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FM 100-23

Field Manual

HeadquartersNo. 100-23 Department of the Army

Washington, DC, 30 December 1994

PEACE OPERATIONS

CONTENTS

PREFACE

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

INTRODUCTION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF PEACE OPERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1The Strategic Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1The Types of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2The Variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12The Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15The Tenets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Chapter 2 COMMAND, CONTROL, COORDINATION, AND LIAISON

. . . . . . 20Command and Support Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Unilateral Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21Multinational Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21United Nations Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23Non-United Nations Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Interagency Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Liaison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Thi d t t d ith F M k 4 0 2

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Chapter 3 PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31Mission Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Campaign Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Use of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Force Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Force Tailoring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Combat Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Public Affairs Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47Legal Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Chapter 4 LOGISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50Logistics-Preparation-of-the Theater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50Shared Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52Resource Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56Logistics Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Appendix A THE UNITED NATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

Appendix B UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, UNITED NATIONS, AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS . . . . . . . . . .

76

Appendix C TRAINING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

86

Appendix D SAMPLE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

Appendix E SAMPLE CAMPAIGN PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

GLOSSARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

101

REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

118

INDEX

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124

iii

Preface

This manual provides guidance for the full range of peace operations, to include support to diplomacy (peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy), peacekeeping (PK),and peace enforcement (PE). It addresses the environment of peace operations, related con-cepts, principles, and fundamentals, to include planning, operational considerations, training,and supporting functions. This manual is for commanders and staffs charged with the respon-sibility for peace operations to assist them in planning and conducting operations. It is alsouseful to nonmilitary agencies and foreign military units conducting related operations.

This manual supports soldiers and leaders who execute peace operations. It serves as the foundation for further development of US Army tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)manuals and refinement of existing training support packages (TSPs), mission training plans(MTPs), training center and unit exercises, and service school curricula. It drives the examina-tion of organizations and materiel developments applicable to peace operations.

Commanders will face ambiguous situations and uncertainty in peace operations. They are obligated to set clear objectives, define the mission, firmly guide operations, and measureprogress and success. In order to assist commanders and their staffs, this manual explains theprinciples and tenets of peace operations and their applications; describes likely peace opera-tions; and discusses command, control, coordination, and liaison requirements and otherunique planning considerations. It also provides information concerning the UN and otherorganizations that may participate in peace operations.

This manual incorporates lessons learned from recent peace operations and existing doc-trine to provide a framework for development in the conduct of peace operations. It builds onthe discussions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement in FM 100-5

1

and applies to opera-tions conducted by Army forces in joint, multinational, or interagency environments. It out-lines selected considerations for linkages between Army units and certain nongovernmentaland international organizations involved in such operations.

The basis of this manual is the US Army's expertise in conducting missions on land as a demonstration of US resolve and commitment to international peace, security, and stability. Itprovides guidelines for implementation of deterrence and compellance measures duringpeace operations in support of US National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strat-egy (NMS), and US policy.

The proponent of this manual is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 directly to Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, ATTN:ATDO-A, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

1.

Operations,

14 June 1993.

iv

Introduction

It must be peace without victory. . . .

Woodrow Wilson

We are now concerned with the peace of the entire worldand the peace can only be maintained by the strong.

General George C. Marshall

Properly constituted, peace operations can be one useful tool to advance American national interests and pursue

our national security objectives.

The Clinton Administration's Policy onReforming Multinational Peace Operations

May 1994

Today's world, with changing patterns of conflict and threats to US interests, presents new political and military challenges. It also presents extraordinary opportunities. The existence ofinstability and potential threats require a strong military capability sufficiently versatile to exe-cute national military strategy across the full range of operations—to include

war

and

opera-tions other than war (OOTW).

Recognizing these realities, the 1993 version of the Army's keystone manual on operations, FM 100-5, devoted a chapter to OOTW. That chapter includes a broad discussion of PK andPE. This manual focuses specifically on peace operations, building on the foundation laid inFM 100-5.

This manual provides the basis for planning and executing peace operations. As doctrine, this manual guides the Army in how to think about peace operations and provides fundamen-tals for these operations.

THE HISTORY

Peace operations

is a new and comprehensive term that covers a wide range of activities. Peace operations create and sustain the conditions necessary for peace to flourish. Peace oper-ations comprise three types of activities:

support to diplomacy

(peacemaking, peace building,and preventive diplomacy),

peacekeeping,

and

peace enforcement.

Peace operations include tradi-tional peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement activities such as protection of humanitarianassistance, establishment of order and stability, enforcement of sanctions, guarantee anddenial of movement, establishment of protected zones, and forcible separation of belligerents.

Peace operations have become increasingly common in the post-Cold War strategic secu-rity environment. For example, in its first 40 years, the United Nations (UN) conducted only 13such operations, all relatively small, with the exception of UN operations in the Congo during

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the 1960s. Since 1988, the number of peace operations has more than doubled, with each suc-ceeding one being more complex than the last. The UN's peacekeeping operation in Cambodiain 1993, for example, included 22,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from 32 contrib-uting nations. The operation cost the world community well over $2 billion. The UN-sanc-tioned peace operation in Somalia (unified task force [UNITAF]), spearheaded by the US,involved more than 27,000 personnel from 23 contributing nations at a cost of $750 million.

Peace operations are not new to the Army. Since 1948, US soldiers have served in many such operations—to include the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization in the Mid-dle East, Lebanon (1958), the Dominican Republic (1965), and the Sinai (since 1982)—as mem-bers of a multinational force and observers (MFO).

What is new is the number, pace, scope, and complexity of recent operations. For example, in 1993, six separate peace operations were conducted or authorized by the UN in the formerYugoslavia. They included missions to enforce sanctions against all belligerent parties, to denyaerial movement, to protect humanitarian assistance in Bosnia, to establish protected zones,and to establish a preventive deployment to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(FYROM). Commanders must understand the dynamics of peace operations and how actionstaken in one operation may affect the success of another. In recent years, on any given day,thousands of soldiers were deployed to conduct or support peace operations in places such asSomalia, FYROM, the Sinai, and Croatia.

THE ENVIRONMENT

Peace operations often take place in environments less well-defined than in war. The iden-tity of belligerents may be uncertain and the relationship between a specific operation and acampaign plan may be more difficult to define than would normally be the case in war. On theother hand, the relationship between specific peace operations and political objectives may bemore sensitive, direct, and transparent.

US forces involved in peace operations may not encounter large, professional armies or even organized groups responding to a chain of command. Instead, they may have to dealwith loosely organized groups of irregulars, terrorists, or other conflicting segments of a pop-ulation as predominant forces. These elements will attempt to capitalize on perceptions of dis-enfranchisement or disaffection within the population. Criminal syndicates may also beinvolved.

The close link desired by such elements and the civilian population-at-large means the tra-ditional elements of combat power, such as massive firepower, may not apply to peace opera-tions. The nonviolent application of military capabilities, such as civil-military informationand psychological operations (PSYOP) may be more important.

An overemphasis on firepower may be counterproductive. Because of the potential link-ages between combatants and noncombatants, the political and cultural dimensions of thebattlefield become more critical to the conflict. When force must be used, its purpose is to pro-tect life or compel, not to destroy unnecessarily; the conflict, not the belligerent parties, is theenemy.

THE MEASURE OF SUCCESS

As with any mission, commanders at all levels must have a common understanding of the end state and the conditions that constitute success prior to initiating operations. In peaceoperations,

settlement,

not victory, is the ultimate measure of success, though settlement is

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rarely achievable through military efforts alone. Peace operations are conducted to reach a res-olution by conciliation among the competing parties, rather than termination by force. Peaceoperations are designed principally to create or sustain the conditions in which political anddiplomatic activities may proceed. In peace operations, military action must complement dip-lomatic, economic, informational, and humanitarian efforts in pursuing the overarching polit-ical objective. The concept of traditional military victory or defeat is inappropriate in peaceoperations.

1

CHAPTER 1

Fundamentals of Peace Operations

The prime focus of the Army is warfighting, yet the Army's

frequent role in operations other than war is critical.

Versatility is to the decathlete as agility is to the boxer.

FM 100-5

Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers,

but only a soldier can do it.

Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskold

This chapter provides a doctrinal framework for peace operations. It is nota detailed template but an authoritative statement and guide for conductingpeace operations. Adaptable to the diverse and varied nature of peace opera-tions, this chapter describes the strategic context of such operations, to includeunilateral and multinational operations. The chapter includes information onthe variables of peace operations, the principles of peace operations, and thetenets of Army peace operations. It defines the different types of peace opera-tions and establishes an operational context for each.

THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Because peace operations are usually con-ducted in the full glare of worldwide mediaattention, the strategic context of a peace opera-tion must be communicated and understood byall involved in the operation. Soldiers mustunderstand that they can encounter situationswhere the decisions they make at the tacticallevel have immediate strategic and politicalimplications. In addition to the overall strategicand political context of the operation, soldiersshould be aware of the area's history, economy,culture, and any other significant factors. Failureto fully understand the mission and operationalenvironment can quickly lead to incidents andmisunderstandings that will reduce legitimacyand consent and result in actions that are incon-sistent with the overall political objective.

Member nations of the United Nations (UN)conduct peace operations under the provisionsof Chapters VI and VII of the

UN Charter.

1

The

US reserves the right to conduct operations uni-laterally in conformance with appropriate inter-national law. In such cases, the US wouldorganize, equip, and employ its forces consistentwith the unique aspects of these two chapters ofthe

UN Charter

. See Appendix A for a generaldescription of UN organization and functions.

Normally, traditional peacekeeping (PK)involving high levels of consent and strict impar-tiality are operations authorized under the provi-sions of Chapter VI of the

UN Charter,

whichdiscusses the peaceful settlement of disputes.Thus, PK operations are often referred to as

Chapter VI operations.

Peace operations with low levels of consentand questionable impartiality are conducted

1.

Chapter VI, “Pacific Settlement of Disputes” and Chapter VII, “Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,”

Charter of the United Nations,

26 June 1945.


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under mandates governed by Chapter VII of the

UN Charter.

Chapter VII operations are fre-quently referred to collectively as

PE

(peaceenforcement). Because Chapter VII is so broad—including action with respect to acts of aggres-sion—some operations, such as the UN opera-tions in Korea (1950-1953) and in Kuwait andIraq (1990-1991), are also referred to as PE. How-ever, from a doctrinal view, these two operationsare clearly wars and must not be confused withPE as described herein.

THE TYPES OF OPERATIONS

Peace operations encompass three types ofactivities: support to diplomacy, peacekeeping,and peace enforcement. The definitions of theseterms, although precise, must be viewed in aworld beset with imprecise and ambiguous situ-ations. So, it is more useful to understand theprinciples of peace operations and the types offorces required to deal with them.

SUPPORT TO DIPLOMACY

Military support to diplomacy has becomeincreasingly important in furthering US interestsabroad. The components of support to diplo-macy include peacemaking, peace building, andpreventive diplomacy. Support to diplomacytakes place in peace or conflict and is conductedto prevent conflict. Military actions contribute toand are subordinate to the diplomatic peacemak-ing process. Many of these actions are the typi-cal, day-to-day operations conducted by themilitary as part of its peacetime mission. The sta-tioning of military forces abroad as part of a for-ward presence may contribute to stability andthe creation of conditions necessary for thepeaceful resolution of disputes.

Peacemaking

Peacemaking is a process of diplomacy,mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peace-ful settlement that end disputes and resolve theissues that led to conflict. Military activities thatsupport peacemaking include military-to-mili-tary relations and security assistance operations.Other military activities, such as exercises andpeacetime deployments, may enhance the diplo-matic process by demonstrating the engagementof the US abroad. These activities contribute to

an atmosphere of cooperation and assistancewith allies and friends, thus demonstrating theresolve of the US with regard to its commit-ments. Such demonstrations of resolve mayassist diplomatic efforts at conflict resolution.Military-to-military contacts and security assis-tance programs also serve to enhance diplomacyby influencing important groups in regions ofconflict and by promoting the stable environ-ment necessary for the success of diplomacy.

Peace Building

Peace building consists of postconflictactions, primarily diplomatic, that strengthenand rebuild civil infrastructures and institutionsin order to avoid a return to conflict. It alsoincludes mechanisms that advance a sense ofconfidence and well-being and support eco-nomic reconstruction. Military as well as civilianinvolvement is normally required. Peace build-ing activities include restoring civil authority,rebuilding physical infrastructures, and reestab-lishing commerce, schools, and medical facilities.The most extensive peace-building effort in his-tory took place in Europe and Asia in the post-World War II era when the US and its alliesassisted nations in those continents devastatedby a decade of war.

Military support to diplomacy also includesassistance in selected areas such as the conductof elections and plebiscites and demobilizationof former belligerent parties. Nation assistance isanother activity of support to diplomacy. It mayoccur prior to or after a conflict, although the UNterm pertains primarily to postconflict activities.

Preventive Diplomacy

Preventive diplomacy involves diplomaticactions taken in advance of a predictable crisis toprevent or limit violence. In more tense situa-tions, military activities may support preventivediplomacy. Such support may include preven-tive deployments, other shows of force, or higherlevels of readiness. The objective is to demon-strate resolve and commitment to a peaceful res-olution while underlining the readiness andability of the US to use force if required.

Preventive deployment

is the deployment ofmilitary forces to deter violence at the interface

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or zone of potential conflict where tension is ris-ing among parties. The use of preventive deploy-ment does not rely on a truce or a peace planagreed to among parties. Although forces orobservers will deploy with the consent or at therequest of one or all parties involved, their spe-cific tasks may not have been agreed to, except inprinciple, among parties (see Figure 1-1). Usu-ally these deployments will employ forces insuch a way that they are indistinguishable from aPK force in terms of equipment, force posture,and activities.

Preventive deployments can be used in—• Internal or national crises, at the request of

the government or parties concerned.

• Interstate disputes, at the request of one ormore of the parties concerned.

A preventive deployment force may executetasks similar to those conducted by early warn-ing observers. By deploying in greater numbers

and with greater authority, this force can insiston gaining access to areas of potential conflict. Inprinciple, tactical surveillance and monitoringcapability, as well as the symbolic presence ofsuch a force, act as a restraining influence. Theunderlying concept of a preventive deploymentis that under the critical scrutiny of the interna-tional community, parties will be under pressureto consider negotiation before resorting to vio-lence. The tasks of a preventive deploymentforce may include—

• Acting as an interpositional force to forestallviolence.

• Protecting the local delivery of humanitarianrelief.

• Assisting local authorities to protect andoffer security to threatened minorities, tosecure and maintain essential services(water, power), and to maintain law andorder.

Kumanovo

Skopie

Debar

• Stroga

• Ohrio

• Tetovo

Bulgaria

Greece

Albania

SerbiaKosovo

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

FIN

UNCIVPOL

UNMO

UNCIVPOL

UNMO

NORD

NOR

USI

I

II

II

I

XFYROM

••

••

US

•

• • •

• ••

••– Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Command– UN military observers– UN civilian police– United States– Norway– Finland– Nordic

FYROM COMD

UNMOUNCIVPOL

USNOR

FINNORD

LEGEND

Figure 1-1. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Command

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A preventive deployment may be composedof several national contingents in the same man-ner as a conventional PK force. Soldiers maycarry weapons necessary for protective tasks aswell as for self-defense. Deployed civilians maycarry weapons for self-defense only if authorizedby the field commander after receiving propertraining. The minimal capabilities of a preven-tive deployment force may be enhanced by thepresence of an offshore or regional coalitionstrike force. The strike force will have the capa-bility to protect the preventive deployment force.The presence of a strike force will influencenegotiations as well as security of deployedforces on the ground.

A preventive deployment force may act inorder to ensure access to an area of operation(AO). Actions may include—

• Observing and reporting on developmentsin the AO.

• Patrolling and securing a border or demarca-tion line.

• Presenting a show of force in order to dis-suade a potential aggressor.

The employment of forces in support of apreventive deployment will normally involvecombat, combat support (CS), and combat ser-vice support (CSS) units. A reinforcement capa-bility will normally be maintained in theimmediate region. Units charged with this activ-ity should have a high degree of tactical mobility,coupled with significant surveillance and com-munication capabilities.

PEACEKEEPING

PK involves military or paramilitary opera-tions that are undertaken with the consent of allmajor belligerent parties. These operations aredesigned to monitor and facilitate implementa-tion of an existing truce agreement and supportdiplomatic efforts to reach a long-term politicalsettlement. The multinational force and observ-ers (MFO) operation in the Sinai provides a clas-sic example of a force conducting a PK operation.PK activities include observation and monitoringof truces and cease-fires and supervision oftruces.

Observation and Monitoring of Truces and Cease-Fires

Individual military personnel may be calledupon to observe, monitor, verify, and report thatparties to a conflict comply with the commit-ments into which they enter, such as truces andcease-fires. They may also be called upon tomonitor a developing situation and report onevents to the authorizing authority. Soldiersinvolved in such activities are called observers ormonitors. Observers and monitors execute theirduties under the authority of an internationalagreement or a mandate. They must be impartialand responsible to the authorizing authority.

The role of observers engaged in battlefieldstabilization or confidence-building measuresamong regular armed forces involved in conflicthas been extensively developed since the estab-lishment of the first such organization—theUnited Nations Truce Supervision Organization(UNTSO)––in 1948. Observers and monitors aremost commonly deployed on an individual basisand normally form military observer groupswith individuals from other nations. Some tasks,such as liaison, may be performed individually.Observers and monitors are armed or unarmedas the situation dictates. Civilian officials ofinternational organizations or governments mayalso serve as observers and monitors.

The employment of observers in an earlywarning role to report on a developing situationis another aspect of this mission. These observersmay serve to deter aggression by reportingtimely information about a potentially tense situ-ation. Observers and monitors may also be selec-tively employed to oversee certain types ofevents, such as elections, in order to verify theirvalidity.

Reporting and Monitoring.

Military observersreport accurate and timely military informationin their assigned sector of responsibility. Initially,observers may be required to report on the with-drawal of armed forces as belligerent partiesbegin the disengagement process. Subsequently,observers may monitor the interface amongthose forces, to include any demilitarized lines orareas. Observers and monitors do not act to

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interpose themselves between belligerent par-ties.

Supervision.

Observers may be called upon tocarry out numerous types of supervisory tasks.Observers do not normally act with regard toviolations. They merely observe and report.These tasks include supervision of—

• Cease-fire lines, borders, buffers, demilita-rized zones, restricted areas, enclaves, andother geographic entities.

• The execution of the provisions of treaties,truces, cease-fires, arms control agreements,and other binding agreements.

• The exchange of prisoners of war, civilians,human remains, and territory.

• Refugee camps, collection points, and sta-tions.

• Censuses, referendums, plebiscites, and elec-tions.

Investigation of Complaints and Violations.

Observers may be required to conduct investiga-tions of complaints and alleged violations of theprovisions of an agreement. Such investigationsmust be carried out in a completely impartialmanner.

Negotiation and Mediation.

Observers may berequired to undertake negotiations on behalf ofall parties to the conflict and to act as mediatorsamong the parties to a dispute. Observers mustbe prepared to supervise any actions undertakento remedy the situation. Impartiality is critical tothe performance of these tasks; observers mustbe seen as part of the solution, not part of theproblem.

Liaison.

Observers may function as liaison offic-ers with the mission of maintaining personalcontact and exchanging information with any ofa number of entities. These may include the bel-ligerent parties, the host nation, local civilianofficials, international agencies, higher head-quarters, and other military units.

Supervision of Truces

Military formations normally conduct trucesupervision operations. Such formations areintroduced into a conflict area to fulfill a specific

mandate in order to permit diplomatic negotia-tions to take place in a conflict-free environment.These operations are possible only with the con-sent of the disputing parties.

Truce supervisory forces operate in signifi-cantly greater numbers than observers. Ratherthan simply monitoring the situation, trucesupervisory forces can insist that the local popu-lation comply with the specific conditions of a

peace agreement.

Truce supervisory forces can, forexample, patrol in sensitive areas, investigateinstallations or vehicles for prohibited items, andestablish movement control points.

Truce supervisory forces may be used tosupervise a peace or cease-fire agreement. Super-vision of a truce is also known as

traditional PK,

even when no formal peace has been signed. Intraditional PK, truce supervisory forces physi-cally interpose themselves between the disput-ing parties. In such cases, they may occupy adisengagement line or buffer zone at the inter-face between the belligerent parties.

Military forces that conduct truce supervi-sory operations are normally multinational,while subformations are usually exclusivelynational. Military forces supervising truces aregenerally armed with organic small arms. How-ever, forces may deploy with other weapons sys-tems, based on the threat.

These forces will normally commence opera-tions once a truce, cease-fire, or peace has beenagreed to and the situation has stabilized. Trucesupervisory forces may be required to supervisethe disengagement and withdrawal of belliger-ent forces. Supervision actions are similar tothose conducted by observers and monitors, butwith the added requirement of maintaining theability to supervise the terms of the mandate.Liaison tasks are likewise similar to those ofobservers and monitors.

Intermediary tasks may require truce super-visory forces to act as a credible and impartialintermediary among belligerent parties. Suchmediation is accomplished through negotiationson contentious issues or incidents to arrive at amutually acceptable solution that will maintainthe conditions of the mandate. Superior negotiat-ing skills are critical to the successful accom-plishment of these actions.

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

During the early days of the UnitedNations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), theUN force sector commanders had tophysically place themselves and theirunits between armed irregular CypriotGreek and Turkish forces to prevent thespark that might have destroyed theshaky peace. Their presence, along withsometimes lengthy negotiations, madeclear to the would-be belligerent partiesthat shooting was no longer an accept-able action.

warfighting skills. Thus, in a theater of opera-tions both combat and noncombat actions mayoccur simultaneously. Forces conducting PE may,for example, be involved in the forcible separa-tion of belligerent parties or be engaged in com-bat with one or all parties to the conflict. US

Assistance activities by truce supervisoryforces may include the requirement to providehumanitarian assistance (HA) within the AO. Inaddition, truce supervisor y forces may berequired to supervise demobilization and demili-tarization measures subsequent to a peace treaty.In certain unstable situations, these forces maybe required to provide a measure of law, order,and stability on an interim basis until competentcivil authority can reestablish authority.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

PE is the application of military force or thethreat of its use, normally pursuant to interna-tional authorization, to compel compliance withgenerally accepted resolutions or sanctions. Thepurpose of PE is to maintain or restore peace andsupport diplomatic efforts to reach a long-termpolitical settlement.

PE may include combat action. In such cases,missions must be clear and end states defined.With the transition to combat action comes therequirement for the successful application of

PE may include combat action. In such cases, missions must be clear and end states defined. Transi-tion to combat requires the successful application of warfighting skills.

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participation in operations in Somalia in 1992and 1993 is an example of PE. The following ele-ments apply to all PE operations.

•

Phases.

PE operations are normally con-ducted in several phases. The first phasemay involve the insertion of rapidly deploy-able combat forces in order to establish a sig-nificant and visible military presence.Subsequent phases will involve the transi-tion from a military presence to support forthe development of competent civil author-ity.

•

Forces.

The forces employed for such opera-tions will be armed and equipped based oncommanders' estimates and METT-T. Infan-try units, supported by engineer, militarypolice, and aviation assets, are most oftenemployed in this role. They are normallyreinforced by civil affairs (CA) and psycho-logical operations (PSYOP) assets.

•

Missions.

The missions assigned to PE forcesinclude the restoration and maintenance oforder and stability, protection of humanitar-ian assistance, guarantee and denial ofmovement, enforcement of sanctions, estab-lishment and supervision of protected zones,forcible separation of belligerent parties, andother operations as determined by theauthorizing body.

Restoration and Maintenance of Order and Stability

Military forces may be employed to restoreorder and stability within a state or region wherecompetent civil authority has ceased to function.They may be called upon to assist in the mainte-nance of order and stability in areas where it isthreatened, where the loss of order and stabilitythreatens international stability, or where humanrights are endangered.

Very often, operations to restore and main-tain order and stability may be conducted in con-junction with actions designed to provide andprotect the provision of humanitarian assistance.

Historical Perspective

The US Army, responding to a presiden-tial directive, participated in OperationRestore Hope in Somalia from 3 Decem-ber 1992 to 4 May 1993. A joint and multi-national operation, Restore Hope—calledUNITAF (unified task force)—was a US-led, UN-sanctioned operation thatincluded protection of humanitarian assis-tance and other peace-enforcement oper-ations. The Army force (ARFOR) AOincluded over 21,000 square miles. Overthese distances, units conducted airassault operations, patrols, security oper-ations, cordons and searches, and othercombat operations in support of humani-tarian agencies.

Other ARFOR operations included build-ing or rebuilding over 1,100 kilometers ofroads, constructing two Bailey Bridges,escorting hundreds of convoys, confiscat-ing thousands of weapons, and providingtheater communications. Due to theseefforts, humanitarian agencies declaredan end to the food emergency, communityelders became empowered, and market-places were revitalized and functioning.On 4 May 1993 the UN-led operation inSomalia (UNOSOM II) assumed respon-

sibility for operations.


An early example of operations in a situ-ation of civil hostilities is found in ONUC(United Nations Operation in the Congo).When created in 1960, one of the guide-lines governing ONUC was that the forcewas to be used only for self-defense. ByFebruary 1991, the chaotic conditionscaused the security council to expandthe guidelines to include directing the

use of force to prevent civil war.

FM 100-23

8

Protection of Humanitarian Assistance

Military forces have participated in numer-ous HA operations worldwide in recent years.Many HA missions may take place in benignenvironments. However, in other cases hostileforces may interfere with HA missions. Peaceoperations forces may be called upon to protectthose providing such assistance or the relief sup-plies themselves. HA forces must be equippedwith weapons systems appropriate to the mis-sion. Such situations may require the establish-ment of base areas, which usually include air orsea terminals, protected routes or corridors forthe transport of relief supplies, and secure sitesfor the final delivery of supplies to the intendedrecipient. If delivery of aid and relief supplies isopposed, combat and CS forces may be neces-sary to conduct such operations.

Guarantee and Denial of Movement

These operations guarantee or deny move-ment by air, land, or sea in particular areas and/or routes. They may involve the coordinatedpresence of warships and combat aircraft in thedisputed region. Operations to guarantee rightsof passage—called

freedom of navigation—

may beconducted to ensure the freedom of ships to passthrough a threatened sea lane, for aircraft toreach a besieged city or community, or to main-tain safe passage on overland routes. Land forcesmay employ a combination of infantry, armor,engineer, military police, and aviation assets toaccomplish this mission.

Operations to deny movement of belligerentparties may involve the denial of air movement(air exclusion zone/no-fly zone) or overlandmovement to a specified area. The objective is toprevent the harassment of an unprotected popu-lation by the use of combat aircraft or to preventthe delivery of military supplies to a belligerent.Ground forces may conduct these operations bysealing a border to prevent passage.

Land forces may employ a wide range offorces to fulfill these missions, including airdefense forces to deny flight. Safe operation ofair defense forces will require the coordinatedoffensive use of electronic emissions, as well asaccess to strategic and tactical intelligence assess-ments. The joint headquarters will determineday-to-day deployment of these assets.


An example of guarantee of movementand the application of PE techniquesusing the principle of restraint in opera-tions other than war (OOTW) occurred inPanama in 1989. In the wake of continu-ing confrontation with the PanamaDefense Forces (PDF) and with thedeployment of additional forces to Pan-ama from Operation Nimrod Dancer, USforces conducted exercises called Pur-ple Storm and later Sand Fleas. Theirpurpose was to enforce to the maximumthe Panama Canal Treaty guaranteedrights of movement within Panama.

During these exercises, when US forcesencountered interference with treatyrights to movement, the commander onthe scene (a squad or platoon leader, forexample) consulted a card. It authorizedsuch actions as inserting a magazineinto a weapon, fixing bayonets, cockingthe weapon, issuing a warning, or open-ing fire. A senior military commanderapproved each step. At the same time,high performance aircraft flew low-levelflights and armed helicopters hovered atthe scene. Another technique used artil-lery to fire illumination or smoke rounds,demonstrating the capability to fire morelethal ammunition. In every case thePDF withdrew or ceased their offensive

behavior.

Enforcement of Sanctions

Sanctions concern the denial of sup-plies, diplomatic and trading privileges, andfreedom of movement to a sanctioned state.They are usually applied only when diplo-macy and less confrontational methods ofconflict resolution have failed. Used alone,

FM 100-23

9

• The presence of heavy weapons as a deter-rent capa-bility.

� A heavy reliance on air and sea interdiction.

� Execution of coordinated and uniform responsesto all challenges to mandated sanctions.

� Use of electronic emissions to ensure the safetyof the task force.

