fm 100-5 operations - bits...fm 100-5 is the army’s keystone warfighting doctrine. it is a guide...

FM 100-5

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FM 100-5

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Field Manual Headquarters100-5 Department of the Army

Washington, DC, 14 June 1993

OPERATIONSTABLE OF CONTENTS

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PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ivINTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vCHAPTER 1 CHALLENGES FOR THE US ARMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1-1

THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1-1THE AMERICAN VIEW OF WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3THE TRAINING AND READINESS CHALLENGE . . . . . 1-5

CHAPTER 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF ARMY OPERATIONS . . . . . . . 2-0THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . 2-0JOINT, COMBINED, AND INTERAGENCYOPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2INTEGRATION OF ARMY CAPABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . 2-2DISCIPLINED OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3THE FOUNDATION OF ARMY OPERATION . . . . . . . . . 2-4COMBAT POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

CHAPTER 3 FORCE PROJECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1FORCE-PROJECTION CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3FORCE-PROJECTION OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

CHAPTER 4 JOINT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1JOINT RELATIONSHIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1THEATER STRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

CHAPTER 5 COMBINED OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1CONSIDERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1PLANNING AND CONDUCT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3

CHAPTER 6 PLANNING AND EXECUTING OPERATIONS . . . . . . .6-0THE STRATEGIC LINK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6-0PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6-3THE BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11OFFENSE AND DEFENSE AT THE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-15CONFLICT TERMINATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-23

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.*This publication supersedes FM 100-5, May 1986.

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CHAPTER 7 FUNDAMENTALS OF THE OFFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-0PURPOSES OF THE OFFENSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-0CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1FORMS OF THE TACTICAL OFFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3FORMS OF MANEUVER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7-11OPERATIONS IN DEPTH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-12

CHAPTER 8 PLANNING AND CONDUCTING THE OFFENSE . . . .8-1PLANNING THE OFFENSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1PREPARING FOR ATTACKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3CONDUCTING ATTACKS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 8-4

CHAPTER 9 FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DEFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-0THE PURPOSES OF THE DEFENSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 9-0CHARACTERISTICS OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS . . 9-1DEFENSIVE PATTERNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2OPERATIONS IN DEPTH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4

CHAPTER 10 PLANNING AND CONDUCTING THE DEFENSE . . . 10-1PLANNING THE DEFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1PREPARING THE DEFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3CONDUCTING THE DEFENSE . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-4TERMINATING THE DEFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-6

CHAPTER 11 RETROGRADE OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-1PURPOSE OF RETROGRADE OPERATIONS . . . . . . . .11-1TYPES OF RETROGRADE OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . .11-1

CHAPTER 12 LOGISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-1THE UNDERPINNINGS OF LOGISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-2LOGISTICS CHARACTERISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-3LOGISTICS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . 12-5LOGISTICS OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-7TACTICAL LOGISTICS FUNCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 12-11

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CHAPTER 13 OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-0THE ENVIRONMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-0PRINCIPLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 13-3ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 13-5

CHAPTER 14 THE ENVIRONMENT OF COMBAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1THE HUMAN DIMENSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-1THE PHYSICAL DIMENSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14-3

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Glossary-1REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References-1INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index-1

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PREFACE

The mission of the United States Army is to protect and defend the Constitution of the UnitedStates of America. The Army does this by deterring war and, when deterrence fails, by achievingquick, decisive victory on and off the battlefield anywhere in the world and under virtually anyconditions as part of a joint team. How the Army thinks about accomplishing its mission is the subjectof this manual.

The US Army is doctrine-based doctrinally capable of handling large campaigns as well as combatin a variety of scenarios. FM 100-5 is the Army’s keystone warfighting doctrine. It is a guide forArmy commanders. It describes how to think about the conduct of campaigns, major operations,battles, engagements, and operations other than war. It addresses fundamentals of a force-projectionarmy with forward-deployed forces. It applies to the Total Army, active and reserve components aswell as Army civilians. Finally, FM 100-5 furnishes the authoritative foundation for subordinatedoctrine, force design, materiel acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training.

Army operations doctrine builds on the collective knowledge and wisdom gained through recentconduct of operations combat as well as operations other than war numerous exercises, and thedeliberate process of informed reasoning throughout the Army. It is rooted in time-tested principlesand fundamentals, while accommodating new technologies and diverse threats to national security.

This keystone manual links Army roles and missions to the National Military Strategy, of whichpower projection is a fundamental principle. Thus, force projection the military’s ability to respondquickly and decisively to global requirements is fundamental to Army operations doctrine. The Armyrecognizes that it will normally operate in combination with air, naval, and space assets to achieve theoverall strategic aim of decisive land combat. It also recognizes that operations outside the UnitedStates will usually be in conjunction with allies.

The proponent of this manual is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on DAForm 2028 directly to Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, ATTN: ATDO-A,Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively tomen.

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INTRODUCTION

The Army’s doctrine lies at the heart of its professional competence. It is the authoritative guide to howArmy forces fight wars and conduct operations other than war. As the Army’s keystone doctrine, FM 100-5describes how the Army thinks about the conduct of operations. FM 100-5 undergirds all of the Army’sdoctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, and soldier concerns.

Never static, always dynamic, the Army’s doctrine is firmly rooted in the realities of current capabilities.At the same time, it reaches out with a measure of confidence to the future. Doctrine captures the lessons ofpast wars, reflects the nature of war and conflict in its own time, and anticipates the intellectual and techno-logical developments that will bring victory now and in the future.

Winning wars is the primary purpose of the doctrine in this manual. Since wars are fought for strategicpurposes, the doctrine addresses the strategic context of the application of force. Since battle is translatedinto strategic objectives by operational art, a major portion of the manual addresses the operational level ofwar. And, since all operations must be based on sound tactics, a major portion of the text covers tactics.The manual also addresses the related fields of joint and combined operations, logistics, the environment ofcombat, and operations other than war. But, its primary focus is warfighting and how commanders put allthe elements together to achieve victory at least cost to American soldiers.

Doctrine derives from a variety of sources that profoundly affect its development: strategy, history,technology, the nature of the threats the nation and its armed forces face, interservice relationships, andpolitical decisions that allocate resources and designate roles and missions. The advent of Active Defense in1976 was preceded by the emergence of a new order of weapon lethality that was dramatically revealed inthe Arab-Israeli War of 1973. The doctrine of that era also reflected a decreased role for the US Army in theevolving national strategy that followed the country’s decade-long experience in Southeast Asia. The 1976doctrine set as its priority the defense of NATO Europe against a quantitatively superior Warsaw Pact. Itaccepted force ratios as a primary determinant of battle outcomes and argued the virtues of armored warfareand the combined arms team.

By 1982, rising defense budgets and a stronger recognition of the possibility of worldwide commitmentof Army forces combined with a sharpened appreciation of operational depth and maneuver to formulate amore fluid doctrine. The notion of stronger interservice integration, introduced as “air-land battle” in 1976,solidified to AirLand Battle doctrine in the 1982 version of FM 100-5. The ability to see deep translatedinto recognition of the need to fight deep a reality fully achieved after the publication of the Army’s revisedAirLand Battle doctrine in 1986, which emphasized operational art.

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The Army’s ideas about warfighting were evolving in a number of key areas: from service independence (an unequivocalclaim in the 1954 FM 100-5) to service interdependence; from defense to offense and then to a more proper balance betweenthe two; from battlefield linearity to greater fluidity; from set-piece battle to simultaneous operations throughout the depthof the battlefield. Throughout, doctrine reflects the adaptation of technology to new weapons systems and capabilities,organizations, missions, training, leader development, and soldier support. In this way, doctrine continues to be the Army’sengine of change.

The 1993 doctrine reflects Army thinking in a new, strategic era. This doctrine recognizes that the Cold War has endedand the nature of the threat, hence the strategy of the United States as well, has changed. This doctrine reflects the shift tostronger joint operations, prompted by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This doctrine considers the high quality ofArmy leaders and soldiers. It causes AirLand Battle to evolve into a variety of choices for a battlefield framework and awider interservice arena, allows for the increasing incidence of combined operations, recognizes that Army forces operateacross the range of military operations. It is truly doctrine for the full dimensions of the battlefield in a force-projectionenvironment.

This doctrine retains the best of all the doctrine that has gone before and expands upon it as appropriate. The battlefieldframework has been revised to allow practitioners of Army operations a wider range of options in which to organize theirforces on the terrain. It also recognizes that the Army is the only national contingency force capable of achieving landdominance. This manual offers a doctrine for full-dimension operations. And, despite the removal of the Army’s tactical nuclearweapons from its inventories, this doctrine recognizes that the primary purpose of the Army is deterrence; but, shoulddeterrence fail, the Army’s purpose is to win the nation’s wars by fighting as part of a joint force of the United States. Thedoctrine provides for a force-projection army that can build and sustain substantial combat power in remote regions of theglobe.

As with all previous Army keystone doctrine, this doctrine provides direction for the Army and reflects its progressthrough the years. Baron von Steuben’s 1779 Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States(the antecedent of our modern-day FM 100-5) was not penned in a setting of well-ordered formations and well-disciplinedtroops; but it allowed for their creation and led to a highly professional Army that generations later stands foremost in theworld. It reflects the collective wisdom of our Army against the background of history. It reflects the lessons learned fromrecent experiences and the setting of today’s strategic and technological realities. It considers the nature of today’s threats.It is a doctrine for the entire Army, one that seeks nothing less than victory for the United States—now and in the future. vi CHAPTER 1 CHALLENGES FOR THE US ARMY

The United States Army exists to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. It does that by deterring warand, if deterrence fails, by providing Army forces capable of achieving decisive victory as part of a joint team on thebattlefield—anywhere in the world and under virtually any conditions._______________________________________________________________

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The Army’s ideas about warfighting were evolving in a number of key areas: from serviceindependence (an unequivocal claim in the 1954 FM 100-5) to service interdependence; fromdefense to offense and then to a more proper balance between the two; from battlefield linearity togreater fluidity; from set-piece battle to simultaneous operations throughout the depth of the battle-field. Throughout, doctrine reflects the adaptation of technology to new weapons systems andcapabilities, organizations, missions, training, leader development, and soldier support. In thisway, doctrine continues to be the Army’s engine of change. The 1993 doctrine reflects Army thinking in a new, strategic era. This doctrine recognizes thatthe Cold War has ended and the nature of the threat, hence the strategy of the United States as well,has changed. This doctrine reflects the shift to stronger joint operations, prompted by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This doctrine considers the high quality of Army leaders and soldiers. Itcauses AirLand Battle to evolve into a variety of choices for a battlefield framework and a widerinterservice arena, allows for the increasing incidence of combined operations, recognizes thatArmy forces operate across the range of military operations. It is truly doctrine for the full dimen-sions of the battlefield in a force-projection environment. This doctrine retains the best of all the doctrine that has gone before and expands upon it asappropriate. The battlefield framework has been revised to allow practitioners of Army operationsa wider range of options in which to organize their forces on the terrain. It also recognizes that theArmy is the only national contingency force capable of achieving land dominance. This manual offers a doctrine for full-dimension operations. And, despite the removal of theArmy’s tactical nuclear weapons from its inventories, this doctrine recognizes that the primarypurpose of the Army is deterrence; but, should deterrence fail, the Army’s purpose is to win thenation’s wars by fighting as part of a joint force of the United States. The doctrine provides for aforce-projection army that can build and sustain substantial combat power in remote regions of theglobe. As with all previous Army keystone doctrine, this doctrine provides direction for the Army andreflects its progress through the years. Baron von Steuben’s 1779 Regulations for the Order andDiscipline of the Troops of the United States (the antecedent of our modern-day FM 100-5) wasnot penned in a setting of well-ordered formations and well-disciplined troops; but it allowed fortheir creation and led to a highly professional Army that generations later stands foremost in theworld. It reflects the collective wisdom of our Army against the background of history. It reflectsthe lessons learned from recent experiences and the setting of today’s strategic and technologicalrealities. It considers the nature of today’s threats. It is a doctrine for the entire Army, one thatseeks nothing less than victory for the United States—now and in the future.

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Regional challenges will confront Army forceswith an adversary whose system of beliefs interpretsdifferently such fundamental ideas as right and wrong,the value of human life, and the concepts of victoryand defeat. What appears to be fanatical to Army forcesmay be completely rational to their opponent. Under-standing cultural differences is important if friendlyforces are to establish the military conditions neces-sary to achieve strategic goals. Unlike the Cold Warera when threats were measurable and, to some de-gree, predictable Army forces today are likely to en-counter conditions of greater ambiguity and uncer-tainty. Doctrine must be able to accommodate thiswider variety of threats. In so doing, the Army is pre-pared to respond to these worldwide strategic chal-lenges across the full range of possible operations aspart of a joint and combined team.

Given the global range of US national strategy,Army forces may be committed on short noticeto action anywhere in the world to confront andovercome a variety of difficult challenges.Doctrine describes how these forces thinkabout applying the basic principles of warand operations other than war and the conditions,circumstances, and influences in which they may

The United States Army exists tosupport and defend the Constitution of

the United States. It does that bydeterring war and, if deterrnece fails, by

providing Army forces capable ofachieving decisive victory as part of a

joint team on the battlefield--anywhere inthe world and under virtually any

conditions.

THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE Doctrine is the statement of how America’s Army,as part of a joint team, intends to conduct war andoperations other than war. It is the condensed expres-sion of the Army’s fundamental approach to fighting,influencing events in operations other than war, anddeterring actions detrimental to national interests. Asan authoritative statement, doctrine must be definitiveenough to guide specific operations, yet remain adapt-able enough to address diverse and varied situationsworldwide.

Doctrine touches all aspects of the Army. It facili-tates communications between Army personnel nomatter where they serve, establishes a shared profes-sional culture and approach to operations, and servesas the basis for curriculum in the Army school sys-tem. Doctrine permeates the entire organizational struc-ture of the Army and sets the direction for moderniza-tion and the standard for leadership development andsoldier training.

Conditions or events that would cause forces tobe employed will challenge Army forces. Such con-ditions include drug trafficking, natural or man-madedisasters, regional conflicts, civil wars, insurgencies,and intimidation by irrational and often ruthless ex-tremists who have available for their use all mannerof weapons and systems, including weapons of massdestruction.

CONTENTS

THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE ........................... 1-1

THE AMERICAN VIEW OF WAR .................. 1-2

THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT ........................ 1-3The Levels of War ................................. 1-3National Security Strategy and Policies1-3Mational Military Strategy .................... 1-3Strategic Goals and the Use of Force . 1-4The Strategic End State ....................... 1-4The Strategic Army ............................... 1-4Theater Strategy ................................... 1-5

THE TRAINING ANDREADINESS CHALLANGE ................... 1-5

CHAPTER 1

CHALLENGES FOR THE US ARMY

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be called upon to operate. The global realities of to-day are in a period of significant change. Army forcesmay find themselves called upon to fight under condi-tions of rapid force projection that can build to majorsustained operations in war and peace or that can ter-minate quickly only to lead to other commitments else-where. Doctrine must be relevant to these conditionsto be effective. It must be solid enough to weather thewinds of turmoil and, at the same time, sufficientlydynamic to capture the relevant aspects of change.

Doctrine should reflect new technology and itspotential for the future, as well as its effects on Armyoperations. The US has a major strength in technol-ogy. When fielded and incorporated into doctrine,technology affords a significant advantage to soldiersone that enables the employment of overwhelming anddecisive combat power while minimizing risk to theforce. Doctrine seeks to be sufficiently broad and for-ward looking so that it rapidly accommodates majortechnological opportunities to give soldiers a battle-field advantage. It sets the conditions to exploit tech-nologies that afford a significant increase in lethality,offers major improvement for protection of forces,exploits key vulnerabilities of potential adversaries,and offers a capability that presents an adversary withmultiple threats simultaneously. Advances in technol-ogy are continually changing the way warfare is con-ducted at a pace now greater than ever before.Microprocessing, miniaturization, communications,and space technologies have combined to permit al-most real-time intelligence and information sharing,distributed decision making, and rapid execution oforders from a wide variety of forces and systems forconcentrated effect. At the same time, however, war-fare remains a test of the soldier’s will, courage, en-durance, and skill. Freezing rain, muddied foxholes,blistering heat, physical exertion, and imminent dan-ger will remain the domain of the soldier.

Resources and force dispositions—themselves re-flective of national strategy—contribute to the devel-opment of doctrine. Decreases in forward-deployedArmy forces necessitate an Army that is prepared todeploy forces anywhere in the world on short noticefrom the continental United States (CONUS) and fromforward-deployed locations. The Army is likely atany time to be involved in contingency operations athome and abroad. Force projection replaces forwarddefense as a more likely employment of Army ele-ments. Doctrine has to accommodate that reality.

Army forces will have to deploy rapidly to operationalareas. Doctrine cannot assume that Army forces arein place when the conflict begins. Doctrine must pro-vide an understanding of and prepare Army forces forthe difficulty of getting to the region of conflict withthe appropriate force to accomplish the mission.

Doctrine seeks to meet the challenges facing theArmy by providing the guidance to deal with the rangeof threats to which its elements may be exposed. Itreflects the strategic context in which Army forces willoperate, sets a marker for the incorporation of devel-oping technologies, and optimizes the use of all avail-able resources. It also incorporates the lessons of war-fare and the wisdom of the Army’s collective leader-ship in establishing a guide to action in war and op-erations other than war.

THE AMERICAN VIEW OF WAR The Army reflects the highest ideals of the nationit represents—a nation built on a unique set of valuesand aspirations expressed in the Declaration of Inde-pendence and the Constitution. These enduring val-ues influence virtually every facet of American soci-ety, its laws, domestic programs, and foreign rela-tions. A special relationship exists within any nationamong the government, the people, and the military;national values address this relationship.

The Constitution of the United States establishesthe fundamental parameters of the national defensestructure, while national attitudes affect the nature andemployment of US armed forces. Members of theArmy swear to support and defend the Constitutionagainst all enemies, foreign and domestic. The Armyserves as a repository of its national values and em-beds them into its professional ethos. Proper subordi-nation to political authority, loyalty, duty, selfless ser-vice, courage, integrity, respect for human dignity, anda sense of justice are all part of the Army’s identity.These values directly influence the Army’s behaviorin peace and war.

The criteria for deciding to employ military forcesexemplify the dynamic link among the people, the gov-ernment, and the military. The people of the UnitedStates do not take the commitment of their armed forceslightly. They charge the government to commit forcesonly after due consideration of the range ofoptions and likely outcomes. Moreover, the people

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expect the military to accomplish its missions in com-pliance with national values. The American peopleexpect decisive victory and abhor unnecessary casu-alties. They prefer quick resolution of conflicts andreserve the right to reconsider their support should anyof these conditions not be met. They demand timelyand accurate information on the conduct of militaryoperations.

The responsibility for the conduct and use of mili-tary forces is derived from the people and the govern-ment. The Army commits forces only after appropri-ate direction from the National Command Authorities(NCA). In the end, the people will pass judgment onthe appropriateness of the conduct and use of militaryoperations. Their values and expectations must be met.

In an age of instant communication, capabilitiesavailable to the media have had increasingly impor-tant impacts on military operations. They serve as aconduit of information not only to the American pub-lic but also to the rest of the world. Dramatic visualpresentations can rapidly influence public—and there-fore political—opinion so that the political underpin-nings of and operations other than war may suddenlychange with no prior to the commander in the field.The higher the echelon of command, the more likelythe impact of media coverage. Strategic direction and,therefore, the range of operations and their duration,may be dramatically affected.

THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT The detailed formulation of national strategic di-rection is beyond the scope of this manual. Neverthe-less, national military strategy, derived from nationalsecurity policy, provides the basis for all operations.

THE LEVELS OF WARFundamental to the Army’s doctrine is an appre-

ciation of the levels of war tactical, operational, andstrategic—that define the entire range of military op-erations and the links between tactical actions and stra-tegic objectives. The levels of war are defined moreby the consequences of their outcome than they are bythe echelon of involvement, although, as a general rule,the higher the echelon, the higher the level of war.

The levels of war apply not only to war but also tooperations other than war. The strategic perspectives

are worldwide and long-range. Strategy is concernedwith national or, in specific cases, alliance or coali-tion objectives. The operational level provides the vitallink between strategic objectives and tactical employ-ment of forces. At the operational level, military forcesattain strategic objectives through the design, organi-zation, and conduct of campaigns and major opera-tions. Tactical battles and engagements are fought toachieve operational results.

The tactical level of war is concerned with the ex-ecution of battles and engagements. On the battle-field, the primary focus of the tactical commander iswinning battles and engagements in which he executesmaneuvers and fires to achieve a specific objective.Tactical-level commanders are moved in and out ofbattles and engagements by higher commanders. Suc-cesses and failures at the tactical level, as viewed bythe operational-level commander, set the conditionsfor operational maneuver. The interrelationships of thedifferent levels of war are discussed in greater detailin Chapter 6.

NATIONAL SECURITYSTRATEGY AND POLICIES The United States approaches its global commit-ments with a national security strategy founded on de-terrence and the capability to project power to safe-guard its national security interests and objectives.Successful military operations may not, by themselves,achieve the desired strategic goals, but their failurewill ensure eventual defeat. Operations across the fullrange of military activities must complement the otherelements of national power directed to accomplishpolitical aims. National security policies establish thestrategic goals and objectives for specific situations.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGYThe foundations of the national military strategy de-rive from the national security strategy. The US mili-tary fulfills four fundamental demands of the nationalsecurity strategy:

- Ensuring strategic deterrence and defense.- Exercising forward presence in vital areas.- Responding effectively to crises.- Retaining the national capacity to reconstitute forces.

The Army has a role in each of these requirements.

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signed to support a strategic end state that ensures alasting victory. Military forces must be prepared tosupport strategic objectives after the termination ofhostilities. In both war and operations other than war,military and specifically Army—units must integratetheir efforts to support the overall policy scheme.

THE STRATEGIC ARMYIn peace or in war, the Army is the nation’s his-

torically proven decisive military force. A key mem-ber of the joint team, the Army serves alongside theAir Force, Navy, and Marine Corps to protect thenation’s vital security interests. The Army’s primarymission is to organize, train, and equip forces to con-duct prompt and sustained land combat operations. Itis the Army’s ability to react promptly and to conductsustained land operations that make it decisive. TheArmy is competent in many areas, such as nation as-sistance, counterdrug operations, security assistance,deterrence, and stability operations, that can combinewith other elements of national power to achieve stra-tegic effects favorable to US interests around the world.The Army’s capabilities provide the nation a diverse,deployable, and sustainable set of options that includestrategic and operational logistics and communicationscapabilities. Most of all, the Army represents thenation’s only military force capable of prolonged landcombat. Simply stated, the Army has strategic stay-ing power.

The Army must be capable of full-dimensionaloperations. This means employing all means avail-able to accomplish any given mission decisively andat the least cost—across the full range of possible op-erations in war and in operations other than war.

The Army must train to fight as part of a joint, com-bined, United Nations, or interagency force. Com-batant commanders seek the power inherent in jointoperations by synchronizing the complementarywarfighting capabilities of all the services and sup-porting commands into a unified effort. Participationin joint training exercises and joint doctrine develop-ment is a prerequisite to joint capability. The Armydevelops and trains leaders to operate as part of jointand multinational staffs. Forward-presence forces sup-port collective security arrangements and operate aspart of multinational formations. Additionally, theArmy enhances relationships with regional partnersthrough

The national military strategy provides the follow-ing strategic principles to guide the employment ofmilitary forces:

- Readiness.- Collective security.- Arms control.- Maritime and aerospace superiority.- Strategic agility.- Power projection.- Technological superiority.- Decisive force.

These principles reflect America’s strengths and ex-ploit the weaknesses of its opponents.

STRATEGIC GOALS AND THE USE OFFORCE

The military component of the national securitystrategy focuses on the use of military force in dem-onstration or operation as an element of national power.Its combination with other elements of national powerseeks to preserve, to protect, and to advance the vitalinterests of the United States. Military operations inwar or operations other than war influence, and areinfluenced by, other elements of policy. The objec-tive of the military in war is victory over the opposingmilitary force at the least cost to American soldiers.How that victory contributes to the overall policy ob-jectives is determined before the war is joined. Warmakes the most manifest use of military force. How-ever, successful military operations in any form re-quire that military commanders have a clear sense ofstrategic policy goals and objectives, how the use ofmilitary force fits into the overall national securitystrategy, and the desired military end state.

THE STRATEGIC END STATEMilitary force is only one component of national

security strategy. When applied either to deter aggres-sion or prosecute military operations, military forceseeks to end conflict on terms favorable to US inter-ests. The objective of military forces in war is victoryover the opposing military forces at the least cost toUS forces. Integrating that victory with other (eco-nomic, political, diplomatic) policy components is animportant consideration for policymakers before thewar is joined.

While military commanders focus on military vic-tory, they must be aware of the broader concerns ofstrategy. Tactical and operational execution are de-

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combined exercises, continual contacts, and nationassistance.

Army forces must be deployable. Commanders tai-lor force packages to accommodate land combat re-quirements of theater commanders in a variety of stra-tegic contingency plans. Deployability is a product ofstrategic lift coupled with Army force readiness. Toease the burden on strategic lift, the Army pre-posi-tions equipment on land and sea, improves military-related infrastructures in less stable regions, designsforces and equipment that are easily transportable, andtrains forces to deploy quickly.

The Army must be expansible. The Army gener-ates forces to respond rapidly to crises with a mix oftrained and ready, active and reserve component forcesrepresenting the Total Army. How rapidly those forcescan be generated depends on a number of variables,since time and training resources needed to hone afighting edge and prepare combat teams for war areseverely limited. Timely mobilization of reserve forcesprovides the means for sustaining conflict. Deployedforces require reserve component participation forcombat arms, combat support (CS) and combat ser-vice support (CSS) across Army activities ranging fromnation assistance to global war.

The Army must be capable of achieving decisivevictory. The Army must maintain the capability to put

overwhelming combat power on the battlefield to de-feat all enemies through a total force effort. It pro-duces forces of the highest quality, able to deploy rap-idly, to fight, to sustain themselves, and to win quicklywith minimum casualties. That is decisive victory.

THEATER STRATEGYTheater commanders translate national, alliance,

or coalition direction into theater strategies based onplanning requirements for war or operations other thanwar. Theater strategies are reinforced as required bysupporting combatant commanders. Theater strate-gies provide the basis for all operations plans(OPLANs) and are designed to achieve strategic endstates.

THE TRAINING ANDREADINESS CHALLENGE

On the day of battle, soldiers and units will fight aswell or as poorly as they are trained. Training to highstandards is essential in both peace and war; never canArmy forces afford not to train and maintain the high-est levels of readiness. Every commander, every sol-dier, every unit in a force-projection army must betrained and ready to deploy. Leaders have the respon-sibility to train subordinates. This may be their mostsolemn responsibility.

The Army faces a unique set of challenges as it adapts to a worldthat has changed more broadly and fundamentally than at any othertime since the end of World War II. The Army must continue to adaptto ensure success in a rapidly changing strategic environment. Now,more than ever before, it serves as a strategic Army, a land force thatthe United States and its allies rely on to meet global challenges.

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Often the Army will operate inall three environments at once. When-ever operations in these environmentsoccur simultaneously, the Army inte-grates and coordinates their effectsso they mutually support the attain-ment of strategic objectives.

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WARNations use all the resources at their disposal to

pursue national objectives. The US promotes the self-development of nations through the measured use ofnational resources and assistance. The prime focus ofthe Army is warfighting, yet the Army’s frequent rolein operations other than war is critical. Use of Armyforces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensionsbetween nations below the threshold of conflict. Typi-

The US Army’s warfighting doctrine reflects thenature of modern warfare. It applies the principles ofwar and combat power dynamics to contemporary andanticipated future battlefields within the strategicpolicy direction of our government. It is inherently ajoint doctrine that recognizes the teamwork requiredof all the services and the extension of the battlefieldin time, space, and purpose through all available re-sources and campaign design. US Army doctrine iscompatible with joint doctrine. It recognizes that a jointforce commander (JFC) has a variety of ground, sea,air, special operations, and space options available toaccomplish strategic objectives. Nonethe-less, actionsby ground-force units, in coordination with membersof the joint team, will be the decisive means to thestrategic ends.

While the conditions of warfare change with timeand circumstance, the qualities of skill, tenacity, bold-ness, and courage have always marked successfularmies and commanders and will continue to do so.Army doctrine exploits those qualities, together withtechnology, self-reliance, and the spirit of the offensethat characterizes the American soldier. While reflect-ing the increased complexity and lethality of the mod-ern battlefield, Army doctrine recognizes that advancedweapons and technologies are no better than the skillwith which leaders and soldiers employ them againstthe enemy.

THE RANGE OFMILITARY OPERATIONS

The US seeks to achieve its strategic objectives inthree diverse environments, using all elements of na-tional power. The Army classifies its activities duringpeacetime and conflict as operations other than war.During peacetime, the US attempts to influence worldevents through those actions that routinely occur be-tween nations. Conflict is characterized by hostilitiesto secure strategic objectives. The last environmentthat of war involves the use of force in combat opera-tions against an armed enemy.

CHAPTER 2

FUNDAMENTALS OF ARMY OPERATIONS

CONTENTS

THE RANGE OFMILITARY OPERATIONS....................... 2-0Operations Other Than War ................ .2-0War ......................................................... 2-1

JOINT, COMBINED, AND INTERAGENCYOPERATIONS ........................................ 2-2

INTEGRATION OF ARMYCAPABILITIES ....................................... 2-2The Total Force ..................................... 2-2Types of Forces .................................... 2-2Balance .................................................. 2-2Combined Arms .................................... 2-3Technology ............................................ 2-3

DISCIPLINED OPERATIONS........................ 2-3

THE FOUNDATIONS OFARMY OPERATIONS............................. 2-4The Principles of War ........................... 2-4The Tenets of Army Operations .......... 2-6

COMBAT POWER ......................................... 2-9The Dynamics of Combat Power ....... 2-10Combat Functions .............................. 2-12Joint Capabilities ................................ 2-15Tactical Units ....................................... 2-21

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assistance, counterdrug operations, arms control, treatyverification, support to domestic civil authorities, andpeacekeeping.

Americans prefer peace. Hostile forces, however,may seek to provoke a crisis or otherwise defeat ourpurpose by creating a conflict. At the point wherediplomatic influence alone fails to resolve the conflict,persuasion may be required. However, at the pointthe military may be used to resolve the conflict, theUS could enter a more intense environment in whichit uses the military to pursue its aims.

US forces are used to deter enemy action. Theirphysical presence, coupled with their potential use, canserve as a deterrent and facilitate the achievement ofstrategic objectives. Should this deterrence fail, theUS can use force to compel compliance. Regardlessof the specific type of operation, a return to the envi-ronment of peacetime is part of the desired strategicgoal.

WARCongress and the NCA may decide to protect our

national interests with force or the threat of force. Warmay be of a limited or general nature. Limited war isarmed conflict short of general war as was conductedduring Operation Just Cause in December 1989. Gen-eral war, such as World Wars I and II, involves armedconflict among major powers in which the total re-sources of the belligerents are employed and survivalis at stake. In either instance, the Army, as part of ajoint team, applies decisive force to fight and win withminimum casualties.

In concert with the other services, and at timeswith our allies, fighting and winning our nation’s warsis the traditional role of the Army the one on which itprincipally focuses and trains. Even in war, the de-sired strategic goal remains directed at concludinghostilities on terms favorable to the US and its alliesand returning to peacetime as quickly as possible.

Figure 2-1. Range of Military Operations in the Theater Strategic Environment

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2-1 JOINT, COMBINED, ANDINTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

The Army will not operate alone. The Army con-tributes a full range of unique capabilities for combat,CS, and CSS functions for sustained land combat op-erations as part of a joint, combined, or interagencyteam. This poses a dilemma for the enemy. As heattempts to avoid the efforts of one service, he openshimself to attack by another. Also, the nature of con-flict in regional crises may involve coalitions that couldbe different from familiar, longstanding alliance struc-tures. Cooperation with allies is the norm. This im-plies a need for interoperability, accommodation ofallied objectives and capabilities, and some policy limi-tations.

In an environment of joint and combined operations,the Army will also operate with other agencies of theUS Government. This is true not only when the mili-tary is the prime strategic option -- as it is in war -- butwhen other agencies are the preferred option and themilitary provides forces. Army forces must be pre-pared to conduct a number of operations that integratewarfighting and operations other than war with a vari-ety of government and nongovernment agencies, otherservices, forces from other nations, and internationalagencies. Robust liaison will facilitate understanding,coordination, and mission accomplishment. Chapters4 and 5 discuss joint and combined operations in de-tail.

INTEGRATION OFARMY CAPABILITIES

The capabilities of the US Army are best realizedthrough the integration of its many components work-ing in concert with joint and combined forces.

THE TOTAL FORCETo meet future missions with a smaller force, the

US Army conducts operations as a total force of theactive component, reserve components, and civiliansacting in concert with other services and allies. Thetotal force policy engenders public support in any op-eration requiring force projection from operations otherthan war, through war, to postconflict activities.

TYPES OF FORCESThe Army recognizes three general types of com-

bat forces armored forces, light forces, and special op-erations forces (SOF). With their appropriate CS andCSS units, these forces provide a balanced and versa-tile force mix, increasing the options available to the

field commander. Each type of force is unique andpossesses varying degrees of deployability,sustainability, lethality, and survivability. A mix ofthese forces can provide the overwhelming combatpower necessary to meet the unique strategic, opera-tional, and tactical requirements of any contingency.For example, airborne and air assault forces may beinserted to force a lodgment, which will support thelater deployment of armored and sustainment elements.To protect the lodgment in depth, SOF provide sur-veillance and target acquisition until armored forcesare available. Each type of Army force complementsthe others as it contributes to the joint force.

BALANCEThe components of battle can be joined in a limitlessarray of complex combinations. Often, elements of adefense are within every offense; within every defense,an offense. Army forces maneuver to bring firepoweron the enemy, and bring firepower on the enemy inorder to maneuver. Army forces tend to focus on theenemy, but will use terrain for positional advantageswhen warranted. The commander, determined to de-feat enemy forces on one day, may find himself re-sponsible for feeding them the next. Unconventionaland conventional warfare can exist side by side, theone flowing to the other and back again. Balance anda rich choice of options are key to success.

Army forces seek to increase their options whilelimiting those of their opponents. Successful com-manders do not run out of options; they limit theenemy’s options instead. Risks and gambles are partof option decisions. Field Marshal Erwin Rommeldefined a risk as a chance you take; if it fails, you canrecover. A gamble is a chance taken; if it fails, recov-ery is impossible. Only with the capability to parryand strike in any direction with sudden and overwhelm-ing combat power can Army forces attain the ideal ofquick, decisive victory.

While maintaining his balance, the commanderdoes everything in his power to throw the enemy offbalance, to strike the enemy with powerful blows fromunexpected directions or dimensions, and to press thefight to the end. Deception, special operations, ma-nipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum, firepower,and maneuver all converge to confuse, demoralize, anddestroy the opponent. Denial of the enemy’s recon-naissance, intelligence surveillance, and target acqui-sition activities is essential to protect friendly forces.High-tempo operations set the conditions for battle and

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allow the commander to strike the enemy while pre-pared to adjust as conditions change. The commanderstrives never to be without options.

COMBINED ARMSArmy forces prefer to fight as a combined arms

team. Combined arms warfare is the simultaneous ap-plication of combat, CS, and CSS toward a commongoal. These arms and services are integrated horizon-tally at each command echelon, normally battalionthrough corps, and vertically between these commandechelons. Combined arms warfare produces effectsthat are greater than the sum of the individual parts.The combined arms team strives to conduct fully inte-grated operations in the dimensions of time, space,purpose, and resources. Combined arms forces oper-ate over increasingly large areas of the battlefield withless force density than in the past. Modern combined arms warfare puts added stresson maintaining dispersed and noncontiguous forma-tions. Army forces overwhelm the enemy’s ability toreact by synchronizing indirect and direct fires fromground and air-based platforms; assaulting with armor,mechanized, air assault, and dismounted units; jam-ming the enemy’s communications; concealingfriendly operations with obscurants; and attacking fromseveral directions at once. The goal is to confuse, de-moralize, and destroy the enemy with the coordinatedimpact of combat power. The enemy cannot compre-hend what is happening; the enemy commander can-not communicate his intent nor can he coordinate hisactions. The sudden and devastating impact of com-bined arms paralyzes the enemy’s response, leavinghim ripe for defeat.

The application of combined arms in this manner iscomplex and demanding. It requires detailed plan-ning and violent execution by highly trained soldiersand units who have been thoroughly rehearsed.

TECHNOLOGYThe strength of the US is manifested in part by the

breadth and diversity of its technology base. Advancesin electronics, communications, automation, reconnais-sance and surveillance, contamination avoidance, andprecision-guided smart weapons and the exploitationof space-based capabilities have increased the lethal-ity, range, accuracy, and reliability of our weaponry.The Army can best use technology in future conflictsonly if it is integrated with doctrine. Understandingthe relationship between doctrine and technology be-

gins with the premise that doctrine must be the enginethat drives the exploitation of technology.

The Army recognizes how warfare changes withthe emergence of newer, advanced, and more sophis-ticated technologies. This affects its soldiers and thedoctrine that governs how it fights. The Army alsomaximizes its combat power through the horizontalintegration of new weapons or components, especiallywhen they can be applied across a family of systems.

DISCIPLINED OPERATIONSWar is tough, uncompromising, and unforgiving.

For soldiers, the rigors of battle demand mental andphysical toughness and close-knit teamwork. Betweenthe anxiety of battle, soldiers spend long hours doingroutine but necessary tasks in the cold, wet weatherand mud, moving from position to position, often with-out hot meals, clean clothes, or sleep. In war, the po-tential for breakdown in discipline is always present.The Army operates with applicable rules of engage-ment (ROE), conducting warfare in compliance withinternational laws and within the conditions specifiedby the higher commander. Army forces apply the com-bat power necessary to ensure victory through appro-priate and disciplined use of force.

Discipline begins with trained leaders whose per-sonal example, standard of conduct, concern for sol-diers, and loyalty to subordinates create well-disci-plined units and proper conduct of operations on thebattlefield. The Army develops disciplined noncom-missioned and officer leaders who teach their soldiersto do the right thing even during the absence of theirleaders.

Exercising discipline in operations includes limit-ing collateral damage -- the inadvertent or secondarydamage occurring as a result of actions by friendly orenemy forces. FM 27-10 provides guidance on spe-cial categories of objects that international law andthe Geneva and Hague Conventions protect. It alsogoverns appropriate soldier conduct in war. FM 41-10provides guidance on control and treatment of dis-placed civilians.

A nation state that disregards the human rights ofindividuals makes warfare unnecessarily harsh, in-creases the resolve of its enemy, and changes the na-ture of the conflict. How the Army fights is a mark ofwhat it is and what it stands for. Laws of war are only

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effective in reducing casualties and enhancing fairtreatment of combatants and noncombatants alike solong as trained leaders ensure those laws are obeyed.The commander ensures the proper treatment of pris-oners, noncombatants, and civilians by building goodtraining programs that reinforce the practice of respect-ing those laws and ROE.

Commanders build good training programs thatforce the practice of law-of-land warfare and ROE.ROE specify the circumstances and limitations inwhich forces may engage the enemy. Many factorsinfluence ROE, including national command policy,mission, operational environment, commander’s intent,and law-of-land warfare. ROE always recognize thesoldier’s right of self-defense. Properly written ROEare clear and tailored to the situation. ROE may changeover the duration of a campaign. A force-projectionarmy tends to face a wide array of ROE. For example,ROE during Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield,Desert Storm, and Provide Comfort were widely di-verse; within each operation, the ROE were differentand changed over time.

The commander’s understanding of his missionand his higher com-mander’s intent will help protectthe force and decrease the chance of unnecessary ca-sualties. Every soldier is responsible for preventingviolations of the law-of-land warfare. Success resultsfrom leadership, discipline, esprit, and professionaltraining.

THE FOUNDATIONSOF ARMY OPERATIONS

Fundamental to operating successfully across thefull range of military operations is an understandingof the Army’s doctrinal foundations—the principlesof war and the tenets of Army operations.

THE PRINCIPLES OF WARThe nine principles of war provide general guid-

ance for the conduct of war at the strategic, opera-tional, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bed-rock of Army doctrine. The US Army published itsfirst discussion of the principles of war in a 1921 Armytraining regulation. The original principles adopted bythe Army, although slightly revised, have withstoodthe test of time. Today’s force-projection Army rec-ognizes the following nine principles of war.

ObjectiveDirect every military operation toward a clearly

defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

The ultimate military purpose of war is the de-struction of the enemy’s armed forces and will to fight.The ultimate objectives of operations other than warmight be more difficult to define; nonetheless, theytoo must be clear from the beginning. The linkage,therefore, between objectives at all levels of war iscrucial; each operation must contribute to the ultimatestrategic aim.

The attainment of intermediate objectives must di-rectly, quickly, and economically contribute to the op-eration. Using the analytical framework of mission,enemy, troops, terrain, and time available (METT-T),commanders designate physical objectives such as anenemy force, decisive or dominating terrain, a junc-ture of lines of communication (LOCs), or other vitalareas essential to accomplishing the mission. Thesebecome the basis for all subordinate plans. Actionsthat do not contribute to achieving the objective mustbe avoided.

OffensiveSeize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

Offensive action is the most effective and deci-sive way to attain a clearly defined common objec-tive. Offensive operations are the means by which amilitary force seizes and holds the initiative whilemaintaining freedom of action and achieving decisiveresults. This is fundamentally true across all levels ofwar.

Commanders adopt the defensive only as a tem-porary expedient and must seek every opportunity toseize the initiative. An offensive spirit must thereforebe inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.The side that retains the initiative through offensiveaction forces the enemy to react rather than act.

MassMass the effects of overwhelming combat power

at the decisive place and time.

Synchronizing all the elements of combat powerwhere they will have decisive effect on an enemy forcein a short period of time is to achieve mass. To massis to hit the enemy with a closed fist, not poke at himwith fingers of an open hand. Mass must also be sus-tained so the effects have staying power. Thus, massseeks to smash the enemy, not sting him. This resultsfrom the proper combination of combat power withthe proper application of other principles of war.

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Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, canenable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisiveresults, while limiting exposure to enemy fire.

Economy of ForceEmploy all combat power available in the most

effective way possible; allocate minimum essentialcombat power to secondary efforts.

Economy of force is the judicious employment anddistribution of forces. No part of the force should everbe left without purpose. When the time comes foraction, all parts must act. The allocation of availablecombat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense,delays, deception, or even retrograde operations ismeasured in order to achieve mass elsewhere at thedecisive point and time on the battlefield.

ManeuverPlace the enemy in a position of disadvantage

through the flexible application of combat power.

Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation tothe enemy to gain positional advantage. Effective ma-neuver keeps the enemy off balance and protects theforce. It is used to exploit successes, to preserve free-dom of action, and to reduce vulnerability. It continu-ally poses new problems for the enemy by renderinghis actions ineffective, eventually leading to defeat.

At all levels of war, successful application of ma-neuver requires agility of thought, plans, operations,and organizations. It requires designating and thenshifting points of main effort and the considered ap-plication of the principles of mass and economy offorce. At the operational level, maneuver is the meansby which the commander determines where and whento fight by setting the terms of battle, declining battle,or acting to take advantage of tactical actions. Ma-neuver is dynamic warfare that rejects predictablepatterns of operations.

Unity of CommandFor every objective, seek unity of command and

unity of effort.

At all levels of war, employment of military forcesin a manner that masses combat power toward a com-mon objective requires unity of command and unityof effort. Unity of command means that all the forcesare under one responsible commander. It requires asingle commander with the requisite authority to di-rect all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose.

Unity of effort, on the other hand, requires coor-dination and cooperation among all forces even thoughthey may not necessarily be part of the same com-mand structure toward a commonly recognized objec-tive. Collateral and main force operations might go onsimultaneously, united by intent and purpose, if notcommand. The means to achieve unity of purpose is anested concept whereby each succeeding echelon’sconcept is nested in the other. In combined and inter-agency operations, unity of command may not be pos-sible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomesparamount. Unity of effort coordination through co-operation and common interests is an essential comple-ment to unity of command.

SecurityNever permit the enemy to acquire unexpected ad-

vantage.

Security enhances freedom of action by reducingvulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Se-curity results from the measures taken by a commanderto protect his forces. Knowledge and understandingof enemy strategy, tactics, doctrine, and staff planningimprove the detailed planning of adequate securitymeasures. Risk is inherent in war; however, command-ers must not be overly cautious. To be successful,commanders must take necessary, calculated risks topreserve the force and defeat the enemy. Protectingthe force increases friendly combat power.

SurpriseStrike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner

for which he is unprepared.

Surprise can decisively shift the balance of com-bat power. By seeking surprise, forces can achievesuccess well out of proportion to the effort expended.Rapid advances in surveillance technology and masscommunication make it increasingly difficult to maskor cloak large-scale marshaling or movement of per-sonnel and equipment. The enemy need not be takencompletely by surprise but only become aware too lateto react effectively. Factors contributing to surpriseinclude speed, effective intelligence, deception, ap-plication of unexpected combat power, operations se-curity (OPSEC), and variations in tactics and methodsof operation. Surprise can be in tempo, size of force,direction or location of main effort, and timing. De-ception can aid the probability of achieving surprise.

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SimplicityPrepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise

orders to ensure thorough understanding.

Everything in war is very simple, but the simplething is difficult. To the uninitiated, military opera-tions are not difficult. Simplicity contributes to suc-cessful operations. Simple plans and clear, conciseorders minimize misunderstanding and confusion.Other factors being equal, the simplest plan is prefer-able. Simplicity is especially valuable when soldiersand leaders are tired. Simplicity in plans allows betterunderstanding and troop leading at all echelons andpermits branches and sequels to be more easily under-stood and executed.

THE TENETS OF ARMY OPERATIONSWhenever Army forces are called upon to fight,

they fight to win. Army forces in combat seek to im-pose their will on the enemy; in operations other thanwar, they seek to alter conditions to achieve their pur-pose. Victory is the objective, no matter the mission.Nothing short of victory is acceptable. The Army’sdoctrine describes its approach to generating and ap-plying forces and force at the strategic, operational,and tactical levels.

The Army’s success on and off the battlefield de-pends on its ability to operate in accordance with fivebasic tenets: initiative, agility, depth, synchronization,and versatility. A tenet is a basic truth held by an or-ganization. The fundamental tenets of Army opera-tions doctrine describe the characteristics of success-ful operations. All training and leadership doctrineand all combat, combat support, and combat servicesupport doctrine derive directly from, and must sup-port, the fundamental tenets. The US Army believesthat its five basic tenets are essential to victory. In andof themselves they do not guarantee victory, but theirabsence makes it difficult and costly to achieve.

InitiativeInitiative sets or changes the terms of battle by

action and implies an offensive spirit in the conduct ofall operations. Applied to the force as a whole, initia-tive requires a constant effort to force the enemy toconform to commanders’ operational purposes andtempos, while retaining freedom of action. It meansdepleting the enemy’s options, while still having op-tions of their own. This requires leaders to anticipateevents on the battlefield so that they and their units

can act and react faster than the enemy. Applied toindividual soldiers and leaders, initiative requires awillingness and ability to act independently within theframework of the higher commander’s intent.

In the attack, initiative implies never allowing theenemy to recover from the initial shock of the attack.Attacking commanders gain and maintain the initia-tive by surprise in their selection of the time and placeof attack and the violence with which they execute it.They concentrate forces and execute with speed, au-dacity, and violence, continually seeking soft spots andshifting their main effort when required. They areprompt in transitioning from the attack to exploitationand back, if necessary. Commanders press the fighttenaciously and aggressively, accepting risks and push-ing soldiers and systems to the limits of their endur-ance for as long as necessary. The goal is to create afluid situation where the enemy loses the coherenceof the defense. Retaining the initiative over time re-quires thinking ahead, planning beyond the initial op-eration, and anticipating key events on the battlefieldhours, days, and weeks in advance.

In the defense, initiative implies quickly turningthe tables on the attacker. Defending commanders actrapidly to negate the attacker’s initial advantages. Theygather intelligence to gain advance warning and an-ticipate likely enemy courses of action. They set thetempo and restrict, as much as possible, enemy op-tions. Once the attacker commits to a particular courseof action, defenders frustrate it and then preempt anyadjustments by the attacker, thereupon seizing the ini-tiative.

In battle, initiative requires the decentralization ofdecision authority to the lowest practical level. At thesame time, decentralization risks some loss of synchro-nization. Commanders constantly balance these com-peting risks, recognizing that loss of immediate con-trol is preferable to inaction. Decentralization demandswell-trained subordinates and superiors who are will-ing to take risks.

In operations other than war, initiative implies con-trolling the environment rather than letting the envi-ronment control events. In responding to a naturaldisaster, commanders direct their forces to the criticalpoints or facilities where prompt action is needed tostabilize the environment. The objective is to allowlocal governments to assume control at an appropriatetime while the community regains control of basicservices. Commanders direct their military activitiesin

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combination with other elements of national and coa-lition power to restore stability.

AgilityAgility is the ability of friendly forces to react

faster than the enemy and is a prerequisite for seizingand holding the initiative. It is as much a mental as aphysical quality. Greater quickness permits the rapidconcentration of friendly strength against enemy vul-nerabilities. Forces may need to concentrate repeat-edly so that by the time the enemy reacts to one ac-tion, another has taken its place, disrupting the enemy’splans and leading to late, uncoordinated, and piece-meal responses. This process of successive concen-tration against locally weaker or unprepared enemyforces enables smaller forces to disorient, fragment,and eventually defeat much larger opposing forma-tions. To achieve such a defeat, leaders and units mustbe agile.

Friction is the accumulation of chance errors, un-expected difficulties, and confusion of battle that im-pede both sides. It can never be completely elimi-nated, but left unchecked, it can have a devastatingeffect on unit agility. To reduce friction, leaders mustcontinually read the battlefield, know when to decide,and act without hesitation.

In operations other than war, as commanders per-ceive changes to their environment, they devise imagi-native methods of applying their resources to thosechanges and act quickly to gain or maintain control ofthe environ-ment. For example, Army forces in di-saster relief operations can use tactical vehicles andcommunication systems to reach isolated locations, todirect efforts, and to restore services to supplementthe efforts of local governments whose normal re-sources are overwhelmed.

In peacekeeping operations, Army forces mightdefuse conditions that would otherwise lead to a re-sumption of fighting by recognizing the inherent dan-gers and by resolving grievances before they igniteinto open combat. A situational awareness that per-ceives and anticipates changes in the environment,combined with the ability to act quickly within theintent of higher commanders, leads to an agility inoperations other than war that is vital to successfuloutcomes.

DepthDepth is the extension of operations in time, space,

resources, and purpose. These factors vary by ech-elon and by constraints given to commanders. What

is most important, however, is the fact that in any op-eration the Army must have the ability to gain infor-mation and influence operations throughout the depthof the battlefield. This ability highlights the joint na-ture of deep operations, which means participation bythe other services.

To think in depth is to forecast and to anticipate sothat the enemy can be attacked simultaneously through-out the depth of the battlefield. Commanders considerthe effects of distance on operations. They determinehow far operations must extend and how long theirLOCs and those of the enemy will be. They considerthe effect of depth on force densities throughout thelength and breadth of their area of operations (AO).They calculate the effective range of supporting func-tions such as intelligence, fire support, logistics, airdefense, and aviation.

Depth allows commanders to sustain momentumand take advantage of all available resources to pressthe fight, attacking enemy forces and capabilities si-multaneously throughout the battlefield. Momentumin the attack and elasticity in defense derive from depth.Successful commanders are always concerned with theoutcome of current operations and the anticipation offuture operations; they think in depth, understandingthat war is the province of uncertainty and chance.They look beyond the requirements of the moment andforecast the actions needed in the future.

In pursuit of operational objectives, commandersemploy joint assets with Army forces to extend theirability to attack the enemy throughout the battlefield.Key are multiple modes of attacks on different targetsin some reasonable sequence to achieve a commonobjective. By extending the depth of the fight, com-manders force the enemy to fight on their terms. Withjoint resources, commanders observe enemy move-ments and activities and protect their forces through-out the theater. In conjunction with air and naval op-erations, they employ maneuver, fires, space assets,and SOF to attack the enemy.

In offensive and defensive tactical actions, com-manders fight the enemy throughout the depth of hisdisposition with fires and with attacks on his flanksand rear. They attack committed and uncommittedforces and synchronize the attack of enemy artilleryin depth with close operations. Such in-depth opera-tions degrade the enemy’s freedom of action, reducehis flexibility and endurance, and upset his plans and

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coordination. Most importantly, these operations pre-vent the enemy from impacting on friendly actions.Commanders retain reserves and adjust their main ef-forts to exploit tactical opportunities and carry the fightinto the depths of the enemy’s formations or defenses.At the same time, commanders guard their own free-dom of action by protecting their forces and the meansneeded to sustain combat operations.

In operations other than war, depth extends ac-tivities in time, space, resources, and purpose to affectthe environment and the conditions that are to be re-solved. Seldom are short-term situations conclusive.Commanders envision simultaneous activities and se-quential stages that lead to a long-term outcome. Forexample, to solve the problem of feeding the localpopulation, commanders may set up kitchens and dis-tribute food in the first stage, assist in the reestablish-ment of commercial food distribution points in thesecond stage, and finally assist in improving road net-works as the local government regains the ability toprovide a steady supply of food. Similarly, peacekeep-ing operations may begin with an initial objective ofobserving a cease-fire, then move to support of an eco-nomic recovery program, and finally conclude in sup-port of an international agency program that results incultural assimilation and the resolution of the un-derlying conflict. Just as in war, commanders antici-pate future situations and decide how to coordinateactivities in depth that will achieve the desired endstate.

SynchronizationSynchronization is arranging activities in time and

space to mass at the decisive point. For example, in-tegrating the activities of intelligence, logistics, andfire support with maneuver leads to synchronized op-erations. It means that the desired effect is achievedby arranging activities in time and space to gain thateffect.

Synchronization includes, but is not limited to, themassed effects of combat power at the point of deci-sion. Some of the activities that commanders synchro-nize in an operation, such as jamming enemy commu-nications, suppressing enemy air defenses, and shift-ing reserves, might occur before the decisive moment.They may take place at locations distant from one an-other. Though separated in time and space, these ac-tivities must be well synchronized if their combinedeffects are to be felt at the decisive time and place.Synchronization seeks to gain overwhelming combatpower.

Attacking commanders have synchronized theirsupporting fires with maneuver when they have shiftedan artillery strike to a target series of enemy direct firesystems while maneuvering forces rapidly to theenemy’s flanks and rear. Or, on a larger scale, com-manders have synchronized their main and support-ing attacks when the supporting attack takes place atprecisely the right time and place to divert enemyforces and fires from the main effort as they strike theenemy. An operational commander has synchronizedtwo major operations if one diverts the attention ofthe bulk of enemy forces, thus uncovering a key ob-jective for decisive attack by the other.

Synchronization usually requires explicit coordi-nation among the various units and activities partici-pating in any operation. By itself, however, such co-ordination is no guarantee of synchronization unlesscommanders first visualize the consequences to be pro-duced and how they sequence activities to producethem. Staffs must understand their commander’s in-tent since they make a large part of the synchroniza-tion plan happen. Synchronization thus takes place firstin the minds of commanders and then in the actualplanning and coordination of movements, fires, andsupporting activities. Rehearsals are key to success-ful execution of synchronized operations.

In a force-projection army, the ability to synchro-nize operations becomes paramount. When forces arenot already forward deployed in the AO, the follow-ing considerations of early—and, if necessary,forced— entry become highly complex: protection,intelligence preparation, logistics, force buildup, in-frastructure access, and the attainment of overwhelm-ing combat power. Joint and combined operationsdemand careful synchronization of operations to ef-fect intertheater and intratheater logistics flow, mu-tual support, efficient use of all available resources,and the ultimate application of force to achieve thestrategic purpose.

Early decisions that put the operation in motionneed to consider the array of branches and sequels thatmay ensue. The need to synchronize effects in thesequencing of operations is equally important in op-erations other than war. In all matters, the enemy willattempt to disrupt operations at the most inopportunetime. Throughout the depth of the operation—fromthe CONUS base, through the many time zones andregions, to the lodgment, and to the points of decisivecombat commanders will have to synchronize eventsto maximize the probability of success.

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In the end, the product of effective synchroniza-tion is maximum use of every resource to make thegreatest contribution to success. This is true in opera-tions other than war as well as in war. Synchroniza-tion implies judgment in choosing among simultaneousand sequential activities. Commanders make this dis-tinction clear to their staffs and subordinate command-ers when effects of one activity are a precondition forsubsequent action. To achieve this requires the antici-pation that comes with thinking in depth, mastery oftime-space-purpose relationships, and a complete un-derstanding of the ways in which friendly and enemycapabilities interact. Most of all, synchronization re-quires a clear statement of the commander’s intent.

VersatilityVersatility is the ability of units to meet diverse

mission requirements. Commanders must be able toshift focus, tailor forces, and move from one role ormission to another rapidly and efficiently. Versatilityimplies a capacity to be multifunctional, to operateacross the full range of military operations, and to per-form at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Versatility is to the decathlete as agility is to theboxer. The decathlete trains for and competes in tenseparate events; the boxer, one. Army units are ca-pable of rapidly realigning forces and refocusing onwidely divergent missions. Disciplined units, highlytrained and competent throughout the range of mili-tary operations, are the wellspring of versatility.

Versatility is the ability of tactical units to adaptto different missions and tasks, some of which maynot be on unit mission-essential task lists (METL).Army forces have always been versatile; in World WarII, Korea, and Vietnam, they adapted quickly to theenvironment and the tactics of the enemy. In a force-projection army, however, the demands for versatilityincrease. Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield, DesertStorm, and Provide Comfort introduced Army forcesto dynamic environments that called for quick, suc-cessful action across a wide range of war and opera-tions other than war. Forces must be prepared to moverapidly from one geographical region to another andfrom one type of warfare to another in quick succes-sion.

The same is true for operations other than war.Military police (MP), for example, can provide a mo-bile, lethal show of force, restore civil order, processprisoners of war, and assist peacekeeping operations.Engineer units, with some reorganization and retrain-

ing, can transfer their skills from combat missions toother tasks such as rebuilding infrastructures or restor-ing water and power supplies. Field artillery or infan-try units can be committed to fighting forest fires onshort notice with minimal training.

Versatility denotes the ability to perform in manyroles and environments during war and operationsother than war. It allows for the smooth transition fromone mission to another. Versatility requires compe-tence in a variety of missions and skills. It suggeststhat all military organizations must have the ability toorganize in different combinations of units and thecapacity to redeploy from one area or region to an-other without the loss of focus. Versatility is the resultof well-led, well-trained, and well-equipped forces;high standards; and detailed planning. Versatility en-sures that units can conduct many different kinds ofoperations, either sequentially or simultaneously, withthe same degree of success.

