Figure 1-21. Combined ostsacles overlay.

(2) Identify SLOW-GO terrain. Use green single-hatch markings. SLOW-GO terrain hinders groundmovement. but to a lesser degree than NO-GO terrain. Little effort is needed to enhance mobility. Thefollowing define SLOW-GO terrain feature:

(a) Hydrology. Water features that can be forded in several areas.(b) Slopes. Uphill slopes of 30 to 45 percent.(c) Vegetation. Trees 2 inches thick with less than 20-foot intervals (armor only).(d) Elevation. Terrain with elevation changes of 100 to 200 meters per kilometer.(e) Roads and trails. Wooded areas with one hard surface road or two trails per kilometer, or

one hard surface road and one trail per kilometer (armor only).(3) Identify GO terrain. GO terrain is not marked on the map. GO terrain is fairly open terrain that

presents no hindrance to ground movement. Mobility does not require enhancement.(4) Identify mobility corridors. These are routes a force can use to move from one place to another while

deployed. They traverse GO terrain predominantly, bypassing NO-GO terrain and occasionally passing overSLOW-GO terrain. These routes are identified for forces two levels down. Units have the following mobilitycorridor widths:

Company500 meters. Battalion1.5 kilometers. Brigade/regiment-3 kilometers. Division6 kilometers.

These are only planning widths. Mobility corridors may be only as wide as the width of the vehicles insome conditions. Consideration must be given to the type of movement formation two levels down (column,wedge, inverted wedge, diamond, box, etc) and the ranges of weapon systems used throughout the depth ofthe formation.

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(5) Identify avenues of approach (Overlay #2, Avenues of Approach). Place overlay #2 on top of overlay#1. Use axis of advance graphic symbols. Determine avenues of approach one level down. Identify bothfriendly and enemy avenues of approach. Identify avenues of approach throughout the area of interest. (SeeFigure 1-22 for an example avenue of approach overlay.)

Figure 1-22. Avenue of approach overlay (brigade level).(a) For offensive operations, identify friendly avenues of approach first. Identify enemy coun-

terattack avenues of approach second.(b) For defensive operations, identify enemy avenues of approach first. Identify friendly coun-

terattack avenues of approach second.(c) Mark friendly avenues of approach in black. Label them alphabetically left to right facing

the enemy. Label the size force.(d) Mark enemy avenues of approach in red. Label them numerically left to right facing the

friendly force. Label the size force.(e) Mobility corridors can be combined to make avenues of approach. Maximum distances

between mobility corridors (sizes of avenues of approach) are as follows:1 Division avenues of approach have regimental mobility corridors no more than 10 kilometers

2 Regimental avenues of approach have battalion mobility corridors no more than 6 kilo-meters apart.

3 Battalion avenues of approach have company mobility corridors no more than 2 kilometers apart.4 Company avenues of approach are at least 500 meters wide.

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(6) Determine the most likely enemy avenues of approach. This is done by placing a double arrowheadon the most likely avenues of approach. Avenue of approach overlays can be sent to subordinate units, butthis should not preclude subordinates from doing a complete terrain analysis on their own.

(7) Identify key and decisive terrain (Overlay #l). Draw a black circle around the terrain and label it K#or "D#."

(a)

(b)

Key terrain is any feature that, in the control of a combatant, will provide an advantageover the opposing force. Key terrain is important to the accomplishment of the operation.Decisive terrain is key terrain that has an extraordinary impact on the mission. Control ofthis terrain determines success or failure of a particular mission. It is normally designatedby the commander. In some situations, there may not be recognizable decisive terrain.

(8) Analyze observation and fires, and cover and concealment.c. WEATHER ANALYSIS. Analyze the effects of weather on terrain, troops, and equipment for bothfriednly and enemy operations.

(1) Determine visibility (including fog) and light data. Low visibility(a) Hinders the defense and favors the offense.(b) Makes C2 more difficult.(c) Degrades reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.

(2) Determine wind speed and direction.(a) Both factors usually favor the force upwind.(b) Both affect employment of smoke and chemicals.(c) As wind speed increases, wind chill becomes a consideration.

(3) Evaluate precipitation data.(a) Precipitation decreases cross-country mobility and visibility.(b) Extensive cloud cover reduces the effectiveness of CAS and aerial resupply.

(4) Evaluate temperature effects on personnel and equipment.After the terrain and weather analyses, the S2 and S3 can determine the effects of terrain and weather on

enemy and friendly courses of action in their estimates.d. THREAT EVALUATION. Threat evaluation is a detailed study of the enemys composition, organization,tactical doctrine, weapons and equipment, and supporting battlefield functional systems. It is a continuousprocess resulting in doctrinal templates. Doctrinal templates convert enemy order of battle into graphicdisplays of how the enemy might look, according to doctrine, without the effects of weather and terrain.

(1) Information sources include(a) Higher headquarters intelligence overlays, INTSUMs, and PERINTREPs.(b) Order of battle handbooks.(c) Doctrine, training, and equipment publications.

(2) The staff should maintain the following enemy information:(a) Composition (order of battle).(b) Strength.(c) Committed forces and units currently in contact.