� A capability to sustain operations over extendedperiods of time.

Land forces may be required to enforce sanc-tions bydenying overland movement of supplies to the sanc-tioned party. Additionally, individual soldiers mayperform duties as inspectors at key transit points, en-suring that no proscribed items enter the territory ofthe sanctioned party. The use of force is implicit in thismission.Establishment and Supervisionof Protected Zones

As part of a conflict resolution effort,protected zones may be established. These

sanctions do not generally cause a govern-ment partyto change its behavior. However, they can reduce astate�s combat capability. To achieve a significant levelof effective-ness, sanctions must be�

• Imposed with the consent of a widely based group ofnations, including the unanimous support of the re-gional and neighboring states of the belligerent par-ties.

• Planned on a systematic basis, with the assis-tance ofindustrial/logistics intelligence, to withhold only thefacilities (communica-tions, commercial) or suppliesthat are criti-cal to the aggressive activities of the tar-get nation. Sanctions should not be used to vic-timizeinnocent people.

• Enforced on a regionwide cooperative basis to denyprohibited supplies and facilities to the target nation.

A military force involved in enforcing sanc-tions mayinclude�

• Joint air, land, and sea warfighting capabilities.

Establishment of protected zones is part of the conflict-resolution effort.

FM 100-23

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zones are geographic entities that may con-tain substantial numbers of forces of one ormore of the belligerent parties cut off fromthe main body of troops. Alternatively, thesezones may contain large numbers of minori-ties or refugees that are subject to persecu-tion by one of the belligerent parties (seeFigure 1-2).

Land forces may be charged with establish-ment and supervision, to include defense, ofsuch zones. Such supervision may involve theprovision of significant amounts of humanitarianassistance. The existence of these zones may bechallenged by the belligerent party on whose ter-ritory they are established, as they represent a

challenge to the sovereignty or control of thatstate or territory. Land forces must be preparedfor operations by belligerent parties that threatenall or parts of the zone.

Figure 1-2. Example of a Protected Zone


UN action in northern Iraq following theGulf War (1991) established protectedzones for Iraq's Kurds. The zones wereincidental to the provision of humanitar-ian assistance for the Kurds prior to turn-ing the effort over to civil agencies

(Operation Provide Comfort).

Silopi

Turkey

Iraq

Syria

Great Z

abTigris

•

•

•

PirincinkenKaniMasi

Cukurca

AlamadiyahSir SenkZakho

SinjiBatufaBaloka

The 43 Kurdish refugee camps operated by coalition forces during Operation Provide Comfort sheltered more than 500,000 refugees.

Coalition forces secured the major cities in the zone and helped the Kurds return to their homes in northern Iraq.Dahuk

In-ProcessingCenter

CommunityCenter

More than 250,000 Kurdish refugees stayed in this and other transit camps during May 1991 as they traveled to their homes in the coalition-protected security zone.

Zakho 10 KM

North

Transit Camp 3 Near Zakho, Iraq

0 100 200 300

Meters

MP CampFrankfurt South

Marine CampTurner Village

Dutch CampFalcon Crest

Spanish CampSol

Italian CampNisida

Legend

Way stations where gasoline, water, food, and medical supplies were available.

miles

50

25

kilometers0 25

0

FM 100-23

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As a result, land forces suited for this mis-sion are predominately combat and CS units.They may require a full range of organic andsupporting weapons, as well as access to closeair support. Since protected zones may not becontiguous to friendly territory, logistics supportmay be a significant challenge.

CA and PSYOP information operations maybe key to the effort in establishing and sustainingthe protected zones. CA units may be required toorganize local governmental organizations on atemporary basis, pending resolution of the con-flict.

Forcible Separation of Belligerents

It may become necessary to intervene in aconflict in order to establish the conditions nec-essary for peace against the will of one or moreof the belligerent parties. Forcible separation ofbelligerent parties is the ultimate means tocounter a serious threat to peace and securityand should be used only when all other means ofconflict resolution have been exhausted. This

activity will require the use of sufficient force,but only the minimum offensive action consis-tent with achieving the enforcement objectivemay be used. PE forces involved are likely to bemultinational and joint in composition and willrequire an offensive capability and necessarylogistics support (see Figure 1-3).

Under these circumstances, PE forces may beemployed to forcibly separate the belligerentparties. This may involve reducing or eliminat-ing the combat capability of one or more of theparties. Commanders must consider that one ormore of the belligerent forces may see this ascause for aggression against the PE force.

The degree of resistance to PE operationsmay be proportional to the credibility of the sep-arating force. The threat of force may serve as apowerful inducement to the engaged belligerentparties to separate. PE operations will normallyrequire the establishment of a disengagementline or demilitarized zone. Establishment of thisline or zone will require the separating force tointerpose itself between belligerent parties.

CP

CP

CP

CP

CP

OBJ

OBJ

OBJ

AA AA

AAAA

BufferZone

BufferLine A

BufferLine B

CFL

LC

AssemblyArea

Airhead

Figure 1-3. Separation of Belligerent Parties

FM 100-23

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The commander, in deciding on the specificcourse of action to forcibly separate belligerentparties, should consider—

• If sufficient forces are available.

• The antagonism between the belligerent par-ties.

• The lethality of the weapon systems used bythe belligerent parties.

• The degree of intermingling of the civilianpopulation with the belligerent parties.

• The content of the mandate.

When planning operations to separate bel-ligerent parties, the commander should considerthe entire range of combat operations if—

• A high degree of animosity exists betweenthe belligerent parties and/or the PE force.

• Modern, highly lethal weapons are available.

• Low intermingling of the civilian populationexists.

• The mandate has maximum flexibility.

The commander must consider that the endstate is not to destroy the belligerent parties butto force their disengagement. As the commanderdevelops the situation, he should array his forcesand adjust his tempo so that the belligerent par-ties have an option to disengage and withdrawout of an established or emerging buffer ordemilitarized zone. If they are not predisposedto withdrawal, then the only alternative is topursue the operation vigorously to its conclu-sion.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT

US policy distinguishes between PK and PE.Both are classified as peace operations. However,they are not part of a continuum allowing a unitto move freely from one to the other. A broaddemarcation separates these operations. Theytake place under vastly different circumstancesinvolving the variables of consent, force, andimpartiality. A force tailored for PK may lack suf-ficient combat power for PE. Since PK and PE aredifferent, any change must require review of thefactors of mission, enemy, troops, terrain, andtime available (METT-T) and force tailoring. On

the other hand, a force tailored for PE can accom-plish PK missions, provided belligerent partiesaccept their presence. Generally, a contingentthat has been conducting operations under a PEmandate should not be used in a PK role in thatsame mission area because the impartiality andconsent divides have been crossed during theenforcement operation. Commanders mustunderstand these key differences. The crucialdiscriminators between PK and PE consist of theoperational variables:

Consent

In PK, belligerent parties consent to the pres-ence and operations of PK forces, while in PEconsent is not absolute and force may be used tocompel or coerce. In PK, consent is clear.

Force

In PK, force may only be used in self-defenseor defense with a mandate. In PE, force is used tocompel or coerce.

Impartiality

In PK, impartiality is more easily main-tained, while the nature of PE strains the percep-tion of impartiality on the part of the PE force(see the following paragraph on THE VARI-ABLES).

THE VARIABLES

Peace operations are conducted in a dynamicenvironment shaped by a number of factors andvariables that strongly influence the manner inwhich operations can be conducted. Successfulcommanders grasp the importance of these vari-ables.

The critical variables of peace operations arethe

level of consent,

the

level of force,

and the

degreeof impartiality.

The degree to which these threevariables are present plays a major role in deter-mining the nature of the peace operation andforce-tailoring mix. They are not constant andmay individually or collectively shift during thecourse of an operation.

Commanders who are aware of these vari-ables and the direction in which they tend tomove may be more successful in influencing

FM 100-23

13

them and thereby controlling the operational set-ting. In order to exercise control, they must beable to influence the variables and the pace anddirection of change. Success in peace operationsoften hinges on the ability to exercise situationaldominance with respect to the variables; failureis often the result of losing control of one or moreof them. Commanders must avoid inadvertentlyslipping from one type of peace operation toanother. Figure 1-4 shows expected levels of con-sent, force, and impartiality during the differenttypes of operations. Assessments of the level ofconsent are political-military in nature and possi-bly policy driven. Such assessments are factors indetermining force tailoring for operations.

LEVEL OF CONSENT

In war, consent is not an issue of concern forthe military commander. In peace operations,however, the level of consent determines funda-mentals of the operation. One side may consentin whole or in part, multiple parties may con-sent, there may be no consent, or the consentmay vary dramatically over time.

In a traditional PK operation, loss of consentmay lead to an uncontrolled escalation of vio-lence and profoundly change the nature of theoperation. Any decline of consent is therefore ofsignificant concern to the peace operation com-mander and may unfavorably influence the sub-sequent development of the campaign. Thecrossing of the

consent divide

from PK to PE is apolicy level decision that fundamentally changesthe nature of the operation. Commanders shouldavoid hasty or ill-conceived actions that uninten-tionally cause a degradation of the level andextent of consent.

LEVEL OF FORCE

Peace operations cover a broad range of mili-tary operations. While traditional PK is generallynonviolent, PE may include very violent combatactions. The need to employ force may begin acycle of increasing violence; therefore, com-manders must be judicious in employing forcefulmeasures and must understand the relationshipbetween force and the desired end state. Of thethree variables, the level of force is usually theonly one over which the commander can exertdominant influence. Operational level com-manders or higher authorities will usuallydecide about the use of force in this context(other than self-defense).

DEGREE OF IMPARTIALITY

A peace operation is likewise influenced bythe degree to which the force acts in an impartialmanner and the degree to which the belligerentparties perceive the force to be impartial. PKrequires an impartial, even-handed approach. PEalso involves impartiality, which may changeover time and with the nature of operations. Aneven-handed and humanitarian approach to allsides of the conflict can improve the prospectsfor lasting peace and security, even when combatoperations are underway. Compromised impar-tiality may trigger an uncontrollable escalationfrom a PK to a PE situation by crossing the con-sent divide.

In circumstances where the required degreeof impartiality is unclear, the commander mustpress the authorizing body for clarity since mis-understanding can be disastrous. A basic under-standing of PK missions is essential to

Figure 1-4. Operational Variables

VariablesSupport to

DiplomacyPeacekeeping

Peace

Enforcement

Consent High High Low

Force Low Low(self-defense/defense of

mandate from interference)

Sufficient to compel/coerce

Impartiality High High Low

FM 100-23

14

differentiate PK from PE missions. PK enjoyshigh levels of consent and impartiality and lowlevels of force (generally only in self-defense),while PE is marked by the reverse. Regardless ofthe type of operations, commanders shouldalways strive to increase levels of consent andimpartiality and reduce the levels of force.

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Other factors may include—

• The geopolitical situation.

• Prevailing social conditions and cultures.

• The scale of conflict or effectiveness of acease-fire.

• The number, discipline, and accountabilityof contending parties.

• The efficacy of local government.

• The degree to which law and order exists.

• The prevailing attitude and willingness ofthe population at large to cooperate.

In peace operations, national and interna-tional news media coverage plays a major role inquickly framing public debate and shaping pub-lic opinion. The news media serves as a forumfor the analysis and critique of goals, objectives,and actions. It can impact political, strategic, andoperational planning; decisions; and missionsuccess and failure. Therefore, commandersshould involve themselves in information opera-tions.

Humanitarian assistance

is not included in thedefinition of peace operations; however HA pro-grams will probably be conducted simulta-neously in almost every peace operation.Normally limited in their scope and duration,HA projects have a significant impact onresources required and other aspects of peaceoperations. HA programs will often take placefollowing PE. HA includes programs conductedto relieve or reduce the results of complex emer-gencies involving natural or man-made disastersor other endemic conditions such as humanpain, disease, hunger, or privation that mightpresent a serious threat to life or that may resultin great damage or loss of property. HA supple-ments or complement the efforts of a host nation,civil authorities, or agencies that may have pri-mary responsibility for HA.

HA are normally be conducted by a jointtask force and in concert with nongovernmentorganizations (NGOs) and private voluntaryorganizations (PVOs). Depending on the situa-tion, it may be necessary to stage HA operationsfrom a third country or from the sea. Normally, itis necessary to establish a base of operations inthe AO that includes both CS and CSS units andArmy Materiel Command (AMC) logistics sup-port element (LSE) units. Special operationsunits such as Special Forces operationaldetachments-A (SFODAs) and civil affairs directsupport teams (CADSTs) may also play a keyrole, particularly in the provision of medical andsanitation assistance. They may also assist incommunicating with local populations andassisting logistics elements in securing support.HA tasks include—

• Distribution of relief supplies.

• Transportation of relief supplies and civil-ians.

• Provision of health services.

• Provision of essential services.

• Resettlement of dislocated civilians.

• Disposition of human remains.

• Establishment of essential facilities.

Units conducting HA actions deploy withweapons. In a permissive environment, soldierscarry an assigned weapon for self-defense.Deployed civilians may carry a weapon, ifauthorized and trained.

Private organizations that provide HAshould be included in a commander's assess-ment of a peace operation. They generally fallinto one of three categories: NGOs, PVOs, andUN organizations. Appendix B lists examples ofsuch organizations. NGOs and PVOs may beprofessional associations, foundations, multina-tional businesses, or simply groups with a com-mon interest in HA activities (development andrelief).

NGOs, PVOs, and UN organizations play animportant role in providing HA and support tohost nations. They can relieve a commander ofthe need to resource some civil-military opera-tions. Because of the extent of their involvementor experience in various nations and because of

FM 100-23

15

their local contacts, these organizations may be avaluable source of information on local andregional governments, civilian attitudes towardthe peace operation, and local support or labor.However, some organizations may prefer toavoid a close affiliation with military forces forfear of compromising their position with thelocal populace.

On occasion, the US Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) and other relief organiza-tions provide funding for civil engineering infra-structure projects. NGOs and PVOs have theability to respond quickly and effectively todisaster relief, food distribution needs, and pro-grams aimed at addressing the root causes ofpoverty and vulnerability to disaster. While con-tinuing to be responsive to immediate humanneeds, particularly in emergency situations,NGOS and PVOs increasingly contribute to long-term development activities crucial to improvingconditions in the developing world.

In addition to HA, the US has supportednumerous UN and non-UN-sponsored peaceefforts with

financial

and

logistical support.

Finan-cial support is often the principal form of USsupport to international peace operations, espe-cially UN-sponsored peace operations. Althoughparticipating countries may fund the operationin certain cases, the UN, through the contribu-tions of its members, funds the costs in others.

The US may also provide logistics support inthe form of equipment and supplies, as well asby providing airlift and sealift for US and otherpeace operations contingents. The United Statesis one of the few nations capable of providing theintertheater airlift and sealift necessary to deployand redeploy peace operations forces around theworld. Additionally,

The United Nations Participa-tion Act of 1945

2

authorizes the President to pro-vide reimbursable logistics support to UN forces.

THE PRINCIPLES

The principles of OOTW, as outlined inFM 100-5, apply to the conduct of peace opera-tions. Although peace operations are clearlyOOTW, many tasks at the tactical and opera-tional levels may require the focused and sus-

2.

Public Law 79-264 as amended.

tained application of force. This is particularlytrue of PE actions. Thus, while the principles ofOOTW provide guidance for the conduct of thegreat majority of peace operations, the principlesof war and doctrine for conduct of war inFM 100-5 must be included in the planning pro-cess for all peace operations. The principles ofpeace operations follow.

OBJECTIVE

Direct every military operation toward a clearlydefined, decisive, and attainable objective.

A clearly defined and attainable objective—with a precise understanding of what constitutessuccess—is critical when the US is involved inpeace operations. Military commanders shouldunderstand specific conditions that could resultin mission failure as well as those that mark suc-cess. Commanders must understand the strate-gic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensurethese aims and objectives contribute to unity ofeffort with other agencies.

The Mandate and Terms of Reference

In peace operations, a mandate normally setsforth an objective and is a resolution approvedby a competent authorizing entity such as theUN Security Council or the US Government inthe case of unilateral actions. In any case, the res-olution and follow-on terms of reference (TOR)delineate the role and tasks for the force as wellas the resources to be used. See Annexes A and Bto Appendix A.

The mandate should express the politicalobjective and international support for the oper-ation and define the desired end state. Militarycommanders with unclear mandates should takethe initiative to redefine, refine, or restate themandate for consideration by higher authority.The following considerations are of concern tocommanders in regard to the mandate and thefollow-on TOR for the operation:

• Rules of engagement (ROE).

• Force protection.

• Limitations of a geographical nature.

• Limitations on the duration of the operation.

• Relationships with belligerent parties.

FM 100-23

16

• Relationships with others such as NGOs orPVOs.

• Financing and personnel resources.

The End State

The end state describes the required condi-tions that, when achieved, attain the strategicand political objectives or pass the main effort toother national or international agencies toachieve the final strategic end state. The endstate describes what the authorizing entitydesires the situation to be when operations con-clude.

Since peace operations are intended to createor support conditions conducive to a negotiatedconflict resolution, they always complement dip-lomatic, economic, informational, or humanitar-ian efforts. The peace operation should not beviewed as an end in itself, but as part of a largerprocess that must take place concurrently.

UNITY OF EFFORT

Seek unity of effort in every operation.

This principle is derived from the principleof war,

unity of command.

US forces will retainunity of command within their contingents.Unity of effort emphasizes the need for directingall means to a common purpose. However, inpeace operations, achieving unity of effort iscomplicated by the numbers of nonmilitaryorganizational participants (including NGOsand PVOs), the lack of definitive commandarrangements among them, and varying viewsof the objective. These factors require that com-manders, or other designated directors of theoperation, rely heavily on consensus-building toachieve unity of effort.

Commanders may answer to a civilian chiefor may themselves employ the resources of acivilian agency. Fundamental to the successfulexecution of the peace operation is the timelyand effective coordination of the efforts of allagencies involved. Commanders must seek anatmosphere of cooperation to achieve unity ofeffort.

Whenever possible, commanders shouldseek to establish a control structure, such as acivil-military operations center, that takes

account of and provides coherence to the activi-ties of all elements in the area. As well as militaryoperations, this structure should include thepolitical, civil, administrative, legal, and human-itarian activities involved in the peace operation.Without such a structure, military commandersneed to consider how their actions contribute toinitiatives that are also diplomatic, economic,and informational. This requirement necessitatesextensive liaison with all involved parties, aswell as reliable communications. Because peaceoperations often involve small-unit activities, toavoid friction, all levels must understand themilitary-civilian relationship.

A single, identifiable authority competent tolegitimize and support a peace operation, bothpolitically and materially, is essential. Theappointment of an individual or agency to exe-cute the policies of the parties to an agreementresults in more effective control of an operation.Such control is exercised at the interface pointbetween the operational structure and the bodythat authorizes the operation and appoints theauthority. This characteristic is related to andserves to reinforce the principle of unity of effort.

In many cases the legitimizing authority forPK is the UN, although other international orga-nizations may assume this role. In suchinstances, the UN or other body is the competentauthority and ensures single-manager control.This authority may be delegated or subcon-tracted to a subordinate body. In some non-UNoperations, a state or coalition of states may bethe competent authority.

SECURITY

Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unex-pected advantage.

In peace operations, security deals with forceprotection as a dynamic of combat power againstvirtually any person, element, or hostile group.These could include terrorists, a group opposedto the operation, criminals, and even looters.

Commanders should be constantly ready toprevent, preempt, or counter activity that couldbring significant harm to units or jeopardize mis-sion accomplishment. In peace operations, com-manders should not be lulled into believing thatthe nonhostile intent of their mission protects

FM 100-23

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their force. The inherent right of self-defense,from unit to individual level, applies in all peaceoperations at all times.

Security, however, requires more than physi-cal protective measures. A force's security is sig-nificantly enhanced by its perceived legitimacyand impartiality, the mutual respect builtbetween the force and the other parties involvedin the peace operation, and the force's credibilityin the international arena. Effective publicaffairs, PSYOP, and CA programs enhance secu-rity. In PE, security involves demonstrations ofinherent military capability and preparedness.Sustainment training, as well as the overt pres-ence of uncommitted mobile combat poweravailable as a reserve, may also enhance security.

In a peace operation security and force pro-tection may extend beyond the commander'sforces to civil agencies and NGOs. Additionally,the transparency required for peace operationsmay preclude the use of some force-protectiontechniques such as camouflage.

RESTRAINT

Apply appropriate military capability prudently.

Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels ofviolence characterize the environment of peaceoperations. The use of excessive force mayadversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legiti-macy and impede the attainment of both short-and long-term goals. These restraints should beclearly spelled out in the ROE provided for theoperation by higher authority.

In PK, force is used only in self-defense ordefense of the mandate from interference. In PE,force may be used to coerce. It may have far-reaching international political consequences.The use of force may attract a response in kind.Its use may also escalate tension and violence inthe local area and embroil peace operationstroops in a harmful, long-term conflict contraryto their aims. For that reason, the use of forceshould be a last resort and, whenever possible,should be used when other means of persuasionare exhausted.

Commanders should always seek to de-esca-late and not inflame an incident or crisis when-ever possible. Alternatives to force should befully explored before armed action is taken. They

include mediation and negotiation, which maybe used to reconcile opponents, both to oneanother and the peace operation force.

In many societies, self-esteem and grouphonor are of great importance and simple face-saving measures to preserve a party's dignitymay serve to relax tension and defuse a crisis.Other alternatives to the use of force includedeterrence; control measures, such as pre-planned or improvised roadblocks, cordons, andcheckpoints; warnings; and demonstrations orshows of force. As a rule—to limit escalation—conciliatory, deterrent, controlling, and warningactions should be carried out on the spot and atthe lowest possible level.

In PE, force must be employed with restraintappropriate to the situation. In PE operations,the use of force is the primary characteristic thatdetermines the nature of the operation, andauthority for its use should be clear and unam-biguous in the mandate. In all cases, force will beprudently applied proportional to the threat. Inpeace operations, every soldier must be awarethat the goal is to produce conditions that areconducive to peace and not to the destruction ofan enemy. The enemy is the conflict, although attimes such operations assume the character ofmore traditional combat operations. The unre-strained use of force will prejudice subsequentefforts at achieving settlement.

This principle does not preclude the applica-tion of sufficient or overwhelming force whenrequired to establish situational dominance, todisplay US resolve and commitment, to protectUS or indigenous lives and property, or toaccomplish other critical objectives. The princi-ple of restraint will permeate considerations con-cerning ROE, the choice of weapons andequipment, and control measures such as weap-ons control status. When force is used, it shouldbe precise and overwhelming to minimizefriendly and noncombatant casualties and collat-eral damage. Precision and high-technologyweaponry may help reduce casualties.

PERSEVERANCE

Prepare for the measured, sustained applicationof military capability in support of strategic aims.

FM 100-23

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While some peace operations may be ofshort duration, most require long-term commit-ments that involve more than military effortsalone. Underlying causes of confrontation andconflict rarely have a clear beginning or a deci-sive resolution. Commanders need to assessactions against their contribution to long-term,strategic objectives.

Perseverance requires an information strat-egy that clearly explains the goals, objectives,and desired end states and links them with USinterests and concerns. The long-term nature ofmany peace operations must be continuallyemphasized, without giving the impression ofpermanency.

LEGITIMACY

Sustain the willing acceptance by the people ofthe right of the government to govern or a group oragency to make and carry out decisions.

Legitimacy is a condition growing from theperception of a specific audience of the legality,morality, and correctness of a set of actions. It isinitially derived from the mandate authorizingand directing the conduct of operations. How-ever, the perception of legitimacy can only besustained with the US public, US forces, indige-nous parties, and the international community ifoperations are conducted with scrupulousregard for international norms on the use of mili-tary forces and regard for humanitarian princi-ples. Commanders must be aware of theauthority under which they operate and the rela-tionship between it and the other sources oflegitimacy that are present. During operationswhere a clearly legitimate government does notexist, using extreme caution in dealing with indi-viduals and organizations will avoid inadvert-ently legitimizing them. The conduct ofinformation operations, to include public affairs,CA, and PSYOP programs, can enhance bothdomestic and international perceptions of thelegitimacy of an operation.

In PK operations, the impartiality of peace-keepers and the sponsoring state, states, or inter-national organization is critical to success andthe legitimacy of the operation. It must be dem-onstrated at all times, in all dealings, and underall circumstances, whether operational, social, oradministrative. All activities must be conducted

without favor to either side or point of view.Because of the nature of PE operations, impar-tiality and legitimacy may be harder to obtainand sustain. Legitimacy also reinforces themorale and esprit of the peace operations force.


Of 22 UN PK operations conductedbetween 1947 and 1991, about one-fourth derived from the UN SecurityCouncil. An example is UNTSO, whichwas established in 1948 as a result ofthe conflict in the Middle East. Anotherone-fourth were requested by belligerentparties in a local conflict, for example,the UN Military Observer Group in Indiaand Pakistan established in 1948 at therequest of India because of the Kashmirdispute. The remaining operationsresulted from brokered requests by thirdparties who asked for UN help, for exam-ple, when the US mediated the UN Dis-engagement Observer Force, which wasestablished in 1974 as a result of the

October War.

Legitimacy is in some cases also a function ofbalance. Balance refers to the geographic, politi-cal, and functional makeup or composition of thepeace operations force. Balance is a function ofconsent and operational need. In PK operations,the belligerent parties may insist that the forcecontain elements from countries that are mutu-ally acceptable and geopolitically balanced interms of regional or political affiliation. In PEoperations, balance may be a less critical consid-eration.

THE TENETS

The tenets of Army operations, as describedin FM 100-5, apply to peace operations as well.These basic truths held by the Army describe thesuccessful characteristics of peace operationsand are fundamental to success.

FM 100-23

19

VERSATILITY

Versatility is an essential quality of peaceoperations. Commanders must be able to shiftfocus, tailor forces, and move rapidly and effec-tively from one role or mission to another. How-ever, versatility does not imply an inadvertentshifting of missions between PK and PE. Versatil-ity implies the capacity to be multifunctional.Versatility requires competence in a variety offunctions and skills. It ensures that units arecapable of conducting the full range of peaceoperations with the same degree of success.

INITIATIVE

In peace operations, initiative implies thatthe peace operations force controls events ratherthan letting the environment control events.Commanders must ensure that the belligerentparties do not exercise control over the flow ofevents to the detriment of one or the other.Within the limits of the mandate, commandersmust further the process of conciliation. Com-manders must anticipate belligerent actions anduse the means available to forestall, preempt, ornegate acts that do not further the process. In PE,commanders may gain initiative by possessing acombined arms force that demonstrates its fullrange of capabilities without directly challengingany one party to the conflict.

AGILITY

In peace operations, agility is the ability toreact faster than other parties and is essential forholding the initiative. As commanders perceivechanges to their environment, they devise imagi-native methods of applying their resources tothose changes and act quickly to gain control ofthe events. For example, in PK, Army forces

might attempt to defuse conditions that couldotherwise lead to a resumption of fighting byrecognizing the inherent dangers and by resolv-ing grievances before they ignite into open com-bat. A situational awareness that perceives andanticipates changes in the environment, com-bined with the ability to act quickly within theintent of higher commanders, leads to an agilityin peace operations that is vital to successful out-comes. Rehearsals will enhance agility.

DEPTH

Depth extends peace operations activities intime, space, resources, and purpose to affect theenvironment and the conditions to be resolved.In their campaign planning, commanders envi-sion simultaneous activities and sequentialstages that lead to solutions. PK may begin withan initial objective of observing a cease-fire,move to postconflict activities such as peacebuilding, and involve many resources—not onlymilitary but also diplomatic, humanitarian, andinformational.

SYNCHRONIZATION

Synchronization implies the maximum useof every resource to make the greatest contribu-tion to success. In peace operations, the manyplayers involved and increased emphasis on useof CA and PSYOP assets will be important con-siderations.To achieve this requires the anticipa-tion that comes from thinking in depth, masteryof time-space-purpose relationships, and a com-plete understanding of the ways in which thebelligerent parties in a peace operation interact.Commanders must understand how all partieswill view their actions. Synchronization is essen-tial to sustaining legitimacy by maintaining theperception of impartiality.

20

CHAPTER 2

Command, Control, Coordination, and Liaison

Consensus will be important . . . .

Teamwork and trust are essential.