COMBAT POWERCombat power is created by combining the ele-

ments of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leader-ship. Overwhelming combat power is the ability tofocus sufficient force to ensure success and deny theenemy any chance of escape or effective retaliation.The enemy is killed, wounded, captured, or not ca-pable of influencing future battlefield events; he is fro-zen by fear and uncertainty, confused, and isolated.Overwhelming combat power is achieved when allcombat elements are violently brought to bear quickly,giving the enemy no opportunity to respond with co-ordinated or effective opposition.

Commanders seek to apply overwhelming com-bat power to achieve victory at minimal cost. Theyintegrate and coordinate a variety of functions withthe elements of combat power to sustain it at the op-erational and tactical levels. They strive to convertthe potential of forces, resources, and opportunitiesinto actual capability through violent, coordinated ac-tion at the decisive time and place. They attempt todefeat the enemy’s combat power by interfering withhis ability to maneuver, apply firepower, or provideprotection. Commanders multiply the effects of com-bat power through the integrated efforts of combat,CS, and CSS arms, as well as the forces of the AirForce, Marine Corps, and Navy.

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Unlimited resources are seldom, if ever, availableto the commander. He fights with what he has againstwhatever force he is committed. But in so doing, heseeks to attain overwhelming combat power as besthe can at the decisive point and time. Battle shouldnot be a fight between two relatively equal foes. Whentactics are successful, commanders gain a combatpower advantage over the enemy and are able to de-feat him quickly with minimal losses to their owntroops. Army forces seek to overwhelm the enemywith a combination of factors, key among which aresuperior equipment, training, leadership, doctrine, andthe qualities and courage of the American soldier.Combat is the traditional role of the Army, and theone on which it principally focuses and trains. Win-ning in battle depends on an understanding of the dy-namics of combat power and putting them together toensure defeat of the enemy.

THE DYNAMICS OF COMBAT POWERFour primary elements—maneuver, firepower, pro-

tection, and leadership—combine to create combatpower—the ability to fight. Their effective applica-tion and sustainment, in concert with one another, willdecide the outcome of campaigns, major operations,battles, and engagements. Leaders integrate maneu-ver, firepower, and protection capabilities in a varietyof combinations appropriate to the situation.

ManeuverManeuver is the movement of combat forces to

gain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver—or threaten delivery of—direct and indirect fires. Ma-neuver is the means of positioning forces at decisivepoints to achieve surprise, psychological shock, physi-cal momentum, massed effects, and moral dominance.Successful maneuver requires anticipation and men-tal agility.

Commanders may achieve the effects of maneuverwithout movement by allowing the enemy to moveinto a disadvantageous position. Moving and posi-tioning units during deployment to a theater and withina theater prior to operations are forms of maneuver ifthis movement gains a positional advantage and caninfluence the outcomes of battles and campaigns.Maneuver is rarely effective without firepower andprotection. Maneuver keeps the enemy off balance,protecting the force. Maneuver continually poses newproblems for the enemy, rendering his reactions inef-fective, and eventually leading to his defeat.

The positional advantages and staying powergained by ground maneuver forces are unique and can-not be replaced by other means. Army combat avia-tion assets can also offer the ground commander greaterflexibility and unique advantages in reconnaissance,protection, and lethality; however, the temporary na-ture of these platforms cannot replace the permanenceof ground forces. Maneuver and firepower are insepa-rable and complementary dynamics of combat. Al-though one might dominate a phase of the battle, thesynchronized effects of both characterize all opera-tions. Their joint use makes the destruction of largerenemy forces feasible and enhances the protection ofa friendly force. Maneuver may also exploit the ef-fects of nuclear weapons.

FirepowerFirepower provides destructive force; it is essen-

tial in defeating the enemy’s ability and will to fight.It is the amount of fire that may be delivered by aposition, unit, or weapon system. Firepower may beeither direct or indirect. Integrated as part of thecommander’s concept, firepower includes the fire sup-port functions that may be used separately from or incombination with maneuver to destroy the enemy. Theextended range and precision of direct and indirect fireweapon systems, using laser-guided munitions andintegrated target acquisition systems, make firepowermore lethal than ever before. Firepower can be inte-grated with smoke or electronic warfare systems todisrupt or disorganize the enemy, producing specificphysical and psychological effects.

Firepower effects occur at the strategic, opera-tional, and tactical levels and must be synchronizedwith other attack systems against the enemy. Maxi-mum firepower effects require the full integration ofArmy and joint-service systems and procedures fordetermining priorities; locating, identifying, and track-ing targets; allocating firepower assets; and assessingfire effects. Finally, firepower is most effective whencombined with the maneuver force.

ProtectionProtection conserves the fighting potential of a

force so that commanders can apply it at the decisivetime and place. Protection has four components.

• The first component of protection is OPSECand deception operations, which help keep theenemy from locating friendly units. Skillful recon-naissance and counterreconnaissance aid

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force protection. Reconnaissance precedes allsuccessful operations. Proper dispersion helpsreduce losses from enemy fires as does theuse of camouflage, discipline,counterreconnaissance, security operations,and fortified fighting positions. These mea-sures help commanders protect their forcefrom enemy observation and are used through-out the conduct of operations. These aremostly passive measures, but they should alsobe combined with such active measures as cun-ning, guile, and craftiness. At the operationallevel, air and missile defense, protection ofair bases, and friendly force lodgment areasare all important activities associated withforce protection.• The second component of protection keepssoldiers healthy and maintains their fightingmorale. It includes guarding their equipmentand supplies from loss or damage. Tacticalcommanders take care of their soldiers’ basichealth needs and prevent unnecessary expo-sure to debilitating conditions. They considerthe welfare, morale, and spirit of soldiers asthey build cohesion and esprit in units. Theysupervise preventive maintenance and quickrepair of equipment. Operational command-ers ensure systems are in place for adequatehealth service support, quick return of minorcasualties to duty, and preventive medicine.They provide effective systems for mainte-nance evacuation and rapid replacement orrepair of hardware.• The third component of protection, safety,is part of all combat operations and operationsother than war. Commanders at all levelsshould embrace safety as a principal elementin all they do. Sustained, high-tempo opera-tions can put soldiers at risk. Strong commandand high levels of discipline and training lessenthose risks. Safe procedures represent a skill—a product of enforced standards and training.Safety in training, planning, and operations iscrucial to successful combat operations andthe preservation of combat power.• The fourth component of protection is theavoidance of fratricide—the unintentional kill-ing or wounding of friendly personnel by fire.The destructive power and range of modernweapons, coupled with the high intensity andrapid tempo of the battlefield, increase the like-

lihood of fratricide. Commanders must beaware of those tactical maneuvers and terrainand weather conditions that increase the prob-ability of fratricide and take measures to re-duce those probabilities. The primary mecha-nisms limiting fratricide are strong command,disciplined operations, detailed situationalawareness, and anticipation of operationswhen conditions raise the probabilities. Withthis knowledge, commanders can exercisepositive control over fires, control timing oftroop movements, and use disciplined opera-tional procedures. Commanders seek to lowerthe probability of fratricide without overlyconstricting boldness and audacity in combat.

LeadershipThe most essential dynamic of combat power is

competent and confident officer and noncommissionedofficer leadership. Leaders inspire soldiers with thewill to win. They provide purpose, direction, andmotivation in combat. Leaders determine how ma-neuver, firepower, and protection are used, ensuringthese elements are effectively employed against theenemy. Thus, no peacetime duty is more important forleaders than studying their profession, understandingthe human dimension of leadership, becoming tacti-cally and technically proficient, and preparing for war.These help them understand the effects of battle onsoldiers, units, and leaders. The regular study andteaching of military doctrine, theory, history, and bi-ographies of military leaders are invaluable.

Commanders are selected for their tasks becauseof their moral character, firm willpower, and profes-sional ability. They must imbue their commands withtheir ideas, desires, energy, and methods. The per-sonal influence and competence of the commandersof large joint and combined forces, field armies, corps,and divisions have a positive bearing on the outcomesof battles and campaigns.

Professional competence, personality, and the willof strong commanders represent a significant part ofany unit’s combat power. While leadership require-ments differ with unit size and type, all leaders mustdemonstrate character and ethical standards. Leadersare first soldiers, and they must know and understandtheir subordinates. They must act with courage andconviction in battle. Leaders build trust and teamwork.During operations they know where to be to makedecisions or to influence the action by their personalpresence.

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Strong leaders and trained, dedicated soldiers arethe greatest combat multipliers. When opposing forcesare nearly equal, the moral qualities of soldiers andleaders—sense of duty, courage, loyalty, and discipline,combined with stamina and skill—provide the deci-sive edge.

Once the force is engaged, superior combat powerderives from the courage and competence of soldiers,the excellence of their training, the capability of theirequipment, the soundness of their combined arms doc-trine, and, above all, the quality of their leadership.

COMBAT FUNCTIONSA variety of functions help the commander build

and sustain combat power. Commanders integrate andcoordinate these functions to synchronize battle effectsin time, space, and purpose. The combat functionsare —

- Intelligence.- Maneuver.- Fire support.- Air defense.- Mobility and survivability.- Logistics.- Battle command.

To synchronize forces and effects on the battle-field, Army leaders examine large, complex operationsin terms of functional operating systems that exist ateach level of war. At the tactical level the battlefieldoperating systems (BOSs), for example, enable a com-prehensive examination in a straightforward mannerthat facilitates the integration, coordination, prepara-tion, and execution of successful combined-arms op-erations. The BOS has other applications at the opera-tional and strategic levels.

IntelligenceIntelligence is fundamental to effective planning,

security, and deception. Intelligence operations arethe organized efforts of a commander to gather andanalyze information on the environment of operationsand the enemy. Obtaining and synthesizing battlefieldinformation prior to beginning operations is a vital task.Assembling an accurate picture of the battlefield re-quires centralized direction, simultaneous action at alllevels of command, and timely distribution of infor-mation throughout the command. Intelligence opera-tions may employ any of the unit’s resources. Unit

resources include units in contact with the enemy, cav-alry units, patrols, air defense sensors, military intelli-gence (MI) units, reconnaissance units, engineer to-pographic units, field artillery radars, and attached li-aison officers.

In force-projection operations, intelligence opera-tions routinely rely on higher levels of Army com-mand and significant joint intelligence capabilities forintelligence support. This is especially true prior todeployment and continues in theater if tactical unitsare offset from their anticipated battle area. Localpopulation and government agencies also add to theintelligence picture.

In peacetime and in war, the MI effort uses sig-nals, human, imagery, measurement, and signature col-lection and production and counter-intelligence ser-vices to provide commanders at all levels with the in-formation they need to apply their available forceswisely, efficiently, and effectively. The MI effort alsoprovides more specialized and detailed information tooperators and staffs across the full range of MI disci-plines to enable them to cooperatively fulfill thecommander’s intent.

Intelligence provided to the commander to aid hisdecision making must be clear, brief, relevant, andtimely. Wartime, especially battlefield, support to thecommander must be anticipatory and precise. Theintelligence system should maximize and synchronizethe support offered to the commander while minimiz-ing the demands it makes on him.

The commander drives the intelligence effort. Hemust ask the right questions and focus the intelligencework. He must know the enemy; the commander’spersonal involvement and knowledge have no substi-tutes. He helps his intelligence system work effec-tively by clearly stating his intent and decisively des-ignating his priority intelligence requirements. Target-ing guidance need not always identify specific targets,but it must boldly prioritize the types of targets to at-tack. Finally, the commander must understand thecapabilities and real limitations of the intelligence sys-tem to exploit its full effectiveness without holdingunrealistic expectations.

Joint Publications in the 2-0 series discuss intelli-gence support to joint operations. The 34-series FMsdiscuss Army doctrine for intelligence support.

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ManeuverManeuver is both an element of combat power and

a principle of war and is discussed at length under thoseheadings elsewhere in this manual. Maneuver is move-ment relative to the enemy to put him at a disadvan-tage. Commanders maneuver their forces to create theconditions for tactical and operational success. Bymaneuver, friendly forces gain the ability to destroythe enemy or hinder his movement through the director indirect application of lethal power or threat thereof.Tactical maneuver is done to gain operational results.As the commander develops his concept of operationand considers the maneuver of all his forces, he is care-ful to retain a balance in the application of maneuver,firepower, and protection. The nature of this balanceestablishes the priorities and relationships of maneu-ver to the other combat functions as the commandertranslates the art of his vision of operations to the sci-ence of detailed planning and execution of combatfunctions.

Maneuver refers to the employment of forcesthrough offensive or defensive operations to achieverelative positional advantage over an enemy force toachieve tactical, operational, or strategic objectives.Generating combat power on the battlefield requirescombining the movement of combat forces and em-ployment of their direct fires in combination with firesupport. The more immediate the combat in time andspace, the more intertwined are maneuver and fire-power. An assaulting platoon maneuvers under sup-porting fires, while putting forth a base of fire of itsown. The higher the level, the more one establishesthe conditions for the other. The breakout of Ameri-can ground forces at St. Lo in 1944 was achieved inthe wake of carpet bombing by the allied air forces;the encirclement of German forces by allied groundforces some time thereafter set up the punishing airattacks that decimated the trapped enemy. In eithercase, maneuver and firepower were parts of the samewhole.

Fire SupportSynchronizing fires with maneuver is critical to

the successful prosecution of combat operations. Com-manders synchronize organic and supporting joint fireassets with their scheme of maneuver through the com-bat function of fire support.

Fire support is the collective and coordinated em-ployment of the fires of armed aircraft, land- and sea-based indirect fire systems, and electronic warfaresystems against ground targets to support land combatoperations at both the operational and tactical levels.

Fire support is the integration and synchronization offires and effects to delay, disrupt, or destroy enemyforces, combat functions, and facilities in pursuit ofoperational and tactical objectives.

Generating effective firepower against an enemyrequires that organic and supporting fires be coordi-nated with other combat functions such as intelligence,logistics, and battle command. Subordinate systemsand processes for determining priorities, identifyingand locating targets, allocating fires assets, attackingtargets, and assessing battle damage must be fully in-tegrated. Fire support provides for the planning andexecution of fires so the right targets are adequatelyattacked to achieve the commander’s intended effects.

Commanders are responsible for fighting their fireand maneuver assets. They fight much of their firesthrough the function of fire support, because much ofthe combat power of fires is not from within their chainof command but from external resources. Conse-quently, the ability to employ all available firesthroughout the depth of the battlefield as an integratedand synchronized whole is done through the processof fire support planning, coordination, and execution.Fire support is the function that binds fire resourcestogether so that the multiple effects of each asset aresynchronized with the force commander’s intent andconcept of operation.

Air DefenseAir defense operations are key when generating

combat power. They provide the force with protec-tion from enemy air attack, preventing the enemy fromseparating friendly forces while freeing the commanderto fully synchronize maneuver and firepower.

Air defense operations are performed by all mem-bers of the combined arms team; however, ground-based air defense artillery (ADA) units execute thebulk of the force-protection mission. These units pro-tect deployed forces and critical assets within a the-ater area of responsibility (AOR) by preventing en-emy aircraft, missiles, and remotely piloted and un-manned aerial vehicles (RPV/UAV) from locating,striking, and destroying them.

The threat to friendly forces and combat functionsis significantly greater than in the past due to weaponsof mass destruction and the proliferation of missiletechnology. The potential for catastrophic loss of sol-diers, time, or initiative, forcing a change to opera-tional objectives, requires a greater role for

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theater missile defense when generating combat powerat the operational level.

Air defense operations represent the Army contri-bution to counterair operations. The theater air com-mander is normally the area air defense commander.He integrates the capabilities of different services andestablishes counterair ROE and procedures for the the-ater. A control and reporting center (CRC) usuallyexercises control of theater counterair operations.

Mobility and SurvivabilityMobility operations preserve the freedom of ma-

neuver of friendly forces. Mobility missions includebreaching enemy obstacles, increasing battlefield cir-culation, improving existing routes or building newones, providing bridge and raft support for crossingrivers, and identifying routes around contaminatedareas. By denying mobility to enemy forces(countermobility), Army forces can destroy them withfire and maneuver. These efforts limit the maneuverof enemy forces and enhance the effectiveness of fires.Countermobility missions include building obstaclesand using smoke to hinder enemy maneuver.

Survivability operations protect friendly forcesfrom the effects of enemy weapon systems and fromnatural occurrences. Hardening of facilities and forti-fication of battle positions are active survivability mea-sures. Deception, OPSEC, and dispersion can increasesurvivability. Nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC)defense measures are also key survivability operations.

LogisticsLogistics incorporates a variety of technical spe-

cialties and functional activities, to include maximiz-ing the use of available host nation infrastructure andcontracted logistics support. It provides the physicalmeans with which forces operate, from the productionbase and replacement centers in the US, to soldiers incontact with the enemy. It applies across the full rangeof military operations and at all levels of war. As thescale and complexity of Army operations increase, theimportance of logistics to their success increases too.Chapter 12 covers logistics in greater detail.

Battle CommandIn modern battle, the magnitude of available in-

formation challenges leaders at all levels. Ultimately,they must assimilate thousands of bits of informationto visualize the battlefield, assess the situation, anddirect the military action required to achieve victory.

Thinking and acting are simultaneous activities forleaders in battle.

Visualizing the battlefield is a continuing require-ment for commanders. In larger tactical and operationalformations, the headquarters normally is the focal pointfor the flow of information and the resulting planningefforts. Yet, commanders of neither large nor smallunits can visualize the battlefield and direct and syn-chronize the efforts of their units from a computerscreen at the command post. Commanders are fre-quently away from their command posts and in thefield to assess the state of battle face-to-face with sub-ordinate commanders and their soldiers. Commandremains a very personal function. The commandergoes where he can best influence the battle, where hismoral and physical presence can be felt, and wherehis will to achieve victory can best be expressed, un-derstood, and acted upon. Commanders commandwhile the headquarters and staff coordinate and makenecessary control adjustments consistent with thecommander’s intent.

To command is to direct. Command at all levelsis the art of motivating and directing soldiers and theirleaders into action to accomplish missions. Commandmeans visualizing the current and future state offriendly and enemy forces and then formulating con-cepts of operations to accomplish the mission. Com-manders are aware that battle is two-sided and that theenemy is trying to influence the outcome. Command-ers influence the outcome of battles, campaigns, andengagements by assigning missions; prioritizing andallocating resources; assessing and taking risks; de-ciding when and how to make adjustments; commit-ting reserves; seeing, hearing, and understanding theneeds of subordinates and seniors; and guiding andmotivating the organization toward the desired end.In battle, command is being with soldiers, sharing theirhardships, feeling their pride—and often their pain—and continuing to think and act to accomplish the mis-sion with the least cost to them.

Command has two vital components—decisionmaking and leadership.

• Decision making is knowing if to decide,then when and what to decide. These are tac-tical, operational, and strategic judgments.Being in command means anticipating theactivities that will be put into motion once adecision is made; knowing how irretrievable

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some commitments will be once put into mo-tion; knowing the consequences of the act ofdeciding; anticipating the outcomes that canbe expected from the implementation of a de-cision.• Leadership is taking responsibility for deci-sions; being loyal to subordinates; inspiringand directing assigned forces and resourcestoward a purposeful end; establishing a team-work climate that engenders success; demon-strating moral and physical courage in the faceof adversity; providing the vision that both fo-cuses and anticipates the future course ofevents.

As such, command is more an art than a science.In battle, it is often guided by intuition and feel gainedfrom years of practice and study.

Command occurs from the location of the com-mander, whether he is at a command post, infiltratingat night with his forward light infantry elements, or ina main battle tank moving with the main effort. Thebattle command system must permit tactical leadersto position themselves wherever they can best com-mand without depriving them of the ability to respondto opportunities and changing circumstances. For ex-ample, a division commander operating forward witha lead brigade must be able to visualize the battlefieldand, if he so decides, be able to shift his main effort tocapitalize on the unexpected success of a supportingattack without sacrificing the momentum of the divi-sion effort.

The need for flexibility in command is greatestfor the committed maneuver unit commander. He canneither cope with constant direction from above norcan he constantly provide detailed direction to his staffand subordinate commanders. He and his organiza-tion must know the intent of the commander two lev-els above, understand the concept of operation andintent of the immediate commander, and know the re-sponsibilities of flanking and supporting units. Then,the unit commander can fight his unit confidently. Hecan anticipate events and act freely and boldly to ac-complish his mission with minimal guidance, particu-larly when he cannot communicate with his com-mander.

Control is inherent in battle command. Controlmonitors the status of organizational effectiveness andidentifies deviations from set standards and correctsthem. Commanders acquire and apply means to ac-

complish their intent. Ultimately, commanders pro-vide a means to measure, report, and correct perfor-mance.

Control serves its purpose if it allows the com-mander freedom to operate, delegate authority, leadfrom any critical point on the battlefield, and synchro-nize actions across his entire AO. Moreover, the battlecommand system must support the ability of the com-mander to adjust plans for future operations, even whilefocusing on the current fight. Skilled staffs work withincommand intent to direct and control units and resourceallocations to support the desired end. They also arealert to spotting enemy or friendly situations that re-quire command change and see to it that the com-mander is so advised. The related tools for imple-menting command decisions include communications,computers, and intelligence.

Space-based systems provide commanders recon-naissance, surveillance, navigation, and positioningthat greatly facilitate battle command. These systemssignificantly upgrade the speed and accuracy of infor-mation that commanders exchange with subordinates.

Reliable communications are central both to battlecommand and to control. General Omar Bradley oncesaid, Congress can make a general, but only commu-nications can make him a commander. Effective battlecommand requires reliable signal support systems toenable the com-mander to conduct operations at vary-ing operational tempos. Signal planning increases thecommander’s options by providing the requisite sig-nal support systems to pass critical information at de-cisive times, thus leveraging and exploiting tacticalsuccess and facilitating future operations. Nonethe-less, battle command style is dictated by the com-mander, not by his supporting communication system.

Communication and technology may assist com-mand, and accurate and timely intelligence may ad-vise it. But at its core, in land combat, when distanceto the enemy can be measured from meters to hun-dreds of kilometers, command remains an expressionof human will the will embodied in the commandercharged to accomplish the mission. The followinghistorical example from the Battle of Gettysburg il-lustrates the leadership component of battle command.

JOINT CAPABILITIES AND MISSIONSThe Army does not fight alone. It integrates its

efforts within the theater commander’s unified

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operations along with the other services, other nationalagencies, and often allied and coalition forces. Bydoing so, the Army’s operational capabilities are en-hanced, victory comes quicker, and friendly casualtiesare reduced. The capabilities described below are es-sential to success on the battlefield.

Space OperationsArmy forces depend on space-based systems in

joint and combined operations. Space-based systemsoffer significant political and technical advantages to

force-projection operations, allowing quick access tocertain capabilities without concern for national bound-ary restrictions. Normally, Army units are offset froman AO and rely on space-based systems to gain intel-ligence and to track deployment and early employ-ment. Intelligence, early warning, communication,navigation, mapping, environmental monitoring, mis-sile warning, weather, imagery, and data processingare all enhanced by uninterrupted space operations.Position and navigation satellites enable forcesequipped with passive receivers to know their exact

Historical Perspective

At 1630, 2 July 1863, near Little Round top, a rocky hill near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, Colo-nel Joshua Chamberlain’s 358 remaining soldiers of the 20th Maine Regiment were orderedinto a defensive line. Minutes later, they came under a violent frontal assault by the 47th Ala-bama Regiment. While the 20th Maine was repulsing this assault, an officer rushed up to Cham-berlain and informed him that another large enemy force was moving to attack their exposedleft flank.

Chamberlain immediately ordered a new defensive line at right angles to his existing line,shifting the entire regiment to the left and back, while maintaining continuous fire to the front,masking the movement of his left flank. Minutes later the 20th Maine was assaulted by the 15tAlabama Regiment. During that assault, the 20th Maine fired 20,000 rounds, suffering 30percent dead and wounded. Chamberlain, wounded in the foot by a shell fragment, was bleed-ing. HIs right thigh was severely bruised where a musket ball had struck his scabbard. The20th Maine miraculously withstood six charges before they ran out of ammunition.

Chamberlain, fearing an overwhelming, decrimating rebel attack, realized that by withdrawinghe would be giving up key terrain and the battle too. To the astonishment of his company com-manders, he ordered a bayonet charge with the enemy, beginning another fierce charge fromonly 30 yards away. The left half of his regiment began the charge, stunning the confederatesbefore them. As they came abreast of their own right half,

Chamberlain raised high his saber and shouted, “Fix bayonets! Charge! Fix bayonets! Charge!Fix bayonets! Charge!” Running downhill like a thundering herd of raging animals, Cham-berlain and his men had the clear advantage over the tired rebels. The Alabama men wereshocked and fell back. A company of Chamberlain’s men who had formed a screen line on theleft flank began firing into the panic-stricken confederates who, even though they outnumberedthe 20th Main 3 to 1, did not realize the strength of their numbers.

Fearing the worst for his troops, Oates, the commander of the Alabama regiments, ordered abreakout that turned into a rout and the capture of more than 400 of his men. Afterwards,Colonel Chamberlain was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. His actions serve asone of the finest examples of what a combat leader must be able to be and do to exerciseeffective battle command.

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location. Military and civilian communication satel-lites provide responsive, worldwide, line-of-sight com-munications links to tactical forces.

The Tactical Exploitation of National CapabilitiesProgram also provides reconnaissance, surveillance,and target acquisition support to tactical units. TheDefense Meteorological Satellite Program and civil-ian environmental monitoring satellites provideweather and terrain information. The efficiencies re-sulting from the use of these space capabilities havedramatic effect on ground combat operations. Forexample, precise knowledge of the location of friendlyunits allows for rapid decision making, quick adjust-ments of fires, and greater protection of the force.When married with precise knowledge of enemy lo-cations, this capability allows the Army forces to domi-nate the battlefield. These capabilities are further de-fined in four military space functions.

Force Enhancement. This function is analogousto combat support with space capabilities that improvethe effectiveness of forces across the full range of mili-tary activities. It includes, but is not limited to,communications, navigation, weather, and surveil-lance support. Commanders use the capabilities offorce enhancement to reduce uncertainty, to facilitatecommand and control (C2), and to moderate the ef-fects of friction.

Commercial and allied space capabilities may aug-ment US military space systems if military capabili-ties are lost or unavailable. Immediate worldwideconnectivity can be provided to all forces in combat,regardless of the level of commitment, physical loca-tion, weather conditions, or type of operation. Forexample, during Operations Desert Shield and DesertStorm and joint task force (JTF) operations in Soma-lia, satellite communications, military and commer-cial, provided the backbone for long-haul and intrath-eater connectivity. In regions with limited communi-cations infrastructure, satellite communications are theonly means to provide reliable, high-capacity services.Also, successful contingency operations rely on highlymobile satellite communications terminals for rapidinsertion and flexible C2 links.

Force Application. This function is the conductof combat operations from, in, or through space. Con-sistent with treaty obligations and national policy, this

capability currently uses space- and ground-based de-fenses to provide protection from ballistic missiles.Technology development creates other capabilities tosupport national power projection through this func-tion. With its potential global positioning, space-basedfirepower can suppress, neutralize, or destroy enemyoffensive and defensive capabilities. In addition, thethreat of potential space to ground fires could create aposition of advantage at the strategic, operational, andtactical levels.

Space Control. This function is the conduct ofoffensive and defensive space operations directedagainst the enemy’s space forces to gain and maintainspace superiority. It ensures freedom of action in spacefor friendly forces while denying it to the enemy.

Space Support. Space support provides the mili-tary infrastructure to deploy and maintain militaryspace systems. This function includes Army forcesand activities responsible for maintaining telemetry,tracking and commanding space systems, recoveringspacecraft, and providing logistics support for space,ground control, and launch elements.

As the United States makes further advances inspace, the interdependence between space and Armysystems will become even greater. Commanders mustseize the opportunity to enhance ground capabilities,while guarding against vulnerabilities to enemy spaceoperations. Joint Publication 3-14 and FM 100-18 dis-cuss space operations.

Electronic warfare (EW) uses the electromagneticspectrum to locate enemy units and facilities, to inter-cept enemy communications, and to disrupt enemy C2and target acquisition systems at critical moments.Commanders employ joint EW systems as they em-ploy fires. They use the effects of these systems toslow, misdirect, or confound enemy operations andsynchronize them accordingly. EW operations occurconcurrently at all levels.

Commanders can use joint EW to generate falsesignals of friendly forces that confuse, mask, or de-ceive. They synchronize these efforts with one an-other and with other functions—particularly maneu-ver, firepower, and air operations—to obtain the bestresults. Since the enemy has an EW capability also,commanders must degrade it while protecting theirown. OPSEC, as a passive form of protecting the pres-ence

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and use of our EW system, is as important as the ac-tive measures taken.

When developing the concept of operation, tacti-cal commanders should consider EW assets the sameas they do artillery assets. They should deploy EWassets to committed units based on their missions, thecapabilities of available systems, and potential enemyactions. Plans should reflect the relative scarcity ofEW weapons, their limitations, and the transient na-ture of their effects. Joint Publication 3-51 discusseselectronic warfare.

InterdictionInterdiction destroys enemy forces, delays and dis-

rupts their maneuver, and diverts their resources fromthe main effort. Interdiction is a means to direct com-bat power simultaneously throughout the depth of en-emy forces and hasten enemy loss of initiative andultimate destruction. Effective interdiction occurswhen it is synchronized with maneuver to support theconcept of operation of a single commander. Allforces—ground, air, space, maritime, and special op-erations—are capable of interdiction. When their op-erations are integrated and synchronized with maneu-ver, they present the greatest dilemma to the enemy.The enemy cannot move against his objective withoutabsorbing losses or eroding resources, nor can he syn-chronize his combat power. Joint Publication 3-03discusses interdiction.

Air OperationsA primary consideration in employing joint forces

is gaining and maintaining the freedom of action toconduct operations against the enemy. Control of theair gives commanders the freedom to conduct success-ful attacks that can neutralize or destroy an enemy’swarfighting potential. A continuous effort exists to gainand maintain the capability to use the enemy’s airspaceto perform combat missions and to deny the enemythe use of friendly airspace. Control of the air enablesland forces to execute operations without interferencefrom an enemy’s air forces. Without this control, tac-tical flexibility is lessened. Ground commanders musthave access to sufficient airspace to employ Armyhelicopters, drones, and airborne sensors.

Strategic Attack.Strategic attacks are carried out against an enemy’s

center of gravity, which may include national com-mand elements, war production assets, and support-ing infrastructure (for example, energy, transportation,and communications assets). Strategic attacks focus

on degrading the enemy’s capability and possibly itswill to wage war. They are designed to affect the en-tire war effort rather than a single campaign or battle.Even nations without a significant industrial base, thatrely on imported weaponry, may have vulnerable lead-ers or economic targets, ports, or sea lines of commu-nications (SLOCs). In some less-developed states,transportation and communications nets may be primi-tive or extremely resilient, and enemy command ele-ments may be difficult to target. In such cases, strate-gic attacks may not be as effective as against industri-alized nations but nonetheless will have an impact onwar-sustaining capabilities and help protect the force.

Counterair . US forces cannot count on air su-premacy. Enemy air forces will contest US control ofthe air, creating conditions of temporary or local airsuperiority, air parity, or even temporary enemy domi-nation in some areas. The objective of counterair op-erations is to gain control of the air environment.Counterair operations are inherently joint, with Armyair defense contributing to the effort of the other ser-vices. Counterair operations protect friendly forces,ensure freedom to use the aerospace environment toperform other air missions and tasks, and deny the useof that environment to the enemy. The ultimate goalof counterair is to control the airspace to allow com-manders to execute their operational plans. The threetypes of complementary and mutually supportive op-erations that establish and maintain air superiority areoffensive counterair, suppression of enemy air defenses(SEAD), and defensive counterair.

Offensive counterair missions seek out and neu-tralize or destroy enemy air forces at the times andplaces the joint commander chooses. In these mis-sions, US forces destroy the enemy forces shortly af-ter hostilities begin. They conduct operations in theenemy’s airspace and neutralize or destroy enemy airforces and the infrastructure supporting their air op-erations.

Suppression of enemy air defenses missions neu-tralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy air de-fensive systems in a specific area by physical and elec-tronic warfare. The goal of SEAD is to allow friendlyforces to perform other missions effectively withoutinterference from enemy air defenses.

Defensive counterair missions detect, identify, in-tercept, and destroy enemy air forces that attempt toattack friendly forces or penetrate friendly airspace.

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These missions, combined with Army air defense sys-tems, defend friendly LOCs, protect friendly bases,and support friendly land forces while denying theenemy the freedom to carry out offensive operations.

Air Interdiction . Air interdiction (AI) missionsdelay, disrupt, or destroy an enemy’s military poten-tial before it can be brought to bear effectively againstfriendly forces. AI can greatly benefit ongoing Armydeep operations when synchronized with Army inter-diction efforts. AI may be used against enemy sur-face forces; LOCs; command, control, and communi-cations (C3) networks; and combat supplies. AI canalso delay the arrival or buildup of enemy forces andsupplies, disrupt the enemy commander’s concept ofoperation and control of forces, or cause him to divertvaluable resources to other uses.

Close Air Support. Close air support (CAS) mis-sions support land operations by attacking hostile tar-gets close to friendly ground forces. CAS can supportoffensive operations with preplanned or immediate at-tacks. All preplanned and immediate CAS missionsrequire timely intelligence information. CAS missionsrequire positive identification of friendly forces andpositive control of aircraft. CAS can enhance groundforce operations by delivering a wide range of weap-ons and massed firepower at decisive points. It cansurprise the enemy and create opportunities for themaneuver or advance of friendly forces through shockaction and concentrated attacks. CAS can also pro-tect the flanks of friendly forces, blunt enemyoffensives, enhance economy-of-force operations, andprotect the rear of land forces during retrograde op-erations. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps aviationmay be required to provide significant air support toArmy forces during the entry stage of force-projec-tion operations.

Maritime OperationsOperations in the maritime and littoral environ-

ment contribute to gaining and maintaining freedomof action, just as do air operations. Sea control givescommanders the freedom to project power through thestrategic and operational movement of forces by sea,to protect SLOCs, to secure littoral areas from sea-based threats, and to execute air and land operationsfrom the sea. Maritime functions that contribute toland operations are sea control and power projection.

Sea Control. US forces cannot count on unchal-lenged sea control. Enemy naval forces will contestcontrol of the sea, seeking conditions of temporary or

local sea superiority, parity, or even enemy domina-tion in some areas. The purpose of sea control opera-tions is to gain control of defined sea areas in the air,on the surface, and under the surface. Ultimately thepurpose of sea control operations is to gain and main-tain sea supremacy. Naval forces perform antiair war-fare, antisubmarine warfare, and antisurface ship tasksin sea control operations.

Power Projection. Power projection supports airand land operations ashore through the application ofoffensive naval capabilities. These include carrier-based aircraft, amphibious assault forces, naval bom-bardment, and fleet ballistic and cruise missiles. At-tacks from the sea to gain early entry or to supportforces ashore can combine Army, Marine Corps, andNavy capabilities in both fire and maneuver through-out the contested battle space. For example, Navy andArmy air defense, along with attack helicopter assaultsfrom sea-based platforms, might occur to complementearly entry Marine Corps forces. A Marine Corpsforcible-entry capability is essential to opposed-entryoperations from the sea. Naval forces perform strikewarfare, amphibious warfare, and mine warfare inpower-projection operations.

Surveillance and ReconnaissanceArmy, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps sur-

veillance and reconnaissance efforts are a part of na-tional intelligence gathering and the systematic obser-vation process. These missions are effected to collectinformation from airborne, space-based, surface-based,and subsurface sensors. Surveillance and reconnais-sance operations provide a wide variety of informa-tion necessary to the development of national securitypolicy, force posture, planning actions, force employ-ment, and informed responses in times of crisis.

Surveillance operations are effected to collect in-formation continuously from the air, land, and sea. Re-connaissance operations are directed toward specifictargets. Through surveillance and reconnaissance,varied data, such as meteorological, hydrographic,geographic, electronic, and communications charac-teristics, can be collected on any given area of theearth’s surface. The products of these operations havestrategic, operational, and tactical applications in bothpeace and war. Surveillance and recon- naissancecombine at all levels to provide timely notification ofhostile intent and actions as well as other informationvital to the NCA and combatant commanders. Theseoperations are instrumental in identifying the

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composition and capability of hostile and potentiallyhostile forces. The US can thus assess the total capa-bility of foreign nations to conduct war and tailor itsforces to effectively counter the threat.

Airlift and SealiftArmy forces depend upon airlift and sealift to

project their capabilities into the theater of operationsand to sustain themselves throughout the assigned mis-sion. They are critical elements of the Army’s force-projection strategy. Airlift provides quick insertionand limited capability to move supplies and equipmentfor Army elements. Sealift provides the movement oflarge tonnages of supplies, heavy equipment, and weap-ons systems over the length of a campaign. Sealiftalso allows for the projection of power through am-phibious landings and transport to ports within or ad-jacent to the theater of operations.

Airlift and sealift can be strategic (intertheater) oroperational/tactical (intratheater). Both extend therange of options available to military forces engagedin operations in peace and war. They enable a strate-gic army to project forces anywhere in the world.

Airlift provides rapid and flexible movement offorces and limited amounts of equipment and suppliesto the theater. It provides the best means of movementfor replacement personnel and time-sensitive resup-ply and equipment. Airlift requires careful manage-ment, overflight agreements, host nation support, andsecurity of air lines of communication (ALOCs).

Sealift complements airlift with its ability to movearmored forces, heavy equipment, and the vast major-ity of the materiel for sustained operations. Althoughslower than airlift, sealift operations can begin with-out prerequisite diplomatic negotiations required foroverflight. Sealift can concentrate forces and suppliesnear the theater of operations prior to their commit-ment. Sealift operations depend upon security of theSLOCs.

Special OperationsSpecial operations are actions conducted by spe-

cially organized, trained, and equipped military andparamilitary forces to achieve military, diplomatic,economic, or psychological objectives by unconven-tional means. US SOF consist of Army, Navy, and AirForce units. Special operations occur frequently inhostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas across thefull range of Army operations. In operations other thanwar, they may substitute for the commitment of gen-

eral-purpose military forces. Joint Publication 3-05 dis-cusses special operations.

The theater SOF commander executes special op-erations as part of the theater commander’s joint spe-cial operations effort. Preestablished command ar-rangements help determine how the combatant com-mander assigns missions to his SOF. The five princi-pal missions of special operations are unconventionalwarfare, direct actions, special reconnaissance, for-eign internal defense, and counterterrorism. In addi-tion, SOF may participate in collateral activities ofsecurity assistance, humanitarian assistance, antiter-rorism, counterdrug operations, personnel recovery,and special activities with other components.

Special operations during war and in other hostileenvironments usually occur deep in the enemy’s reararea or in other areas void of conventional maneuverforces. They may also extend into the territory of hos-tile states adjacent to the theater. While each specialoperations action may be tactical in nature, its effectsoften contribute directly to theater operational or stra-tegic objectives in support of the theater campaign plan.Special operations may seek either immediate or long-range effects on the conflict.

Typical SOF missions include interdicting enemyLOCs and destroying military and industrial facilities.SOF detachments may also have missions associatedwith intelligence collection, target acquisition, termi-nal guidance for strike aircraft and missile systems,personnel recovery, and location of weapons of massdestruction. These detachments conduct psychologi-cal operations (PSYOP) to demoralize the enemy andcollect information in the enemy’s rear areas. SOForganize, train, equip, and advise resistance forces inguerrilla warfare for evasion and escape, subversion,and sabotage. They add depth to the campaign, forc-ing the enemy to deploy significant combat forces toprotect his rear area.

SOF are an invaluable tool across the range of mili-tary operations. In war and operations other than warthey work with indigenous people in regions of con-flict in support of US national interests. They are alsohighly capable of unilateral actions of extreme sensi-tivity. They can be relied upon for quick, decisiveaction at long ranges, as well as protracted operationsin remote regions of the world.

Naval Special Warfare Forces. Naval SpecialWarfare (NSW) forces support the requirements of sea

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control and power projection of theater conventionalnaval forces. Sea-air-land (SEAL) teams, SEAL de-livery vehicle teams, special boat units, and NSW unitscomprise NSW groups. NSW forces conduct directaction, special reconnaissance, coastal patrol and in-terdiction, and beach intelligence for amphibious land-ings, in addition to foreign internal defense,counterterrorism, and military training with other na-tions.

Air Force Special Operations Forces. Air ForceSpecial Operations Forces (AFSOF) provide aircraftfor a variety of SOF missions: infiltrating, exfiltrating,and resupplying SOF; aerial refueling; PSYOP; andfire support. AFSOF units are special operations wingsand groups, special tactics groups, and special opera-tions weather teams.

Army Special Operations Forces. Army Spe-cial Operations Forces (ARSOF) have five types ofunits: Special Forces (SF), rangers, Army special op-erations aviation, PSYOP, and civil affairs (CA).ARSOF are effective in insurgencies andcounterinsurgencies, contingency operations, peaceoperations, and counterterrorism operations. In peace-time, ARSOF participate in foreign internal defenseefforts, in humanitarian and civic assistance programs,and in demonstrating US presence in troubled regions.

Special Forces units are organized, trained, andequipped to conduct special operations. They conductall of the principal special operations missions andcollateral activities.

Ranger units are rapidly deployable, airborne-ca-pable, and trained to conduct joint strike operationswith, or in support of, special operations units of allservices. They can also conduct strike missions insupport of conventional operations and can operate asconventional light infantry units when properly inte-grated with other combined-arms elements.

Army special operations aviation units are spe-cialized aviation assets dedicated to conducting spe-cial operations missions. They provide a mix of short-, medium-, and long-range lift and limited light-attackcapabilities. They support all principal and collateralmission areas and can conduct autonomous special re-connaissance and direct-action missions.

PSYOP forces are employed to influence favor-ably the attitudes and behaviors of specific foreign au-diences and reduce the will, capacity, or influence of

hostile forces to wage war or otherwise threaten USinterests. PSYOP forces are equipped with audiovi-sual, print, loudspeaker, and radio and TV broadcast-ing capabilities to support friendly forces. Their ac-tivities often are sensitive and have significant politi-cal implications. Joint Publication 3-53 and FM 33-1cover PSYOP in detail.

CA forces are employed to enhance relationshipsbetween military forces and civilian authorities andpopulations in friendly, neutral, or hostile AOs. CAforces are used to reduce civilian interference and togain popular understanding, support, and compliancewith measures required to accomplish the mission. CAforces engage in the type of activities associated withthe operation of civil government and its institutions,population, and resources. Joint Publication 3-57 andFM 41-10 cover CA operations in detail.

TACTICAL UNITSArmy commanders use a variety of Army units to

generate combat power. Commanders may task-orga-nize maneuver units for a particular mission to im-prove their combined arms capabilities. Battalions andcompanies defend, attack, or execute retrograde op-erations in cooperation with other battalions and com-panies. These units support their maneuver with theirown mortars and also receive fire support from fieldartillery units as well as the support of engineer, ADA,chemical, and EW units.

Division and brigade commanders fight combinedarms battles and engagements employing every tacti-cal means available. They integrate and coordinatedifferent kinds of maneuver battalions, field artillery,aviation, engineer, ADA, tactical air support, and,sometimes, naval fire support to accomplish brigadeand division missions. Thus, organic and supportingcombat, CS, and CSS units all combine to make vitalcontributions to these operations.

Corps commanders combine arms in a similar fash-ion. They employ different types of divisions, sepa-rate brigades, and cavalry regiments. They arrange CSand CSS and integrate the support of other services toaccomplish their missions. The corps may be respon-sible for operational planning and execution.

Corps, division, and brigade commanders get bat-talions to the right places at the right times and in theright combinations to defeat the enemy decisively. Atall but most basic echelons, units consist of elementsof

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different branches. In this way, the strengths of eachbranch are enhanced.

InfantryThe five types of infantry forces are light, airborne,

air assault, ranger, and mechanized. Each has its ownspecial skills and specific organizational design, butall share the common mission to close with and de-stroy the enemy. Airborne and air assault forces aremost readily distinguished by their means of entry intobattle. Rangers serve both as a type of infantry and asSOF. Regardless of their mode of conveyance—byaircraft, by armored vehicle, by truck, or by foot—they all serve as a key element of combat power inclose combat.

Light Infantry . Light infantry units can operateeffectively in most terrain and weather. They may bethe dominant arm in fast-breaking operations becauseof their rapid strategic deployability. In such cases,they can wrest the initiative early, seize and holdground, and mass fires to stop the enemy in restrictiveterrain. They are particularly effective in urban ter-rain. They can infiltrate and move rapidly to the en-emy rear. Their tactical mobility is enhanced throughthe use of helicopter support and tactical airlift.

Light infantry units are capable of rapid deploy-ment due to their austere but lethal design. They mayoperate throughout the battlefield and can be rapidlyaugmented for almost any task or situation. Light in-fantry units are especially useful for operations in dif-ficult terrain and urbanized areas. They operate pri-marily at night or during periods of limited visibilityin close or restrictive terrain. Light infantry unitsachieve decisive results through the employment oforganic and supporting forces and weapons systems.

Airborne Infantry . Airborne infantry units havethe greatest capability for large-scale force-projectionoperations. They rapidly deploy over great distancesand conduct combined arms combat parachute or airlanding assaults to seize and secure vital objectives.These units can be projected to virtually any objectivearea under almost any weather condition. Once onthe ground, their capabilities and lethality are similarto other infantry units.

Air Assault Infantry . Air assault infantry unitshave great tactical and operational-level mobility. They

train to fight across the range of military operations.Their significant antiarmor capability, coupled withtheir strategic deployability, makes them particularlywell-suited as an early deploying force in contingencyoperations against heavy forces. They train and fightas a team in combination with air assault artillery andattack and lift aviation and are capable of penetratingdeep into enemy territory to cut LOCs, seize airfields,destroy C2 nodes, block reinforcing units, or seize keyterrain. Because of their agility and mobility, air as-sault infantry units are well-suited for covering forceoperations.

Ranger Units. Ranger units plan and conduct spe-cial military operations in support of national policiesand objectives. They have the capability to supportconventional military operations, or they may conductoperations independently when conventional infantrycannot be used. Ranger units are highly trained andwell-disciplined and capable of being employed inany environment.

Mechanized Infantry. Mechanized infantry hasthe same mobility as armor forces, but less firepowerand protection. Armor and mechanized infantry trainand fight as a team to defeat enemy armored forces.When equipped with infantry fighting vehicles, themechanized infantry can accompany tanks in mountedassault, although commanders must be careful in de-termining if, when, and where infantrymen must dis-mount to accomplish their mission. In the attack,mechanized infantrymen can act as fixing forces. Inthe defense, they act as pivot points for maneuveringtank-heavy forces. Mechanized infantry forces seekto integrate fast, protected mobility; lethal, vehicle-mounted, fire-support systems; and dismounted infan-try skills into an effective fighting system that enhancesthe striking power of armor forces.

ArmorIn mounted warfare, the tank is the primary offen-

sive weapon. Its firepower, protection from enemyfire, and speed create the shock effect necessary todisrupt or defeat the enemy. Tanks can destroy en-emy armored vehicles, infantry units, and antitankguided missile units. Tanks can break through sup-pressed defenses, exploit the success of an attack bystriking deep into the enemy’s rear areas, and pursuedefeated enemy

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forces. Armored units can also blunt enemy attacksand launch counter-attacks as part of a defense.

Light armored units can participate in a variety ofArmy operations, including rapid worldwide deploy-ment, throughout a wide range of environments. Tac-tical missions include providing security, reconnais-sance, and antiarmor firepower to the light infantry orairborne division. Light armored units also conductstandard armor operations, including the destructionof enemy forces in coordination with other arms.

CavalryThe basic missions of cavalry units are reconnais-

sance, security, and economy of force. The ability ofcavalry units to find the enemy, to develop the situa-tion, and to provide the commander with reaction timeand security also make them ideal for operating in aneconomy-of-force role. Cavalry forces can delay anattacking enemy as well as assist in a withdrawal. Aircavalry units perform the same missions of reconnais-sance and security as ground cavalry and are organicto all cavalry units. Because of their greater mobility,air cavalry troops can reconnoiter and maintain sur-veillance over a much larger area in a shorter periodof time than ground troops. During security operations,the air cavalry reconnoiters, screens forward and tothe flanks of ground forces, and acts as a rapid reac-tion force.

Army AviationThe firepower, agility, and speed of Army avia-

tion permit ground com-manders to close with anddefeat a wide range of enemy forces. Attack helicop-ters are ideally suited for rapid reaction in close, deep,or rear operations. They are also used where the ter-rain restricts or prohibits ground-force occupation.Attack helicopters can favorably influence the battlewhen ground forces are decisively engaged.

Scout helicopters provide a wide range of armedand unarmed recon-naissance and security capabili-ties. Whether autonomous or operating with a cav-alry organization, air scout assets are essential in de-tecting and identifying enemy forces throughout thebattlefield—an important source of real-time battle-field information. On-board radars and digitalcommun-ications are key in winning the informationwar at the tactical and operational levels.

Utility aircraft provide airmobile and air assaultcapabilities for dismounted infantry and ground anti-tank units. Dismounted forces achieve greatly in-creased mobility and can gain positional advantagewhen rapidly airlifted across the battlefield. As thecommander requires, utility assets can quickly movetowed artillery and light elements of the combined armsteam and perform lifesaving medical evacuation(MEDEVAC) missions. Utility aircraft provide a fullrange of critical CSS to forces throughout the battle-field.

Field ArtilleryA principal means of fire support in fire and ma-

neuver is the field artillery. It not only provides fireswith cannon, rocket, and missile systems but also in-tegrates all means of fire support available to the com-mander. Field artillery can neutralize, suppress, ordestroy enemy direct fire forces, attack enemy artil-lery and mortars, and deliver scatterable mines to iso-late and interdict enemy forces or protect friendly op-erations. Field artillery units contribute to attackingthe enemy throughout the depth of his formations andsuppress enemy air defense systems to facilitate groundand air operations. As mobile as the maneuver force itsupports, field artillery provides continuous fires insupport of the commanders’ schemes of maneuver.

Commanders exercise overall control of the firesupport system. In integrating fire support into opera-tions, their most important considerations are adequacy,flexibility, and continuity. In offensive operations, themain attack gets priority fire support, while long-rangesystems strike in-depth defenses, enemy reserves, ortargets such as command posts, bridges, and enemyartillery. In the defense, a broader balance of fire sup-port is necessary, but the main effort is still allocatedstronger fire support. Commanders should changepriority of support when they shift their main effort.

When maneuver forces conduct raids, deep attacks,or covering-force operations that take them beyondsupporting distance of the main body, commandersmust provide for their fire support. They may do sowith supporting field artillery brigades, division artil-leries, battalions, dedicated batteries, or mortars, de-pending on the size of the force and its mission.

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Air Defense ArtilleryADA units provide tactical and operational-level

force protection. Tactical air defense supports the over-all objectives of divisions and corps. Operational airdefense protects the force and supports joint servicecounterair objectives. The commander must retainorganic capabilities to meet his inherent responsibil-ity of force protection. ADA air and missile defenseunits protect maneuver forces and vital assets. Divi-sional ADA units normally provide forward area airdefense (FAAD) protection for maneuver units con-ducting tactical combat operations. Corps ADA bri-gades have both FAAD and high-to-medium altitudeair defense (HIMAD) missile defense units to protectcorps assets as well as reinforce divisional ADA units.

ADA units make a variety of contributions to thebattle. They contribute to the intelligence and elec-tronic warfare (IEW) effort by gathering and dissemi-nating information about the enemy air order of battle.They also contribute to the deep battle by denying theenemy his own reconnaissance and C2 aircraft. Addi-tionally, they provide information on enemy surface-to-surface missile launch points to our deep-attacksystems.

EngineersEngineers operate as an integral member of the

combined arms team throughout the theater of opera-tions to provide full range of engineering capabilities.Engineers execute mobility, countermobility, and sur-vivability missions in the forward combat zone andprovide sustainment engineering for support forces.Topographic engineers provide terrain analysis andmap products.

In offensive operations, engineers normally con-centrate their efforts in supporting maneuver by breach-ing and crossing obstacles, assisting in the assault offortified positions, and emplacing obstacles to protectthe flanks of friendly attacking forces. In the defense,engineers reinforce the terrain to anchor the defensein critical areas, to maximize the effects of defenders’fires, to provide maximum protection to friendly fight-ing positions, and to facilitate the movement of coun-terattack forces. In all types of operations, engineersadvise the maneuver commander on the effective useof terrain; construct, improve, and maintain routes,bridges, airfields, and other facilities; and reorganizeto fight as infantry when required.

Military IntelligenceMI units are capable of exploiting signals, imag-

ery, signatures, counterintelligence, and human intel-ligence to provide the commander with early warningof enemy intentions, intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield, situation development, target development,force projection, and battle damage assessment. Theycan also direct EW against enemy C2, fire direction,and electronic guidance systems, as well as providecritical counterintelligence support to friendly com-mand force protection programs. These capabilitiescontribute both directly and indirectly to the effective-ness of combined arms operations.

Supporting UnitsOther units perform CS or CSS functions in war-

time and offer a variety of mission capabilities in op-erations other than war. Chemical, finance, legal,health service support, MP, personnel, maintenance,ammunition, public affairs, signal, supply, field ser-vices, and transportation units are all indispensable tooperations and offer a range of capabilities necessaryto a versatile force. They can comprise the early en-try component in strategic deployments.

Health service support and transportation unitswere the first Army elements deployed to Croatia in1992. MPs can facilitate large unit movements, assistin the restoration of civil order, provide counterdrugand antiterrorism capabilities, and support peacekeep-ing and disaster relief operations. Their organic com-bat power enhances their protection capability in bothwartime and peacetime operations.

Signal units enable effective battle command. Inforce-projection operations, signal units make split-based operations possible through the employment ofsatellite downlink equipment, which is vital to the in-tegration of the total force. Chemical units supportthe mobility and survivability battlefield function. De-contamination units, NBC reconnaissance elements,and smoke units contribute to force protection andmission accomplishment.

Each element of the Total Army is an importantpiece of the overall effort. Units are task-organizedand employed according to the mission and the situa-tion. They integrate their capabilities to ensure vic-tory across the entire range of military operations,while providing the maximum protection and care toAmerican soldiers.

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Force projection is the demonstrated ability to rap-idly alert, mobilize, deploy, and operate anywhere inthe world. It is a key element of power projection—the ability of the nation to apply all or some of theelements of national power to act in crises, to contrib-ute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.Power projection is a central element of US nationalsecurity and national military strategy. The Army con-tributes to this strategy as part of a joint team throughforce projection. Force projection applies to the en-tire Army, active and reserve components, based in oroutside the continental United States (OCONUS), andsupported by civilians.

Combatant commanders often attempt to resolvecrises within their AOR with forward-presence forces.A quick response may preclude escalation of crises.When such a response is not enough, the projection offorces from CONUS or another theater may be theonly recourse.

During Operation Just Cause, the armed forces ofthe United States rapidly assembled, deployed, andconducted an opposed entry operation. The well-tai-lored force involved in this operation simultaneouslyseized multiple key targets in Panama, virtually elimi-nating organized resistance in the space of a few hours.The operation demonstrated the capability of the USmilitary to project forces rapidly against oppositionwhile synchronizing multiple elements of combatpower.

Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Stormdramatically demonstrated the capability of the US tosynchronize assets at all levels of war and to respondto crises by rapidly projecting forces. Though theseoperations differed in terms of the threat faced, forcesinvolved, and duration of deployment, both providedinsights for future force-projection operations.

Force projection is inherently joint in nature. Keyto success is the synchronized employment of land,air, sea, special operations, and space forces and as-sets that provide the combatant commander a widerange of operational and tactical options.

Force projection usually begins asa contingency operation—a rapid response to a crisis.Alert may come without notice, bringing with it tre-mendous stress on soldiers and systems, accompaniedby pressure from the media for information. In anyevent, rapid, yet measured response is critical. A com-batant commander may be able to resolve the crisisand achieve theater aims faster by committing a smallerforward-presence force than by waiting for a largerbut less timely response option.

The Army participates in force projection in bothwar and operations other than war. US forces may beeither opposed or unopposed. Opposed operationsrequire a lethal and survivable forcible entry capabil-ity with forces prepared to fight immediately uponentry. Unopposed operations may afford an opportu-nity following arrival in theater to continue to buildcombat

CHAPTER 3

FORCE PROJECTION

CONTENTS

FORCE-PROJECTION CONSIDERATIONS 3-3Lethality for the Deploying Force........ 3-3Anticipation ........................................... 3-3Force Tailoring and Teamwork ............ 3-4Intelligence ............................................ 3-5Battle Command ................................... 3-5Logistics ................................................ 3-6Training .................................................. 3-6Combined Operations .......................... 3-6Media Impact ......................................... 3-7Postconflict Considerations ................ 3-7

FORCE-PROJECTION OPERATIONS ......... 3-7Mobilization ........................................... 3-7Predeployment Activity ........................ 3-9Entry Operations................................. 3-10Operations ............................................ 3-11War Termination and Postconflict Operations ................... 3-11Redeployment and Reconstitution ... 3-12Demobilization .................................... 3-12

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During the 1991 Persain Gulf Conflict, the military was once again called upon to respond to crisis. Inthe early hours of 2 August 1990, an Iraqi force of more than 100,000 soldiers, spearheaded by threearmored divisions, invaded Kuwait.

On 7 August, the NCA directed the deployment of US forces in response to Saudi Arabia’s request forassistance. USCENTCOM responded rapidly, placing the first US solider on the ground within 31 hoursof the initial alert order.

Operation Desert Shield was a two-phase operation. The first phase involved the initial deployment offorces to deter further Iraqi aggression and to defend Saudi Arabia. The second phase included thesubsequent deployment of forces to resource the coalition with a robust counteroffensive capability thatcould evict the Iraqi Army from Kuwait. Although some units did not begin to deploy until late November,they were in place and combat-ready by early February 1991.

The tailoring of a proper force mix for this operation required the mobilization of 140,000 Army guards-men and reservists - the largest mobilization since World War II. During this force-projection operation,the Army, supported by the other services, deployed a force equivalent in size to eight divisions and theirsupporting forces -some 300,000 soldiers and 60 days of supplies - from the United States and Europe, allwithin a period of six months.

Operation Desert Storm also consisted of two primary phases. CENTCOM initiated a 34-day air opera-tion on 17 January 1991 to gain the initiative by attacking critical Iraqi targets, such as C2 facilities,missile sites, nuclear facilities, and chemical and biological weapons sites, before shifting its focus to theattrition of Iraqi ground units. These operations set the stage for land operations which began in the earlymorning hours of 24 February 1991. Less than 100 hours later much of the Iraqi Army in the Kuwaititheater was destroyed, and the remainder was in flight. Organized resistance ceased, and the alliedcoalition won a victory of unprecedented dimensions.

The destruction of the Iraqi Army did not end the campaign in the Persian Gulf. Units rapidly began tofocus on postconflict activities. Task Force Freedom began operations to restore Kuwait. The task forcewas charged with assisting in explosive ordance disposal, public safety, health service support, food andwater distribution, sanitation, conversion of currency, reopening of banking and public school systems,and restoration of telephone, radio, and television service.