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(d) Reinforcements. Enemy units not committed in or out of the friendly sector, but which canreact to the friendly course of action.

(e) Artillery, engineer, air, and NBC assets, and other forces, such as EW, air defense, anti-tank, unconventional warfare, and combat surveillance.

(f) Enemy engineer obstacles and fortifications.e. THREAT INTEGRATION. Analyze the enemy two levels down. There are three parts to threat integra-tion: the situation template, the event template, and the decision support template.

(1) Situation template (Overlay #3, Situation Template). The situation template is a doctrinal templatewith terrain, weather, and known intelligence applied (see Figure 1-23.) This template becomes the intelli-gence overlay of the OPORD. Use red unit or graphic symbols. Ensure all units are accounted for and nounits are duplicated. For example, a templated company with a known enemy platoon location should have a(-) symbol.

(a) Plot known enemy locations (solid symbols).(b) Template assumed enemy locations (dashed).(c) Identify boundaries, CPs, and reserves.(d) Identify PIR. PIR is located in the coordinating instructions of paragraph 3 of the OPORD.

If organic elements are not capable of gaining the information, request information fromhigher headquarters.

Figure 1-23. Battalion level situation template (offensive mission).

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(2) Event template (Overlay #4, Event Template). The event template shows significant battlefield eventsand enemy activities that provide indications of enemy courses of action (see Figure 1-24). It is used forfocusing intelligence collection assets.

(a) Select NAI. NAI are places where enemy activity will confirm or deny enemy courses ofaction. Use circles with numbers inside.

(b) Determine the enemys most probable course of action.(c) Determine the enemy situation. The S2 can now prepare paragraph 1a (enemy situation) of

the OPORD. The S2 also develops the unit R&S plan (see Figure 1-25). The S3 can nowdetermine the enemy situation portion of his estimate.

Figure 1-24. Event template.

(3) Decision support template (Overlay #5, Decision Support Template). The decision support templateidentities enemy activities, relative to time and location, that may require tactical decisions. It is developedthrough war-gaming by the entire staff. This template is useful for contingency planning. In addition, the S3can use the decision support template in his war-gaming when he analyzes courses of action later. Thefollowing steps will be helpful in preparing a decision support template.

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Figure l-25. Battalion reconnaissance and surveillance plan.

(a) Prepare a decision support matrix. This supports the decision support template. Placethe matrix on the template outside the area of interest. Fill in the matrix as the war-gamingproceeds. (See Figure l-26 for an example decision support template and matrix.)

(b) Draw time lines. Label them with H-hour times. Movement rates are determined as thenumber of minutes the enemy will take to travel 1 kilometer. Use this formula: rate (in minutesper kilometer) equals 60 divided by speed (in kilometers per hour). For example, if the enemysmost likely movement rate is 25 kilometers per hour through an area, the enemy movement ratewill be 2.4 minutes per kilometer. Enemy movement rates will most likely be dependent enter-rain and formation.

(c) Identify TAI. TAI are locations for effective interdiction of enemy forces by deep battleor, if necessary, close battle. Use rectangles with numbers inside.

(d) Identify decision points. Decision points are based on the time and distance factors nec-essary to react to the enemys approach to TAI. Use the formula for the movement rate in min-utes per kilometer, described above. Indicate decision points using triangles with numbers inside.

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Figure 1-26. Decision support template and matrix (brigade defense).NOTE: The overlays/templates previously described pertain to brigade level IPB. When time islimited or when battalion-level IPB is conducted, the following overlays/templates can be produced:

Overlay #1: Combined Obstacles Overlay. Put all terrain analysis on this overlay, includingavenues of approach.

Overlay #2: Threat Integration. The situation template, event template, and decision supporttemplate are put on one overlay.

This method saves time and acetate, though information will be more cluttered. In most cases, however,information contained on these two overlays is still readily understandable.

NOTE: IPB is a useful aid to planning. There is a tendency, however, to believe the assumptionsmade in IPB are in fact true and to develop plans accordingly. This is dangerous because it couldmake friendly forces susceptible to surprise by the enemy. Commanders and staffs must be awareof this possibility. They must develop plans to prevent the command from being surprised byunexpected enemy actions.

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IPB is the oommanders, as well as the whole staffs tool in decision making. Hence, thecommander and the staff should be actively involved in the IPB process.

NOTE:This concludes the discussion of IPB. The analysis of the situation in the command esti-mate continues with an analysis of the units own situation and an analysis of time (execution time).