FM 100-5

US military forces conducting peace operations may do so as part of a uni-lateral US operation or as part of a multinational force led by the US oranother nation. This chapter discusses the various command, control, coordi-nation, and liaison requirements for forces conducting peace operations. Thecommand arrangements of US forces committed to a unilateral or multina-tional peace operation vary with the type of operation (Figure 2-1), the level ofUS involvement, and the nature of the international organization chargedwith the operation. FM 100-8

1

provides details on the various commandarrangements that apply to peace operations for forces under national control,dual control, or with a lead nation command structure. The latter is furtherdepicted with national or multinational subordinate formations, allied subor-dinate formations, or integrated formations. In most instances, elements willoperate as part of a joint force. Joint Publication 3-0

2

fully addresses the com-mand relationships for such operations. Other agencies, both government andnongovernment, invariably participate in these operations as well. This chap-ter addresses coordination and cooperation with such agencies

1.

Multinational Operations.

2.

Doctrine for Joint Operations,

9 September 1993.

Figure 2-1. Types of Command Arrangements

Unilateral US operation

• US acts alone• Responds only to NCA

Multinational operationUS as lead nation

• US leads operation• Mandate from international organization• Reports to organization and US NCA

Multinational operation US in support

• US is not lead nation• US contribution may be combat or logistics• Mandate from international organization• US reports to organization and US NCA


FM 100-23

21

COMMAND AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

Command is central to all military actions,and unity of command is central to unity ofeffort. A common understanding of commandrelationships will facilitate the required unity ofeffort. Various multinational directives whichdelineate the degree of authority that may beexercised by a multinational commander andprocedures that ensure unity of effort will setforth command relationships. These proceduresshould include provisions regarding if, when,and how the transfer of authority from nationalcommand to multinational command may takeplace. The authority vested in a commandermust be commensurate with the responsibilityassigned. Ideally, the coalition or alliance willdesignate a single military commander to directthe multinational efforts of the participatingforces. Command and support relationships willlikely include terms similar to those used in USjoint relationships, for example,

operational con-trol (OPCON), tactical control (TACON), support,coordinating authority,

or terms that identify asimilar type of authority such as

operational com-mand (OPCOM)

or

tactical command (TACOM).

These terms, including NATO terms, are definedin the glossary.

UNILATERAL OPERATIONS

Even though most peace operations havebeen conducted by a coalition of forces, the USreserves the right to conduct a peace operationunilaterally, as it did in Lebanon in 1958. Fre-quently, a peace operation that begins unilater-ally may transition to a coalition operation. TheUS operation to provide and protect humanitar-ian assistance in Somalia began in 1992 as a US-only operation and transitioned to a US-led coa-lition and, later, UN-led operation. Because theUS possesses the unique capability to rapidlydeploy by strategic lift, it may find itself initiallyforced to conduct peace operations unilaterallyuntil a coalition can be assembled.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

The US has tried to avoid purely unilateraloperations. The operation in the DominicanRepublic in 1965 (Figure 2-2), for example, was

under the aegis of the Organization of AmericanStates (OAS). More recently, Operation ProvideComfort included a coalition of forces from othernations under the sponsorship of the UN. USforces may participate in a US-led coalition suchas Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) or a non-US led coalition such as Operation Able Sentry(FYROM) (Figure 2-3). In either case, US forceswill be committed to execute mandates spon-sored by the UN or other international orregional organizations such as OAS or the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Theseoperations may be divided into two categories—UN- or non-UN-sponsored.

The effectiveness of multinational opera-tions will be improved by—

• Establishing rapport and harmony amongsenior multinational commanders. Onlycommanders can develop such a personal,direct relationship. The keys are respect,trust, and the ability to compromise. Theresult will be successful teamwork and unityof effort.

• Respecting multinational partners and theirideas, culture, religion, and customs. Suchrespect (consideration and acceptance)shows each partner's importance to the alli-ance or coalition.


In 1900, the US Army participated in the firstmultinational operation since the Revolution-ary War in the Boxer Rebellion in China. InPeking, foreign legations from several nationswere besieged by members of the secret anti-foreign society known as the Righteous, Har-monious Fists—the Boxers. British AdmiralE.H. Seymour headed a coalition of British,German, Russian, French, American, Japa-nese, Italian, and Austrian forces to rescue theforeign legations. The US contingent com-manded by MG Adna R. Chaffee was com-posed of two infantry regiments, a cavalryregiment, a Marine battalion, and a field artil-lery battery. A multinational force eventually

forced the Boxers out of Peking.

FM 100-23

22

• Assigning missions appropriate to each mul-tinational partner's capabilities. Multina-tional partners' opinions should be soughtduring the planning process. National honorand prestige may significantly impact mis-sion assignment.

• Ensuring that multinational partners havenecessary resources to accomplish theirassigned missions. Cross-leveling amongpartners may be required.

• Ensuring concerted action through liaisoncenters. The ability to communicate in apartner's native language is importantbecause it enhances and facilitates liaison.

• Enabling all partners to operate together inthe most effective manner and to make themost efficient and economical use ofresources. Standardization agreements arethe result of rationalization, standardiza-tion, interoperability (RSI) efforts in alli-ances. These agreements may be appropriatefor rapid adoption by coalitions.

Command (US & OAS)Political guidance (OAS)Consultation (OAS –US)Informal consultation (US)Coordination & advice (US)

LEGEND

Cdr Latin AmericanBrigade

InfantryBattalion Fraternity

Battalion

US Ambassador toDominican Republic

Secretaryof State

Secretaryof Defense

CINCLANT

Cdr USFORDOMREP

Cdr 82d Abn Div

President

Cdr IAPF

OAS Commission toDominican Republic

OAS

X

X

Figure 2-2. US and OAS Relationships

FM 100-23

23

• Ensuring all multinational members' effortsare focused on a common goal to produceunity of effort.

• Knowing and understanding the capabilitiesof multinational partners as well as or betterthan you know the belligerent parties—frommovement and maneuver to logistical sup-port.

UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS

The great majority of US peace operationswill be part of a UN peace operation. Their mul-tinational character merits particular attention.National interests and organizational influencemay compete with doctrine and efficiency. Con-sensus is painstakingly difficult, and solutionsare often national in character. Commanders canexpect contributing nations to adhere to nationalpolicies and priorities, which at times compli-cates the multinational effort.

United Nations-sponsored operations nor-mally employ a force under a single commander.The force commander is appointed by the secre-tary general (SYG) with the consent of the UNSecurity Council. The force commander reportseither to a special representative of the SYG ordirectly to the SYG. While the force commanderconducts day-to-day operations with fairly widediscretionary powers, he refers all policy mattersto the special representative or SYG for resolu-tion.

The force commander's staff will be multina-tional. Its national membership may sometimesbe based on the percentage of troops on theground. It is normally composed of a personalstaff, a military staff, and a civilian component.The composition and functions of the personaland military staff correspond closely to thosefound in US forces. The international civilianstaff is augmented with local civilians hired toprovide basic logistics and administrative skills.

USEUCOM UNPROFOR

MacedoniaCommand

CommandCombatant CommandOperational Control

JTF Provide Promise(Zagreb)

USAREUR

Berlin Bde

TF 6-502

JTF Provide Promise(Naples)

LEGEND

Figure 2-3.

Command Structure for Operation Able Sentry

FM 100-23

24

Multinational operations are divided into two categories--Un- and non-UN-sponsored.

In any multinational operation, the UScom-mander retains command over all assignedUS forces. The US chain of command runs fromthe National Command Authorities (NCA) to thetheater CINC. The chain of command, from thePresident to the lowest US commander in the field,remains inviolate. Subject to prior NCA approval,a multinational force commander may exerciseappropriate and negotiated OPCON over US unitsin specific operations authorized by a legitimiz-ing authority such as the UN Secu-rity Council inUN operations. In addition to these control con-siderations, support relation-ships and arrange-ments may often be more appropriate to peaceoperations.

The degree of OPCON exercised over USunits must be coordinated and agreed to betweenthe superior multinational force com-mander andthe US theater CINC who provides the US forcessubordinate to the multinational force. This agree-ment must be in consonance with the NCA crite-ria for peace operations com-mand and controlarrangements. These criteria establish limits to the

OPCON that may be exer-cised over US units.Within these limits, a foreign UN commander can-not—

• Change the mission or deploy US forcesout-side the area of responsibility agreed toby the NCA.

• Separate units, redirect logistics and sup-plies, administer discipline, promote indi-viduals, or modify the internal organizationof US units.

Arrangements for support in these opera-tions may vary from one nation being responsi-ble for all logistics and support, to various par-ticipating nations being responsible for par-ticularaspects of an entire operation, to the spon-soringauthority providing equipment and supplies. Lo-gistics responsibilities are normally negotiated atthe time of force formation and should reflect anappreciation of various national capabilities aswell as proportionality. Simplicity is an impor-tant asset to consider in all peace

FM 100-23

25

operations. Facility requirements should be min-imized to avoid any perception of permanencybut be consistent with the anticipated durationof operations and the health and welfare of thetroops.

A national contingent consists of a nation'sentire contribution—its units as well as its staff

officers in the force headquarters. National con-tingent commanders report directly to the forcecommander.

National contingent commanders actin an advisory capacity to the UN force commanderand his staff on contingent matters.

Each unit commander is ultimately responsi-ble for accomplishing his mission, is responsibleto the force commander, and is responsible to hisnational chain of command. US units normallymaintain a direct line of communications to anappropriate US headquarters—normally the the-ater combatant commander. Other participantsin a coalition can be expected to maintain similarlines of communication (see Figure 2-4).

The national contingent commanders areresponsible for disciplinary action within theirown contingents and according to their nationalcodes of military law. Authority for national con-tingent commanders to carry out their nationallaws in the host nation's territory should beincluded in the agreement for the peace opera-tion. When US military unit commanders cannotresolve a matter with the UN commander, theywill refer the matter to a higher US authority.Such matters include orders that are illegal


US forces have served under temporaryOPCON of foreign commanders in oper-ations during the Revolutionary War, theBoxer Rebellion, World War I, World WarII, the Cold War (NATO), and OperationDesert Storm and in UN operations since1948. In Operation Desert Storm, a USbrigade from the 82d Airborne Divisionwas placed under OPCON of the French6th Light Armored Division. Their missionwas to screen the western flank of coali-

tion operations.

NationalGovernment

National Government

CINCPoliticalLeader

ForceCommander

USNationalForce

NationalForce

NationalForce

Command

OPCON, TACON, or Support

Advisory

LEGEND

Figure 2-4. Generic Multinational Command Structure

FM 100-23

26

under US or international law or are outside the man-date of the mission to which the US agreed with theUN. They also include guidance and constraints placedon US commanders by the US CINC. See Appendix Afor further details on UN operations.

Extract of General Principles 3

Chapter X - Strategic Direction and Command ofArmed Forces

Article 39

The command of national contingents will be exer-cised by commanders appointed by the respectivemember nations. These contin-gents will retain theirnational character and will be subject at all times tothe discipline and regulations in force in their own national armed forces.

Article 40

The commanders of national contingents will be en-titled to communicate directly with theauthorities of their own country on all matters.

NON-UNITED NATIONSOPERATIONS

While the UN is the organization most likely toundertake peace operations, a number of regional or-ganizations may perform this func-tion or the UN maydesignate a specific organi-zation as its operationalagent. Organizations such as NATO, the Organizationof African Unity, the OAS, and Conference on Securityand Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) have performed avariety of functions related to peace operations, to in-clude monitoring of elections. They also exe-cute peaceoperations within their areas of interest.

Each of these organizations will have differ-ent operational concepts and organizational pro-

cedures. In the case of NATO, these concepts and.procedures are well-established and US forces are ac-customed to operating within those guide-lines. In thecase of other international organiza-tions, these guide-lines may not be as well established or may be nonex-istent. Operations conducted under the aegis of suchorganizations will necessarily be more ad hoc in na-ture. In each of these operations the precise nature ofthe com-mand relationship between the US forces andthe international organization is subject to mutual reso-lution.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Commanders must consider the presence and ca-pabilities of NGOs and PVOs and coordi-nate and co-operate with their efforts. Command-ers can establisha CMOC. The CMOC may perform liaison and coordi-nation between the

3. Extracted from General Principles Governing theOrganiza-tion of Armed Forces made available to the Se-curity Council by member nations of the UN: Reportof the Military Staff Committee, 30 April 1947

Humanitarian assistance should be directedtoward the relief of immediate, life-threateningsuffering.

FM 100-23

27

military support structure, NGOs and PVOs,other agencies, and local authorities. Figure 2-5illustrates players that may interact with aCMOC. Commanders must understand thatNGOs and PVOs have valid missions and con-cerns, which at times may complicate the mis-sion of US forces. Relationships with nonmilitary

agencies are based on mutual respect, communi-cation, and standardization of support. Suchorganization are to be supported where feasiblein compliance with the mandate and militaryobjective (see Appendix B for further discussionof related organizations).

InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross

UN PoliticalDepartment(HumanitarianDiplomacy)

US Military

US Agencies

UN PeacekeepingDepartment(HumanitarianSecurity) • UN Special Representative • UN Observers

NGOs

Partners

Local Authorities

UN OperationalAgencies

Figure 2-5. Civil-Military Operations Center

FM 100-23

28

The Humanitarianism and War Project of the Thomas J. Watson, Jr.Institute for International Studies at Brown University, developed a set ofeight principles that figure prominently in deliberations by practitionersof humanitarian assistance. Commanders should be aware of the possibil-ity of specific dilemmas and tensions as they conduct peace operations insupport of HA.

PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION

IN ARMED CONFLICT

1

1.

Relieving Life-Threatening Suffering:

Humanitarian action should bedirected toward the relief of immediate, life-threatening suffering.

2.

Proportionality to Need:

Humanitarian action should correspond tothe degree of suffering, wherever it occurs. It should affirm the view thatlife is as precious in one part of the globe as another.

3.

Nonpartisanship:

Humanitarian action responds to human sufferingbecause people are in need, not to advance political, sectarian, or otheragendas. It should not take sides in conflicts.

4.

Independence:

In order to fulfill their mission, humanitarian organiza-tions should be free of interference from home or host political authori-ties. Humanitarian space is essential for effective action.

5.

Accountability:

Humanitarian organizations should report fully on theiractivities to sponsors and beneficiaries. Humanitarianism should betransparent.

6.

Appropriateness:

Humanitarian action should be tailored to local cir-cumstances and aim to enhance, not supplant, locally availableresources.

7.

Contextualization:

Effective humanitarian action should encompass acomprehensive view of overall needs and of the impact of interventions.Encouraging respect for human rights and addressing the underlyingcauses of conflicts are essential elements.

8.

Subsidiary of Sovereignty:

Where humanitarianism and sovereigntyclash, sovereignty should defer to the relief of life-threatening suffering.

1.

Quoted by permission of Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, co-directors, Humanitarian and War Project, from

Humanitarian Actions in Times of War.

Other widely recognized doc-uments have elaborated humanitarian principles. See, for example, “The Mohonk Crite-ria for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies,” produced by the Task Force on Ethical and Legal Issues in Humanitarian Assistance, convened by the Program on Humanitarian Assistance World Conference on Religion and Peace, February 1994.

FM 100-23

29

INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

Many peace operations are likely to be char-acterized by a high degree of interagency coordi-nation. Such coordination involves many of theagencies of the US Government, to include theDepartment of State, USAID, and others. Inter-agency operations facilitate the implementationof all elements of national power in a peace oper-ation and as a vital link uniting Department ofDefense (DOD) and other governmental depart-ments and agencies. Interagency operations arecritical to achieving strategic end states of peaceoperations.

Interagency operations facilitate unity andconsistency of effort, maximize use of nationalresources, and reinforce primacy of the politicalelement. A joint headquarters conducts inter-agency coordination and planning. For certainmissions, the joint headquarters may delegateauthority to the component for direct coordina-tion with other agencies. In all cases, the compo-nent must ensure appropriate authority exists fordirect coordination. Components may, in certainspecial missions, work directly with or foranother government agency. In such cases, directcoordination is authorized and commandarrangements are specified based on the situa-tion.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense andthe joint staff coordinate interagency operationsat the strategic level. This coordination estab-lishes the framework for coordination by com-manders at the operational and tactical levels. Insome cases—such as PK—Department of State(DOS) is the lead agency and DOD provides sup-port. In others—such as PE—DOD is the leadagency.

The combatant commander is the centralpoint for plans and implementing theater andregional strategies that require interagency coor-dination. The combatant commander may estab-lish an advisory committee to link his theaterstrategy to national policy goals and the objec-tives of DOS and concerned ambassadors. Mili-tary personnel may coordinate with other USGovernment agencies while operating directly

under an ambassador's authority, while workingfor a security assistance organization, or whileassigned to a regional combatant commander.

Coordination among DOD and other USGovernment agencies may occur in a countryteam or within a combatant command. Militarypersonnel working in interagency organizationsmust ensure that the ambassador and combatantcommander know and approve all programs.Legitimizing authorities determine specific com-mand relationships for each operation. This com-mand arrangement must clearly establishresponsibility for the planning and execution ofeach phase of the operation.

In addition to extensive US Governmentagency coordination, commanders must alsofully integrate operations into local efforts whenappropriate. Such integration requires closecoordination with local government agenciesand bureaus; local military, paramilitary, orpolice forces, and multinational partners. Astructure such as a mixed military workinggroup comprised of senior officials of the mili-tary and other agencies may assist such an effortand include belligerent parties as appropriate.

LIAISON

Unity of effort is facilitated through the useof liaison officers (LNOs). LNOs are used to cen-tralize direction and staff cognizance over plan-ning, coordination, and operations with externalagencies or forces. Commanders establish LNOsas the focal point for communication with exter-nal agencies. LNOs normally report to the opera-tions officer. LNOs may be able to resolveinteragency problems by establishing communi-cations to facilitate control for participatingforces and agencies.

LNOs should have sufficient rank andauthority appropriate to their level of liaison andbe identified early in the planning process. LNOteams should be staffed with sufficient personnelto conduct 24-hour operations. Senior LNOsshould travel with commanders while LNOteam activities are maintained.

FM 100-23

30

Language qualifications and knowledge ofthe doctrine, capabilities, procedures, and cul-ture of their organizations are extremely impor-tant for LNOs. CA or special operations forces(SOF) teams may be available to serve as LNOs.

The use of contracted interpreters to augmentLNO teams may be another option, although insome cases their loyalties may affect their reli-ability.

31

CHAPTER 3

Planning Considerations

An integrated approach to timely planning and conduct of operations is essential, across the military and civilian components and agencies

of the United Nations and the nongovernment organizations, all the way from the United Nations secretariat, to the forward area

for the duration of the mission.

Lieutenant General John M. Sanderson

Companion of the Order of Australia

The complex environment, changing circumstances, and multinationaland political dynamics of peace operations complicate planning. The planningprocess itself is the same as for other types of operations, but considerationsand emphasis may be different. For example, in many peace operations, CSand CSS units execute the primary mission of the force. This chapter high-lights those aspects of planning that are unique or require special emphasis inpeace operations.

MISSION ANALYSIS

A clearly defined mission is the key to thesuccessful planning and execution of a peaceoperation. Commanders must continually workwith higher authorities to ensure that the mis-sion is well-defined. In peace operations, theconditions for success are often difficult todefine. The 10th Mountain Division (Light Infan-try) translated its security mission to clearlydefined end states at the operational level duringthe relief stage of Operation Restore Hope inSomalia in 1992-1993. See Figure 3-1.

CAMPAIGN PLAN

A campaign plan is an essential tool for link-ing the mission to the desired end state. Because,peace operations tend to unfold incrementally,planners develop a campaign plan that lays out aclear, definable path to the end state. Such a planhelps commanders assist political leaders visual-ize operational requirements for achieving the

end state. Essential considerations for develop-ing a campaign plan in peace operations includeunderstanding the mandate and TOR, analyzingthe mission, and developing the ROE. A conceptfor transition and termination is absolutelyessential to the campaign plan. Planners con-sider the media, NGOs, PVOs, and coalitionpartners and allies as primary players. Plannersalso consider friendly and belligerent party cen-ters of gravity. See Appendix E for a sample cam-paign plan.

Transitions may occur from one kind ofoperation to another, such as from PE to PK orPK to PE, between authorizing entities, and dur-ing conflict termination. Transitions may involvethe transfers of certain responsibilities to nonmil-itary civil agencies. NGOs and PVOs may beresponsible for the ultimate success of the peaceoperation, perhaps with significant US support,to include military forces. Transitions in peaceoperations may have no clear division betweencombat and peacetime activities, they may lack


FM 100-23

32

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FM 100-23

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definable timetables for transferring responsibili-ties,and be conducted in a fluid, increasingly political en-vironment.

US authorities, must determine when the condi-tions for the desired military end state are achieved.The transition to postconflict activities is decided byhigher authorities. Some guide-lines to this processwhich should commence prior to the introduction ofpeace operations forces may include�

• Achievement of a successful end state.

• Determination of correct players such aslocal government agencies, US agencies(DOS, USAID, United States InformationAgency [USIA] as a minimum), NGOs andPVOs, regional powers, belligerentrepresen-tatives, and other military forces.

• Types of activities required such as securityassistance and electoral assistance.

• Determination of centers of gravity of bellig-erent parties.

PE forces should plan to exit the area when theagreements and buffer zones are formalized and shouldnot attempt to transition to PK. The hand-over of op-erations and facilities should occur much like relief-in-place operations. Of prime importance are the estab-lishment of liai-son, linguistic assistance, sequencingof incom-ing and outgoing forces (combat, CS, andCSS), and coordination of logistics and equipment leftin place.

USE OF FORCE

The proper use of force is critical in a peace opera-tion. The use of force to attain a short-term tactical suc-cess could lead to a long-term strate-gic failure.The use of force may affect other aspects of theoperation. The use of force may attract a responsein kind, heighten tension, polarize public opinionagainst the operation and participants, foreclosenegotiating opportu-nities, prejudice the perceived impartiality of the peace operation force, and escalatethe overall level of violence. Its inappropriate use may

In peace operations, as in military operations, the inherent right of self-defense applies.

FM 100-23

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embroil a peace operation force in a harmfullong-term conflict that is counterproductive tothe overall campaign objectives.

In PK, commanders should regard the use offorce as a last resort; in PE, commanders shouldexercise restraint in employing force. In eithercase, sufficient force must be available to—

• Achieve objectives rapidly through simulta-neous application of combat power.

• Protect the force.

In peace operations, as in all military opera-tions, the inherent right of self-defense applies.

ALTERNATIVES

Commanders should consider all possiblealternatives to the use of force before takingaction. Peace operations demand restraint in theemployment of force, as settlement—not vic-tory—remains the objective. Alternatives to useof force include the following measures.

Deterrence

The skillful use of deterrent measures mayavoid the use of force. The interposition of forcesor a deployment in strength are effective deter-rent measures. The presence of sufficient force atthe scene of a potential incident tends to dimin-ish the confidence of a would-be aggressor andallow the commander on the spot a wider num-ber of options to counter an incident.

Mediation and Negotiation

Mediation and negotiation may be helpful inreconciling differences among belligerent par-ties. They are effective tools in improving rela-tions among belligerent parties and the peaceoperations force. In many societies, self-esteemand group honor are of great importance. Theuse of simple face-saving measures to preserve aparty's dignity may serve to relax tension anddefuse a crisis.

Commanders of PK forces may find them-selves in the role of negotiator, mediator, andeven arbitrator of a confrontation. If possible,negotiations on matters affecting all partiesshould be carried out jointly with all belligerentparties present. They should be conducted byspecially organized negotiation teams thatexpress neutrality to the belligerent parties.

On occasion, relations among belligerentparties may be so strained that a third party hasto act as an intermediary. A negotiator must befirm, fair, and polite if he is to gain and keep thetrust of all parties. Negotiators must be tactful,resourceful, objective, impartial, and patient;have a sense of proportion; and be painstakinglyattentive to detail. On matters of principle, anegotiator must be insistent without being offen-sive and must be careful not to pass the confi-dences of one side to another.

Negotiations are not always successful.Agreements by all belligerent parties may ormay not occur. The negotiator must remember toremain impartial and courteous and avoid beingused by any belligerent. He might expect somebelligerent parties to negotiate in bad faith. Theymay attempt to twist the issues to prolong nego-tiations while they continue to violate previouslyagreed-upon settlements. Negotiations are time-consuming and often frustrating; however, theycan prevent unnecessary loss of life and offer thebest long-term prospect for a final peaceful set-tlement.

Population and Resource Control

Control measures, such as roadblocks, cor-dons, curfews, access control, and checkpoints,may contribute to avoiding the use of force.

Rewards and Penalties

Rewards and penalties such as granting ordenying access to key routes used by belligerentparties may shape behavior and cooperation.However, the potential exists for propaganda bythe belligerent parties. They may convince thepopulace that the peace operations force isunfairly denying needed resources.

Warnings

Belligerent parties may be given specificwarnings that continued hostile activities may bemet with the use of force.

Other Measures

Restrained use of force consists of physicalmeans not intended to harm individuals, instal-lations, or equipment. Commanders shoulddevelop measured responses and train in therestrained use of force for peace operations.

FM 100-23

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Examples are the use of vehicles to block the pas-sage of persons or vehicles and the removal ofunauthorized persons from unit positions. Inlimited circumstances, commanders may useforce that may result in physical harm to individ-uals, installations, or equipment. When properlyauthorized, the use of incapacitants such as riotcontrol agents and riot batons may preclude theneed to resort to more lethal measures. Thesemeans are more suitable for use in PE and areseldom used in PK.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

In peace operations, well-crafted ROE canmake the difference between success and failure.ROE are directives that delineate the circum-stances and limitations under which US forcesinitiate and/or continue engagement with bellig-erent forces.

In peace operations, ROE define when andhow force may be used. ROE may reflect the lawof armed conflict and operational considerationsbut are principally concerned with restraints onthe use of force. ROE are also the primary meansby which commanders convey legal, political,diplomatic, and military guidance to the militaryforce.

ROE are developed by military commandersand must consider the direction and strategy ofpolitical leaders. This process must balance mis-sion accomplishment with political consider-ations while ensuring protection of the force. Inall cases, restraint remains a principle of peaceoperations and should guide ROE development,particularly in light of collateral damage, post-conflict objectives, desired end states, and thelegitimacy of the operation and authoritiesinvolved.

Intent

ROE seldom anticipate every situation.Commanders and leaders at all levels mustunderstand the intent of the ROE and act accord-ingly. The commander responsible for ROE for-mulation should consider including an intentportion that describes the desired end state of theoperation as well as conflict termination consid-erations. Rehearsing and wargaming ROE in avariety of scenarios will help soldiers and lead-ers better understand the ROE.

Dissemination

All commanders must instruct their forcescarefully concerning ROE and the laws that gov-ern armed conflict. ROE should be included inOPLANs and OPORDs and address all means ofcombat power. Fire support ROE is as importantas individual weapons ROE. The staff judgeadvocate (SJA) should review all ROE. ROEshould be issued in an unclassified form to allpersonnel, who should adhere to them at alltimes, notwithstanding noncompliance byopposing forces.

Multinational Interpretation

ROE in multinational operations can createunique challenges. Commanders must be awarethat there will most likely be national interpreta-tions of the ROE. Close coordination of ROEwith multinational partners may preclude prob-lems.

Varied Circumstances

ROE vary in different operations and some-times change during peace operations. The ROEmust be consistent at all levels of command.Nothing in the ROE should negate a com-mander's obligation to take all necessary andappropriate action to protect his force. Addition-ally, the ROE in peace operations may establishguidance for situations such as the search andseizure of inhabitants, the authority of local secu-rity patrols, the prevention of black market oper-ations, the surrender of hostile personnel, andthe protection of contractor personnel and equip-ment in support of US operations.

Changes

Commanders at all levels need to know howto request changes to ROE. ROE are developedwith political considerations in mind and areapproved at a high level of authority. However,the requirement to change the ROE may resultfrom immediate tactical emergencies at the locallevel; introduction of combat forces from a hos-tile nation; attacks by sophisticated weapon sys-tems, including nuclear, biological, or chemical(NBC); or incidents resulting in loss of life. Com-manders should anticipate these situations andexercise request channels.

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Execution

Commanders should be firm and deter-mined when executing ROE in peace operations.If the peace operations force is seen to lack confi-dence, it may be further challenged, resulting inan unnecessarily high level of response or escala-tion in the overall level of violence. Commandersshould thoroughly plan the manner in whichforce is to be used and rehearse anticipatedactions. Finally, ROE must be impartially appliedin PK. In PE, this guideline may not apply fully.Even in PE, however, use of force without preju-dice remains important. Appendix D providessample ROE.

FORCE PROTECTION

Commanders attempt to accomplish a mis-sion with minimal loss of personnel, equipment,and supplies by integrating force protection con-siderations into all aspects of operational plan-ning and execution. Force protection consists ofoperations security (OPSEC), deception, healthand morale, safety, and avoidance of fratricide.