Task Force Freedom provided invaluable assistance in restoring the Kuwaiti infrastructure and returninga degree of normalcy to the country. Within occupied Iraq, for a period of more than six weeks, US Armyforces provided humanitarian assistance, restored order, opened schools, and resettled almost 20,000Iraqi refugees into Saudi Arabia.

Operation Provide Comfort, a joint and combined postconflict activity with extensive SOF involvement,focused on providing humanitarian relief and protection to the displaced Kurdish population of Iraq,following an unsuccessful attempt by Kurdish rebels to overthrow the Iraqi government.

Even as this postconflict activity continued, units no longer needed for the campaign began to redeploy tohome stations and to reconstitute in preparation for future operations. Reserve component individualsand units no longer needed an active duty demobilized. The Persian Gulf campaign—a force-projectionoperation—thus went full cycle.

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power, to train, and to acclimate. Both demand a ver-satile mix of light, armored, and special operationsforces that are organized, trained, equipped, and poisedto respond quickly. To ensure a rapid response capa-bility, yet retain the flexibility to contend with situa-tions requiring a larger military response, the Armydesignates units as forward presence, crisis response,initial reinforcement, follow-on reinforcement, and re-constitution. FM 100-17 discusses these units in de-tail.

FORCE-PROJECTIONCONSIDERATIONS

Force-projection operations will challenge Armyleaders. Early critical decisions, set against a back-drop of uncertainty and friction, will be required atevery level—strategic, operational, and tactical—inwar and in operations other than war. The commanderand the force will routinely be required to plan andexecute multiple concurrent activities. Decisions madeearly will begin to set conditions for successful mis-sion accomplishment.

Mobilization and deployment may occur simulta-neously or sequentially. Senior leaders will decidewhen and whom to mobilize based on national policy,force requirements, and strategic aims. Seldom willeach of the three be clear at the outset.

The purpose of force projection is mission accom-plishment and not merely entry into the area of opera-tions (AO). The entire flow and commitment of forceis focused to that end. Deployment itself—its methodand embarkation and debarkation points—depends onthe type and timing of available lift, urgency of thecrisis, LOCs, and destination. Enemy capabilities,however, affect all of the above. Operational designand tactical execution in force projection are designedto overcome the latter, as well as any other obstaclesthat impede success.

Force projection is a complex process in whicheach action impacts upon many others. Units shouldnot expect to move cleanly from one stage of forceprojection to the next. The initial entry of forces intothe contingency area could lead immediately to directcombat. Deployed forces and LOCs require protec-tion. Intelligence might lack detail, especially in theinitial period, since tactical units must pull intelligencefrom national data bases. The capabilities and extentof cooperation from the host nation may be unknown.

Missions might change at any point in the operation.For example, a humanitarian relief mission mightchange to peacekeeping, which in turn could transi-tion to peace enforcement or actual wartime opera-tions.

Despite the complexity of force-projection opera-tions, Army forces are able to execute them success-fully. The fundamentals discussed in Chapter 2 applyfully to force projection. The following additional keyconsiderations also apply.

LETHALITY FOR THE DEPLOYING FORCEAn important strategic consideration for planning

contingency operations that involve the potential forcombat is to introduce credible, lethal forces early.Commanders should be prepared to deploy sufficientcombat power to resolve a crisis on favorable terms.From a strategic perspective, the rapid insertion ofhighly lethal forces can convince a potential adver-sary that further aggression is too costly, paralyzingthe enemy’s initiative before he can consolidate hisgains. These forces must be interoperable and flex-ible to take into account unforeseen circumstances asthe main body closes into the objective area.

In all contingencies, the early entry force must pos-sess the required lethality to accomplish the missionand to protect the force the moment it arrives in the-ater. Commanders cannot always depend on havingthe time to build up lethal forces in a theater. A tai-lored force with enough assets—such as SOF, airborneand air assault forces, attack aviation, electronic war-fare assets, long-range precision munitions, and ac-cess to and influence over strategic and theater intelli-gence assets—might enable the deploying force to de-ter the enemy from attacking critical functions such asC2 nodes, logistics sustainability, and maneuver for-mations.

ANTICIPATIONThe first rule of anticipation in a force-projection

era is to expect to be alerted and deployed. Command-ers everywhere in the Army must hold that view. Sucha level of anticipation causes military forces to men-tally and physically prepare for force projection. Ifunits have been assigned a region of focus in peace-time, planning can occur long before alert and deploy-ment. Appropriate actions include ordering and post-ing

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maps, studying available infrastructures, familiarizingsoldiers with the language, training soldiers for de-ployment, and sensitizing soldiers to a particular cul-ture. Key to successful anticipation is continuous forcetracking, total asset visibility during deployment, andcontinuous intelligence preparation of the battlefield(IPB) of the contingency area.

In addition to direct broadcast from collection plat-forms, analyzed, predictive, and all-source intelligence(ASI) reports and assessments must be transmitted tothe tactical commander. These activities help unitsmaintain a high state of combat readiness. If possible,officers and noncommissioned officers should conductan early leaders’ reconnaissance of the AO.

Generally, decisions made after the alert as to size,composition, and deployment sequences of Armyforces will begin to set the conditions for later suc-cess. Senior commanders and staffs must provide im-mediate and intense problem solving and forecasting,based on known METT-T. Commanders must ensurethat they do not foreclose options the deployed forcemay need later. Proper planning should give the op-erational commander the resources and dispositionsto deal with any eventuality that might jeopardize ei-ther mission accomplishment or protection of the force.

Uncertainty and chance combine to confound the bestplans. Even with extensive planning, the nature of theoperation will often change significantly before satis-factory execution. Plans must be simple, deploymentoptions redundant, and deployment flow sufficientlyversatile to generate alternative options. Simplicity inplanning and the ability to adapt will help ensure suc-cess.

Early deploying forces must have the combat ca-pability to establish and protect lodgments from themoment of arrival. The ability to fight at the outset iscrucial to the successful execution of the theater cam-paign plan since hostilities can begin at any time.

FORCE TAILORING AND TEAMWORKForce tailoring is the process of determining the

right mix and sequence of units. Forces on quick alertmay have little opportunity to tailor forces.Predesignated load plans might not precisely matchthe contingency for which they deploy. Their forcepackages, however, should include sufficient combatpower to sustain and protect them for the short term,wherever they might go. Follow-on forces can thenbe tailored to meet the specific concerns of the long-term mission.


During the weekend of 18-19 August 1990, the vice chief of staff of the Army and senior Department of theArmy staff officers met with the commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps on the green ramp at Pope AirForce Base. The 82d Airborne Division had already prepared soldiers and equipment for immediatedeployment to secure an air base in Saudi Arabia. Having considered the factors of operational METT-T, the immediate concern of the senior officers present was the threat of an Iraqi armor attack on theinitial deploying force of infantrymen.

As the soldiers waited on the ramp for whatever aircraft would arrive, C-141, C5A, or Civilian ReserveAir Fleet (CRAF), the officers decided that sufficient protection was needed to deploy with the lightforces. This was task-organization on the move. Sections or platoons—not company- or battalion-sizeunits—were already on the ramp, waiting to be woven into the hastily improvised time-phased forcedeployment list (TPFDL). These were sections or platoons of Sheridans with antitank capability, long-range multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), some deep intelligence satellite downlink equipment, andother BOSs. This additional equipment was critical to the operation in order to protect the force and holdthe airhead that would be vital for the rest of the Army’s deploying forces.

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Commanders consider the factors of METT-T,strategic lift, pre-positioned assets, and host nationsupport when they tailor forces. For an unopposed entryoperation, for example, a commander might schedulelogistics, engineer, MP, and special operations unitsto deploy early, particularly if faced with limited hostnation support and infrastructure. Faced with an op-posed entry operation, the commander would tailorhis flow and mix differently, placing more combat unitsin the early deploying echelons. Commanders mightfind they need to substitute one type of unit for an-other or to add units that have never trained togetherbefore. This places a premium on early and continu-ous teamwork. Such early and continuous teamwork,emphasized by visits and other contacts, builds thecohesion in the new team that is essential for missionsuccess. Whether planning for war or operations otherthan war, commanders must select a force composi-tion appropriate for the mission, build the team, andplan for simultaneous deployment and expeditiousemployment of the force.

INTELLIGENCEThe rapid introduction of US forces requires ac-

curate, detailed, continuous, and timely intelligence,especially during the critical early deployment deci-sion windows. Therefore, key intelligence personneland equipment must arrive in the theater early. Com-batant commanders, in their peacetime regional intel-ligence assessments, and host nation support person-nel should determine the availability of infrastructuresuch as roads and railroads, ports and airfields, mate-rials handling equipment, construction materials, wa-ter, storage facilities, and similar resources. Theyshould also assess the capabilities of potential enemies.In the early days of a crisis, uncertainties and higherrisks dictate the need for rapid intelligence updates.Planning time is typically short, and units may have tooperate in areas where few intelligence-gathering ca-pabilities exist. Therefore, tactical commanders andunits will not normally be able to produce answers totheir intelligence requirements, but will rely on moresenior echelons. They will need to gain timely intelli-gence from the full integration of national and theaterassets.

Early deploying units usually face a maze of com-plex information requirements—some relating to theenemy, others to local laws, bureaucratic procedures,availability of facilities, and similar considerations.This ability of theater or national intelligence sources

to fulfill tactical intelligence requirements and toremain responsive to dynamic, lower-echelon needsis key to the success of early deploying tactical ech-elons. Force-projection operations need accurate andresponsive tactical intelligence. In any case, command-ers must include in the tailoring considerations how tosatisfy their intelligence requirements for the missioneither by providing early arriving intelligence units,ensuring connectivity with national assets, or both.

BATTLE COMMANDForce-projection operations will greatly tax battle

command. The deployment phase of an operation mayresult in the physical separation of units in space andtime, thus causing units to be separated from the nexthigher headquarters. Soldiers may arrive by air, whiletheir equipment arrives by sea at a separate location,particularly if the deployment is unopposed. Someunits might not arrive in the order anticipated, whileothers might report to new organizations upon arrivalin theater. The enemy may attack unexpectedly be-fore deployment is complete. This may cause somecommanders to fight without their entire complementof forces present.

Commanders must contend with the simultaneouschallenges of deployment, entry, and combat, retain-ing the capability to adjust to evolving conditions ofeach. Simplicity and the ability to adapt and adjustare key considerations. Tactical commanders mustadapt to the nature of the deployment flow and pre-pare plans that rapidly build combat power, providefor security of the force, and facilitate future opera-tions.

Commanders and staffs must have robust com-mand and intelligence means during force projection.Army and joint systems must accurately track friendlyforces and forecast their arrival in the theater so thatcommanders can react to last-minute adjustments.These forecasts provide flexibility and help command-ers keep their options open. Space-based systems cangreatly facilitate the commander’s real-time knowl-edge of unit status and visibility of other key assets, aswell as supplement other intelligence systems. Estab-lishing adequate communications networks may re-quire linking with compatible commercial systems.

Commanders require home station, en route, andin-theater communications means that are secure,reliable,

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and timely. They should be compatible with the mixof supporting forces and services within the region,including civilian agencies of the US Government.Units must rapidly establish communications channelswith other organizations and services participating inthe operation.

Battle command in force projection requires con-siderable initiative at the small-unit level since com-mand echelons are frequently separated. It also re-quires leaders to wargame possible deviations fromplans caused by deployment problems or enemy ac-tion. A teamwork-oriented command climate that en-courages initiative and a reasonable tolerance for un-expected friction-caused imperfections will ensuresuccess.

LOGISTICSSuccessful force projection requires tailorable,

flexible logistics. The nature of logistical projectiondepends upon the size of the force, the maturity of thetheater, the availability of in-theater stockage, and hostnation support capabilities. Existing theater infrastruc-ture greatly affects both logistics and operational plan-ning. The availability of ports, roads, and other assetswill affect the sequencing of units and tempo of entryoperations. Chapter 14 discusses infrastructure con-siderations in detail, while Chapter 12 describes hostnation support.

Force projection may require the development offorward support bases, intermediate staging bases, andlodgments in theater with associated over-the-shoreor airflow requirements. Contracted logistics may pro-vide some initial support and augment military capa-bilities. Split-based logistical operations reduce theburden on the deployment flow and preclude unnec-essary stockage in theater. A split-based logistics con-cept relies on assured communications systems thatallow much of the logistics base to remain in CONUS,receive and act on information, and send necessarysupplies forward.

Logistical capabilities are critical duringpostconflict activity. Logistical units are often amongthe last to redeploy, due to the continuing need fortheir services during this turbulent period. Logisticalunits may become the main effort during and afterconflict termination.

TRAININGDemanding and relevant training is important.

When alerted to deploy, units build upon home-sta-tion training by focusing on missions and conditionsthey expect to encounter during a contingency. Giventime and mission requirements, commanders mightchoose to use better training facilities at home stations,thus deploying some units later. Commanders and unitsmust also anticipate soldiers being separated from theirequipment during movement and plan training accord-ingly. Leaders must use time to their advantage byconducting mission-essential individual and collectivetraining during deployment.

Although training begins at home stations, it con-tinues throughout the entire operation. Units continueto train to standard and to rehearse following arrivalin theater and throughout the conduct of operations astime, the enemy, and other conditions permit. Les-sons learned should be passed from unit to unit andfrom early deploying units to those deploying later.This task requires extensive planning and coordina-tion even when units are not in combat. In order tomaintain readiness for future operations, training con-tinues after hostilities cease. Units must consider thepriority for ranges and the allocation of training am-munition for weapons that need to be test-fired, ze-roed, and bore-sighted.

COMBINED OPERATIONSCombined operations occur when two or more na-

tions combine their efforts in a military operation.Force-projection operations will almost always involveoperations with other nations. Measures taken toachieve unity of effort and mutual trust—such asinteroperability, well-understood C2 structures, liai-son, and interpreters—greatly facilitate operations.Commanders and soldiers should be sensitive to cul-tural differences that may impact on operations. As-sets that can facilitate a smooth transition to combinedoperations may already be in the theater. Among thesecould be the US ambassador and his country team, USforeign-area officers stationed in country, and US ci-vilian contractors who may know the area well andare proficient in the local language.

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MEDIA IMPACTThe impact of visual media on the conduct of mili-

tary operations is substantially greater today than inany previous time. During the Vietnam War, theAmerican public was exposed for the first time to thehorrors of war on the evening news. However, thescenes covered by the news media during that war wererecorded on film or tape, edited, then shown as muchas 48 hours later. Despite the great impact those sceneshad on the public, they were not nearly as powerful asthe impact global network news has as it transmits on-going action live into the homes of millions of peoplearound the world. News coverage of the destructionon the Kuwait City-to-Basrah road during OperationDesert Storm clearly had an impact on military com-manders and policymakers. When hostilities begin,tactical field commanders are normally separated fromthe media’s visual presentations, which are usuallyavailable at the theater and national levels. Since theseimages might condition the tempo of the operation,tactical commanders need to be aware of them so theycan better anticipate.

The importance of understanding the immediacyof the impact of raw television coverage is not so thatcommanders can control it, but so they can anticipateadjustments to their operations and plans. Providingearly and continuous access to the press throughoutthe force-projection stages enhances operations andstrengthens public support. Misuse of this elementcan endanger units and weaken public support. Withinthe command, an effective internal information pro-gram also enhances the morale of soldiers, reinforcestraining and safety messages, and corroborates mediareports for both soldiers and their families.

POSTCONFLICT CONSIDERATIONSEven during the predeployment activity stage, se-

nior Army and joint commanders, together with theState Department and other agencies, consider issuesrelated to the strategic end state, postconflict activi-ties, and the transition to peace. Early decisions re-garding the mobilization of specific assets and theirplace in the deployment flow provide an importantfoundation for operations after the fighting stops. Atevery level, analysis of the strategic objectives for theoperation should always include consideration of theanticipated consequences of the war to help smooththe transition from active combat to postconflict op-erations.

FORCE-PROJECTIONOPERATIONS

Force-projection operations follow a general se-quence, although the stages often overlap in space andtime. These operations seldom begin with a clear ideaof the entire package or purpose. Often, deploymentrequirements develop by bits and pieces, with a fewfalse starts and subsequent large adjustments. Enemyactions further change the equation. Force-projectionoperations do not end when units arrive in theater.They end when the mission is completed and the lastsoldier returns.

Commanders should assume no set arrangementof events. Rather, they should be prepared to deal withmany activities. They should conceptualize a logicalflow through stages, as long as the force remains physi-cally and mentally prepared to adjust as the situationdevelops. The stages usually include mobilization (ifnecessary), predeployment activities, deployment,entry operations, operations, postconflict or postcrisisoperations, redeployment, and demobilization.

These stages may not be distinct. Activities ofone stage will often blend with another. Force buildupand preparation for major operations, for example, mayblend into deployment and entry operations. Also,combat operations might begin well before the entireforce arrives in theater. The following paragraphs dis-cuss potential stages of force-projection operations.

MOBILIZATIONMobilization is a process in which the armed forces

augment the active component capability in prepara-tion for war or other national emergencies. Mobiliza-tion includes activating all or part of the reserve com-ponents as well as assembling and organizing person-nel, supplies, and material and certifying the profi-ciency of individuals and units.

The Army Mobilization and Operations Planningand Execution System (AMOPES) provides a guidefor Army mobilization planning and participation injoint operations. This system supports the rapid mo-bilization of selected assets for specific, limited con-tingencies such as Operation Just Cause. It also ac-commodates the extended mobilization necessary to

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support large, protracted conflicts such as World WarII. The mobilization system includes five levels:

• Selective mobilization.• Presidential selected reserve call-up (PSRC).• Partial mobilization.• Full mobilization.• Total mobilization.

These levels might not be implemented sequen-tially. Rather, a flexible decision-making process re-ferred to as graduated mobilization response (GMR)controls the pace and extent of mobilization. GMRtriggers readiness and response actions incrementallyto provide timely yet reversible steps to increase theUS national security emergency preparedness posture.The actual mobilization flow for a unit includes fivephases: planning, alert, home station, mobilizationstation, and port of embarkation. Details of the mobi-lization process are in FM 100-17.


The projection of American military power to the Republic of Korea in July 1950 provided a costly lessonin strategic and military unreadiness. Ambiguous national policy had clouded the issue of South Korea’sinclusion under the US defense umbrella when North Korean armies crossed the 38th Parallel on 25June. Lack of planning for conventional war in the new nuclear age, together with postwar occupationconcerns and weak defense budgets, had left the US Army understrength and undertrained to projectforces quickly.

In June 1950, active Army strength stood at 593,000, with 10 active divisions: 5 in the CONUS generalreserve (140,000 soldiers), 4 in Japan (111,000), and 1 in Germany. All units were far understrength.Infantry regiments had only 2 of their 3 battalions, most artillery battalions had only 2 of their 3 firingbatteries, and organic armor was generally lacking.

Planners had to fill out the Far East divisions by stripping the CONUS general reserve of infantry battal-ions, other untis, and individual replacements. In two months, the strength of the general reserve hadfallen to 90,000, losing most of its capacity to react to a major contingency. Since the active Army, withglobal defense responsibilities, could not focus on Korea alone, reserve component troops and units werecalled to duty. They were used both to reconstitute the depleted general reserve and to provide a reserviorof units and individuals to reinforce Far East Command and strengthen European defenses. Eight ArmyNational Guard divisions were federalized during the course of the conflict.

Fortunately, the United States could project forces initially from Japan. But the four divisions underGeneral Douglas MacArthur’s Far East Command were severely undermanned, and the early US re-sponse was perilously weak. Task Force Smith, the initial, lightly equipped contingent of the 24th Divi-sion, suffered heavy casualties against enemy armor in a costly delaying action. Three of the Japan-based divisions deployed in July 1950, the fourth being stripped for fillers and replacements before even-tually following. Only one additional division could be spared from unready and depleted CONUSgeneral reserve deploying in September 1950. But the buildup was painful.

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PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITYSuccessful force-projection capabilities rely on a

foundation of fully trained, well-led, properly equippedand sustained units and soldiers. All units in the Army,whether active or reserve components, within CONUSor OCONUS, are an integral part of the force-projec-tion strategy. Thus, unit METLs must reflect appro-priate mobilization and deployment tasks. Also, unittraining must emphasize and integrate critical aspectsof force projection.

When required to deploy forces in response to acrisis, the Army tailors them based upon the missionassigned by the combatant commander and availableresources. The theater campaign plan will specify thecommand, intelligence, and logistics relationshipsamong the services. It should also specify any com-bined operations relationships, if known. Intelligencepreparation must begin as early as possible to allowcommanders to develop adequate plans. The deploy-ing force achieves this through split-based operations,which integrate CONUS-based national systems withforward-deploying tactical systems. Anticipatory lo-gistics planning during this stage is key to successfulexecution of later stages. While always important,OPSEC is critical during this stage to deny the enemyintelligence that he may use against friendly forcesduring deployment and entry operations.

Army commanders must prioritize lift require-ments consistent with METT-T. The combatant com-mander or JFC can then establish the sequence in whichArmy units should deploy relative to the movement offorces of the other services. Early decisions on se-

quencing will solidify the time-phased force and de-ployment data (TPFDD), determine the time requiredto deploy the force, and initialize the theater distribu-tion plan.

DEPLOYMENTThe Joint Operation Planning and Execution Sys-

tem (JOPES) provides the umbrella structure for thedeployment of Army units. Deployment planning toolsmust allow commanders to adapt to rapidly changingcircumstances. Sealift and airlift assets are limited yetcritical to the successful projection of the force. TheArmy therefore makes every effort to integrate thecapabilities of the deploying force with host nationsupport and forward-presence capabilities to maximizethe available airlift and sealift. US Army forces aretrained, structured, and postured for rapid deployment.Light forces are based close to major airports. Ar-mored forces are located near major rail nets, assist-ing rapid displacement to seaports.

Army forces, capable of striking worldwide re-gardless of weather, terrain, location, or threat, pro-vide the predominant ground element to joint forces.Commanders must balance the factors of METT-Tagainst available airlift and sealift assets to determinethe composition of the initial response force. Whentime is critical, light and SOF Army units may be thebest for initial deployment.

Light-armored, cavalry, and selected aviation unitscan deploy more quickly than heavier armored unitsand enhance the firepower and flexibility of earlydeploying forces. Armored forces, if required, will

Years of undertraining and neglected weapon development placed Army units in battle against a better-equipped enemy that was superior in numbers. The time needed to fill out and train the half-strengthGuard division delayed deployment of the first two Guard divisions to March 1951. One year after theoutbreak of hostilities, the Eight Army reached the level of eight divisions, which maintained for theduration of the conflict.

MacArthur’s brilliant amphibious flanking stroke at Inchon in September 1950 broke the initial NorthKorean thrust. But almost three years of arduous combat up and down the Korean peninsula - ending ina stalemate in July 1953 - was the price paid for American unreadiness to meet the force-projectionchallenges of American’s global leadership responsiblities.

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simultaneously upload for deployment by sea. Eachcrisis will have unique demands, causing command-ers to balance the speed with which light and SOFunits can deploy against the greater lethality and pro-tection provided by heavier forces. In deployment,commanders must maintain versatility and agility inforce mix, combat capability, sustainment, and lift,along with the need to forecast future events that callfor decisions early in the deployment stage.

ENTRY OPERATIONSThe requirements of entry operations following

deployment will vary. Entry may be in direct supportof host nation or forward-presence forces. In some in-stances conditions may dictate that operations be con-ducted in the absence of either. Entry may be eitheropposed or unopposed. Commanders sequence com-bat units and supporting structures into the contingencyarea in a manner that enables them to gain and sustainthe initiative and protect the force.

Unopposed EntryWhenever possible, US forces seek unopposed

entry, entering the theater peacefully with the assis-tance of the host nation. Early deploying units mayflow through airports or seaports into a lodgment area.From this area, they will prepare to assist forward-presence or host nation forces, protect the force,reconfigure, build combat capability, train, and accli-mate to the environment. Entry during operations otherthan war will normally be unopposed. However, evenin an apparently benign entry operation, protection ofthe force remains a critical command consideration.

Opposed EntryAn opposed entry requires combat operations to

land deploying forces in the theater. If the circum-stances are right, the entry and combat operationsstages could combine in a coup de main, achievingthe strategic objectives in a single major operation.Operation Just Cause, conducted in Panama in 1989,is such an example. When this type of operation isnot possible, Army forces will typically gain, secure,and expand a lodgment as part of the joint team beforeconducting combat operations. The operation is atgreatest risk during opposed entry operations in whichunits move directly to combat operations. Often thiswill be the first contact between US forces and theenemy.

Commanders make maximum use of joint capa-bilities to ensure early lethality and security of the forceby engaging the enemy in depth. Early entry forcesmay have to move immediately to combat operationsto take advantage of an opportunity, protect the force,or even conduct retrograde operations to gain time foradditional force buildup. Situations are likely to arisewith little or no advance warning. Opposed entry op-erations will require the full synchronization of jointcapabilities in order to place large ground forces inthe theater.

Early Entry DecisionsThe initial decisions in force-projection operations

will often be the most critical. These decisions nor-mally fall into an early deployment time window. Oncedecisions are made and the operation begins, adjust-ments, while necessary, become more difficult. Thus,it is vital that commanders and staffs focus immedi-ately on deployment, early entry, and force placementin the theater decisions. The essential trade-off is be-tween projecting force rapidly and projecting the rightmix of combat power and resources to accomplish themission. The selection of the earliest arriving unitswill have far-reaching implications.

If the right units deploy early, they may help theforce maintain a balanced posture, ready to respond tounforeseen events. In areas with substantial infrastruc-ture, the commander may more heavily weight hisforce with combat units. When entry is made into anarea requiring infrastructure enhancement, CS and CSSunits will be needed early in the flow and will reducethe number of combat units arriving early in theater.

These decisions are most difficult when combathas not begun, yet the enemy is capable of sudden,effective opposition. In such cases, the commandermust seek a balance that provides protection of hisforce, efficient deployment, ad a range of feasible re-sponse options—should the enemy attack. Joint forcecooperation is particularly critical in this phase. Airand naval forces may have to compensate for an ini-tial lack of ground combat power that can reach deep.

Forces are most vulnerable and the success of thecontingency operation at greatest risk during initialentry. This vulnerability is acute when the enemypossesses weapons of mass destruction. Defensive andoffensive operations to counter these weapons willaffect both Army and joint planning. Protecting theforce

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will be critical to the success of this phase of the op-eration because of extreme vulnerability.

Even as the commander begins entry operations,his main focus shifts to building up his capabilities inpreparation for operations. Projection of the force andrapid buildup may include establishing forward oper-ating and logistics bases, closing the remainder of theforce, expanding the lodgment, linking up with otherforces, and preparing for future operations.

Placement of the force on the ground must not onlyachieve initial mission success but also have forcesarrayed on the ground to maximize future employmentoptions. The commander works to acclimate and trainarriving soldiers. Whether or not units are in combat,the emphasis is on seizing the initiative early and con-trolling events from this point in time forward. To doso, commanders at all levels generate as many optionsas possible by skillfully positioning maneuver andsupport assets, protecting the force, refining intelli-gence assessments, and using fires appropriately. Sus-taining the tempo of operations is especially impor-tant. The success of operations may hinge on swiftresponse in peacetime or on the rapid generation ofcombat power in conflict to prevent losing the initia-tive.

OPERATIONSIn operations involving combat, the JFC will at

some point decide to move against the enemy. Thispoint in time may be predetermined and stated in thecampaign plan, or it may be tied to specific enemyactions. In either case, the commander bases his deci-sion on sufficient information and a clear picture ofthe enemy. Occasionally, commitment might be re-quired before such a picture is available. At this point,the ground commander might reposition forces to fa-cilitate the imminent start of combat.

The arrangement of forces on the ground in rela-tion to one another, the terrain, and the enemy shouldallow the maximum number of employment options.Sometimes such positioning will be at a significantoffset from the actual operational area, thus continu-ing the reliance tactical commanders must place ontheater and national intelligence assets. In order toparalyze the enemy and rapidly gain the initiative forfriendly forces, commanders normally seek to engageenemy forces simultaneously throughout the depth andspace of the operational arena.

As he begins operations, the ground commander

assembles sufficient, sustained combat power towin the decisive battles. He allocates enough com-bat power to supporting efforts to ensure overall vic-tory. Force agility, initiative, and synchronized op-erations in depth characterize the rapid generation ofcombat power for ground operations. The ground com-mander may have initially dispersed his maneuverforces out of range of most enemy direct-fire and in-direct-fire systems. In order to conduct decisive ac-tion, he maneuvers them to gain the best positionaladvantage over the enemy. This maneuver eventuallyresults in close combat with enemy forces.

Reconnaissance and force protection remain cru-cial to the joint and ground commanders’ plans as theyengage the enemy in combat operations. Actions tocounter the enemy’s reconnaissance, intelligence, sur-veillance, and target acquisition efforts help maintainthe conditions created earlier for decisive operations.Deception operations continue to mislead the enemycommander as to the timing, intent, and location offriendly forces, as well as to the objectives of the op-eration. Commanders conduct their operations againstthe backdrop of a sound logistics concept integratedwith their concept of combat operations. Conduct ofcombat operations within the theater is described indetail in later chapters. Commanders also seek deci-sive results in operations other than war, although theapproach may be quite different than for obtainingsuccessful results in war.

WAR TERMINATION ANDPOSTCONFLICT OPERATIONS

Successful combat operations are designed to bringan end to the war. When a cessation of hostilities or atruce is called, deployed forces transition to a periodof postconflict operations. This transition can occureven if residual combat operations are still underwayin parts of the theater of operations. Anticipation andappropriate planning during earlier stages will smooththe transition during this critical period immediatelyafter the fighting stops.

The postconflict operations stage focuses on re-storing order and minimizing confusion following theoperation, reestablishing the host nation infrastructure,preparing forces for redeployment, and continuingpresence to allow other elements of national power toachieve the overall strategic aims. Postconflict opera-tions make demands at every level of command. Com-pany- and even squad-sized units may be called uponto conduct emergency humanitarian assistance andpopulation control, especially in remote areas. At

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higher echelons, commanders must engage in jointplanning with the State Department, relief agencies,and host nation officials to prepare for a smooth andrapid transition to host country rule.

Army forces are extremely well-suited forpostconflict operations. The Army has the skills andstaying power to control prisoners, handle refugees,mark mine fields and destroy unexploded ordnance,provide emergency health service support, providehumanitarian assistance and support the social needsof the civilian population, provide emergency restora-tion of utilities and other civil affairs, and perform otherrequired humanitarian assistance activities. During thepostconflict stage, commanders emphasize those ac-tivities that reduce postconflict or postcrisis turmoiland help stabilize the situation until other US, interna-tional, interagency, or host nation agencies assumecontrol.

The postconflict stage may be interrupted by theresumption of hostilities. Thus, units must rapidly con-solidate, reconstitute, train, and otherwise prepare toremain in theater should fighting resume. During thistime, force protection is vital in order to prevent iso-lated enemy individuals or forces from engaging indestructive operations.

REDEPLOYMENT AND RECONSTITUTIONThe objective in this stage is to redeploy assets no

longer needed. Postconflict requirements have a di-rect impact on the redeployment flow. The extent ofthis impact is dependent upon the amount of disrup-tion caused by the crisis and the measures and

forces required to resolve it. Commanders contend withthe same challenge as in deployment, balancing thefactors of METT-T against available lift assets. Forcesand materiel not required for subsequent operationswill redeploy to CONUS or their home theater andprepare for future missions. Redeploying forces mustalso prepare for deployment to areas other than homestations on short notice. Protection of the force duringredeployment is as critical as during deployment orany other stage of the operation. Planners mustalso consider the significant resources required forpackaging and preparation. Successful redeploymentmay require contractor and host nation support.

Reconstitution activities can begin in the theaterprior to redeployment. These include rebuilding unitintegrity and accounting for soldiers and equipment.These activities continue after arrival in CONUS orhome theater, with focus on the reconstitution of unitsto premobilization levels of readiness, the regenera-tion of logistics stockpiles, and the accountability ofmobilized equipment and supplies.

DEMOBILIZATIONDemobilization is the process by which units, in-

dividuals, and materiel transfer from active to apremobilization posture or to some other approvedposture. Although the overall focus of demobiliza-tion is generally on units and individuals, the demobi-lization of logistics also requires significant resourcessuch as supplies, materiel, and support activities.

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CHAPTER 4

JOINT OPERATIONS

Joint operations are the integrated military activi-ties of two or more service components—Army, Navy,Air Force, Marine Corps—of the US military. Thischapter describes considerations associated with plan-ning and executing these integrated operations. Mod-ern warfare is fluid and dynamic. Future circumstancesare difficult to predict with any certainty. A force-pro-jection army requires extraordinary flexibility in think-ing about operations because of the variety of combi-nations of joint forces available and the range of pos-sible circumstances for their employment. Army doc-trine stresses unified air, land, sea, and special opera-tions—all supported by space operations—through-out the theater of war. Army doctrine is compatiblewith and supports joint doctrine as described in JointPublications 1 and 3-0.

JOINT RELATIONSHIPS When the Army operates outside the United States,the area to which Army forces deploy will always bethe responsibility of a unified combatant commander.He provides strategic direction and operational focusto his forces by developing strategy, planning the the-ater campaign, organizing the theater, and establish-ing command relationships for effective unified andjoint operations.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPSA combatant commander may or may not be re-

sponsible for a geographical area. When he is, he isreferred to as a theater commander. This designationindicates that the President has assigned him a geo-graphical AOR or theater. Combatant commandersexercise combatant command of unified and jointforces in accordance with applicable law and the Uni-fied Command Plan. Joint Publication 0-2 providesadditional guidance. Joint forces consist of servicecomponents working together, subordinate unifiedcommands, JTFs, and joint functional componentcommands.

Each military service operates in accordance withservice and joint doctrine and is responsible for pro-viding a contingent of forces to the joint commands.These contingents are service components, but theymay have other titles such as theater army, naval fleet,fleet marine force, or theater air force. A CINC nor-mally assigns his forces to JTFs as he deems appropri-ate.

Joint forces operate within two distinct chains ofcommand—one for operations and another for admin-istrative and logistical matters (see Figure 4-1). Foroperations, the NCA issues orders through the Chair-man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to command-ers of unified and specified commands and to existingJTFs that are established by and report directly to theNCA. The CJCS, working with other members of theJCS, prepares plans and provides strategic directionto the armed forces, including commanders of unifiedand specified commands and existing JTFs. Thesecommanders are responsible to the NCA for accom-plishing their assigned tasks.

The military departments are responsible for train-ing, administration, and logistical support of theirforces wherever employed. They exercise this respon-sibility

CONTENTS

JOINT RELATIONSHIPS .............................. 4-1Command Relations ............................. 4-1 Combatant Command Authority ...... 4-2 Operational Control ........................... 4-2 Tactical Control .................................. 4-2 Support ............................................... 4-2Types of Commands............................. 4-2 Unified Commands ............................ 4-2 Specified Commands ........................ 4-4 Joint Task Force ................................ 4-4 Component Command ...................... 4-5

THEATER STRUCTURE ............................... 4-5

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through a separate service component chain of com-mand. Forces assigned to joint commands work di-rectly with their respective departments and serviceson these matters. Joint Publication 0-2 provides de-tailed information on command relationships; however,a brief discussion of the most common types of com-mand relationships follows:

Combatant Command AuthorityThe commanders of unified and specified com-

mands exercise combatant command (COCOM) au-thority over all assigned and attached forces. Thisbroad authority allows them to perform a variety offunctions, including organizing and employing com-mands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objec-tives, and directing military operations, joint training,and logistics necessary to accomplish assigned mis-sions. During contingencies COCOM can be expandedto give the combatant commander the authority to re-organize service component forces as necessary andto consolidate logistics support within the command.

Operational ControlSubordinate JFCs and service component com-

manders normally exercise operational control(OPCON). This command relationship provides fullauthority to organize commands and forces and em-ploy them as the commander considers necessary toaccomplish assigned missions. OPCON does not nor-mally include authority to direct logistics, administra-tion, internal organization, or unit training. JFCs usu-ally exercise OPCON through the service componentcommanders.

Tactical ControlTactical control (TACON) is the detailed and usu-

ally local direction and control of movement and ma-neuver necessary to accomplish missions and tasks.TACON allows commanders below combatant com-mand level to apply force and direct the tactical use oflogistics assets but does not provide authority to changeorganizational structure or direct administrative andlogistical support. Functional component command-ers frequently exercise TACON over their forces.

SupportSupport is the action of a force that aids, protects,

complements, or sustains another force. JFCs mayestablish support relationships to emphasize or clarifypriorities, provide a subordinate with an additional ca-pability, and combine the effects of similar assets. Joint

Publication 0-2 provides a detailed description of thetypes of support (general, direct, close, and mutual).

TYPES OF COMMANDSUnified and specified commands, subordinate uni-

fied commands, and JTFs are the three types of jointforces. Each joint force will normally have a servicecomponent for each of the services represented withinthe joint force. Each force may also include one ormore functional components, such as a joint force landcomponent commander (JFLCC) or a joint force spe-cial operations component commander (JFSOCC).Combatant commands and existing JTFs receive ad-ministrative and logistics support from their respec-tive military departments.

Unified CommandThe President establishes a unified command (a

combatant command) through the Secretary of De-fense, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, toperform a broad, continuing mission. Forces of twoor more services comprise this organization and oper-ate under the COCOM of a single, unified combatantcommander. He receives strategic guidance from theJCS and is responsible to the Secretary of Defense foraccomplishing his mission. The Unified CommandPlan assigns some CINCs specific AORs that includeall associated land, sea, and air space. Other unifiedcommanders are given certain functional responsibili-ties such as transportation and special operations.Functionally oriented unified commands operate acrossall geographic regions. As an example, the US Spe-cial Operations Command (USSOCOM) can provideforces to operate under the control of other JFCs, orthe NCA can direct it to conduct relatively indepen-dent operations worldwide. Joint Publication 3-05.3and 3-05.5 and FM 100-25 discuss the specifics of theprocess.

A unified combatant commander normally exer-cises COCOM through service component command-ers and the theater special operations command. Hemay establish a subordinate unified command to ac-complish a broad, continuing mission within the com-batant command or a JTF to conduct specific missions.In an emergency, the combatant commander has theauthority to use all facilities and supplies of assignedforces to accomplish the mission. US European Com-mand (USEUCOM) and US Pacific Command(USPACOM) are examples of geographical unifiedcommands.

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Figure 4-1. Joint Force Relationships.

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Specified CommandThe NCA may also direct the establishment of

specified commands (combatant commands) to accom-plish broad, continuing missions. A specified commandis primarily a single-service command, although it mayhave elements of other services assigned. Like a uni-fied command, a specified command receives strate-gic direction from the JCS.

Joint Task ForceThe Secretary of Defense and the commanders of

unified and specified commands, subordinate unifiedcommands, and existing JTFs may establish joint taskforces. Elements of two or more services operatingunder a single JTF commander comprise the task force.It performs missions having specific, limited objec-tives or missions of short duration. It normally dis-solves when it achieves its purpose. The JTF com-mander is responsible to the JTF establishing author-ity and has OPCON of assigned and attached forces.He normally augments his own staff with representa-tives from component forces.

Operation Urgent Fury—the 1983 US contingencyoperation in Grenada—illustrates the JTF concept. USAtlantic Command (LANTCOM) formed two JTFs forthis operation:

- JTF 123 combined Navy and Army SOF.- JTF 120 consisted of a Navy task group, a Navytask force composed primarily of a Marine expe-ditionary unit, and an Army task force composedof two brigades from the 82d Airborne Division.

A JTF could have both Marine and Army compo-nents assigned and operating independently as in theexample above. It also could have a JFLCC with allor selected land forces under his OPCON or TACON.The size of the ARFOR within the JTF varies with themission of the JTF, but a brigade, division, or corpsheadquarters normally commands and controlsARFOR. Many actions of the JTF may be tactical, butthe entire JTF operation is normally operational. TheJTF may often be the preferred organization for C2during the early stages of force-projection operations.

If the JTF operation requires the commitment oflarge land forces over a large land AO, the Army com-ponent commander may be the JTF commander. Hecould be a corps or numbered army commander. Thus,while usually fighting at the tactical or operationallevel, a corps commander (as a JTF commander) could

be required to plan and conduct a joint campaign toachieve strategic objectives, employing forces frommultiple services. In this event, the JTF establishingauthority should provide additional communications,intelligence, and planning capabilities.

Component CommandEach unified and subordinate unified command

has an Army component. The Army service compo-nent commander (ASCC) is responsible for properlyemploying his forces and accomplishing operationaltasks assigned by the joint commander. The ASCCestablishes the link between ARFOR and the joint com-mand, plans and executes operations in support of thejoint campaign, plans and executes support operationsto sustain subordinate ARFOR, and provides supportto other services in accordance with executive agentresponsibilities.

The ASCC is also responsible for overseeing in-ternal administration and discipline; training Armydoctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures; desig-nating specific units to meet joint force requirements;providing logistics functions normal to the component;ensuring tactical employment of service components;and providing service component intelligence opera-tions.

The choice of a functional command (for example,land component) or a component (for example,ARFOR) belongs to the theater commander. Due tothe more straightforward supporting relationships be-tween the parent services and the combatant commandstructure, ARFOR generally prefer the latter. How-ever, at times, operational considerations and geo-graphical conditions make functional command rela-tionships more appropriate. Major operations on landthat have immediate impact on one another, for ex-ample, may best be coordinated under a single landcomponent commander. In forced-entry operations,functional command may be the preferred method inorder to best synchronize limited combat power in earlystages of the buildup. However, for sustained opera-tions over time, component command offers someadvantages for long-term support arrangements.

Army execution of these roles can vary across thefull range of military operations. During peacetime,the ASCC is responsible for all of the ARFOR assignedto his command. During war and operations other thanwar, the combatant commander may elect to alter thepeacetime structure. For example, he might establishan Army command that reports directly to him and

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contains only the combat and CS forces assigned tothe Army service component. The ARFOR headquar-ters would respond directly to the combatant com-mander by planning and executing major operationsin support of the theater campaign. In this arrange-ment, the ASCC would plan and execute operationsto sustain these forces and other Army elements in thetheater.

The combatant commander might also designatethe senior commander of Army combat and supportforces as the JFLCC. The combatant commander couldthen place other land forces (US Marines or allies)under OPCON or TACON of the JFLCC. Likewise,Army forces could be placed under a JFLCC who isan officer from the US Marine Corps.

Finally, the combatant commander could estab-lish a subordinate theater of operations for a subunifiedcommand or a joint operations area (JOA) for a JTF,using an Army command as the controlling headquar-ters. In this case, the Army commander would haveOPCON or TACON of forces from at least two ser-vices and would plan and execute campaigns or majoroperations in support of the theater campaign. Thetheater army commander would continue to sustainArmy forces in the theater.

THEATER STRUCTUREThrough the application of operational art, the

CINC achieves theater focus by applying structure tothe theater. Theater structure is a product of the CINC’sstrategic objective, the forces allocated for the theater,the strategy for employment, the factors of METT-T,and the presence of alliance or coalition structures.

In operations other than war, CINCs focus theirefforts through the designation of an AO. If required,the AO may be further subdivided into a JOA, jointzone (JZ), or joint special operations area (JSOA).

In war, the CINC achieves focus through the des-ignation of a theater of war. Within that theater, singleor multiple theaters of operation can be formed. Mul-tiple theaters of operation are formed when there aremultiple major threats. A JSOA can also be desig-nated. The JSOA within the theater of war can over-lap into the theater of operations.

A theater of war does not normally encompass thetheater commander’s entire AOR. The theater com-mander may thus conduct combat operations within a

theater of war and react to a separate contingency in atheater of operations or JOA elsewhere in his AOR.Finally, he would continue normal peacetime activi-ties throughout the remainder of his AOR. Nation as-sistance and similar activities do not cease when higherlevels of violence arise. The theater environment isoften one of simultaneous activities across the fullrange of military operations.

The theater commander could also establish a com-bat zone (CZ) and communications zone (COMMZ).The CZ is an area required by combat forces to con-duct operations; it normally extends forward from theArmy rear boundary. The COMMZ constitutes therear portion of a theater of operations, reaching backto the CONUS base or perhaps to another combatantcommander’s AOR. The COMMZ contains those the-ater organizations, LOCs, and other agencies requiredto support forces in the field. The COMMZ includesair and seaports that support the flow of forces intothe theater. It is usually contiguous to the CZ but maybe separate—connected only by thin LOCs—in veryfluid, dynamic situations.

In writing the concept for the campaign, the the-ater commander and his staff need a clear picture ofthe potential theater organization and command rela-tionships. This picture helps them clarify the differ-ent phases of the campaign, determine priorities, andassign tasks. The theater commander has various op-tions available for exercising his COCOM authority.He can

- Task his service component commanders toconduct the major operations of the phases of thecampaign.- Organize a functional component (such as a jointforce land component or maritime component) and task its commander.- Activate a subordinate unified command anddesignate forces for employment in a particulararea.- Organize a JTF.- Task a single-service force.- Exercise COCOM over specific operationalforces (usually when they must remainimmediately responsive to him).

After visualizing the theater organization and com-mand relationships, the theater commander can com-plete his sequencing decisions, allocate forces, and

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prepare his campaign plan. Theater of war command-ers prepare campaign plans and their subordinate the-ater of operations commanders prepare subordinatecampaign plans. Functional component commandsprepare operations plans (OPLANs) for major opera-tions that support the campaign plan. A JTF may writea campaign plan when assigned a strategic objective.An Army corps commander might write a campaignplan if he is also the JTF commander. Theater servicecomponents and other supporting commands preparesupporting plans (such as reinforcement or logistics)and OPLANs (such as employment of forces).

During the planning of campaigns and major op-erations, the possible use of weapons of mass destruc-tion by the enemy is a significant consideration. Suchuse can affect the commander’s decisions on initialtheater organization. Friendly forces may be particu-larly vulnerable during the entry phase of a force-pro-jection operation. Chapter 6 discusses planning con-siderations associated with the potential use of theseweapons by an enemy.

Figure 4-2. Area of Responsibility

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CONTENTS

CONSIDERATIONS....................................... 5-1Goals and Objectives ........................... 5-1Military Doctrine and Training ............. 5-2Equipment ............................................. 5-2Cultural Differences.............................. 5-2Language ............................................... 5-2Teamwork and Trust ............................. 5-2

PLANNING AND CONDUCT ........................ 5-3Command .............................................. 5-3Maneuver ............................................... 5-3Fires ....................................................... 5-4Intelligence ............................................ 5-4Logistics ................................................ 5-4Liasion and Combined Staffs .............. 5-5

Combined operations involve the military forcesof two or more nations acting together in common pur-pose. If the relationship is longstanding and formal-ized by mutual political, diplomatic, and military agree-ments, it is referred to as an alliance. If the relation-ship is short term, ad hoc, and less formal, it is re-ferred to as a coalition.

From the American victory at Yorktown in 1781and throughout the US Army’s history, combined op-erations have remained central to its experience. Com-bined operations occur both in war and in operationsother than war. World War II, the Korean War, and the1991 Persian Gulf conflict are examples of combinedwarfare.

The US will often pursue its objectives throughcoalitions and alliances. In Operations Desert Shieldand Desert Storm, more than 800,000 military person-nel from 36 nations combined their will, forces, andresources to oppose the Iraqi military. These opera-tions, like many before them, demonstrated the ad-vantage of successful combined warfare over the uni-lateral efforts of a single nation. The coalition in-creased the size of the overall force, shared the cost ofwaging the war among the nations, and enhanced thelegitimacy of the strategic aims.

Nations usually form coalitions for focused, short-term purposes. Ad hoc methods are often required todeal with potential coalition issues. Occasionally, coa-litions mature into more formal alliance relationships.

Alliances afford the participant nations the timeto establish formal, standard agreements for broad,long-term objectives. Alliance nations strive to fieldcompatible military systems, structure common pro-cedures, and develop contingency plans to meet po-tential threats in a fully integrated manner. As thesenations plan and train together, theybecome more comfortable with one another, earn-ing mutual respect and trust. The North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) and the Combined Forces Com-mand in Korea are examples of such alliances.

CONSIDERATIONS Regardless of their structure, successful alliances andcoalitions exhibit similar traits. Commanders shouldunderstand the difficulties in forming a strong com-bined force and consider the following factors whenpreparing for combined operations.

GOALS AND OBJECTIVESNo two nations share exactly the same reasons for

entering into a coalition or alliance. Furthermore, eachnation’s motivation tends to change during the life ofthe union. National goals can be harmonized with anagreed-upon strategy, but often the words used in ex-pressing goals and objectives inten-tionally gloss over differences. Even in thebest of circumstances, nations act according to theirown national interests. Differing goals, often unstated,cause each nation to measure progress differently.Thus, participating nations in the coalition must agreeto clearly defined and mutually attainable objectives.

Successful coalitions and alliances build uponcommon purpose in combined operations. By empha-sizing commonalities, coalitions can reduce frictionand hold

CHAPTER 5

COMBINED OPERATIONS

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themselves together for the duration of operations.Maintaining cohesion and unity of effort requires un-derstanding and adjustment to the perceptions of allallied nations, allowing them to do those tasks theyfeel politically and militarily comfortable doing. Main-taining such cohesion among a coalition is an impor-tant factor for US Army forces to consider in both plan-ning and conducting operations.

MILITARY DOCTRINE AND TRAININGAll nations have different vital interests and mili-

tary capabilities. Thus, their strategic aims and mili-tary doctrines vary. The armed forces of one nationmay possess a doctrine with a full treatment of strate-gic, operational, and tactical issues. Other nations maypossess a doctrine for forces of brigade-size or smaller.US Army doctrine endeavors to be compatible withjoint and combined operations requirements.

Other nations’ doctrines may focus on a single ser-vice. Some doctrines emphasize offensive operations;others defensive. Some nations prepare for highlymobile, mechanized operations; others concern them-selves with insurgent or other forms of warfare. USArmy doctrine stresses rapid, agile operations empha-sizing ingenuity and improvisation within the guide-lines provided by the commander’s intent. Others dis-card this approach as too risky. Training, equipment,and technologies vary. Commanders carefully considerwhich national units are best suited for particular mis-sions. In combined operations, as in unilateral opera-tions, US Army commanders employ units accordingto their capabilities or advise the senior allied com-mander of the need to do likewise with US units.

EQUIPMENTCommanders consider equipment capabilities

when employing allied units. Among nations, equip-ment will vary in modernization levels, maintenancestandards, mobility, and degree of interoperability.Commanders of combined units may face a large tech-nological disparity between units, resulting in a mix-ture of systems. They can exploit interoperability byplacing like units with similar capabilities adjacent to,or reinforcing, one another. Nonetheless, they willusually have to overcome some measure of incompat-ibility. Selected coalition units may have some sys-tems similar to that of the enemy, making measures topreclude fratricide vital. Operational planners shouldexpect difficulties such as incompatible communica-tions and differences in the cross-country mobility of

vehicles. Commanders must understand the actual ca-pabilities of allied or coalition partners.

CULTURAL DIFFERENCESEach partner in combined operations possesses a

unique cultural identity, the result of language, val-ues, religious systems, and economic and social out-looks. Nations with similar cultures are more likelyto have similar aspirations. Further, their armed forceswill face fewer obstacles to interoperability in a com-bined force structure. Nations with divergent culturaloutlooks have to overcome greater obstacles in a coa-lition or alliance.

Armies reflect the national cultures that influencethe way they operate. Sources of national pride andcultural sensitivities will vary widely, yet the combinedforce commander must accommodate them. Differ-ences in work ethic, standards of living, religion, anddiscipline affect the way nations approach war. Com-manders cannot ignore these differences because theyrepresent potential major problems. Even seeminglyminor differences, such as dietary restrictions or of-ficer/soldier relationships, can have great impact.Commanders may have to accommodate religiousholidays, prayer calls, and other unique cultural tradi-tions that are important to allies.

LANGUAGELanguage barriers represent a significant chal-

lenge. Because Americans are used to English-speak-ing counterparts, they generally do not understand thedifficulties faced by non-English-speaking allies.Specifying the official coalition language may be asensitive issue. One should not assume the languagewill automatically be English. After a language is se-lected, all written documents must be translated fortactical execution by units of different nations. Theeffort detracts from planning time and has the poten-tial for mistakes or misunderstanding. Few linguistshave both the technical expertise and depth of under-standing to cross both language and doctrinal bound-aries and be fully understood. Loss of meaning in trans-lation can be high. The problems that can arise due tomiscommunication are potentially disastrous. A pos-sible solution is a significant resource commitment todedicated liaison and linguist teams.

TEAMWORK AND TRUSTNations build coalitions and alliances on mutual

trust, understanding, and reliance which bind the

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combined force together. Teamwork and trust are es-sential. Shared hardships; missions that are reason-ably achievable in accordance with capabilities; ac-cess to reserves and reinforcements, to include CASand air interdiction; and frequent face-to-face com-mand and soldier exchanges build trust and a sharedsense of mission.

Common purpose not only requires well-articu-lated goals shared by all members of the coalition oralliance, it demands the efforts of leaders capable ofinspiring, motivating, and directing multicultural forcesin execution. The force of personality in combinedoperations is often key to multinational cooperationdirectly influencing the strength of the coalition or al-liance. If all participating nations understand clearlystated objectives and have trust and confidence in theirleaders, the combined forces should succeed. Build-ing a team and establishing trust before, during, andafter the battle and campaign are vital to success.

PLANNING AND CONDUCTThe US Army has extensive experience in plan-

ning and conducting combined operations. Its partici-pation in peace, conflict, and war over the past 200years has provided insights into how to synchronizecombat power and achieve unity of effort in coopera-tion with allies. These insights are summarized be-low and discussed in greater detail in FM 100-8.

COMMANDSuccessful combined operations center on achiev-

ing unity of effort. Each participating nation must agreeto provide the commander of the alliance or coalitionsufficient authority to achieve this. In turn, the com-mander and his staff use this authority to unify theefforts of the combined force toward common objec-tives. This authority, however, is seldom absolute.Consensus will be important to the overall commander.

National contingents normally retain command oftheir own forces, relinquishing only operational com-mand or OPCON to the alliance or coalition militaryleadership, even though staffs might be combined. The1st (UK) Armored Division under TACON of the VII(US) Corps in Operation Desert Storm is an examplewherein British staff members were totally integratedinto the VII Corps staff. The combined force com-mander may not be a US Army officer. He could be asenior US officer from another service or a commanderfrom another nation. Army commanders fight at the

direction of the allied or coalition commander, retain-ing all of the command authority and responsibilityinherent in the command relationships (OPCON,TACON, attached, direct support) of the forces theyhave been provided. Missions should be perceived asappropriate and achievable for the forces to which theyare given and equitable in terms of burden and risk-sharing.

The factors mentioned earlier in this chapter in-fluence the C2 structure of the combined force. If thenations are very similar in culture, doctrine, training,and equipment, or if extensive cooperative experienceexists, a combined headquarters may be effective. Thisdirect approach requires each armed force to receive,understand, plan, and implement missions at the samelevel as the other nations. However, in planning com-bined operations, commanders have to accommodatedifferences in planning capabilities. Some armies havelarge staffs and the technical means to support plan-ning. Others have austere staff structures and do notpossess the means to process, reproduce, or rapidlydisseminate many contingency plans. Moreover, de-cision authority of staffs and subordinate command-ers varies between armies. The sophistication andnature of missions assigned to each nation may varyto accommodate differences between nations, but thecombined staff should provide guidance directly toeach nation’s forces.

A coalition of dissimilar nations may require anindirect approach to achieving unity of effort. Thetheater commander may use a primary staff for plan-ning and an auxiliary staff to absorb, translate, andrelay straightforward, executable instructions to mem-bers of the coalition. USCENTCOM used such an ap-proach in the 1991 Persian Gulf War as the coalitioncoordination, communications, and integration center(C3IC) was formed to coordinate the efforts betweenIslamic and non-Islamic command structures.

MANEUVERTo best achieve strategic and operational aims,

plans should reflect the special capabilities of each na-tional contingent in the assignment of missions. Mo-bility, intelligence collection assets, size andsustainability of formations, air defenses, capabilitiesfor long-range fires, SOF, training for operations inspecial environments, and preparation for operationsinvolving nuclear and chemical weapons are amongthe significant factors at this level.

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To overcome differences in doctrine, training, orequipment, leaders may assign selected functions tothe forces of a smaller group of allied or coalition part-ners. For example, the combined commander mayassign home defense or police forces missions such asrear area security. The commander may also entrustone member of the combined force with air defense,coastal defense, or some special operation, based onthat force’s special capabilities. In fact, some coali-tion partners might not provide army, air force, or na-val forces at all, but contribute through alternativemeans such as the political power provided by theirmembership in the coalition.

Tactical cooperation requires more precision sinceit deals with immediate combat actions. Among thedisparities that adjacent and supporting commandersmust reconcile are dissimilar TACON measures, dif-ferences in tactical methods and operating procedures,differences in using other service capabilities such asCAS, varying organizations and capabilities of units,and differences in equipment.

Liaison, equipment exchanges, and training canoffset some of these problems. Combining staffs, ratherthan just exchanging liaison parties, is another option.The commander of a combined force plans and con-ducts operations in ways that exploit complementarystrengths and minimize coordination problems. Whenthe combined force commander assigns one nation’sforces to another nation for an extended period, theseforces should establish habitual relationships betweenunits in order to help foster cohesion and understand-ing. Detailed planning with emphasis on rehearsalsand careful wargaming should precede operations inwhich units are working together for the first time.Back-briefs become especially important for under-standing. Tactical plans should address unit recogni-tion, people and equipment, fire control measures, airsupport arrangements, communications, signals, liai-son, and movement control. The commander’s intentand the concept of the operation should also receivespecial attention to avoid confusion that might occurbecause of differences in doctrine and terminology.

FIRESThe focus of fire support at the operational and

tactical levels is on the synchronization of the full rangeof fires provided by all friendly forces. The integra-tion of artillery, armed aircraft, nonline-of-sight fires,naval gunfire, close air support, interdiction, and elec-tronic countermeasures requires the development, full

understanding, and rigid adherence to a common setof fire control measures. In an alliance these mea-sures may be routine. However, in a coalition ad hocprocedures may have to be developed. Commandersgive this early and continuous emphasis to ensuretimely, effective fires and to minimize fratricide.

INTELLIGENCEThe collection, production, and dissemination of

intelligence are major challenges. Allied and coali-tion partners normally operate separate intelligencesystems in support of their own policy and militaryforces. These national systems may vary widely in so-phistication and focus. Most allies cannot approachthe range of US capabilities to collect and process in-telligence. Nonetheless, each nation can contributehuman intelligence (HUMINT). Commanders of com-bined units should rapidly establish a system that takesadvantage of each nation’s contributions and providesall units an accurate intelligence picture.