------------------------------------

2 Own situation. The S3 receives information from all staff officers to help him determine the status offriendly form relative to the type of operation to be conducted. Much of this information (facts) might havebeen identified when the staff and commander exchanged information before the development of the restatedmission (mission analysis) and commanders planning guidance, With the aid of the staff, the S3 projects thestatus of the unit at the beginning of the operation. The S3 does this by making assumptions about thechanges that can occur between then and the time of execution.

a Composition. This is a summary of forces that can aid in accomplishing the mission. Fa-miliarity with the unit, task organization, staff officers, subordinate leaders, and reference docu-ments can aid the S3 in determining the units composition. Command and support relationshipsmust be identified.

b Disposition. This is determined for the present and the future by the S3 with the aid of thecommander, subordinate leaders, and other staff officers. The S3 can also use overlays, situationmaps, or previously published documents. The information addressed should include the locationof combat, CS, and CSS units.

c Strength. This listing develops friendly capabilities and vulnerabilities to aid the com-mander in selecting courses of action. Factors to be considered include the unit mission andintent of the commander one and two levels up, current location of subelements, current andfuture locations of flank units and higher commanders reserves, the seven battlefield operatingsystems, and unit morale. The commander should also consider the effects on soldiers; pacingitems; and the logistical status of the organic, attached and OPCON combat, CS, and CSS unitsfor the operation. Strength is determined by the number of weapon systems and personnelstrength, not by unit size. Battalions determine strength based on the number, type, and status ofavailable platoons.

d Significant activities. This refers to the selected items of information, such as successfultactical techniques or unit morale, considered during planning.

e Peculiarities and weaknesses. These should be considered and their influence on possiblefriendly courses of action should be noted. Only pertinent headings are used. They can includepersonnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and civil-military operations. Input from the appro-priate staff officer is added.

3 Time (execution time). During step 1 of troop-leading procedures, the mission and planning time wereanalyzed. In addition to understanding how to organize planning time, the commander must determine howmuch time is required to execute critical tasks of the mission. Analysis of execution time will help determinethe degree of success, plan for contingencies, and anticipate requirements. This analysis, although rathersubjective, requires a knowledge of movement rates and the amount of time it takes to move forces from onepoint to another (see Table 1-1). Elements of analysis are

a Start time of mission execution.b Movement time.c Maneuver time.d Time required to seize or secure objectives.e How long key terrain must be held.

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Table 1-1. Unopposed rates of movement.

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(b) Own Courses of Action. After analyzing the situation using METT-T the courses of action are devel-oped.

A course of action is a possible plan to accomplish the mission. It is usually stated in broad terms, withthe details determined during the analysis (step (3) in the command estimate). It may be revised, modified,or changed during the analysis. The S3 should develop a manageable number of different courses of actionfor all staff members to analyze. Imagination and creativity are required. Each course of action should beviable. The S3 should avoid the pitfall of developing only one good course of action among other lessfeasible courses of action.

Areas that should be addressed in courses of action are task organization, scheme of maneuver, maineffort, and use of reserves. Courses of action include WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW, and WHY, but notWHO. The units who perform tasks in courses of action are determined when the commander makes hisdecision.

Use the following steps in developing courses of action.1 Analyze relative combat power.

a Relative combat power is the overall relationship of enemy versus friendly combat power. Itprovides conclusions about friendly capabilities pertaining to the operation being planned. It analyzes all theavailable combat power of friendly forces and enemy forces (from the situation template), assuming that allforces are in contact at once.

b The planner analyzes two levels down for both friendly and enemy forces. For example, a brigadewould normally analyze the relative combat power of enemy versus friendly companies.

S3s should remember that war is, as Jomini noted, an impassioned drama and in no way amathematical operation. This step merely provides the planner with a notion of

WHAT, not HOW.

2 Array initial forces. The initial array of forces begins at the expected point of initialcontact. Using the planning ratios for various combat missions found in Table 1-2, and givingcareful consideration to the terrain and enemy templating assumptions, the planner can makesome general conclusions about the type of operations he can conduct. He might also get thebeginning indication of where the operation might take place. For example, the mimimum ratiofor an attack is 3:1. This provides the planner with an appreciation of forces required to accom-plish the mission.

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Table 1-2. Historical planning ratios for the array fo friendly units.

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3 Develop the scheme of maneuver.

a The scheme of maneuver provides the HOW of a course of action. It identifies the main effort andaddresses the five elements of the battlefield framework:

Deep operations. Security operations. Close operations. Rear operations. Reserve operations.b At brigade level all five elements of the battlefield framework are normally addressed. At battal-

ion level, however, deep operations and rear operations are not normally addressed.

4 Determine C2 and maneuver control measures.

a Ensure the span of control is not exceeded. Subordinate headquarters should control two to fivesubordinate units.

b Control measures should be the minimum required to control the operation. They should notnormally split avenues of approach or key terrain, but should allow one unit to have responsibility for thearea. Additionally, space should be provided on the flanks of each avenue of approach to allow for maneuverand fires. The main effort may be in a narrower area, while the area of the supporting effort may be wider.

5 Develop course of action statements and sketches. Figure 1-27 shows an example of acourse of action statement and sketch.

a The course of action statement addresses WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW, and WHY, but notWHO. The sketch provides a generic picture of the statement. Together they identify the scheme of maneu-ver and the main effort. Each course of action should accomplish the mission, be viable, and be differentfrom the others.

b At brigade level, courses of action include the five elements of the battlefield framework. Atbattalion level, however, deep operations and rear operations are normally not addressed.

c At brigade and lower levels, the sketch can be an acetate overlay on a map. The statement can bewritten somewhere on the overlay.

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Figure 1-27. Course of action statement and sketch (battalion).