OPERATIONS SECURITY

In peace operations, OPSEC includes suchareas as communications security, neutrality,photography, sites, accommodations and defen-sive positions, roadblocks, personnel vulnerabili-ties, personal awareness, security measures,sniper threats, coordination, and evacuation.

Communications Security

Communications security (COMSEC) is asimportant in peace operations as it is in conven-tional military operations. Belligerent parties canmonitor telephone lines and radios. However, inPK the need to maintain transparency of theforce's intentions is a factor when consideringCOMSEC.

Neutrality

Maintaining neutrality contributes to pro-tecting the force. Manifest neutrality and even-handedness could afford the force a measure ofprotection. In peace operations, the entire forceshould safeguard information about the deploy-ment, positions, strengths, and equipment of oneside from the other. If one side suspects that the

force, either deliberately or inadvertently, is giv-ing information to the other side, it could resultin accusations of espionage. One or both partiesto the dispute may then become uncooperativeand jeopardize the success of the operation, put-ting the force at risk.

Photography

Prohibiting photography of local areas orpeople might contribute to neutrality. However,this should not impede collection efforts in sup-port of protecting the force.

Sites, Accommodations, and Defensive Positions

Precautions should be taken to protect posi-tions, headquarters, support facilities, andaccommodations. These may include obstaclesand shelters. Units must also practice alert proce-dures and develop drills to rapidly occupy posi-tions. A robust engineer force provides supportto meet survivability needs. When conductingPE, units should maintain proper camouflageand concealment. Additional information onprecautions is provided in FM 5-103, TM 5-585,and FM 90-10.

Roadblocks

Military police (MP) forces may establishand maintain roadblocks. If MP forces areunavailable, other forces may assume thisresponsibility. As a minimum, the area should behighly visible and defensible with an armedoverwatch.

Personnel Vulnerabilities

A peace operation force is vulnerable to per-sonnel security risks from local employees andother personnel subject to bribes, threats, or com-promise.

Personal Awareness

The single most proactive measure for sur-vivability is individual awareness by soldiers inall circumstances. Soldiers must look for thingsout of place and patterns preceding aggression.Commanders should ensure soldiers remainalert, do not establish a routine, maintainappearance and bearing, and keep a low profile.

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Sniper Threats

In peace operations the sniper is a significantthreat. Counters include rehearsed responses,reconnaissance and surveillance, barriers,shields, and screens from observation. ROEshould provide specific instructions on how toreact to sniper fire, to include restrictions onweapons to be used. Units can use specific weap-ons, such as sniper rifles, to eliminate a sniperand reduce collateral damage.

Security Measures

Security measures are METT-T-dependentand may include the full range of active and pas-sive measures such as patrolling, reconnaissanceand surveillance, and use of reaction forces.

Coordination

Commanders should coordinate securitywith local military and civil agencies and chari-table organizations whenever possible.

Evacuation

A PK force may need to evacuate if warbreaks out or if the host nation withdraws itsconsent to the mandate. In a UN operation, theUN force headquarters develops a plan to evacu-ate all PK forces. The evacuation plan shouldinclude appropriate routes for ground, sea, or airevacuation. All units should rehearse their evac-uation plan and develop contingency plans thatcover tasks such as breakout of an encirclementor fighting a delaying action.

DECEPTION

During PK, the requirement for transparentoperations normally precludes deception mea-sures. However, these measures may be appro-priate during PE.

HEALTH AND MORALE

Peace operations often require special con-sideration of soldier health, welfare, and moralefactors. These operations frequently involvedeployment to an austere, immature theater withlimited life support systems. In addition, peaceoperations place unique demands, such as peri-ods of possible boredom while manning obser-vation posts or checkpoints, on soldiers. Soldiers

must deal with these stresses while under theconstant scrutiny of the world press. Command-ers must consider these factors when assigningmissions and planning rotations of units into andwithin the theater.

SAFETY

Commanders in peace operations mayreduce the chance of mishap by conducting riskassessments, assigning a safety officer and staff,conducting a safety program, and seeking advicefrom local personnel. The safety program shouldbegin with training conducted before deploy-ment and be continuous. Training will includefactors that could have an effect on safety, suchas the environment, terrain, road conditions andlocal driving habits, access or possession of liveammunition, unlocated or uncleared mine fields,and special equipment such as tanks and othersystems that present special hazards. Safety isalso important during off duty and recreationalactivities. If possible, the safety officer and staffshould coordinate with local authorities concern-ing environmental and health concerns. US forcepresence should not adversely impact the envi-ronment.

AVOIDANCE OF FRATRICIDE

Most measures taken to avoid fratricide inpeace operations are no different than thosetaken during combat operations. However, com-manders must consider other factors such aslocal hires or NGO or PVO personnel that maybe as much at risk as US forces. Accurate infor-mation about the location and activity of bothfriendly and hostile forces (situational aware-ness) and an aggressive airspace managementplan assist commanders in avoiding fratricide.LNOs increase situational awareness andenhance interoperability. Use of night visionlight-intensifier devices aids units in target iden-tification during limited visibility. ROE mightprevent the use of some weapon systems andlessen the risk of fratricide. The collateral effectsof friendly weapons in urban and restricted ter-rain can affect fratricide. Soldiers must know thepenetration, ricochet, and blast consequences oftheir own weapons.

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FORCE TRAINING

The most important training for peace oper-ations remains training for essential combat andbasic soldier skills. Leader development inschools will further provide the requisite knowl-edge, skills, and attitudes required in peace oper-ations. The unique aspects of peace operationsshould be addressed in predeployment trainingwith the assistance of mobile training teams(MTTs), training support packages (TSPs), and, iftime permits, training at combat training centers(CTCs). Commanders should consider sustain-ment training during mission execution, if possi-ble, and postoperations training. Joint andmultinational unit and staff training is alsoimportant. See Appendix C for more details con-cerning training.

FORCE TAILORING

In planning for peace operations, the com-mander must tailor a force suitable for the mis-sion. It should be based on a unit's ability tocontribute to achieving national interests andobjectives and perceptions of the indigenouspopulation, the international community, andthe American public. Commanders should alsoconsider the synergy and enhanced capabilitiesinherent in joint operations when tailoring theforce. Building teamwork early and continuallyis vital to success when forces are rapidly tai-lored for mission.

The force must be appropriate to the statedgoals of the sponsoring authority and providesufficient capability to deploy, complete the mis-sion, and protect itself. The perception thatemployed forces exceed the limits of the man-date weakens legitimacy. Suitability varies basedupon the threat, the intensity of operations, themissions to be performed, and changing interna-tional perceptions. Commanders should preparefor worst-case situations by planning for theemployment of combined arms assets.

Reserve component soldiers and units maybe included in the US force under specificauthority, usually under a Presidential SelectedReserve Call-Up. The authority carries with itunique planning requirements. FM 100-17

1

cov-ers these considerations in detail.

1.

Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization,

28 October 1992.


Throughout Operation Restore Hope, MPunits were in great demand because oftheir ability to serve as a force multiplier.Marine force (MARFOR) and ARFORcommanders quickly took advantage ofthe MP's significant firepower, mobility,and communications and used themeffectively as a force multiplier conduct-ing security-related missions as one oftheir combat forces. Doctrinal missionsincluded security of main supply routes(MSRs), military and NGO convoys, criti-cal facilities, and very important persons(VIPs); customs; detention of local civil-ians suspected of felony crimes againstUS force or Somali citizens; and criminalinvestigative division (CID) support asthe JTF's executive agency for jointinvestigations. MPs responded to a sig-nificant number of hostile acts takenagainst US forces, NGOs, and civiliansby armed bandits and technicals (seeFigure 3-1) and to factional fighting thatthreatened US forces or relief efforts.They also supported the JTF weaponsconfiscation policy by conducting reconsand gathering information and intelli-gence (human intelligence [HUMINT])about the size, location, and capabilitiesof factions operating throughout theARFOR and MARFOR AOs. This infor-mation included the location of sizeableweapons caches. MPs also had anexpanded role in the actual confiscationof weapons by establishing checkpointsand roadblocks along MSRs, within smallvillages, and within the congested, con-fined urban environment of Mogadishu.Serving in both a combat and CS role,MPs also participated in a larger, com-bined arms show-of-force operation (air

assault) in the city of Afgooye.

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Commanders must recognize the availabilityand contribution of civilians and contractors aspart of the total force. Civilians may participateto provide expertise that is not available throughuniformed service members and to make themost effective use of government resources. Sup-port provided by civilians in past conflictsincluded, but was not limited to, communica-tions, intelligence, contract construction, realestate leasing, water detection, civil engineeringtechnical assistance, and logistics services. Civil-ians in the nonappropriated fund category pro-vide morale, welfare, and recreation programsand staff the service exchanges.

AUGMENTATION AND LIAISON

The unique aspects of peace operations mayrequire individual augmentees and augmenta-tion cells to support unique force-tailoringrequirements and personnel shortfalls. Augmen-tation supports coordination with the media,government agencies, NGOs and PVOs, othermultinational forces, and civil-military ele-ments. METT-T considerations drive augmenta-tion. Augmentation requires life support,transportation, and communication. Liaisonrequirements are extensive in joint and multina-tional operations. Commanders must provideaugmentees with resources and quality of lifenormally provided to their own soldiers.

Commanders may consider task-organizingsmall liaison teams to deal with situations thatdevelop with the local population. Teams canfree up maneuver elements and facilitate negoti-ation. Unit ministry, engineers, CA, counterintel-ligence, linguists, and logistics personnel may becandidates for such teams. Commanders ensurethat teams have transportation and communica-tion allocated.

Special negotiation teams may be formedthat can move quickly to locations to diffuse ornegotiate where confrontations are anticipatedor occur. Teams must have linguists and person-nel who have authority to negotiate on the behalfof the chain of command.

SPECIAL TECHNOLOGY

In tailoring the force, commanders mustweigh the appropriateness of using technology

based on the nature of the mandate, maintenancerequirements, local sensitivities, skills requiredfor operation, and other factors. Technologyavailable from battle laboratory experiments,even in small numbers, can make a big differ-ence. Commanders of operations, however, mustdecide on its use consistent with mission accom-plishment.

Aircraft normally used for transport mayconduct air surveillance. Satellites, scout aircraft,unmanned aerial vehicles, airborne reconnais-sance low (ARL), or the joint surveillance andtarget attack radar system (J-STARS) are othermeans of air surveillance. Ground surveillancetechnology such as radar, night vision devices,sensors, and thermal sights may also be useful inpeace operations. All such devices may be espe-cially useful in observing and monitoring situa-tions.

Another category of technology with whichsoldiers may be less familiar is a broad categoryof instruments that may assist forces in conduct-ing operations in consonance with the principleof restraint and minimal force. Types of weaponsare those that could disrupt communications,radar, computers, or other communications orstop belligerent parties without killing or maim-ing them, weapons that could disrupt or inter-dict supply routes or make equipmentinoperable, or those that could disarm combat-ants without killing or maiming them. This cate-gory requires special consideration of the rules ofwar or treaties concerning war or humanitarianpractices, unintended environmental or person-nel effects, availability and state of development,and postconflict activities or requirements.

COMBAT FUNCTIONS

Combat functions apply in peace operations.Commanders must exercise judgment in apply-ing them to these operations. Some functionsmay apply differently in peace operations thanin war. An example is maneuver in the sense ofmovement to gain relative advantage over anenemy. In peace operations, maneuver may con-tribute to achieving situational advantage over abelligerent rather than destruction of an enemy.Intelligence is another example of unique appli-cations. Figure 3-1 is an example of using force

FM 100-23

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protection, coordination, and information dis-semination as functions appropriate to the peaceoperation situation. The following selected com-bat functions may apply to peace operations.

MANEUVER

Maneuver warfare and the applications ofdirect fires in support of it do not lend them-selves to all forms of peace operations, particu-larly PK. On the other hand, armored forces andattack helicopter assets may, for example, playmajor roles in preventive deployments and PEand be useful in PK for force protection, deter-rence, convoy escort; for personnel transportwhere threats exist, or as a mobile reserve.

Geographic locations of buffer zones ordemilitarized areas may severely restrict maneu-ver. The force commander may have little lati-tude in adjusting the zone since it may be theresult of political, ethnic, and religious consider-ations. Conversely, the force commander mayhave to spread forces thinly to accommodatemissions such as checkpoints and observationposts.

Forces conducting PE, particularly opera-tions to separate belligerent parties, may find itnecessary to employ certain basic maneuvers inorder to accomplish the separation mission.These maneuvers may include attacks to seizekey terrain features in a buffer zone. In suchinstances, the objective is the seizure of terrain,not the destruction of the belligerent force.

Special Operations Forces

Army special operations forces (ARSOF) area valuable asset when planning peace opera-tions. For example, ARSOF can help prepare theAO through normal SOF activities designed togain intelligence updates on key and local per-sonnel and facilities, especially in PE. ARSOF cancontact local agencies and friendly authorities,establish surveillance over the planned points ofentry, or conduct operations to prevent the syn-chronized defense or counterattack by hostileforces. They can also provide up-to-the-minuteweather and intelligence.

A ranger force can support conventional mil-itary operations or it may operate independentlywhen conventional forces cannot be used.Ranger forces can typically perform direct-action

missions such as strike operations, tactical recon-naissance, and special light infantry operations.

Special Forces.

Special Forces (SF) assetsdeployed rapidly in denied or hostile areas cancollect intelligence through area surveillance andreconnaissance. They can provide initial assess-ments in the areas of engineering, medical, secu-rity, and intelligence. With their language andarea orientation, they can provide liaison withthe local population, multinational forces, non-military agencies, and other military organiza-tions.

SF may assist in training and organizinglocal security forces. They may also enhancemultinational interoperability by cross trainingwith these forces. In humanitarian assistanceoperations, they can assist in providing andsecuring relief supplies.

In peace operations, SF may execute preci-sion strikes to destroy certain facilities and mili-tary capabilities by employing terminal guidancetechniques for precision-guided munitions. SFmay also be used to preclude or preempt terror-ist activities and to conduct liaison with localmilitias.

Psychological Operations Forces.

PSYOPcan play an important role in facilitating cooper-ation between belligerent parties and peace oper-ation forces. Tactically, PSYOP forces can assistthrough persuasion rather than intimidation.Through the use of local information programs,such as radio or television newscasts and leafletdistribution, PSYOP elements can ensure theoperational objectives and efforts are fullyunderstood and supported by the target audi-ence.

Civil Affairs Units.

CA in peace operationsmay include activities and functions normallythe responsibility of a local government. CAunits can assess the needs of civil authorities, actas an interface between civil authorities and themilitary supporting agency and as liaison to thecivil populace, develop population and resourcecontrol measures, and coordinate with interna-tional support agencies. CA units are regionallyoriented and possess cultural and linguisticknowledge of countries in each region. The civil-ian skills CA units possess allow them to assessand coordinate infrastructure activities. CA units

FM 100-23

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are responsible for establishing and managingcamps. The legal status of individuals within thecamps is dependent upon the type of operationand the legal mandate establishing it.


Soon after peace operations began inthe Dominican Republic, the 1st Psycho-logical Warfare Battalion deployed withvarious types of broadcasting and print-ing facilities. Loudspeaker trucks provedto be very effective in imparting informa-tion. Wherever the trucks stopped, largecrowds of Dominicans gathered to hearthe latest news and receive leaflets andpamphlets. The unit ran a radio stationpowerful enough to reach into the inte-rior of the island. The US InformationService determined the themes andtightly controlled all the battalion's activi-ties. The combined CA and PSYOPactivities were very effective in theDominican Republic, as indicated by oneof the most frequent pieces of graffiti:"Yankee go home—take me with you.”


The 353d CA Command (-) and the354th CA Brigade were two USAR com-mands completing their Desert StormCMO support missions in Saudi Arabia,when they were redeployed in April 1991to conduct Kurdish relief operations insoutheastern Turkey and northern Iraq.An element of the 96th CA Battalion (Air-borne) deployed from Fort Bragg, NC, toassist in the Provide Comfort humanitar-ian relief operation. The 354th CA Bri-gade HQ, with three companiesaugmented the 353d CMO Section ofthe multinational combined staff, estab-lished a task force to facilitate transfer ofmilitary relief operations to civilian agen-cies, and assisted in moving the Kurdsfrom the mountains, through temporary

transit support sites, to their homes. CAsupport included provision of medicaland water distribution assistance to SFteams in the mountains; establishment,initial operation, and turnover of transitcenters to the United Nations High Com-missioner for Refugees (UNHCR); andsupport of over 40 civilian humanitarianrelief agencies in moving people and

supplies to numerous relief sites.

Planners must consider end state and transi-tion strategies when planning, building, andmanaging camps. They must plan for the assimi-lation of private relief agencies and NGOs andPVOs early in the process. Funding and budget-ing considerations must be resolved early inorder to expedite hand-off of facilities andresponsibilities to other forces and agencies.


On 16 April 1991, the President of theUS, authorized by UN resolution 688,expanded Operation Provide Comfort toinclude multinational forces with the addi-tional mission of establishing temporaryrefuge camps in northern Iraq. CombinedTask Force (CTF) Provide Comfort wouldoversee the building of shelters and dis-tribution of supplies, ensure order, andprovide security throughout this area. Theprovision of security was essential to getthe Kurds to move from the mountainsback to their homes and transfer theresponsibility for them from the military tointernational agencies. The camps weredesigned to reflect the cultural realities ofthe Kurds. They were built around five-person tents, a 66-person tent neighbor-hood (Zozan); a 1,056-person tent village(Gund); a 2,500-person tent community(Bajeer) and in the center, the community

center and administration area.

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Military Police

MPs in peace operations can project a forcesignature that may be more politically acceptableto the international community and the US pub-lic. The domestic and international acceptance ofMPs as a force focused on security, protection,and assistance provides the commander the useof a highly capable and versatile force without asignificantly increased force signature.

While peace operations may detract from acombat unit's primary mission of training sol-diers to fight and win in combat, peacetime MPtraining and operations support many peaceoperation missions, particularly those thatemphasize minimal use of force. As a directresult of their peacetime daily law-and-ordermissions, MPs and the CID are continuallytrained in the prudent use of force, crisis man-agement, and operations requiring restrictiveROE. MP and CID are trained and experiencedin demonstrating understanding and compas-sion in dealing with the civilian population.They are also trained to understand how andwhen to transition from restrictive ROE to lethalforce if required or directed.

FIRE SUPPORT

Fire support assists commanders in the care-ful balancing of deterrent force with combatpower to accomplish the peace operation mis-sion and protect the force. Precision munitionsplay an important role. Mortars, due to theirsmaller bursting radius, may reduce the possibil-ity of collateral damage—a critical considerationduring peace operations. They may provide illu-mination rounds as a deterrent demonstration ofcapability, for observing contested areas, for sup-porting friendly base security, or for patrollingmaneuver forces.

Artillery fires—in particular rockets androunds with ordnance, though relatively selec-tive and accurate—involve a significantly higherpossibility of collateral damage. In addition,unexploded ordnance can pose a safety hazardto the indigenous population and/or provide alocal combatant the building blocks of an explo-sive device. Commanders should be cautious inusing artillery fires in general and in selecting anappropriate munition to minimize collateral

damage and the threat to both friendly forcesand local populations.

Field artillery howitzers and rocket systemsprovide both a continuous deterrent to hostileaction and a destructive force multiplier for thecommander. To deal with an indirect fire threat,the force may deploy artillery- and mortar-locat-ing radars for counterfire. Firefinder radars canalso document violations of cease-fire agree-ments and fix responsibility for damage andcivilian casualties.

AC-130 aircraft, attack helicopters, andobservation/scout helicopters are important tar-get acquisition, deterrent, and attack assets inpeace operations. Tactical air (TACAIR) can pro-vide selective firepower, particularly in theemployment of precision-guided munitions. Col-lateral damage and unexploded ordnance aresignificant planning factors when consideringthe employment of TACAIR.

Fire support coordination, planning, andclearance demands special arrangements withjoint and multinational forces and local authori-ties. These include communication and languagerequirements, liaison personnel, and establish-ment of procedures focused on interoperability.Excellent examples of coordinated fire supportarrangements are the NATO standardizationagreements (STANAGs). These provide partici-pants with common terminologies and proce-dures. ROE should provide guidelines forclearance of indirect fires (both lethal and nonle-thal).

AIR DEFENSE

PE requires forces to be thoroughly trainedon passive and active air defense measures. Sol-diers must be trained on visual aircraft recogni-tion and ROE due to the possibility of likeaircraft being flown by more than one of theforces involved. Air defense considerations areof great importance in PE operations that denyor guarantee movement or enforce sanctions.

Belligerent parties may employ extensivemeasures such as cover and concealment, hand-held surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and light airdefense artillery (ADA) weapons to protectthemselves from air attack. Since many targets

FM 100-23

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will be in belligerent-controlled areas, command-ers must weigh the potential loss rate of aircraftagainst the returns that air interdiction missionsmight produce. However, they should also con-sider that curtailment of rotary and low-levelfixed-wing operations is one of the goals of thebelligerent.

BATTLE COMMAND

A key challenge occurs in battle command.Intuitive skills of commanders, an element ofbattle command, are especially appropriate tothe ambiguities and uncertainties of the peaceoperations environment discussed in Chapter 1and in managing the variables of peace opera-tions. Training, situational drills, and constantstudy and reading of changing patterns sharpensthis intuitiveness.

Battle command recognizes the inevitableco-existence of both hierarchical and non-hierar-chical organizations, systems, and players inpeace operations, both military, interagency,multinational, and NGOs. Digitization and infor-mation technology will permit greater situa-tional awareness, empower individual soldiersto act appropriately under varying circum-stances, and reduce the probability of fratricideand collateral damage.

Peace operations pose various challenges tosignal support functions. First and foremost isthe level of complexity and coordinationrequired to effect the maximum use of availablesignal support. Early deployment of signal plan-ners and use of joint doctrine and TTPs are criti-cal.

Communications systems are difficult tostandardize, given the wide range of availablecommercial and military assets. The integrationof multinational and US signal support isextremely important in transition planning andexecution of the various dimensions of peaceoperations. An overall network manager andsystem interoperability criteria are critical to suc-cessful communications.

Incompatibilities among systems, standardoperating procedures (SOPs), and doctrine canbe expected in multinational operations. Theseoperations require careful consideration of

equipment capability and procedural and cul-tural differences among all coalition forces.Incompatibilities must be overcome to sustaincommand and unity of effort during joint andmultinational operations.

All nations share the electronic spectrumand reserve their right to its unlimited use. Spec-trum managers at all echelons must be aware ofwhat equipment is being used in their vicinity toensure negligible mutual interference. LNOsmust facilitate close coordination with friendlylocal or multinational forces in close proximity.

Commercial communications may be aus-tere. Deploying forces must not depend on localcommercial communications. Even when com-mercial communications are available, the pres-ence of US forces puts a burden on thatcapability. Signal planners must consider transi-tion and funding of communications functions tolocal authorities, the UN, or other forces assum-ing the support mission. Functions left behindfor the host nation or multinational forces mayoverwhelm them unless the transition is gradualand begins several months before the organicsignal units departure. In an austere theater,commanders should be prepared to providemedia access to communication assets, as long asit does not interfere with critical military opera-tions.

MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY

To ensure a mobile, survivable force, bothengineer and chemical forces provide essentialsupport during peace operations.

Engineer Forces

Planners consider all available engineercapabilities, to include

other services,

multina-tional forces, contractors, and troop units(including reserve components). The latterrequires greater reaction time than active compo-nent engineers. Planners consider the specificcapability and availability of the units whenbuilding the force, along with facilities availablefor leasing and the infrastructure. The joint taskforce contingency engineer manager (JTFCEM)normally provides staff assistance to the JTFcommander, who controls engineer assets. Simi-lar considerations apply to multinational forces.

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Planners must consider interoperability toensure that assets are complementary, if not com-patible. Engineer planners also consider person-nel or material assets available throughcontracts, local sources, and private agencies,including the Logistics Civil Augmentation Pro-gram (LOGCAP).

Engineer operations require large amountsof construction materials which may be acquiredlocally, regionally, and from CONUS. Thesematerials may be obtained through military sup-ply channels or by contract. Engineers identify,prioritize, and requisition required constructionmaterial consistent with acquisition regulations.Supply units process the requisition and acquire,receive, store, and transport construction materi-als. This support may be also be providedthrough a combination of engineer unit Class IVacquisition and storage by LOGCAP contractorsupport.

Chemical Units

Commanders must consider the requirementfor chemical support of peace operations if evi-dence exists that belligerent forces haveemployed agents or have the potential for doingso. In addition, when authorized, riot controlagents may be selectively employed as an alter-native to deadly force in certain peace opera-tions. A mix of different units (decontaminationunits, NBC reconnaissance elements, and smokeunits) are often necessary to achieve the properbalance of capabilities. Additional capabilitiesinclude providing vector control and limitedwater transfer, spray, and storage. Chemical staffofficers may advise on commercial chemicalthreats as well as on the collection, packaging,storage, disposal, and cleanup of hazardousmaterials and wastes.

INTELLIGENCE

Successful intelligence support duringpeace operations relies on continuous peacetimeinformation collection and intelligence produc-tion. Increased reliance on HUMINT sourcesmay often be necessary. Furthermore, it is neces-sary to collect information on all parties to theconflict and other peace operations forces as well

to understand and appreciate varying perspec-tives and methods of operation. Special equip-ment such as night observation devices andthermal imagery devices, as well as special sur-veillance aircraft, will also be useful in peaceoperations.


Operation Restore Hope demonstratedthe usefulness of engineers in operationsother than war. Somalia's austere land-scape and climate posed challengessimilar to or greater than the onesencountered during Operations DesertShield/Storm, including a harsh desertenvironment, resupply over great dis-tances, limited resources, and a devas-tated infrastructure.

The deployed engineer force was a jointand multinational effort, building on theengineer capabilities found with eachservice component and coalition partner.Engineers provided standard maps andimagery products, detected and clearedhundreds of land mines and pieces ofunexploded ordnance, built base campsfor US and coalition forces, and drilledwater wells. They constructed andimproved over 2,000 kilometers of roads,built and repaired several Bailey bridges,upgraded and maintained airfields, andparticipated in local civic action projectsthat helped open schools, orphanages,hospitals, and local water supplies.

Army engineers cooperated fully withand complemented engineer capabilitiesfound within the US Marine Corps, USNavy, and US Air Force. In addition, coa-lition force engineer efforts were fullycoordinated with US and UN goals for

the area.

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The intelligence needs of the commanderinvolved in peace operations are in some waysmore complex than those of the commander con-ducting combat operations in war. Regardless ofthe mission, the commander must be preparedfor direct attack, either by one of the parties tothe deployment agreement or by extremist ele-ments acting independently. Peace operationsare often conducted in a joint, and, most proba-bly, a multinational and/or UN operational envi-ronment. The commander and his staff mustunderstand and apply the current joint intelli-gence doctrine in Joint Publication 2-0

2

to eachnew peace operations environment. This may becompounded by the intricacies of dealing in aninteragency arena where different agencies havedifferent rules. When conducting multinationaloperations, sharing information with allies mayin itself become an issue. In PK, the terms

infor-mation

and

intelligence

are synonymous. Forinstance, in PK, there is an information officer inaddition to or in lieu of an intelligence officer asin other operations. In PE, the intelligence func-tion is employed with sufficient assets and focusto support necessary combat operations. A jointoperations support element (JOSE) or other spe-cially organized intelligence assets may beneeded.

Peace operations often require augmentationof the intelligence staff. In particular, the com-mander-in-chief's (CINC's) staff must recognizethat available communications may precludeeffective use of the normal channels for request-ing and providing intelligence; therefore, com-manders must tactically tailor the force to ensurecommunications, processing capability, anddown-links are available for broadcast dissemi-nation of intelligence.

The supporting CINC normally providesdetailed analytical support to the deployingcommander through split-based operations. Thisincludes anticipating and initiating collectionagainst long lead-time requirements, synthesiz-ing available information on the AOs and orches-trating the collection efforts of existingintelligence organizations. The degree of supportneeded depends on the size and sophistication ofthe deploying unit's intelligence staff and should

2.

Intelligence Operations,

30 June 1991 (Test Pub).

be tailored as the operation develops to ensureseamless intelligence support. The supportingCINC can make a major contribution to thedeploying commander simply by ensuring at theoutset that intelligence is decompartmented andreleasable to multinational units.