For operational and tactical purposes, command-ers arrange for the rapid dissemination of military in-telligence and the use of available intelligence assetsby all partners. This arrangement usually requires theformation of a combined intelligence staff at theaterlevel. It also necessitates establishing an intelligencenetwork with dedicated communications and liaisonofficers to link various headquarters. Few nations willhave the technical means to link with US systems. Theprovision of the appropriate interfaces will be an earlyand major concern.

LOGISTICSCombined logistics present a major challenge.

Problems include differences in logistics doctrine,stockage levels, logistics mobility, interoperability, andinfrastructure and national resource limitations. None-theless, allied and coalition commanders have to co-ordinate the use of facilities such as highways, raillines, ports, and airfields in such a way as to ensuremission accomplishment. The concept that logisticsis primarily a national responsibility cannot supplantdetailed logistics planning within a theater of opera-tions. For these reasons, combined commanders shouldform a combined logistics staff section as early as pos-sible.

Movement control, operation of ports and airfields,theater logistical communications, and specific sup-ply functions are significant matters often coordinated

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above the level of national contingents. To assure co-ordination and prevent duplication, commanders ofcombined forces establish clear responsibilities forsuch functions. Lower level commanders and staffofficers responsible for operating in the theater resolvethe problems of liaison, language, and equipment com-patibility that are inherent in these multinational lo-gistical operations.

Transportation, construction services, medical sup-port, and some classes of supply may be available fromthe host nation. US forces may rely upon host nationsupport to supplement or substitute for US services,supplies, and facilities. Central allied or coalition agen-cies may obtain and provide water, food, and construc-tion materials to be shared between national contin-gents. Civil affairs officers can assist commanders inidentifying and coordinating requirements for localresources, facilities, and support.

The US often supplies allied and coalition forceswith materiel and receives combat support or combatservice support in exchange. This can lead to signifi-cant economies of force and effort. US forces seeksuch support agreements early in a combined opera-tion.

When allies or coalition partners use similar equip-ment, they plan for resupply, maintenance, or othersupport operations across national lines. This occursroutinely, whenever feasible, and always in the caseof tactical emergency. Members of an alliance or coa-lition can use such common items as petroleum, oils,and lubricants (POL), medical supplies, barrier mate-rials, mines, and some tools and vehicles. The com-bined force commander, at appropriate times, allowscombined forces to obtain and distribute these itemsthrough a single, combined supply agency to facilitatesimple operations and economy of effort.

LIAISON AND COMBINED STAFFSDuring combined operations, US units establish

liaison early with forces of each nation and the nexthigher headquarters. Where appropriate, coalitioncommanders might choose to combine staffs of twoor more nations to better coordinate the complemen-tary capabilities. This fosters the understanding of mis-sions and tactics, facilitates transfer of vital informa-tion, and enhances mutual trust and confidence.

Combined forces that employ units or equipmentwith which they are unfamiliar exchange liaison per-sonnel such as aviation staff officers, fire support of-ficers, engineers, or intelligence specialists. When-ever possible, such liaison or coalition staff personnelshould be familiar with the staff and operational orga-nizations, doctrine, and procedures of the force withwhich they will work. They should either speak thelanguage of that force or be accompanied by inter-preters. Also, civil affairs staff officers can assist inthe control of operations that require the cooperationof host nation civilian authorities.

The Army provides specialized training (for ex-ample, language) to liaison officers. Coalitions andalliances should pursue standardized procedures,equipment, and doctrine as time and national capa-bilities permit. The use of mobile training teams, thedevelopment of standardization agreements(STANAGs), and the exposure and ultimate integra-tion of staffs promote standardization and enhance theability of forces from many nations to fight alongsideone another. STANAGs already in existence may alsobe used to form the basis for detailed coalition agree-ments and procedures.

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In a force-projection army, plan-ning and conducting operations at boththe tactical and operational levelshave become more complex since theend of the Cold War. In Cold WarEurope, many strategic, operational,and even tactical choices had longago been made. A strategic theaterin a force-projection environment withfew or no US forces creates opera-tional circumstances where plan-ners have many more strategic,operational, and tactical options thanthey were used to having in the ColdW a r .

Such a diversity of available options should, inthe end, give US commanders the means to confuse,confound, and rapidly defeat armed enemies of theUnited States in full-dimensional operations. Thischapter discusses principles of planning and execut-ing operations that, when applied, should achieve thatend.

THE STRATEGIC LINKIn peacetime the National Security Strategy and

policies, National Military Strategy, Unified CommandPlan, and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) arekey sources of guidance for the combatant commander.The commander’s theater strategy supports the accom-plishment of US and coalition objectives within thetheater AOR.

These strategic objectives and guidance becomethe basis for the theater campaign plan. While everyeffort is made to anticipate conditions for employingUS forces and to frame a plan, the probabilities arethat some plans might be formulated just prior to orconcurrent with employment of US forces.Concurrency of deliberate and crisis action planningat strategic, operational, and tactical levels is an es-tablished part of joint doctrine.

THEATER-STRATEGIC PLANNINGTheater-strategic planning during peace provides

CHAPTER 6

PLANNING AND EXECUTING OPERATIONS

CONTENTS

THE STRATEGIC LINK ................................. 6-0Theater-Strateic Planning .................... 6-0The Us of Force in Support of Strategic Policy Options ................... 6-1Strategic End State and Supporting Military Conditions ............................ 6-1The Levels of War ................................. 6-1 The Stratgic Level .............................. 6-1 The Operational Level ....................... 6-2 The Tactical Level .............................. 6-2

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS ................... 6-3Simultaneous Operations .................... 6-3Total Mission Awareness ..................... 6-5Teamwork .............................................. 6-5Fundamentals ....................................... 6-5 Mission ............................................... 6-6 Commander's Intent .......................... 6-5 Estimates ............................................ 6-6 Concept of Operations ...................... 6-6 Will ...................................................... 6-7 Concepts of Theater and Operational Design ......................... 6-7Sequencing Operations ....................... 6-9Deception .............................................. 6-9Rehearsals ........................................... 6-10Weapons of Mass Destruction .......... 6-10 The Mass Destruction Environment 6-10 Nuclear Weapons.............................. 6-11 Biological Weapons.......................... 6-11 Chenical Weapons ............................ 6-11

THE BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK ............ 6-11

Area of Operations ............................. 6-12Battle Space ........................................ 6-12Battlefield Organization ..................... 6-13 Deep Operations .............................. 6-14 Close Operations ............................. 6-14 Rear Operations ............................... 6-15

OFFENSE AND DEFENSE AT THE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS ................ 6-15

Offensive Operations ......................... 6-16Defensive Operations ......................... 6-19

CONFLICT TERMINATION ......................... 6-23

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essential for rapid transition to war and force-projec-tion operations.

In time of war or conflict, planners develop stra-tegic end states tailored to the particular situation. Thecombatant commander modifies existing strategic andcontingency plans and alters portions of his theaterstrategy using crisis action procedures. The theaterstrategy is written in terms of military objectives, mili-tary concepts, and resources (ends, ways, and means)and provides guidance for a broad range of activitiesthroughout the AOR, including provisions for both warand operations other than war.

The theater commander and his staff conduct the-ater-strategic planning by using the Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System (JOPES). The as-signed planning requirements are formulated into afamily of OPLANs to meet strategic and contingencyrequirements in the theater. The ASCC develops thesupporting plan as part of the family of plans. Thetheater commander’s OPLAN can be a theater cam-paign plan. All theater OPLANs achieve strategicgoals. The theater commander uses operational art inhis theater design to influence the strategic intent foundin both the theater strategy and campaign plan.

THE USE OF FORCE IN SUPPORT OFSTRATEGIC POLICY OPTIONS

When the nation commits its armed forces, itshould clearly understand the overall policy goal andhow the use of force helps achieve that goal. Deter-mining how war (or military operations) accomplishesthe national objectives is the critical first step in theoperational planning process. In order to describeclearly how the use of force contributes to the overallpolitical objectives, planners must consider what maybe necessary to end the conflict, as well as the likelyconsequences of warfare and the period of conflictactivities that follow.

Commanders at all levels must have a commonunderstanding, prior to hostilities, of the conditionsthat constitute success. Decisions to stop military op-erations and to transition from active combat topostconflict operations will necessarily require the in-put and experience of both operational and tactical-level commanders. The situation brought about bysuccessful military operations should conform to thepolitical decision makers’ view of how victory in warbrings the country closer to its strategic goals. There-fore, military planners must understand the desired

military end state to be achieved as part of the overallstrategy.

STRATEGIC END STATE ANDSUPPORTING MILITARY CONDITIONS

When the nation commits its armed forces, itshould clearly understand what military end state itwants to achieve. A military end state includes the re-quired conditions that, when achieved, attain the stra-tegic objectives or pass the main effort to other instru-ments of national power to achieve the final strategicend state. That end state describes what the NCA wantsthe situation to be when operations conclude—bothmilitary operations, as well as those where the mili-tary is in support of other instruments of nationalpower.

While the military end state conditions will nor-mally represent what the combatant commander wantshis campaign to achieve, he rarely concerns himselfwith only those conditions. Often, the combatant com-mander is required to support the other instruments ofnational power that the NCA and coalition leadersdesignate. He must first understand the desired endstate, then plan the means to achieve it. Neglecting todo so could result in a military victory that fails toachieve strategic objectives.

Determining the end state and ensuring that it ac-complishes the national objectives are the critical firststeps in the operational planning process. Failure tomake this determination will waste scarce resourcesand put the entire effort at risk.

THE LEVELS OF WARThe levels of war help clarify activities by ech-

elons within the theater across the full range of mili-tary operations. The levels of war—strategic, opera-tional, and tactical—provide a useful framework forordering activities within AORs. The levels of warhelp commanders visualize a logical flow of opera-tions, allocate resources, and assign tasks. Each levelis defined by the outcome intended—not by the levelof command or the size of the unit.

The Strategic LevelAt the strategic level of war a nation or group of

nations use national interests to determine their strat-egy to ensure an effective, responsive national power-projection capability. Strategy involves the art andscience of employing armed forces with the other in-struments of national power to secure strategic goals.The NCA and the CJCS translate strategy intomilitary

OPERATIONS

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paigns, major operations, and battles. Operational arttranslates theater strategy and design into operationaldesign which links and integrates the tactical battlesand engagements that, when fought and won, achievethe strategic aim. Tactical battles and engagementsare fought and won to achieve operational results. Nospecific level of command is solely concerned withoperational art. In its simplest expression, operationalart determines when, where, and for what purposemajor forces will fight. It governs the deployment ofthose forces, their commitments to or withdrawal frombattle, and the sequencing of successive battles andmajor operations to attain major objectives.

Operational art seeks to ensure that commandersuse soldiers, materiel, and time effectively to achievestrategic aims through campaign design. Such a de-sign provides a framework to help the theater and op-erational commanders order their thoughts. Opera-tional art helps commanders understand the conditionsfor victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding un-necessary battles. Without operational art, war wouldbe a set of disconnected engagements, with relativeattrition the only measure of success or failure.

Operational art requires broad vision, the abilityto anticipate, a careful understanding of the relation-ship of means to ends, an understanding of the inher-ent risks that are under them, and effective joint andcombined cooperation. It challenges the commanderto answer three questions:

- What military conditions will achieve thestrategic objectives in the theater of war or theaterof operations?- What sequence of actions is most likely toproduce these conditions?- How should the commander apply militaryresources within established limitations toaccomplish that sequence of actions?

These are important questions. They require thetheater and operational commanders to consider theends they must achieve, the ways to achieve those ends,and how to use the means available. The commandertempers his answers by the specified and implied re-strictions and by actions he is specifically directed todo. These are sometimes called restraints and con-straints. By answering these questions, he

policy and requirements, which are the starting pointsfor developing campaign plans. Theater commandersparticipate in national and alliance or coalition dis-cussions as the theater military experts. They designthe campaign plan so that it relates to both nationalstrategies and operational activities. The campaignplan derives from policy and requirements, sets the-ater-strategic goals, and is the basis for operational-level planning.

The Operational LevelAt the operational level of war, joint and combined

operational forces within a theater of operations per-form subordinate campaigns and major operations andplan, conduct, and sustain to accomplish the strategicobjectives of the unified commander or higher mili-tary authority.

The operational level is the vital link between na-tional- and theater-strategic aims and the tactical em-ployment of forces on the battlefield. The focus atthis level is on conducting joint operations—the em-ployment of military forces to attain theater-strategicobjectives in a theater of war and operational objec-tives in the theaters of operations through design, or-ganization, and execution of subordinate campaignsand major operations.

Combatant commanders and theater-of-operationscommanders usually plan and execute campaigns.Combatant commanders have strategic intents, con-cepts, and objectives. Service or subordinate jointcommanders have operational intents, concepts, andobjectives in support of the combatant commanders.The echelon of Army commands varies with the na-ture of warfare, the strategic objectives, the size andstructure of the theater of war, and the number of forcesinvolved. The intended purpose, not the level of com-mand, determines whether an Army unit functions atthe operational level. Armies normally design themajor ground operations of a subordinate campaign,while corps and divisions fight tactical battles and en-gagements. A corps commander might also commanda joint force land component or a JTF. As a JTF com-mander, he might plan and execute a campaign thatwould achieve the theater-strategic objectives of theCINC’s theater campaign.

Operational art is the skillful employment of mili-tary forces to attain strategic and/or operational ob-jectives within a theater through the design, organiza-tion, integration, and conduct of theater strategies, cam-

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articulates a vision for warfighting, a statement of hisintent in his campaign plan, and a command structurewithin which he will execute that plan.

The Tactical LevelAt the tactical level of war, battles and engage-

ments are planned and executed to accomplish mili-tary objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces.These victories, put together, achieve operational re-sults. Activities at this level focus on the ordered ar-rangement and maneuver of combat elements in rela-tion to one another and to the enemy to achieve com-bat objectives directed by the operational commander.Tactics is the art and science of employing availablemeans to win battles and engagements. Tactics isbattlefield problem-solving—usually rapid and dy-namic in nature.

Battles. A battle consists of a series of relatedengagements; it lasts longer than an engagement, in-volves larger forces, and could affect the course of thecampaign. Battles occur when division, corps, or armycommanders fight for significant objectives. They maybe short and fought in relatively small areas, as on theGolan Heights in 1973; or they last several weeks andcover large areas, as in the Battle of the Bulge duringWorld War II.

Engagements. Engagements are small conflictsor skirmishes, usually between opposing maneuverforces; they are normally short in duration and foughtat division level and below. They include, for example,covering forces and guard forces. Also, units in de-fense fight engagements when they encounter the en-emy. These engagements may or may not bring onbattle.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONSJoint operation planning is a continuous process

that begins with the assignment of strategic guidance,limitations, tasks, and objectives or with thecommander’s recognition of a requirement until themission is accomplished. Planning and fighting areoften concurrent, with planning done as thoroughly as

time allows. Successful planning requires an appre-ciation of the simultaneous nature of operations, anawareness of the total mission, anticipation of futureevents, and application of the battlefield frameworkdescribed later in this chapter.

SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONSA campaign is a series of related military opera-

tions designed to achieve strategic objectives within agiven time and space. A campaign plan describes howthese operations are conducted. Major operations con-sist of coordinated actions in a single phase of a cam-paign and usually decide the course of a campaign.

Wartime campaigns are broad in scope and usu-ally involve the employment of large forces. Peace-time campaigns can be broad in scope but usually in-volve smaller forces and, many times, other US Gov-ernment agencies, international agencies, or UnitedNations forces.

More than one campaign can occur concurrentlywithin the same theater. Operations go on simulta-neously throughout the depth of enemy formations towin rapidly and decisively. A wide variety of combatand noncombat operations requires synchronization toachieve designated objectives.

A single, unifying strategic concept of operationssynchronizes actions taken at each level of war againstthe enemy, whether the actions occur simultaneouslyor sequentially. The intent is to destroy or disrupt theenemy’s key capabilities and functions and exploit theresulting strategic advantage before the enemy canreact. The results should so demoralize the enemy bytheir combined and simultaneous effects that he per-ceives he cannot win.

Commanders at all levels requirevision to fight simultaneously within theaters of op-erations, to respond to contingency requirements else-where in a theater of war, and to conduct normal peace-time activities throughout the combatant commander’sAOR.


Late on 19 December 1989, a joint force of 7,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines deployed fromUS bases bound for Panama. During the early morning hours of 20 December, this force—supported byUnited States Southern command (USSOUTHCOM) forward-deployed forces in Panama—simultaneouslyhit targets at 26 separate locations.

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The success of the attack against key Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) strongholds required asequence of stealthy moves by an assortment of US SOF and elements from the 82d AirborneDivision, the 5th Mechanized Division, the 7th Infantry Divsions, and US Marines Corps. Thesewere supported by the Air force and Navy in a variety of ways, including airlift and sealift,SEAD, and AC-130 gunship strikes. MIssion orders, decentralized execution, and individualingenuity contributed greatly to the ability of the joint force to rapidly paralyze PDF responsecapability.

Figure 6-1. depicts a few of the many actions that occurred within the same hour on 20 Decem-ber.

- Marines from the 6th Marine Expeditionary Brigade secured Howard Air Force Base and the Bridge of the Americas.

- The 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, secured Tocumen Airport.- The 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry (7th Infantry Divsion), and 3d Battalion, 504th Infantry (82d Airborne Division), secured Renacer Prison and Madden Dam.- The 2d and 3d Battalions, 75th Ranger Regiment, secured the PDF base at Rio Hato.- The 193d Separate Infantry Brigade and the 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry (5th Infantry Division), struck many targets in and around Panama City, including La Comandancia.

Figure 6-1. Operations in Panama, 20 December 1989

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The combination of increased tempo and simulta-neous operations dictates a need for tightly integratedoperations. Tactical commanders fight engagementsand battles, understanding their relevance to the higheroperation plan. Operational commanders conductmajor operations to achieve operational and theater-strategic objectives. Combatant commanders serve astheater strategists and campaign designers. At the sametime, they remain acutely aware of the impact of op-erational and tactical events of the battlefield. Rap-idly unfolding operations of all types blur the linesamong the levels of war so that no commander canconcern himself only with the results of events at hisechelon.

A world of instant communications has shrunk theglobe. The effect of information-age technology hasbeen not only to increase the tempo of operations butalso to provide images of operations that begin to con-dition strategic plans and define time limits of opera-tions. This phenomenon must not be lost on tacticaland operational Army commanders. Reality on thebattlefield is reality in the household at almost the sametime. The commander considers this and reaches be-yond his immediate tasks to see the interrelationships,complexities, and opportunities offered by high-tempo,simultaneous operations. The commander’s job hasalways been to bring order out of chaos; he must nowdo it quicker, while on the move, and with practicedinsight.

TOTAL MISSION AWARENESSFrom receipt of the mission to its accomplishment,

Army commanders at all levels consider everythingthat affects their operation. Their thoughts, therefore,extend beyond the current moment and outside the AO.When deploying for combat operations, for example,a corps commander’s thoughts may focus on the im-mediate tasks -- tailoring his force for deployment andflowing it smoothly to the theater of operations. Byhaving a total mission awareness, he thinks simulta-neously about activities on both sides of the deploy-ment: finding a place and time to train active and RCroundout and roundup units; accommodating late-ar-riving units; placing initial and subsequent forces onthe ground; adjusting task organizations; recoveringfrom setbacks; keeping the range of options open, andso on.

Total mission awareness helps the division com-mander, for example, analyze his AO and mission withregard to his capabilities. Even as he approaches com-bat operations, however, his total mission awareness

extends back into the COMMZ. Are his LOCs pro-tected? Will late-arriving units be ready? Are unitspositioned to facilitate future operations? Are his keyrear area facilities adequately protected? Are deploy-ing civilian employees and contractor personnelequipped, trained, and ready? Then, after command-ers have arrived in theater and have absorbed the bigpicture, their focus narrows, and they concentrate onthe immediate combat mission and future operations.

TEAMWORKAn effective fighting force requires teamwork,

which is based on individual trust and unit cohesion.In force-projection operations, the mix of deployedforces will be dictated by the need to maintain opera-tional versatility and teamwork. In many cases, de-ploying units will find themselves assigned to an or-ganization that has not previously trained or workedtogether. Additionally, many Army units will be op-erating in a joint and interagency environment for thefirst time. Forging the team is one of the early chal-lenges facing commanders in a force-projection op-eration. Depending on time available and geographicseparation, team-building techniques could includecommanders meetings and leader reconnaissance tothe AOR, early and continuous emphasis on face-to-face leadership, and liaison team exchanges. Theseare some of the Army’s team-building techniques unitscan use, whether operating with other members of theArmy’s combined arms team or participating in joint,combined, or interagency operations.

FUNDAMENTALSArmy operational planning requires the complete

definition of the mission, expression of thecommander’s intent, completion of the commander andstaff estimates, and development of a concept of op-erations. These form the basis for a plan or order andset the conditions for successful battle. The initial planestablishes the commander’s intent, the concept of op-erations, and the initial tasks for subordinate units. Itallows the greatest possible operational and tacticalfreedom for subordinate leaders.It is flexible enoughto permit leaders to seize opportunities consistent withthe commander’s intent, thus facilitating quick andaccurate decision making during combat operations.The plan not only affects the current fight but also setsthe stage for future operations.

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Commanders issue orders to their subordinatesface-to-face whenever the situation permits. In tacti-cal units this often occurs on the ground chosen forthe operation. Mission orders, which specify what thesubordinate commands are to do without prescribinghow they must do it, are often the best.

MissionThe mission is the commander’s expression of

what the unit must accomplish and for what purpose.Orders contain both specified and implied tasks. Dur-ing mission analysis, commanders translate these intoorders for their subordinates. They do so by analyz-ing the mission statement and concept of operations,understanding the commander’s intent starting two lev-els above, assessing the current situation, and orga-nizing all resources available to achieve the desiredend. A precise, clear mission statement that subordi-nates understand before and during the battle is vitalto mission success.

Commander’s IntentThe commander’s intent describes the desired end

state. It is a concise expression of the purpose of theoperation and must be understood two echelons be-low the issuing commander. It must clearly state thepurpose of the mission. It is the single unifying focusfor all subordinate elements. It is not a summary ofthe concept of the operation. Its purpose is to focussubordinates on the desired end state. Its utility is tofocus subordinates on what has to be accomplished inorder to achieve success, even when the plan and con-cept of operations no longer apply, and to disciplinetheir efforts toward that end.

The intent statement is usually written but can beverbal when time is short. It should be concise andclear; long, narrative descriptions of how the com-mander sees the fight tend to inhibit the initiative ofsubordinates. A commander’s order should containthe intent statement of the next higher commander.

EstimatesThe commander’s estimate helps commanders

choose the best course of action. Estimates never stop.The process continues by staffs and by commanders,often independently and separately from one another,but coordinated when possible. The basic end resultof the estimate is an accurate visualization of the cur-rent enemy and friendly situation, a visualization ofthe goal or mission, and a clear expression of alterna-tives.

The commander’s estimate considers the enemy’slikely intent and courses of action and wargamesfriendly alternatives to get from the current state tothe end-of-mission state. Once commanders choose acourse of action, they articulate their concept, describ-ing how they visualize the fight. This description formsthe basis for the rest of the plan. Commanders con-tinually review the situation by visiting subordinatesand getting their estimates, by observing operations,by meeting with higher and adjacent commanders, andby receiving updated information and intelligence.They revise their concept accordingly. The estimateprocess is continuous. Estimates for the current op-eration can often provide a basis for estimates for fu-ture missions.

Concept of OperationsThe operational or tactical concept of operations

describes how Army commanders visualize the majoroperation and battle unfolding. The concept is basedon the commander’s selected course of action to ac-complish the mission, expressing what, where, and howthe force will affect the enemy. Commanders answerthese questions in sufficient detail for the staff andsubordinate commanders to understand what they areto do and how they are to fight the battle. In the con-cept of operations, commanders describe how they seethe actions of each of their units fitting together to ac-complish the mission. They describe their view ofprobable enemy actions and how they will defeat theenemy. This description includes, as a minimum, thescheme of maneuver and concept of fires (see previ-ous discussion on Commander’s Intent).

In developing their concept, commanders shouldconsider alternatives that lead to decisive operationsand battles. These operations are key to determiningthe outcome of engagements, battles, and major op-erations. Many other operations lead to or support de-cisive operations. For example, two supporting groundbattles, an interdiction operation, and a deception op-eration could all support a separate decisive groundbattle during a single phase of a campaign.

Commanders at all levels should designate a pointof main effort along with supporting efforts. This helpsthem and their staffs to allocate resources accordingly,providing focus to the operation while setting priori-ties and determining risks, promoting unity of effort,and facilitating an understanding of the commander’sintent.

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WillWill is the disposition to act toward achievement

of a desired end state. It is an expression of determi-nation, the articulation of choice and desire. A pla-toon takes the hill because it wants to take the hill.The squad defends its position because it wants to holdthe position.

War is a contest of wills. Combat power is theproduct of military forces and their will to fight. Whenwill is lacking, so is combat power; when will is strong,it multiplies the effectiveness of military forces.

Ultimately, the focus of all combat operations mustbe the enemy’s will. Break his will and he is defeated.When he no longer wants to fight, he cannot fight.Conversely, if his will remains strong, even thoughphysically weakened and materially depleted, he re-mains a formidable opponent.

Leaders are the main source of will. They inspiretheir soldiers with the desire to win, to accomplish themission, and to persevere in the face of all difficulties.When the will of the enemy commander is broken, hisforce quickly disintegrates. Analyzing and attackingthe underpinnings of his will therefore is key to vic-tory.

Concepts of Theater and Operational DesignSeveral key concepts of campaign design guide

theater- and operational-level planners in their efforts.These include how to address the center of gravity,lines of operation, decisive points, and the culminat-ing point.

Center of Gravity. The center of gravity is thehub of all power and movement upon which every-thing depends. It is that characteristic, capability, orlocation from which enemy and friendly forces derivetheir freedom of action, physical strength, or will tofight. Several traditional examples of a potential cen-ter of gravity include the mass of the enemy army, theenemy’s battle command structure, public opinion,national will, and an alliance or coalition structure.The concept of a center of gravity is useful as an ana-lytical tool to cause the joint commander and his staffto think about their own and the enemy’s sources ofstrength as they design the campaign and determineits objectives.

The essence of operational art lies in being able tomass effects against the enemy’s main source ofpower—his center of gravity, which he seeks to pro-tect. At any given time, however, a center of gravitymay not be immediately discernible. For example,

the center of gravity might concern the mass of en-emy units, but that mass might not yet be formed. Ad-ditionally, the center of gravity may be abstract, suchas the enemy’s national will or an alliance structure,or concrete, such as strategic reserves, C2, or indus-trial bases and LOCs.

The Iraqi Republican Guard is a good example.Although not located in Kuwait, it was the real sourceof power necessary for Iraq to hold that country. Thedestruction of the Republican Guard was seen as thecenter of gravity for achieving the strategic goal ofremoving the Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The eventualdestruction of elements of the Republican Guard inthe Kuwaiti theater of operations led to the withdrawalof Iraqi forces and limited their capability to return.The initial analysis of the enemy’s center of gravityrequires constant reappraisal during both planning andexecution. It may develop or change during the courseof the campaign.

Lines of Operation. Lines of operation repre-sent a second concept for operational design. Theydefine the directional orientation of the force in timeand space in relation to the enemy. They connect theforce with its base of operations and its objectives.

A force operates on interior lines when its opera-tions diverge from a central point and when it is there-fore closer to separate enemy forces than the latter areto one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker forceby allowing it to shift the main effort laterally morerapidly than the enemy. A force operates on exteriorlines when its operations converge on the enemy. Suc-cessful operations on exterior lines require a strongerforce but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihi-late a weaker opponent.

In modern war, lines of operation attain a three-dimensional aspect and pertain to more than just ma-neuver. Commanders use them to focus combat powertoward a desired end. They apply combat powerthroughout the three dimensions of space and over timein a logical design that integrates firepower, PSYOP,deception, special operations, and maneuver forces toconverge upon and defeat the enemy center of gravity.

Decisive Points. Decisive points provide com-manders with a marked advantage over the enemy andgreatly influence the outcome of an action. Decisivepoints are often geographical in nature, such as a hill,a town, or a base of operations. They could alsoinclude

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elements that sustain command such as a commandpost, critical boundary, airspace, or communicationsnode. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; theyare the keys to getting at centers of gravity.

Normally, more decisive points will be in a the-ater than a commander can seize, retain, or destroywith his available resources. Therefore, planners mustanalyze all potential decisive points and determinewhich enable eventual attack of the enemy’s center ofgravity. Commanders designate the most importantdecisive points as objectives and allocate resources toseize or destroy them.

Decisive points help commanders gain or main-tain the initiative. Con-trolling these points in the at-tack helps them gain freedom of operational maneu-ver, thus maintaining the momentum of the attack andsustaining the initiative. If the defender controls sucha point, it interferes with the attacker’s momentum andfacilitates the defender’s counterattack.

Decisive points include transportation nets or ter-rain features that are critical for the continued momen-tum of operations or the rapid shifting of the directionof maneuver and provide a pathway for advancingforces. They allow for passage of combat power indeeper and increasingly damaging thrusts against theenemy. One of the classic operations in this regardwas Operation Market Garden in September 1944¡aneffort to seize three successive bridgeheads and thrustdeep into enemy lines. Each bridge was a decisivepoint in that its seizure by the Allies ensured the main-tenance of momentum and initiative. The German 9thSS Panzer Division’s retention of the bridge at Arnhemled to culmination of the Allied attack and collapse ofthe initiative.

By correctly identifying and using decisive points,commanders can place the enemy at a great disadvan-tage. Securing decisive points can give the operationalcommander the flexibility to select from more thanone line of operation for further advance.

Culmination . Culmination has both offensive anddefensive application. In the offense, the culminatingpoint is the point in time and location when theattacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of thedefender. Here the attacker greatly risks counterattackand defeat and continues the attack only at great peril.The art of the attack at all levels is to secure the objec-tive before reaching culmination. A defender reaches

culmination when he no longer has the capability togo on the counteroffensive or defend successfully. Theart of the defense is to draw the attacker to his culmi-nation, then strike when he has exhausted his resourcesand is ill-disposed to defend successfully.

Tactical overextension is less a matter of culmi-nation than a temporary exhaustion or depletion of re-sources. Normally, the problem can be remedied byreinforcement, resupply, or unit substitution in a shortperiod of time. Strategic and operational offensivesmay reach culmination for several reasons. The for-ward movement of supplies may be poorly organized,lack needed transport, or available stocks may be ex-hausted. The need to protect LOCs from partisans orregular forces operating on the flanks may sap thequantitative advantage of forward forces. The attack-ing force may suffer sufficient losses to tip the bal-ance of forces. The soldiers of the attacking force maybecome physically exhausted and less morally com-mitted to the attack as it progresses. The defendingforces may become more determined as large portionsof their territory are lost. Other countries that feelthreatened could join the defender.

At the strategic level, examples of offensives thatculminated before reaching their ob-jectives include:

- The German attack on France in 1914.- The German invasion of Russia in 1941.Operational examples of culmination include:- Rommel’s drive into Egypt, which culminatedat El Alamein in 1942.- The Japanese drive in 1944 from Burma intoIndia, which culminated at Imphal-Kohima.- Patton’s rapid advance across France, whichbogged down for lack of supplies in Lorraine.- The December 1944 German counteroffensivethrough the Ardennes, which resulted in the Battleof the Bulge.

Factors other than combat losses and lack of re-sources can influence culmination. For example, acommander could outrun his current intelligence inan attack that moves faster and farther than planned.The resulting increase in risk by continuing to advancemay be acceptable if the commander knows he canovermatch any combination of forces he is likely toencounter. Given the lack of sufficient intelligence atthat time, however, he may begin taking needless

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losses or otherwise jeopardize the success of his op-erations. At that point, the better course of action mightbe to go more slowly to develop the situation.

Synchronization of logistics with combat opera-tions can forestall culmination and help the commandercontrol the tempo of his operations. For both tacticaland operational levels, theater logistics planners fore-cast the drain on resources associated with fightingover extended distance and time. They respond bygenerating enough military resources to enable thecommander to achieve his strategic objectives beforereaching his culminating point. If they cannot do so,the commander should rethink the concept of opera-tions.

SEQUENCING OPERATIONSArmy commanders determine the best sequence

of major operations that achieve a tempo of opera-tions to reach the desired objective. Commanders con-sider a variety of factors, including geography, strate-gic lift, command structure, logistics, enemy reinforce-ment, and public opinion. However, sequencing deci-sions for force-projection operations of ground forcesis complicated by rapidly changing enemy situations.The sequence that commanders choose, therefore,should not foreclose future options but should be flex-ible enough to accommodate change.

PhasesThe sequence of major operations (or the sequence

of battles within a major operation) relates directly tothe commander’s decision on phasing. A phase repre-sents a period during which a large number of forcesare involved in similar activities (deployment, for ex-ample). A transition to another phase—such as a shiftfrom deployment to defensive operations—indicatesa shift in emphasis. For example, Phase I, the defense,could lead to Phase II, the counteroffensive, followedby a third phase that orients on consolidation andpostconflict activities. World War II’s Operation Over-lord contained six distinct phases: buildup, rehears-als, embarkation, assault, buildup, and breakout.

During planning, commanders establish conditionsfor moving into each phase. They adjust their phasesto take advantage of opportunities presented by theenemy or to react to an unexpected setback. Actionsby the enemy also determine conditions for phases.

Changes in phases at any level can lead to a pe-

riod of vulnerability for the force. At this point, mis-sions and task organizations often change. Therefore,the careful planning of branches and sequels can re-duce the risk associated with transition between phases.

Logistics is crucial to phasing. Operational plan-ners consider establishing logistics bases, opening andmaintaining LOCs, establishing intermediate logisticsbases to support new phases, and defining prioritiesfor services and support. Logistics, then, is key tosequencing the major operations of the campaign.

Branches and SequelsNo plan of operations can be projected with con-

fidence much beyond the first encounter with theenemy’s main force. The commander builds flexibil-ity into his plan so that he may preserve his freedomof action under rapidly changing conditions. Branchesand sequels directly relate to the concept of phasing.Their proper use can add flexibility to a campaign ormajor operation plan. During Operation Desert Storm,VII Corps planned a combination of seven branchesand sequels called FRAGPLANs, an example of an-ticipation and flexibility in planning to maintain mo-mentum.

Branches. Branches are contingency plans— op-tions built into the basic plan—for changing the dispo-sition, orientation, or direction of movement and alsofor accepting or declining battle. They give command-ers flexibility by anticipating enemy reactions thatcould alter the basic plan.

Sequels. Sequels are subsequent operations basedon the possible outcomes of the current operation—victory, defeat, or stalemate. A counteroffensive, forexample, would be a logical sequel to a defense. Ex-ecuting a sequel will normally mean beginning anotherphase of the campaign. This is a continuous processduring an operation—the commander should never bewithout options.

DECEPTIONDeception operations are designed to mislead en-

emy decision makers by distorting, concealing, andfalsifying friendly intentions, capabilities, and dispo-sitions. The deception objective is the enemy com-mander and the decisions he is expected to make dur-ing the operation. The goal of the deception is to mis-lead the opposing military commander, prompting himto plan and conduct his activities in a manner that un-wittingly serves the commanders’ objectives.

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While commanders at all levels can plan decep-tion operations, those operations must support andcomplement the higher headquarters deception plan.In many cases, strategic or operational plans may in-clude the employment of lower-level units, eventhough subordinate commanders may not be aware ofthe deception effort (see FM 90-2 for details on battle-field deception).

REHEARSALSA rehearsal is the process of practicing a plan be-

fore actual execution. Rehearsing key combat actionsallows participants to become familiar with the opera-tion and to visualize the plan. Rehearsals assist unitsin orienting themselves to their environment and toother units during execution. Rehearsals also providea forum for subordinate leaders to analyze and under-stand the plan, but caution must be exercised in ad-justing the plan or order to prevent errors in synchro-nization. While rehearsals with combat units usuallyoccur at the tactical level, headquarters at the opera-tional level can rehearse key aspects of a plan usingcommand post exercises.

Sometimes conditions allow for rehearsals of large,tactical formations such as the VII Corps move westduring Operation Desert Storm from tactical assem-bly areas to attack positions using the same formationalignments they would later use during the attack.XVIII Airborne Corps conducted rehearsals of Opera-tion Just Cause just prior to that operation, using avariety of methods to shield them from the enemy.However, even if time does not permit a complete re-hearsal with a full complement of troops and equip-ment, some form of rehearsal must take place with allkey leaders. It can be as simple as a leader discussionover a sand table or a C2 tactical exercise withouttroops (TEWT) over similar terrain—whatever rein-forces the commander’s intent.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTIONThe use of weapons of mass destruction can have

an enormous impact on the conduct of all operations.Not only do the sheer killing and destructive power ofthese weapons create the battlefield effect, but the stra-tegic, operational, psychological, and political impactsof their use affect campaign designs. Further, the pro-liferation of weapons of mass destruction dramaticallyalters the nature of regional conflict. As these weap-ons proliferate, the likelihood of their use againstfriendly forces or in response to an enemy’s first useincreases. The effects of these weapons on a cam-

paign or major operation—either through use or thethreat of use—can cause large-scale shifts in tacticalobjectives, phases, and courses of action. Thus, plan-ning for the possibility of their use against friendlyforces is critical to campaign design.

From the combatant commander’s perspective, aswift end to a conflict will partially negate the escala-tory potential of these weapons. A combination ofconventional offensive and defensive measures canhelp deter or reduce the likelihood of an enemy’s useof these weapons. Offensive preventive measures mayinclude raids, surgical air strikes, and operations de-signed to locate and neutralize the threat of such weap-ons. Commanders implement defensive NBC prin-ciples of avoidance, protection, and decontamination.They also plan for effective air and ballistic missiledefense with different systems. US military policyattempts to deter enemy use of weapons of mass de-struction through a defense posture that allows USforces to survive, fight, and win under conditions pro-duced by these weapons.

Commanders must assess an enemy’s willingnessto employ these weapons and the conditions that wouldprompt him to do so. However, commanders shouldnever assume rationality in the mind of the enemy. Avirtually defeated enemy may resort to unrestrictedwarfare by any means at hand.

The Mass Destruction EnvironmentWhen weapons of mass destruction are used, ex-

tensive destruction and mass casualties can result.Only cohesive, disciplined, physically fit, and well-trained units can function in this environment. Butlong-term operations in this environment will degradeeven the best individual and unit performance as a re-sult of wearing protective equipment. Commandersmust train and equip soldiers and civilians alike toendure these conditions. By being better prepared thanthe enemy for continuous operations under conditionsproduced by weapons of mass destruction, US forcescan maintain an advantage over the enemy that detershim from using these weapons.

Force protection is an imperative in this environ-ment. Units can survive the use of weapons of massdestruction by anticipating their employment. Com-manders can protect their forces in a variety of ways.These include training, OPSEC, dispersion of forces,and proper use of terrain for shielding against effects.

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In an NBC environment, battle command becomesmore difficult. Command posts and headquarters atall levels are likely targets. Control will be difficulteven within the smallest unit. Personnel in protectiveclothing will be slow to respond to rapid changes inmission. The employment of these weapons willgreatly alter the tempo of combat. Consequently, com-manders must never assume that they are immune toattack but consider ways of decreasing their risk.

Contamination avoidance is essential for success-ful operations when faced with an NBC threat. Avoid-ing contamination allows units to maintain tactical mo-mentum and preserves combat power by keeping sol-diers out of increased NBC protective postures. It alsoremoves or lessens the need for decontamination. FM3-3 provides detailed information on NBC contami-nation avoidance.

Combined operations become more risky with thethreat of NBC use. Countries that cannot protect them-selves against these weapons may become the primarytarget of an enemy, whose aim is to disintegrate thecoalition. The likelihood that an enemy will use massdestruction weapons against other coalition memberswill increase as US forces demonstrate the ability todefend effectively against their effects. Commandersshould consider that possibility in all strategic, opera-tional, and tactical planning.

Nuclear WeaponsAs a force that now has no organic nuclear capa-

bility, the Army must rely on Air Force and Navynuclear capabilities to deter regional threats from us-ing weapons of mass destruction, and should it be nec-essary, to respond to regional use of these weapons.The integration of nuclear weapons and long-rangeballistic missile systems expands the scope of regionalconflict. Ballistic missiles significantly reduce reac-tion times and create complex planning and decisioncriteria. The ability of some nations to employ nuclearweapons at extended ranges, using ballistic or cruisemissiles and high-speed aircraft, will significantly en-hance their effectiveness as instruments of terror. Withthis ability comes the possibility of conflict escalationbeyond the boundaries of the region.

Using intelligence systems, planners advise thecommander of the enemy’s capability to employnuclear weapons and under what conditions he is mostlikely to do so. A significant intelligence task is locat-ing these weapons and assessing the probability of their

employment. Accordingly, the integration of national,joint, and combined intelligence means is vital to thiseffort.

The immediate effects of a nuclear detonation areblast, thermal radiation, initial nuclear radiation, andelectromagnetic pulse (EMP). These effects can causesignificant personnel and materiel losses. Secondaryeffects include urban devastation, fires, and radiologi-cal contamination. The EMP from a nuclear detona-tion can affect unshielded electronic equipment anddegrade command, control, communications, and in-telligence (C3I) systems. Residual radiation also canhave long-term effects on personnel, equipment, fa-cilities, terrain, and water sources. Therefore, ensur-ing that friendly force dispositions do not provide lu-crative targets for nuclear weapons is important.

Biological WeaponsWhile the US has renounced the use of biological

weapons, many nations have not. The availability ofbiological weapons to possible enemies requires thatcommanders prepare for operations in a biological en-vironment. Defensive measures are necessary to miti-gate the effects of a biological attack. Both militaryand civilian populations require informational, psy-chological, and medical preparation.

Chemical WeaponsAll current and future operations have the poten-

tial to occur in a chemical environment. Although USpolicy does not condone or authorize first use of chemi-cal weapons, preparedness to operate in this environ-ment negates many possible advantages for an enemyto employ these weapons—in itself a deterrent to theiruse.

Chemical weapons produce immediate and delayedeffects that can hamper operations through the con-tamination of equipment, supplies, and critical terrainfeatures. Commanders can reduce the effects of chemi-cal employment by applying the fundamentals of con-tamination avoidance, protection, and decontamina-tion. Chemical reconnaissance and decontaminationare two planning imperatives for all future missions;training is the key. Detailed information on providingNBC protection to the force, as well as risk analysisand assessment, is found in FM 3-4.

THE BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORKA battlefield framework helps commanders relate

their forces to one another and to the enemy in time,

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space, resources, and purpose. This battlefield frame-work establishes an area of geographical and opera-tional responsibility for the commander and providesa way to visualize how he will employ his forcesagainst the enemy. To understand this framework isto understand the relationship between the AO, battlespace, and operations in depth. Proper relationshipsallow for simultaneous operations and massing of ef-fects against the enemy.

During the Cold War, US Army doctrine stresseda battlefield framework that fit the conduct of opera-tions against the Warsaw Pact, even while allowingvariations of that framework to apply in other theaters.Army commanders and staffs in force-projection op-erations must go beyond that single alternative in con-sidering the correct battlefield framework for the mis-sion. US joint doctrine establishes a preferred frame-work where joint forces can apply combat power si-multaneously throughout the land, sea, air, and spacedimensions of the theater to stun and then defeat anenemy rapidly. Thus, US Army doctrine also preferssuch a battlefield framework.

Thinking about choices to lay out that frameworkis the business of both tactical- and operational-levelarmy commanders and staffs. Options available rangefrom a linear framework with clearly defined geom-etry and lines with contiguous units and deep, close,and rear boundaries, to a less precisely structuredframework where units might not be adjacent to oneanother and have no linear relationship. The follow-ing paragraphs discuss the selection of the battlefieldframework that most readily suits the conditions ofMETT-T, the various planning tools, and the doctri-nal considerations in the use of these methods.

The 1st Cavalry Division’s operations in the IaDrang Valley in 1965 and Operation Just Cause in 1989differed considerably in framework from the defenseof the Fulda and Meiningen Gaps by the V and VIICorps in Central Army Group (CENTAG) during theCold War. Operation Desert Storm in 1991 saw yetanother battlefield framework.

AREA OF OPERATIONSA theater of war will normally contain more than

one theater of operations, which can extend fromfriendly ports and logistics areas to distant sources ofenemy support. Within a theater of operations, theJFC may define the lateral, rear, and forward bound-aries of a geographical area of operations, includingthe air space above. Subordinate commanders may

also define smaller AOs as the conditions of METT-Tdictate. Within the AO, the JTF commander has theauthority to control and synchronize the timing, prior-ity, and effects of joint force actions consistent withhis higher commander’s intent and concept.

The AO must be appropriate in size and design sothat the commander can accomplish his mission andprotect his force. It should allow him to employ hisorganic, assigned, and supporting systems to the fullextent of their capabilities.

If a land component commander is designated, theAO may be assigned to him. This determines whatactivities occur within his AO and how they contrib-ute to his mission accomplishment. He allocates partsof this area to subordinate commanders, usually usingzones or sectors. Commanders at all levels have thefull range of measures described in FM 101-5 and FM101-5-1 to help them control operations within theirAO. Generally, however, they should use the mini-mum measures necessary for effective control of com-bat and sustaining activities.

BATTLE SPACEWithin a given battle space, commanders must un-

derstand the effects of geography and terrain, appro-priately apply use of organic capabilities, and integratejoint and combined assets that can be brought to bearagainst the enemy.

Commanders seek to dominate the enemy in agiven battle space. Battle space is a physical volumethat expands or contracts in relation to the ability toacquire and engage the enemy. It includes the breadth,depth, and height in which the commander positionsand moves assets over time. Battle space is not as-signed by a higher commander and extends beyondthe commander’s AO. It is based on the notion thatcommanders expand their thinking to develop a vi-sion for dominating the enemy and protecting the forcebefore any mental constraints are emplaced, such asoverlays depicting phase lines, boundaries, and arrows.This gives them complete freedom of thought to builda broad vision according to existing factors of METT-T.

Battle space includes the combat power of allfriendly forces that can be brought to bear on the en-emy, including joint and combined forces. It containsthe physical, three-dimensional view of the battlefield,which can later be depicted with operational graphics.Battle space also includes the operational

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dimensions of combat, including time, tempo, depth,and synchronization.

At the lower tactical levels, battle space is deter-mined by the range of direct fire systems and the ter-rain on which they are applied. The higher the ech-elon, the greater the complexity and number of varia-tions of battle space. A corps commander envisionsthe combined battle space of his divisions, long-rangeweapons, airborne and ground acquisition systems, andother assets given to him or used on his behalf (forexample, SOF, interdiction assets, and adjacent unitfires).

Unity of effort is essential to operations within agiven battle space. Ownership of assets is less impor-tant than application of their effects toward an intendedpurpose. In that way, battle space can overlap, sharedby two adjacent commanders who perceive ways toemploy their respective assets to mutual advantage.

Battle space must be used to every possible ad-vantage. It is better to see, target, and hit the enemy ata distance from which he cannot hit back.Conversely, if the enemy has distinct advantages atlong range, the counter may be to move in closer todeter him from using firepower effects that may en-danger his own forces.

Understanding battle space allows commanders tokeep their options open, protect and sustain their forces,synchronize combat power, and keep the enemy offbalance. As the commander considers his mission, hecan visualize how he wants his battle space to look atdifferent times as he moves against the enemy. Thishelps him determine how he might task-organize andposition his units during different phases.

Effective commanders have always known howto use battle space. It was said of LTC CreightonAbrams in World War II that he knew the location ofevery tank and every piece of equipment and therebywas able to command, move his outfit, and alwaysdefeat the enemy in front of him. The tempo of opera-tions today has accelerated to the point that all com-manders must learn to dominate their battle space. Thatspace has expanded dramatically as have events andcombat systems that can impact on it. The challengesto control battle space have increased as have the pen-alties for failing to know what is where within thatspace and how those resources can be respectively pro-tected, denied, damaged, or destroyed.

Commanders use the concept of battle space tohelp determine how the terrain and all available com-bat power can be used to dominate the enemy and pro-tect the force. Eventually, this vision becomes thebattlefield framework from which their intent and con-cept of operation are derived. Understanding battlespace allows commanders to synchronize combatpower against the enemy and keep the enemy com-mander from extending his own battle space to itsgreatest range. As commanders consider their mis-sion, they visualize how they can make best use oftheir battle space. This helps them determine how theymight task-organize and position their units. By un-derstanding how to visualize operations in depth, com-manders can synchronize operations to disrupt theenemy in depth, to throw him off balance, to attackhis functions, and to set the conditions for decisivevictory.

BATTLEFIELD ORGANIZATIONCommanders visualize their battle space to set the

relationship of friendly forces to one another and tothe enemy in time, space, resources, and purpose. Oncecommanders decide the purpose and relationship ofbattlefield activities, they determine how to arrangethem within the breadth, depth, and space of the battle-field to meet their considerations of METT-T. This,in turn, helps them relate their activities to those ofthe enemy over time.

Three closely related sets of activities character-ize operations within an AO—deep, close, and rearoperations. Army commanders fight deep, close, andrear actions simultaneously in a manner that appearsto the enemy as one continuous operation against him.They seek to attack the enemy simultaneously through-out the depth of the battlefield and mass both effectsand forces when and where necessary to accomplishthe mission.

Consistent with the JFC’s plan, assets of othermembers of the joint team are used to accomplish theseattacks as well as operate outside tactical depths toachieve simultaneous attacks throughout the theater.Fighting within this framework thus requires constantsynchronization. The lines between these actions maybe transparent and will often shift. Sometimes timeand space are separated between these elements. Com-manders arrange deep, close, and rear operations con-sistent with orders they have received and in a waythat accomplishes the mission at least cost.

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Deep operations, combined with simultaneousclose operations, might be decisive in one operation,while in an other, deep operations set the conditionsfor future close operations to be decisive. Reachingthe decisive operations point quickly is the aim. Thefactors of METT-T determine the relationship betweenassets committed to close, deep, and rear operations.Commanders must see the entire AO and reactpromptly to developments anywhere within it.

Understanding time-space relationships and sys-tems capabilities is vital to commanders’ reaction timesand contributes directly to maintaining the momen-tum of operations and the initiative. It is important toknow not only the location of the enemy but also howfast friendly commanders can react to his initiativesand how fast the enemy can react to our initiatives.Battle is a contest of these dynamic relationships.

Synchronization of deep, close, and rear opera-tions is a complex undertaking. It requires a clear un-derstanding of commander’s intent within the organi-zation, stimulating both command and staff initiative.Effective operations in depth require dynamic, antici-patory responses in order to synchronize a variety ofassets, including space-based systems. The ultimatesuccess in synchronizing deep, close combat, and rearoperations determines the outcome of battles, majoroperations, and campaigns.

Deep OperationsDeep operations are those directed against enemy

forces and functions beyond the close battle. Theyare executed at all levels with fires, maneuver, andleadership. Deep operations affect the enemy througheither attack or threat of attack. They expand the battle-field in space and time to the full extent of friendlycapabilities. Effective deep operations facilitate overallmission success and enhance protection of the force.

The deep battle is designed to nullify the enemy’sfirepower, disrupt his C2, destroy his supplies, andbreak his morale. A well-orchestrated deep battle mayhelp cause the enemy to be defeated outright or mayprevent him from achieving his intended objectives.In conducting simultaneous attacks in depth, Armyforces employ long-range, intelligence-acquisition andtargeting assets, including electronic warfare and jointassets, to track enemy forces, to complicate their op-erations, and to determine the effects of our strikes indepth.

The enemy is best defeated by fighting him close

and deep simultaneously. In doing so, Army forcesuse deep operations to set the conditions for decisivefuture operations. Attack of enemy formations at depthdelays, diverts, or reduces enemy combat capabilitiesand hastens enemy defeat. These operations enablefriendly forces to choose the time, place, and methodto fight the close battle. The principal targets of deepoperations are the freedom of action of the opposingcommander, the coherence and tempo of his actions,and the physical size of his force or selected parts ofit. Successful deep operations attack the enemy’s func-tions, such as his command, logistics, and air defense,while also destroying his combat forces.

While firepower plays an essential role in the con-duct of deep operations, the integrated application offirepower and maneuver makes the Army’s deep at-tack capability effective. Airborne and air assaultforces, attack aviation units, and high-speed armorforces provide the land component and joint force com-manders the capability to thrust deep into the battle-field to seize facilities and destroy key enemy func-tions that would be too expensive or risky to attack byother means. Maneuver at depth will often result inclose combat. It may result in massing ground forma-tions against a deep objective from previously dis-persed friendly positions. It can also provide advan-tageous positions for indirect fire systems and basesfor aircraft, or it can secure an advantage by only thethreat of direct and indirect firepower against the en-emy from those positions. Successful deep maneuverrequires the synchronization of supporting assets, in-cluding systems organic to Army echelons and thoseof other services or allied forces.

Close OperationsForces in immediate contact with the enemy, in

the offense or defense, are fighting close operations.Close operations are usually the corps and divisioncurrent battles. At the tactical level, they include theengagements fought by brigades and battalions. Com-manders should dictate when and where to fight deci-sive close battles. Only ground forces can dominatethe terrain through close operations. No other meansare capable of doing this. Close battle occurs where,when, and against whom commanders choose to com-mit assault formations. Normally it takes close opera-tions on land to gain decisive and lasting battlefieldeffects. Close operations by ground forces give com-manders staying power.

The concept of close operations is sufficiently elas-tic to adjust to the conditions of a wide range of com-

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bat situations. Since the close fight usually placesfriendly forces at greatest risk, it is essential to choosecorrectly the time and place for key close operations.Moreover, commanders must concentrate forces onlywhen necessary for decisive effects, preferring to con-centrate effects instead, if that is possible. Nonethe-less, in some circumstances it will be necessary to con-centrate forces. Forces can be dispersed, concentratedto achieve decisive results, then dispersed again. De-ciding between concentration of forces or massing ofeffects is a function of METT-T.

Rear OperationsRear operations assist in providing freedom of

action and continuity of operations, logistics, and battlecommand. Their primary purposes are to sustain thecurrent close and deep fights and to posture the forcefor future operations. At the operational level, rearoperations support current operations and posture theforce for the next phase of the major operation or cam-paign. At the tactical level, they enhance thecommander’s ability to influence the tempo of com-bat, helping him take advantage of any opportunitywithout delay. At either level, rear areas may not becontiguous with forward areas, complicating both pro-tection for rear area forces and sustainment of forcesfighting close operations.

Rear operations can be the targets of the enemy’sdeep attack. To preclude diverting assets needed forclose operations, commanders train and equip unitsinvolved in rear operations to protect themselvesagainst all but the most serious threats.

Contingency plans can also commit combat forcesto respond to rear area threats. Protective actions inthe rear can be active and passive. Soldiers and lead-ers at all levels are alert to threats to rear areas. Theymust be psychologically prepared to deal with them.Commanders continually reevaluate the possibility ofserious threats to rear operations and devise measuresto meet them with minimum penalty to ongoing closeoperations.

OFFENSE AND DEFENSE ATTHE TACTICAL

AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS Commanders set favorable terms for battle by syn-chronizing ground, air, sea, space, and special opera-tions capabilities to strike the enemy simultaneouslythroughout his tactical and operational depths. The

theater commander attacks the enemy at strategicdepths to set conditions for deeper operational maneu-ver. Commanders and units seek to be unpredictableto the enemy. They must be crafty and have a certainamount of guile and cunning in selecting how to layout the battlefield and where, when, and against whomto fight. They must also remember battle is two-sidedand the enemy influences the outcome.

Successful reconnaissance normally precedes suc-cessful operations at all levels. Large-scale groundmaneuvers always require protection from enemyground and air forces and sometimes from naval forces.Joint force and component commanders continuouslysynchronize interdiction, electronic warfare, air de-fense, air and ground reconnaissance and security, lo-gistics, and special operations to support the overallcampaign and its integral ground operations, especiallyat decisive junctures. Planning is not fighting, andkey to success are the continuous adjustments duringthe conduct of operations. Commanders achieve theinitiative by making adjustments and having optionswhen the enemy has none.

Ground operations require the coordinated move-ment and the dynamic, agile concentration of units upto corps and numbered armies to gain positional ad-vantage over the enemy. Intelligence, movement con-trol, command on the move, air defense, deception,and logistics must all function harmoniously to sup-port operational movements. Commanders protect keyforces and facilities—some of them deep in the reararea—during this movement.

Major tactical events can lead to fast-breaking de-velopments. Coordination of actions that support themovement of large forces is extremely important fol-lowing major operations and battles. Commanders oflarge units will attempt to exploit tactical gains or de-fend and reorganize units. Air defense, deception,ground and air transportation, reconnaissance and se-curity, logistics, and movement control will be the chiefconcerns as these movements occur.

Original plans may require modification as the en-emy situation changes or becomes clear. Tactical for-mations, therefore, must be able to modify their direc-tion of movement or orientation of defenses duringoperations. The mental agility of the commander, or-ganizational agility of his staff, and physical agility ofhis units are vital to success. Staffs continually workto generate workable options for the

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commander as fighting continues and friendly forcesseek to gain and maintain the initiative.

Use of reserves and realignment of forces is con-tinuous. The commander may have to realign forcesin response to the operational situation or otherwiseattempt to adjust the terms of the battle itself to meethis objectives or facilitate future operations. A sig-nificant concern of the large-unit commander duringbattle is to defeat the enemy’s operational reserves andcommit his own reserves, if necessary, at the decisivetime and place. Friendly operational reserves oftenexploit the results of battle by penetrating deep be-yond enemy defenses. In the defense, such reservescounterattack to defeat the enemy attack or start thefriendly counteroffensive. The operational reserve canlimit the enemy’s success or cover the force’s with-drawal. The theater commander attacks the enemy’sstrategic reserves. One-time commitment of reservesto achieve decisive results is desirable, but often notattainable. Thus commanders and staffs continuallyreconstitute a reserve in order to have decisive optionsavailable.

During the current battle, commanders comparethe progress of ongoing operations against the antici-pated requirements of future operations. They continu-

ally assess the potential culmination of their force andseek to achieve decisive results before reaching cul-mination.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONSThe offensive is the decisive form of war-¡the com-

manders’ ultimate means of imposing their will uponthe enemy. While strategic, operational, or tacticalconsiderations may require defending, the defeat ofan enemy force at any level may require shifting tothe offensive. Even in the defense itself, seizure andretention of the initiative requires offensive activities.The more fluid the battle, the truer this will be.

Offensive campaigns and major operations are de-signed to achieve operational and strategic objectivesquickly and decisively at least cost. Operations JustCause and Desert Storm are good examples. Armyforces must also be adept and have the will to fight inmore protracted conflicts if necessary. Several dy-namic characteristics apply to offensive operations:initiative on the part of subordinate commanders, rapidshifts in the main effort to take advantage of opportu-nities, momentum and tempo, and the deepest, mostrapid and simultaneous destruction of enemy defensespossible.


The Desert Storm phase of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War reflects the dynamic joint andcombined nature of the operational offensive and simultaneous operations in depth.