The following is another technique for developing a course of action.1. Determine the decisive point. The battalion main effort, which could be to gain or retain terrain, destroy

enemy forces, or secure friendly forces, focuses on the decisive point during the decisive phase of the battle.A point is potentially decisive if the essential tasks and purpose of the command, detemnined through missionanalysis, could be achieved there.

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2. Determine the supporting efforts. The commander can determine what supporting efforts are needed byasking the question, What else must be done to allow the main effort to succeed?

3. Determine Purposes. The commander determines the purposes to be achieved by the main and support-ing efforts. He links the main efforts purpose directly to the battalions purpose. He links the supportingefforts purposes directly to the main efforts purpose.

4. Determine the Essential tasks. Determine the essential task(s) required for subordinate units (main andsupporting efforts) to achieve the purposes determined above.

5. Task organize. Develop a generic task organization based on the number of available company head-quarters. This task organization allows achievement of the common purpose. Weight the main effort. Ensuremore risk is taken in the areas away from the main effort (economy of force). Do not consider assets, such asCAS or FASCAM, that maybe unavailable to the battalion during execution.

6. Establish control measures. Establish control measures that clarify responsibilities and synchronize theefforts of subordinates to support the possible main effort. Allow as much freedom of action as possible.

7. Prepare a course of action statement and sketch. This is accomplished in the same manner described inthe previous discussion.

(3) ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION. Analysis identifies the advantages and disadvantages ofcourses of action. The S3 analyzes (war-games) each course of action against likely enemy courses of action.War-gaming is a logical step-by-step process that relies heavily on tactical judgment and experience. Theanalysis process is action-reaction-counteraction.

During war-gaming, the course of action can be changed or modified, or another one can be developed.Additionally, the S3 identifies requirements for CS and CSS.

The rules for war-gaming include the following: List the advantages and disadvantages as they become obvious during the war-gaming process. Remain unbiased. Continually assess the feasibility of the course of action to see if it meets the requirements of the

mission. Avoid comparing courses of action. Avoid drawing premature conclusions, Trace each course of action from beginning to end against the most likely enemy course of action and

variations. The S2 must interpret the template to anticipate enemy actions.Before stinting, post the enemy situation (situation template), the friendly situation, and the course of

action to be analyzed on a map. Then war-game using the following steps.(a) List enemy capabilities (retained for analysis). Often there is not enough time to war-game every

enemy capability. List the most important enemy capabilities that can be war-gamed in the time available.(b) List friendly forces. Use the METT-T analysis of troops (friendly situation).(c) List the critical events. Use the task list from mission analysis to identify critical tasks that are

essential to mission accomplishment or that require detailed analysis.(d) List the assumptions. Assumptions are made when necessary facts are not available. Assumptions are

usualIy based on factors of METT-T that cannot be controlled. The validity of each assumption is tested

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Figure 1-28. Sample war-gaming worksheet with advantages and disadvantages(brigade level, offensive mission).

against the question, Is the assumption absolutely necessary for the solution of the problem? or Would theend result change if the assumption were not made? If the answer is no, the assumption is not valid andshould not be used.

(e) Select the criteria for analysis. List the criteria for analysis that will be used to judge the value of thecourse of action and determine the advantages and disadvantages. The following are sources for criteria:

1 Principles of war.2 METT-T.3 Commanders intent.4 Analysis of battlefield operating systems.

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(f) War-game (visualize) the battle and assess the results. Do this for each course of action. War-gamingtechniques include

Avenue-in-depth technique, which focuses on one avenue at a time. Belt technique, which divides the battlefield into areas that run the width of the sector. This allows the

commander to analyze each critical event and all forces involved. Box technique, which is a microanalysis of isolated critical areas and is less time-consuming.

1 Select a war-gaming technique and use it toa Analyze the critical events of the courses of action against enemy capabilities using the criteria

listed.b Identify requirements for CS and CSS.c Identify requirements for external support.d Identify the necessary changes to courses of action.e Address degree of risk of failure for each course of action.

2 Record and display results, including the advantages and disadvantages. A war-gamingworksheet can aid in recording the results and determining requirements. Figure 1-28 shows asample worksheet.

3 Repeat the steps for each course of action.

(4) COMPARISON OF COURSES OF ACTION. The fourth step in the estimate process consists of com-paring options and choosing a course of action.

(a) Comparison matrix. An effective technique for comparing courses of action is to use a comparisonmatrix. To set it up, list the significant factors used in step 3 (analysis) of the estimate on the left side of thechart: list the course of action numbers across the top. (figure 1-29 provides an example format for a courseof action comparison matrix.) The simplest way to use this matrix is to give a plus to the best course ofaction for each factor. If two or more courses of action are equally superior, give them both a plus. Allothers receive a minus. Another way is to rank the courses of action. The best course of action for eachsignificant factor is given a 1, the second best a 2, and so on. The course of action with the lowest total sumsupports the significant factors best. This comparison matrix conveniently summarizes the results of theanalysis and comparison. It aids the staff in deciding their recommendations, and aids the commander informing his decision during the decision brief.