Intelligence Analysis in Peace Operations

Success for the intelligence officer in peaceoperations depends on a thorough understand-ing of the situation. This understanding oftenfocuses on what were formerly considered

non-military topics,

such as politics, economics, anddemographics. The intelligence officer must con-sider political objectives that drive military deci-sion making at every level. This means finaldecisions on military intelligence operations maybe made by nonmilitary personnel, such as a UNrepresentative or the senior US State Departmentofficial at the scene. Further, the intelligenceofficer may have to markedly revise his conceptof threat, to include multiple belligerent parties,terrorists (possibly from outside the area of con-flict), and local nationals nursing a wide range ofgrievances. In addition, a friendly or neutralforce may become hostile because of some real orperceived failure of the US force to treat themfairly. The intelligence officer must know theentire situation and the current status of all theplayers.

Intelligence-Preparation-of-the-Battlefield

The principal difference between intelli-gence-preparation-of-the-battlefield (IPB) forconventional battlefield situations and peaceoperations is the focus and degree of detailrequired to support the commander's decision-making process. Another major difference is theenormous demand for demographic analysisand templates. New information categoriesbegin to emerge for the commander as he directstroops and accomplishes missions in an unfamil-iar environment.

Expand the Area of Interest.

Analysis shouldinclude all military and paramilitary forces andNGOs that may interact with US troops. Intelli-gence analysts should consider political groups,media, and third nation support to belligerentforces.

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Analyze Terrain and Infrastructure.

Intelli-gence analysts consider the legal impact of themandate, TOR, geographic boundaries, andother limitations upon both peace operation andbelligerent forces. They identify existing and tra-ditional infrastructures. In an unfamiliar envi-ronment, analysts should assess other featuressuch as small villages, nomadic camp sites, foodsources and food distribution points establishedby civilian relief organizations, water sources(ground or surface or artesian wells), guardshacks and towers, perimeter fences, surveil-lance cameras or other warning devices, animalgrazing sites, religious monuments, cemeteries,local places of worship, hospitals, boat ramps,local gas stations, and telephone exchanges. Inessence, they should analyze the environment tothe smallest possible detail.

Analyze the Local Area.

Analysts considerthe population, government, available transpor-tation, demographics, status of utilities, ware-house storage, and so on. The analysis includeshousing, the health of the population, hospitals,population distribution, ethnic backgrounds,languages, and religious beliefs; tribe, clan, andsubclan loyalties; political loyalties to thenational government; loyalties to the de factogovernment; holiday and religious observancespracticed by the local populace; monetary sys-tems and currencies used by the populace; andblack-market activities conducted within the AI.Analysts identify the best case and worst casetime lines of the operation.

Describe Effects.

Analysts consider theimpact of demographic and social data on theoverall operation. They identify the root causesof the conflict and analyze them from the per-spective of all belligerent parties. They ask them-selves, “What would have to happen to bringpeace to the region? Can belligerent leadersenforce discipline throughout the belligerentparties? How do these factors affect the course ofaction (COA) of each belligerent? What are bel-ligerent centers of gravity?”

Terrain dictates points of entry and infiltra-tion and exfiltration routes. Commanders mayuse a terrain analysis to divide the AO, particu-larly urban areas, into zones of control usinggroup, religion, or established TOR as determin-ing factors. Analysts consider topography,

hydrology, and weather from both a current andhistorical perspective. They consider the effectsof weather on mobility, trafficability, and visibil-ity. The environment may also pose threats to thehealth of both mission and host nation person-nel. Analysts should also identify corridors forreserve operations and contingency forces.

Evaluate the Threat.

Analysts identify allfactions involved in the peace operation. Theyrecognize differences in the types of threats,strategies, modi operandi, and tactics, as well asweapons, equipment, materiel, and personnel.They add

personalities

to the usual list of order ofbattle factors; identify leaders, trainers, key staffmembers; and develop psychological profiles ofkey personnel. Analysts identify and analyze allthreat battlefield operating systems and vulnera-bilities

Determine Threat Courses of Action.

Thisdetermination culminates analysis. Intelligenceanalysts determine COAs using the followingsteps:

Step 1. Template or describe the actions of bellig-erents that would violate the peace. Initi-ating hostilities, breaking legalmandates, or disregarding establishedTOR are examples of violations. Developcourse of action models depicting theresponse of belligerent to violations ofthe peace.

Step 2. Develop course of action models depict-ing the reaction of all belligerents tofriendly peace operations within the AOand AI.

Step 3. Wargame each COA. Use friendly com-manders and staffs to role-play both thefriendly and belligerent parties to aid indetermining the likelihood of variousCOA.

Step 4. Analyze the reactions of the local popu-lace to friendly COAs.

Step 5. Analyze the reactions of the host nationgovernment and military to friendlyCOAs.

Intelligence operators wargame terroristactions and other activities that could jeopardize

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the peace or friendly security and where belliger-ents could avoid claiming responsibility. Giventhe nature of these types of potential threats toUS forces, it may be difficult to obtain much ofthis information without an interagencyapproach to the IPB process. The success of peaceoperations will increasingly depend on the com-bined efforts of numerous agencies.

Intelligence Collection and Synchronization Planning

Collection of intelligence in peace operationsdiffers somewhat from collection of intelligencein conventional operations. Units should con-sider the use of the

dispersed battlefield

collectionplan format. For detailed guidance on this for-mat, refer to FM 34-2.

3

In peace operations, bel-ligerent parties may perceive intelligencegathering as a hostile act. Intelligence operationsmay therefore destroy the trust the partiesshould have in the peace operations force.

Intelligence Dissemination

LNOs should disseminate intelligence prod-ucts in standard intelligence report format.LNOs should pass intelligence products to allparties requiring them in joint or multinationaloperations.

Intelligence for Multinational Peace Operations

In a multinational setting, forces will need toshare intelligence information to some degree.This may involve sharing intelligence informa-tion with military forces of nations with whichwe have no intelligence-sharing agreements orsharing intelligence that is not covered by exist-ing agreements. In some cases, we may haveexisting agreements that discriminate amongallies within the multinational force. For exam-ple, our standardized exchange systems withNATO nations may create friction where wehave NATO and non-NATO partners in a peaceoperation.

3.

Collection Management and Synchronization Planning,

8 March 1994.

Situations may exist where intelligenceshould be shared with NGOs outside usual polit-ical-military channels. Therefore, these opera-tions require policy and dissemination criteriaand authority for each instance. At the outset,intelligence planners should establish a decom-partmentation cell—provided by the DefenseIntelligence Agency (DIA). Other special intelli-gence arrangements for multinational operationsmay include a single director of intelligence andcombined intelligence centers.

LOGISTICS

As noted previously, CSS units may executeprimary missions of the force. Regardless, logis-tics will be a key aspect of any peace operation.The complexity of such operations, especially ina joint and multinational environment whereNGOs and PVOs are also involved, will produceunique demands on logistics operators and plan-ners. Rapid force projection from platforms inCONUS or forward-presence bases, extendedlines of communication, and potential forcible-entry operations into logistically bare-basedareas of operations will require versatile andagile logistics leadership. Chapter 4 providesadditional planning considerations.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONSIDERATIONS

Peace operations are carried out under thefull glare of public scrutiny. Public affairs (PA)personnel support the commander by workingto establish the conditions that lead to confidencein the Army and its conduct of peace operations.Because reports of peace operations are widelyvisible to national and international publics, PAis critical in peace operations. News mediareports contribute to the legitimacy of an opera-tion and the achievement of political, diplomaticgoals. PA must monitor public perceptions anddevelop and disseminate clear messages.

PA planners support open, independentreporting and access to units and soldiers. PApersonnel pursue a balanced, fair, and crediblepresentation of information that communicatesthe Army perspective through an expedited flowof complete, accurate, and timely information.

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Commanders should ensure early coordina-tion of PA, CA, and PSYOP efforts during theplanning process. A continual exchange of infor-mation must exist during execution. Althougheach has a specific audience, information willoverlap, making it crucial that messages are notin conflict. All members of the force shouldunderstand the following basic PA principles:

• Identifying, understanding, and fulfillingcommand information needs is critical tosuccess. The uncertainty, unfamiliar condi-tions, and visibility of many peace opera-tions requires that the information needs ofsoldiers be met. Soldiers must receive infor-mation specific to the operation throughcommand channels and world, national, andlocal news. This enhances morale and unitesprit. It eases distractions and reduces theboredom, fear, isolation, uncertainty, rumor,and misinformation inherent in peace opera-tions.

• Every soldier is a spokesperson. PA guid-ance should be widely disseminated.Although the commander is normally theunit's official spokesperson, informed juniorsoldiers, however, are also honest, accurate,forthright, and insightful spokespersons.The degree of media attention focused on apeace operation will lead to soldier-mediainteraction, and members of the media willseek soldier commentary.

• The media is an important information chan-nel to the American public. In the high visi-bility, politically sensitive peace operationenvironment, public opinion is a critical ele-ment. By proactively assisting news mediarepresentatives, commanders help themunderstand the Army role in peace opera-tions and produce stories that foster the con-fidence of the American public. Neverthelesscommanders must balance OPSEC and otheroperational requirements with these needs.

• Following the principles of news coverage ofDOD operations agreed upon by the mediaand the military is essential to accomplishingthe PA mission. The public has a right toknow about Army participation in peaceoperations, but more importantly, the Army

has a responsibility to keep the publicinformed. Voids in information supplied tothe media by the military will be filled withhostile propaganda or media speculation.The extremely political nature of peace oper-ations and the open and independent natureof reporting strongly support the principle ofmaking information readily available withinthe constraints detailed by the source ofauthority.

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

Numerous legal issues may arise because ofthe unique nature of peace operations. Peaceoperations may be authorized by the UN, aregional organization, or the NCA. Regardless ofwho has authorized the peace operation, interna-tional law and US domestic laws and policyapply fully. For example, the laws of war and fis-cal law and policy apply to US forces participat-ing in the operation.

STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS OR STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENTS

In PK, the status of the PK force, as well asthat of individual PK personnel in the hostnation, is controlled by a status of forces agree-ment (SOFA) or a status of mission agreement(SOMA). In a UN operation, the UN negotiatesthe SOFA or SOMA. In the case of a non-UNoperation, the US will negotiate an agreementwith the host nation. In certain situations, thestatus of US forces may not be defined by a spe-cific international agreement. Such was the case,in Somalia, where a functioning host govern-ment that could enter into a SOFA or SOMA didnot exist. In typical PE, where the host nationdoes not necessarily consent to the US presence,a SOFA or SOMA usually is not practical. In sucha case, as in Somalia, the US retains total jurisdic-tion over its forces. See Appendix A for addi-tional information.

LAW OF WAR

Because of the special requirement in peaceoperations for legitimacy, care must be taken toscrupulously adhere to applicable rules of the

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law of war. Regardless of the nature of the opera-tion (PK or PE) and the nature of the conflict, USforces will comply with the relevant provisionsof FM 27-10

4

and DA Pamphlet 27-1.

5

In a tradi-tional PK operation, many uses of force may beaddressed in the mandate or TOR. In a PE opera-tion, the laws of war may fully apply.

CLAIMS AND LIABILITY

A significant aspect of legal activities inpeace operations relates to claims and liabilityadjudication. In some instances the US mayassume this role for the entire UN or multina-tional force, requiring extensive coordination,liaison, and accurate accounting.

FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS

Military commanders cannot spend opera-tions and maintenance Army (OMA) funds onprojects beyond the scope of their mission; norcan they authorize the expenditure of funds spe-cifically appropriated for other purposes. Theymust be aware that well-meaning civil action

4.

The Law of Land Warfare, July 1956.

5.

Treaties Governing Land Warfare,

7 December 1956.


In Operation Restore Hope, the US wasnot an occupying power, yet the law ofoccupation (Fourth Geneva Convention)was used as a model in defining US rela-tionships with the civilian population. Thislaw included obligations owed to the civil-ian population within the US AOs andrules regarding destruction, seizure, con-fiscation, and requisition of public and pri-vate property. Both the law of occupationand the law regarding the treatment ofprisoners of war (Third Geneva Conven-tion) provide useful guidance on proper

disposition of the detainees.

projects have significant funding limitations. IfUS forces participate as part of a UN operation,all costs should be captured for future reim-bursement from the UN. Commanders shouldconsult with their servicing judge advocate, sup-porting contracting officer, and comptroller.

50

CHAPTER 4

Logistics

Logisticians deal with unknowns. They attempt to eliminate unknowns, one by one, until they are confident that they

have done away with the possibility of paralyzing surprises.

LTG William G. PagonisCommander, 22d Support Command (1992)

In peace operations, the US Army may find itself the principal provider oflogistics support to a joint or multinational force. This chapter outlines aspectsof logistics planning for peace operations. It includes specialized guidance foroperating within the UN or other multinational logistics support environ-ment, developing a local capability to provide support, and providing sup-port to multinational forces as well as local nationals, NGOs, and PVOs.

LOGISTICS-PREPARATIONOF-THE THEATER

Logistics-preparation-of-the-theater (LPT) iscritical. LPT is a key tool available to logisticsplanners in building a flexible operational sup-port plan. It consists of actions taken by logisti-cians to optimize means—force structure,resources, and strategic lift—of logistically sup-porting peace operations. These actions includeidentifying and preparing bases of operations;selecting and improving lines of communication(LOCs); projecting and preparing forward logis-tics bases; and forecasting and building opera-tional stock assets forward and afloat. Theseactions focus on identifying the resources cur-rently available in the theater for use by friendlyforces and ensuring access to them. A detailedlogistics estimate of requirements, temperedwith LPT, allows the command logistician toadvise leaders of the most effective method ofproviding support that will not overwhelm theforce or fail to provide adequate, timely support.It involves the full range of logistics activities.

UN assessment teams are normally sent to anew mission site to provide UN leaders with

information to refine force size and composition,as well as logistical planning data for forcedeployment and sustainment. When participat-ing in a UN mission, engineers and logisticiansshould plan to participate in the UN mission sur-vey team in order to prepare the UN assessment.Logistics automation and communication per-sonnel may assist in this UN effort. US efforts toparticipate and/or coordinate with UN forceswill improve the unity of effort and reducepotential conflicts for facilities or resources. Sev-eral logistics considerations are critical in peaceoperations. Those that cross functional linesinclude training, security, and transition.

TRAINING

Logisticians must consider special trainingfor peace operations. Logistics planners at alllevels must have a basic understanding of logis-tics and support doctrine, procedures, and capa-bilities. They must understand the limitations ofthe nations participating in the mission. The ulti-mate goal is logistics support and sustainment ofthe total force (see Figure 4-1). Planners mustconsider ways of integrating logistics automa-tion and foreign parts and supplies into existingautomation.


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SECURITY

All CS and CSS units are responsible for pro-viding their own security. This security missionmay however, detract from the unit capability toprovide logistics support. Security may be pro-vided by another unit to ensure the unrestrictedflow of logistics. The US Army Criminal Investi-gation Command (USACIC) provides advice onlogistics security.

TRANSITION

Logisticians play a key role in planning tran-sition of functions. Logistics functions per-formed by US Army elements may shift to—

• Another US service.

• An ally.

• The UN or a regional alliance or coalition.

• An NGO or PVO.

• Civilian authorities or contractors.

In other situations, the requirement for thefunction may end. In such a case, the transitionmust be planned in depth. Transfers of functionsrequire careful coordination between the twoparties. They must specifically agree on whatfunctions are involved, when the transfer is totake place, whether any assets will accompanythe transfer, the standard required for the sup-port function, and any other items peculiar to aparticular situation. The same factors applywhen a US element takes responsibility for afunction from another party. Army units accept-ing functions cannot assume that equipment andsupplies on hand when they arrive will remainbehind for their use.

US Army Personnelon

Non-US Equipment/Systems

Local/MultinationalPersonnel on

Non-US Equipment/Systems

Local/MultinationalPersonnel on

US Equipment/Systems

LOG PLANNING

PERS SVCS SPT

MAINTENANCESTORAGE PACKAGES

SUPPLY SUPPORT

AUTOMATION

TRANSPORTATION

Figure 4-1. Logistics Training

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SHARED LOGISTICS

Nations, forces and agencies coordinate andwork toward a common goal without reserva-tion. Logistics may be conducted unilaterally. Inother cases, a US element may be part of a logis-tics operation of the UN, a regional alliance, oran

ad hoc

coalition.

The most efficient logistics operation isplanned and operated by one country. However,such a situation may not always be feasible oracceptable; therefore, logistics is often a sharedresponsibility. Such cases require extensive plan-ning and coordination to integrate variousnational logistics systems. Yet, even a logisticsoperation led by the US involves numerous com-plexities since other elements of the force arelikely to be from other countries.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Traditionally, the responsibility for logisticsis a national responsibility. However, logisticssupport for a multinational operation must bethe collective responsibility of the nationsinvolved. The level of US participation in theseoperations is dependent on the objectives agreedupon at the national level.

The US logistician, as part of a multinationalstaff, will confront differences in terminology,procedures, cultural attitudes, and preferencesrelated to all aspects of logistics. The multina-tional commanders or staffs may place demandson the system without understanding the capa-bilities and limitations of logistics elements.They may also require results not attainablethrough the logistics system or give directionsthat may conflict with established policies orprocedures. Logisticians should use LNOs andhave periodic coordination meetings to addressthese considerations.

Varying expectations of support from differ-ent elements of a multinational force provideanother challenge during multinational opera-tions. Nations must agree individually orthrough cooperative agreements to the provisionof logistics resources or specific support require-ments for their forces. Agreements may beworked out for specific operations where mem-bers of various contingents receive specific com-pensation such as cash bonuses, paid trips home,

shorter tours, or specific logistics support. With-out specifically agreed-upon levels of support,contingents may have different expectationsregarding support. Logisticians must know ifavailable support assets meet not only US stan-dards but also those of supported multinationalforces. In the case of subsistence, for instance, thestandards include both hygiene and cultural andreligious requirements.

The chief logistics officers of the force mustensure that standardized logistics procedures arebased on mutual understanding. All must usethese procedures and understand status report-ing so that the chief logistics officer and his staffknow what assets are available. In UN opera-tions, logisticians should pay particular attentionto the

Guidelines for Contributing Nations,

pub-lished by the UN. Logisticians must communi-cate logistics priorities to the chief administrativeofficer (CAO) to ensure consistency with budgetpriorities. See Figure 4-2.

UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS

UN operations present unique logistics chal-lenges. However proactive coordination estab-lishes effective logistics support andsustainment. Logistics policies and proceduresfor both the UN and participating nations shouldbe tailored for the specific mission. Planning,coordination, and agreements among participat-ing nations are essential. Also the effective use ofcontracting and control of funding is critical toeliminating unnecessary competition for limitedresources.

The UN has only a small operational plan-ning capability. A small staff of military officersfrom member nations assists the UN's militaryadvisor in logistics planning. Support plans aretypically developed for each operation. One ofthe most important planning aspects for eachoperation is to clearly affix logistics supportresponsibilities. Each contributing nation hassome responsibility for providing logistical sup-port to its own forces. Funding for UN opera-tions is only approved after establishment of aforce and only for the period of the mandate ofthe operation. Support techniques that may beefficient and effective for a lengthy operationmay not be feasible if planners cannot count onfunding past a short-term mandate period.

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Finally, the nature of a peace operation is fre-quently fluid in terms of tactics and sometimeseven strategies. As a result, logisticians who areused to time-driven schedules may have toadjust to working in event-driven situations.

The UN uses an expanded definition for theterm

logistics.

The UN definition includes engi-neering, communications, and aviation support.UN headquarters, force headquarters, and con-tingents all deal with logistics. All must under-stand the UN logistics system.

United Nations Headquarters

The UN headquarters element that has themost responsibility for support to aUN-sponsored force is the field administrationand logistics division (FALD) of the departmentof peacekeeping operations (DPKO). Its respon-sibilities include—

• Planning the support structure.

• Selecting key civilians for the operation.

• Coordinating contributions from memberstates.

• Prioritizing requirements from the force.

• Negotiating local purchase agreements withhost nations.

• Negotiating for transportation to the theater.

The FALD develops its support plan aroundone of three possible methods.

• One option is to have one nation control allthe logistics for an operation. Though this isusually the most efficient option, it is notalways acceptable, nor is one nation alwayscapable or willing to perform this role.

• The second option is to make logistics ashared responsibility, both in terms of logis-tics elements deployed and logistics person-nel on the force headquarters staff.

• The final option is to decentralize logisticsplanning and operations if the operation isdispersed over wide areas in differentregions.

Figure 4-2. Multinational Logistics Operations

Logistics Support StructureC2

DeploymentChallenges

TerminalOperations

MovementControl

SustainmentChallenges

MULTINATIONALLOGISTICS

OPERATIONS

UN

HOSTNATION

NGOsPVOs

CONTRACTSERVICES

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Planning, coordination, and agreement among participating nations is critical to UN logistics operations.

Force Headquarters

For the deployed force, the key logistics officers arethe CAO and the chief logistics officer (CLO). The CAOhas overall control of support to the operation, whilethe CLO controls the day-to-day logistics functions.Effective support to the force requires that these twoofficers work closely together.

The FALD appoints the CAO. The CAO may notbe appointed for operations that are limited to a strictlyobservation mission. The CAO acts under the author-ity of the chief of mission, who is normally a specialrepresentative of the SYG. He retains a direct link tothe UN headquarters. Within the AO, he is responsiblefor local pur-chases, host nation support, financial ar-range-ments, prioritizing lift, and passing requirementsto the FALD at the UN headquarters. If logistics opera-tions are to be handled on a decentralized, regionalbasis, a CAO may be appointed for each region. CAOfunding authority is limited. The CAO manages theentire mission budget.

The CLO is a military staff officer on the force head-quarters staff. He is responsible for establishing and

operating the logistics base, often called the field main-tenance area. He uses a series of UN directives to con-trol operations and ensures all contingents understandthe logistics policies and procedures. The CLO validatesall logistics requirements and passes them to the CAOfor funding and procurement. The CLO also controlsthe activities of the logistics ele-ments in the logisticsbase. Typically those ele-ments provided by each con-tingent are organized into a force logistics supportgroup (FLSG).

The FLSG coordinates receipt of stocks andmovement to forward bases, as well as the sus-tainment of the force. The FLSG headquarters, undercontrol of the CLO, coordinates support to contin-gents and keeps the force headquarters apprised ofthe logistics situation. The FLSG headquartersincludes staff elements called national support cellsfrom each contingent. These cells oversee support totheir contingents and serve as liaison elements tocoordinate with other contingent cells. The logisticsactivities provided by the FLSG include the full rangeof logistics support.

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The base also includes maintenanceshops and facilities for other required ser-vices such as postal or operations. The UNprovides any required unique items such asUN berets, field caps, hat bands, scarves,and cloth shoulder pads. Also, the FALDprovides contingents with supply planningfactors.

Contingents

For each participating nation, logistics plan-ning is similar to planning for any other multina-tional operation, except it receives support froma UN-operated base. Each contingent provides anational support element (NSE) to the FLSG. TheNSE is a logistics operations element incorpo-rated into the FLSG to meet the requirements ofits contingent.

Some contingents may be self-supporting,while others rely on cooperative resources andbilateral agreements. Each operation is different.The UN negotiates the level of stocks the partici-pating nations must bring. However, planners

should anticipate a requirement to build a self-sufficient contingent force for the early stages ofthe operation.

The UN typically requests national contin-gents to arrive with personal weapons andammunition, organic transportation, unit radios,organic maintenance and medical assets, and anagreed-upon stockage level of all supplies for 30to 90 days. Despite such requests, units mayarrive with little more than rifles and rucksacks.In such cases, the UN seeks donations of equip-ment from member nations, buys new equip-ment, or attempts to procure equipment on thelocal market. The UN's member nations haveagreed to establish stockpiles of essential sup-plies and equipment. This effort will the speedUN's operational response time.

NATO Operations

When called upon to reinforce peace opera-tions using NATO forces, planners must beaware of NATO requirements and procedures.Nations and NATO authorities have a collectiveresponsibility for logistics support of NATO's

Responsibility

Provision

Cooperation

Authority

Sufficient to Achieve

Economy

Flexibility

Visibility

Collective

Ensured by Nations ofAllocated Forces

Essential

NATO Commander

Readiness

in use of Logistics Resources

of Logistics Assets

Figure 4-3. NATO Logistics Principles

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multinational operations. Although each nationbears ultimate responsibility for ensuring theprovision of logistics support for its forces allo-cated to NATO, the NATO commander estab-lishes the logistics requirements and coordinateslogistics support within his AO. While nationshave first call on their logistics resources, NATOcommanders may direct the redistribution oflogistics resources to meet critical operationalneeds. The principles in Figure 4-3 emphasizelogistics support responsibilities during NATOoperations. NATO logistics doctrine is addressedin greater detail in MC-319,

1

MC-326,

2

andMCM-CIJ-001-94

3

.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The UN will reimburse contributing coun-tries for the costs of the operations in accordancewith its standard procedures as covered in theUN guidelines to contributing governments,aides-memoir to the peacekeeping agreement,notes verbal, and specific and general letters ofassist (LOA).

If possible, the UN must approve all ele-ments of national contributions and the extent ofreimbursement prior to the actual deployment.Therefore, costs incurred for activities and troopdeployments that are not agreed to by the UNwill not normally be reimbursed by the UN. TheCAO determines the obligatory authority in aparticular operation.

US logisticians should track items that theUN agrees to reimburse. The CAO or his desig-nated representative verify delivery of suppliesor services. UN reimbursement is contingent onvalidation of requirements prior to obligation offunds and verification that supplies and serviceswere rendered. Bills are generated for reimburs-able items and sent through channels to the UN(see Figure 4-4).

1.

NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics.

2.

Medical Support Precepts and Guidance for NATO.

3.

NATO Commander's Authority Over Logistics Resources,

[Annex A to MC-319).

Logistics assistance during peace operationsmay be furnished under a variety of statutes:

• For ongoing UN operations, much of thesupport is provided under Section 552 of the

Foreign Assistance Act (FAA),

Title 22.

• In other cases, support involving NATOcountries may be covered by NATO agree-ments.

• The President may direct an emergencydrawdown of military department inventorystocks under Section 506 of the FAA foremergency assistance programs or supportor under Section 552 of the FAA for PK.

• In an emergency drawdown, all materiel,services, and training must be drawn fromexisting service stocks. This emergencyauthority does not authorize new procure-ment or expenditure of service funds.

• Support may be provided to other countriesand to the UN under FAA, Section 607, Salesor Grant Transfers, or with reciprocal ser-vices or replacement-in-kind under Title 10,Chapter 138, with Secretary of Stateapproval.

• Logistics support authorized under Chapter138 includes food, billeting, petroleum, oils,transportation, nondistinctive clothing, com-munications services, medical services,ammunition, storage, spare parts, repair andmaintenance services, and training. Unlikesecurity assistance transfers under the FAA,however, logistics support authorized underTitle 10, Chapter 138 does not include majorend items, missiles, or bombs.

• The service judge advocate will answerquestions concerning fiscal issues associatedwith the provision of statutory logistics sup-port.

LOGISTICS FUNCTIONS

The LSE is the forward element of thenational strategic logistics base and may performany and all supply, maintenance, readiness, andother logistical functions. Its traditional role is tosupport Army forces. However, by augmentingits normal role, it is also uniquely structured tosupport multinational land forces. The LSE canestablish and operate a humanitarian depot in

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coordination with local authorities, multina-tional partners, and nongovernment agencies.The LSE must augment its organic capability tomaintain non-US weapon systems. The follow-ing logistics functions are key to peace opera-tions.

MOVING

Early deployment of transportationplanners, a port-opening package, andmovement control staff are critical. In under-developed countries, the logistician mustplan to conduct transportation and move-ments control in adjacent and/or support-ing countries to ensure expeditious resupplyto the.

Movement Control

In a UN-controlled or multinational environ-ment, participating nations share use of the sameLOCs (air, sea, ports), requiring prioritization

and deconfliction of the use of LOCs. The com-mander may establish a multinational move-ments control center (MCC) at the UN level toresolve disputes, allocate resources, and inte-grate transportation efforts. If US forces providea majority of inland movement assets, the USmay be required to provide a US movement con-trol element to form the nucleus of the MCC or toprovide representatives if another nation has themission. The senior US movement control orga-nization must ensure US requirements are ade-quately articulated and integrated intomultinational plans.

Port Authority

A military or civilian port authority inte-grates seaport operations; discharges US, multi-national, and civilian vessels; and manages realestate in the port and adjacent areas. In theabsence of a recognized government or civilianauthority, planners must select the appropriateheadquarters to perform this mission.

Bill

Check

Supplier of Materiel

US Army

NormalPaymentProcedures

CAO, UN Force Headquarters

UN Headquarters

US Mission at UN Headquarters

DOD/DOS

Figure 4-4. UN Reimbursement to the US

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Augmentees to a civilian or multina-tional port authority staff may be required.These may include a diplomatic officer(DOS), a political officer, a judge advocateofficer (with knowledge of maritime law), amilitary translator, a LNO for contractsupervision, and a CA team.