Desert Storm began on 17 January 1991, when allied air and naval forces began the destruction of keyIraqi strategic, operational, and tactical targets. By the end of the second day, the coalition air compo-nent had achieved air superiority; by 21 January the Iraqi air force was incapable of operations. Airoperations continued to strike at key systems in the heart of Iraq, as well as at the Republican Guard andfrontline Iraqi forces. USMC forces afloat tied down Iraqi ground forces along the coast with a threat-ened amphibious landing. SOF operated throughout the theater.

The coalition set the final conditions for the ground attack. It moved the VII Corps by ground tacticalmovement and the XVIII Airborne Corps by road convoy from defensive positions in the east to attackpositions up to 500 miles away, west of Kuwait. As air interdiction and operational deception operationscontinued, allied ground forces were set to execute the decisive action against the enemy.

The major ground operation began in the early morning hours of 24 February. The objective was to driveIraqi forces from Kuwait, requiring defeat of the Republican Guard divisions in southern Iraq. The planfor achieving this envisioned a deliberate attack along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabia border by the 1st Ma-rine Expeditionary Force and Arab coalition forces. Included in the plan were deception operations to fixIraqi forces while the VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps swept around to the west of the Iraqi defensesto envelop them, to strike deep into Iraq to sever Iraqi LOCs, and to isolate and defeat the RepublicanGuard.

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The coalition attack began with supporting attacks on both flanks and a feint in the center of sector(Figure 6-2). The XVIII Airborne corps attacked in the west with two divisions. The French DaguetDivision (6th French Light Armored Division), with OPCON of a brigade of the 82d Airborne Division,attacked to secure as-Salman Airfield and protect the coalition’s west flank. The 82d Airborne Division (-) followed and supported the 6th French Light Armored Division. The 101st Airborne Division (AirAssault) conducted the largest air assault operation in history to secure a forward operating base deep inIraq.

Figure 6-2. Operation Desert Storm, 24 February 1991

On the coalition’s eastern flank, the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, with an attached armor brigade of the2d Armored Division and forces of the Saudi Arabian National Guard, attacked north into Kuwait. In thecenter, the 1st Cavalry Division conducted a feint as part of the plan to deceive the Iraqis as to thelocation of the coalition’s main effort.

Based on the initial success, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) began the coalition’s maineffort 14 hours early. The XVIII Airborne Corps continued to attack west of the Iraqi obstacle belt withthe 24th Infantry Division and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) to seize objectives inside Iraq.VII Corps, conducting the main effort for USCENTCOM, attacked in the center with the 1st InfantryDivision penetrating the main Iraqi defensive belt. The 1st (UK) Armored Division attacked through thebreach to defeat Iraqi tactical reserves and secure the corps eastern flank. Simultaneously, to the west ofthis, the 2d ACR led the attack of the 1st and 3d Armored Divisions around the flank of the obstacle beltand into Iraq. In the east, Arab coalition forces began their attack into Kuwait.

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By the evening of 26 February, the VII Corps had turned 90 degrees to the east, fixed the RepublicanGuard, and opened a corridor for the XVIII Airborne corps to continue their attack to the east afterhaving secured the coalition’s west flank. The 24th Infantry Division had reach the Euphrates River,blocking Iraqi western routes of withdrawal, and had turned east with the 3d ACR to engage the Repub-lican Guard. Throughout the theater of operations, coalition forces held the initiative.

Coalition forces attacked on the night of 26 February, with VII Corps making the main attack againstthree Republican Guard Armored Divisions (Figure 6-3) and parts of other Iraqi formations, to includethe Jihad Corps. In the south of the corps sector, the 1st Infantry Division conducted a night passage oflines through the engaged 2d ACR and immediately made contact. To their north, the 1st and 3d ArmoredDivisions pressed the attack east while the 1st Cavalry Division, released for USCENTCOM reserve,moved almost 200 kilometers in 24 hours to an attack position. XVIII Airborne corps pressed the attackeast to the north of VII Corps, with attack aviation of the 101st Airborne Division and ground and airattacks of the 3d ACR and 24th Infantry Division. The allies pressed the attack relentlessly through thenight and during the day of 27 February toward the Iraqi city of Basrah and the coast of Kuwait.

Figure 6-3. Operation Desert Storm 24 February 1991

By the morning of 28 February, the Republican Guard divisions were effectively routed and incapable offurther coordinated resistance. At 0800 hours on the 28th, after the coalition achieved the militaryobjectives of the operation, President Bush called for coalition forces to cease offensive operations.

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The ideal attack might resemble a torrent of waterrushing forward and expanding its channels aroundmajor resistance. It should move fast, follow recon-naissance units or successful probes through gaps inenemy defenses, and shift its strength quickly to widenpenetrations and reinforce its successes, thereby car-rying the battle deep into the enemy’s rear.

JFCs orient offensive campaigns and major op-erations on decisive objectives. Their plans identifythe center of gravity and decisive points and establishobjectives that lead to the enemy’s defeat. Although acampaign should attempt to defeat the enemy in asingle major operation, an elusive enemy may causecommanders to structure the campaign to defeat theenemy in a series of major operations.

Within a given theater, a number of ground, air,and naval operations occur simultaneously in supportof the campaign plan. Even during a major operation,one large joint force might be attacking, another de-fending, and still another protecting LOCs, while oth-ers arrive in theater.

Additionally, commanders may find themselvesfighting offensive campaigns against either concen-trated or dispersed enemy forces. Facing a concen-trated enemy, operational commanders maneuver toforce the enemy to abandon his position or fight at adisadvantage. In practice, this means directing opera-tions against an enemy’s flanks or rear or penetratinghis defenses through weak areas. Facing a dispersedenemy, attacking commanders can isolate and defeatseparated enemy forces in turn before they can join toorganize a stronger defense.

However, in any offensive operation, ground com-manders try to collapse enemy defenses as rapidly aspossible with the smallest expenditure of resources.They do this by massing fires, concentrating units onlywhen necessary. They also do this by retaining theinitiative, striking enemy weaknesses, attacking theenemy in depth, and creating conditions that preventthe enemy from organizing a coherent defense. Occa-sionally, attacking commanders maneuver to avoidbattles that would slow or weaken the offensive.

The initiative is critical to successful offensive op-erations. Whatever its purpose, campaign plans mustbe flexible enough to accommodate change so com-manders can shift their main effort in response to ei-ther setback or opportunity without losing the initia-tive. Accordingly, commanders anticipate likely en-

emy actions and prepare contingencies for them andtrain their units to do likewise. Successful command-ers do not run out of options and are always lookingfor ways to hurt the enemy. Anticipation and continu-ous formulation of attack options are key.

Security of the force is crucial. Successful recon-naissance is vital to success. The high-speed mobilityof modern forces can create exposed LOCs and gapsbetween large, friendly formations. Commandersshould anticipate this and take precautions to keep itfrom happening. Moreover, covering forces operatewell forward, providing early warning.

In each phase of a campaign, operational com-manders deploy their units using whatever form of ma-neuver best fits the conditions of METT-T. They movethe force as a whole, orienting on enemy forces ormajor geographical terrain features, keeping someforces in depth as reserves.

The employment of the reserve may be the mostcrucial decision commanders make. As the battle isjoined, operational-level commanders adjust the finalmaneuver of their forces and look for opportunities todefeat the enemy’s defense in depth. In particular,they seek ways to employ their operational reservesdecisively. In any battle, commanders position opera-tional reserves where they can best exploit tacticalsuccess. As tactical success is achieved, the choicesfor employing reserves become more certain, whetherto destroy the enemy in the battle area, to secure deepobjectives, or whatever else commanders desire. So itis important that commanders plan for the commit-ment of the reserve and, once committed, anticipateits reconstitution.

Finally, in an offensive campaign, commanders tryto preserve the fighting integrity of the force. How-ever, if their force becomes dispersed or overextended,they may have to resort to the defense, planning forsuch a contingency as either a branch or sequel to theiroffensive operations.

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONSThe defense is the less decisive form of war. The

defense may nonetheless be stronger than the offense,thus METT-T may necessitate defense in a campaignfor a force-projection army prior to conducting offen-sive operations. The advantages of cover and con-cealment, advance siting of weapons, shorter LOCs,and operations over familiar terrain among a friendlypopulation generally favor the defender. The

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advantages enjoyed by the attacker are the initialchoices of when and where to strike and when andwhere to mass; these give him the initiative. The ma-jor challenge of the defense is to overcome this initialoffensive advantage and look for and create early op-tions to transition to the offense.

The defender uses prepared positions and knowl-edge of the ground to slow the attacker’s momentumand strike him repeatedly and unexpectedly. The de-fender disrupts the attacker’s synchronization, de-grades his strength and ability to concentrate, and de-feats his force with effective use of combined arms.The defender simultaneously attacks the enemythroughout the full depth of his formations. He neednot kill every enemy tank, squad, or fieldpiece; he needonly destroy the ability of the enemy force to sustainand coordinate his forward movement.

A successful defense consists of reactive and of-fensive elements existing together to deprive the en-emy of the initiative. An effective defense is rarelypassive. The defender resists and contains the enemywhere he must but seeks every opportunity to conductoffensive operations such as local counterattacks. Suchopportunities may be limited early in the defensive; asthe situation develops they become more numerous.This is especially true when the defender takes stepsto uncover enemy vulnerabilities or confuse or disor-ganize enemy forces. When the attacker exposes him-self, the defender’s reserves or uncommitted forcescounterattack. The defense that successfully destroysthe coherence of enemy operations can more easilydefeat him after the defender transitions to the offense.


The Yom Kuppur War, 6-24 October 1973, exemplifies the relationship between offensive and defensiveactions as the operational level of war. On 6 October 1973, at 1504 hours, the Egyptians launchedmassive air and artillery stikes against Israeli positions in the Bar Lev Line (Figure 6- 4). At precisely thesame time, Syrian forces opened a second operational axis against Israeli positions on the Golan Heights.The Israeli High Command soon determined that the critical theater of operations would develop alongthe Suez front and devised plans to begin decisive offensive operations there against the Egyptians. Butto ensure the ultimate success of these operations, Israeli troops had to maintain a strong defense in theGolan region, securing the strategic rear of the Israeli forces operating in the Sinai.

By the end of 6 October, Syrian commandos in a heliborne assault seized the key observation post onMount Hermon that overlooked the Golan Plateau and the Damasucs Plain. The next day, the Israeli 7thArmored Birgade defeated the Syrian 7th Infantry Division north of Juneitra. The 3d Tank Division,operating in the second echelon of the Syrian attack, then sought a breakthrough on its own further to thesouth. This thrust was defeated in a fierce tank battle west of Amadiye.

On 6-7 October, Syrian forces achieved greater success across the more favorable terrain to the southnear the town of Rafid. Here, the 5th Mechanized Division broke the defenses of the Israeli 188th Ar-mored Brigade. Although virtually destroyed (90 percent of the unit’s officers were killed or wounded),the unit’s two-day struggle bought time of the Israeli defense, led by Major General Rafael Eitan. By theend of 7 October, the initial Syrian attack, reinforced by the 1st Tank Division, had reach offensive culmi-nation near the western escarpment of the Golan.

During 8-9 October, General Eitan redeployed the 7th Armored Brigade from the north for a counterat-tack against the newly won Syrian positions. Catching the Syrians in the midst of

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resupplying their units, the Israelis were able to recover much of their lost territory. Eitan’s counterat-tack, however, was merely the prelude to an operationl counteroffensive that began on 10 October.

Figure 6-4. Yom Kippur War, 6 October 1973

Thanks in large measure to the last stand of the 188th Armored Brigade, the Isarelis were able to rushthree divisions to Eitan on the Golan front. These three division launched a coutneroffensive down theKuneitra-Damascus highway. By 12 October, the counteroffensive was so succesful that the Israelisbegan to shift untis to the decisive Sinai front. All positions on the Golan were restored by 22 October1973, Mount Hermon being retaken on that day (Figure 6-5).

Thanks to the stout defense by General Eitan and his troops on the Golan front, the great encircling battleof Suez-Adabiya was able to take place in the Sinai. The encirclement of the Egyptian Third Armyessentially sealed the victory for the Israeli armed forces in the Yom Kuppur War.

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Commanders fight defensive operations to defeata large, attacking force, retain territory, build strength,or gain time. They also defend in certain areas as aneconomy-of-force measure. They use the defense tohelp set the terms for future decisive operations.

In preparing for defensive operations, the com-mander considers the logistical base and the strengths,limits, and vulnerabilities it imposes on him. The com-mander coordinates his plans for ground operationswith theater air, sea, space, and special operations toensure that the five are synchronized and that he fullyexploits the capabilities of each. The campaign planshould set clear objectives for all major forces in thetheater.

Defensive operations control the enemy’s attackwhile preserving the defending force. Because theattacker normally attempts to push forces into thedepths of the defended theater, the defending com-mander holds reserves in depth. He may employ themto engage the enemy’s operational reserve, extricatecommitted units after battle, exploit tactical successby imposing greater losses on the enemy, or seize theoperational initiative after a decisive victory. In par-ticular, the defender isolates or defeats the attacker’soperational reserve.

Whatever the design, commanders conducting de-fensive operations mix offensive and defensive tacti-cal actions and contest the initiative at every opportu-nity. They consider their offensive actions carefullybut accept calculated risks. As a rule, any

Figure 6-5. Yom Kippur War, 22 October 1973

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tives of military force, the plans and operations thatwill most affect the enemy’s judgment of cost and risk,and the impact of military operations on alliance andcoalition warfare. The commander’s view of the situ-ation on the ground and, particularly, the enemy’s re-sidual fighting capacity and ability for continued re-sistance contribute importantly to the political deter-mination that military operations should cease.

If the conditions have been properly set and metfor ending the war, the enemy should be both unableand unwilling to resist. Success here should give po-litical leverage to achieve the strategic objectives.Since war is fought for political aims, it is only suc-cessful when such aims are ultimately achieved. Suc-cess on the battlefield does not always lead to successin war. Making sure that it does requires the closecollaboration of political and military leaders.

A period of postconflict activities exists in the pe-riod from the immediate end of the conflict to the ac-complishment of the national strategic goals and ob-jectives. A variety of operations other than war occurduring this period. Chapter 3 discusses this phase of aforce-projection operation, while Chapter 13 discussesprinciples and considerations for operations other thanwar.

concept of operation the commander adopts reflectsthe greatest possible use of mobility, surprise, knowl-edge of the terrain, and offensive tactics. The ulti-mate objective is to turn to the offensive and defeatthe enemy decisively.

CONFLICT TERMINATIONMilitary operations seek to end war on favorable

terms. Knowing when to end a war and how to pre-serve the objectives achieved are vital components ofcampaign design and relate to theater-strategic plan-ning discussed earlier in this chapter. Before the firstshot is fired, the theater commander must have a clearsense of what he needs to see in order to know that hisoperations (and hence, the conflict) can end; he alsoneeds to know whether (and how) ending the conflictat the point he has chosen will contribute to the over-all policy goals.

The combatant commander considers how mili-tary operations combine to bring the conflict to a fa-vorable end. He must understand strategic objectivesand how victory in war contributes to those objectives.National decision makers will rely on the advice ofsenior military leaders as they consider how and whento end a conflict. The commander provides decisionmakers with critical information on enemy intent, ob-jectives, strategy, and chances of success. Command-ers consider the nature and type of conflict, the objec-

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CHAPTER 7

FUNDAMENTALS OF THE OFFENSE

The offense is the decisive form of war. Whilestrategic, operational, or tactical considerations mayrequire defending for a period of time, defeat of theenemy sooner or later requires shifting to the offense.Seizure and retention of the initiative comes with of-fensive action.

The fundamentals of the offense apply equally toentry operations as they do to more traditional offen-sive operations. In both cases, the intent is to gainfreedom of action to allow swift transition from oneaction to another and to put the enemy at risk through-out the depth and space of the battlefield. The attackerpresses successful operations relentlessly to preventthe enemy from recovering from the initial shock ofthe attack, regaining his equilibrium, forming a cohe-sive defense, or attacking in turn. The fight is taken tothe enemy in such a way as to achieve decisive vic-tory at least cost.

PURPOSES OF THE OFFENSEThe main purpose of the offense is to defeat, de-

stroy, or neutralize the enemy force. Additionally, of-fensive operations are undertaken to secure decisiveterrain, to deprive the enemy of resources, to gain in-formation, to deceive and divert the enemy, to holdthe enemy in position, to disrupt his attack, and to setup the conditions for future successful operations.

Because tactical offensive operations often exposethe attacker, they normally require local superior com-bat power at the point of attack. That and the need tohave sufficient force available to exploit success im-ply accepting risk elsewhere. Commanders build upsufficient combat power in their main effort to over-whelm the enemy at the critical time and place.

At the point of their attack, commanders avoid theenemy’s main strength, turning him out of his defen-sive positions, isolating his forces from sources of sup-port, and forcing him to fight in an unintended direc-tion over ground he has not prepared. By attackingthis way, the disadvantages of fighting exposed and

surprised shift to the defender. One experienced sol-dier once put it this way, “Hit the other fellow as quickas you can, as hard as you can, where it hurts the most,when he isn’t looking.”

At times more direct attacks are possible. How-ever, such attacks are nearly always costly in lives andmateriel. Commanders should undertake them onlywhen no other approach will accomplish the mission.

Inflicting physical damage is frequently necessaryfor offensive success. The tactical offense can achievelarge gains by destroying the coherence of the defense,fragmenting and isolating enemy units in the zone ofattack, and driving deep to secure decisive objectives.Historically, the most successful offensives have pro-duced more enemy prisoners than casualties, reflect-ing the significant impact of offensive shock on theenemy’s will to resist.

CONTENTS

PURPOSES OF THE OFFENSE ................... 7-0

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE .... 7-1Surprise ................................................. 7-1Concentration ....................................... 7-2Tempo .................................................... 7-2Audacity ................................................. 7-3

FORMS OF THE TACTICAL OFFENCE ....... 7-3Movement to Contact ........................... 7-4Attack ..................................................... 7-5Exploitation ........................................... 7-8Pursuit ................................................... 7-9

FORMS OF MANRUVER ............................. 7-11Envelopment ........................................ 7-11Turning Movement ............................... 7-11Infiltration ............................................ 7-12Penetration .......................................... 7-12Frontal Attack...................................... 7-12

OPERATIONS IN DEPTH............................ 7-12Deep Operations ................................. 7-13Close Operations ................................ 7-13Read Operations ................................. 7-13

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Offensive tactical operations are continuous, notisolated, battles. They may continue for weeks, pre-senting the enemy with continuous pressure and fewoptions. Commanders therefore plan for conductingthe tactical offense over extended times, resting troopsas necessary, and alternating and combining differentforms of maneuver and operations throughout the du-ration of the fighting. For example, the initial assaultto gain forcible entry may be followed by a defense ofthe lodgment area by ground forces to protect thebuildup, while air and sea forces conduct simultaneousoffensive operations. Limited maneuver may followto expand the lodgment and to set the stage for a sus-tained ground offensive.

The offense is an integral part of any defense. Adefending force may attack to disrupt an expected en-emy offensive, upsetting its preparation while buyingtime and information. As in the case of the reconnais-sance in force, a spoiling attack may develop into amajor offensive operation if the attack reveals an ex-ploitable weakness. Raids are a special form of spoil-ing attack designed to destroy installations or facili-ties critical to the enemy’s operations. Commandersmay also conduct raids prior to or in conjunction withother offensive operations to confuse the enemy or todivert his attention.

CHARACTERISTICSOF THE OFFENSE

The main feature of an offensive battle is the out-flanking or bypassing of the defender—that is, takingthe initiative. The aim of the commander in an offen-sive battle is to expedite the decision. Surprise, con-centration, tempo, and audacity characterize offensiveoperations and are components of initiative. Initia-tive, combined with maneuver, makes decisive offen-sive operations possible.

The basic tenets allow the commander to focuson these characteristics. In a violently executed attack,agility is particularly important. It requires that com-manders anticipate developments and prepare branchesand sequels so that they are ready to exploit opportu-nities by shifting forces and activities quickly. Agil-ity requires units to be able to rapidly change forma-tion alignments and shift from one form of maneuverto another without pause. To preserve synchroniza-tion on a fluid battlefield, commanders conduct de-tailed initial planning. Subordinates understand theintent of the next two higher commanders so well that

they can properly exploit battlefield opportunities evenwhen communications fail. At every level, command-ers develop options so that whatever happens, they canmaintain the momentum of the attack.

Commanders in the offense synchronize the ef-fects from all of their assets, control operations to thedepth of their combat systems’ effective ranges, andchange direction frequently. They sustain themselvesand maintain the ability to change direction quicklywithout losing the concentration of their forces andsynchronization of effects. Commanders use routes thatpermit the most opportunities for maneuver aroundstrongpoints. Offensive battle plans include contingen-cies such as reverting to the defense when necessary,exploiting opportunities whenever possible, changingthe direction or location of the main effort, or continu-ing operations in altered light or weather conditions.As the conditions of battle change, commanders per-ceive opportunities and dangers and adjust accordingly.Agile units plan for dispersal, use multiple routes, ear-mark reserves that are prepared for all conceivablecontingencies, and adjust as necessary to enemy useof weapons of mass destruction.

SURPRISECommanders achieve surprise by striking the en-

emy at a time or place or in a manner for which it isnot physically or mentally ready. Knowing the en-emy commander’s intent and denying his ability toconduct thorough and timely intelligence is crucial.Being unpredictable and using deception, cunning, andguile also help to gain surprise. Surprise is achievedby the direction, timing, boldness, and force of the at-tack. Surprise delays enemy reactions, overloads andconfuses enemy C2, induces psychological shock inenemy soldiers and leaders, and reduces the coher-ence of the enemy defense. By diminishing enemycombat power, surprise enables an attacker to succeedwith fewer forces than he might otherwise require.

Achieving outright surprise once hostilities havebegun is difficult. The proliferation of modern surveil-lance and warning systems and the presence of globalcommercial news networks make complete surpriseless likely. Nonetheless, surprise can still be achievedby operating in a manner the enemy does not expect.The enemy may anticipate an attack, but he can stillbe deceived as to its nature, its timing, and its force.Bad weather, seemingly impassable terrain, feints,demonstrations, and false communications can all beused to

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lull the enemy into false expectations. Sudden and vio-lent attacks have a paralyzing effect on the enemy. Sodo attacks from unanticipated directions. Airborne,air assault, and special operating forces deep in theenemy’s rear tend to have a disconcerting psychologi-cal effect on the enemy’s equilibrium.

Surprise can come from operations used to throwthe enemy off balance and eventually off guard. Re-peated rehearsals by the Egyptian Army in 1973 causedrecurring alerts by Israeli forces on the Bar Lev Line.The Israelis finally tired of the drills and believed thatthe Egyptians did not intend to cross. At that point theEgyptians attacked, successfully achieving surprise.

Surprise can also come from an unexpected changein tempo. Tempo may be slow at first, setting the con-ditions for a later acceleration that catches the enemyoff guard. After several weeks of air attacks in Opera-tion Desert Storm with only limited offensive actionon the ground, the sudden breakthrough of allied forcescaught the Iraqis off guard. VII Corps’ night turningmovement into the flank of the Iraqi Republican Guardunits and the rapid exploitation, which put the 1st In-fantry Division in blocking positions on the North-South Coastal Highway and the 24th Infantry Divi-sion astride Highway 8 blocking the enemy’s retreator reinforcement, completely surprised the Iraqi forcescaught on the road.

CONCENTRATIONWhile surprise may contribute to offensive suc-

cess, concentration is the ability to mass effects with-out massing large formations and is therefore essen-tial for achieving and exploiting success. Concentra-tion of any size force is also a vulnerability. Moderntechnology makes the process of concentration moredifficult and dangerous. While advances in groundand airmobility enable the attacker to concentrate morerapidly, they also enable the defender to react morequickly. Moreover, the lethality of modern weaponrysignificantly increases the threat to concentrated for-mations.

To overcome these difficulties, attacking com-manders manipulate their own and the enemy’s con-centration of forces by some combination of disper-sion, concentration, deception, and attack. Dispersionstretches the enemy’s defenses and denies lucrativetargets to deep fires. By concentrating forces rap-idly along converging axes, the attacker overwhelmsenemy forces at the point of attack by massing the

effects of combat power. The attacker makes everyeffort to deceive the enemy as to his true intentions. After a successful attack, attacking commanders keeptheir force concentrated to gain full advantage of itsmomentum. Should other forces threaten them, theymay disperse again. They adopt the posture that bestsuits the situation, protects the force, and sustains themomentum of the attack.

Commanders designate a point of main effort andfocus resources to support it. They are ready to shift itrapidly without losing synchronization of effects asthe attack unfolds. Allocating enough CS and CSS tounits making the main attack permits them to adjust tochanging circumstances without time-consuming andconfusing reorganizations. At the same time, com-manders retain centralized control of sufficient assetsto shift the main effort to a supporting attack if it ap-pears more advantageous.

At every level, especially at division and higher,commanders conceal the concentration of their forcesuntil it is too late for the enemy to react effectively.Units avoid or mask the patterns of their movementand preparatory activity that might reveal the direc-tion or timing of attack. Commanders monitor theirlogistical buildups, patrolling activities, communica-tions, and indirect fires to keep the enemy from seeinga visible change in the attacking force’s operating pat-tern. Speed, security, and deception are essential tosuccessful concentration of forces.

Concentration requires careful, prior coordinationwith other services and coalition forces. At every stageof the attack commanders integrate joint intelligenceassets vertically and horizontally with joint fires. Inaddition to the protection from detection and attackthat air superiority provides, tactical commandersemploy ground, air, and sea resources to delay, dis-rupt, or destroy the enemy’s reconnaissance. Theyalso employ air, air defense, fires, and maneuver forcesto gain tactical protection of combat and support forcesas they concentrate. Once concentrated, forces cangenerate tactical fires from ground systems, CAS, andsea-based systems to weight the main effort and tosustain the momentum of the attack.

TEMPOTempo is the rate of speed of military action; con-

trolling or altering that rate is essential for maintain-ing the initiative. As opposing forces battle one an-other, military operations alternate between actions and

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pauses. Sometimes units go slow at one point in orderto go fast later. Commanders seek a tempo that main-tains relentless pressure on the enemy to prevent himfrom recovering from the shock and effects of the at-tack. A quick tempo demands an ability to make tacti-cal decisions quickly, to execute operations that denythe enemy a pause, and to exploit opportunities accord-ing to the commander’s intent. An attack tempo thatputs sufficient pressure on the defender is essential tosuccess; it promotes surprise, keeps the enemy off bal-ance, contributes to the security of the attacking force,and denies the defender freedom of action. Properlyexploited, tempo can confuse and immobilize the de-fender until the attack becomes unstoppable.

Tempo can be either fast or slow. While speed isoften preferred, commanders adjust tempo to ensuresynchronization. At times, tempo may be slowed toensure conditions are set before accelerating again togain the advantages that come with speed. The attackermay adjust his tempo prior to the final decisive actionto ensure the location of key enemy targets, to arrangeforces for a simultaneous attack in depth, or to com-plete resupply and repositioning to sustain the imme-diate transition to exploitation and pursuit. Once com-bat begins, attacking forces move fast to follow recon-naissance units or successful probes through gaps inenemy defenses before the enemy recovers. Attackersshift their strength quickly to widen penetrations, rollup exposed flanks, and reinforce successes. The attackertries to carry the battle deep into the enemy rear tobreak down the enemy’s defenses before it can react.The attacker does not permit the enemy to recover fromthe shock of the initial assault, never gives him the timeto identify the main effort, and, above all, never af-fords him the opportunity to concentrate his forces ormass his effects against the main effort.

Tempo provides the necessary momentum for at-tacks to achieve their objectives. Tempo is a combina-tion of speed and mass that creates pressure on the en-emy. Speed, moreover, is not a substitute for the massproduced by sound tactics. Commanders who overex-tend their ability to mass effects or otherwise act hast-ily may give the advantage to the enemy. To gain thegreatest advantage, commanders combine their con-trol of tempo with sound tactics to create pressure; thisconfuses and shocks the enemy and robs him of hiscombat power.

Commanders build tempo into operations throughcareful planning. They identify the best avenues forattack, plan the battle in depth, provide for quick tran-

sition to other phases of offense, and concentrate andcombine forces effectively.

AUDACITYAudacity is a key component of any successful

offensive action. A simple plan, boldly executed, re-quires audacious leaders to negate the dis-advantagesof numerical inferiority. A good example from Op-eration Desert Storm is the audacity demonstrated lateon 27 February 1991. The two ground troops of the 1-4th Cavalry reached Highway 8, which connected Ku-wait City and Basrah. The squadron commander, op-erating on the extreme northern flank of the division,attempted to contact the 1st Infantry Division tacticaloperations center to report his situation. He realizedthe inherent risk to his force in continuing the attackwhile separated from the rest of the division by 25kilometers and without support by artillery or rein-forcements due to the loss of radio communications.Knowing the intent of the corps and division command-ers, he blocked the Iraqi escape route. Subsequently,1-4th Cavalry captured more than 1,000 prisoners.

Commanders should understand when and wherethey are taking risks but must not become tentative inthe execution of their plan. A difficult situation handledboldly often leads to dramatic success. The offensiveis inherently a bold action and must be pursued withaudacity.

FORMS OF THE TACTICALOFFENSE

The four general forms of the tactical offense aremovement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pur-suit. While it is convenient to talk of them as differentforms, in reality they flow readily from one to another.Operations are increasingly fluid. Different forms ofattack—occurring throughout the depth of the battle-field simultaneously and in closely aligned phases thatshift back and forth—take new forms and offer increas-ing options for development. An attack may lead toexploitation, which can lead to pursuit. But there arealso occasions when pursuit can be followed by delib-erate attack, or deliberate attack can lead directly topursuit. The ebb and flow of battle opens up manyavenues for attack; victory goes to the bold.

In force-projection operations, the transition fromoffense to defense is another critical ebb and flow. En-try forces have to survive their initial battles to buildforces. Initial-entry forces have to secure a lodgment

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Two limited-purpose applications of the move-ment to contact are the search and attack, and recon-naissance in force.

Search and AttackSearch and attack operations are conducted by

smaller, light maneuver units and air cavalry or airassault units in large areas. The purpose of this op-eration is to destroy enemy forces, protect the force,deny area to the enemy, or collect information. Com-manders use search and attack when the enemy dis-perses in an area of close terrain that is unsuited forheavy forces, when they cannot find enemy weak-nesses, or when they want to deny the enemy move-ment in an area. They also employ search and attackin rear areas against infiltrators or SOF. Finally, searchand attack is also useful as an area security mission toclear assigned zones.

Reconnaissance in ForceThe reconnaissance in force is a limited-objec-

tive operation by a considerable force to obtain infor-mation and locate and test enemy dispositions,strengths, and reactions. If the enemy situation mustbe developed along a broad front, the reconnaissancein force may consist of strong probing actions to de-termine the enemy situation at selected points.The enemy’s reactions may reveal weaknesses in hisdefensive system.

Commanders may conduct reconnaissance in forceduring mobile operations as a means of keeping pres-sure on the defender by seizing key terrain and un-covering enemy weaknesses. Even when command-ers execute a reconnaissance in force primarily togather information, they must be alert to seize anyopportunity to exploit tactical success.

Meeting EngagementThe desired result of the movement to contact is

to find the enemy. When this happens, commandersfight a meeting engagement. To maintain their free-dom of action once they make contact (essential tomaintaining the initiative), commanders usually leadwith a self-contained force that locates and fixes theenemy.

The commanders hold the bulk of their force backso that when their lead forces make contact they canmaneuver the majority of their force without becom-ing decisively engaged. They fight through light re-sistance with lead units whenever possible to main-tain the

area to permit the buildup of forces. Their selectionof offensive and defensive missions changes with thesituation and flow of forces. Forced entry is clearlyoffensive, but it often leads directly to the defense ofthe newly gained lodgment area. On the other hand,the tempo of force-projection operations may movefrom the initial offensive objective to a defensive pauseand then to a subsequent limited objective to seize keyterrain essential to the defense. As the buildup of forcestakes place, tactical units conduct a combination ofdefensive and offensive operations to set the stage forthe sustained offensive operations. Such choices areinfluenced principally by the factors of METT-T. Theforms of offensive operations serve different purposesand offer specific outcomes at different points in theoffense.

MOVEMENT TO CONTACTMovement to contact is the offensive operation

conducted to develop the situation and to establish orregain contact. It may also include preliminary diver-sionary actions and preparatory fires. The extent andnature of the movement to contact depends on whetheropposing forces were previously in contact. If forcesare not in contact, then the central feature of the move-ment-to-contact operations is gaining or reestablish-ing contact with the enemy. Establishing contact oc-curs at some level in virtually all offensive operationswhere forces are not in immediate proximity to oneanother. Knowing the enemy’s location and activitiesis an underpinning of a unit’s ability to conduct mo-bile, force-oriented battles. Technologies such asspace-based or joint-extended range surveillance andreconnaissance systems help locate the enemy, butphysical contact by friendly troops remains a vitalmeans of finding and fixing enemy forces. It is bestwhen friendly forces discover the enemy with at leastenough time to make hasty attack plans. Being sur-prised by inadvertently running into the enemy is al-ways a possibility -- but not the preferred tactical op-tion.

Approach MarchAn approach march is a variant of the movement

to contact. Commanders conduct an approach marchwhen they are relatively certain of the enemy’s loca-tion and are a considerable distance from the enemy.Commanders adjust their tempo appropriately as theyanticipate closing with enemy forces. They decidewhere their forces can deploy into attack formationsthat facilitate the initial contact and still provide free-dom of action for the bulk of their forces.

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momentum of the operation. Focusing combat powerrapidly requires agility in organizations and leaders.Commanders also must balance the need to focus com-bat power rapidly with the need to keep other optionsopen and to maintain pressure to which the enemy mustreact. Sometimes a meeting engagement occurs bychance wherever the opposing forces meet. This isnot a preferred operation or one that intelligence as-sets should allow to happen. Rather, com-mandersseek to surprise the enemy whenever possible.

Sometimes in a race to an objective or occupationof key terrain, forces make contact while on the move.Moreover, meeting engagements can occur even wheneach opponent is aware of the other, but both decideto attack without delay.

Once commanders establish contact, they imple-ment the option that provides them the most advan-tage. Hasty attacks usually follow movement-to-con-tact operations, but other options are possible. Amongthese are fixing the enemy force while the bulk of at-tacking forces bypass it or transitioning to a deliberateattack. When Army forces run into a larger enemy, orif the terrain is such that it offers an advantage, com-manders may elect to conduct a hasty defense and forcethe enemy to fight in the open. Commanders exploitevery opportunity. Whatever the choice¡attack ordefend¡at the point of collision of combat forces, com-manders must be able to generate and sustain over-whelming combat power.

ATTACKThe purpose of the attack is to defeat, destroy, or

neutralize the enemy. The same fundamentals applyto each type of attack. The differences between typesof attacks lie in the amount of planning, coordination,and preparation before execution—in other words, howthoroughly commanders can apply the fundamentals.Force-oriented objectives allow greater freedom ofaction than terrain-oriented objectives and are there-fore the preferred option. The attack usually followsa movement to contact (see Figures 7-1 and 7-2) but isalso appropriate after defensive operations, exploita-tions, and pursuits. Deciding when to begin and endan attack is a tactical or operational judgment basedupon its contribution to the commander’s objectives.

Whether hasty or deliberate, successful attack de-pends on the skillful massing of effects against theenemy force. The objective is to shatter the enemy’swill, disrupt his synchronization, and destroy his units’

cohesion and the willingness of his soldiers to fight.Successful attacks leave defending units incapable offurther resistance.

Once commanders decide to attack, any unneces-sary delays or preparatory movements before execu-tion of the plan may allow the defender additional timeto react, which makes this defeat more difficult. Com-manders, staffs, and units are prepared to react quickly.Adjustments during the execution of the attack are tobe expected. Skillful commanders provide the meansand methods to work these adjustments rapidly in or-der to sustain the momentum of the attack. Theircourse of action is influenced by the purpose of theattack. Commander’s intent drives the selection ofavailable attack options—hasty attack, deliberate at-tack, spoiling attack, counterattack, raid, feint, dem-onstration, or any combination thereof.

Hasty AttackThe hasty attack is the most likely result of the

meeting engagement. Commanders launch the hastyattack with the forces at hand and with minimum prepa-ration to destroy the enemy before he is able either toconcentrate or to establish a defense. The attacker mayalso employ such an attack to seize a fleeting opportu-nity or to regain the initiative quickly after a success-ful defense. In the defense, hasty counterattacks mayrecapture lost positions before the enemy has time toconsolidate his success. Commanders can often recoverlost ground and a shattered defense by counterattack-ing rapidly before the enemy is able to consolidate hisgains. At higher echelons, commanders anticipate andemploy hasty attacks in their contingency plans. Largeformations attack from the march, using hasty attacksby subordinate units or covering forces.

Regardless of its purpose or echelon, a hasty at-tack enhances agility at the risk of losing synchroni-zation. To minimize this risk, units conducting hastyattacks should use standard formations and well-un-derstood and -rehearsed plans supported by sound in-telligence-preparation-of-the battlefield. Supportingarms and services react quickly using prearranged pro-cedures. The more closely combat and supporting unitswork together before the attack, the easier and moresuccessful such coordination will be. Hasty attacksplace a premium on habitual relationships among sup-ported and supporting units at every level. A properIPB also enables commanders to anticipate hasty at-tack contingencies, allowing some planning to makethese attacks less improvised.

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Figure 7-1. Offensive Operation, Step 1

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Deliberate AttackIn contrast to hasty attacks, deliberate attacks are

fully synchronized operations that employ the effectsof every available asset against the enemy defense.They are often conducted from a defensive posture.Because such synchronization requires careful plan-ning and extensive coordination, deliberate attacks taketime to prepare. During this time, the enemy can im-prove his defenses, disengage, or launch a spoilingattack of his own. Commanders should use the delib-erate attack when the enemy situation is known andwhen the combined arms team can be employed withsufficient combat power to defeat the enemy. Theyconsider all of the factors of METT-T and the prin-ciples of war to thwart the enemy’s defensive prepa-rations, especially making effective use of bold ma-neuver and annihilating fires.

Spoiling AttackCommanders mount spoiling attacks from a de-

fensive posture to disrupt an expected enemy attack.A spoiling attack attempts to strike the enemy whilehe is most vulnerable—during his preparations for at-tack in assembly areas and attack positions—or whilehe is on the move prior to crossing his line of depar-ture. In most respects, commanders conduct spoilingattacks like any other attack. They may be either hasty(when time is short) or deliberate (when the commandhas obtained adequate forewarning). When the situa-tion permits, however, commanders exploit a spoilingattack like any other attack.

CounterattackCommanders conduct counterattacks either with

a reserve or with lightly committed forward elements.They counterattack after the enemy launches his at-tack, reveals his main effort, or creates an assailableflank. Although commanders conduct counterattacksmuch like other attacks, synchronizing them withinthe overall defensive effort requires careful timing.

Counterattacks afford the defender the opportu-nity to create favorable conditions for the commitmentof combat power. Counterattacks can be rehearsed,their timing can be controlled, and the ground to betraversed can be prepared. Counterattacks are mostuseful when they are anticipated, planned, and executedin coordination with other defending, delaying, or at-tacking forces and in conjunction with a highercommander’s plan.

As in spoiling attacks, commanders prepare toseize the opportunity to exploit success by the entireforce. However, counterattacks may be limited tomovement to better terrain in order to bring fires onthe enemy. Counterattacks can achieve greater effectsthan other attacks, given the same forces on both sides,because the defender can create more favorable con-ditions. If it is possible to fix the enemy, then timingcan be controlled and the counterattack rehearsed.

RaidA raid is a limited-objective attack into enemy ter-

ritory for a specific purpose other than gaining andholding ground. Commanders conduct raids to de-stroy key enemy installations and facilities, to captureor free prisoners, or to disrupt enemy C2 or supportfunctions. The raiding force withdraws from the ob-jective area after completing its mission and, unless itis a stay-behind unit, recovers to friendly lines.

Feint and DemonstrationDiversionary operations include feints and dem-

onstrations. A feint is designed to divert the enemy’sattention from the main effort. Brigades and smallerunits conduct feints. Feints are usually shallow, lim-ited-objective attacks conducted before or during themain attack. During Operation Desert Storm, units ofthe 1st Cavalry Division, as part of the VII Corps, con-ducted feints in the Rugi pocket prior to 24 February1991, to fix Iraqi frontline units and to deceive Iraqicommanders that the coalition main attack was goingto be in the Wadi al-Batin.

A demonstration is a show of force in an areawhere a decision is not sought. A demonstration threat-ens attack but does not make contact. Feints and dem-onstrations deceive the enemy as to the true intentionsof the attacker. They pin the enemy in place, diverthis attention, and allow decisive action elsewhere. Ifthey unveil weaknesses in the enemy, they are followedup with a hasty or deliberate attack.

EXPLOITATIONIn exploitation, the attacker extends the destruc-

tion of the defending force by maintaining offensivepressure. Attacks that result in annihilating a defend-ing enemy are rare. More often, the enemy will at-tempt to disengage, withdraw, and reconstitute an ef-fective defense as rapidly as possible. In large-scaleoperations, the enemy may attempt to draw forces fromless active areas or bring forward previously uncom-mitted reserves.

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Opportunities for local exploitation may occur evenas the attack continues elsewhere in the same battlespace.

Units remain alert to enemy signs that would sig-nal the opportunity to transition to exploitation. Eventssuch as increased EPWs, enemy units disintegratingafter initial contact, lack of organized defense, andcapture of or absence of enemy leaders all signal tothe attacking units their opportunity to transition toexploitation. Commanders should be ready to followevery attack (when not restricted by higher authorityor lack of resources) without delay. Such bold exploi-tation keeps the enemy under pressure, compounds hisdisorganization, and erodes his will to resist. The ul-timate objective of the exploitation is the disintegra-tion of the enemy to the point where he has no alterna-tive but surrender or flight. This requires applyingdifferent tempos among subordinate commands to takeadvantage of exploitation in one sector while pressingthe attack in others.

While exploitation following an attack is funda-mental, it is especially important in a deliberate at-tack. Failure to exploit aggressively the success ofthe main effort may provide the enemy sufficient timeto regain the initiative. Commanders consider exploi-tation and move rapidly to execute it when they seethe opportunity.

Commanders of committed forces act fast to capi-talize on local successes. When possible, the forcesalready leading the attack continue directly into theexploitation. If that is not feasible, commanders passfresh forces into the lead. Exploitation requires thephysical and mental aggressiveness to combat the fric-tion of night, bad weather, dangers of fratricide, andextended operations. After weighing and accommo-dating the risks, commanders ruthlessly exploit vul-nerable forces.

Commanders normally designate exploiting forcesby fragmentary orders issued during an attack. Typi-cal missions for these forces include seizing objec-tives deep in the enemy rear, cutting LOCs, isolatingand destroying enemy units, and disrupting enemy C2.Commanders of the exploiting force are given thegreatest possible freedom of action to accomplish theirmission. They act with great aggressiveness, initia-tive, and boldness. Their objectives are a critical com-munications center, key terrain that would significantlycontribute to destruction of organized enemy resis-tance, or simply a point of orientation.

As the enemy becomes demoralized and his for-mations begin to disintegrate, exploitation may developinto pursuit. Commanders of all units in exploitationmust anticipate the transition to pursuit and must con-sider any new courses of action that become availableas enemy cohesion and resistance break down. SeeFigure 7-3.

PURSUITA pursuit is an offensive operation against a re-

treating enemy force. It follows a successful attack orexploitation and is ordered when the enemy cannotconduct an organized defense and attempts to disen-gage. The object of the pursuit is destruction of theopposing force. If it becomes apparent that enemyresistance has broken down entirely and the enemy isfleeing the battlefield, any type of offensive operationcan give way to pursuit. Command-ers conduct airand ground operations to intercept, to capture, or todestroy the enemy. Air forces can also interdict flee-ing forces. Like exploitation, pursuit encompassesbroad decentralization of control and rapid movement.Unlike exploitation, however, commanders can rarelyanticipate pursuit, so they do not normally hold forcesin reserve solely to accomplish this mission. There-fore, commanders must be agile enough to react whenthe situation presents itself.

Exploitations and pursuits test the audacity andendurance of soldiers and leaders alike. Both of theseoperations risk disorganizing the attacker nearly asmuch as the defender. As LOCs become extended,soldiers tire and equipment wears down. Extraordi-nary physical and mental effort is necessary to sustainmomentum, transition to other operations, and trans-late tactical success into operational or strategic vic-tory. Pursuit, like other operations, can give way toother forms of the offense. As the Allies pursued Ger-man forces to the Rhine in November 1944, the FirstUS Army turned unexpectedly from pursuit operationsto the deliberate attack of an organized defense at theHuertgen Forest. Some tactical difficulty and highfriendly losses occurred due to problems recognizingthe need to transition from exploitation back to delib-erate attack.

Although history reveals examples in which theoffense occurred in the sequence of movement to con-tact, attack, exploitation, pursuit (see Figures 7-1, 7-2, and 7-3), many offensive operations deviate fromthis pattern in one way or another. Attacks—espe-cially counterattacks—can take place with little prepa-ration or foresight. The Battle of Gettysburg resultedfrom just

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such an unintended collision. Successful attack maygive way directly to pursuit, bypassing exploitationaltogether. Such a pattern was typical of engagementsin Vietnam, where enemy forces attacked by US forcessimply sought sanctuary in Laos or Cambodia. Pur-suit occurs infrequently and exploitation usually endsshort of annihilation, curtailed either by insufficientsustaining capability or by deliberate strategic restric-tion. Whenever possible, however, commanders usepursuit to overwhelm and shatter the enemy, makingfurther resistance impossible.

Commanders rarely use all four forms of the of-fense; they select a combination and order that pro-vide the greatest advantage. Thus, the objective soughtfrom the different attack forms does not always leadto exploitation. Spoiling attacks and feints rarely de-velop into full exploitation, although unusual circum-stances may convert either into a full-scale attack.Demonstrations, which seek no real contact, serve todeceive the enemy into expecting an attack.

Commanders recognize that the many types of op-erations they employ within the offensive and defen-sive forms may run into one another with no abruptand discernible break. They employ spoiling attackswhile defending to slow the tempo until they are readyto conduct a sustained offensive. As they prepare totransition from one offensive operation to another orfrom offense to defense, they can conduct a feint inone area to divert the enemy as the condition for con-ducting operations elsewhere.

FORMS OF MANEUVERThe forms of maneuver are envelopment, turning

movement, infiltration, penetration, and frontal attack.Commanders use these forms of maneuver to orienton the enemy, not terrain. They determine what formof maneuver to use by their analysis of the factors ofMETT-T. However, this is art, not science, and morethan one form of maneuver may apply. The forms ofmaneuver and the forms of tactical offensive opera-tions complement one another (see Figures 7-2 and7-3) and may apply to either linear or nonlinear battle-fields. Further, a commander’s statement of intent orconcept of operations should articulate how fires willbe used to support whatever form of maneuver he de-cides to use.

Reconnaissance is a precursor to maneuver andfire. Reconnaissance elements maintain contact with

the enemy, develop the situation, and forewarn ma-neuver units prior to initial engagements. Orientingtheir movement on the movement of the enemy, re-connaissance elements avoid decisive engage-ments.Tactical reconnaissance includes cavalry regiments andsquadrons, army aviation, drones, SOF, scouts, engi-neers, and maneuver units.

ENVELOPMENTEnvelopment uses maneuver and fires to put

greater relative combat power against the defender andstrip him of his advantages. To use this form of ma-neuver, commanders must find or create an assailableflank, pitting their strength against the enemy’s weak-ness. Sometimes the enemy exposes his flank by hisown forward movement, unaware of his opponent’slocation. In a fluid battle involving noncontiguousforces, the combination of air and indirect fires mayisolate the enemy on unfavorable terrain and establishthe conditions for maneuver against an assailable flank.

The attacker may develop the assailable flank byarriving from an unexpected direction. He may alsofix the defender’s attention forward through a combi-nation of fires and supporting or diversionary attackswhile he maneuvers his main effort to strike at theenemy’s weak flanks and rear. The attacker needs tobe agile enough to concentrate his forces and mass hiscombat power effects before the enemy can reorienthis defense.

An encirclement is an extension of either a pur-suit or an envelopment. A direct-pressure force main-tains contact with the enemy, preventing his disengage-ment and reconstitution. It attempts to inflict maxi-mum casualties. Meanwhile, an encircling force ma-neuvers to envelop the enemy, cutting his escape routes.If necessary, the encircling force organizes a hasty de-fense behind the enemy, blocking his retreat, whilesynchronizing the fires of the joint or combined teamto complete the destruction of the encircled force.Forces must also be positioned to block or interdictthe enemy’s attempt to break through to the rear orbreak out of other points. All available means shouldbe used to contain the enemy, including obstacles.Then, all available fires are brought to bear to weakenor collapse the enemy.

TURNING MOVEMENTThe turning movement, like the envelopment, uses

freedom of maneuver to create a decisive point wherethe enemy is unprepared. The attacker secures key

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terrain deep in the enemy’s rear and along its LOCsby maneuvering around the enemy. Deep fires be-come relatively more important in this type of maneu-ver to protect the maneuver force and attack the en-emy, especially when unaccompaned by artillery. Thisthreat forces the enemy to abandon his prepared de-fense and attack in an undesirable direction and at atime of his opponent’s choice. The X Corps and USMCamphibious assault at Inchon was a classic turningmovement that achieved strategic and operational ef-fects.

INFILTRATIONInfiltration uses covert movement of forces

through enemy lines to attack positions in the enemyrear. Light infantry units are especially valuable forinfiltration operations. Commanders may use infil-tration to attack lightly defended positions or strongerpositions from flank and rear, to secure key terrain insupport of the main effort, or to disrupt enemy rearoperations. Commanders are careful to avoid alertingthe enemy as to their intentions by the position of ma-neuver and artillery units and the effects of fires insupport of the infiltration. Commanders normally useinfiltration in conjunction with other forms of maneu-ver.

PENETRATIONCommanders use penetration when enemy flanks

are not assailable. They mass sufficient combat powerat the point of penetration to overwhelm the enemyand gain the advantage (see Figure 7-2). They masseffects from fires of all available means at the point ofpenetration to make the breach, hold open the shoul-der, and cripple any enemy counterattacks. Other at-tacking forces minimize losses by employing feintsand demonstrations, fixing the defender with the in-tensity of their fires along the front, or catching thedefender by surprise with rapid and violent execution.

Because penetration is an attack into the strengthof the defense, it could be costly in friendly casual-ties. Penetration may be necessary to rupture enemydefenses on a narrow front to create assailable flanksand access to the enemy’s rear. Commanders may at-tempt penetration on one or several axes, dependingon the forces available. Commanders carefully weighthe advantage of attacks on multiple axes to avoidundue costs and casualties. Multiple penetrations maybe desirable if they force the enemy to disperse hisfires and consider multiple threats before committinghis reserves.

FRONTAL ATTACKThe frontal attack strikes the enemy across a wide

front and over the most direct approaches. It is nor-mally used when commanders possess overwhelmingcombat power and the enemy is at a clear disadvan-tage. Commanders mass the effects of direct and indi-rect fires on enemy positions, shifting indirect andaerial fires just before the assault.

For deliberate attacks, the frontal attack may bethe most costly form of maneuver since it exposes theattacker to the concentrated fires of the defender whilelimiting the effectiveness of the attacker’s own fires.As the most direct form of maneuver, however, thefrontal attack is useful for overwhelming light defenses,covering forces, or disorganized enemy forces. It isoften the best form of maneuver for a hasty attack ormeeting engagement in which speed and simplicityare paramount to maintaining battle tempo and, ulti-mately, the initiative. The frontal attack is an appro-priate form of maneuver to be used by a fixing forceas a supporting attack to an envelopment. The frontalattack may also be used during exploitation or pursuitand by subordinate elements of a large formation con-ducting an envelopment or penetration.

OPERATIONS IN DEPTHAs discussed in Chapter 6, tactical commanders,

as well as operational commanders, conduct offensiveoperations simultaneously throughout the depth of thebattlefield. The payoff is high-tempo operations thatpresent the enemy with one continuous operation.Commanding forces in depth requires an understand-ing of the relationship of friendly forces to enemyforces in time, space, and purpose. Commanders de-termine the arrangement of battlefield activities withinthe width, depth, and height of the battlefield over time(see Figures 7-1, 7-2, and 7-3).

Three closely related activities occur in well-syn-chronized operations: deep, close, and rear operations.Commanders may pursue separate battle objectives byusing deep and close combat operations, either ofwhich may be the main effort. In addition, during theconduct of operations, the lines of distinction amongthese three activities tend to blur. As a result, com-manders need to teach their staffs and subordinate com-manders how to achieve the desired effects.

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DEEP OPERATIONSAt the tactical level, commanders design opera-

tions in depth to secure advantages in later engage-ments and to protect the force. The preferred methodis to simultaneously engage enemy forces throughoutthe depth of the battle area and achieve decisive re-sults rapidly. The purpose of these operations is todeny the enemy freedom of action and to disrupt ordestroy the coherence and tempo of his operations.Attack of enemy formations at depth destroys, delays,disrupts, or diverts enemy combat capability. Theseattacks also aim at enemy functions such as command,logistics, or air defense, thus exposing or creating avulnerability that friendly forces can exploit.

Typical deep operations include interdiction byground and air maneuver and fires, either singly or incombination; deep surveillance and target acquisition;and command, control, and communications counter-measures (C3CM). Other activities in depth, such ascounterfire and electronic countermeasures, focus oneffects that protect the force before and during the closebattle. To synchronize activities that are both deepand close, commanders prioritize and integrate theavailable collection and intelligence resources with aplan of attack to give the tactical information neces-sary to make critical decisions.

Deep operations for different echelons may occuranywhere on the battle-field. To ensure unity of ef-fort, higher echelons and joint forces coordinate deepactivities that may affect or complement the opera-tions of brigades and subordinate units.

CLOSE OPERATIONSClose operations are when soldiers close with and

destroy the enemy. Close combat is normally requiredfor decisive and lasting effects on the battlefield. It isalso the type of combat that places soldiers at greatestrisk. Close operations are the activities of the mainand supporting efforts around or through enemy de-fenses to occupy objectives that permit the defeat ofdefending forces. Commanders pick a combinationof the forms of offensive operations and maneuver touse at the critical time and place to close with and de-stroy the enemy. Dispersed formations that mass tofight decisive, close battles disperse again to protectthe force and allow attacking commanders to pick thetime, place, and circumstances for the battle.

Commanders weight their combination of optionsto mass effects. For example, commanders may fix

part of the enemy force with a frontal attack by asmaller force, while maneuvering the rest of the forcein an envelopment to turn the enemy from his defen-sive positions and defeat him in detail. This causescommanders to designate the envelopment as the maineffort so they can concentrate forces and mass the ef-fects of combat power to achieve decisive results.Priority of fires shifts with the main effort during theseoperations. Massed fires are critical. Setting a baseof fire and movement of forces to close with and de-stroy the enemy is the essence of close operations.Allocation of forces, selection of the location at whichthe enemy will be destroyed, and the tempo of the fightare functions of METT-T. Once committed, friendlyforces press the fight to overwhelm the enemy rap-idly.

In close operations, reconnaissance and securityforces serve as covering forces. They are the advance,flank, or rear guards that locate the enemy, find gapsin his defenses, protect the force from surprise, de-velop the situation, and give commanders time andspace in which to control enemy actions. Given ex-tended and noncontiguous battlefields, tactical com-manders may choose a variety of methods to securethe gaps between their subordinate units when theyare operating at great distances from one another.

The reserve enters the action offensively at theproper place and moment to clinch the victory. Thisis its primary purpose. In this way it provides thesource of additional combat power to commit at thedecisive moment, and it provides a hedge against un-certainty. Once the attack begins, commanders shapethe course of the battle and take decisive action, de-ciding when, where, and if to commit the fires of thesupporting arms and their reserves. Thus, the initialstrength and location of reserves vary with contem-plated missions, the type of maneuver, possible hos-tile reaction, and clarity of the situation.

REAR OPERATIONSRear operations ensure freedom of action of com-

mitted and uncommitted forces and protect the meansnecessary to sustain combat operations and supportthe force. The location of CSS functions need not becontiguous to their supported combat forces. Some-times a rear area may not be apparent. A rapid, ex-tended major operation may place tactical units farfrom the original support area. Commanders may de-cide to separate their support units and extend theirLOCs. They then consider the resources for tempo-rary LOCs.

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these rear area units and facilities, depending on hisobjective. LOCs, reserves, and displacing support el-ements are the logical targets of the enemy’s own deepoperations. Commanders protect them by remainingcapable of quick reaction to any posed threat.

Additionally, they need to have procedures for en-suring support by keeping roads clear. On more con-strained battlefields, rear areas are of particular con-cern to divisions and larger units that must allocateforces and other resources to maintain freedom of ac-tion and continuity of operations during and follow-ing an attack. The enemy will either bypass or attack

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CHAPTER 8

PLANNING AND CONDUCTING THE OFFENSE

Offensive doctrine leaves the commander widelatitude and the greatest possible freedom of action toaccomplish the mission. Offensive operations are char-acterized by rapid shifts in the main effort to take ad-vantage of opportunities by momentum and by thedeepest, most rapid, and simultaneous destruction ofenemy defenses possible. In applying the four formsof offense (see Chapter 7), commanders at all levelsplan and synchronize joint intelligence and fires withtheir combat and CS systems to gain full advantage oftheir ability to see and strike the enemy simultan-eouslythroughout the depth and space of his AO. Withintheir AOs, commanders exploit their successes withadditional forces and fires to increase the momentumof the attack and overwhelm the enemy.

Brigades and divisions accomplish major offen-sive tasks as part of corps or JTF operations. Battal-ions attack, delay, or defend as a function of the largermission. Corps and divisions may employ divisionsand brigades respectively as ground combat forces ina deep, combined arms battle. For smaller tactical unitsso employed, however, their activity is close combat.

PLANNING THE OFFENSETactical planning centers on preparing for com-

bat. Such planning can be relatively deliberate, suchas before beginning offensive maneuver; or it mightbe more rapid, such as when done simultaneously withthe conduct of the offense. Planning and fighting inthe offense can, and usually does, occur simulta-neously.

Essential to success is a succinct statement of thecommander’s intent (discussed in Chapter 6). Thecommander’s intent should be complemented by asimple concept of operations that is clearly expressedin a manner that permits the attacker to press the fightby taking away the natural advan-tages of the defender.

Commanders tailor their offensive concept to thespecific situation. Planning may occur while units arestill in a defensive posture, preparing to begin offen-sive operations. It may also occur in anticipation of

shifting efforts within the ebb and flow of continuousoperations. Tactical units must be committed in theright place, at the right time, and in the right com-bination. Commanders attempt, where possible, toattack enemy forces simultaneously throughout theirAO in order to stun and then rapidly defeat them.