(b) Discussion. The weights of one factors advantages and disadvantages are rarely the same as those foranother factor, so weighting significant factors might be necessary. One or several of the METT-T factorsmight be considered more important than others-for example, an assault might need to be conducted on aparticular objective before BMNT. In this example, time may be more important than the other significantfactors. If the example chart in Figure 1-29 is used, speed may be weighted as twice as important as theother factors. The commander/S3 could annotate x2 beside speed on Figure 1-29. If the numberingsystem previously described is used to rank courses of action, the value assigned to each course of action isdoubled. This makes the already significant course of action factor speed more significant than othersignificant course of action factors.

NOTE: This method of weighting a course of action is just one way the commander can indicate theimportance of one factor over others. However, the commander should be careful when weightingsignificant factors. Seldom is one factor so vital to the mission that it causes the planners to ruleout other viable courses of action that do not take advantage of that specific factor.

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Figure 1-29. Example course of action comparison matrix.

(5) RECOMMENDATION/DECISION. The staff recommends to the commander the best course of ac-tion.

NOTE: This concludes the discussion of the command estimate.

b. Decision Briefing to the Commander. The staff provides a decision briefing to the commander. Itspurpose is to aid the commander in making a decision. Each course of action is outlined, the advantages anddisadvantages of each presented, and a recommendation made. The commander may decide on a specificcourse of action or a variation of courses of action. Figure 1-30 lists a technique for effective briefings.

c. The commander considers the staff recommendation presented by the S3,completes his estimate, and announces his decision and concept.

d. Commander's Conept of the Operation. The commanders concept provides the necessary elements ofparagraph 3a of the OPORD, concept of the operation. The commanders concept is a clear, concise state-ment of the task organization, the mission statement, the commanders intent, the general scheme of maneu-ver, supporting fires, and the acceptable degree of risk. The commanders concept takes the same form as thestaff recommendation, except that the commander confirms the units to be employed. The main effort in the

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e. Additional Guidance.

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Figure 1-30. Technique for decision briefings.scheme of maneuver is critical-it affects all planning. The commanders concept provides the least informa-tion needed to further develop the tectica plan and to issue the order.

The commander can provide the staff with more planning guidance besides hisdecision and concept. How much he provides depends on the experience of the staff and on how well theyknow the commander. This extra guidance helps the staff complete the plan and prepare orders. The com-mander can include an elaboration on the scheme of maneuver, fire support plan, and CSS. He outlines anytask organization changes he wishes to make. He also designates subordinate units to be employed, which isa command responsibility that cannot be delegated. The S3 can only recommend units (though not as part ofthe operations estimate recommendation).

f. Develop a Tentative Plan.(1) The tentative plan results from the commanders decision and concept and becomes the

basis for the finalized plan. It consists of(a) Task organization (maneuver units).(b) Mission.(c) Scheme of maneuver.(d) Operations overlay.

(2) A WO may be issued at this point to update subordinate units on further developments.This is especially important when units must move early.Step 4. INITIATE MOVEMENT

a. Movement can be started in several ways: with a new WO, a FRAGO, or a movement order.The unit may have to reposition to start the operation on time. Movement of subordinate units maybe necessary to change task organization. Some movement, especially by reconnaissance units, may

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be necessary immediately after receipt of the WO from higher headquarters. If there is enough timeto issue the OPORD before any movement begins, the movement instructions can be included in theOPORD. Often, movement may have to occur simultaneously with planning.

b. During initial time analysis, conduct time distance analysis to determine when the unit must start move-ment so it can conduct the mission on time.

c. Since the XO or S3 is often busy during the planning of an operation, the planning and preps.mtion of amovement plan may become the task of a junior staff officer. Training of junior staff officers in movementplanning will be valuable. See Appendix A, Movement.

Step 5. CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCEa. Reconnaissance should be conducted whenever possible. The commander may want to conduct reco-

nnaissance immediately after restating the mission and providing planning guidance to the staff. Otherwise,commanders may conduct reconnaissance after the decision briefing. In this case, the commander will usereconnaissance to confirm his decision or to make necessary changes to the plan.

b. The situation, especially the time available, dictates the type and quality of reconnaissance. To best useavailable time, leaders should do an initial map reconnaissance to find routes and locations to reconnoiterbefore departing. For best results, map reconnaissance begins immediately on receipt of the higher headquar-ters WO; it should continue through mission accomplishment. Physical reconnaissance can be conductedalong the same routes units will use. In addition, necessary coordination with other units, such as for passageof lines, can be made during reconnaissance.

c. Other leaders, such as the S3, may conduct reconnaissance, either with the commander or separately.The leaders should be accompanied by a security element, which usually will be composed of subordinateunit members.

d. Before departing on reconnaissance, the leader should leave instructions with the person next in charge.In his contingency plan, the leader should provide the following information:

(1) Where the leader is going.(2) Others that are going with the leader.(3) Time the leader will be gone.(4) What should be done if the leader does not return.(5) Other actions, such as actions on enemy contact and things to be accomplished while the

leader is away.e. Subordinate units can also be given reconnaissance missions. These missions could be based on the

S2s R&S plan, developed from the NAI on the event template during IPB. All pertinent information isreported to the TOC so the information can be used to complete the plan.