Inland Movement

Planning for inland movement must ensurethat adequate transportation assets, materiel,and cargo handling equipment are provided.Types of units provided are based on the mis-sion, terrain, and route characteristics.

FIXING

Maintenance elements should be prepared tosupport civilian assets as well as those of othermilitary forces in peace operations. Also, the UNmay purchase US equipment to outfit other mul-tinational forces. In such cases, those forces maynot have the capability to repair or perform pre-ventive maintenance on the equipment. US unitsmay be called on to provide support or at leastidentify total support packages that includetools, repair parts, test equipment, and training.National-level agreements determine the extentof maintenance support of other nations' equip-ment.

The end state may require that maintenancesupport for peace operations include reestablish-ing and/or upgrading the infrastructure mainte-nance capabilities. This may entail providingtools and equipment to multinational and localforces. Careful property accountability is impor-tant. Non-US personnel at the user level mayalso require training in maintenance and supplyautomation

SUSTAINING SOLDIERS AND THEIR SYSTEMS

Unique aspects of peace operations in amultinational context include the need forcompatibility of automated systems amongdirect-support, materiel management, andfinancial management organizations. Addi-tionally, LPT and a greater reliance on UNsupport and local and contingency contract-ing to provide supplies may release valuable

strategic lift for both supplies and CSS units.

When possible, it may be more efficient toassign a single supply support responsibility toone nation. Another unique aspect of multina-tional operations is that non-US forces are gener-ally not authorized to use the Army and AirForce Exchange System (AAFES) or otherexchange facilities. This may generate misunder-standings and expectations of support that needto be addressed. Under some circumstances, thecommander can authorize the limited use ofexchange facilities by foreign military forcesoperating with US forces. However, the com-mander must carefully consider the ramifica-tions of such a decision.

Field Service Support

Predetermined agreements aid in providingeconomy of force. Field service support person-nel must respect the social mores, customs, andstandards of health and welfare of the locality, aswell as the peace operation participants. Logisti-cians should use available services in the AO orthose provided by other forces to reduce therequired force structure.

Health Service Support

Planners for peace operations must con-sider all health service support (HSS) sys-tems. In determining requirements forassets, they must consider the impact of pro-viding medical care to multinational forcesor local populations. Peace operations resultin more frequent and direct contact with thelocal population. Provision for the mix ofcare-provider skills, instrument sizes, drugs,and supplies to support pediatric, geriatric,and obstetric problems requires prior plan-ning for mission support. The US can projectpower from forward presence locations inresponse to requirements from the NCA.Because of this presence, medical units ofthe medical command (MEDCOM) and/orcorps support command (COSCOM) areamong the initial medical forces availableoutside the continental United States(OCONUS).

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Personnel Services

In peace operations the personnel systemmay need to account for joint, multinational, orlocal personnel. Maintaining accurate strengthaccounting may be more demanding due tounusual tailoring of units to fit the particularpeace operation mission. Strength reportingaccording to the UN format is required for reim-bursement by the UN. Personnel units may assistlocal civilian authorities in personnel identifica-tion, classification, and accounting. Personnelunits may assist in receiving and interviewingcivilians to collect information and to identifyindividual skills that may be useful in the con-duct of the operation. Personnel units mayaccount for civilian casualties.

Religious Support

Peace operations require a diverse religioussupport capability. Without augmentation, eachcommander must share religious support assetsto form a religious support system with diversecultural and religious capabilities.

Band Support

Bands fulfill a variety of music roles toinclude military support to diplomacy, PA, CA,civil-military operations, PSYOP, and HA.

Finance Operations

Finance elements should deploy early tosupport procurement efforts and to begin theaccounting process for peace operations. Theyalso interpret, coordinate, and disseminate finan-cial guidance to the commander.

Additionally, finance support ensuresthat soldiers' pay accounts reflect all entitle-ments associated with their peace opera-tions duties. The deployed finance elementsprovide limited check-cashing support tosoldiers and DOD civilians. Operational pol-icies and may impose restrictions on cashpayments to soldiers and limitations on cur-rency and the value of goods removed fromthe country. Finance elements may berequired to certify that such currency is areasonable remainder of pay received in thatcountry.


1

Operation Able Sentry, a UN preventivedeployment mission in the former Yugo-slav Republic of Macedonia, providessome insight into the positive impact ofchaplains in this environment. In this partof the world, diverse religions clearly playa significant role in the daily lives of thepopulation. Religion captures the spot-light in the national political arena as well.

In FYROM, for example, 60 percent ofthe population is Greek Orthodox, 25percent is Muslim, and 2 percent isRoman Catholic. The remainder is splin-tered among a variety of religions andsects. A task force chaplain's interactionwith the Macedonian Roman Catholicbishop and local Greek Orthodox priestsproved significant in convincing the reli-gious leaders to view the UN missionpositively. The calming effect resultingfrom “telling the UN/US story” proved sig-nificant in enhancing both force protec-tion (citizens now view the UN positively)and the overall mission.

1.

Adapted from a Center for Army Lessons Learned “News From the Front.”


In the first 30 days, finance supporttouched more than one-third of the Armyforce deployed and was directly responsi-ble for providing Army units the capabilityof employing more than 120 local citi-zens, freeing that number or more sol-diers for the direct support of OperationRestore Hope.

33d Finance Battalion After-Action Report

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Finance elements may provide for currencysupport, including currency exchange. Financemay provide payments for weapons turned in(weapons for cash), other bounties and claims,and other special programs. They may providedisbursing support to properly credentialedcivilians (media, Red Cross), and civilian con-tractors. They may also pay travel and per diemfor temporary duty during the operation.

Contracting Support

For UN operations, contracting supportincludes accounting for support provided toUS forces through UN forces contractingand disbursing and arranging for reim-bursement. Commercial vendor services(CVS) support covers the immediate needsof the force that cannot be reasonably met bynormal logistics. CVS payments are usuallypaid by imprest fund cashiers, or Class Aagents. These cash payments cover suchexpenses as day laborer wages and smallquantities of supplies and services.

Some operations may require the creation ofjoint or multinational contracting elements,staffed by personnel from all services and contin-gents operating in the theater. Joint contractingorganizations promote cooperation and coordi-nation among the service elements and precludeinterservice competition for local supplies andservices to more effectively use scarce resources.In UN operations, contracting operations should

be coordinated with the UN chief procurementofficer. A budget officer should also be involvedin early planning.

Legal Services

Peace operations present many unique legalservice support issues that may not be present inother types of operations. The legal services sup-port package must meet the traditional legalassistance, military justice, administrative andcivil law (including contract and fiscal lawadvice), and operational and international lawneeds of the deploying force. The package mustalso be tailored to the particular peace operation.Additional peace operations planning consider-ations for legal services may include, but are notlimited to—

• Staffing a multinational task force law officedesigned to support the operations of manynations and/or the UN.

• Coordinating the efforts of attorneys frommany nations, ensuring quality and consis-tency of advice.

• Having foreign claims authority and suffi-cient assets to investigate and adjudicateclaims.

• Adjudicating conflict of law issues when nogovernment or legal system or proceduresfor reestablishing a government or legal sys-tem exists.

• Assisting with legal issues when dealingwith NGOs and PVOs.

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The UN has as its primary responsibility the main-tenance of international peace and security. USforces may participate as part of a UN force.

ORGANIZATION

The UN has, as its primary responsibility, the main-tenance of international peace and security. The char-ter provides the basis for the various elements of theUN in fulfilling this responsibil-ity.

SECURITY COUNCIL

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) isvested with the authority from the UN Charter to in-vestigate any situation or conflict that threatens inter-national peace and security. It usually tasks the secre-tary general (SYG) to pre-pare a plan to deal with thecrisis and is the approving authority for that plan. TheUNSC may either decide to take action or refer the mat-ter to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)for consideration. The council�s deci-sions are theoreti-cally binding on all member states of the UN.

SECRETARY GENERAL

The UN SYG is responsible to the UNSCfor the organization, conduct, and directionof UN peacekeeping operations. The office is, in effect, the commander-in-chief responsible for

APPENDIX A

The United Nations

A new chapter in the history of theUnited Nations has begun.

Boutros Boutros-GhaliUN Secretary General

The Peacekeepers� Handbook and other references explain in extensive detail the organi-zation and functions of the UN during peace operations. This appendix does not pro-vide an extensive description of the UN, but rather a general description of its organi-zation and functions, the legal aspects of its operations, extracts of the UN charter, asample mandate, and TOR.

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conducting negotiations with the host nations,belligerents, and contributing states; preparingthe operational plan; and presenting it to theUNSC for approval.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The UNGA may consider any matterreferred to it by the UNSC or may consider anyother situation or conflict it feels impairs the gen-eral welfare or friendly relations among nations.The recommendations of the UNGA are notbinding on the SYG, the UNSC, or its own mem-bers. Its powers in conflict resolution are notwell-defined.

MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

The MSC was originally designed toadvise and assist the UNSC and the SYG on mat-ters of military concern. It is composed of thechiefs of staff of the permanent representatives ofthe UNSC or their representatives. Althoughenvisioned as an international joint staff, to plan,organize, and command UN peacekeeping oper-ations, various factors precluded its develop-ment in that direction. From time to time, a

military advisor or assistant has been appointedto advise and assist the SYG on military matters.

SECRETARIAT

The UN Secretariat is headed by the SYGand is the permanent organization responsiblefor the establishment, coordination, and admin-istration of peacekeeping operations. Several sec-retariat departments headed by under secretarygenerals (USYGs) are involved in peace opera-tions and may interface directly with the SYG'sspecial representative to a specific peace opera-tion. See Figure A-1.

The USYGs are responsible to the SYG forpolicy concerns with respect to peace operations.The Department of Peacekeeping Operations isheaded by a USYG who is responsible to the SYGfor the day-to-day operational matters affectingpeace operations. Under the USYG for Peace-keeping is the military advisor to the SYG as wellas the Director, Field Administration and Logis-tics Division, who is responsible for logisticalsupport of peace operations. See Figure A-2.

Dept of PolicyCoordination andSustainable Dev

Officeof

Legal Affairs

Dept ofEconomics and

Social Informationand Policy Analysis

ExecutiveOffice of the Chief of Staff

SeniorPoliticalAdvisor

Secretary General

SeniorPoliticalAdvisor

Dept of PoliticalAffairs

Dept of Adminand

Management

Dept of Public

Information

Dept ofHumanitarian

Affairs

Dept of Development, Support

and Management

Dept ofPeacekeeping

Operations

Field Administrationand

Logistics Division11Previously titled Field Operations Division

Figure A-1. United Nations Secretariat

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The Department of Administration andManagement is headed by a USYG who isresponsible to the SYG for the administrationand financial support of peacekeeping opera-tions.

The Department of Humanitarian Affairsis headed by a USYG who may also provideguidance to the SYG's special representativewith respect to the humanitarian aspects of aspecific peace operation and the peace opera-tion's interface with PVOs and NGOs.

The Department of Political Affairs is thepolitical arm of the SYG in matters relating to themaintenance of international peace and securityand the control and resolution of conflicts withinstates. As such, it advises on policy in those areasand is responsible for political research and anal-ysis. It also has executive responsibilities in thefields of preventive diplomacy and peacemak-ing, including negotiations and other diplomatic

activities. All these functions and responsibilitiesas they relate to field operations are preparedand carried out by the department under theoverall direction of the SYG.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operationsis the operational arm of the SYG for the day-to-day management of peacekeeping operations. Inthis capacity, the department acts as the mainchannel of communication between UnitedNations headquarters and the field. However,the Department of Political Affairs (on strictlypolitical matters), the Department of Humanitar-ian Affairs (on humanitarian policy matters), andthe Department of Administration and Manage-ment are also in regular contact with the field(see Figure A-2).

The Department of Humanitarian Affairs isresponsible for the coordination of humanitarianoperations, particularly for making the necessary

Figure A-2. Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Office of the Under Secretary General

Executive Office

Situation Center

Office ofOperations

Assistant Secretary General

Office ofPlanning & Support

Assistant Secretary General

Policy and Analysis unit

Military Adviser1

PlanningDivision

Field Administration & LogisticsDivision2

Europe and Latin America

Division3

AfricaDivision3

Asia and Middle East

Division3

Mission PlanningService

TrainingUnit

DeminingUnit

Civilian PoliceUnit

PersonnelService

Logistics & Communications

Service

FinanceService

UNPROFOR

ONUSAL

UNMIH

UNOMIG

UNOSOM

UNAVEM

ONUMOZ

MINURSO

UNOMURUNAMIR

UNOMIL

UNMOGIP

UNIKOM

UNTSO

UNIFIL

UNFICYP

UNDOF

1 Also acts as the Head of the Planning Division2 Previously titled Field Operations Division3 The missions are listed here for illustrative purposes

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arrangements for the timely and effective deliv-ery of assistance by United Nations relief organi-zations. As the focal point of the SYG forHumanitarian Assistance, its responsibilities alsoinclude early warning and negotiations foraccess to populations in need. In most recentcomplex operations, the department hasappointed a field-based humanitarian coordina-tor who works under the authority of the specialrepresentative of the secretary general (SRSG)and is in direct contact with the Department ofHumanitarian Affairs. In some cases, the human-itarian coordinator is with an agency or pro-gram, while in others, he is independent.

FIELD ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS DIVISION

Each UN peace operation will have a UNofficial on staff. This official commands thedeployed elements of the FALD and is responsi-ble for all matters related to the operation. Theofficial is usually a career UN civil servant. TheFALD, in coordination with selected militarystaff officers, is also responsible for negotiatingthe SOFA, receiving and dispatching UN person-nel, and establishing administrative and logisticstanding operating procedures (SOPs). SeeFigure A-2.

PLANNING PROCESS

While no formal planning process exists forUN peacekeeping operations, the planning unitin the Department of Peacekeeping Operations isresponsible for developing plans for approvedoperations. Each operation is unique and indi-vidually authorized, planned, and controlled.Instead of a universal checklist, a general pat-tern, based on past experience, is used for UNplanning. The planning process of other interna-tional or regional organizations should parallelthis sequence.

SITUATION ANALYSIS

At the outbreak of a conflict, the UNSC orUNGA should perceive a threat to internationalpeace and security. The situation may bedebated, and if a permanent member of theUNSC does not use its veto, a resolution may bepassed.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

A UNSC resolution usually calls for acease-fire or other measures designed to resolveconflict and may appoint a special representa-tive, ambassador, or mediator to be sent to theconflict area to report on the crisis. The resolu-tion may require the SYG to prepare a plan todeal with the conflict by creating a peace opera-tion. The SYG is then responsible for informalnegotiations and the preparation of a mandate.Mandates are typically for a 6-month period andmust be renewed by the UNSC twice per year.

INFORMAL PREPARATIONS

Based on the direction the SYG receives fromthe UNSC, informal negotiations commence.This involves negotiations with member states toestablish the tentative contributions (personnel,financial, logistical) that can be provided to a UNforce. The requirements, balanced with the scaleof contribution, determine the general composi-tion and organization of the force. The SYGapproaches the belligerent parties and drafts amutually acceptable and enforceable mandatethat is also acceptable to contributing members.The final product of these negotiations should bea viable mandate. The role, mission, and tasks ofthe operation derive from this mandate.

MANDATE

The SYG submits a plan for the peacekeep-ing operation and a proposed mandate forapproval by the UNSC. If the council approvesthe plan and the mandate, the SYG commencesformal preparations. The mandate provides theinternational legal authority for the operation. Asecond and equally important document is thebudget plan that must be accepted to ensure thatthe operation can be funded.

FORMAL PREPARATIONS

With the approval of the mandate and thebudget, the SYG ensures negotiations commencewith the belligerent parties and the host nationfor preparation of the SOFA. The SYG selects thekey appointments for the force:

• The force commander—who is a militaryofficer from a nation not involved in the con-flict

• The UN political advisor—often called theSRSG—who is normally a career diplomat.

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These appointments are usually agreed to bythe belligerent parties in peacekeeping opera-tions prior to the formal announcement to themedia. Either the force commander or the SRSGmay be appointed as head of mission.

The SYG verbally requests military forcesand equipment from the contributing members.The requests at this stage are still general innature, allowing some flexibility to contributingmembers until the exact scale of the force andinternational composition is determined. Oncethe UN has an acceptable force composition, itissues formal requests for troops and equipmentservices in the form of verbal notes or LOAs.

PARTICIPATING MEMBER-STATE PREPARATIONS

Participating member states negotiate theextent of their contribution to the operation withthe UN and the host nation. Results will be incor-porated into memorandums of understanding tosecure those services or support from the hostnation that are not provided by the UN. It is notunusual for the UN to place limits on nationalcontributions due to nonmilitary factors such asfinancial limitations. The UN should finalize theSOFA or SOMA with the host nation before theforce deploys. Until the SOFA or SOMA is final-ized, soldiers are subject to the local laws orgranted diplomatic status.

RECEPTION AND SERVICE SUPPORT

FALD usually deploys an advance party toestablish reception and service support arrange-ments for the operation. The UN plans, orga-nizes, and directs the deployment of the force tothe theater. National contingents conduct train-ing and prepare administrative materialsrequired for deployment to the operation.National reconnaissance may not be allowedprior to deployment.

END SURVEY

The key action at the start of operationswith the UN is the conduct of the

end survey.

TheUN command performs the end survey after thenational force arrives. The survey is the UN mili-tary staff identification of equipment, supplies,and personnel that the member country hasdeployed in support of the mission. Based on

that survey, the UN command can identify mem-ber nation capabilities and items it must supportor reimburse for costs associated with opera-tional use. The UN normally pays for equipmentdeployment and the costs to maintain equipmentfor operational use. The UN normally also paysfor personnel rotations twice annually, usuallyon a six-month basis.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The TOR (used in Somalia and FYROM) isan important document in UN operations. TheTOR is the document developed by DOS withDOD that explains national responsibilities foreach nation involved in a UN operation. TheTOR is the planning document that impacts forcestructure, sets the stage upon deployment for theend survey, and provides the mission for the USforce deployed for a UN operation. The TOR alsoaddresses resource management and cost reim-bursement. Detailed planning at the conceptionstage of involvement in UN operations duringthe development of the TOR eases cost impactson national forces, since planners have alreadyagreed on those subjects with the UN. US partici-pants in the TOR development process are gen-erally DOS and DOD. Force planners workingwith the UN should understand that if a US forceis not tasked in the TOR—and the US deploysone—the UN will not provide resources or reim-burse support to that force. See Annex A to thisappendix for an example of TOR.

DEPLOYMENT

Deployment is usually a UN responsibility. Itmay be delegated to nations that possess a self-deployment capability. In the absence of thiscapability, a third nation such as the US may beused, under UN arrangements, to assist indeployment of national contingents. Uponarrival in the AO, the national contingents arenormally placed under OPCON of the force com-mander.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

The normal operational chain of commandfor peacekeeping operations is from the unitcommander, to the force commander, to the headof mission; if not to the force commander, to theSYG, who reports to the UNSC. In certain cases,

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US forces may be placed under OPCON of a for-eign commander, but command is exercised onlyin the US chain to the NCA.

LEGAL ASPECTS

The legal authority under which a UN peaceoperation is conducted defines the parameters ofthe operation. The duties, responsibilities, pow-ers, privileges, and immunities of a force and itspersonnel are laid out in international agree-ments and other documents. All commanders,observers, and officers in a peacekeeping opera-tion must know the legal authority that regulatestheir operation. The key legal authority docu-ments are—

• The mandate.

• The SOFAs, SOMAs, or other applicableagreements

• Applicable US directives and regulations.

THE MANDATE

The two types of mandates include UnitedNations mandates and non-United Nations man-dates.

United Nations Mandates

The UNSC or UNGA resolution authorizingand defining a peace operation is referred to asthe

mandate.

The mandate is the authority underwhich an operation is conducted. It may be sub-ject to periodic renewal. Annex B to this appen-dix is an example of a UN mandate resolution.

The mandate is usually prepared in a climateof crisis. Its preparation involves a great deal ofdiplomatic negotiation and compromise. Politi-cal expediency usually takes priority over mili-tary operational requirements. The mandate istherefore a document of compromise. However,it must remain acceptable to the belligerent par-ties involved and the nations providing thepeace operation force.

As a general rule, the clearer and moredetailed the mandate, the more enforceable it is.Ideally, it should be flexible enough for peaceoperations forces to have freedom of action andmovement. Once agreed upon, it is unlikely themandate will change. Historically, there has beena general reluctance to reopen negotiations to

change a mandate. The mandate usuallyincludes—

• The role of the peace operation force.

• The mission of the peace operation organiza-tion.

• The tasks or functions to be performed.

• The size and organization of the force or mis-sion.

• The appointment of the commander, anyspecial mediators, and their TOR.

• The nomination of the office responsible forthe supervision of the operation.

• General arrangements for financial andlogistical support.

• The division of UN and national responsibil-ities.

• The time limit of the mandate.

• The terms or conditions the host nationintends to impose on the presence of theforce or mission.

• Statements of the rights and immunities offorce or mission members.

Non-United Nations Mandates

Non-UN mandates usually result from trea-ties, accords, resolutions, or agreements evolvingfrom other international or regional organiza-tions. The aim of these is the same as a UN man-date, namely to create a peace operation force ormission to resolve a conflict. The contents of anon-UN mandate should be the same as a UNmandate.

STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS OR STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENTS

The second key document that defines thelegal authority and responsibilities of a force andforce personnel participation in a peace opera-tion is the SOFA or SOMA. The SOFA or SOMAmay be a treaty or a memorandum of under-standing. It is an agreement negotiated betweenthe UN and the host countries, which details therights privileges, immunities, and nature of ser-vices to be provided to the force and its person-nel, as well as their responsibilities andobligations.

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Participating member states provide input tothe UN secretariat on details in the SOFA orSOMA, but the secretariat and the host nationmay, however, negotiate the agreement. Individ-ual states may negotiate a memorandum ofunderstanding with the host nation concerningspecific items not covered in the SOFA or SOMA.SOFAs or SOMAs are rarely amended. Moreover,unlike a mandate, a SOFA or SOMA does notrequire renewal because it is a standing agree-ment.

Each SOFA or SOMA is different. Subjectsthat may be covered include—

• Control and authority over force areas andpremises.

• Displaying of flags, banners, symbols, and soforth.

• Wearing of uniforms.

• Authority to carry weapons.

• Freedom of movement in the AO.

• Freedom of peacekeeping action in the AO.

• Identification of personnel, vehicles, build-ings, positions, and so forth.

• Economic and financial regulations.

• Use of host nation support such as commu-nications, water, electricity, sewerage, air-ports, sea ports, and so forth.

• Immunity from search, seizure, or inspectionof force documents, personnel, vehicles,buildings, or areas.

• Cooperation and liaison channels betweenthe force and local authorities.

• Employment of civil labor,

• Claim and dispute settlement.

A key subject is the exercise of civil andcriminal jurisdictions. Unless the SOFA orSOMA states otherwise, peace operation forcesare subject to local laws, customs, and proce-dures. Ordinarily, the SOFA or SOMA grantslimited immunity from host nation civil andcriminal jurisdiction to peace operation forcesperforming official duties; however, peace opera-tion forces must respect the local laws and cus-toms. Commanders should discuss jurisdictionalprovisions with their servicing staff judge advo-cate.

OTHER TREATIES, DIRECTIVES, AND REGULATIONS

In addition to the mandate and SOFA orSOMA, peace operations forces must be familiarwith or have a working knowledge of otherdirectives and regulations that further define andprovide legal authority for the conduct of theiroperations.

United Nations Secretary General Directive

The SYG, upon appointing the force or mis-sion commander, issues a formal written direc-tive to him, outlining the TOR. He issuessubsequent direction in supplementary direc-tives.

United Nations Regulations

The force commander issues specific forceregulations once a force has been established.These regulations cover such subjects as—

• General provisions such as regulations, defi-nitions, instructions, amendments.

• International uniforms, insignia, privileges,immunities.

• Authority of the force commander such ascommand authority, chain of command, del-egation, discipline, military police.

• General administrative, executive, andfinancial arrangements such as the authorityof the SYG and the force commander, UNheadquarters, finance and accounting, per-sonnel, food, accommodations, amenities,transportation, supplies, equipment, com-munications, maintenance, medical, dental,sanitary, contracts, and public informationservices.

• Rights and duties of members of the forcesuch as respect for local law, conduct, andlegal protection.

• Information handling, honors and awards,jurisdiction, customs duties, foreignexchange regulations, identity cards, drivingprivileges, pay, overseas service allowances,dependents, leave, promotions, and service-related death, injury, or illness.

• Applicable international conventions such asthe observance of international conventionsapplicable to military personnel.

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Force Commander's Directive

The force commander's directive is alsoreferred to as a force SOP or force standing order.Upon receipt of the UN regulations, the forcecommander prepares more detailed regulationsand operating procedures for the force. All keymembers of the force must understand theseprocedures, since all operations are conducted inaccordance with them.

Each operation is unique. SOPs are designedand issued for each force. The UN has standard-ized the main subject headings, which are—

• Command and control (includes force com-mander's briefing, force administration,headquarters, operational briefings, and con-tingent briefings).

• Organization (includes structure and TORfor operations, personnel, administration,logistics, communications, and civilian per-sonnel).

• Operations (defines the mission and tasks ofthe force and gives details on the proceduresand actions to be taken by the force toaccomplish its tasks).

• Information (details collection, collation,analysis, assessment, and dissemination).

• Air operations (details aircraft, states ofreadiness, availability, limitations on flying,flight planning procedures, instructions onnight flying, airspace control).

• Operations economics (details the aim, roles,organizations, and procedures).

• Communications (details the organizationand procedures for force communications).

• Personnel and logistics (details personnelmanagement administration and servicesand logistics support).

• Public information (details UN and forcepress policy and procedures).

Memoranda of Agreement

MOAs may be reached among the force com-mander, the other UN peacekeeping force con-tingents, and the host nation. These MOAsaddress administrative matters such as use ofairports for rotation, national visitors, and soforth.

National Law

Members of peace operation contingentsremain subject to applicable national laws, poli-cies, and regulations of their sponsoring nations,including military criminal codes. Ordinarily, thesponsoring nation authority takes the appropri-ate military discipline and punitive actions—notthe UN chain of command. US personnel remainsubject to the UCMJ, which is administered bythe US contingent commander or other appropri-ate US authority. US forces also remain subject toapplicable domestic laws, policies, and regula-tions.

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Annex A

Terms of Reference for US Forces Somalia, United Nations Operation in Somalia

1. PURPOSE. These terms of reference constitute an agreement between theCommander-in-Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT) and the Com-mander, United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) for the staffing,organization, and operations of US Forces, Somalia (USFORSOM).

2. AUTHORITY. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has estab-lished UNOSOM II in accordance with UNSC Resolution 814 (1993). The NationalCommand Authorities have approved the participation of US Armed Forces aspart of, and in support of UNOSOM II.

3. MISSION. USFORSOM will perform duties as assigned by USCINCCENTand Commander, UNOSOM II pursuant to UNSC Resolution 814 (1993).

4. TIMING. UNOSOM II was established on 26 March 1993 by UNSC Resolu-tion 814 (1993). Administratively, UNOSOM II Force Command Headquarterswill be operational in early May 1993. Commander, UNOSOM II Force Commandwill assume full responsibility for enforcement of UNSC Resolution 814 (1993) onor about 4 May or at a date mutually acceptable to him and the Commander, Uni-fied Task Force (UNITAF), Somalia.

5. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.

a. USCINCCENT retains command of USFORSOM and delegates opera-tional, tactical, and/or administrative control of USFORSOM as required to sup-port the Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command.

b. USCINCCENT exercises command of USFORSOM through the Com-mander, USFORSOM, who is dual-hatted as Deputy Commander, UNOSOM II.

c. USCINCCENT retains operational control of the quick reaction force (QRF)and intelligence support element (ISE), as described in paragraphs 6b and 6c.below.

d. Commander, USFORSOM has administrative control of USFORSOM.

e. Specific command relationships not outlined in the TOR will be coordi-nated between Commander, UNOSOM II; Deputy Commander, UNOSOM II; andUSCINCCENT. USCINCCENT retains final approval authority for all commandrelations involving US forces.

6. ORGANIZATION. The USFORSOM consists of the support force, includ-ing US personnel assigned to the UNOSOM II staff, the QRF—when directed, theISE—when directed, and other augmentation forces, as required and whenapproved by USCINCCENT, to support the Commander, UNOSOM II.

a. The support force will consist of those US military combat service, combatservice support personnel, and headquarters staff assigned directly to UNOSOMII.