The attacker seeks to maintain his momentum atall times. To avoid losing momentum after seizingtheir initial objectives in hasty or deliberate attacks,commanders plan for success. They exploit successesrelent-lessly, choosing the appropriate combination ofactions over time. They use reconnaissance, since mostsuccessful attacks are preceded or led by successfulreconnaissance. Offensive plans facilitate transitionto future operations, allow rapid concentration anddispersal of units, introduce fresh forces to exploitsuccess, rest other forces, protect the force, and sus-tain combat operations throughout their duration.

Commanders conduct an estimate at the beginningof their planning process to determine how best to ac-complish their mission. As they make this estimate,they consider the factors of METT-T, which have tac-tical, operational, and strategic applications. Thecommander’s estimate is a continuous process. Sincecommanders remain alert to changes in their situation,they continuously review the METT-T analysis.

CONTENTS

PLANNING THE OFFENSE .......................... 8-1Mission .................................................. 8-2Enemy .................................................... 8-2Terrain and Weather ............................. 8-2Troops .................................................... 8-3Time Available ....................................... 8-3

PREPARING FOR ATTACKS ....................... 8-3

CONDUCTING ATTACKS ............................. 8-4

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8-2

MISSIONCommanders pass to their subordinates a clear

statement of what is to be done and for what purpose.Different combinations of offensive and defensive op-erations allow subordinate commanders freedom of ac-tion. Whenever possible, commanders assign subor-dinates a force-oriented objective and a zone with fewrestrictive measures. They attempt to assign missionsthat last some time so that the momentum of the at-tack is not constantly interrupted. They give subordi-nate commanders a heads-up as to what they are think-ing about for the future, and they issue warning orderswhen they are certain of future courses of action. Someoperations require greater control and coordination,necessitating more detailed orders for attacks. In allcases, commanders anticipate likely developmentsduring an attack. They bear in mind their superior’smission and intentions, prepare to continue beyondtheir assigned objectives, and assume additional re-sponsibilities. Commanders and staffs gain and main-tain the initiative by continuously developing execut-able options through the campaign to keep the enemyoff balance.

ENEMYCommanders consider the enemy’s dispositions,

equipment, doctrine, capabilities, and probable coursesof action. The intelligence system serves command-ers directly when it directs its capabilities to their needs.Commanders get directly involved in deciding priori-ties for reconnaissance and intelligence operations.Commanders aggressively seek gaps or weaknessesin the enemy’s defenses; study enemy defensive prepa-rations and attempt to obstruct and frustrate thosepreparations; and plan to penetrate enemy security ar-eas, overcome obstacles, avoid the strengths of estab-lished defenses, and destroy the coherence of the de-fense. All of this requires an active, predictive intelli-gence effort oriented on critical units and areas.

In a force-projection army, where forces are oftenoffset a great distance from their full complement ofsupport, tactical units frequently turn to senior head-quarters for answers to tactical intelligence require-ments before they can do their own intelligence-gath-ering activities. These include identifying and locat-ing enemy reserves as accurately as possible; locatingand tracking enemy fire support systems; gatheringinformation about enemy intelligence capabilities, toinclude air capabilities and air defenses. Aggressivereconnaissance to see the enemy and to anticipate his

reactions, coupled with equally aggressive force-pro-jection actions, is also important to getting and keep-ing the initiative.

TERRAIN AND WEATHERAttacking forces select avenues of approach that

permit rapid advance, afford maneuver opportunitiesto the attacking force, provide cover and concealment,permit lateral shifting of reserves, allow good com-munications, resist obstruction by enemy obstacles, andorient on key terrain. They exploit weather condi-tions that affect mobility, concealment, and air sup-port whenever possible. Commanders and staffs de-mand tactical weather forecasts that will affect groundoperations and operations by Army aviation in theground environment, in addition to the more generaltheater weather patterns.

Terrain designated for the main effort should al-low for rapid movement into the enemy’s rear area.Commanders typically identify and avoid terrain thatwill hinder a rapid advance; however, an initial ma-neuver over difficult terrain may be desirable to sur-prise the enemy. Commanders personally reconnoiterthe terrain whenever possible, particularly the terrainwhere they will conduct the main effort. Time spentin reconnaissance is time well spent.

Attackers pay particular attention to obstacles.Commanders plan to negotiate or avoid urban areas,rivers, extreme slopes, thick forests, or soft groundbetween their units and their objective. They use suchterrain, when parallel to the axis of advance, to pro-tect their own flanks. Light forces can use such areasas approaches, or they can capitalize on them for de-fensive positions, freeing heavier forces for maneu-ver. To deny key terrain to the enemy along the axisof advance, the commander either seizes it or controlsit by fire. While the majority of operations are force-oriented, decisive terrain can become the focal pointof the attack.

Weather and visibility conditions significantly af-fect offensive operations. The concealment and pro-tection from air attack that weather or light conditionsoffer can be critical to success, especially air assaultor airborne operations. Ground conditions increaseor reduce the number of avenues available for maneu-ver and affect speed of movement for all forces. Main-tenance and logistics support of heavy forces and limi-tations on air operations also increase with inclementweather.

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TROOPSThe number and type of friendly troops available

affect the tactical plan. Choosing which units for whichtypes of actions is vital to success and is influenced bythe status of the units’ training and the experience oftheir leaders. Commanders consider relative mobil-ity, protection, and firepower as they design a planthat makes full use of the reinforcing effects of com-bined arms. Commanders employ units according totheir capabilities. Dismounted infantry can open ap-proaches for armor and mechanized forces by attack-ing through heavy cover or by penetrating anti-armordefenses. Air assault or airborne units can seize ob-jectives in depth to block enemy reserves or securechoke points.

Armor units can move rapidly through gaps to dis-organize the defense in depth. Field artillery, ADA,engineer, and chemical units perform critical functionsto support all elements of an attacking force. Aviationunits engage the full range of enemy ground targets aswell as enemy helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. Theextent of possible combinations of forces enhancesagility.

TIME AVAILABLEOffensive operations become harder to conduct

when the defender has more time to organize theground and bring up more troops. The attacker takestime to assure that he can concentrate his forces togenerate all available combat power for the attack. Thepresence of space-age telecommunications and theelectronic media also limit available time. Electronicmedia can report news of engagements on internationaland national news broadcasts before higher and adja-cent commands are informed of the battle. In an aus-tere environment, commanders may have limitedawareness of media reporting and its effect on publicopinion. Operational and higher-level tactical com-manders need to recognize and plan for the presenceand effects of news media.

Commanders acquire speed by making the neces-sary reconnaissance and providing the proper artilleryand other tactical support, including air support. Theyalso acquire speed by bringing up forces and thenlaunching the attack with a predetermined plan to re-duce the time under fire to a minimum. Once an at-tack is underway, time remains critical. The attackcan succeed only if it achieves its objective before theenemy recovers his balance, identifies the threat to hisdefense, and masses forces and fires against the at-tack. Time is therefore vital to the attacker; he must

prolong the enemy’s surprise, confusion, and disorga-nization as long as possible and maintain the momen-tum of the attack. The aim is to conduct the attack ata tempo of operations and a degree of lethality—bothapplied simultaneously throughout the battle area—that the enemy cannot handle.

PREPARING FOR ATTACKSCommanders maximize time available for plan-

ning and issuing orders. They give subordinates ampletime to conduct necessary reconnaissance and coordi-nation and to follow troop-leading procedures through-out the force. Commanders discuss possible coursesof action with their subordinates and staffs; when sureof the course of action, commanders issue warningorders. Warning orders are vital in preparing for at-tacks; time is critical. Failure to provide ample time toexecuting forces creates great risk and threatens suc-cessful execution. Commanders carefully budget avail-able time; they discipline themselves and their battlestaffs to get information to the executing forces.

Attack orders embody the commander’s intent andconcept of operation. Commanders select only thecontrol measures necessary to avoid unduly slowingthe tempo of the attack and over-centralizing control.They include measures for coordinating and control-ling operations. Control measures graphically illus-trate the concept, assign zones, maintain separation offorces, concentrate effort, assist the C2 of forces, andadd flexibility to the maneuver plan.

Whenever possible, commanders issue orders andreview subordinates’ planning concepts face-to-face.They attempt to issue orders that will last some timeor from which adjustments can easily be made. Theyemploy techniques to achieve clarity and synchronizeoperations between echelons. Immediately after issu-ing the order, for example, commanders have theirsubordinate commanders restate their missions in theirown words. In this way, a commander ensures thathis subordinate commanders understand his expecta-tions before they begin their own planning activities.

As part of the preparation process (during the de-liberate planning process for lower echelons beforethey issue their orders), commanders gather their sub-ordinate commanders and battle staffs to review andadjust the synchronization of the battle plan. This brief-back is normally conducted over a map or terrainmodel. It begins with the subordinate commanders’descriptions

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of the timing and employment of their concepts ofmaneuver and fires to execute their commander’scourse of action and likely contingencies. Face-to-facesynchronization meetings serve to reveal operationalgaps and synchronization problems. Commanders andstaffs do a lot of if this, then this type of war gaming.They might even ask an element to role-play the en-emy to effect a two-sided nature to planning—just aswill occur in the attack. Commanders also providefor branches and sequels to the basic plan so that, dur-ing conduct of the operation, units can more easilyadapt while sustaining the momentum. When com-manders integrate the timing and trigger events for themaneuver and firepower of subordinate and support-ing forces early in the preparation process, they havethe time to adjust and refine their plans to enhancesuccessful execution.

Coordination begins immediately upon receipt ofa mission and is continuous throughout the operation.Subordinate commanders and staffs must have perti-nent information and as much time as possible to pre-pare and rehearse their plans. Units at every level con-duct route reconnaissance, rehearsals, and multipleactivities to adjust coordination details and timing.They adjust the synchronization plan accordingly.When properly done, subordinate commanders’ intentsand concepts of operations support and complementthe higher commander’s plan.

During their preparations, commanders integratetheir concept for support with their concept of opera-tions. They carefully ensure that communications sys-tems fully support the concept of operation in fast-paced and extended battles. Logistics operators stayfully informed of the action during the battle. Attack-ers carefully link CSS operations to ensure continu-ous sustainment of combat operations. This is espe-cially key during high-tempo operations and is facili-tated by habitually associated combat and CSS units.When the plans call for the attacking unit to passthrough a defending unit, CSS operators seek assis-tance from the defending unit.

Commanders plan and coordinate movement ofthe force in detail to avoid confusion and delay and togain surprise. They concentrate the force quickly andmake maximum use of cover and concealment, signalsecurity, and deception. An attacker avoids or masksactions that would alert the enemy to the coming at-tack to preserve surprise.

CONDUCTING ATTACKSTimely issuance of plans and thorough rehearsals

are vital to success; so is the ability of attacking unitsto adjust to the situation. Sustaining a tempo the en-emy cannot handle is vital to the conduct of the at-tack. Units press the fight. They vary the tempo andmethods of attack, but they maintain momentum. Theability of commanders to continually anticipate andvisualize both enemy and friendly situations is vital inthe attack. Their decision making is likewise key. Thisincludes knowing when as well as what to decide.

The attack must be violent and rapid to shock theenemy and to prevent his recovery as forces destroyhis defense. The attacker minimizes his exposure toenemy fires by using maneuver and counterfire, avoid-ing obstacles, maintaining security, ensuring C2, andremaining organized for the fight on the objective.

The attack erupts in a powerful and violent as-sault upon the objective. Its purpose is to destroy anenemy force or to seize the ground it occupies. Agileunits are prepared to shift the main effort as condi-tions unfold. Synchronized fires, maneuver, and com-bat support are imperative to achieve superior combatpower at the point of the assault. Firing artillery prepa-rations and suppressive fires, isolating the enemy force,concentrating combat power, and overrunning the en-emy all combine to destroy the defending force. Sev-eral forms of attack may be conducted in differentcombinations. During the execution phase, command-ers read the battle and exploit in some areas whileholding back in others. They may need to designatespecial C2 measures to adjust the main effort and sus-tain the momentum.

Commanders often mass all available firepoweron the enemy at the beginning of the assault. Thisrequires detailed planning, precise execution, and con-siderable discipline in the fire support force as well asin the assault force. Dismounted assault forces shouldmove as closely behind their own fires as possible;armored forces should assault under overhead artil-lery fire. Air assault forces attack directly onto or asclose as possible to objectives, once the enemy de-fender and supporting artillery and air defenses havebeen suppressed or defeated by fires. As the attackernears the enemy force, he must overcome enemy re-sistance with violent massed firepower and a rapidadvance. Speed during this phase of the attack is es-sential to reduce casualties and avoid becoming stalled.

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A coordinated effort to suppress enemy field ar-tillery not previously destroyed is critical during theassault. Reserve enemy forces in depth, enemy nuclearand chemical delivery systems, enemy C2 facilities,and enemy fire support units pose the greatest threatto the attacking force. As part of coordinated deep op-erations, commanders synchronize some combinationof electronic warfare capabilities to jam these threats,artillery or air fires to attack them, and maneuver tocounter them. Exploitation follows immediately, ei-ther by continuing the attack with the same force orby passing through another element.

The conduct of operations in depth and over timerequires operations designed to pass one unit throughanother or to relieve units that are in contact. Com-manders conduct these operations to rest soldiers, re-supply the unit, and move it to new areas and mis-sions. Like all operations, forward passage of linesand offensive relief require detailed planning andpreparation to achieve successful execution.

Both attack and exploitation often begin with aforward passage of lines, an operation where onefriendly unit moves forward through positions held byanother. Such a passage must be well-planned andcoordinated to ensure minimum congestion and con-fusion. When possible, passage should be through el-ements that are not in contact. Specific details of thepassage are coordinated between the respective sub-ordinate unit commanders.

The overall commander assigns boundaries to des-ignate areas through which subordinate elements willmove. Such boundaries usually correspond to those

of the assisting force. This assisting force mans con-tact and passage points; provides information concern-ing the enemy, mine fields, and obstacles; and pro-vides guides. To ensure continuous support withoutincreasing battlefield clutter, the assisting unit mayprovide the passing unit initial logistical support. Oncestarted, the passage is completed as quickly as pos-sible to minimize the vulnerability of the two forces.The passing force assumes control of the battle as soonas its lead elements have moved through the assistingforce. The assisting force integrates its artillery sup-port and direct fires into the fire support plan of thepassing unit.

To maintain offensive momentum, commandersconduct an offensive relief to pass fresh troops intothe attack. Such reliefs are most common as the forceenters the exploitation or pursuit but may also be nec-essary during the attack itself if previously committedunits have suffered so severely that they are unable toreach their objectives. Commanders may conduct of-fensive reliefs as reliefs in place, but ideally they con-duct them without a significant pause in offensivetempo.

The ability to continually mass combat power atkey times and places, while maintaining the momen-tum of the attack at a tempo the enemy cannot handle,is essential. Issuing orders that are both simple andclear and anticipating and adjusting are key elementsin successful offensive operations. Finally, success-ful and continuous reconnaissance by a variety of tac-tical, operational, and strategic means is vital for thesuccess of offensive operations.

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CHAPTER 9

FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DEFENSE

The immediate purpose of defensive operations isto defeat an enemy attack. Army forces conduct de-fensive operations as part of major operations and cam-paigns, in combination with offensive operations.

For a force-projection army, defensive operationsby forces already in theater or early arriving forces atthe tactical level support the campaign plan and main-tain operational initiative for the joint or combinedteam. For example, if conditions do not support si-multaneous operations to defeat an enemy rapidly, themission of initial-entry forces might be to defend theforces, air bases, and seaports in the lodgment area toprovide time for the JFC to build forces in the theaterfor future operations. In such cases, initial-entry forceswould include sufficient combat power to deter attackor defend successfully while the buildup continues.

In other cases of offensive operations, command-ers may require defensive operations by air assault,airborne, or amphibious forces. These forces wouldconduct an economy-of-force mission until a largerforce could link up. Nonetheless, the preferred methodis to conduct operations simultaneously throughout thedepth and space of the AOR. This method can requiredefensive operations in some areas.

THE PURPOSES OF THEDEFENSE

Military forces defend only until they gain suffi-cient strength to attack. Though the outcome of deci-sive combat derives from offensive operations, it isoften necessary, even advisable, to defend. Command-ers choose to defend when they need to buy time, tohold a piece of key terrain, to facilitate other opera-tions, to preoccupy the enemy in one area so friendlyforces can attack him in another, or to erode enemyresources at a rapid rate while reinforcing friendly op-erations.

They make this choice and create the conditionsfor a smooth transition from offense to defense or de-fense to offense, as the situation allows. Understand-ing the commander’s intent is especially key in the

defense, since more precise synchronization is nor-mally required, thus requiring close teamwork.

An effective defense consists of active and pas-sive components combined to deprive the enemy ofthe initiative. It uses all arms and services in mosteffective combinations to fight the defense so that theenemy losses mount rapidly and the defender canquickly attack his vulnerabilities. As in the offense,passage of lines will be frequent, moving in alldirections¡rearward, forward, and laterally. Even inthe defense, commanders seek greater freedom ofmaneuver while degrading or denying the enemy’s.

The defender withstands and holds the enemywhile continuously seeking every opportunity to as-sume the offensive at the appropriate time. With eachengagement or battle, commanders seek conditions thatfavor future operations. They try to reduce optionsavailable to the enemy and increase their own, therebyseizing the initiative. They take risks to gain the ini-tiative. There may be few opportunities in the earlyphases of an engagement or battle to assume the of-fensive. As the battle develops, such opportunitiesbecome more numerous. This is especially true dur-ing lulls in the

CONTENTS

THE PURPOSES OF THE DEFENSE .......... 9-0

CHARACTERISTICS OFDEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ................... 9-1Preparation ............................................ 9-1Security .................................................. 9-1Disruption .............................................. 9-1Mass and Concentration ...................... 9-1

DEFENSIVE PATTERNS............................... 9-2Mobile Defense ..................................... 9-2Area Defense ......................................... 9-3

OPERATIONS IN DEPTH.............................. 9-4Deep Operations ................................... 9-4Close Operations .................................. 9-5Rear Operations .................................... 9-5

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battle when the defender should take steps to uncoverenemy vulnerabilities and attack and destroy them ifpossible. Whatever the immediate purpose, the greaterintent of the defense is to force the attack to culmi-nate, to gain the initiative for friendly forces, and tocreate the opportunity to shift to the offensive.

CHARACTERISTICS OFDEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Prepared positions, security, disruption, mass andconcentration, and flexibility characterize defensiveoperations.

PREPARATIONThe defender arrives in the battle area before the

attacker, making the most thorough preparations thattime allows. In the early stages of battle, the defendercapitalizes on the advantage of fighting from preparedpositions of his selection. Defense always includes apoint of main effort. Preparations involve positioningforces in depth, improving terrain to favor the defender,wargaming plans, organizing the force for movementand support, rehearsing, and taking measures to pro-tect the force, such as mounting reconnaissance andsurveillance operations forward of the defended area.

Mobilizing reserves and auxiliary forces, strength-ening air and missile defenses or critical areas, con-ducting security operations to deny the enemy effec-tive reconnaissance, and preparing deceptions to mis-lead the enemy are equally important tasks. Duringthe course of the battle, the defender looks for oppor-tunities to wrest the initiative from the attacker.

He prepares for this by designating counterattackforces and rehearsing counterattack plans for the even-tual transition to the offense. Cunning and guile arepart of defensive preparations in order to keep the en-emy off balance and make him begin early to doubthis ability to continue the attack.

SECURITYDefending forces provide security. Since a force

defends to conserve combat power for use elsewhere,or at a later time, commanders must provide protec-tion of their force. They do this principally throughdeception and physical means in the defended area.Defending units want to deceive the enemy as to theirstrengths and weaknesses. Normally a security areais designated with a covering force. The purpose of

these measures at all tactical echelons is to coordinateand synchronize the defense, to provide early warn-ing, and to begin disrupting the integrity of the enemyattack early and continuously.

DISRUPTIONThe defender disrupts the attacker’s tempo and

synchronization by countering his initiative and pre-venting him from massing overwhelming combatpower. Defending commanders also use disruption toattack the enemy’s will to continue. They do this bydefeating or misleading enemy reconnaissance forces,separating the enemy’s forces, isolating his units, andbreaking up his formations so that they cannot fight aspart of an integrated whole. The defender interruptsthe attacker’s fire support, logistics support, and C2.He deceives the enemy as to his true dispositions andintentions, unravels the coordination of the enemy’ssupporting arms, and breaks the tempo of the offen-sive operations. The attacker is never allowed to getset. He is hit with spoiling attacks before he can focushis combat power and is counterattacked before he canconsolidate any gains.

MASS AND CONCENTRATIONThe defender seeks to mass the effects of over-

whelming combat power where he chooses and shiftsthat mass repeatedly in accordance with his point ofmain effort. To obtain an advantage at decisive points,the defender economizes and takes risks in some ar-eas; retains and, when necessary, reconstitutes a re-serve; and maneuvers to gain local superiority at thepoint of decision. The defender may have to surren-der some ground to gain the time necessary to con-centrate his forces.

The defender normally masses effects and con-centrates forces repeatedly during battle. He does soswiftly, since periods that allow them to develop su-perior combat power will be brief. Commanders ac-cept risks in some areas to concentrate forces for deci-sive action elsewhere. Obstacles, security forces, andfires can assist in reducing these risks. Since concen-tration of the force increases the threat of large lossesfrom weapons of mass destruction, commanders usedeception and concealment to hide this vulnerabilityfrom the enemy. They also protect their forces withstrong air and missile defenses to decrease the threatfrom weapons of mass destruction.

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FLEXIBILITYDefensive operations epitomize flexible planning

and agile execution. In exercising the initiative, theattacker initially decides where and when combat willtake place. The defender who is agile enough tocounter or evade the attacker’s blow can then strikeback effectively. Tactical flexibility stems from de-tailed planning, particularly in IPB. It is also neededfor organizing in depth and retaining reserves. Theplan enables commanders to shift their point of maineffort quickly without losing synchronization. Com-manders add flexibility to their basic plans by desig-nating supplementary positions throughout the battle-field, designing counterattack plans, and preparing toassume the offensive.

Once the defender controls the attacker’s thrust,he can operate against the enemy’s exposed flanks andrear. The defender, under the cover of his own fires,can then maneuver over previously reconnoitered ter-rain against extended elements of the attacking force.The defender’s fires cover all approaches and accom-modate changes in priority and in sequencing targetsand effects. Reserve commanders prepare for move-ment. They formulate counterattack plans that addresstheir on-order and be-prepared missions and likelycontingencies.

DEFENSIVE PATTERNSThe two primary forms of defensive operations

are mobile and area defense. These apply to both thetactical and operational levels of war. Mobile defensesorient on the destruction of the attacking force by per-mitting the enemy to advance into a position that ex-poses him to counterattack by a mobile reserve. Areadefenses orient on retention of terrain by absorbingthe enemy in an interlocking series of positions anddestroying him largely by fires.

Although these descriptions convey the generalpattern of each type of defense, both forms of defenseemploy static and dynamic elements. In mobile de-fenses, static defensive positions help control the depthand breadth of enemy penetration and ensure reten-tion of ground from which to launch counterattacks.In area defenses, commanders closely integrate patrols,intelligence units, and reserve forces to cover the gapsamong defensive positions, reinforcing those positionsas necessary and counter-attacking defensive positionsas directed. Defending commanders combine both

patterns, using static elements to delay, canalize, andultimately halt the attacker and dynamic elements(spoiling attacks and counterattacks) to strike and de-stroy enemy forces. The balance among these ele-ments depends on the enemy, mission, force composi-tion, mobility, relative combat power, and the natureof the battlefield.

MOBILE DEFENSEMobile defense orients on the destruction of the

enemy force by employing a combination of fire andmaneuver, offense, defense, and delay to defeat hisattack. The minimum force possible is committed topure defense; maximum combat power is placed in astriking force that catches the enemy as it is attempt-ing to overcome that part of the force dedicated to thedefense. Commanders conducting a mobile defensetake advantage of terrain in depth, obstacles, and mines,while employing firepower and maneuver to wrest theinitiative from the attacker. A mobile defense requiresa mobility greater than that of the attacker. The de-fenders cause the natural aggressiveness of the attackerto focus on the wrong objective, setting him up forattack from an unexpected direction and driving thatattack home with overwhelming force and violence.

Defenders place minimum forces forward, form-ing powerful forces with which to strike the enemy athis most vulnerable time and place. Defenders trackthe enemy throughout his attack. They identify criti-cal enemy nodes, such as C2, radars, logistics trains,and indirect fire support elements. They blind or de-ceive enemy critical reconnaissance elements; theyallow less critical reconnaissance elements to drawattention to the friendly forces’ secondary efforts. Atthe decisive moment, defenders strike simultaneouslythroughout the depth of the attacker’s forces. Theyjam or destroy the enemy’s C2 systems, attack ammu-nition carriers and POL tankers by fires, and emplaceminefields aerially or by field artillery behind and infront of the attacking enemy. They strike the enemyby air and ground attacks, assaulting him from an openflank and defeating him in detail.

Terrain is traded for maximum effect to divert theattention of the enemy from the defender’s main force,overextend the attacker’s resources, exposing hisflanks, and leading him into a posture and terrain thatdiminishes his ability to defend against the counterat-tack of the larger, mobile reserve. The mobile defensesets up large-scale counterattacks that offer the de-fender the opportunity to gain and retain the

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initiative, going over to the offense and moving intoexploitation and pursuit. See Figure 9-1.

AREA DEFENSECommanders conduct an area defense to deny the

enemy access to designated terrain or facilities for aspecified time. In a theater campaign, selective use ofan area defense can be part of a theater’s mobile de-fense. Those elements designated to conduct areadefense must understand their role in the larger cam-

paign plan. In an area defense, the bulk of defendingforces deploy to retain ground, using a combinationof defensive positions and small, mobile reserves.Commanders organize the defense around a staticframework provided by defensive positions, seekingto destroy enemy forces with interlocking fires. Com-manders also employ local counterattacks against en-emy units penetrating between defensive positions. Asecurity area or covering force is also part of an areadefense.

Figure 9-1. Mobile Defense

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At times, commanders may be required to deny orhold key terrain, if the friendly situation gives the de-fender no other option or friendly forces are fightingoutnumbered. In such situations, the key to success ismaking wise use of all resources in the time availableto prepare positions and to ensure troops are fit andready. This is a continuing process that ends only whenthe defender is ordered to give up the terrain. Thefactors of METT-T drive the tasks to be done and theirpriority, making maximum use of obstacle and barrierplans. Engagement areas and control and distributionof fires are keys to a successful area defense.

To make maximum use of the depths of their AO,commanders weigh all the factors of METT-T and usethe defense pattern that offers the best advantage. Aposition defense in depth provides positions through-out the battlefield that provide mutual support and forcethe attacker to expose his force in the attack of oneposition after another. While such a forward defensemay be necessary, it is more difficult to execute thanan in-depth defense. Mobile defenses require consid-erable depth, but area defenses vary in depth accord-ing to the situation.

Commanders position their forces in platoon, com-pany, or battalion battle positions on suitable terrain,with a specific orientation and direction or sector offire. On occasion, commanders may also direct theconstruction of a strongpoint in order to deny key ter-rain to the enemy and force his movement in a differ-ent direction. The construction of a strongpoint re-quires considerable time and combat engineer support.In some cases, because of terrain restrictions, require-ments to hold specific terrain, or when enemy forcesare weak and disorganized, area defenses without muchdepth may be necessary, requiring the main effort tobe well forward. See Figure 9-2.

OPERATIONS IN DEPTHA concise and comprehensive in-depth concept of

operations is the basis for a successful defense. Si-multaneous application of combat power—through-out the depth of the battle area—that defeats the en-emy rapidly with minimum friendly casualties is pref-erable to the attrition nature of sequential operations.Quick, violent, and simultaneous action throughout thedepth of the defender’s battle space can hurt, confuse,and even paralyze an enemy just as he is most ex-posed and vulnerable. Such actions weaken theenemy’s will and do not allow his early successes tobuild confidence. Operations in depth prevent the

enemy from gaining momentum in the attack. Sud-den strikes by both fire and maneuver from a varietyof directions—synchronized with other disruptive ef-fects on the enemy such as jamming, smoke, and de-ception—can stall and overwhelm an attack even be-fore it has begun. Commanders synchronize threecomplementary elements to defensive actions whenexecuting their defensive plan: deep, close, and rearoperations.

Although deep, close, and rear operations may notbe contiguous to one another, commanders do not al-low enemy forces freedom of movement within thegaps formed by extended, noncontiguous battles. Theydominate their battle space throughout the depth ofoperations, designating responsibilities for unoccupiedground and providing the combat power as needed toattack the enemy wherever he ventures. Security ofthe force is a continuous concern of the command, andcommanders must clearly designate this responsibil-ity.

Regardless of the proximity or separation of vari-ous elements, command-ers see their defense as a con-tinuous whole. They fight deep, close, and rear op-erations as one battle, synchronizing simultaneous op-erations to a single purpose—the defeat of the enemy’sattack and early transition to the offense.

DEEP OPERATIONSCommanders design deep operations to achieve

depth and simultaneity in the defense and to secureadvantages for future operations. Deep operations dis-rupt the enemy’s movement in depth, destroy high-payoff targets vital to the attacker, and interrupt or denyvital enemy operating systems such as command, lo-gistics, or air defense at critical times. As deep opera-tions succeed, they upset the attacker’s tempo and syn-chronization of effects as the defender selectively sup-presses or neutralizes some of the enemy’s operatingsystems to exploit the exposed vulnerability. Individualtargets in depth are only useful as they relate to thedestruction of a critical enemy operating system suchas air defense or CSS. As the defender denies free-dom of maneuver to the attacker with deep operations,he also seeks to set the terms for the friendly forcetransition to offense.

Deep operations provide protection for the forceas they disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s abilityto bring combat power to bear on friendly close com-bat

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forces. As with deep operations in the offense, activi-ties in depth, such as counterfire, focus on effects toprotect the close combat operations directly. To syn-chronize the activities that encompass both deep andclose objectives, commanders integrate and prioritizereconnaissance, intelligence, and target acquisitionefforts to focus fires and maneuver at the right placeand time on the battlefield.

CLOSE OPERATIONSClose operations are the activities of the main and

supporting efforts in the defensive area to slow, cana-lize, and defeat the enemy’s major units. The defend-ing commander may do this in several ways. Often,he fights a series of engagements to halt or defeat en-emy forces. This requires him to designate a maineffort, synchronize effects to support it, then shift it toconcentrate forces and mass effects against anotherthreat. This may be done repeatedly. Maneuver unitsdefend, delay, attack, and screen as part of the defen-sive battle.

Security operations warn of the enemy’s approachand attempt to harass and to slow him. A coveringforce meets the enemy’s leading forces, strips awayenemy reconnaissance and security elements, reportsthe attacker’s strength and locations, and gives thecommander time and space in which to react to theenemy.

Reserves conduct operations throughout the de-fense and may require continual regeneration. Theygive commanders the means to seize the initiative andto preserve their flexibility; they seek to strike a deci-sive blow against the attacker but prepare to conductother missions as well. They provide a hedge againstuncertainty. Reserves operate best when employed toreinforce and expedite victory rather than prevent de-feat.

REAR OPERATIONSRear operations protect the force and sustain com-

bat operations. Successful rear operations allow com-manders freedom of action by preventing disruptionof

Figure 9-2. Area Defense

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C2, fire support, logistical support, and movement ofreserves. Destroying or neutralizing enemy deep battleforces achieves this goal.

Enemy forces may threaten the rear during estab-lishment of the initial lodgment and throughout op-erations in theater. In the first case, close and rearoperations overlap due to the necessity to protect thebuildup of combat power. In the second case, deep,close, and rear operations may not be contiguous.When this situation occurs, rear operations must re-tain the initiative and deny freedom of action to theenemy, even if combat forces are not

available. A combination of passive and active de-fensive measures can best accomplish this. Command-ers assess threat capabilities, decide where risk willbe accepted, and then assign the units necessary toprotect and sustain the force. Unity of command fa-cilitates this process.

Regardless of the proximity or separation of ele-ments, defense of the rear is integrated with the deepand close fight. Simultaneous operations defeat theattacking enemy throughout the battlefield and allowan early transition to the offense.

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Defense doctrine describes two general forms ofdefense at the tactical level—area and mobile. Nor-mally, operational-level defense is some combinationof both. The design of an operation that lays out where,when, and in what sequence to conduct each form ofdefense is operational art. That design is largely con-ditioned by METT-T and imperatives to attempt togain the initiative early. Doctrine provides command-ers great freedom in formulating and conducting theirdefense consistent with mission require-ments. Com-manders may elect to defend well forward with strongcovering forces by striking the enemy as he approaches,or they may opt to fight the decisive battle well for-ward within the main battle area. Nevertheless, theywill strike the enemy wherever they find him. If theydo not have to hold a specified area or position, de-fending commanders may draw the enemy deep intotheir defenses and then strike his flanks and rear. Theymay even choose to preempt the enemy with spoilingattacks if conditions favor such tactics.

A simple concept of operations flexible enough tomeet the enemy wherever he chooses to attack is es-sential to success. Commanders tailor their defensiveconcept to their specific situation; they pay particularattention to their mission, operations against the en-emy in depth, and the efficient and effective use ofavailable time.

PLANNING THE DEFENSEPlanning the defense begins when commanders re-

ceive a mission or perceive a requirement to defend.The results of the defense should satisfy the intent ofthe next two higher commanders and set the terms forfuture operations.

Defending commanders must use terrain wiselyand designate a point of main effort. They choosedefensive positions that force the enemy to make costlyattacks or conduct time-consuming maneuvers to avoidthem.

A position that the enemy can readily avoid hasno defensive value unless the enemy can be inducedto attack it. The defense, no less than the offense,

should achieve surprise. As commanders conduct theirestimates of how to meet the requirements of the mis-sion, they consider the factors of METT-T.

MISSIONThe first consideration in planning the defense is

the mission. It defines the parameters of the defenseor the force to defeat and logically flows from the con-cept of operations of the higher headquarters. Assign-ment of missions to subordinates is one way command-ers influence the outcome of the defense. Defendingbroad frontages forces commanders to take risks andaccept gaps, while defending shallow sectors or posi-tions reduces flexibility and requires commanders tofight well forward. Narrow frontages and deep sec-tors increase the elasticity of the defense and thenumber of options available. Commanders also con-sider subsequent missions.

ENEMYCommanders consider the enemy’s doctrine,

equipment, recent or past tendencies, intent, and prob-able courses of action (most likely and most danger-ous) in planning the defense. Commanders and unitsrespect enemy capabilities but are not paralyzed bythem. Defending commanders view themselves andtheir sectors through the enemy commander’s eyes toanticipate whether the enemy will orient on seizure ofterrain or destruction of forces. They analyze the en-emy and determine the critical points in time and spacefor enemy

CHAPTER 10

PLANNING AND CONDUCTING THE DEFENSE

CONTENTS

PLANNING THE DEFENSE ........................ 10-1Mission ................................................ 10-1Enemy .................................................. 10-1Terrain and Weather ........................... 10-2Troops .................................................. 10-2Time Available ..................................... 10-3

PREPARING THE DEFENSE...................... 10-3

CONDUCTING THE DEFENSE .................. 10-4

TERMINATING THE DEFENSE .................. 10-6

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10-2

and friendly vulnerabilities during the battle by an-swering a series of questions:

- Where and when is the enemy most vulnerable?- When, where, and how can the defender exploitthose vulnerabilities?- What are the specific conditions that trigger theexploitation of those vulnerabilities?- What is the worst thing the attacker can do tothe defending force?

To determine the enemy’s vulnerabilities and ef-fective countermeasures to their attack, defending com-manders conduct a thorough IPB. The IPB enablescommanders and their staffs to anticipate the enemy’sobjectives and courses of action and helps determinewhat control measures are needed. Sometimes the IPBis helped by an enemy who is predictable, rational,and doctrinal. The IPB, however, is more difficult iffriendly units are fighting irregular forces that haveno doctrine and adapt their methods rapidly when fight-ing conventional forces.

In a defense against an enemy in echelon, com-manders determine the location and response time ofreserves and follow-on forces. Delaying the enemyfollow-on forces may allow defeat in detail. Whenthe defense forces the enemy to increase his tempo ofoperations, the enemy may commit forces earlier thanplanned, thereby disrupting his concept of operationsand creating exploitable gaps between the committedand subsequent echelons. Accurate and timely target-ing of enemy units, facilities, and operating systemsand rapid-to-near-real-time shooter-to-user links arecrucial to defeat an attacking enemy in depth.

The foundation of a defensive plan is locating, con-taining, and defeating the attacker’s main and support-ing efforts. Commanders use every resource avail-able to offset the attacker’s numerical advantage, toidentify dangerous threats, and to mass combat poweragainst the vulnerabilities of the enemy force. In par-ticular, planners anticipate the enemy’s use of indirectapproaches and his ability to project combat powerinto the rear area by long-range fires, infiltration, airmobility, unconventional warfare, and weapons ofmass destruction.

TERRAIN AND WEATHERThe defender must decide where he can best kill

the enemy and plan accordingly. A study of the ter-

rain that the enemy must traverse to conduct his at-tack gives valuable information. This study indicatesthe probable positions of assembly areas, logistics dis-positions, artillery locations, ground favoring armoredand mechanized attack, and an area most advantageousfor the main attack. Personal reconnaissance is essen-tial. The characteristics of the terrain may exercise adecisive influence on the positioning of the defense.The defending force exploits any aspect of terrain thatimpairs enemy momentum or makes it difficult for theenemy to achieve mass or conduct maneuver.

Defenders engage the attacker at points where theterrain puts him at the greatest disadvantage. Defend-ing commanders use man-made obstacles to improvethe natural impediments, to slow or canalize enemymovement, and to protect friendly positions and ma-neuver. Some terrain may be so significant to the de-fense that its loss would prove decisive. When terrainis a critical factor in a defense, commanders make it afocal point of their plan.

Weather and visibility affect how defenders orga-nize the terrain. In periods of adverse or limited vis-ibility, commanders plan for the impact on weaponssystems and optical devices. A defensive plan thatsucceeds in clear conditions may be less effective inperiods of bad weather. Contingencies to the basic planshould address necessary modifications to the defenseduring periods of reduced visibility. Commanders andstaffs need local tactical weather information as wellas the more general theater-level forecasts.

TROOPSCommanders consider the composition of their

force. They also consider teamwork, state of training,and experience of leaders when they assign missions.The mobility, protection, morale, and training of theirtroops determine to some extent how they defend. Dif-ferences in mobility, training, and leadership makesome units more suitable for some missions than forothers. In combined operations, for example, particu-lar arrangements may be necessary to accommodatenational pride or interests. In joint operations, specificweapons systems, rates of consumption, and tacticaldoctrine might prohibit certain missions. In addition,the lack of ground combat forces in the initial stagesof forcible-entry operations makes effective synchro-nization of joint forces critical at that stage. The abil-ity of the joint force to synchronize effects is essentialto protect the lodgment area and force buildup duringthis vulnerable stage of operations. The defendershould

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exploit relative strengths such as skill in night com-bat, infiltration, long-range fires, or air assault that givethe defender an advantage over the attacker.

TIME AVAILABLEThe amount of time to prepare is a crucial factor

in organizing a defense. The defense is far more ef-fective when time is available to conduct reconnais-sance and deliberately occupy positions; designatesecurity and main battle areas; fortify the ground; planfires; install obstacles; coordinate maneuver, fires, andlogistics support; and rehearse. To gain time for orga-nization of the battle area, commanders may order adelay by a covering force or a spoiling attack by groundor air units. Lack of time may compel a commander tomaintain a larger-than-normal reserve force or acceptgreater risks than usual. While small units train todefend with minimal preparation, strong defenses taketime to organize and prepare. Time is a critical ele-ment the defender cannot waste.

PREPARING THE DEFENSECommanders and battle staffs take advantage of

all the time available in preparing the defense. Just asin the offense, commanders have subordinates dem-onstrate their understanding of the commander’s in-tent and order by restating the commander’s missionsin their own words. This should be done immediatelyafter the order is issued. Preparations should begin asearly as possible and continue until the battle begins.As staffs prepare plans, leaders conduct personal re-connaissance. Noncom-missioned officers see to it thatsoldiers and units are fit and prepared for battle byresting soldiers and conducting precombat checks.There is no substitute for actually seeing and walkingthe defensive area. In forcible-entry operations, de-tailed rehearsals with mockups and simulations cansubstitute for lack of opportunity to see the defensivearea. Parallel planning activities facilitate simultaneouspreparation at all command levels.

Among the most important activities are designa-tion of security and main battle areas; rear areas; re-connaissance of the sector; preparation of routes, po-sitions, and obstacles; and coordination of maneuverwith direct and indirect fire support. Adjustments as aresult of preparation activities are integrated at andaffect each echelon. The higher echelon refines itsorders to achieve better synchronization, while lowerechelons are still in the deliberate planning process.

Senior commanders gather their subordinate com-manders and staffs before they issue their orders toreview and adjust the synchronization of their battleplan. This meeting is normally conducted at promi-nent terrain overlooking the battle area, with a terrainmodel or map. This meeting describes the desired tim-ing and effects of their schemes of maneuver and con-cepts of fires. In particular, commanders ensure thatspecific resources have been tasked to identify high-payoff targets and the enemy’s main attack, to trackthese when found, and to mass the desired effects atthe right place and time. This mutual discussion per-mits adjustments to the superior commander’s plan andrefines responsibilities for actions and contingenciesat critical points in the battle. Following this meeting,subordinate commanders complete their plans and havetheir leaders brief, train, and rehearse troops for theirspecific tasks. Liaison takes place between adjacentunits and joint and combined forces.

Commanders and battle staffs continue to wargametheir plans and are flexible enough to amend thembased on their analyses. They take advantage of prepa-ration time to develop alternate routes and positions,to time movements between positions and along routes,and to rehearse counterattacks. They personally in-spect the preparations of their troops in all areas. Theydevelop branches and sequels to the plan.

Preparation for the defense also entails the stock-ing of forward supply points, liaison with civilian of-ficials, adjustment of air defense coverage, and secu-rity of installations in the rear area. If time permits,units prepare alternate sites for command posts, artil-lery firing positions, and logistics facilities. Early iden-tification of enemy units gives commanders a betteridea of when the attack will begin and is vital for ex-ecuting deep operations.

Commanders can strengthen their defense of themost dangerous approach by narrowing the sector ofthe unit astride it. A significant obstacle to the front,such as a river, built-up area, swamp, or escarpment,favors an area defense. Such an obstacle adds to therelative combat power of the defender. Open terrainor a wide sector favors a mobile defense that orientson the enemy. The primary function of committedunits in a mobile defense is to control the enemy pen-etration pending a counterattack by a large reserve.Obstacles support static elements of the defense andslow or canalize the enemy in vital areas.

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Commanders determine the mission, composition,and size of the reserve and counterattack forces. Re-serves by definition are uncommitted forces. Reserveforces are not uncommitted if the commander’s con-cept of defense depends upon their employment as acounterattack force to strike a decisive blow. Coun-terattacking, blocking, reinforcing defending units, orreacting to rear area threats are all actions a reservemay be required to perform. Each situation is unique.The primary mission of the reserve derives directlyfrom the commander’s concept of the defense and,therefore, the commander who established the require-ment to have a reserve must approve its commitment.

Mobile defenses sometimes rely on reserves tostrike the decisive blow. They require a large, mobile,combined arms reserve. When conditions favoringcounterattack occur, the main effort shifts to the re-serve, which then strikes with overwhelming combatpower. Area defenses are more likely to use reservesto block and reinforce at lower tactical levels, leavingmajor counterattacks to divisions, corps, and higherechelons. Brigade- and battalion-level area defensesmay benefit from the use of mobile reserves when sucha force is available and the enemy uncovers his flanks.The actual size and composition of the reserve dependon the commander’s concept of operation.

In planning a counterattack, commanders carefullyconsider the enemy’s options and the likely locationsof his follow-on echelons. Commanders then decidewhere to position their reserves, what routes and av-enues of approach to use, what fire support is neces-sary, and what interdiction or deep attack will isolatethe enemy’s forces. Counterattacks seek to avoid en-emy strengths. Brigade and battalion counterattacksseize positions from which to fire on the enemy’s flanksand rear. Division or corps counter-attacks either strikeisolated enemy maneuver units or pass around theenemy’s forces to strike directly at his reserves, artil-lery, and other supporting forces.

Reserves may be air or ground maneuver units.Divisions, brigades, and battalions become reservesas part of their higher commander’s defense. Whencounterattacking, they conduct hasty or deliberate at-tacks. Army air assault and air attack forces can re-spond rapidly as reserves. On suitable terrain, theycan reinforce positions to the front or on a flank. In athreatened sector, they are positioned in depth and canrespond to tactical emergencies. Air assault forces arealso suitable for swift attack against enemy airborneunits landing in the rear area. Once committed, how-

ever, they have limited mobility.

Commanders tend to be more stationary in the de-fense, yet they should anticipate and provide for themeans to command and control on the move in thedefensive area. To minimize the vulnerability of rearoperations, C2 and support facilities in the rear areaare redundant and dispersed. Air defense elementsprovide defense in depth by taking positions to coverair avenues of approach and vital assets. When rearbattle response forces are insufficient, tactical combatforces prepare to respond rapidly against rear areathreats and prepare to move to their objectives bymultiple routes.

CONDUCTING THE DEFENSEForces conduct the defense aggressively. Com-

manders continuously seek opportunities to take ad-vantage of the enemy’s errors or failures. The objec-tive of the defense is to gain and maintain the initia-tive rapidly. The integrity of the defense depends onmaneuver and counterattack, as well as on the suc-cessful defense of key positions. As the attack begins,the defender’s first concerns are to identify the enemy’scommitted units, determine his direction of attack, andgain time to react. Security forces, intelligence units,SOF, and air elements conducting deep operationswill be the first sources of this information. Duringthe battle, commanders track battle damage to knowhow much combat power remains as a prerequisite toexploiting opportunities.

Battle command in the defense differs from theattack. Defensive operations tend to be more closelysynchronized, thus commanders tend to monitor thebattle in more detail. Visualizing the present and fu-ture state and setting in motion actions to move fromone to the other are more difficult and can more easilybreak up synchronization of the defense. Battle track-ing of both enemy and friendly units and frequent as-sessments, often face-to-face, help with these deci-sions. Commanders provide themselves with themeans to command while moving about the battlefieldin the defense. The tendency will be to reduce thesize of the staff element moving with the commander.Commanders also look for opportunities to rest units,if even for a few hours.

AOs extend far enough forward to give command-ers time to react to approaching enemy forces, to as-sess their options, and to execute operations accord-ingly.

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Operations in depth begin before the enemy closes withmaneuver forces. They continue against follow-onforces to isolate them well forward, to guard againstinterference with the commitment of reserves, and toshape the conditions of the next set of engagements.

Operations in depth are an integral part of the de-fense. Commanders use them to create opportunitiesfor decisive action. Simultaneous operations in depthare commanders’ means of ensuring the success of theirdecisive engagements and counterattacks by limitingthe enemy’s options, disrupting his coordination, andaffecting the closure times of his follow-on elements.In conducting them, commanders view the entirebattlefield with an understanding of the critical tacti-cal decisions they must make and an appreciation ofthe current intelligence picture of enemy forces. Theykeep the focus of available collection assets on itemsof particular concern.

As enemy formations enter their battle space, com-manders monitor their activities and movement andlocate the elements of the enemy force most threaten-ing to their plans. They then track and attack high-payoff targets and disrupt and delay selected enemyreserves to facilitate specific actions within their overalldefense. For example, a division commander mightact to isolate an enemy regiment by interdicting forcesthat could reinforce or support it during a counterat-tack.

Commanders position and employ fire and ma-neuver to control or repel enemy penetrations. Theyemploy reserves to block penetrations, to destroy pen-etrating enemy formations, and to regain the initia-tive. The force responsible for the most critical sectornormally receives priority in the initial allocation ofartillery, engineer, and close air support. It is usuallythe initial main effort.

Commanders slow the enemy’s movement in someareas or separate their formations to deny the enemythe ability to mass or establish a tempo that will makedefense impossible. Defending commanders normallyhave to economize or take risks in some parts of theirsector to concentrate forces and fires in the areas ofgreatest danger. They may employ long-range sur-veillance to assist in monitoring economy-of-forcesectors. However, they weigh such employment againstthe need to direct sufficient assets toward enemy ele-ments that could directly influence the battle. Cover-ing forces and ground or air maneuver units can delayin less threatened areas to gain time for actions against

committed enemy units.

In an area defense, committed brigades counter-attack whenever conditions are favorable. Brigadecommanders use their reserves in cooperation withstatic elements of their defenses—battle positions andstrong-points—to break the enemy’s momentum andreduce his numerical advantage. As the attack devel-ops and the enemy reveals his dispositions, reservesand fires strike at objectives in depth to break up thecoordination of the attack.

Using mobile defenses, commanders anticipate en-emy penetration into the defended area and use ob-stacles and defended positions to shape and controlsuch penetrations. They also use local counterattackseither to influence the enemy into entering the plannedpenetration area or to deceive him as to the nature ofthe defense. As in area defenses, static elements of amobile defense contain the enemy in a designated area.In a mobile defense, the counterattack is strong, well-timed, and well-supported. Preferably, counter-attack-ing forces strike against the enemy’s flanks and rearrather than the front of his forces.

During the defense, commanders shift their maineffort to contain the enemy’s attack until they can takethe initiative themselves. This requires the adjustmentof sectors, repeated commitment and reconstitution ofreserves, and modification of the original plan. Todeny the enemy passage through a vital area, com-manders may order a force to remain in a strong posi-tion on key terrain. They also might leave a unit inposition behind the enemy or give it a mission thatentails a high risk of entrapment. Defending units maybe unintentionally cut off from friendly forces. When-ever an unintentional encirclement occurs, the en-circled commander who under-stands his mission andhis higher commander’s intent can continue to con-tribute to the mission of his higher commander.

An encircled force acts rapidly to preserve itself.The senior commander assumes control of all encircledelements and assesses the all-around defensive pos-ture of the force. He decides whether the next highercommander wants the force to break out or to defendits position. He reorganizes and consolidates expedi-tiously. If the force is free to break out, it should do sobefore the enemy has time to block escape routes.Breaking out might mean movement of the entire en-circled force, where one part is attacking and the other

OPERATIONS

10-6

forces in their rear areas, using a combination of pas-sive and active defensive measures. While command-ers can never lose focus on their primary objectives,they assess risks throughout their battle space and com-mit combat power where necessary to preserve theirability to accomplish the mission.

Commanders protect their forces at all times. Theyachieve the effects of protection through skillful com-binations of offense and defense, maneuver and fire-power, and active and passive measures. As they con-duct operations, they receive protective benefits fromdeep and close operations as they disrupt the attacker’stempo and blind the enemy reconnaissance efforts.Defenders also employ passive measures such as cam-ouflage, terrain masking, and OPSEC to frustrate theenemy’s ability to find them. Commanders should re-main aware that their forces are at risk. They shouldadjust their activities to maintain the ability to protecttheir forces from attack at vulnerable points.

Weapons of mass destruction present defenderswith great risks (see Chapter 6). These weapons cancreate gaps, destroy or disable units, and obstruct thedefender’s maneuver. Commanders anticipate the ef-fects of such weapons in their defensive plans. Theyprovide for dispersed positions for forces in depth,coordinating the last-minute concentration of units onpositions with multiple routes of approach and with-drawal. They also direct appropriate training andimplement protective measures.

TERMINATING THE DEFENSEAn attacking enemy, through its own maneuvers,

losses, errors, exhaustion, skillful friendly defense, orother causes, may be in such an unfavorable positionthat the initiative passes to the defender. The defenderthen has a prospect of success in conducting a deci-sive counterattack to reach a tactical decision and tran-sition to the offensive. Without a compelling reason todefend, such as those conditions described herein, thedefender attacks.

defending. The entire formation moves throughplanned escape routes created by the attacking force.If the force cannot break out, the senior commandercontinues to defend while planning for and assistingin a link-up with a relieving force.

Reserves preserve commanders’ flexibility in thedefense. They provide the source of combat powerthat commanders can commit at the decisive moment.Commanders may use reserves to counterattack theenemy’s main effort to expedite his defeat, or they mayelect to exploit enemy vulnerabilities, such as exposedflanks or support units and unprotected forces in depth.Reserves also provide a hedge against uncertainty.Reserves may reinforce forward defensive operations,block penetrating enemy forces, conduct counterat-tacks, or react to a rear area threat.

Timing is critical to counterattacks. Command-ers anticipate the circumstances that require commit-ting the reserves. At that moment, they seek to wrestthe initiative from the attacker. They commit theirreserves with an accurate understanding of movementand deployment times. Committed too soon, reservesmay not have the desired effect or may not be avail-able later for a more dangerous contingency. Com-mitted too late, they may be ineffective. Once com-manders commit their reserves, they should immedi-ately begin regenerating another reserve from uncom-mitted forces or from forces in less threatened sectors.

During battle, protection of rear areas is neces-sary to ensure the defender’s freedom of maneuverand continuity of operations. Because fighting in therear area can divert combat power from the main ef-fort, commanders carefully weigh the need for suchdiversions against the possible consequences and pre-pare to take calculated risks in rear areas. To makesuch decisions wisely, commanders require accurateinformation to avoid late or inadequate responses andto guard against overreacting to exaggerated reports.

Threats to the rear area arise throughout the battleand require the repositioning of forces and facilities.When possible, defending commanders contain enemy

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CHAPTER 11

RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

CONTENTS

PURPOSE OF RETROGRADEOPERATIONS ....................................... 11-1

TYPES OF RETROGRADEOPERATIONS ....................................... 11-1Delays ................................................... 11-2 Considering the Factors of METT-T 11-2 Deploying, Dispersing, and Employing Forces........................ 11-3 Organizing and Conducting the Delay ...................................... 11-3 Ending the Delay.............................. 11-3Withdrawals ......................................... 11-3Retirements .......................................... 11-6

A retrograde operation is a maneuver to the rearor away from the enemy. It is part of a larger schemeof maneuver to regain the initiative and defeat the en-emy. Its purpose is to improve the current situation orprevent a worse situation from occurring. Its objec-tives are to gain time, to preserve forces, to avoid com-bat under undesirable conditions, or to maneuver theenemy into an unfavorable position. Retrograde op-erations may facilitate repositioning forces, shorten-ing LOCs, or permitting unit withdrawals for employ-ment elsewhere.

PURPOSE OFRETROGRADE OPERATIONSCommanders use retrograde operations to harass,

exhaust, resist, delay, or damage an enemy. Whileretrograde operations are difficult, delays and with-drawals are particularly risky. Due to their rearwardorientation, retrograde operations tend to cause in-creased levels of psychological stress in soldiers. Theytend to see movement away from the enemy as a har-binger of defeat. Unless held in check, such concernscan lead to rout and panic. Success in retrograde op-erations requires strong leadership, exemplary orga-nization, and disciplined execution. A disorganizedretrograde operation in the presence of a strong en-emy invites disaster.

Units in retrograde must avoid decisive engage-ment. Subordinate elements endeavor to deny the en-emy critical intelligence on the movement of the mainforce. Intelligence on the enemy is constantly updatedto avoid surprise. Deception and delaying actions arecombined to prevent the enemy from closing instrength. The actions of friendly troops are swift butnever precipitous. Because of their effects on otherunits, retrograde operations require the prior approvalof the next higher command. Retirements, on the otherhand, are conducted when units are not in contact andare usually not risky.

As do other operations, retrograde operations relyon logistics support. Logistics planners advise com-

manders and operational planners on the status, capa-bilities, and limitations of the logistics support for ret-rograde operations.

The ability to conduct a timely withdrawal is es-pecially dependent upon sufficient transport. Logisti-cians assist in formulating courses of action, adjustingsupport operations to conform to the commander’sdecisions. Logistics unit commanders and staff offic-ers play a key role in assisting and preparing the forcefor retrograde operations.

TYPES OFRETROGRADE OPERATIONS

The three types of retrograde operations are delays,withdrawals, and retirements. In delays, units yieldground to gain time while retaining flexibility and free-dom of action to inflict the maximum damage on theenemy. Withdrawing units, whether all or part of acommitted force, voluntarily disengage from the en-emy to preserve the force or release it for a new mis-sion. In each type of a retrograde, a force not in con-tact with the enemy moves to the rear—normally by atactical road march. In all retrograde operations, firmcontrol of friendly maneuver elements is a prerequi-site for success.

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Commanders directing retrograde operations planand coordinate complementary operations to enhancethe probability of success. These operations shouldattempt to reduce the enemy’s strength, concentrateforces in another area, prepare stronger defenses, ormaneuver the enemy into areas where he is vulnerableto counterattacks. As in other operations, depth is im-portant. Enemy movement is impeded in depth;countermobility, interdiction, and long-range fires areintegrated to slow his advance.

Commanders combine different forms of retro-grade into simultaneous or sequential actions. For in-stance, the withdrawal of one unit may precede theretirement of another. Another unit’s delaying actionmay cover both operations. Synchronizing these op-erations requires detailed planning, close and continu-ous coordination, and precise execution.

DELAYSUnits conduct delays when forces are insufficient

to attack or defend or when the design of the opera-tion dictates maneuvering the enemy into an area forsubsequent counterattack. Delays gain time forfriendly forces to reestablish the defense, to cover adefending or withdrawing unit, to protect a friendlyunit’s flank, and to participate in an economy-of-forceeffort. Delays also slow or break up enemy momen-tum or do not allow it to begin.

Considering the Factors of METT-TCommanders preparing to delay consider the fac-

tors of METT-T in their estimate of the situation.

Mission. The mission states the highercommander’s delay requirements, outlines the conceptof operations, and specifies the duration and terrainlimitations. If the commander’s intent is to employthe delaying force in subsequent operations, he mustspecify the critical parameters of the delay¡duration,terrain to retain or deny, and the nature of the subse-quent operation.

Enemy. The strength, location, tactics, mobility,and capabilities of the enemy have a direct impact onhow the commander plans for and organizes a delay.Some important considerations are the enemy’s likelycourses of action and his vulnerabilities to friendlycounterattack, interdiction, nonlethal technology, aerialattack, and obstacles. Commanders also examine theenemy’s capabilities to conduct air attacks on the de-laying force, to insert forces behind friendly units, and

to employ weapons of mass destruction.

Terrain and Weather. Terrain determines the ex-tent of the commanders’ options for designing delays.Open, unobstructed terrain makes delays more diffi-cult. While such terrain favors the use of armored,mechanized, and aviation units by the delaying force,it requires major engineer effort. The delaying forcemay be subject to air attack and long-range, observedfires.

Close or broken terrain slows enemy movementbut also makes maintaining contact with the enemymore difficult. In wooded, swampy, or rugged ter-rain, infantry forces are ideal units for a delay. Theprimary effect of weather on the delay is to enhanceor degrade cross-country movement, aviation support,and obstacle construction. Limited visibility requiresgreater troop unit numbers to cover a given sector andaffects the way troops maneuver and fight.

Troops. The troops available to the delaying com-manders will determine their operational design. As arule, a delaying force should be at least as mobile asthe enemy. Because delaying commanders attempt toavoid decisive combat, their forces should be capableof constructing significant obstacles and deliveringaccurate, long-range fires. The organization and train-ing of cavalry units make them uniquely suited to con-duct a delay and cover other delaying forces.