Step 6. COMPLETE THE PLANa.. Preparation of the Plan/Order. (See FMs 71-1,71-2, and 101-5 for example OPORD formats.)

(1) After the commander makes his decision and issues his concept, the staff quickly pre-pares the plan/order. Using the tentative plan as a basis makes this process more efficient. Recon-naissance results are used in preparing the plan/order. Multiple copies of the plan/order must bemade and overlays must be accurately copied. Standard procedures should be established to in-clude all staff members in the reproduction procedure. Each staff officer can be made responsiblefor producing appropriate portions of the plan/order.

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(2) The following are integrated into the plan/order:(a) Fires.(b) Air defense.(c) Engineer.(d) Intelligence.(e) EW.(f) MP.(g) NBC.(h) Signal.(i) C2.(j) CSS.

(3) Orders do not command an operation; they assist in control. An order provides a visuali-zation and articulation of the commanders intent and enough information so that all subordinateunits can work together toward the desired end. Commanders and their staffs must ensure thatorders are not lengthy and that redundancy is reduced. Short, concise mission-type orders areused, but only if a common doctrinal understanding and a good SOP exist. Use only the wordsand graphic control measures necessary to ensure a coordinated effort.

(4) A good plan is clear, brief, and complete. It is simple to understand and to execute.Mission-type orders that describe WHAT, not HOW are used to give subordinates maximum lati-tude and minimum restrictions. A good plan uses positive expression. It is timely. A 70-percentsolution given on time is better than a 100-percent solution delivered too late. A good plan pro-vides decentralization. It delegates authority to the maximum extent consistent with control. Agood plan is flexible. It allows for changes as the situation changes.

(5) Annexes are used only when absolutely necessary and when the information is importantto the whole command. Annexes must not serve as a substitute for subordinate unit orders. Re-sist the temptation to allow the staff to spell out in great detail how a CS unit, for example, is todo its job. Subordinate unit commanders must develop their own orders and plans and not rely ondetailed guidance from higher headquarters.

(6) Graphics. The staff should follow the guidelines below when preparing the plan/order.(a) Ensure graphics are simple, yet clear enough for a subordinate element to understand.(b) Include the number of control measures necessary to ensure execution of the operation as in-

tended.(c) To add flexibility, provide additional checkpoints where there are no control measures. Check-

points provide a reference for unanticipated maneuver. They also simplify FRAGOs. The plotting of TIRSpoints outside the area of operations will also aid in the transmittal of FRAGOs and provide a means ofoperating outside the area if necessary.

b. Approval of the Plan/Order. The commander approves the plan or order by signing the original copy.

Step 7. ISSUE THE ORDERa. An OPORD is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for coordinated execution

of an operation. A FRAGO is an abbreviated OPORD used to convey changes to an OPORD as required bythe situation. Both can be used when issuing orders.

b. A number of different orders groups can be established in the units SOPs to speed the issuance oforders and to provide flexibility in issuing orders for different purposes.

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(1) Orders group Alpha (hasty planning): commander, XO, S3, S2, FSO, and engineer.(2) Orders group Bravo (detailed planning): orders group Alpha, plus S1, S4, FAC, air de-

fense officer, and other necessary CS and CSS officers.(3) Orders group Charlie (issue orders): orders groups Alpha and Bravo, plus company team

commanders and LOs.c. The commander should use the following techniques in issuing orders:

(1) Use any aids that can help personnel to understand the conduct of the operation. Atbattalion and company level, issue the order from a vantage point overlooking the terrain onwhich the operation will be conducted. If that is not possible, use aids such as sand tables,sketches, or graphics.

(2) The order should be issued at the time and place stated in the WO. The most securemeans available should be used. As a minimum, an overlay order, including an execution matrix,should be issued to subordinate leaders. All essential personnel should be present. They shouldbe oriented to the maps, graphics, and other aids to provide them with an initial reference pointfrom which they can gain an understanding. A time check should be made at the conclusion ofthe order and the meeting.

(3) The order is normally briefed orally to the orders group. If a written order is also issued,the staff briefs only the most essential information. Members of the orders group can read thedetails later. The meeting should normally last no longer than 30 minutes. More time should betaken, however, to ensure understanding.

(4) During issuance of the order, the commander personally provides his intent and conceptof operation to the orders group. All personnel should leave the meeting with a clear under-standing of his intent and the intent of the next higher commander.

Step 8. SUPERVISEOnce orders are issued, the commander supervises combat preparation and execution. He ensures his

intent is understood and his decisions are implemented. Supervision spans a wide variety of activities, in-cluding leadership and synchronization of the battle.

a. Rehearsal. When time permits, commanders conduct briefback rehearsals with their subordinate com-manders. The briefback rehearsal ensures the commanders intent is understood. It also ensures greater syn-chronization of operations during execution. Key staff officers may participate; staff sections also conducttheir own rehearsals. The requirement for briefback rehearsals may be specified in WOs. Consideration mustbe given, however, to the need for subordinate commanders to plan and prepare their own operations. Re-hearsals are discussed in detail in Chapter 2, Section II.

b. Intelligence Update. Just prior to the start of the operation, the commander should receive an intelli-gence and weather update from the S2.

c. Execution. During execution of the operation, the commander should position himself where he canbest command and control the battle. He will monitor the situation, assess the important information, makedecisions, and issue FRAGOs. FRAGOs normally contain the minimum necessary changes to the plan.