When infantry units move by air to positions indepth, they provide great flexibility to a delaying unit,although their limited mobility makes disengagementcomplex. Delaying forces rely heavily on artillery,attack helicopters, CAS, and engineers. The longerthese forces are required to delay, the more supportthey will need. MI units assist by tracking the dispo-sitions of the enemy and impeding enemy operationsby interrupting communications.

A delay can be most effective when deception con-fuses the enemy as to the true dispositions and inten-tions of the delaying force. Deception, therefore, canbe a force multiplier in conducting delaying actions.Freedom of movement is essential to a successful de-lay. Therefore, when the force cannot achieve air su-premacy, the positioning of air defense assets aroundcritical points is important.

Time Available. Time to prepare and the dura-tion of the delay are the commanders’ final prelimi-nary

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considerations. They use available time effectively toprovide subordinates with time to plan and preparetheir own operations. The duration of the delay deter-mines the tactics they use and the risks they must ac-cept.

Deploying, Dispersing, andEmploying Forces

In conducting a delay, commanders deploy theirmaneuver forces forward and disperse their CS andCSS units farther to the rear to reduce their vulner-ability. Artillery fire control, generally centralized inthe defense, should be in position to support all delay-ing units. When feasible, commanders designate ma-neuver reserves and use them to disengage committedunits and retard the enemy’s advance by blocking orcounterattacking his vulnerable forces.

Organizing and Conducting the DelayDelays can involve echelons up to entire corps or

divisions. Corps may conduct delays as part of anoperational withdrawal. Divisions may conduct de-lays as part of a corps defense or in accomplishingtheir missions as a corps advance, flank, or rear guard.If the delay is of short duration, units may fight for asingle set of positions or delay using alternate or suc-cessive positions.

Normally, unit commanders organize their delaysin parallel sectors of considerable depth, using ever-reforming combinations of friendly combat power. Thecorrect combination of attack, defense, and delay fromalternate or successive positions is essential to suchoperations. Considerations that affect those choices arenormally METT-T. The aim is to prevent enemy mo-mentum, inflict maximum destruction, and preservefriendly unit integrity while thinking of subsequentoperations to maintain the initiative. For instance, acommander delays initially from alternate positionsalong his most dangerous approach, while delayingfrom successive positions in less threatened areas. Si-multaneously, commanders establish defensive posi-tions in depth in particularly critical areas to impedethe enemy. During the delay, commanders may shiftfrom one technique to another as the operation devel-ops and the posture of the enemy force changes.

By contesting the enemy’s retention of the initia-tive, the delaying force avoids a passive pattern thatfavors the attacker. Commanders seize the initiativewhenever possible. Assaulting an advancing enemythrows him off balance, disorganizes his forces, pro-longs the delay, and deceives him as to the intentionsof the delaying force. However, delaying command-

ers try to avoid decisive engagement. Commandersmust frequently pass units through each other forward,rear, or laterally in order to keep units fresh, throw theenemy off balance, and preserve the integrity of theforce.

Commanders plan and prepare positions in depthto interrupt enemy movement. Orderly repositioningof the delaying force depends on preparation of friendlypositions in depth. While engineer efforts center oncountermobility throughout the delay, they also im-prove the delaying force’s mobility and construct pro-tected positions. Throughout the delay, engineer ef-forts remain flexible and orient on the enemy force.

At all levels, commanders integrate natural ob-stacles into their delay plans and cover them with di-rect and indirect fires. The efficient use of combatpower throughout the depth and duration of the delayis crucial since delays often accompany economy-of-force operations. Due to the fluid nature of the delay,the fastest means of massing fires on the enemy areindirect artillery and aerially delivered mines. Indi-rect mortar and artillery fires protect defensive posi-tions, cover obstacles, and provide maneuver forceswith obscurants and illumination. See Figures 11-1 and11-2.

Ending the DelayThe delay ends when enemy forces halt their at-

tack or when the delaying force completes its missionand passes through another force. If attrition or lackof logistical support halts the enemy force, the delay-ing force commander can either maintain contact, with-draw for another mission, or use the opportunity tostrike a counterblow and regain the initiative. A coun-terblow larger than a limited counterattack usually re-quires support from the higher commander, perhapsincluding commitment of his reserve. For example, ifthe division commander perceives that the enemy hasreached a culminating point during a division-leveldelay, the time may be right to commit the reserve orask for the corps reserve. Taking advantage of suchopportunities requires a clear understanding of the in-tent of the next two higher commanders.

WITHDRAWALSCommanders conduct withdrawals to extract sub-

ordinate units from combat, adjust defensive positions,or relocate the entire force. Whether it is a local orgeneral withdrawal, forces voluntarily disengage fromthe enemy and move rearward. Normally, withdraw-als are free from enemy pressure

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and do not require the assistance of other friendly units.Since the force is the most vulnerable if the enemyattacks, commanders plan for a withdrawal under pres-sure first. Then they develop plans for a withdrawalwithout pressure.

Withdrawals are inherently dangerous. Whatevertheir size, withdrawing forces prepare as thoroughlyas time allows and defend themselves if the enemyinterrupts the operation. In a general withdrawal by adivision or corps, commanders organize a coveringforce and a main body. The covering force preventseffective pursuit or interference with the main body’swithdrawal; the main body forms behind the coveringforce and moves to the rear.

In all withdrawals, commanders attempt to deceivethe enemy. The plan includes deception for the cover-ing force and main body, using multiple routes, addi-tional transportation, route improvement, and coordi-nated traffic control and movement planning.

Normally, air and ground reserves are available tosupport a general withdrawal. Since withdrawingforces are extremely vulnerable to enemy detectionand interdiction, the presence of effective indirect and

missile counterfires, strong air defenses, and air supe-riority in the AO is desirable. Conducting demonstra-tions in adjacent areas can also divert the enemy’s fo-cus on the withdrawing forces.

Whenever possible, withdrawals take place at nightor in adverse weather to help negate enemy detection.Commanders anticipating withdrawals avoid signal-ing their intentions by obvious relocation of CS andCSS facilities, premature obstacle installation, or routedestruction. Jamming enemy C2 nodes slows theenemy’s reaction once the withdrawal is underway.The foundation of withdrawal plans and orders is thecommander’s intent and scheme of maneuver. Theplan also prescribes combat organization, primary andalternate withdrawal routes, and the movement sched-ules of the withdrawing units.

In the conduct of a withdrawal, commanders an-ticipate enemy interference by fires, direct pressure,and envelopment. Withdrawing under enemy pres-sure, they fight a delay, permitting the main body’swithdrawal. Main body units reinforce the coveringforce as necessary and will themselves delay or de-fend if the

Figure 11-1. Delay from Successive Positions

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covering force fails to slow the enemy. All availablefires, electronic warfare assets, and obstacles supportthe withdrawal of these closely engaged forces. Deepoperations may be useful in relieving pressure on unitsin contact with the enemy. Commanders must tightlycontrol rearward movement and maintain synchroni-zation throughout the force.

If the withdrawal begins without enemy pressure,the covering force may remain in position to prolongthe deception. If the enemy does not attack during thewithdrawal, covering forces and rear guards remainbetween the enemy and the main body. The main bodymoves as rapidly as possible rearward. After the mainbody withdraws a safe distance, the covering force canmove to intermediate or final positions. Every with-drawing force element must be capable of defendingitself, at least temporarily, against ground attack.

Reports of enemy activity in the rear area are amatter of great urgency. When the enemy blocksmovement to the rear, commanders either shift to al-ternate routes to bypass the interdicted area or attackthrough the roadblock. When simultaneous withdrawalof all forces is not practicable, commanders deter-

Figure 11-2. Delay from Alternate Positions

mine the sequence of withdrawal. Withdrawing themost heavily engaged units from the greatest actual orpotential pressure area may result in enemy attemptsto encircle or destroy the remaining units. Withdraw-ing the least heavily engaged units first may find com-manders unable to withdraw those most heavily en-gaged or most dangerously threatened. Commandersdecide which course of action best preserves the forcewhile accomplishing the mission.

When corps or divisions withdraw, their reservesremain well forward to assist other units by fire orground attacks. While units withdraw under pressure,reserves launch spoiling attacks to disorganize anddelay the enemy. Reserves can extricate encircled orheavily engaged forces.

Defending forces may provide the withdrawingunit with fire support, EW support, air defense, andlogistical assistance. More importantly, they assumesector responsibility once the withdrawing force passesthrough them. When a defending force is in position,the withdrawing unit coordinates support as early aspossible. The unit conducts the withdrawal in the usualway until the withdrawing force passes behind the

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assisting force. Once in the defended area, the with-drawing force either joins the defense or continues tothe rear in a retirement.

RETIREMENTSRetirements are rearward movements conducted

by units not in contact. Large tactical units can ex-ecute a retirement. Typically, another unit’s securityforces cover their movement as they conduct a tacti-cal road movement. Nonetheless, they cannot assumeabsolute protection from a resolute enemy. Retiringunits must organize to fight, but they fight only in self-defense. Mobile enemy forces, unconventional forces,air strikes, air assaults, or long-range fires may inter-dict the retiring unit. Commanders plan such actions.Prearranged rear guards, artillery and aviation cover-age, engineer obstacles, and command arrangementsare essential to a successful retirement.

The terrain objective toward which the retiringforce moves should support the mission of the com-mand and the purpose of the movement. Its selectionshould favor the future action of the command shouldcombat occur during the retirement.

Security and speed are important considerationswhen conducting a retirement. Retiring units move atnight when possible. They conduct daylight move-ment only if their mission requires or if the enemy isincapable of interfering. When the enemy controlsthe air or can otherwise interdict friendly movementin depth, a retiring force moves by infiltration. Com-manders conducting any retrograde operation mustemphasize OPSEC during the entire movement.

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Logistics is the process of planning and executingthe sustainment of forces in support of military opera-tions. It includes the design, development, acquisi-tion, storage, movement, equipping, distribution, andevacuation functions of supply, field services, mainte-nance, health service support, personnel, and facili-ties. Accordingly, it is an overarching function thatoccurs across the range of military operations. At thetactical level it focuses on the traditional CSS func-tions of arming, fixing, fueling, manning, moving, andsustaining the soldier and his equipment. Logisticscannot win a war, but its absence or inadequacy cancause defeat.

Geographical conditions, space and time dimen-sions, and a determined enemy work to make logisticsoperations difficult. Branches and sequels of cam-paigns should stress logistics plans made in earlierphases. Logistics operations are designed and protectedso they continue to sustain forces throughout conflict,adapting as conditions change.

Logistics support for a force-projection army hasunique characteristics. It takes on dimensions far mov-ing different from moving units and supplies from theUnited States to an already-established theater. TheArmy relies on joint—and sometimes combined—sup-port to project forces, which must be planned in detailprior to the onset of operations. Failure to anticipateneeds properly and to provide security for LOCs, sup-plies, facilities, and infrastructures undermines thesuccess of combat operations.

Operations tend not to begin all at once from astanding start. They develop by bits and pieces. Ini-tial positioning of the force in theater often influencesthe outcome of war. Contingency operations initiallylimit support to essentials, relying on logistics esti-mates and strategic airlift for rapid resupply.

Commanders should assess the resources and capa-bilities that are available in the theater and tailor fol-low-on forces accordingly. Surface transportationmoves outsized equipment, mounted units, and bulk

supplies. Force-projection operations require compre-hensive logistics support from initial planning at thestrategic level to effective support for the soldier inthe foxhole.

CHAPTER 12

LOGISTICS

CONTENTS

THE UNDERPINNINGS OF LOGISTICS .... 12-2Strategic Logistics .............................. 12-2Operational Logistics ......................... 12-2Tactical Logistics ................................ 12-3

LOGISTICS CHARACTERISTICS .............. 12-3Anticipation ......................................... 12-3Integration ........................................... 12-4Continuity ............................................ 12-4Responsiveness ................................. 12-4Improvisation ...................................... 12-5

LOGISTICS PLANNINGCONSIDERATIONS ............................. 12-5Logistics Preparations of the Theater12-5Force Composition ............................. 12-5Logistics Priorities ............................. 12-6Joint Logistics .................................... 12-6Combined Logistics ........................... 12-6Host Nation Support ........................... 12-6Supporting Operations Other than War ................................. 12-7

LOGISTICS OPERATIONS ......................... 12-7The CONUS Base ................................ 12-7The Communications Zone................ 12-7Split-Based Operations ...................... 12-8Lines of Communications .................. 12-9Establishing a Theater Logistics Base ................................. 12-9Expanding the Theater Logistics Base ............................... 12-10Reconstitution Operations .............. 12-10

TACTICAL LOGISTICS FUNCTIONS ........ 12-11Manning .............................................. 12-11Arming ................................................ 12-11Fueling ................................................ 12-11Fixing .................................................. 12-11Moving ............................................... 12-12Sustaining Soldiers and their Systems ................................ 12-12

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THE UNDERPINNINGSOF LOGISTICS

A dependable, uninterrupted logistics system helpscommanders seize and maintain the initiative. Con-versely, attacking the enemy’s support system can of-ten threaten or weaken its center of gravity. Destruc-tion of the enemy’s support system and protection ofour own are important aspects of campaigns and ma-jor operations. Strategic concentration and operationalmaneuver and the exploitation of operational or tacti-cal success often hinge on the adequacy of logisticsand the ability of the force to safeguard its criticalLOCs, materiel, and infrastructure. While effectivelogistics operations sustain combat effectivenessthroughout the duration of operations, they retain theability to surge in support of decisive operations. Asthe scale and complexity of Army operations increase,so does the importance of logistics to the success ofthese operations.

The objective of logistics is to ensure that opera-tions succeed. Logistics arrangements cannot be someager that they do not meet the needs of command-ers as they execute their operations, nor can they be soexcessive that they overwhelm the ability of command-ers to move, protect, and employ them efficiently. Thelogistics system must strike a balance of sufficient sup-port to sustain operations throughout the peaks andvalleys of their duration without burdening command-ers with more support than is necessary to succeed.

Logistics is one of the combat functions that helpscommanders build and sustain combat power (seeChapter 2). It is also a major operating system at eachlevel of war. Combat operations and logistics increas-ingly merge at higher levels of war. Neither can beconceived without consideration of the other. Strate-gic and operational logistics support wars, campaigns,and major operations; tactical logistics supports battlesand engagements.

STRATEGIC LOGISTICSAt the strategic level of war, logistics is largely

the purview of the CONUS industrial and civilian sec-tor. National political and military-strategic leaders,as well as civilian and military suppliers and contrac-tors, effectively combine efforts to provision the force.Strategic logistics deals with mobilization, acquisition,projecting forces, strategic mobility, and the strategicconcentration of logistics in the theater base andCOMMZ. It links a nation’s economic base (people,resources, and industry) to its military operations in atheater. Strategic and operational logistics interface inthe theater of war.

OPERATIONAL LOGISTICSOperational logistics focuses on force reception,

infrastructure develop-ment, distribution, and the man-agement of materiel, movements, personnel, and healthservices. Contractors and civilians provide supportfrom within as well as from outside the theater


The logistics support for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrates the impact of develop-ing a theater plan for supporting deployed forces. The replacement operations management systemprocessed and deployed 18,000 filler personnel. Of the 139,000 reserve personnel mobilized, 124,500 ofthem were in 1,033 units and 14,900 were from the individual ready reserve. While 40 percent of theArmy’s CSS assets were deployed to the theater, 60 percent of those assets came from the reserve compo-nents.

The modern division consumes as much as a World War II field army. During Operation Desert Shield,the defensive phase of the Gulf War, each division required 345,000 gallons of diesel fuel, 50,000 gallonsof aviation fuel, 213,000 gallons of water, and 208 40-foot tractor-trailers of other supplies each day,ranging from barrier material to ammunition. During Operation Desert Storm, a 100-hour offensive, asingle division consumed 2.4 million gallons of fuel transported on 475 5,000-gallon tankers.

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of operations. In theater, contractors and DOD civil-ians assigned to a logistics support element performspecified support functions. The combatant com-mander provides strategic guidance and priorities foroperations while the service component commandersidentify strategic and operational requirements to thenational industrial logistics base. Deployment and in-tegration of forces and logistics in the theater arebased on the combatant commander’s theater-strate-gic design in his campaign plan. Centralized manage-ment and distribution of supplies and materiel at thestrategic level facilitate decentralized execution of lo-gistics at the operational and tactical levels.

Operational logistics encompasses those supportactivities required to sustain campaigns and major op-erations. It enables success at the tactical level of war.Logistics significantly impacts on the ARFORcommander’s decision process. METT-T analysisdetermines logistics time and distance factors, through-put, and LOCs. Assured logistics communicationssupporting high data-transmission rates with the na-tional industrial base provide total asset visibility ofcritical items. In-transit visibility enables the com-mander to know the location of resources in transitand to allocate them based on their projected arrival.

TACTICAL LOGISTICSTactical logistics, which includes construction en-

gineering activities, sustains the tactical commander’sability to fight battles and engagements.Successful tactical logistics provides the right supportat the right time and place to units in the CZ. Thefocus at the tactical level is on manning and armingtactical units, fixing and fueling their equipment, mov-ing soldiers, equipment, and supplies, and sustainingsoldiers and their systems. Tactical commanders thor-oughly integrate the concept of logistical support withtheir concept of operations during tactical planning.Mobile, responsive capabilities are essential for prepa-ration and execution of tactical logistics.

LOGISTICS CHARACTERISTICSSuccessful logistics must be both effective and ef-

ficient. Logistics operations are not successful unlessthey provide effective support. Scarce resources re-quire logistics operations to be efficient. Effectiveness,however, cannot be handicapped by efficiency. Thesetwo aspects of logistics are balanced to provide thefoundation for successful logistics operations.

Five characteristics facilitate effective, efficient lo-

gistics operations. Foremost among these character-istics is anticipation. Commanders and logisticians an-ticipate requirements. They integrate logistics con-cepts and operations with strategic, operational, andtactical plans. Logistics operations and systems mustbe responsive to the commander, providing continu-ous support to forward-deployed forces. Finally, lo-gisticians improvise to expedite actions when needed.These five characteristics—anticipation, integration,continuity, responsiveness, and improvisation—enableoperational success. They apply to war and opera-tions other than war.

ANTICIPATIONAccurate anticipation of requirements can enhance

both the agility of the force and its ability to seize andretain the initiative and synchronize activities in depth.Though no one can predict the exact course of events,future logistics demands must be estimated as accu-rately as possible. Anticipation means identifying,accumulating, and maintaining the assets and infor-mation necessary to support operations at the righttimes and places. Anticipation also means develop-ing logistics capabilities that are versatile and mobileenough to accommodate likely operational or tacticalevents. Strategic and operational commanders andlogisticians visualize the entire course of a major op-eration or campaign while planning in detail for thecurrent phase.

Logistics planners should anticipate requirementsin order to push the right support forward; this mini-mizes the need for improvisation in the theater. An-ticipation requires constant coordination between theoperations and logistics staffs.

Base facilities, priorities of support, LOCs, andtroop movements in the theater support the main linesof operation. Successful logistics plans anticipate shiftsin demand based on the changing nature of operations.Examples include operations that shift from high-am-munition to high-petroleum consumption or the tran-sition from combat operations to operations other thanwar.

Anticipation may mean pre-positioning criticalsupplies, end items, and replacement crews behindeach corps sector at the beginning of high-tempo op-erations. This precludes the impracticality of cross-leveling between corps at the start of combat opera-tions.

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INTEGRATIONTactical and operational success depend on fully

integrated concepts of logistics and operations. Inte-gration during planning ensures support of operationsduring execution. Logistics capabilities often affectthe feasibility of a concept of operations. Based onthe theater strategic and operational concept, logisti-cians develop a logistics concept that gives command-ers the greatest possible freedom of action and en-hances the agility and versatility of an operation. Sup-porting unit commanders are bold and innovative intheir support operations and contribute to surprise byhelping the supported force do more than the enemybelieves possible. Even deception plans should incor-porate logistics activities.

Since Army forces usually operate as part of jointand combined forces, integrating support operationsmay yield efficiencies not otherwise achievable. TheArmy seeks opportunities for such integration through-out the planning and execution of operations by deter-mining who can best provide support. The Army con-tinues to promote standardization and interoperabilityof its forces and equipment with other services andallies.

CONTINUITYAny interruption in logistics operations diminishes

the combat power of a force. During operations, com-mitted forces require continuous supply and servicesupport to sustain their fighting strength and agility.Continuity of support is the lifeblood of combat op-erations at all levels. For example, a tactical plan shouldprovide for logistics support to friendly units that maybe isolated by enemy action. This can be done byensuring that CSS capabilities accompany isolated ordetached units or by specifically planning resupply,health service support, and personnel replacementoperations.

While both combat operations and logistics canvary in intensity, combat operations may enter peri-ods of relative inactivity; logistics operations do not.Commanders use every opportunity to increase sus-taining capabilities. When the pace of combat activ-ity diminishes, CSS units replenish their capabilitieswhile continuing support to combat units.

Continuity requires that the logistics effort neverbecome hostage to a single source or mode of support.It means adapting to changing missions and prioritiesquickly and adjusting to temporary or permanent losses

of key seaports and airports and LOCs. Forward-po-sitioned bases and alternate facilities enhance conti-nuity of support. These options may require additionalconstruction or a reduction in current consumption.Force-projection operations require balancing the costof these options against the risk of interrupting conti-nuity of support.

RESPONSIVENESSThe logistics system must react rapidly in crises.

Moreover, seldom will requirements for units and sup-plies be known. Logistics commanders and staffs mustadapt units to requirements, often on short notice. Tai-loring organizations will be the rule. Often units willoperate with troop lists different from normal garrisonand home station training situations. Provisional unitsmight need to be formed. Logistics units, like combatand CS units, will frequently be task-organized forforce-projection requirements that will be difficult toforecast with complete accuracy. Training CSS andbase development engineering units to respond on shortnotice and surge their support for brief periods devel-ops quick reaction to increased demands. Such quick-reaction efforts may temporarily disrupt long-rangelogistics planning but are often required to win.

At the operational level, the logistics system meetssimilar extraordinary demands on an even greater scale.Efforts to reestablish a ruptured defense or exploit atactical success may require relocation of logisticsbases, repositioning of forward health service support,major redirection of LOCs, reallocation of transporta-tion and construction means, or short-notice transferof replacement personnel or units from one part of thetheater to another. The mental and physical ability tocope with such requirements and the discipline to re-focus in a crisis is built into the logistics system byeffective organization, careful planning, solid train-ing, and strong leadership. Supply discipline includesadhering to movement tables, declaring and distribut-ing excess materials, and observing senior command-ers’ logistics priorities. Supply discipline contributesto a responsive logistics system.

Responsive logistics, especially when time or otherresources are constrained, relies greatly on worldwide,assured communications and automation networks.These capabilities assist in integrating the full spec-trum of logistics functions into a single system. Thismay eliminate unnecessary accounting, bookkeeping,and information processing during combat operations.

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IMPROVISATIONImprovisation is the talent to make, invent, arrange,

or fabricate what is needed out of what is at hand. Suc-cessful logistics operations adapt to changing situa-tions. The American soldier is a master at this. Im-provised methods and supply sources can maintainlogistics continuity when standard procedures fail.

Commanders and planners continually reviewplanning factors and consumption rates, maintain in-transit asset visibility, and revise logistics planning es-timates. Creative commanders and smart logisticianslearn to anticipate the unexpected and adjust accord-ingly. Enemy action, interruption of sealift or airlift,and natural disasters can disrupt plans and requireimprovisation. Logistical improvisation will oftenspell the difference between success and failure ofcombat operations.

The need to improvise is even necessary in best-case scenarios. As ground operations enjoyed greatsuccess in Operation Desert Storm, Army units had todeal with an unexpectedly large number of enemy pris-oners of war (EPW). Coalition forces collected 60,000EPWs during the 100 hours of combat and thousandsmore following the cease-fire. Since the engineer unitsthat would normally construct new EPW facilities werestill committed to other operations, the 800th MP Bri-gade (EPW) constructed the additional EPW campsthey were to operate to accomplish their mission.

In fast-breaking situations, commanders are pre-pared to press tactical or civilian vehicles into serviceas supply transporters, to conduct battle damage as-sessment (BDA), to cannibalize equipment for parts,or to establish emergency supply points. Less dra-matic circumstances¡such as unexpected maintenancefailures in a particular type of equipment, loss of sup-port equipment, destruction of vital infrastructure,shortage of a particular blood type, or unanticipatedpeaks in work load¡may also require improvised solu-tions. While improvisation is not a substitute for an-ticipation, it is a necessary complement.

LOGISTICSPLANNING CONSIDERATIONSPlanning for logistics at all levels involves sev-

eral critical decisions concerning the interface of com-bat, CS, and CSS activities. Support of major opera-tions, battles, and engagements requires organizationof capabilities and resources into an overall logisticsconcept. Logistics planning and operations must be

versatile; they must complement combat plans andoperations and enhance the ability of the supportedunit to accomplish its mission. Balanced logisticsmeans enough support to do the mission but not somuch that it overwhelms the system. Although logis-tics factors constrain combat operations, the supportedcommander’s concept of operations, priorities, andallocations dictate the actions of the supporting logis-tician.

Logistics planners seek innovative ways to mini-mize strategic-lift requirements. Strategic lift is ascarce resource. Some of the ways that help reducethe demands on strategic-lift requirements includeecheloning capabilities and CSS units, establishingsplit-based operations, precon-figuring the packagingof material, and using civilian contractor, allied, andhost nation capabilities.

LOGISTICS PREPARATIONOF THE THEATER

Logistics preparation of the theater combinespeacetime planning actions taken by logisticians at allechelons to maximize means (force structure, re-sources, and strategic lift) of logistically supportingthe commander’s plan. These planning actions includeidentifying and preparing the bases of operations; se-lecting and improving LOCs; projecting and prepar-ing forward logistics bases; and forecasting and build-ing operational stock assets forward and afloat. Theseactions focus on identifying the resources currentlyavailable in the theater of war or operations for use byfriendly forces and ensuring access to them.

As time and resources allow, the Army will pro-gram actions to improve the infrastructure of the the-ater, assisting the move toward greater stability andmilitary capability. Logistics preparation of the the-ater is a tool to optimize the volume of deploying re-sources and personnel, as well as the number of logis-tics units that compete for strategic lift.

FORCE COMPOSITIONThe active and reserve components’ force com-

position, as well as the ratio of combat, CS, and CSStroops, influences the time needed to create a logisticsbase in the theater and prepare it for operations. Forexample, force-projection operations may begin ascontingency operations, consisting primarily of activecomponent combat forces. Reserve component forcesmay assist in the deployment, providing CS and CSS.Planners also consider that assured availability of

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civilian and contractor support will be necessary forvirtually all deployment and logistics operations. Thetheater support structure may be augmented from TDAorganizations such as an AMC logistics support orga-nization.

In operations other than war, the reserve compo-nents may furnish the primary forces for certain typesof missions. Since a large portion of the Army’s CSSunits are in the reserve components, the preparednessof those units and the time necessary to mobilize anddeploy them will be significant planning factors. Spe-cialized force structures require specialized supportstructures, often drawn from the reserve components.

Theater entry considerations require a thoroughreview of the mobilization and deployment plans toensure the best mix of units and integration of arrivaltimes. This ensures logistics support for combat forcesas they arrive in theater. A force-projection army needsthe capability to develop the logistics base concurrentlywith building combat power. As combat power builds,the logistics base must be dynamic and expand to meetthe needs of the combat force.

LOGISTICS PRIORITIESCommanders conserve resources by establishing

priorities for support. The priorities of all supportingcommanders are governed by the theater commander’sguidance and priorities under his combatant commandauthority (COCOM). This is a prerequisite for devel-oping a support plan. Priorities may shift between unitsor to different areas. As they do, it is necessary toevaluate the capability of the existing logistics systemto support such a shift.

Exploiting an operational situation, reconstituting,preparing for future battles, or continuing current op-erations may alter priorities. Any shifting of prioritiesmay require the relocation of certain supply, medical,service, maintenance, or personnel units to ensure fullsupport. During relocation, logistical planners antici-pate a temporary reduction in CSS capability but en-sure continuous support throughout the relocation.Such relocations may require diverting transportationand other logistics assets from support of combat unitsto move the support base.

JOINT LOGISTICSJoint integration of logistics is crucial to unity of

effort. The concept of joint logistics cannot be fullyrealized until accountability and acquisition procedures

are completely integrated. At the strategic levels oflogistics, this integration is already unified and joint.The theater combatant commander may direct the ser-vice components to support the joint force with par-ticular logistics functions, based on the dominant-useror most-capable-service concepts. For example, theArmy may provide all Class I (subsistence) support,construction, movement control, mortuary affairs, orwater support. Duplication of support among the ser-vices is expensive and wasteful. Support plans mustbe versatile enough to realize the efficiencies possiblewith joint logistics.

COMBINED LOGISTICSCombined logistics operations require similar in-

tegration. Operations with other nations require asmuch standardization as possible between forces toensure interoperability. While this ideal is rarelyachievable, the Army integrates its efforts as much aspossible to that end. The Army cannot rest on thenotion that logistics is a national responsibility. Whilethat is an accepted principle, the Army endeavors tostreamline multinational efforts toward focused com-bat power. Complementary arrangements work bestwhen each partner contributes national assets as it isable. The coalition or alliance coordinates these ef-forts. Army forces can benefit from assistance fromtheir allies. During both deployment and entry opera-tions, combined logistics can be crucial. Although othernations’ logistical structures may not have the sametechnological capabilities or the same level of sophis-tication, Army forces must work toward integratinglogistics systems.

HOST NATION SUPPORTIn a forward-presence theater, preestablished ar-

rangements for host nation support can significantlyreduce the requirement for early augmentation of USlogistics assets. Host nation support can maximizeearly strategic lift by reducing requirements for mov-ing resources to the theater. Host nation support ar-rangements may include operation, maintenance, andsecurity of seaports and airports; construction and man-agement of routes, railways, and inland waterways;provision of some health service support, subsistencesupport, laundry and bath support, petroleum pipelines,and bulk storage or warehouse for other facilities; lo-gistics civil augmentation programs; and operation ofexisting communications networks. Host nation sup-port could also include transportation, civilian labor,and local security and police forces.

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Whether or not the Army has a host nation sup-port agreement, logistics contracting support (includ-ing comptroller and finance personnel) should deployearly to arrange access to host nation capabilities.While certainly a logistics multiplier, host nation sup-port cannot be relied on as a sole source for support.

SUPPORTING OPERATIONSOTHER THAN WAR

Supporting operations other than war places spe-cial demands on the logistics system. Operation An-drew, in the wake of Hurricane Andrew’s devastationof southern Florida in 1992, is an example of a disas-ter relief mission where soldiers supported local andstate domestic authorities. Throughout Andrew, sol-diers distributed relief supplies, constructed temporaryshelters, and removed debris.

Other typical support operations involve construct-ing roads, bridges, and other key infrastructure andproviding emergency medical support abroad in sup-port of diplomatic initiatives. Combatant command-ers tailor logistics support of these operations basedon theater needs much as they would do in wartimesituations. In some cases, CS or CSS units may be theonly units involved in operations other than war. Thelogistical operation may well be the main effort in cer-tain situations. The level of support, however, shouldnot overwhelm indigenous forces or cause them tobecome solely dependent on Army resources. Armyefforts must be integrated with host nation or localresources and activities. The wide variety of potentialsupport requirements demands a flexible logisticsstructure tailored to theater missions.

LOGISTICS OPERATIONSThe logistics needs of the force determine the lo-

gistics structure. The operational logistics system linkstactical CSS units to strategic logistics support struc-tures. Theater-strategic logistics supports the theatercampaign and links logistics support from the CONUS,or other theater base, to operational logistics. It in-cludes all activities in the theater base and theater rearportion of the COMMZ. Operational logistics includesthose support activities required to sustain campaignsand major operations within a theater. It extends for-ward from theater port facilities and support bases toCSS units and facilities organic to major tactical for-mations. It also extends to the rear from the sameports or bases to the strategic industrial base in theUnited States. Tactical logistics directly supports tac-

tical units throughout the theater. Figure 12-1 depictsthe relationship of strategic, operational, and tacticallogistics operations.

Depending on the factors of METT-T, command-ers decide when to deploy CSS and construction engi-neer units with respect to the deployment of combatforces. Prior to deployment of these units, combatantcommanders consider deploying a logistics planningcell to begin evaluating requirements, assessing hostnation capabilities, and contracting for those items nec-essary to sustain initial units. Based on METT-T, com-batant commanders build logistics forces from thoseresources provided by the services. Combatant com-manders also provide limited support for ad hoc mul-tinational coalition forces.

With total asset visibility (TAV), supply manag-ers will know the locations of all supplies throughoutthe supply system. TAV allows managers to quicklylocate, distribute, and redistribute equipment and sup-plies, including ammunition associated with specificweapon systems. Current and certain knowledge ofthe location of supply items allows managers to divertmateriel to priority units and locations.

The heart of any logistics system is the distribu-tion system—the complex of facilities, installations,methods, and procedures designed to receive, store,maintain, issue, and move materiel to using activitiesand units. LOCs connect the critical points of thissystem. Both logistical and combat operations relyon an effective and efficient distribution system.

THE CONUS BASEThe CONUS base includes the national industrial

base with its national inventory control points, distri-bution centers, arsenals, plants, manufacturing facili-ties, and medical and personnel support centers. TheCONUS base is the strategic foundation for the logis-tics system.

THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONEThe COMMZ extends from the rear of the CZ in

the theater of operations to the CONUS base. TheCOMMZ includes the LOCs; the establishments withinthe theater logistics bases that provide supply, mainte-nance, field services, transportation, health services,personnel support, and evacuation; and other agenciesrequired for the immediate support and sustainmentof the field forces. The theater support structure can

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be formed around Army organizations and can be aug-mented by the Army, other government agencies, andcivilian resources.

The national industrial base and bases in other the-aters are linked to the theater logistics base throughintertheater LOCs. Theater army commanders assumeresponsibility for distribution management at theaterport facilities. The mission of the entire logistics sys-tem—from CONUS to the most forward-deployedCSS forces in the CZ—is to provide support in theright quantities at the right time and place.

Theater logistics capabilities support units locatedin and passing through the COMMZ and absorb re-quirements that are beyond the capability or capacityof the forward support units. Theater logistics basesare often located well behind the CZ. Positioning se-lected theater logistics capabilities forward can help

disperse critical assets and be more responsive to unitsin the CZ.

SPLIT-BASED OPERATIONSThe full integration of supply and transportation

functions into a vertical distribution system is critical.Enhanced and assured communications allow selectedlogistics management functions to be accomplishedfrom CONUS or from a forward-presence location,deploying only those functional capabilities absolutelynecessary. This is called split-based operations. Split-based operations can be used as a means of providingmateriel management support to the force, whereverit is located. To do this, part of the materiel manage-ment center (MMC) remains in CONUS or its peace-time forward-presence location, while force-projectioncells deploy to an AO with the force they support.

Figure 12-1. Theater Logistics System

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The deployed MMC cells consist of personnel andequipment in modular components that provide a con-duit for electronic transmission of logistics data andmessage and voice communications traffic. The rearMMC continues to support the stay-behind force whileconcurrently interfacing with the deployed cells toprovide the required support forward. With assuredcommunications and automation, the forward-de-ployed MMC cell is able to interface back to the sup-porting MMC. Split-based operations apply to all otherlogistics functions. Planners assess the capabilities andassets available in the theater and determine how tosupplement them without unnecessary duplication.

LINES OF COMMUNICATIONLOCs are all the routes (land, water, and air) that

connect an operating military force with a base of op-erations and along which supplies and military forcesmove. They are different than lines of operation, whichdescribe the direction from a combat force’s base ofoperations to its objective. Traditionally, limited clear-ance capacities at ports and airfields and limited in-land transportation networks constrain combat opera-tions. Significant logistics coordination takes place atthose key nodes. Land, naval, and air forces of vari-ous nations, for example, compete for real estate, shipberthing and unloading facilities, transportation, labor,and construction materials. Identifying bottlenecks enroute to or within the theater is the first step in coordi-nating activities to avoid overloading LOCs or deter-mining how to increase throughput.

Maintaining uninterrupted logistics supportthroughout all phases of an operation or campaign isthe central challenge of logistics. Effective and effi-cient distribution of logistics along LOCs is critical.Depending on the geography of the theater, the avail-ability of transportation assets, and the threat, ALOCsand SLOCs may supplement ground LOCs. StrategicLOCs are linked with a predominantly ground LOCnetwork at the theater base. Intratheater ALOCs arerequired to maintain flexibility and effect emergencyhigh-priority resupply and replacement actions.

A campaign or major operation should never de-pend on a single LOC. Moreover, where austere lo-gistics resources limit multiple LOCs, security for airand ground LOCs is particularly important. Protect-ing LOCs at minimum cost to committed combat unitsincludes using geographic features, friendly civil se-curity forces, and uncommitted combat units. It maybe necessary to conduct a major operation to secure

the LOCs required to support later phases of a cam-paign.

On a fluid battlefield, LOCs may change orienta-tion rapidly. Unexpected threats may require the rapidredeployment of combat forces to block or counterat-tack the enemy. Unexpected opportunities may de-velop which might disappear unless quickly exploited.Doing so might require a significant reorientation ofthe main effort. Ideally, the locations of LOCs allowshifts in operational direction without major adjust-ment of the sustaining effort. More frequently, how-ever, shifts in lines of operation require a correspond-ing change in LOCs. Such a change may also be nec-essary to compensate for damage to or interruption ofexisting LOCs.

The operational commander understands the rela-tionship between time, LOCs, and forward combatpower. Time spent in deliberate preparation—mov-ing units and stockpiling resources—can result ingreater operational capability in the future. This wasthe case in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,where bases were positioned forward to support fu-ture operations. The commander weighs these advan-tages against current operational requirements. Theoperational commander seeks to support each majoroperation efficiently and, as the campaign progresses,to adjust his LOCs and support bases as necessary.

Versatility is built into the logistics system to makethese adjustments with minimum confusion and de-lay. Forces decrease risk associated with shifting LOCsby terrain and route reconnaissance, assignment andreconnaissance of alternate transhipment and supplypoint areas, construction and maintenance of alternatefacilities and transportation networks, development andrehearsal of rapid relocation procedures, and continu-ous contingency planning. Logistics operations canavoid shortfalls by carefully integrating intratheaterairlift and using host nation support and tactical sup-port assets during the actual relocation of facilities andtraffic. Logistics planners estimate the time requiredto make those adjustments and begin the relocationprocess early.

ESTABLISHING ATHEATER LOGISTICS BASE

Combat and supporting logistics activities rely onan underlying infrastructure system. The Army willoften be required to provide engineering and base de-velopment support to joint and combined operations.

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The throughput capacity of airports and seaports con-strains units and materiel flowing into a theater. Engi-neer resources can expand this capacity. Theater lo-gistics bases are characterized by facilities for storageand transfer of ammunition and bulk petroleum, main-tenance of sensitive equipment, power generation anddistribution, and protection of vital materiel. Roadsand bridges should be sufficient to move traffic to theforward combat areas. Logistics preparation of thetheater includes determining maintenance priorities forexisting infrastructure, repairing damaged or destroyedinfrastructure, and constructing facilities to compen-sate for infrastructure shortfalls. Balancing require-ments for combat engineers with base developmentengineering needs and considering host nation engi-neering capabilities along with those of other servicesare also part of the planning process. During initialbase establishment, split-based logistics operations areoften a necessity.

The depth, simultaneity, and tempo of operationschallenge planners to forecast and respond to the needsof forward-deployed units. Even in a developed the-ater, operational and logistical planners continually re-assess the location of their principal and supplemen-tary bases of support. The choice of where to estab-lish the initial lodgment or support base could influ-ence the course of the entire campaign. Lodgmentsshould allow easy access to strategic sealift and air-lift, offer adequate space for storage, facilitatetranshipment of supplies, and be accessible to mul-tiple LOCs. Lodgments are thus often established nearkey seaport or airport facilities. Logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations may augment undevelopedor damaged facilities or provide ports where none ex-ist. The vulnerability of ports to long-range, highlydestructive enemy weaponry will increase the impor-tance of the ability to conduct LOTS operations fromanchorages.

Seldom will logistics base locations contain theideal mixture of desired characteristics. Commandersmake difficult choices as they organize a theater ofoperations. They weigh the risks and benefits of par-ticular logistics base sites, seeking a structure that isflexible, supports the campaign design, and meets theneeds of the fighting force.

EXPANDING THE THEATERLOGISTICS BASE

As the force in a theater increases, the commanderensures an appropriate balance of combat, CS, and CSSunits throughout expansion. Plans to build up forces

in a theater reflect any necessary acclimatization, re-equipping, or in-theater training, as well as establish-ing and enhancing life support infrastructure. Thesupport capacity of the logistics base must accommo-date the flow of combat forces.

With the arrival of each unit in the theater, logis-tics planners revise support plans, assign missions tonewly arrived CSS units, adjust the missions of CSSunits already in support, and cross-level supplies andpersonnel. With the integration of each new unit, com-manders reevaluate and adjust their logistics priori-ties. Each time the force expands or contracts, plan-ners review facilities and logistics requirements toensure they are adequate to accomplish the mission.

Using information provided in the logistics esti-mate, the logistics system responds to meet the in-creased demands for supplies and services caused bythe expanding force. Both logistics and operationalplanners prepare to meet the increased competition forspace on the battlefield. Units preparing for futuremissions require adequate terrain to train and preparefor combat. Commanders carefully balance sustain-ing the force with retaining the initiative, protectingthe force, and preparing for future operations.

RECONSTITUTION OPERATIONSAt the strategic level, reconstitution consists of

those functions and activities required to restore theArmy’s capability to respond to any mission acrossthe full range of possible operations. Strategic recon-stitution refers to the industrial and mobilization baseof the nation. The Army’s strategic reconstitution de-pends on the integration of national efforts to restoreits capability to mobilize, deploy, and conduct futureoperations.

At the tactical level, reconstitution consists of thereorganization or regeneration of people and equip-ment to restore combat capability. Reorganization isrestoring combat effectiveness by cross-leveling as-sets within a unit or by forming a composite (smaller)unit. For example, an attrited battalion could be reor-ganized into two full-strength companies. Reorgani-zation provides a means to maintain a level of con-tinuous combat effectiveness. Regeneration is the re-building of a unit in which the mission capability hasbeen reduced or degraded. Normally, the headquar-ters two levels higher is responsible for regeneration.It is accomplished through replacement of personneland equipment, reestablishment of effective C2, andconduct of essential training. During regeneration,consideration should be

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given to maintaining the integrity of the remainingeffective squads, teams, or crews. Taking this actionpreserves the cohesion, trust, and confidence of a unitto the maximum extent possible. Regenerated unitsneed training before being reintroduced into combat.

TACTICALLOGISTICS FUNCTIONS

CSS units, supported by engineer units, accom-plish tactical logistics functions. Tactical logistics unitsnormally operate from tactical rear operations areas.Commanders choose rear operations areas as part ofthe battlefield framework, with close and deep areasappropriate to accomplish the mission at least cost.Commanders, however, may choose to separate theirtactical rear operations in time and distance to anoncontiguous or adjacent area. Such separation mightbe temporary or permanent. Commanders make thesechoices as a result of their METT-T analysis.

Logistics operations at the strategic and operationallevels make the execution of logistics at the tacticallevel possible. Tactical logistics functions are man-ning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving the force, andsustaining soldiers and their systems.

MANNINGThe systems of personnel readiness management,

replacement management, and casualty managementmeet the Army personnel requirements from mobili-zation and deployment through redeployment and de-mobilization. The Army personnel readiness systemprovides a flexible tool for selecting and assigningsoldiers with the correct skills to meet the requirementsbefore, during, and after combat. The replacementmanagement system moves soldiers and civiliansthrough the CONUS replacement centers to unit com-manders in the theater of operations. The replacementsystem responds to commanders through the person-nel-readiness management system. Casualty manage-ment helps the personnel-readiness manager replacelosses incurred during battle.

ARMINGDuring periods of intense combat, arming the force

is extensive and time-sensitive. It begins with peace-time planning and covers all phases of force-projec-tion operations. Arming the force requires detailed

planning and coordination among the combat users andthe ammunition and transportation logisticians at alllevels. Modern warfare consumes large amounts ofammunition. Much of the Army’s ordnance dependson high-quality electronic and optical technologies forprecision and effectiveness. Logistics provides the to-tal package of components, technical maintenance, andskilled soldiers to keep weapons systems firing. Thekey to arming soldiers in the field is planning for aflexible logistics distribution system capable of surg-ing for the main effort. Given the large variety ofammunition and weapons in use and the fluid natureof battle, arming soldiers has become an even greaterchallenge.

FUELINGWhile the high performance air and ground ve-

hicles of the Army furnish great potential mobility forboth heavy and light forces, they also consume largequantities of fuel. Wheeled vehicles use less fuel thantracked vehicles and heavy equipment but still makegreat cumulative demands on the logistics system.Providing clear priorities for fueling, accurately esti-mating fuel consumption, and economizing assetswhenever possible contribute to ensuring adequatesupport of operations. Logisticians operate a high-vol-ume refueling system to support routine consumptionrates; they also provide a surge capability. In peakconsumption periods, victory may depend on the abil-ity of the logistics system to increase the flow of fuel.Whether combat, CS, or CSS, all units require unin-terrupted fueling to function effectively.

FIXINGMaximizing equipment availability is a necessity

in supporting a force-projection army. Sound mainte-nance practices in all units, forward positioning ofmaintenance capabilities, quickly accessible repairparts, and well-understood priorities for recovery andrepair may spell the difference between success andfailure. Repairing equipment far forward is key. Atailored maintenance capability will deploy, move with,and redeploy with supported units. Modular supportteams will provide additional capabilities. Battle dam-age assessment and repair (BDAR) provides the capa-bility to quickly repair and return equipment to com-bat or expedite recovery and evacuation to the closest

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maintenance facility with required capabilities. Themaintenance focus is on supporting combat operations.

MOVINGSoldiers, equipment, and supplies must move rap-

idly and in sufficient quantities to support combat op-erations. Tactical actions require timely concentra-tion of units and materiel and often demand short-no-tice movement of large forces and major shifts in di-rection of movement. Automated systems provide in-transit visibility. At the tactical level, units, supplies,and important facilities move as battles progress toensure responsive support of committed units as largeas corps. While moving, CSS units must protect them-selves and provide logistical support to combat units.Planning, controlling, and executing transportationoperations require detailed preparation and extensivetraining of CSS staffs and units. The complicatingeffects of terrain, weather, and enemy interdiction de-mand well-planned engineer support and great flex-ibility of transportation planners and operators.

SUSTAINING SOLDIERSAND THEIR SYSTEMS

The five elements to sustaining soldiers and theirsystems are personnel services, health services, fieldservices, quality of life, and general supply support.

Personnel Service SupportPersonnel service support is the management and

execution of personnel services; resource management;finance services; chaplaincy activities; command in-formation services; and legal service support. Soldiersare reassured by concerned, positive leadership and apersonnel system that ensures care for them while theyperform their missions.

Health Service SupportThe HSS system provides flexibile, versatile, and

fully modernized HSS units to support the rapid de-ployment of a CONUS-based, force-projection army.The medical force will assure a medical presence withthe soldier and, at the same time, provide state-of-the-art medical and surgical treatment and evacuation, lim-ited only by the operational environment. This sup-port will ensure that battlefield casualties are treatedand evacuated quickly.

The HSS system is a continuum of health care from

the forward line of own troops through the CONUSsustaining base. It is a system designed to providecontinuous medical management of patients through-out the differing levels of care and evacuation. Themedical challenge is to provide HSS simultaneouslyto the CONUS base and to establish an HSS systemwithin the theater that provides requisite care and sup-port to soldiers, including progressive treatment andevacuation. An additional requirement exists to pro-vide HSS to redeployment and demobilization opera-tions at the conclusion of military operations. Further-more, HSS requirements will surface in support of op-erations other than war. Typical operations includedisaster relief, nation assistance, support to domesticcivil authorities, and peacekeeping activities.

HSS is based on far-forward surgical and medicaltreatment to sustain the health of the force and treatlife-threatening injuries; standardized medical unitsusing a modular medical support system throughoutthe division, corps, and COMMZ areas; standardizedair and ground medical evacuation units, using airevacuation as the primary means of medical evacua-tion; flexible and responsive hospitals designed andstructured with medical modules to allow for strategicdeployment; and enhanced ancillary and functionalsupport systems using advanced state-of-the-art tech-nology.

Field Service SupportField services consist of food preparation, water

purification, bakery, clothing and light textile repair,laundry and shower, parachute packing, air item main-tenance, rigging supplies and equipment for airdrop,and mortuary affairs. Technological advances haveimproved the quality of field service support to thesoldier from tactical showers to improved food ser-vice support from modular field kitchens. Provisionof these basics is essential for the maintenance of sol-dier health, morale, and welfare.

Quality of LifeEnsuring quality of life is a command responsi-

bility. Quality of life and family considerations affectevery soldier’s readiness and willingness to fight.Effective personnel services, health services, and fieldservices ease immediate soldier concerns. The sol-dier who fights best is the one who is reassured thathis loved

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ones are adequately cared for at the home station, es-pecially when units deploy from forward-presence lo-cations. The family supports the soldier best when itis assured that the soldier is appropriately cared for.Accurate and timely delivery of mail enhances thequality of life of the soldier in the field. Commandinformation provided to family members must be astimely and accurate as possible, especially in an ageof instant communications where a soldier’s friend maybe sharing news about a loved one in almost real time.A direct relationship exists between adequate, well-thought-out soldier and family quality of life programs,soldier morale, and combat effectiveness.

General Supply SupportGeneral supply support encompasses the provi-

sion of clothing, water, barrier material, and major enditems in support of the force. These classes of supplyinclude all the systems that support the soldier. Thequality and acceptability of rations, clothing, and sun-dry packages are critical in sustaining the morale ofsoldiers, enhancing their ability to perform effectively.

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The Army’s primary focus is to fight and win thenation’s wars. However, Army forces and soldiersoperate around the world in an environment that maynot involve combat. Chapter 2 describes fundamen-tals that apply to all Army operations. This chapterdescribes the principles and tenets associated withArmy operations other than war.

THE ENVIRONMENTIn preparing to fight the nation’s wars, the Army

develops the leadership, organizations, equipment, dis-cipline, and skills for a variety of operations otherthan war. Doctrine for war complements that for op-erations other than war. Though modified to accom-modate different situations, some of the same prin-ciples apply to both environments.

Properly applied to the situation at hand, these prin-ciples balance the Army’s response to challenges andconfrontations in situations other than war. They en-sure that the efforts of Army forces are effective andproportional to the task at hand.

Army forces have participated in operations otherthan war in support of national interests throughout itshistory. They have protected citizens at the edge ofthe frontiers of an expanding America; built roads,bridges, and canals; assisted nations abroad; and servedour nation in a variety of other missions.

Thus, operations other than war are not new to theArmy. Their pace, frequency, and variety, however,have quickened in the last three decades. Today, theArmy is often required, in its role as a strategic force,to protect and further the interests of the United Statesat home and abroad in a variety of ways other thanwar.

Army forces face complex and sensitive situationsin a variety of operations. These range from supportto US, state, and local governments, disaster relief,nation assistance, and drug interdiction to peacekeep-ing, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies,noncombatant evacuation, and peace enforcement.

Operations other than war often are of long dura-tion and undergo a number of shifts in direction dur-ing their course. Immediate solutions to difficult prob-lems may not be obvious or may jeopardize long-termobjectives. Peacekeeping, for example, demands thatthe peacekeeping force maintain strict neutrality. Oneor more of the belligerents may attempt to provoke aresponse from peacekeeping forces that could under-mine long-term peacekeeping efforts. Certain militaryresponses to civil disturbance may solve the immedi-ate crisis but subvert the legitimacy of local authori-ties and cause further civil unrest. Humanitarian reliefand

CHAPTER 13

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

CONTENTS

THE ENVIRONMENT .................................. 13-0

THE PRINCIPLES ....................................... 13-3Objective.............................................. 13-4Unity of Effort ...................................... 13-4Ligitimacy ............................................ 13-4Perserverance ..................................... 13-4Restraint .............................................. 13-4Security ................................................ 13-4

THE ACTIVITIES ......................................... 13-5Noncombatant Evacuation Operations ....................................... 13-5Arms Control ....................................... 13-5Support to Domestic Civil Authorities ............................... 13-5Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief ................................. 13-5Security Assistance............................ 13-5Nation Assistance............................... 13-6Support to Counterdrug Operaions .. 13-6Combatting Terrorism ........................ 13-7Peacekeeping Operaions ................... 13-6Peace Enforcement ............................ 13-7Show of Force ..................................... 13-7Support for Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies ...................... 13-8Attacks and Raids............................... 13-8

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nation assistance should not promote dependency onaid from outside sources. Quick, efficient action byUS forces that resolves an immediate issue withoutconsidering the long-term consequences and goals maypromote instability. In operations other than war, vic-tory comes more subtly than in war. Disciplined forces,measured responses, and patience are essential to suc-cessful outcomes.

Operations other than war may precede and/or fol-low war or occur simultaneously with war in the sametheater. They may be conducted in conjunction withwartime operations to complement the achievementof strategic objectives. They may support a combat-ant commander’s forward-presence operations or a USambassador’s country plan. They may occur in theUnited States. They are designed to promote regionalstability, maintain or achieve democratic end states,retain US influence and access abroad, provide hu-mane assistance to distressed areas, protect US inter-ests, and assist US civil authorities. The NCA em-ploys Army forces to such ends in support of US Na-tional Military Strategy. Such employment serves topreserve and promote American democratic valuespeacefully, minimizing the need for combat operationsby defusing crises and nurturing peaceful resolutionof contentious issues.

The Army conducts such operations as part of ajoint team and often in conjunction with other US andforeign government agencies. Operations other than

war are intrinsic to a combatant commander’s peace-time theater strategy, an ambassador’s country plan,or civil assistance at home. Army soldiers serve dailyin this capacity: engineers help host nations build roadsand improve infrastructures; MPs assist in the restora-tion of civil order; medics provide inoculations andadvice for preventing disease; mobile training teamsenhance local militaries’ expertise in securing theirnations’ interests. Operations in this environment canpresent a special leadership challenge since the activi-ties of relatively small units can have operational—and even strategic¡impact. The entire Army—active,reserve, and civilian components—is involved dailyin operations other than war.

The United States seeks to further regional stabil-ity and peace through the effective integration of allelements of national power. The Department of Statewill often be the lead agency and the ambassador thekey individual in this process. Other agencies such asthe Drug Enforcement Admini-stration, Central Intel-ligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Agencyfor International Development, Department of Justice,Environmental Protection Agency, Department ofAgriculture, and Department of Commerce, amongothers, contribute to these activities.

Combatant commanders integrate activities into the-ater - and country -specific plans in order to achieveregional or national objectives. As in wartime opera-tions, they define desired objectives that would

Historical Persepctive

Hurricane Andrew swept ashore near Miami, Florida, during the early morning hours of 23 August 1992.Its 140 mile-an-hour winds and torrential rains left a wide swath of destruction and killed several people.Entire suburbs were in ruin and hundreds of thousands of people were without shelter, power, and drink-ing water.

More than 17,000 active component soldiers and nearly 7,000 from the USAR and National Guard—along with other uniformed servicemen and women - supported state and local authorities, the AmericanRed Cross, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief operations. TheArmy Corps of Engineers, as well as other Army units and soldiers, provided food, shelter, and medicalassistance; cleared debris; moved furniture; provided construction materials; and helped elderly citi-zens. Constant coordination with civilian authorities enabled commanders to provide responsive andappropriate support during this emergency.

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signify victory. These may be open-ended objectivessuch as the continued prevention of hostilities in peace-keeping operations, or they may be specific such asthe reopening of public schools on a target date fol-lowing a national disaster.

Theater assessments that incorporate informationand intelligence from a variety of sources form thebasis for theater planning. Peacetime operations relyheavily on cultural orientations and regional exper-tise. A diverse group of forces—military units, inter-national and national relief groups, police and fire de-partments, local governmental agencies, and others—integrate their efforts and cooperate to achieve spe-cific objectives. Other military and nonmilitary head-quarters develop supporting plans, allocate resources,and provide services to assist committed forces. Theentire effort is brought together in an overarching cam-paign plan that synchronizes each agency’s effort withothers to achieve the desired end state.

Operations other than war will not always bepeaceful actions. Determined opponents may resort tofighting or other aggressive acts in an attempt to de-feat our purposes and promote theirs. While all mili-tary forces have an intrinsic right of self-defense, theuse of overwhelming force may complicate the pro-

cess toward the Army’s stated objectives. As a result,operational commanders may find themselves operat-ing under restrictive ROE.

The operations other than war environment is acomplex one that will require disciplined, versatileArmy forces to respond to different situations, includ-ing transitioning rapidly from operations other thanwar to wartime operations. Counterdrug operations,for example, may move through various activities, be-ginning with education and training and eventually in-cluding interdiction and direct action. Drug dealers,in turn, may resort to propaganda and legal protectionactivities and outright armed combat that employs sig-nificant firepower. While the dividing line betweenthe two may not always be clear, commanders seek-ing to retain the initiative should plan for combat op-erations as a branch or sequel to the overall campaignplan.

In the turbulent period immediately following theend of combat operations, a number of units will berequired to transition to operations other than war.Pending the reestablishment of a civilian infrastruc-ture, military forces may be in the best position to con-duct refugee control, to reestablish civil order and pub-lic services, and to provide health assistance and otherpostconflict activities. While military forces will


In late November 1989, conditions in El Salvador intensified when the Farabundo Marti National Lib-eration Front (FMLN), a communist front organization, launched a major offensive. It involved country-wide attacks against the El Salvadorian Armed Forces (ESAF). The FMLN used newly acquired SA-7surface-to-air missiles against ESAF aircraft. This early FMLN success impacted immediately on theESAF. The balance and momentum could have shifted in favor of the FMLN.

USSOUTHCOM responded rapidly to restore ESAF initiative by coordinating an interagency responsehelpful to the military balance. ESAF received additional small arms and ammunition. The continutedresolve of the ESAF was due in part to this responsive US support. This type of support continued throughthe following summer, allowing the ESAF to maintain a high tempo of operations. This period of sus-tained, hard-hitting operations kept the FMLN on the defensive, while reacquiring lost territory. It alsofacilitated the ability of the government of El Salvador in peace negotiations. The signing of a peacetreaty between the FMLN and the government on 16 January 1992 was the end result.

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initially be heavily involved in providing these ser-vices, as civil government is reestablished and the mili-tary threat wanes, civilian agencies will be expectedto assume these activities.

The Army’s presence and its ability to operate incrisis environments and under extreme conditions maygive it the de facto lead in operations normally gov-erned by other agencies. In this environment Armyforces must work competently, while properly subor-dinating military forces to the agency in charge. Plan-ning and conducting postconflict activities requires avariety of perspectives, expertise, cooperation, andassistance from governmental agencies, other services,and alliance or coalition partners.

THE PRINCIPLESArmy warfighting doctrine has long been based

on well-established principles of war that have with-stood the tests of time and experience and remainembedded in our doctrine. Operations other than waralso have principles that guide our actions. For thoseoperations other than war that involve our forces indirect combat, the principles of war apply. Some, suchas the principles of objective and security, apply equallyto noncombat operations. Unity of command requires

modification as described below. The Army mustsupplement these three with principles more suited tothe noncombat operations that comprise most opera-tions other than war. While these principles are notimmutable, they serve as guides for action.

The relative application of each principle will varydepending on the specific operation. The principle ofperseverance, for example, will impact more duringlong-term nation assistance and counterdrug operationsthan during a short-term noncombatant evacuation mis-sion. Commanders must balance these principlesagainst the specific requirements of their mission andthe nature of the operation.

OBJECTIVEDirect every military operation toward a clearly

defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

This principle of war applies also to operationsother than war. Each separate operation must be inte-grated with every other to contribute to the ultimatestrategic aim. Leaders of disparate units, military andotherwise, must understand the strategic aims, set ap-propriate objectives, and ensure that they contributeto unity of effort with other agencies.


On 5 April 1991, President Bush announced the beginning of a relief operation in the area of northernIraq. The US responded immediately. By 7 April, US aircraft from Europe dropped relief supplies overthe Iraqi border. More than 6,000 soldiers from units which had just participated in Operation DesertStorm eventually redepolyed to Turkey and northern Iraq in support of Operation Provide Comfort.

During the next four months, Army forces demonstrated agility, versatifity, and deployability during op-erations other than war. Missions included providing supplies to refugee camps, construction, medicalassistance, refugee control, PSYOP, and CA. Operation Provide Comfort was a joint and combinedoperation execurted with no formal agreements between participating agencies and countries. It exhib-ited the unity of effort essential to operations of this nature.

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UNITY OF EFFORTSeek unity of effort toward every objective.

The principle of unity of command in war alsoapplies to operations other than war, yet can be adaptedto meet special challenges. Our military commandstructure is suited to achieve unity of command andeffort in war. However, in operations other than war,this may be more difficult to attain. In such opera-tions, other government agencies will often have thelead. Commanders may answer to a civilian chief,such as an ambassador, or may themselves employ theresources of a civilian agency. Command arrangementsmay often be only loosely defined, causing command-ers to seek an atmosphere of cooperation rather thancommand authority to achieve objectives by unity ofeffort. Military commanders consider how their ac-tions contribute to initiatives that are also political,economic, and psychological in nature.

LEGITIMACYSustain the willing acceptance by the people of

the right of the government to govern or of a group oragency to make and carry out decisions.

Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy ofthe operation and of the host government. Legitimacyderives from the perception that constituted authorityis both genuine and effective and employs appropriatemeans for reasonable purposes. If committed forcessolve an immediate problem within a nation or regionbut detract from the legitimacy of the government inso doing, they may have acted detrimentally againstlong-term, strategic aims.

PERSEVERANCEPrepare for the measured, protracted application

of military capability in support of strategic aims.

Operations other than war may be of short dura-tion or protracted. Peacetime operations may requireyears to achieve the desired effects. Underlying causesof confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear be-ginning or a decisive resolution. Commanders mustassess quick contingency response options against theircontribution to long-term, strategic objectives. Thisdoes not preclude decisive military action but doesrequire careful, informed analysis to choose the righttime and place for such action. Commanders balancetheir desire to attain objectives quickly with a sensi-tivity for the long-term strategic aims and the restraintsplaced on operations.

RESTRAINTApply appropriate military capability prudently.

The actions of soldiers and units are framed bythe disciplined application of force, including specificROE. In operations other than war, these ROE will bemore restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to politicalconcerns than in war. Moreover, these rules maychange frequently. Restraints on weaponry, tactics,and levels of violence characterize the environment.The use of excessive force could adversely affect ef-forts to gain legitimacy and impede the attainment ofboth short-and long-term goals. Transmission of andassured understanding of ROE throughout the totalityof units requires follow-through, rehearsals with situ-ations to check understanding and compliance, andcontinuing brief-backs. Soldiers who thoroughly un-derstand ROE are better prepared to act with initiativeand defend themselves and members of their unit.

SECURITYNever permit hostile factions to acquire an unex-

pected advantage.

The presence of US forces in nations around theworld may provoke a wide range of responses by fac-tions, groups, or forces of an unfriendly nation. Re-gardless of the mission, commanders must protect theirforces at all times. They must be ready to counteractivity that could bring harm to their units or jeopar-dize their mission. They should never be lulled intobelieving that the nonhostile intent of their missiondoes not put their forces at risk. Inherent in this re-sponsibility is the need to be capable of rapid transi-tion from a peaceful to a combat posture, should theneed arise. Commanders should never be misled aboutthe risks to their forces. The intrinsic right of self-de-fense always applies.

THE ACTIVITIESOperations other than war include, but are not lim-

ited to, the following. Note that not all of these activi-ties require the use of force.

NONCOMBATANTEVACUATION OPERATIONS

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) re-locate threatened civilian noncombatants from loca-tions in a foreign country or host nation. These opera-tions may involve US citizens whose lives are in dan-ger but could include selected host nation citizens orthird

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country nationals. NEOs occur in a peaceful, orderlyfashion or may require force. Army forces may con-duct NEOs under the combatant commander in theenvironments of conflict or war.

ARMS CONTROLArms control focuses on promoting strategic mili-

tary stability. It encompasses any plan, arrangement,or process controlling the numbers, types, and perfor-mance characteristics of weapons systems. This ex-tends not only to weapons themselves but also to C2,logistics support, and intelligence-gathering mecha-nisms. Selected Army units provide assistance inmonitoring the proliferation of weapons and technol-ogy, in verifying the status of arms control agreements,and in demilitarizing munitions and hardware.

SUPPORT TO DOMESTICCIVIL AUTHORITIES

When appropriate governmental authority directsthe armed forces to assist in domestic emergencieswithin CONUS, the Army has primary responsibility.Army units support disaster relief, humanitarian as-sistance, and similar operations.

Federal law also authorizes the domestic use ofmilitary force to suppress domestic violence or insur-rection. The Constitution and federal law, however,restrict its use in this manner. Under the provisions ofthe Posse Comitatus Act, neither the active compo-nent nor the US Army Reserve may execute the law inthe place of duly appointed law-enforcement meanswithout specific presidential or congressional approvaland direction. However, the Posse Comitatus Act doesnot apply to National Guard Title 32 soldiers until fed-eralized. See FM 100-19.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCEAND DISASTER RELIEF

Humanitarian assistance operationsuse DOD personnel, equipment, and supplies to pro-mote human welfare, to reduce pain and suffering, toprevent loss of life or destruction of property from theaftermath of natural or man-made disasters. In somecircumstances, humanitarian assistance may includemedical, dental, and veterinary care to rural areas of acountry; construction of rudimentary surface transpor-tation systems; well-drilling and construction of basicsanitation facilities; and rudimentary construction andrepair of public facilities.

Disaster relief operations fall within the overallcontext of humanitarian assistance. They are conductedin emergency situations to prevent loss of life and prop-erty. Such operations may be in the form of immedi-ate and automatic response by US military command-ers or in response to domestic or foreign governmentsor international agencies. Army elements involved ininternational disaster relief operations are often respon-sible for supporting the implementation of assistanceprograms developed by the Office of Foreign DisasterAssistance within the Department of State. The coor-dination of federal response to domestic disaster re-lief efforts are generally under the direction of FEMA,although immediate response is permitted to preventloss of life and property. The Army’s global reach, itsability to deploy rapidly, and its capability to operatein the most austere environments make it ideally suitedfor these missions.

The Army can provide logistics support to movesupplies to remote areas, extract or evacuate victims,establish emergency communications, conduct directmedical support operations, and render emergencyrepairs to vital facilities. The Army can also providemanpower for civil relief, or it can assist civil authori-ties with public safety.

SECURITY ASSISTANCESecurity assistance consists of the groups of pro-

grams authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961(amended), the Arms Export Act of 1976 (amended),and other related statutes. Through security assistanceprograms, the United States provides defense mate-riel, military training, and defense-related services bygrant, loan, credit, or cash sales to further its nationalpolicies and objectives. A predominant interface ofthe US Army with host nations occurs through theSecurity Assistance Training Program (SATP). Thisprogram has two primary subcomponents—the Inter-national Military Education and Training Program(IMETP) and the Foreign Military Sales Program(FMSP).

The IMETP is designed to enhance the proficiency,professional performance, and readiness of foreignarmed forces. The US conducts international educa-tion and training in CONUS as well as in the host na-tion. This typically takes the form of formal courses,orientation tours, and on-the-job training.

The FMSP allows designated governments to pur-chase military equipment, services, and training from

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the US. The sale of defense items may require train-ing on the operation and maintenance of military equip-ment. Mobile training teams, resident instruction inUS Army schools, and similar methods are used toconduct this training. The FMSP differs from theIMETP in that the recipient pays for equipment, ser-vices, and training.

Occasionally situations require accelerated secu-rity assistance when allied or friendly nations face animminent threat. During these surges of increased as-sistance, operations focus on logistical support but mayrequire more forceful measures.

NATION ASSISTANCENation assistance supports a host nation’s efforts

to promote development, ideally through the use ofhost nation resources. In United Nations terms, na-tion assistance equates to peace-building operations.The interagency orchestration of all the elements ofnational power is essential for success. It supports theambassador’s country plan and the CINC’s regionalplans. The goals of nation assistance are to promotelong-term stability, to develop sound and responsivedemocratic institutions, to develop supportive infra-structures, to promote strong free-market economies,and to provide an environment that allows for orderlypolitical change and economic progress. These goalscan only be accomplished through education and thetransfer of essential skills to the host nation.

SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUGOPERATIONS

Military efforts principally support law enforce-ment agencies, the counterdrug efforts of other USagencies, the states, and cooperating foreign govern-ments to interdict the flow of illegal drugs at the source,in transit, and during distribution.

Support to host nations includes assistance to theirforces to destroy drug production facilities; collabo-ration with host nation armed forces to prevent exportof illegal drugs; and nation assistance to help developeconomic alternatives to production, exportation, anddistribution of drugs. Support to interdiction effortscenters on monitoring and detecting illegal drugs intransit as well as integrating C3I systems. US forcesmay well assist host nation forces at war while theyare in an operations-other-than-war posture.

Support for domestic counterdrug operations in-cludes military planning and training assistance for do-mestic law enforcement agencies, National Guard par-ticipation, equipment loans and transfers, use of mili-tary facilities, and other assistance as requested andauthorized. This support may expand as national policyand legal prohibitions evolve.

COMBATTING TERRORISMThe Department of State is the lead US agency in

combatting terrorism overseas or on the high seas; theDepartment of Justice (the Federal Bureau of


A humanitarian assistance operation conducted by a US Army CA unit in the Republic of Cameroon inAfrica provided relief to a nation devastated by disease. In 1989, the US Embassy and the Ministry ofPublic Health in Cameroon proposed a campaign to inoculate citizens against meningitis, a disease tharavages that tropical country each year during the dry season. The embassy defense attached office(DAO) contacted USEUCOM and plans were drawn to support a humanitarian assistnace exercise inconjunction with CA support. In February 1991, a medical team from the 353d Civil Affairs Command,working in conjunction with the host nation, inoculated more than 58,000 people against menigitis andtreated an additional 1,700 people for other ailments. This exercise not only accomplished its humanitar-ian goals but also provided an opportunity for the unit to train and use its language skills. At the sametime, it enhanced the image of the United States with a grateful country.

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Investigation) has this responsibility within the US.The Department of Transportation (Federal AviationAdministration) combats terrorism related to aircraftin flight within the territories of the US. The Depart-ment of Defense supports each of these agencies inthese activities.

Combatting terrorism has two major compo-nents—antiterrorism and counterterrorism. Duringpeacetime, the Army combats terrorism primarilythrough antiterrorism, which is those passive defen-sive measures taken to minimize vulnerability to ter-rorism. Antiterrorism is a form of force protectionand, thus, the responsibility of Army commanders atall levels. Antiterrorism complementscounterterrorism, which is the full range of offensivemeasures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to ter-rorism. Army elements, such as SOF, assist in this in-teragency effort by applying specialized capabilitiesto preclude, preempt, and resolve terrorist incidentsabroad. Counterterrorism occurs in conflict and war;antiterrorism occurs across the range of military op-erations.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONSPeacekeeping operations support diplomatic ef-

forts to maintain peace in areas of potential conflict.They stabilize conflict between two belligerent nationsand, as such, require the consent of all parties involvedin the dispute. The US may participate in peacekeep-ing operations unilaterally or when requested by theUN, with a regional affiliation of nations, or with otherunaffiliated countries. US personnel may function asimpartial observers, as part of an international peace-keeping force, or in a supervisory and assistance role.

Peacekeeping often involves ambiguous situationsrequiring the peacekeeping force to deal with extremetension and violence without becoming a participant.These operations follow diplomatic negotiations thatestablish the mandate for the peacekeeping force. Themandate describes the scope of the peacekeeping op-eration. Typically, it determines the size and type offorce each participating nation will contribute. It alsospecifies the terms or conditions the host nation in-tends to impose on the presence of the force or mis-sion, and it specifies a clear statement of the functionsthe peacekeeping force is to perform.

The peacekeeping force deters violent acts by itsphysical presence at violence-prone locations. It col-lects information through means such as observationposts, patrols, and aerial reconnaissance.

PEACE ENFORCEMENTPeace enforcement operations are military inter-

vention operations in support of diplomatic efforts torestore peace or to establish the conditions for a peace-keeping force between hostile factions that may notbe consenting to intervention and may be engaged incombat activities. Peace enforcement implies the useof force or its threat to coerce hostile factions to ceaseand desist from violent actions. Units conducting peaceenforcement, therefore, cannot maintain their objec-tive neutrality in every instance. They must be pre-pared to apply elements of combat power to restoreorder, to separate warring factions, and to return theenvironment to conditions more conducive to civilorder and discipline.

SHOW OF FORCEA show of force is a mission carried out to dem-

onstrate US resolve in which US forces deploy to de-fuse a situation that may be detrimental to US inter-ests or national objectives. Shows of force lend cred-ibility to the nation’s commitments, increase regionalinfluence, and demonstrate resolve. These operationscan influence other governments or politico-militaryorganizations to respect US interests and internationallaw. They can take the form of combined trainingexercises, rehearsals, forward deployment of militaryforces, or introduction and buildup of military forcesin a region. The appearance of a credible military forcecan underscore national policy interests and commit-ment, improve host nation military readiness and mo-rale, and provide an insight into US values.

SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIESAND COUNTERINSURGENCIES

At the direction of the NCA, US military forcesassist either insurgent movements or host nation gov-ernments opposing an insurgency. In both instances,the military instrument of US national power predomi-nantly supports political, economic, and informationalo b j e c t i v e s .

The US uses its military resources to provide sup-port to a host nation’s counterinsurgency operationsin the context of foreign internal defense (FID) throughlogistical and training support. FID is the participa-tion by civilian and military agencies in any of theaction programs another government takes to free andprotect its society from subversion, lawlessness, andinsurgency. The US ambassador, through the countryteam, provides the focal point for interagency coordi-nation

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and supervision of FID. Military support to FID isprovided through the unified CINC.

The US supports selected insurgencies opposingoppressive regimes that work against US interests. Thefeasibility of effective support and the compatibilityof US and insurgent interests are major considerations.Because support for insurgencies is often covert, SOFis frequently involved. Due to their extensive uncon-ventional warfare training, SOF are well-suited to pro-vide this support. General-purpose forces may alsobe called upon when the situation requires their par-ticular specialties or when the scope of operations isso vast that conventional forces are required.

ATTACKS AND RAIDSThe Army conducts attacks and raids to create situ-

ations that permit seizing and maintaining political andmilitary initiative. Normally, the US executes attacksand raids to achieve specific objectives other than gain-ing or holding terrain. Attacks by

conventional ground, air, or special operations forces,acting independently or in concert, are used to dam-age or destroy high-value targets or to demonstrateUS capability and resolve to achieve a favorable re-sult. Raids are usually small-scale operations involv-ing swift penetration of hostile territory to secure in-formation, temporarily seize an objective, or destroya target. Raids are followed by a rapid, preplannedwithdrawal. These operations also occur in war. Asin all operations, to conduct successful attacks andraids, commanders must conduct successful reconnais-sance, consider the factors of METT-T, conduct de-liberate planning, rehearse, and follow up with swift,violent execution.

The Army organizes, trains, and equips to fightand win the nation’s wars. This remains its primarymission. The leadership, organization, equipment, dis-cipline, and skills gained in training for war are alsoof use to the government in operations other than war.

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to achieve decisive results at minimum cost to sol-diers and materiel. Understanding the total environ-ment and its potential impact on combat is essential tosuccessful planning and execution.

THE HUMAN DIMENSIONSoldiers are central to Army doctrine. They are

the foundation of the Army’s will to win. Their spirit,initiative, intelligence, discipline, courage, and com-petence comprise the basic building blocks of a victo-rious Army. The combination of quality soldiers withprofessional, caring, and competent leaders in versa-tile, cohesive units presents an indomitable force onthe battlefield.

Leaders have special challenges and responsibili-ties in regard to soldiers. They successfully lead themthrough danger, mold and protect their spirit, and chan-nel their energies toward mission accomplishment.Leaders consider the physiological, psychological, andethical challenges soldiers will face, providing themthe proper training and leadership that give them thewill to fight. They build units and teams that have thecourage to overcome odds to accomplish the missionand the determination to press on to victory.

The geopolitical and social realities of the mod-ern world often obscure the reasons for following aparticular course of action to achieve national goals.Leaders

CHAPTER 14

THE ENVIRONMENT OF COMBAT

Warfare presents a challenging environment to anymilitary organization and its soldiers. In a force-pro-jection army, soldiers and units must remain trainedand ready for rapid deployment anywhere in the world.The environment will often be harsh. Extreme tem-peratures, rugged terrain, fear, uncertainty, confusion,exertion, and fatigue will take their toll. Poorly trainedsoldiers and units succumb to the hostilities of the en-vironment, withdraw inside themselves, and perma-nently surrender the initiative. Conversely, soldiersand units that are prepared to cope with a tough envi-ronment take a giant step toward victory.

The environment of combat combines human andphysical dimensions. Soldiers, the first dimension, arethe centerpiece of the Army’s doctrine and warfightingability. Their training, initiative, resilience, and un-derstanding of the demands put on them are key tosuccess on the battlefield.

Their physiological and psychological limitationsmake them the most vulnerable part of the warfightingsystem. Their character-¡as individuals and as mem-bers of their units¡makes them the most valuable. Theirspirit and perseverance, their will to win, their dedica-tion to the cause and their devotion to fellow soldiersand their unit are distinctly human elements that canmake the difference between victory and defeat.

The second dimension of this environment isphysical. In accordance with the US National Mili-tary Strategy, US Army forces must be prepared tofight and win on short notice anywhere in the world,from blistering deserts to frigid wastelands, in rainforests, tundra, mountains, jungles and swamps, ur-ban sprawl, and all types of terrain in between. Com-bat operations occur day and night, for weeks ormonths on end, among friendly or hostile populations,and in areas infested with blight, disease, and epidem-ics.

Mastering environmental dimensions is vital tosurvival on the battlefield. Operational and tacticalcommanders lead their organizations to overcome andtake advantage of dimensions. Only then can they hope

CONTENTS

THE HUMAN DIMENSION .......................... 14-1The Physiological Perspective .......... 14-2The Psychological Perspective ......... 14-2The Ethical Perspective ..................... 14-2

THE PHYSICAL DIMENSION ..................... 14-3Geography ........................................... 14-3Terrain .................................................. 14-4Weather ................................................ 14-4Infrastructure ...................................... 14-5

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must ensure they and their soldiers clearly understandwhy their nation is engaged in a particular course ofaction and how it is essential for protecting America’svital national interests. When soldiers understand whyAmerican forces have been committed, they followtheir leaders and risk their lives to accomplish the mis-sion despite all odds.

THE PHYSIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVEPhysically unfit or unhealthy soldiers do not with-

stand the rigors of combat well. Hardened soldiers,kept healthy and reasonably rested, can persevere un-der harsh conditions. Commanders ensure their sol-diers’ fitness and enhance their self-confidence throughtough, realistic training, provision of proper uniformsand equipment, disciplined hygiene and health prac-tices, enforced rest plans, and intelligent assignmentof operational missions.

Soldiers are capable of withstanding a great dealof physical exertion, but they must be cared for. Com-manders may find it necessary to drive their soldiershard, but they must not abuse them.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVEThe harsh environment of combat is likely to have

a greater effect on the soldier’s mind than on his body.Since the mind directly affects the soldier’s will to win,it must be prepared to accept the stress of combat.

Combatants no longer deploy or defend in theranks, files, and echelons of the nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries. Distance from fellow soldiers canheighten fear and a sense of abandonment on the mod-ern battlefield. The threat of chemical and biologicalweapons compounds psychological challenges becauseof the debilitating protective measures that have to betaken to conduct operations and survive. Lonelinessand fear on the battlefield increase the fog of war. Theycan be overcome by effective training, unit cohesion,and a sense of leadership so imbued in the membersof a unit that each soldier, in turn, is prepared to stepforward and give direction toward mission accomplish-ment.

In battle it can also be overcome by unit chatter,soldiers talking to each other and constantly reinforc-ing other members of the team. New or replacementsoldiers must be quickly made to feel part of the teamand not isolated. Mutual trust, confidence, self-respect,and a strong sense of teamwork are elements that builda cohesive combat unit. FM 22-102 outlines methods

to create an effective, combat-ready soldier team.

Psychiatric casualties decrease when morale, unitcohesion, leadership, and training are strong. Theleader is the key. He must develop realistic, toughtraining programs that promote individual confidenceand unit capabilities. At the same time, he must in-spire in his soldiers the confidence that he will do ev-erything in his power to protect them as the unit drivestoward its objective. Leaders must understand theconditions that can lead to battlefield stress and dealwith them quickly and effectively. A well-led, disci-plined, and mentally conditioned soldier can overcomeextremes of hardship and uncertainty.

THE ETHICAL PERSPECTIVEThe nation expects its Army to adhere to the high-

est standards of professional conduct and to reflectthe ideals of American values. The American peopledemand a high-quality Army that honors the core val-ues of the Constitution it is sworn to uphold—a strongrespect for the rule of law, human dignity, and indi-vidual rights.

Despite the difficult environments in which Armyforces operate, soldiers are expected to obey the lawsof land warfare, to protect civilians and other noncom-batants, to limit collateral damage, to respect privateproperty, and to treat EPWs with dignity. Amid therigors of combat, the integrity of every soldier—fromthe highest to the lowest ranks—is of paramount im-portance. Since lives hinge on accurate reporting, therecan be no room for half-truths or falsehoods. Soldiersmust be counted on to do what is right even when noone is watching.

Leaders have a special responsibility to subordi-nates. They must never risk their soldiers’ lives need-lessly. They return their soldiers’ trust with the great-est care for their well-being, while aggressively pur-suing the accomplishment of the mission. Leaders treatsubordinates with respect; never do they seek self-gainat the expense of their soldiers or their subordinatecommanders. Leaders imbue soldiers with a sense ofhonor, share their hardships, and acknowledge theiraccomplishments. Leaders set the example by ethicalbehavior and a selflessness that puts duty above allpersonal concerns.

The human dimension of war will be decisive inthe campaigns and battles of the future, just as in thepast. In this difficult environment, soldiers must havefaith

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in their leaders and fellow soldiers. Trust is the basicbond of leadership. Good leaders occupy a positionof special trust and confidence in the eyes of their sol-diers. A motivated soldier in the hands of a compe-tent leader, loyal to and supported by his fellow sol-diers, can accomplish the most difficult of missions.

Wars are fought and won by soldiers, not machines.The human dimension of war will be decisive in thecampaigns and battles of the future, just as in the past.Soldiers are the heart and soul of the Army. Leadersmold them, discipline their efforts, supply them re-sources, and give them direction. But, in the end, it issoldiers who do the job. Ultimately, soldiers makethe difference.

THE PHYSICAL DIMENSIONThe four major physical elements of the environ-

ment of operations are geography, terrain, weather,and infrastructure. These greatly affect Army opera-tions within the physical dimension. They form animportant component of the planning tool—METT-T.The combinations of effects of the physical elementsare infinite. Good commanders have an eye for ground,understand the effects of weather, and can turn a toughenvironment to advantage. They use the IPB processto help them understand the environmental conditionsof the physical dimensions on military operations.

Factors of the physical dimension normally affectthe time required to accomplish a mission. For ex-ample, the time necessary to move a large, armoredforce over dry, open terrain may increase dramaticallyafter a day of heavy rain. Factors such as drainage,soil composition, and vehicle characteristics affectmovement. Infrastructure availability may increaseor decrease time required for operations. A well-es-tablished road net may greatly aid movement towardor away from the enemy but limit lateral movement ifthe roads are built on berms. The physical environ-ment may include operations in an NBC environment,as well as night and limited visibility conditions. Thesedimensions must be considered in operations planning.The net effect may be a decrease in the commander’sability to maneuver against the enemy.

GEOGRAPHYCommanders may operate over many different terraintypes within a single geographic area. The Army mustbe able to operate in any geographic area. Each areapresents a unique set of physical characteristics andrequires a unique set of operational and tactical guide-

lines. A human factor is also associated with geogra-phy. Populations in an area of conflict may directlyaffect the commander’s operations. The will of thepeople, their urbanization and industrial efforts, theiragricultural underpinnings, their social and culturalpredilections, their political leanings, and, from a tac-tical perspective, their physical movement during con-flict, may all impact.

Mountain OperationsLight forces and aviation units can operate more

effectively than heavy forces in mountainous regionsbecause their movement is less limited by the terrain.Effective communications and air operations are im-portant factors in obtaining the advantage in moun-tainous regions. FM 90-6 discusses mountain com-bat.

Jungle OperationsThe features of jungles and swamps combine to

restrict movement, observation, fields of fire, signalsystems, battlefield surveillance, and target acquisi-tion. The use of advanced technology navigation de-vices helps overcome these challenges. Air operationsare very important in the jungle environment. Theyfacilitate troop movement and provide a degree of fire-power not otherwise available due to the shortenedfields of fire and thick vegetation. FM 90-5 discussesjungle warfare.

Desert OperationsAll types of forces can operate in desert environ-

ments. Armored, mechanized, and aviation forces areespecially suitable. The lack of prominent terrain fea-tures complicates land navigation and requires the useof dead reckoning and advanced technology naviga-tion devices. This environment has a debilitating ef-fect on soldiers who are not properly trained and ac-climated. It induces mental fatigue, impaired percep-tion, and possible depression that can overwhelm un-prepared soldiers. The impact on machines can beeven more severe unless commanders establish appro-priate maintenance programs. FM 90-3 discusses com-bat in desert areas.

Cold Weather OperationsThe weather conditions in extremely cold areas

make operations for friendly and enemy forces diffi-cult. Special training is required to acclimate sol-diers. Leaders must ensure that troops and their equip-ment are protected from the physical effects of ex-tremely

OPERATIONS

14-4

low temperatures. FM 90-11 discusses cold weatheroperations.

Urban OperationsUrban operations present unique and complex

challenges to Army forces. Urban operations can oc-cur in any of the geographical environments. Theycan constrain technological advantages; they impacton battle tempo; they force units to fight in small, de-centralized elements; they also create difficult moraldilemmas due to the proximity of large numbers ofcivilians. Commanders must enforce discipline in theiroperations to minimize unnecessary collateral dam-age and civilian casualties. FM 90-10 discusses fight-ing on urbanized terrain.

TERRAINTerrain is not neutral—it either helps or hinders

each of the opposed forces. Commanders must de-velop an eye for terrain; they must recognize its limi-tations and possibilities for protecting friendly forcesand putting the enemy at a disadvantage. Successfulcommanders understand terrain and how it affects op-erations. They are able to grasp the potential capabili-ties and limitations of the space in which they operate.

At each level of war commanders view and evalu-ate terrain differently. At the tactical level, command-ers are concerned with close-in terrain such as hills,rivers, mountains, swamps and marshes, streams, andvalleys. Their perspectives influence the conditions forengagements and battles.

At the operational level, the commander’s analy-sis broadens to major road systems and movement cor-ridors that can accommodate large friendly and en-emy maneuver forces. The operational-level com-mander is also concerned with air corridors for bothfriendly and enemy air and aviation operations.

He considers the opportunities for the movementof large units and the posturing of the force, where hemust disperse, and where he should concentrate hisforces. He understands where intelligence assets willserve him best and where and when he will begin tooperate in a less clear environment.

At the strategic level, analysis of the terrain en-compasses both tactical and operational considerations,but it broadens to include the considerations associ-ated with the value of occupying or controlling large

amounts of territory (at its larger expansion, terrainbegins to define geography). The strategic-level com-mander considers the constraints and opportunitiesaffecting deployment and supporting the force overthe duration of the campaign. He considers the assetsthat are available to him within his assigned geographicspace and how they help or limit his operations.

Commanders consider terrain from not only theirperspective but also from the enemy’s perspective.They conduct detailed personal reconnaissance wher-ever possible. Sources of terrain intelligence include,but are not limited to, military and civilian topographicstudies, civilian officials and area residents, EPW, andair, space, and ground reconnaissance units. Com-manders ensure that terrain information gets down tothe level where it can assist in operations planning,

WEATHERWeather conditions affect soldier performance, the

capabilities of equipment to perform at the optimumlevel, and the ability of forces to maneuver on theground and in the air. Commanders pay attention tolocal tactical weather in the ground environment as itmay differ from broader weather patterns in the AO.They also understand the effects of weather patternson future operations and the enemy. The commanderwho can best measure and take advantage of weatherand terrain conditions has a decided advantage overhis opponent. By understanding the effects of weather,seeing the opportunities it offers, and anticipating whenthey will come into play, the commander can set theterms for battle to maximize his performance and takeadvantage of limits on enemy forces. Weather fore-casts must be tailored to the specific operational andtactical environment to assist commanders and staffsto determine effects on the operation. Moreover, dif-ferent weather conditions impact parts of the organi-zation and weapons systems differently.

Weather and terrain information systems providecommanders and their planning staffs with known andforecasted conditions in the air and on the ground.These enable them to plan for conditions before abattle, helping the commander to choose the time,manner, and place of engagement. For example, inadverse weather the effectiveness of long-range, pre-cision-strike weapons with electro-optical sensors andlaser-guided systems becomes severely limited. In suchcases, employment of conventional systems would bemore effective. Technological developments, such as

FM 100-5

14-5

direct, satellite-linked forecasting and observing sys-tems that provide advance knowledge of environmen-tal conditions on the battlefield, can serve as a forcemultiplier.

Training, physical conditioning, and discipline atthe small-unit level remains the most effective way tooffset adverse effects of the weather. Training in poorweather conditions builds confidence and teaches sol-diers and commanders how to adjust to weather ex-tremes. This training should supplement map andweather analysis. Good training can mitigate the ef-fects of weather so that the unit’s combat power in-creases relative to the enemy’s. The commander’sprimary tool for analyzing the effects of terrain andweather is the IPB.

INFRASTRUCTUREInfrastructure consists of the facilities, equipment,

and framework needed for the functioning of a sys-tem, city, or region. The area’s infrastructure impactson the commander’s planning for entering and operat-ing within a theater. Commanders consider not onlythe physical structures but also the cultural, religious,and ethnic customs in the region that affect their use.In considering infrastructure, commanders must ana-lyze its impact upon operations; its impact upon theenemy; how its condition promotes or hinderspostconflict activities; and the extent of indigenouspublic support.

At the strategic level, commanders assess the avail-ability of seaports, airfields, power networks, road andrail networks, communications networks, and naturalfuel reserves. The availability of warehousing, water,and food sources is crucial to plan-

ning. At the operational level, the presence or absenceof an underlying infrastructure framework affects op-erational tempo. Local transportation networks, forexample, can contribute greatly to force movement,maneuver, and logistics. If a combat force has longlines of resupply and cannot rely on existing infra-structures within a country, robust operations are lim-ited. Regeneration of forces is also more difficult inan area of limited infrastructure. Similar consider-ations apply at the tactical level.

In Operation Just Cause, the proximity and utilityof key airfields to both friendly and enemy forces in-fluenced planning for the early hours of fighting. InOperation Desert Shield, the great expanses of terrain,austere landscapes, and limited road nets affected op-erational and logistics planning. In Operation RestoreHope, Army units had to build an infrastructure sincelittle was present in the host country. Extending theuninterrupted flow of units and supplies from the well-developed seaports influenced the tactical, operational,and strategic levels. As these recent operations dem-onstrate, consideration of infrastructure is crucial toboth rapid contingency operations and those of longerduration.

While the physical environment of combat oftenpresents harsh conditions to soldiers, they cannot onlypersevere but can predominate over the environmentand the enemy. A well-led, force-projection army,prepared to go anywhere in the world on short notice,remains trained and ready at all times to meet what-ever conditions present themselves in the environmentof combat.

FM 100-5

Glossary-0

GLOSSARY

ACactive component

ACRarmored cavalry regiment

ADAair defense artillery

AFSOFAir Force special operations forces

agilitythe ability of friendly forces to act faster than the

enemyAI

air interdictionalliance

the result of formal agreements between two ormore nations for broad, long-term objectivesAMC

United States Army Materiel CommandAMOPES

Army Mobilization and Operations Planning andExecution Systemanticipation

the ability to avoid surprise as operations unfold;mental and physical adjustments as a result of moni-toring operations and determining future actionsantiterrorism

defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability ofindividuals and property to terrorismAO

area of operationAOR

area of responsibilityARCENT

Army component to Central Commandarea defense

denying the enemy access to designated terrainfor a specific time to retain ground using a combina-tion of defensive positions and small, mobile reserves

area of operationsgeographical area assigned to an Army commander

by a higher commander—an AO has lateral and rearboundaries which usually define it within a larger jointgeographical areaARFOR

Army forces headquartersArmy force

that force provided by the Army service compo-nent to the joint force commander for the conduct ofjoint operationsArmy service component commander

the commander of the Army component in sup-port of a theater commander, combatant commander,or joiont force commander. The ASCC is responsiblefor preparing, maintaining, training, equipping, admin-istering, and supporting Army forces assigned to uni-fied and specified commands. The ASCC normallyadvises the combatant or subordinate unified com-mander on the proper employment of the forces of theArmy component. The ASCC is normally not a partof the joint force staff.ARSOF

Army special operations forcesASCC

Army service component commander; Army ser-vice component commandASI

all-source intelligenceassured communications

the certainty of priority electronic transmission ca-pability when needed throughout the strategic, opera-tional, and tactical areas of operationsaudacity

bold action in concert with calculation of riskAWACS

airborne warning and control system

b a t t l ea series of related tactical engagements

FM 100-5

Glossary-1

battle commandthe art of battle decision making, leading, and mo-

tivating soldiers and their organizations into action toaccomplish missions. Includes visualizing current stateand future state, then formulating concepts of opera-tions to get from one to the other at least cost. Alsoincludes assigning missions; prioritizing and allocat-ing resources; selecting the critical time and place toact; and knowing how and when to make adjustmentsduring the fight.battle damage assessment

the process of determining the essential tacticalreconstitution requirements for an attrited unit; theprocess of determining the combat effectiveness of theenemy after engagement by friendly forcebattlefield framework

an area of geographical and operational responsi-bility established by the commander; it provides a wayto visualize how he will employ his forces; it helpshim relate his forces to one another and to the enemyin time, space, and purposebattlefield operating systems

the major functions performed by the force on thebattlefield to successfully execute Army operations(battles and engagements) in order to accomplish mili-tary objectives directed by the operational commander;they include maneuver, fire support, air defense, com-mand and control, intelligence, mobility and surviv-ability, and combat service supportbattle space

components determined by the maximum capa-bilities of a unit to acquire and dominate the enemy;includes areas beyond the AO; it varies over time ac-cording to how the commander positions his assets.BDA

battle damage assessmentBDAR

battle damage assessment and repairBOS

battlefield operating systemsbranch

a contingency plan (an option built into the basicplan) for changing the disposition, orientation, or di-rection of movement of the force

C2command and control

C3CMcommand, control, and communications counter-

measures

C3Icommand, control, communications, and intelli-

genceC3IC

coalition, coordination communications, and in-tegration centerCA

civil affairscampaign

a series of related military operations designed toachieve one or more strategic objectives within a giventime and spaceCENTAG

Central Army Group (NATO)center of gravity

the hub of all power and movement upon whicheverything depends; that characteristic, capability, orlocation from which enemy and friendly forces derivetheir freedom of action, physical strength, or the willto fightCINC

commander-in-chiefCJCS

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCJTF

commander, joint task forceclose operations

offensive or defensive operations where forces arein immediate contact with the enemycoalition

an ad hoc agreement between two or more nationsfor a common actionCOCOM

combatant commandcombat service support

the focus of logistics at the tactical level of war;the synchronization of essential functions, activities,and tasks necessary to sustain soldiers and their weaponsystems in an area of operations; includes but is notlimited to that support rendered by service supporttroops to arm, fuel, fix, move, man, and sustain sol-diers and their equipmentcombatant commander

a commander of one of the unified or specifiedcommands established by the President

OPERATIONS

Glossary-2

combatting terrorismactions, including antiterrorism (defensive mea-

sures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts)and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to pre-vent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to opposeterrorism throughout the entire threat spectrumcombined arms

application of several arms, such as infantry, ar-mor, artillery, and aviationcombined operation

an operation conducted by forces of two or moreallied nations acting together for the accomplishmentof a single missioncommander’s intent

a concise expression of the purpose of an opera-tion, a description of the desired end state, and theway in which the posture of that goal facilitates tran-sition to future operationscommunications zone

the rear part of the theater of war or theater ofoperations that contains the lines of communications,theater logistics bases, forward operating bases, andother agencies required for the immediate support andmaintenance of the field forces; extends back to theCONUS baseCOMMZ

communications zoneconcept of logistics support

a verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, ofa commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to thelogistics support to be provided to an operation or cam-paign; always developed concurrently and closely in-tegrated with a companion concept of operationsconflict

the period characterized by confrontation and theneed to engage in hostilities other than to secure stra-tegic objectivesconflict termination

the process and period during which military forcestransition from active combat operations to postconflictactivities and from postconflict activities to redeploy-men tcons t ra in t

limitations placed on the command by a highercommand. Constraints restrict freedom of action forplanning a mission by stating what must be done.CONUS

continental United States

counterat tackan attack with a reserve or lightly committed for-

ward element that is launched after the enemy beginsits attack, after the commander has identified theenemy’s effort, or when a resolute defense creates anassailable enemy flankcounterterror ism

offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and re-spond to terrorismCRC

control and reporting centercrisis response forces

AC and RC CONUS-based units, including for-ward-presence units, trained and configured to deployanywhere in the world, based on the unit’sdeployability postureCS

combat supportCSS

combat service supportculmination

the point in time and space when the attacker’scombat power no longer exceeds that of the defenderor when the defender no longer has the capability todefend successfullyCZ

combat zone; that area required by combat forcesfor the conduct of operations forward of the army reararea boundary

DADepartment of the Army

DAOdefense attache office

decisive forceapplying overwhelming forces to fight and win

quickly with minimum casualtiesdecisive point

a point, usually geographical in nature, that, whenretained, provides a commander with a marked ad-vantage over his opponent. Decisive points could alsoinclude other physical elements such as enemy for-mations, command posts, and communications nodesdeep operations

operations designed in depth to secure advantagesin later engagements, protect the current close fight,and defeat the enemy more rapidly by denying free-dom of action and disrupting or destroying the coher-ence and tempo of its operations

FM 100-5

Glossary-3

deliberate attackfully synchronized operations that employ the ef-

fects of every available asset against the enemy’s de-fensedemobilization

the act of returning the force and materiel to apremobilization posture or to some other approvedposture; also involves returning the mobilized portionof the industrial base to peacetime conditionsdemonstration

a show of force in an area where a decision is notsought, made with the aim of deceiving the enemy asto the true intentions of the attackdeployment

the relocation of forces to desired areas of opera-tions; the movement of forces within areas of opera-tionsdistribution system

that complex of facilities, installations, methods,and procedures designed to receive, store, maintain,distribute, and control the flow of military materielbetween the point of receipt into the military systemand the point of issue to using activities and unitsdoctrine

fundamental principles by which military forcesguide their actions in support of national objectives.Doctrine is authoritative but requires judgement in ap-plicationDOD

Department of Defensedominant user concept

the concept whereby the service that is the princi-pal consumer will have the responsibility for support-ing all using services

EACechelons above corps

EADechelons above division

early reinforcement forcesprimarily AC divisions (CONUS- and OCONUS-

based) and associated EAD and EAC support elements(both AC and RC); RC round-out and round-up bri-gades are available to add combat power to AC divi-sions designated as early reinforcement forceselectronic warfare

military actions including: a. electronic attack—the use of either electromagnetic or directed energy todegrade, neutralize, or destroy an enemy’s combat ca-pability; b. electronic protection—those actions takento protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from

any effects of friendly or enemy employment of elec-tronic warfare; c. electronic warfare support thoseactions tasked by an operational commander to searchfor, intercept, identify, and locate sources of radiatedelectromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediatethreat recognitionEMP

electromagnetic pulseengagement

small, tactical conflicts, usually between oppos-ing maneuver forcesenvelopment

an offensive maneuver in which the main attack-ing force passes around or over the enemy’s principaldefensive positions to secure objectives in the enemy’srearEPW

enemy prisoner of warESAF

El Salvadorian Armed ForcesEW

electronic warfareexploitation

the attacker’s extension of destruction of the de-fending force by maintaining offensive pressure

FAADforward area air defense

feinta spoiling attack designed to divert the enemy’s

attention from the main effortFEMA

Federal Emergency Management AgencyFID

foreign internal defensefield services

logistical soldier sustainment functions such asfood preparation, water purification, bakery, clothingand light textile repair, laundry and bath, airdrop andparachute rigging, and mortuary affairsFM

field manualFMLN

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (ElSalvador)FMSP

Foreign Military Sales Program

OPERATIONS

Glossary-4

follow-on reinforcement unitsprimarily National Guard divisions, brigades, and

associated EAD and EAC support elements that aretrained and deployed for protracted operations. Theseforces include units that replace or augment forward-presence units that have deployed to other regions forprotracted operationsforce projection

the movement of militry forces from CONUS or atheater in response to requirements of war or opera-tions other than war. Force-projection operations ex-tend from mobilization and deployment of forces, toredeployment to CONUS or home theater, to subse-quent demobilizationforward-presence units

those US active component forces and reserveforces assigned or deployed overseas in a specific the-aterFORSCOM

United States Forces CommandFRAGPLAN

fragmentary planfratricide

the employment of friendly weapons and muni-tions with the intent to kill the enemy or destroy hisequipment or facilities, which results in unforeseen andunintentional death or injury to friendly personnelfriction the accumulation of chance errors, unexpecteddifficulties, enemy actions, and confusion of battleFSSG

First Service Support Group (USMC)full-dimensional operations

the application of all capabilities available to anArmy commander to accomplish his mission decisivelyand at the least cost across the full range of possibleoperations

GMRgraduated mobilization response

hasty attackresult of a meeting engagement—launched with

the forces at hand and with minimum preparation todestroy the enemy before he is able to concentrate orestablish a defensehealth services

the logistical function of promot-ing, improving,conserving, or restoring the mental or physical well-being of military personnel

HIMADhigh-to-medium altitude air defense

host nation supportcivil and/or military assistance rendered by a na-

tion to foreign forces within its territory during peace-time, times of crisis, emergencies, or war; assistanceprovided during war is based upon agreements mutu-ally concluded between nationshumanitarian assistance

assistance provided by DOD forces, as directedby appropriate authority, in the aftermath of natural orman-made disasters to help reduce conditions thatpresent a serious threat to life and property; assistanceprovided by US forces is limited in scope and dura-tion and is designed to supplement efforts of civilianauthorities who have primary responsibility for pro-viding such assistanceHUMINT

human intelligence

IMETPInternational Military Education and Training Pro-

graminfrastructure

all fixed and permanent installations, fabrications,or facilities for the support or control of military forcesinitiative

the ability to set or change the terms of battle;implies an offensive spiritintelligence

the product resulting from collection, processing,integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation ofavailable information concerning foreign countries orareasintelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield

a systematic and continuous process that describesthe tactical environment and the effects of that envi-ronment on operations and what the enemy can ac-complishinterdiction

actions to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the en-emy before it can affect friendly forcesin-transit visibility

the immediate availability of data pertaining to thelocation of materiel in-transit from the provider to therequesterIPB

intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefieldITEP

intelligence and tactical exploitation processor

FM 100-5

Glossary-5

JFCjoint force commander

JCSJoint Chiefs of Staff

JFLCCjoint force land component commander

JFSOCCjoint force special operations component com-

manderJOA

joint operations areajoint task force a force composed of assigned or at-tached elements of two or more services and consti-tuted by appropriate authority for a specific or limitedpurpose or missions of short durationJOPES

Joint Operations Planning and Execution SystemJSCP

Joint Strategic Capabilities PlanJSOA

joint special operations areaJ-STARS

joint surveillance and target attack radar systemJTF

joint task forceJZ

joint zone; an area established for the purpose ofpermitting friendly surface, air, and subsurface forcesto operate simultaneously

LALos Angeles

LCline of contact

LDline of departure

liaisonthat contact or intercommunication maintained be-

tween elements of military forces to ensure mutual un-derstanding and unity of purpose and actionline of operation

a directional orientation that connects the forcewith its base of operations and its objectivelines of communication

all the routes (land, water, and air) that connect anoperating military force with a base of operations andalong which supplies and military forces move

LOClines of communication

LOGCAPLogistics Civil Augmentation Program

logisticsthe process of planning and executing the move-

ment and sustainment of forces in the execution ofmilitary operations. Logistics includes the design, de-velopment, acquisition, storage, movement, distribu-tion, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of ma-teriel; the acquisition, preparation, maintenance, equip-ping, movement, and health service support of per-sonnel; the acquisition or furnishing of services; andthe acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation,and disposition of facilities. Logistics is an overarchingfunction that must encompass the range of militaryoperations. At the tactical level, logistics focuses onthe traditional CSS functions of arming, fixing, fuel-ing, manning, moving, and sustaining soldierslogistics bases a principal or supplementary base ofsupport; a locality containing installations that pro-vide logistics or other supportlogistics-over-the-shore

operations the loading and unloading of ships with-out the benefit of fixed port facilitieslogistics preparation of the theater

actions taken to optimize the means (force struc-ture, resources, and strategic lift) of logistically sup-porting the commander’s planLOTS

logistics-over-the-shoreLZ

landing zone

major operationthe coordinated actions of large forces in a single

phase of a campaign. A major operation could containa number of battles or could be a single, critical battleMARFOR

Marine Corps forcesmateriel management

the supervision of supplies and equipment through-out strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level areas ofoperationMETL

mission-essential task listMETT-T

mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, andtime available

OPERATIONS

Glossary-6

MImilitary intelligence

MLRSmultiple-launch rocket system

MMCmateriel management center

mobile defenseemploying a combination of fire and maneuver,

offense, defense, and delay to destroy the enemy anddefeat his attackmobilization

the process by which the Armed Forces or a por-tion thereof is brought to a state of readiness for waror other national emergency; includes activating all orpart of the RC, as well as assembling and organizingpersonnel, supplies, and materielmodular units

units comprised of multiple capabilities; depend-ing on the requirement, modules can be added or sub-tracted from the unit or force packagemovement control

the planning, routing, scheduling, and control ofpersonnel and freight movements over LOCsMSR

main supply route

nation assistancediplomatic, economic, informational, and military

cooperation between the US and the government ofanother nation, with the objective of promoting inter-nal development and the growth of sustainable insti-tutions within that nation. This corrects conditionsthat cause human suffering and improves the qualityof life of the nation’s peoplenational industrial base

the private and government production and main-tenance capacity that could be used to manufactureand repair items required by the military servicesNATO

North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNAVFOR

Naval forcesNBC

nuclear, biological, chemicalNCA

National Command Authorities

NEOnoncombatant evacuation operations

noncombatant evacuation operationsoperations that relocate threatened civilian non-

combatants from locations in a foreign country or hostnation. These operations normally involve US citi-zens whose lives are in danger. They may also in-clude selected host nation natives and third countrynationalsNSW

Naval Special Warfare

objobjective

OCONUSoutside the continental United States

operational artthe employment of military forces to attain strate-

gic goals through the design, organization, integration,and execution of battles and engagements into cam-paigns and major operations. In war, operational artdetermines when, where, and for what purpose majorforces will fight over timeoperations in depth

the totality of the commander’s operations againstthe enemy—composed of deep, close, and rear opera-tions which are usually conducted simultaneously in amanner that appears as one continuous operationagainst the enemyoperations other than war

military activities during peacetime and conflictthat do not necessarily involve armed clashes betweentwo organized forcesoperational operating systems

the major functions performed by joint and com-bined operations forces to successfully execute cam-paigns and major operations in a theater or area ofoperations; these systems include movement and ma-neuver, fires, intelligence, protection, command andcontrol and supportOPCON

operational controlOPSEC

operations securityoverwhelming combat power

the ability to bring together, in combination, suf-ficient force to ensure success and deny the enemyany chance of escape or effective retaliation

FM 100-5

Glossary-7

PDFPanamanian Defense Force

peace buildingpostconflict diplomatic and military action to iden-

tify and support structures that tend to strengthen andsolidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into combatpeace enforcement

military intervention to forcefully restore peacebetween belligerents who may be engaged in combatpeacekeeping

operations using military forces and/or civilian per-sonnel, at the request of the parties to a dispute, tohelp supervise a cease-fire agreement and/or separatethe partiespeacemaking

the diplomatic process or military actions to gainan end to disputespeacetime

the period when the United States influences worldevents through actions that routinely occur betweennationsPL

phase linePOD

port of debarkationPOE

port of embarkationPOL

petroleum, oils, and lubricantsport of debarkation

an aerial or seaport within the theater of opera-tions where the strategic transportation of forces iscompleted; it may not be the force’s final destinationport of embarkation

an air or sea terminal at which troops, units, mili-tary-sponsored personnel, unit equipment, and mate-riel are boarded or loadedpostconflict activities

those operations other than war that are conductedin the period following conflict and the cessation ofactive combat; activities focused on restoring orderand minimizing confusion following the operation, re-establishing the host nation infrastructure, preparingforces for redeployment, and continuing presence toallow other elements of national power to achieve over-all strategic aims

power projectionthe ability of the nation to apply all or some of the

instruments of national power—diplomatic, economic,informational, or military—to respond to crisis, to con-tribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stabilityprinciples of war

the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine that pro-vides general guidance for the conduct of war at thestrategic, operational, and tactical levelsPSRC

presidential selected reserve call-upPSYOP

psychological operationspursuit

an attack with the purpose of annihilating the en-emy once his resistance has broken down completelyand he is fleeing the battlefieldPZ

pickup zone

r a i da limited-objective attack into enemy territory for

the specific purpose of gaining and holding groundRC

reserve componentsrear operations

operations that assist in providing freedom of ac-tion and continuity of operations, logistics, and battlecommand. Their primary purposes are to sustain thecurrent close and deep fights and to posture the forcefor further operationsreconstitution

at the strategic level, those functions and activi-ties required to restore the Army’s capability to re-spond to any mission across the full range of possibleoperations. At the operational and tactical levels, re-constitution consists of extraordinary actions that com-manders plan and implement to restore units to a de-sired level of combat effectiveness commensurate withmission requirements and available resourcesreconstitution units

forces in addition to those in the active and re-serve component base force; these forces are createdto deter an emerging global threat from competing mili-tarily with the United States and, should such deter-rence fail, to provide a global warfighting capability.Reconstitution forces may be composed of regenera-tion assets, assets, industrial/technology base assets,and manpower assets

OPERATIONS

Glossary-8

requirements determinationthe process of deciding what is essential to sup-

port a strategy, campaign, or operationrestraint

limitations placed on the command that prohibit acommand from doing somethingretrograde operation

a maneuver to the rear or away from the enemy toimprove a situation or prevent a worse situation fromoccurringROE

rules of engagementRPV

remotely piloted vehicleRISTA

reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and tar-get acquisitionrules of engagement

directives issued by competent military authoritythat delineate the circumstances and limitations underwhich US forces will initiate and/or continue combatengagement with other encountered forces

SACEURSupreme Allied Commander, Europe

SARFSaudi Arabia Redistribution Facility

SATPSecurity Assistance Training Program

SEADsuppression of enemy air defenses

SEALsea-air-land

security assistancegroups of programs authorized by the Foreign As-

sistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Ex-port Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other relatedstatutes by which the United States provides defensearticles, military training, and other defense-related ser-vices, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in further-ance of national policies and objectivessequel

major operations that follow an initial major op-eration. Plans for sequels are based on the possibleoutcome—victory, stalemate, or defeat—of the cur-rent operationsimultaneous operations

two or more campaigns and complementary op-erations or activities within those campaigns occur-ring concurrently within the same theater

SOFspecial operations forces

specified commanda command with a broad, continuing mission un-

der a single commander and normally composed offorces from only one servicespoiling attack

an attack from a defensive posture to disrupt anexpected enemy attack. A spoiling attack attempts tostrike the enemy while he is most vulnerable—duringhis preparations for attack in assembly areas and at-tack positions—or while he is on the move prior tocrossing the line of departuresplit-based logistics

dividing logistics management functions so thatonly those functions absolutely necessary are deployed,allowing some management functions to be accom-plished from CONUS or another theaterspt

supportstrategic mobility

transportation actions using national assets, bothmilitary and civilian, in support of a force-projectionmissionstrategy

the art and science of employing the armed forcesand other elements of national power during peace,conflict, and war to secure national security objectivessupply discipline

command responsibility to identify and redistrib-ute excess materiel, observe senior commander’s pri-orities, and ensure subordinates operate within the le-gal boundaries of the logistics systemsupporting attack

an attack designed to hold the enemy in position,to conceal the location of the main attack, to preventhim from reinforcing the elements opposing the maineffort, and/or to cause him to commit his reserves pre-maturely at an indecisive locationsynchronization

the ability to focus resources and activities in timeand space to produce maximum relative combat powerat the decisive point

TACONtactical control

tacticsthe art and science of employing available means

to win battles and engagements

FM 100-5

Glossary-9

TAVtotal asset visibility

tempothe rate of military action; controlling or altering

that rate is a necessary means to initiative; all militaryoperations alternate between action and pauses as op-posing forces battle one another and fight friction tomount and execute operations at the time and place oftheir choosingtenets

a basic truth held by an organization; the funda-mental tenets of Army operations doctrine describethe characteristics of successful operationsTEWT

tactical exercise without troopsTPFDD

time-phased force and deployment dataTPFDL

time-phased force deployment listtotal asset visibility

the immediate availability of data pertaining to thelocation of materiel in storage or in transit from theprovider to the requestertotal mission awareness

the ability of commanders at all levels to considereverything that affects their operation¡applies to op-erations other than war and war

UAVunmanned aerial vehicle

UKUnited Kingdom

UNUnited Nations

UNAAFUnified Action Armed Forces

unity of effortcoordination and cooperation among all forces, not

necessarily part of the same command structure to-ward a commonly recognized objectiveunified command

a command with a broad, continuing mission un-der a single commander and composed of significantassigned components of two or more services

USUnited States

USCENTCOMUnited States Central Command

USCINCCENTcommander-in-chief, United States Central Com-

mandUSCINCPAC

commander-in-chief, United States Pacific Com-mandUSCINCSO

commander-in-chief, United States Southern Com-mandUSEUCOM

United States European CommandUSFK

United States Forces KoreaUSMC

United States Marine CorpsUSSOCOM

United States Special Operations CommandUSSOUTHCOM

United States Southern CommandUSSPACECOM

United States Space Command

versatilitythe ability of units to meet diverse challenges, shift

focus, tailor forces, and move from one role or mis-sion to another rapidly and efficiently

wara state of open and declared armed hostile con-

flict between political units such as states or nations;may be limited or general in natureweapons of mass destruction

weapons that through use or the threat of use cancause large-scale shifts in objectives, phases, andcourses of action

FM 100-5

References-0

REFERENCES

SOURCES USED

Strategic Publications

National Military Strategy. January 1992.

National Security Strategy. January 1993.

Joint and Multiservice Publications

Joint Publication 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces. December 1986.

Joint Publication 1. Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces. November 1991.

Joint Publication 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.December 1989.

Joint Publication 2-0. Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. (Test Publication)June 1991.

Joint Publication 2-01. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Support toJoint Operations. (Initial Draft) August 1992.

Joint Publication 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. (Test Publication) January 1990.

Joint Publication 3-03. Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations. (Test Publication)December 1990.

Joint Publication 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. October 1992.

Joint Publication 3-14. Doctrine for Joint Space Operations. (Final Draft) April 1992.

Joint Publications 3-51. SIGINT and EW Support Measures for Joint Operations. June 1991.

Joint Publication 3-53. Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine. February 1987.

Joint Publication 3-57. Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs. (Test Publication) October 1991.

Joint Publication 4-0. Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations. 25 September 1992.

Army Publications

FM 1-111. Combat Aviation Brigade. August 1990.

FM 3-4. NBC Protection. 29 May 1992.

FM 3-100. NBC Defense, Chemical Warfare, Smoke, and Flame Operations. 23 May 1991.

FM 6-20. Fire Support in the AirLand Battle. May 1988.

FM 7-30. Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault Brigade Operations. April 1981.

FM 22-100. Military Leadership. July 1990.

FM 100-5

References-1

FM 22-102. Soldier Team Development. March 1987.

FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. July 1956.

FM 33-1. Psychological Operations. July 1987.

FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. December 1985.

FM 90-3. Desert Operations. August 1977.

FM 90-5. Jungle Operations. June 1982.

FM 90-6. Mountain Operations. June 1980.

FM 90-10. Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). August 1979.

FM 90-11. Cold Weather Operations. (Coordinating Draft) January 1992.

FM 100-1. The Army. December 1991.

FM 100-7. The Army in Theater Operations. (Final approved draft) March 1993.

FM 100-8. Combined Army Operations. (Initial Draft) January 1992.

FM 100-10. Combat Service Support. February 1988.

FM 100-17. Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization. 28 October 1992.

FM 100-19. Domestic Support Operations. (Final approved draft) May 1993.

FM 101-5-1. Operational Terms and Symbols. October 1985.

Air Force Publications

Air Force Manual 1-1. Basic Aerospace Doctrine for the United States Air Force. March 1992.

DOCUMENTS NEEDED

DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. February 1974.

READINGS RECOMMENDED

STP 21-II-MQS. Military Qualification Standards II, Manual for Common Tasks forLieutenants and Captains. January 1991.

STP 21-III-MQS. Military Qualification Standards III, Leader Development Manual forMajors and Lieutenant Colonels. (To be published August 1993)

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