The following actions will aid the commander during the execution of the operation.(1) Subordinate commanders should coordinate departures from the plan with the commander.

If they cannot contact the commander, subordinate commanders may take action based on theirknowledge of the commanders intent and their own judgment. Subordinate commanders mustnotify the commander of their action at the earliest opportunity.

(2) SOPs should specify essential information about enemy and friendly situations to keepreporting simple.

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(3) The staff should have periodic huddles to update all members on essential informationthey might have missed in the confusion of ongoing operations.

NOTE: This concludes the step-by-step discussion of hoop-leading procedures.

Abbreviated Decision-Making Process

IntroductionIf planning time is short, the commander may abbreviate the decision-making process only in the amount

of time required for each step. All steps should be completed, in the proper order, as outlined in precedingparagraphs. The following paragraphs address techniques for shortening the process so that the best possibleplan can be produced in a timely manner.

Mission AnalysisThe mission analysis step of the decision-making process can be shortened as follows.

Facts and AssumptionsThe staff must keep the facts and assumptions up to date on a continuous basis. Time to prepare written

estimates may not be available. The staff must therefore be prepared to give their estimates orally.Analysis of Higher Mission and Intent

Commanders may give a more detailed explanation of the higher commanders mission and intent. Thisinformation can be sent to subordinate units immediately in the form of a WO.

Commanders may also perform much of the task analysis themselves, or in consultation with one or twokey personnel (i.e., the XO or S3).

The XO must organize the staff according to a specific timeline. He can also shorten planning time bydeveloping preformatted methods of transmitting information so the commander can focus on the crucial bitsof information that are needed for decision making at each step in the process.Commander's Guidance

Regardless of planning time available, the commander must develop his intent fully and ensure that allstaff members understand it.

Commanders can significantly shorten planning time by giving detailed and directive guidance. For exam-ple

Give the staff specific direction on how to develop courses of action.Give the staff specific courses of action to develop. Specify the number of courses of action to be developed. Develop the entire course of action and issue it to the staff, thus allowing them to move directly to

war-gaming.After the commanders guidance is issued, another WO is issued. This WO should include the restated

mission, the commanders intent, aspects of the planning guidance that subordinate units would find useful,and the planning time line.

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When mission analysis is condensed, staff members should raise concerns to the commander about mis-sion analysis before course of action development. The staff and commander must have a common basis ofunderstanding or the following steps will take much longer and probably will not reflect the commanderstrue intent.

Course of Action DevelopmentUnless the commander has developed a course of action and issued it as part of commanders guidance,

the staff must find ways to shorten the time required for course of action development. Normally, anyserious compromise of the steps involved in course of development will be felt adversely during war-gaming.Therefore, time reductions in this step usually flow from improved staff training, experience, and efficiency.

Analysis of Courses of ActionAnalysis of courses of action is the most time-consuming of all the planning steps. There are several

factors that can speed up the process.The Commander

The commander can direct that the staff war-game the courses of action against only one situation tem-plate. The commander selects a situation template based on his assessment of which one is the biggest threatto the accomplishment of his intent.The Staff

Staff assistants set up the war-gaming battlefield (maps, acetate, automation tools) during the missionanalysis and course of action development steps.The S3

The S3 can select a war-gaming method that takes less time. The box method, in which the staff focuseson one or two critical points, is an example. Another way is to use the avenue-in-depth technique to analyzeonly the activities of the unit making the main attack.

The commander can shorten the process by participating in the war game. This makes the war-gamebriefing unnecessary. War-gaming itself may be condensed, but not eliminated. The use of experiencedwar-garners can speed the process. Also, the use of automated simulations may help to decrease the timedevoted to calculations and combat calculus.Comparison of Courses of Action

When there is only one course of action being analyzed, this step is omitted. When this step is used (morethan one course of action), its length is often governed by the number and complexity of comparison toolsconsidered. To shorten this step, the XO should use one consolidated decision matrix instead of one fromeach staff section. Also, decision matrixes can be simplified by unweighting them or reducing the number offactors or criteria considered.Decision and Execution

A formal decision brief probably will not be needed if the commander has narrowed the courses of actionat the outset and has been interactive during staff planning.

The time required to create and distribute the order may be reduced by using standard orders formats andabbreviated orders that are graphic intensive. Another time-saving technique is to have the commander andkey staff deliver the order to the subordinate commander, or visit soon after receipt. What might be lackingin the written OPORD can be made up with a personal visit from the commander or his personal agent.

Application of Troop-Leading ProceduresTroop-leading procedures are used at all echelons of command. The previous discussion of troop-leading

procedure provides commanders and staffs with a detailed explanation of the processes involved in planning.The application of troop-leading procedures in practice will vary with each situation.

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Company commanders will not be able to perform all the planning processes contained in thetroop-leading procedures. They cannot produce a detailed IPB product. They will have to visualizeall elements of the IPB that relate to their area of interest. This includes identifying enemy avenuesof approach and dead space, reconnoitering as far forward as possible, and viewing the AO from theenemys perspective. Company commanders should seek assistance from the battalion staff. Ten to15 minutes of staff coordination can preclude much wasted time and effort. Company commanderscan also receive assistance during planning from their XOs, 1SGs, and fire support team chiefs.

SECTION Ill. COMMUNICATIONGeneral

Communication is the means through which C2 is exercised. The chain of command and succession ofcommand must be known throughout the organization. There must be open lines of communications up,down, and laterally. The commander should

Provide for redundancy in means of communications. When possible, have a backup means at keylocations.

Make sure subordinates know what to do during interruptions in communications. Ensure SOPs specifyimmediate actions in case of jamming. This should include code words and prearranged frequencies toswitch to.

Avoid overloading the communications systems. Use them only when absolutely necessary. Practicedisciplining communications procedures by eliminating nonessential conversations.

Minimize the use of radios to preserve them. Pay particular attention to maintaining effective lateral communications.

ResponsibilitiesResponsibilities for communications are as follows: senior to subordinate, supporting to supported, rein-

forcing to reinforced, passing to passed (for forward passage of lines), passed to passing (for rearward pas-sage of lines), left to right, and rearward to forward. All units take prompt action to restore lost communica-tions. These responsibilities also apply to the establishment of liaison between headquarters.

Means of Communications

WireWire is the primary means whenever the situation permits. Wire is normally used when the unit is station-

ary. It is used for communicating in AAs and in defensive positions.Messengers

Messengers are used between C2 facilities and between higher and lower headquarters. Although messen-gers are slower and more vulnerable than other means of communications, they can be used when othermeans cannot.

Sound and VisualSound and visual signals may be included in SOI extracts or in unit SOPs. Visual signals include lights,

flags, arm-and-hand, and pyrotechnics. Sound signals include metal-on-metal, rifle shots, whistles, and bells.Mobile Subscriber Equipment

Key brigade personnel can communicate with the brigade, higher headquarters, or adjacent units throughthe MSE. The brigade CPs also have tactical computers that connect them to higher headquarters faster.

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Telephone LinesCommercial telephone lines can be used with permission of higher headquarters.

RadioRadio should not be the primary means of communication before contact is made with the enemy. To

avoid detection by enemy direction-finding equipment, use all other means to communicate until it becomesabsolutely necessary to use the radio. Once units make contact, the primary means of communication will beFM voice. Unit radio nets are described below.Command Nets

Command nets are for C2. They are controlled by the S3. All subordinate units are normally on this net.Operations and Intelligence Net

The OI net is controlled by the S2. Intelligence reports and operations matters are sent on this net.Administrative/Logistics Net

This net is used for A/L traffic within the battalion or brigade. It is controlled by the S4.Special Radio Nets

Brigades and battalions have FS nets, air defense early warning nets, and a USAF tactical air request net.At battalion level, the scout platoon net can also function as a surveillance net.

Communications TechniquesThe eavesdrop technique may be used at all levels. It requires radio stations to monitor and use messagetraffic on a given net, even if they are not the direct recipients of the message. For example, the battalionand company commanders may neither respond to nor relay a report by a company to the battalion. Theysimply monitor and use the information as necessary. This allows commanders to stay abreast of the situ-ation without having to respond to all reports. The main CP takes the bulk of the reports. The main CP canprovide essential information to the commander on request. All C2 elements monitor transmissions.

Other techniques include the following:l Ensure communications checks have been conducted prior to starting an operation. Ensure that an

actions-on-jamming plan has been completely disseminated.l Send all necessary spot report information the first time.l Have the NCS enforce radio discipline continuously. This will reduce unnecessary transmissions.

Communications SecurityRadio Transmissions

Radio transmissions should be brief to reduce the EW signature. Using a secure means or operational andnumerical codes will also reduce the chance of enemy detection. Use low-power transmissions and terrain tomask signals from enemy direction-finding equipment. Messengers or wire should be used for lengthy mes-sages. Units must practice the use of SOIs, SOPs, and operational terms.Physical Security

Physical security protects cryptographic systems and classified documents from capture or loss. Before anarea is vacated, it should be inspected for any materials that will provide friendly information to the enemy.Wire lines are patrolled to prevent enemy tapping. When SOI codes or cryptographic equipment is lost orcaptured, the facts are reported promptly to the next higher command. The SOP must contain instructions fordestruction of equipment and classified documents to prevent their capture or use by the enemy. The battal-ion should establish priority for issue of SOIs and extracts.

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SECTION IV. COMMAND POST OPERATIONSBrigade Tactical Operations Center Operations

Brigade Command GroupThe command group, operating under the brigade commander, operates well forward at the critical loca-

tion of the battle. The primary function of the command group is to influence the battle through personalpresence. Other functions include providing planning guidance, conducting ongoing close operations, anddisseminating the commanders decisions.

Tactical Command PostThe brigade TAC CP, with the S3 in charge, is the forward-most CP in the briga

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