(1) Personnel assigned to the support force will be under the operational con-trol of the Commander, UNOSOM II, through the Commander, USFORSOM, andalso serve as Deputy Commander, UNOSOM II.

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(2) The primary element of the support force will consist of the Logistics Sup-port Command, Somalia (LSCS), whose mission is:

(a) During transition to UNOSOM II, provide UNOSOM II the same level ofcombat service support being provided by US forces to UNITAF, until relieved byother UNOSOM II donors or UN contract services, or as directed byUSCINCCENT. Transition or logistics support functions to the UN FOD

1

logisticssupport structure will be event-driven, not schedule- driven.

(b) After completion of the transition to UNOSOM II, be prepared to providecommand, control, and management of common-item, theater-level logistics sup-port for UNOSOM II, to include all units of USFORSOM deployed in support ofUNSC Resolution 814. Provide selected common item support/common-user ser-vice support and inland distribution of bulk POL, as required to support theCommander, UNOSOM II. Further logistics functions are outlined in paragraph 7below.

b. A QRF provides US combat capability for rapid response in support of theCommander, UNOSOM II to counter specific threats that exceed the capability ofUNOSOM II units. It will not be used to spearhead routine operations, escort con-voys, or perform long-term security actions. The QRF will initially be ashore inSomalia and will transition to offshore/over-the-horizon presence where condi-tions warrant and when directed by the US National Command Authorities.

(1) Tactical control of the QRF is delegated from USCINCCENT to Com-mander, USFORSOM, in the following situations:

(a) Deployment for normal unit training exercises within Somalia.

(b) Situations within Somalia that exceed the capability of UNOSOM II forcesand require emergency employment of immediate combat power for a limitedperiod or for show-of-force operations.

(2) QRF tasking outside of the above guidelines requires explicit USCINC-CENT approval. However, when a situation arises requiring immediate actionand prior approval is impossible or impracticable, the Commander, USFORSOM,is authorized to make the execution decision.

(3) The QRF will comply with the rules of engagement for US forces support-ing UNOSOM II as established in Operation Restore Hope II, OPORD 001.

c. The ISE will be deployed by USCENTCOM to provide intelligence supportto UNOSOM II and USFORSOM. All US intelligence information will be derivedfrom and pass through the ISE. The ISE will consist of a US-only intelligence cell,US representatives to UNOSOM II headquarters, intelligence-related systems andcommunications personnel, and other US intelligence support activities, asrequired.

(1) The ISE assets will remain under the supervision and control of the US atall times. Consistent with US releasibility requirements, the ISE will directly sup-port UNOSOM II operations.

(2) The director of intelligence, USCENTCOM, has overall responsibility fordeveloping and implementing the concept of operations for intelligence, coordi-nating intelligence requirements, developing the organization of the US-only ISE,and facilitating the acquisition of intelligence support systems.

1.

Now called the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD).

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(3) There will be no bilateral intelligence exchanges with coalition forces inSomalia.

7. LOGISTICS.

a. Organization of the UNOSOM II Support Command is based on the follow-ing assumptions:

(1) UNOSOM II will operate from five area support centers, one in each of thefive brigade sectors, with a general support base in Mogadishu, initially staffedlargely by the LSCS.

(2) The predominant UNOSOM II contributor within each sector will acceptresponsibility for the area support center and provide logistics support for theentire sector.

(3) The items below are the responsibility of UNOSOM II:

(a) Perishable and nonperishable subsistence.

(b) Petroleum (fuel).

(c) Construction materials and barrier material.

(d) Water production/purification, storage, and issue/

(e) Ammunition: standard calibers.

(f) Intratheater airlift.

(g) Ground line haul.

(4) The following items are a national responsibility:

(a) Personal demand items (Class VI).

(b) Clothing, individual equipment, tools, administrative supplies.

(c) Ammunition: nonstandard calibers.

(d) Major end items: racks, pylons, tracked vehicle, and so forth.

(e) Repair parts (tactical vehicle maintenance, aviation support/mainte-nance).

(f) Medical support.

1 Level-I and -II medical care are national responsibilities. Level-III care forUNOSOM force is to be provided by UNOSOM designated area support facility.The US will provide LEVEL-I, -II, and -III care specifically for the US forces.

2 Class VIII (medical supplies) remains a national responsibility.

3 Casualty evacuation is a national responsibility unless specifically desig-nated by UNOSOM II to be provided by an area support unit.

(g) Postal support and legal support.

b. Consistent with the above assumptions, initially the LSCs will providemost of the personnel and resources to stand up the UNOSOM II Support Com-mand. The LSCS will furnish support at approximately the same level presentlybeing provided by the UNITAF support command.

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c. Once the UNOSOM II support command is operational, the LSCs will dothe following:

(1) Provide command and control of logistics support to UNOSOM II.

(a) Furnish theater-level logistics management expertise.

(b) Assist Commander, UNOSOM II, in establishing procedures for thereceipt, storage, and issue of materiel at the theater level.

(c) Coordinate with the UN FOD

2

for contracting and acquisition support toUNOSOM II. All contracting functions will be assumed by the UN FOD.

1

(d) Provide highway regulation services.

(3) Conduct materiel management control and be responsible for the manage-ment functions attendant to US common item support for combat rations, water,and bulk petroleum to UNOSOM II.

(4) Provide common item support (CIS), defined as combat rations, water,and bulk petroleum, to UNOSOM II, to include:

(a) Receipt, storage, and issue/distribution of combat rations to the area sup-port centers.

(b) Production, purification, storage, and issue or distribution of water to thearea support centers.

(c) Receipt, storage, and issue or distribution of bulk petroleum (limited to JP5and MOGAS) to the area support centers.

d. Once the UNOSOM II support command is established and functioning,the LSCS will begin drawing down by shifting selected functions to other donorsand UN contractors. This transition will be event-driven, not schedule-driven.

8. FUNDING. US support of UNOSOM II will be handled in accordance withapplicable US law regarding agreements between the UN and the US govern-ment.

9. OTHER SERVICES. Administrative and technical support and services spe-cifically not outlined in this TOR must be coordinated and negotiated among UN,US, and participating countries.

10. COORDINATION AND LIAISON. Coordination and liaison among theUS and UN and other countries will be conducted as appropriate.

11. RESPONSIBILITIES OF US MILITARY PERSONNEL.

a. US Armed Forces personnel assigned to UNOSOM II will perform theirduties in accordance with the rules and regulations established for the UNOSOMII force command and as directed by USCINCCENT. The QRF, ISE, and otherunits operating under US control will maintain current US command relation-ships.

b. No classified US military information of any nature that is not releasablebased on appropriate directives, will be released to foreign nationals or the UNunless specifically cleared by an appropriate US official.

2.

Now called the Field Administration Logistics Division (FALD).

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12. PRESS GUIDANCE. There will be no press release for this TOR. Specificrequests for press activities with UNOSOM II will be forwarded to the UN forappropriate actions. The Department of State will remain the lead US agency forpublic affairs activities regarding all aspects of US participation in UNOSOM. TheUSCENTCOM Public Affairs Office may conduct routine public affairs activitiesconsistent with the UN and participating government agreements.

13. MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION. Modification of the TOR will beissued by USCINCCENT in consultation with the joint staff, Office of the Secre-tary of Defense, Department of State, and United Nations. The TOR will bereviewed one year from the date of issuance. The TOR may be terminated bymutual agreement of the parties or by direction of USCINCCENT.

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Annex B

Example of United Nations Mandate Resolution

The UNSC, noting that the present situation with regard to (country or coun-tries) is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteri-orate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and toseek out a durable solution.

Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the “peacefulintentions” signed at New York on (date). Having in mind the relevant provisionsof the charter of the UN and its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads: “All membersshall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force againstthe territorial integrity manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UnitedNations.”

a. Calls upon all member states, in conformity with their obligations underthe charter of the UN, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely toworsen the situation in ( ) and ( ), or to endanger international peace.

b. Asks the governments of ( ), which have the responsibility for the mainte-nance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessaryto stop violence and bloodshed in their countries.

c. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the governments of ( ), of aUN peacekeeping force in those countries. The composition and size of the forceshall be established by the SYG, in consultation with the governments of ( ). Thecommander of the force shall be appointed by the SYG and report to him. TheSYG, who shall keep the governments providing the force fully informed, shallreport periodically to the UNSC on its operation.

d. Recommends that the function of the force should be, in the interest of pre-serving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recur-rence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance andrestoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions.

e. Recommends that the stationing of the force shall be for a period of threemonths, all costs pertaining to it being met in a manner to be agreed upon by thegovernments providing the contingents and by the governments of ( ). The SYGmay also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose.

f. Recommends further that the SYG designate, in agreement with the govern-ments of ( ), a mediator, who shall use his best endeavors with the representa-tives of the communities and also with the aforesaid governments for the purposeof promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed-upon settlement to the problemconfronting ( ), in accordance with the charter of the UN, having in mind thewell-being of the peoples of ( ) as a whole and the preservation of internationalpeace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the SYG on hisefforts.

g. Requests the SYG to provide, from funds of the UN, as appropriate for theremuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff.

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Annex C

Extract of the UN Charter

Chapter VI

Pacific Settlement of Disputes

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endangerthe maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solu-tion by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settle-ment, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means oftheir own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the partiesto settle their dispute by such means.

Chapter VII

Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to thepeace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendation,or decide what measures shall be taken, in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, tomaintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use ofarmed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call uponthe Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may includecomplete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of dip-lomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for inArticle 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take suchaction by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore inter-national peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade,and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

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APPENDIX B

United States Government, United Nations, and Other International

Organizations

Now is the time to explore jointagency ventures . . .

Admiral Paul David MillerCINC USACOM

US Army forces conduct peace operations directed by the NCA in closecooperation with or under the supervision of other agencies, the UN, andNGOs. This appendix provides commanders and their staffs with informationabout possible players in peace operations with whom they may be unfamil-iar. It includes descriptions of these entities and their functions and roles but isnot an exhaustive treatment of all possibilities.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Units may work with any number of UnitedStates Government agencies, to include theNCA, the National Security Council (NSC), otherDOD agencies, DOS, AID, the Aid Office for For-eign Disaster Assistance (AOFDA), the FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA), theDepartment of Transportation, the Coast Guard,the Department of Agriculture (USDA), theDepartment of Justice, the Office of InternationalAffairs, the Public Health Service (PHS), and theImmigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES

The NCA consists of the President and theSecretary of Defense (SECDEF) together or theirduly deputized alternates or successors. Bothmovement of troops and execution of militaryaction must be directed by the NCA, no one elsein the chain of command has such authority. TheNCA directs armed forces involvement in opera-

tions. Orders given to the US forces commandermust include the appropriate NCA mandate(instructions) for the operation.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The NSC develops policy guidance foremployment of military assets and conduct ofoperations. The NSC provides a representative toany established interagency oversight committeewhen requested by the SECDEF.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Office of the SECDEF has several assis-tants who may be involved in the conduct ofpeace operations.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements

The Assistant Secretary for Strategy andRequirements (ASD[S&R]) is the principal staffassistant and advisor to the Under Secretary ofDefense for Policy (USD[P]) and the SECDEF onDOD policy and planning for US participation in


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international PK and PE operations. In these capaci-ties, the ASD(S&R) shall develop, coordi-nate, andoversee the implementation of policy and plans formatters related to the participation of US armed forcesand other DOD resources in UN and other interna-tional peacekeeping or peace enforcement activities.This includes the development of policy related to cre-ating, identi-fying, training, exercising, and commit-ting mili-tary forces for such purposes. A Deputy As-sistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping andPeace Enforcement (DASD[PK/PE]) serves under theASD(S&R).

Assistant Secretary of Defense for SpecialOperations and Low-Intensity Conflict

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Spe-cial Op-erations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD[SO/LIC])is the principal staff assistant and civilian advisor tothe Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) for policy-

and planning-related special operations and low-in-tensity conflict activities within DOD. Many peaceoperations are low-intensity conflicts or have the char-acter-istics of low-intensity conflicts. SOF, especiallyCA, PSYOP, and SF units, have unique capabili-tiesand responsibilities for peace operations. ASD(SO/LIC), among other responsibilities�

• Provides policy guidance and oversees plan-ning, programming, resourcing, and execu-tion of SO and LIC activities.

• Provides policy concerning PSYOP forces,plans, and programs.

• Oversees integrated development and refine-ment of doctrine, strategies, and pro-cessesfor SO and LIC, to include supporting stud-ies and analyses.

• Reviews and evaluates policies, processes,and programs of DOD components to plan,

In peace operations, units may work with any number of US Government or nongovernment agencies.

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resource, prepare forces, and execute SO andLIC operations and initiate and coordinateaction to enhance readiness.

• Supervises overall preparation and justifica-tion of program recommendations and bud-get proposals for SO activities in the FiveYear Defense Plan (FYDP).

• Advises the Under Secretary of Defense(Acquisition) (USD[A]) on acquisition priori-ties and requirements for SO and LIC-relatedmateriel and equipment, to include partici-pation in appropriate boards and commit-tees.

• Serves as principal staff assistant and advi-sor to the USD(P) and SECDEF for—

– DOD support to the President's counter-drug strategy.

– DOD humanitarian assistance programsand other humanitarian issues, includingrefugees and laws of war.

– US international information programs.

Defense Security Assistance Agency

The Defense Security Assistance Agency(DSAA) directs, administers, and supervises theexecution of security assistance programs. Thisinvolves providing guidance to military services,unified commands, and in-country securityassistance officers in their efforts to assist foreigngovernments obtain US equipment, training, andother defense-related services authorized by the

Foreign Assistance Act,

as amended, and the

ArmsExport Control Act.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Department of State is responsible forthe formulation and implementation of US for-eign policy.

Authority and Responsibilities

In a given country, DOS authority is dele-gated to one of several principal staff assistants.The Secretary of State (SECSTATE) provides asenior DOS representative to any interagency orinterdepartmental HA oversight committee, asrequested by the SECDEF. The DOS may provideprimary policy guidance in the following areas:

• Matters having an impact on US relations

with other countries.

• The extent to which commanders interfere inthe government of a particular country.

• The level at which the economy of a countryis maintained.

• Matters involving informational programs,supporting psychological aspects, and atti-tudes of the indigenous population.

• The level of subsistence for civilians in acountry in which US forces are stationed oremployed and by whom such subsistence inpart or in whole must be provided.

• Plans or procedures for the return of civilgovernment functions to civilian control.

• Efficiency and costs of programs undertakento gain the understanding, acceptance, confi-dence, and support of civil populations.

• Embassy or consulate emergency actionplans (EAPS) for the city or area under theircognizance. These plans and photographscould be beneficial to the forces involved inmissions. The information they provideincludes evacuation sites, landing zones(LZs), ports, and beaches; the number ofevacuees (if required); assembly areas; com-mand posts.

• Acts of terrorism. If the host nation is unableto adequately protect itself from acts of ter-rorism, the DOS can provide supportthrough its antiterrorism assistance (ATA)program to teach host nation officials gover-nance and law enforcement. The lattershould include how to maintain the internalsecurity of the nation. In particular, FederalAviation Administration instruction on air-port procedures and security could beincluded.

Important State Department Embassy Positions

Commanders involved in peace operationsshould be familiar with the duties of the follow-ing State Department officials and organizationsnormally found at US embassies.

Ambassador/Chief of Mission.

The ambassador,or chief of mission, is the senior US official, mili-tary or civilian, at the embassy. The ambassadorusually has overall direction, coordination, andsupervision of US Government activities and

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personnel in a host country. This authority doesnot extend to personnel in other missions orthose assigned to either an international agencyor to a combatant commander. A crisis may arisewhere the US has no diplomatic mission. In sucha situation, the President may send a representa-tive with instructions that vary from the stan-dard authorities and responsibilities of a chief ofmission.

During cross-border emergencies, the USambassador to the host nation normally exer-cises command and control in the interagencyenvironment. However, this control may be com-plicated when cross-border emergencies such ascivilians crossing international borders or attacksagainst refugee camps take place. Therefore,interagency working groups should establishprocedures on cross-border situations.

Deputy Chief of Mission.

The deputy chief ofmission (DCM) is the senior diplomatic official inan embassy below the rank of ambassador. Hehas the diplomatic title of minister, minister-counselor, or counselor (depending upon thesize of the mission) and is nearly always a careerForeign Service officer (FSO). The DCM usuallychairs the country team meetings and coordi-nates the embassy staff.

Chief of Military Mission.

The chief of militarymission is the senior military person at theembassy. He maintains liaison with the hostnation's military forces. He is authorized by lawto perform certain military functions with hostcountry military barred to others. He is cogni-zant of the advance party forward command ele-ment (FCE).

Chief of Station.

The chief of station is the per-son responsible for gathering HUMINT and sig-nal intelligence (SIGINT) and informing theambassador.

Defense Attache Officer.

The defense attacheofficer (DAO) is the military person attached tothe embassy in a diplomatic status representingDOD. This officer can facilitate access to thedaily embassy situation report (SITREP) andother written intelligence. All military personnel,even those not assigned to the embassy or underdirect control of the ambassador, must coordi-nate their activities through the DAO.

Security Assistance Officer.

The security assis-

tance officer is the person assigned to carry outsecurity assistance management functions, pri-marily, logistics management, fiscal manage-ment, and contract administration of countrysecurity assistance programs.

Administration Officer.

The administrationofficer is responsible for various activities at theembassy compound, which may include provid-ing security at small posts; running the commis-sary, motor pool, and maintenance activities; andhandling monetary aspects of the embassy busi-ness, including foreign service national (FSN)payroll, cash collection, and budget. The AO isthe third in command in the embassy hierarchy.In a small post with no security officer assigned,the AO assumes the functions of the securityofficer.

Political Officer.

A political officer is an FSOwho reports on political developments, negoti-ates with governments, and represents viewsand policies of the US Government to his con-tacts. The political officer maintains regular con-tact with host government officials, political andlabor leaders, and other influential citizens of acountry, as well as third country diplomats. Thepolitical officer is a major contributor to the over-all intelligence picture.

Economic Officer.

The economic officer analyzes,reports on, and advises superiors and DOS per-sonnel on economic matters in the host country.Economic officers also negotiate with the hostgovernment on trade and financial issues. Theymay also work in close contact with relief organi-zations.

Consular Officer.

The main function of the con-sular officer is to screen, process, and grant USpassports and visas. Other duties include attend-ing to the welfare of US citizens and performingadministrative tasks such as maintaining a countof US nationals within the host country. The con-sular officer provides appropriate personnel toscreen documents of all potential evacuees dur-ing noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO)and provides any necessary instructions thatpersonnel may need to effectively staff process-ing stations.

Medical Officer.

The medical officer is qualifiedfor general practice and responds to and sets uptriage, trauma, and mass casualty operations.

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The medical officer also advises on indigenousdisease vectors and proper prophylaxis neces-sary for forces introduced into the country.

Public Affairs Officer.

The USIA (US InformationService [USIS] overseas) representative of thecountry team normally serves as the publicaffairs officer (PAO) to provide public affairsadvice to the ambassador and coordinate infor-mation efforts with other agencies.

Regional Security Officer.

The regional securityofficer (RSO) is a security officer responsible forthe security functions of US embassies and con-sulates in a given country or group of adjacentcountries.

Post Security Officer.

The post security officer(PSO) has general security duties at a specificembassy (or consulate). The PSO is a special staffofficer under the control of the AO.

Special Security Force.

The special security forceconsists of DOS employees who respond to cri-ses in foreign countries. They work for the RSOand provide additional bodyguard security forthe ambassador, the DCM, and others.

General Services Officer.

The general servicesofficer performs many of the same functions as aG4 or S4. He is normally responsible for build-ings, grounds, construction, vehicles, and main-tenance.

Marine Security Guard Detachment.

The non-commissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) of theMarine Security Guard (MSG) Detachment isnormally a member of the EAC and is responsi-ble to the PSO for internal security, protection ofclassified material, and American lives. An MSGdetachment normally has 5 to 35 personnelassigned. The detachment is not available forduty with incoming forces, except with theexpress consent of the ambassador.

Country Team.

The country team consists of theranking representatives of embassy sections andother US Government agencies operating withina country. Chaired by the ambassador or theDCM, the country team meets regularly toadvise the ambassador on US matters and toreview current developments in the country.Included in the country team are the—

• Ambassador.

• DCM.

• Chief of political section.

• Political and military affairs officers.

• Consular officer.

• Administrative officer.

• Economics officer.

• USIS representatives.

• DEA, AID, and Peace Corps representatives.

• CIA, DAO, and military assistance group(MAG).

• Security assistance officer.

The country team facilitates interagencyaction on recommendations from the field andimplements effective execution of US programsand policies.

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

USAID is an agency under the policy direc-tion of the DOS that coordinates US foreignassistance efforts. In a peace support operation,armed forces work closely with USAID staff.USAID emphasizes—

• Stimulation of market economies and invest-ment by US companies in developingnations.

• Improvement of schools, colleges, trainingorganizations, supportive government min-istries, and other institutions to support eco-nomic growth.

• Policy reform to advance development.

• Transfer of technology to help countries pro-duce their own resources.

Foreign economic assistance provided byUSAID is normally in the form of developmentassistance loans and grants to improve the qual-ity of life of the poorest people in less developedcountries. It also includes the Economic SupportFund, part of the Security Assistance Program.The SECSTATE and the USAID administratormake policy decisions concerning the EconomicSupport Fund Program. The fund includes bal-ance of payment support and financing of infra-structure and other capital projects. Food isadministered in close cooperation with theUSDA.

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UNITED STATES AID OFFICE FOR FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE

AOFDA is the federal agency responsible forproviding prompt nonmilitary assistance to alle-viate loss of life and suffering of foreign disastervictims. AOFDA may request DOD assistanceduring HA operations. Coordination and deter-mination of required forces is normally accom-plished through the Assistant Secretary ofDefense for International Security Affairs(ASD[ISA]) and the JCS.

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

The USIA (US Information Service [USIS]overseas) helps to achieve US foreign policyobjectives by influencing public attitudes over-seas. The agency advises the President and USdepartments outside CONUS on the possibleimpact of policy, programs, and official state-ments on foreign opinion. USIA monitors theimpact of peace support operations on local atti-tudes and aids peace operation forces by gainingpopular support for them. To encourage publicsupport for US policy objectives and to counterhostile attempts to distort and frustrate US pro-grams, USIA conducts a wide range of informa-tion activities.

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

FEMA coordinates federal, state, and localresources on issues of national security, emer-gency preparedness, civil defense, continuity ofmobilization preparedness, and continuity ofgovernment and technological disasters withinthe US, its territories, and possessions. FEMAhas the authority to direct DOD assistance tostate and local governments to save lives andprotect property, public health, and safety. Peaceoperation forces may facilitate FEMA-DOD plan-ning and coordination of assessments consistentwith their mission and ease suffering, consistentwith established procedures and nationaldefense priorities.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

DOT has technical capabilities and expertisein public transportation that may be availableupon request to assist specific HA operations.

The primary organization with which peaceoperation forces may work is the Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard (USCG) is responsible forfederal maritime law enforcement and port secu-rity in peacetime and is a military service underthe Department of the Navy in wartime. TheUSCG has expertise in areas of shipping, com-merce, marine life industry, and conservation.USCG international training efforts provide amechanism for sharing its expertise abroad; suchexpertise can be made available for peace sup-port operations, if needed. Additionally, resultsof DOD and DOT projects related to peace sup-port missions are available upon request.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

The Department of Agriculture (USDA) hasprojects and activities ongoing in foreign coun-tries and can provide technical assistance topeace support forces, if requested. CoordinatedDOD and projects and teams can be developedfor specific countries or regions.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

The Department of Justice agencies withwhich HA forces may come into contact includeDEA and Community Relations Service (CRS).

Drug Enforcement Agency

DEA coordinates DOD peace support opera-tions. DEA programs and projects can be devel-oped for specific countries and regions. The DEAcan—

• Assist in providing legal, self-sustaining,income-earning alternatives to underdevel-oped, agriculturally based nations.

• Improve international exchange of informa-tion about successful drug prevention andeducation programs.

Community Relations Service

CRS is under the general authority of theattorney general. CRS provides on-site resolu-tion assistance through a field staff of mediatorsand conciliators. CRS not only aids in resolvingdifficulties as they erupt but also seeks to assistand support communities in developing mecha-nisms to address future problems.

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Office of International Affairs

The Office of International Affairs coordi-nates and supports Department of Justice inter-national efforts and supports the DOS duringinternational treaty negotiations.

PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE

The promotes the protection and advance-ment of a nation's physical and mental health.Peace support forces are most likely to workwith the PHS when bringing migrants or refu-gees into the US or US territories. PHS ensuresthat no health threat is posed by such immigra-tions.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

The INS provides information and service tothe general public while enforcing immigrationcontrol. The INS—

• Facilitates the entry of persons legallyadmissible as visitors or as immigrants of theUS.

• Grants benefits under the

Immigration andNationality Act,

including assistance to thoseseeking permanent resident status or natu-ralization.

• Prevents unlawful entry to the US.

• Apprehends and removes aliens who enteror remain illegally in the US or whose stay isnot in the best interests of this nation.

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATIONS

UN organizations primarily concerned withpeace operations include the High Commis-sioner for Refugees, the Disaster ManagementTeam (UN-DMT), and the Department ofHumanitarian Affairs (UNDHA).

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER

FOR REFUGEES

The UNHCR has a major role in coordinat-ing aid to refugees, returnees, and displaced per-sons. Except in special circumstances, it material

assistance activities are conducted throughnational or local authorities of the country con-cerned, other organizations of the UN system,NGOs, or private technical agencies.

Coordination with the UNHCR is critical forany humanitarian relief effort. Failure to coordi-nate with UNHCR before and during the opera-tion, or failure to meet UNHCR standards, maypreclude the UNHCR from accepting transfer ofequipment, supplies, and facilities as the militarydisengages. To preclude this, a working relation-ship should be established with UNHCR imme-diately upon notification of a mission withUNHCR. A copy of the UNHCR text that out-lines specifications for refugee camp construc-tion should be available.

UNITED NATIONS DISASTER MANAGEMENT TEAM

The UN-DMT is the primary agency respon-sible for coordinating assistance to persons com-pelled to leave their homes as a result ofdisasters, natural and otherwise.

United Nations Department Of Humanitarian Affairs

UNDHA is the focal point for disaster man-agement in the UN system. It mobilizes andcoordinates international disaster relief, pro-motes disaster mitigation (through the provisionof advisory services and technical assistance),and promotes awareness, information exchange,and the transfer of knowledge on disaster-related matters.

UNDHA is responsible for maintaining con-tact with disaster management entities andemergency services worldwide and is able tomobilize specialized resources. The appointedUNDHA resident coordinator has a crucial rolein providing leadership to the UN team at coun-try level. He also coordinates locally representedPVOs and NGOs as required. The resident coor-dinator convenes the UN-DMT at country level,seeking unity of effort among all the variousPVOs, NGOs, and agencies. The following UNprograms can be expected in the AO. They helpform the UN-DMT when the UN system hasbeen mobilized to assist in the emergency.

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United Nations Development Program

The UN Development Program (UNDP) pro-motes the incorporation of disaster mitigation indevelopment planning and funds technical assis-tance for all aspects of disaster management.Work is long range. The UNDP senior membermay be appointed as a regional coordinator ormay also serve as the UNDHA in-country coor-dinator. UNDP also provides administrativeassistance support to the resident coordinatorand to the UN-DMT.

World Food Program

The World Food Program (WFP) is an opera-tional, relief-oriented organization. It providestargeted food aid and supports rehabilitation,reconstruction, and risk-reducing developmentprograms. Targeted food aid is special subsis-tence aligned to a special segment of the popula-tion. This organization mobilizes andcoordinates the delivery of complementaryemergency and

program

food aid from bilateraland other sources.

United Nations Childrens' Fund

The United Nations Childrens' Fund(UNICEF) is a relief-oriented organization. Itattends to the well-being of children and women,especially child health and nutrition. The activi-ties of this organization may include social pro-grams, child feed (in collaboration with WFP),water supplies, sanitation and direct health inter-vention (in coordination with the World HealthOrganization [WHO]). UNICEF providesrelated management and logistical support.

World Health Organization

WHO is an organization involved more inlong range programs. It provides advice andassistance in all aspects of preventive and cura-tive health care. This assistance includes the pre-paredness of health services for rapid responseto disasters.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

The Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO) is an organization also involved in long-

range programs. It provides technical advice inreducing vulnerability and helps in the rehabili-tation of agriculture, livestock, and fisheries. Theorganization emphasizes local food production.It also monitors food production, exports andimports, and forecasts any requirements forexceptional food assistance.

OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Other international organizations includethe American Council for Voluntary Interna-tional Action and PVOs and NGOs.

AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR VOLUNTARY INTERNATIONAL ACTION

(INTERACTION)

The American Council for Voluntary Interna-tional Action is a broadly based coalition of 120American PVOs that work in internationaldevelopment, refugee assistance, public policy,and education of Americans in third worldnations. Since 1984, it has played a significantrole in disaster preparedness and response todisasters. It exists to complement and enhancethe effectiveness of its member organizationsand the PVO community as a whole.

A grant from AOFDA has helped this orga-nization establish a professional forum for coop-eration, joint planning, and exchange ofinformation when disaster occurs. However, it isnot likely that interaction will occur within thecountry in need of assistance. The work of thecouncil is executed in the US and is geared tomaintain an effective liaison with AOFDA. It actsas a coordinator at the staff level in meetingrequirements identified by its members operat-ing within the country in need.

PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AND

NONGOVERNMENTORGANIZATIONS

The list of PVOs and NGOs that may befound in an AO could be very large. Approxi-mately 350 agencies capable of conducting someform of humanitarian relief operation are regis-tered with the USAID. Also, many foreign-based

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organizations are not required to register in theUS. USAID publishes a yearly report, titled

Vol-untary Foreign Aid Programs,

that describes theaims and objectives of the registered organiza-tion. It should be part of the combatant com-mander's library. The following humanitarianPVOs and humanitarian relief organizations(HROs) may be found in an AO.

American Friends of Action Internationale Contre La Faim

American Friends of Action InternationaleContre La Faim (AIFC) promotes developmentefforts and provides emergency assistance inAfrican, Asia, and the Caribbean. It focuses onprimary health care, potable water, environmen-tal sanitation, and agriculture-based income gen-eration. The most basic commitment is toenhance local capacities at both the communityand central levels.

Catholic Relief Services

Catholic Relief Services operates relief, wel-fare, and self-help programs in 74 countries toassist refugees, war victims, and other needypeople. CRS emphasizes the distribution of foodand clothing and the provision of primary healthcare. Their capability to provide technical assis-tance and social services has steadily increasedin recent years.

Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Incorporated

Cooperative for American Relief Every-where, Inc. (CARE) conducts relief and develop-ment programs in over 40 countries in Asia,Africa, Latin American, and the Caribbean. Pro-grams are carried out under three-way partner-ship contracts among CARE, private or nationalgovernment agencies, and local communities inthe areas of health, nutrition, acquired immunedeficiency syndrome (AIDS), population man-agement, natural resources management, agri-culture, small economic activities, andemergency assistance. CARE provides technicalassistance, training, food, other materialresources, and management in combinationsappropriate to local needs and priorities. Theirparticular strength is in food distribution, emer-gency transport and general logistics.

Doctors Without Borders/Medicines Sans Frontiers

Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) providesmedical assistance to victims of disasters, acci-dents, and war. The US organization is closelyassociated with its counterparts in Belgium, Hol-land, Spain, and France. Medical relief teamsdepart on over 700 yearly missions to areas ofconflict, refugee camps, national disaster sites,and areas lacking adequate health care facilities.Their particular areas of expertise are emergencymedicine, vaccinations, and basic hygiene ser-vices.

The International Medical Corps

The International Medical Corps (IMC) pro-vides health care and establishes health trainingprograms in developing countries and distressedareas worldwide. They specialize in areas wherefew other relief organizations operate. IMCs goalis to promote self-sufficiency through healtheducation and training. Its particular areas ofexpertise are immunizations and primary healthcare.

International Rescue Committee

The International Rescue Committee (IRC)assists refugees and internally displaced victimsof war and civil strife. Services range from emer-gency relief and assistance programs to refugeeresettlement in the US. IRC monitors human ser-vice delivery and refugee processing for USresettlement. IRC can provide emergency medi-cal support, public health, and small-scale waterand sanitation capabilities.

Irish Concern

Irish Concern (IC) is one of the foreignNGOs that receives funding from USAID andAOFDA. Its primary area of expertise is supple-mentary and therapeutic feeding and sanitation.

Lutheran World Relief, Incorporated

Lutheran World Relief, Inc. (LWR) providesfinancial, material, and personnel support, usu-ally through counterpart church-related agen-cies, in the areas of disaster relief, refugeeassistance, and social and economic develop-ment. LWR is also competent in the provision ofhealth care.

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Save the Children Federation

Save the Children Federation-UK (SCF-UK)programs are guided by a set of principles thatinclude identifying project goals and implement-ing projects, transferring necessary skills,encouraging self-help, and using availableresources. This organization is more relief-ori-ented than its US counterpart. It concentrates onsupplementary feeding, seeds and tools, andgeneral infrastructure.

World Vision Relief and Development, Incorporated

World Vision Relief and Development(WVRD), Inc., or Vision, provides cash, gifts in-kind, services in-kind, and technical resourcesfor large-scale relief and rehabilitation anddevelopment projects in over 90 countriesthroughout the world. Development programsinclude child survival, vitamin A, prostheticsand handicap rehabilitation, child development,and AIDS prevention and education.

INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS MOVEMENT

The International Red Cross and Red Cres-cent Movement is formed by the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross, the InternationalFederation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Soci-eties, and the National Red Cross and Red Cres-cent Societies. The statutes of the internationalRed Cross and Red Crescent Movement give themovement other tasks in situations not coveredby the Geneva Conventions.

International Committee of the Red Cross

The International Committee of the RedCross (ICRC) works for the faithful applicationof the provisions of international humanitarianlaw that applies in armed conflicts and under-takes the tasks incumbent upon it under this law.ICRC is an independent organization based inGeneva. It derives its mandate from the GenevaConventions of 1949 and the additional protocolsof 1977. Although at times it may get involved instrictly humanitarian operations, its mandate isto function only during armed conflict.

ICRC neutrality is a vital aspect of itsinvolvement in any relief operations. The ICRCprotects it neutrality in terms of reality and per-ception because it operates on all sides of a dis-pute to protect victims of armed conflict, toinclude internal disturbances and tension. ICRCneutrality is a key consideration for militaryplanners and operators.

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

The member organizations are the Red Crossand Red Crescent Societies that normally operatewithin the borders of their own country. Theirmandate is to provide humanitarian relief dur-ing disasters. Red Cross organizations may pro-vide assistance to other federation membersthrough their international alliance provisions.The basic considerations for planners is toremember that these organizations also go thegreat length to preserve their neutrality.

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APPENDIX C

Training

We will not have room for specialists. We must develop a team that plays both ways, a team that is scrappy and willing to perform many

missions, a team that is versatile and agile.

General Frederick M. Franks, Jr.

Training and preparation for peace operations should not detract from aunit's primary mission of training soldiers to fight and win in combat.

The firstand foremost requirement for success in peace operations is the successful applicationof warfighting skills.

Peace operations are not a new mission and should not betreated as a separate task to be added to a unit's mission-essential task list(METL). However, units selected for these duties require time to train and pre-pare for a significant number of tasks that may be different from their wartimeMETL. The amount of training required and when the training is given willdepend on the particular peace operation mission. However, the philosophyused to determine the

how much

and

when

training questions for operationsother than war can be summed up as

just enough

and

just in time.

PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING

Most facets of normal military operationsapply to peace operations, particularly personaldiscipline. However, peace operations require anadjustment of attitude and approach. On theother hand, many facets of normal military train-ing apply to peace operations.

To accomplish peace operations, individualsand units need training in various skills andtechniques before deployment to change theirfocus from wartime to the unique demandsplaced on soldiers in peace operations. Forexample, in PK, soldiers may only use force inself-defense. The urgent need to deploy forcesoften precludes a complete and lengthy trainingprogram. However, with prior planning, TSPs,MTTs, and CTCs can be used to assist command-ers in preparing soldiers for these missions.

Many of the skills that enable a unit toaccomplish its primary mission, such as intelli-gence and observation and reporting, apply in

peace operations. Training to enhance these skillsshould be part of the predeployment trainingprogram.

INTELLIGENCE

An important aspect of training for a peaceoperations mission is to understand that theforce is a potential target of foreign intelligenceand terrorist activities.

OBSERVATION AND REPORTING

Observing and reporting are the primaryfunctions of a force involved specifically withPK. Individuals must be familiar with the stan-dard reporting formats that include the follow-ing reports: situation, shooting, overflight, andaircraft sighting. Personnel should learn to rec-ognize the aircraft, vessels, vehicles, dress, andequipment of all sides.

Learning to function properly in an observa-tion post is essential. Small units must learn the


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typical layout of an observation post and check-point, as well as the general daily duty routine atan observation post. A unit may live and work atan observation post for days at a time, isolatedfrom its parent organization.

UNIT TRAINING

Time required to train units selected forpeace operations varies according to the com-plexity of the mission and unit. For planningpurposes, units require from 4 to 6 weeks of spe-cialized training. To be effective, the unit has totailor its entire training methodology toward thetasks required. The unit training program willdepend on whether the primary mission is PK orPE.

PEACEKEEPING

Key subjects that should be included in unittraining for PK missions are—

• The nature of PK.

• The establishment of lodgments.

• The performance of relief in place.

• Regional orientation.

• Establishment of a buffer zone.

• Supervision of a truce or cease-fire.

• The monitoring of boundaries.

• Contributions to maintenance of law andorder.

• Negotiating skills.

• Mine and booby trap training and aware-ness.

• Assistance in rebuilding of infrastructure.

• Checkpoint operations.

• Investigation and reporting.

• Information collection.

• Patrolling.

• Media interrelationships.

• Staff training.

• Demilitarization of forces and geographicalareas in a permissive environment.

• ROE.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

In addition to those subjects required for PK,subjects that should be included in unit trainingfor PE operations are—

• Fighting a meeting engagement.

• Conducting movement-to-contact andsearch and attack.

• Performing air assault.

• Enforcing UN sanctions.

• Protecting the human rights of people.

• Protecting humanitarian relief efforts.

• Separating warring factions.

• Disarming belligerent parties of heavy offen-sive weapons.

• Restoring territorial integrity.

• Restoring law and order.

• Demilitarizing forces and geographical areasin a nonpermissive environment.

• Opening secure routes.

• ROE.

• Civil-military operations.

• Control of multinational units.

• Intelligence fusion and dissemination

• NGO operations.

• Multinational logistics.

• PSYOP.

• Intercultural communication.

• Raids, attacks, and defense

The entire chain of command must developa different mind set than that required for fight-ing wars. Nevertheless, the force must always beprepared to protect itself or conduct combatoperations. Examples of in-country premission,PK, and TOE mission training material can befound in the XVIII Airborne Corps SOP for Sup-port of MFO in the Sinai. In addition, command-ers may wish to consider PA media training forthe chain of command and soldiers.

LEADER DEVELOPMENT

Leader development may be the single mostimportant factor in achieving success. Peace

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operations require skill, imagination, flexibility,adaptability, and patience. Emphasis duringtraining must be placed on developing theseleadership skills, as well as knowledge of the cul-tures involved in the operation.

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

Individual training for peace operationsduties should emphasize the personal character-istics of patience, flexibility, self-discipline, pro-fessionalism, impartiality, tact, andinquisitiveness. These characteristics have con-notations that may be unique in a peace opera-tions environment.

PATIENCE

Patience is an important characteristic forindividuals in all peace operations. Negotiationsoften produce results slowly and time may seemto stand still. Training should help soldiersadjust their expectations to the circumstancessurrounding their mission.

PROFESSIONALISM

The credibility of a force involved in peaceoperations can be significantly damaged byunprofessional activities, both on and off duty,which in turn can affect its relationship with theparties in the conflict. All members of the forcemust be knowledgeable and trained in allaspects of the mission.

IMPARTIALITY

A force must guard against unequal treat-ment and avoid controversial, off-the-recordremarks that may reach unintended audiences.These comments may lead to a demand for theoffender's removal and, if reflecting a prejudicebelieved to be widely held in a national contin-gent, to pressure for the withdrawal of the entirenational contingent.

INQUISITIVENESS

The normal routine of daily life shouldbecome so familiar that soldiers notice evensmall events that could be of importance ifmatched with information from other observers.All personnel involved in peace operations mustreceive training on the customs of the local pop-ulation and coalition partners.

Training should emphasize security andpatrolling and the ROE that will apply to theoperations. Individuals who staff checkpoints onmajor roads must be taught to slow and observetraffic without stopping it. This procedure willallow them to observe and report traffic passingfrom one zone to another.

Vehicles and personnel entering and exitinginstallations should be stopped and searched forcontraband and explosives. Personnel must learnnot only how to search but also how to searchcourteously without undue force.

SUSTAINMENT TRAINING

Once deployed, the force should be able tocontinue its mission training. Time permitting,the force may also train in items that requirerecurring emphasis such as common task train-ing. Training may be restricted by an agreementamong the parties in the conflict. However, oncethe force is formed, it may be possible to estab-lish a schedule that enables the force to train onMETL requirements on a regular basis.

Unit commanders should plan to conductMETL training when not actively involved in thepeace operation. For a multinational and per-haps multilingual force to operate effectively, itmust periodically train together. Although thecommander and subordinate officers, regardlessof nationality, must reconnoiter likely crisispoints with discretion, they should performtraining where it is unlikely to alarm the localpopulation and the parties in the conflict.

POSTOPERATIONS TRAINING

Peace operations require a significant changein orientation for military personnel. Before thepeace operations mission, training is provided totransition the wartime-ready individual to oneconstrained in most, if not all, actions. At theconclusion of the peace operation, certain actionsare necessary to reorient the soldier to the unit'swartime METL. Commanders must allocate suf-ficient resources and time for training in order toachieve collective and individual standardsrequired to meet the unit's primary warfightingmission.

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Unit commanders must allow sufficient timeand allocate sufficient resources after a peaceoperation mission for refresher training. Thisrefresher training is for redeveloping skills andabilities that may have been unavoidably

affected by the nature of the peace operation.This refresher will require a training program tohone skills necessary to return the unit to a war-time-ready status.

90

APPENDIX D

SAMPLE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Meanwhile, I shall have to amplify the ROE so that all commanding officerscan know what I am thinking, rather than apply their own interpretation, which might range from “ask them for lunch to 'Nuke' em for breakfast.”

Admiral “Sandy” WoodwardCommander of the Task Force

(Falkland Islands, 1982)

This appendix provides actual unclassified ROE and instructions for use offorce and weapons policy as samples. The purpose of this appendix is tofamiliarize commanders and their staffs with the types of rules and instruc-tions and various formats and means of dissemination used by US Armyforces in recent operations.

The selected operations include Operation Restore Hope—the UN-sanc-tioned humanitarian relief and enforcement operation conducted in Somaliain 1992 and 1993—and Operation Provide Comfort—a UN-sanctionedhumanitarian protection operation conducted in Northern Iraq in 1991.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

1. (U) Situation. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.

2. (U) Mission. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Concept of the Operation.

(1) (U) If you are operating as a unit, squad, or other formation, followthe orders of your leaders.

(2) (U) Nothing in these rules negates your inherent right to use rea-sonable force to defend yourself against dangerous personal attack.

(3) (U) These rules of self-protection and rules of engagement are notintended to infringe upon your right of self defense. These rules areintended to prevent indiscriminate use of force or other violationsof law or regulation.

(4) (U) Commanders will instruct their personnel on their mission.This includes the importance of proper conduct and regard for thelocal population and the need to respect private property and pub-lic facilities. The

Posse Comitatus Act

does not apply in an overseas


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area. Expect that all missions will have the inherent task of forcesecurity and protection.

(5) (U) ROE cards will be distributed to each deploying soldier (seeAnnex A to this appendix).

b. (U) Rules of Self-Protection for all Soldiers.

(1) (U) US forces will protect themselves from threats of death or seri-ous bodily harm. Deadly force may be used to defend your life, thelife of another US soldier, or the life of persons in areas under UScontrol. You are authorized to use deadly force in self-defensewhen—

(a) (U) You are fired upon.

(b) (U) Armed elements, mobs, and/or rioters threaten human life.

(c) (U) There is a clear demonstration of hostile intent in your pres-ence.

(2) (U) Hostile intent of opposing forces can be determined by unitleaders or individual soldiers if their leaders are not present. Hos-tile intent is the threat of imminent use of force against US forces orother persons in those areas under the control of US forces. Factorsyou may consider include—

(a) (U) Weapons: Are they present? What types?

(b) (U) Size of the opposing force.

(c) (U) If weapons are present, the manner in which they are dis-played; that is, are they being aimed? Are the weapons part of afiring position?

(d) (U) How did the opposing force respond to the US forces?

(e) (U) How does the force act toward unarmed civilians?

(f) (U) Other aggressive actions.

(3) (U) You may detain persons threatening or using force whichwould cause death, serious bodily harm, or interference with mis-sion accomplishment. You may detain persons who commit crimi-nal acts in areas under US control. Detainees should be given tomilitary police as soon as possible for evacuation to central collec-tion points (see paragraph d below).

c. (U) Rules of Engagement. The relief property, foodstuffs, medical sup-plies, building materials, and other end items belong to the relief agen-cies distributing the supplies until they are actually distributed to thepopulace. Your mission includes safe transit of these materials to thepopulace.

(1) (U) Deadly force may be used only when—

(a) (U) Fired upon.

(b) (U) Clear evidence of hostile intent exists (see above for factorsto consider to determine hostile intent).

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(c) (U) Armed elements, mobs, and/or rioters threaten human life,sensitive equipment and aircraft, and open and free passage ofrelief supplies.

(2) (U) In situations where deadly force is not appropriate, use the mini-mum force necessary to accomplish the mission.

(3) (U) Patrols are authorized to provide relief supplies, US forces, andother persons in those areas under the control Of US forces. Patrolsmay use deadly force if fired upon or if they encounter opposingforces which evidence a hostile intent. Nondeadly force or a showof force should be used if the security of US forces is not compro-mised by doing so. A graduated show of force includes—

(a) (U) An order to disband or disperse.

(b) (U) Show of force/threat of force by US forces that is greaterthan the force threatened by the opposing force.

(c) (U) Warning shots aimed to prevent harm to either innocentcivilians or the opposing force.

(d) (U) Other means of nondeadly force.

If this show of force does not cause the opposing force to abandonits hostile intent, consider if deadly force is appropriate.

(4) (U) Use of barbed wire fences is authorized.

(5) (U) Unattended means of force (for example, mines, booby traps,trip guns) are

not

authorized.

(6) (U) If US forces are attacked or threatened by unarmed hostile ele-ments, mobs, and/or rioters, US forces will use the minimumamount of force reasonably necessary to overcome the threat. Agraduated response to unarmed hostile elements may be used.Such a response can include—

(a) (U) Verbal warnings to demonstrators in their native language.

(b) (U) Shows of force, including the use of riot control formations(see Annex A for information on using RCAs).

(c) (U) Warning shots fired over the heads of the hostile elements.

(d) (U) Other reasonable uses of force, to include deadly force whenthe element demonstrates a hostile intent, which are necessaryand proportional to the threat.

(7) (U) All weapons systems may be employed throughout the area ofoperations unless otherwise prohibited. The use of weapons sys-tems must be appropriate and proportional, considering the threat.

(8) (U) US forces will not endanger or exploit the property of the localpopulation without their explicit approval. Use of civilian propertywill usually be compensated by contract or other form of payment.Property that has been used for the purpose of hindering our mis-sion will be confiscated. Weapons may be confiscated and demilita-rized if they are used to interfere with the mission of US forces (seerule (10) below).

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(9) (U) Operations will not be conducted outside of the landmass, air-space, and territorial seas of Somalia. However, any USCENTCOMforce conducting a search and rescue mission shall use force as nec-essary and intrude into the landmass, airspace, or territorial sea ofany county necessary to recover friendly forces.

(10) (U) Crew-served weapons are considered a threat to US forces andthe relief effort whether or not the crew demonstrates hostileintent. Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force toconfiscate and demilitarize crew-served weapons in their area ofoperations.

(a) (U) If an armed individual or weapons crew demonstrates hos-tile intentions, they may be engaged with deadly force.

(b) (U) If an armed individual or weapons crew commits criminalacts but does not demonstrate hostile intentions, US forces willuse the minimum amount of necessary force to detain them.

(c) (U) Crew-served weapons are any weapon system that requiresmore than one individual to operate. Crew-served weaponsinclude, but are not limited to tanks, artillery pieces, antiaircraftguns, mortars, and machine guns.

(11) (U) Within those areas under the control of US forces, armed indi-viduals may be considered a threat to US forces and the reliefeffort, whether or not the individuals demonstrate hostile intent.Commanders are authorized to use all necessary force to disarmand demilitarize groups or individuals in those areas under thecontrol of US forces. Absent a hostile or criminal act, individualsand associated vehicles will be released after any weapons areremoved/demilitarized.

d. (U) Use of riot control agents (RCAs). Use of RCAs requires theapproval of CJTF. When authorized, RCAs may be used for purposesincluding, but not limited to—

(1) (U) Riot control in the division area of operations, including the dis-persal of civilians who obstruct roadways or otherwise impede dis-tribution operations after lesser means have failed to result indispersal.

(2) (U) Riot control in detainee holding areas or camps in and aroundmaterial distribution or storage areas.

(3) (U) Protection of convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, orparamilitary groups.

e. (U) Detention of Personnel. Personnel who interfere with the accom-plishment of the mission or who use or threaten deadly force against USforces, US or relief material distribution sites, or convoys may bedetained. Persons who commit criminal acts in areas under the controlof US forces may likewise be detained.

(1) (U) Detained personnel will be treated with respect and dignity.

(2) (U) Detained personnel will be evacuated to a designated locationfor turnover to military police.

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(3) (U) Troops should understand that any use of the feet in detaining,handling or searching Somali civilians is one of the most insultingforms of provocation.

4. (U) Service Support. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.

5. (U) Command and Signal. Basic OPLAN/OPORD.

Acknowledge

ARNOLDMG

OFFICIALSMITHStaff Judge AdvocateAnnex AROE Card

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Annex A

ROE Card

Rules of EngagementJoint Task Force for Somalia Relief Operations

Ground Forces

Nothing in these rules of engagement limits your right to take appropriateaction to defend yourself and your unit.

1. You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or threatsof attack.

2. Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop a hostile act.

3. When US forces are attacked by

unarmed

hostile elements, mobs, and/orrioters, US forces should use the minimum force necessary under the circum-stances and proportional to the threat.

4. You may not seize the property of others to accomplish your mission.

5. Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or in self-defense.

Remember

• The United States is

not

at war.

• Treat all persons with dignity and respect.

• Use minimum force to carry out the mission.

• Always be prepared to act in self-defense.

Rules of Engagement forOperation Provide Comfort

1

(As Authorized by JCS [EUCOM Dir 55-47])

1. All military operations will be conducted in accordance with the laws ofwar.

2. The use of armed force will be utilized as a measure of last resort only.

3. Nothing in these rules negates or otherwise overrides a commander's obli-gation to take all necessary and appropriate actions for his unit's self-defense.

4. US forces will not fire unless fired upon unless there is clear evidence ofhostile intent.

Hostile Intent

- The threat of imminent use of force by an lraqi force orother foreign force, terrorist group, or individuals against the UnitedStates, US forces, US citizens, or Kurdish or other refugees located

1.

These rules of engagement were extracted from the Rules of Engagement Card carried by all coali-tion soldiers.

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above the 38th parallel or otherwise located within a US or allied safehaven refugee area. When the on-scene commander determines, basedon convincing evidence, that

hostile intent

is present, the right existsto use proportional force to deter or neutralize the threat.

Hostile Act

- Includes armed force directly to preclude or impede themissions and/or duties of US or allied forces.

5. Response to hostile fire directly threatening US or allied care shall be rapidand directed at the source of hostile fire using only the force necessary to elimi-nate the threat. Other foreign forces as (such as reconnaissance aircraft) that haveshown an active integration with the attacking force may be engaged. Use theminimum amount of force necessary to control the situation.

6. You may fire into lraqi territory in response to hostile fire.

7. You may fire into another nation's territory in response to hostile fire only ifthe cognizant government is unable or unwilling to stop that force's hostile actseffectively or promptly.

8. Surface-to-air missiles will engage hostile aircraft flying north of the 36thparallel.

9. Surface-to-air missiles will engage hostile aircraft south of the 36th parallelonly when they demonstrate hostile intent or commit hostile acts. Except in casesof self-defense, authorization for such engagements rests with the designated airdefense commander. Warning bursts may be fired ahead of foreign aircraft todeter hostile acts.

10. In the event US forces are attacked or threatened by unarmed hostile ele-ments, mobs, or rioters, the responsibility for the protection of US forces restswith the US commanding officer. The on-scene commander will employ the fol-lowing measures to overcome the threat:

a. Warning to demonstrators.

b. Show of force, including the use of riot control formations.

c. Warning shots fired over the heads of hostile elements.

d. Other reasonable use of force necessary under the circumstances and pro-portional to the threat.

11. Use the following guidelines when applying these rules:

a. Use of force only to protect lives.

b. Use of minimum force necessary.

c. Pursuit will not be taken to retaliate; however, immediate pursuit maybegin and continue for as long as there is an immediate threat to US forces. In theabsence of JCS approval, US forces should not pursue any hostile force intoanother nation's territory.

d. If necessary and proportional, use all available weapons to deter, neutral-ize, or destroy the threat as required.

97

APPENDIX E

Sample Campaign Plan

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)

Copy No. ____ of ____ copiesIssuing HeadquartersPlace of IssueDate/Time Group of Signature

PEACE OPERATIONS CAMPAIGN PLAN: (Number or Code Name)

Reference: Maps, charts, and other relevant documents.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. Briefly describe the command organiza-tion (composition and relationship) for the campaign. Is it UN-sponsoredwith a single force commander? Is the US in support? OPCON? Is it non-UNsponsored with a single headquarters or dual headquarters for military andpolitical activities? Is there a distinct command arrangement for US observ-ers? Will NGOs and PVOs be in theater? How will they be addressed?

1. Situation. Briefly describe the situation that the campaign planaddresses. Identify the related mandate as appropriate and any agreements,cease-fires, or truce arrangements.

a. Strategic Guidance. Summarize the force commander's directives, sanc-tions, or other measures or directives of higher authority that apply to theplan.

(1) Strategic Direction. Specify UN or non-UN direction for the situationin the theater, theater operations, or designated area for operations.

(2) Strategic Objectives and Tasks Assigned to the Command. Specifywhich tasks apply: preventive deployment, peacekeeping, peace enforcement,supervision of truces, prisoner-of-war exchanges, demilitarization and demo-bilization, protection of humanitarian assistance, guarantee or denial ofmovement.

(3) Constraints. Address actions that are prohibited or required by higherauthority (ROE, SOFA/SOMA, TOR, legal, financial, political, identificationof forces, mandate, jurisdictional, and so forth). Annexes may expand thisinformation.

b. Belligerent Data. Summarize intelligence data or information.

(1) Composition, location, disposition, movements, and strengths of allfactions, political groups, belligerent groups, and local or regional supportthat can influence the campaign.



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(2) Strategic concept (if known), to include belligerent intentions and condi-tions that could violate the peace (border crossings, entering demilitarized zones,initiation of hostilities, acts of terrorism, and so forth).

(3) Major belligerent objectives, root causes of the conflict, cause and effectrelationships of each side to agree to peace, each side's strategic and operationalobjectives.

(4) Operational and sustainment capabilities of probable belligerent COAs.

(5) Belligerent leadership patterns and idiosyncrasies.

(6) Vulnerabilities and sensitivities; key cultural, religious, ethnic characteris-tics, beliefs, values, attitudes.

(7) Centers of gravity; main source of belligerent power or weakness.

NOTE: Identify assumed information as such. Reference the intelligence orinformation operations annex for more detailed information.

c. Friendly Forces. Specify information on friendly or neutral forces or entitiesnot assigned that may directly affect the command, to include centers of gravityor friendly or neutral forces.

(1) Intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting US commands.

(2) Intent of higher, adjacent, and supporting UN or other national contingentcommands or elements.

(3) Intent, philosophy, and modus operandi of NGOs and PVOs, UNHCR, orother players of this nature.

d. Assumptions. Include assumptions applicable to the plan as a whole.

2. Mission. Specify tasks of the command and the purposes and relationshipsto achieve the strategic objectives. Does the mission entail support to diplomacy,peacekeeping efforts, observer or peacekeeping forces, or peace enforcement mea-sures.

3. Operations.

a. Strategic Concept. Based on the relevant major elements of UN, US, or mul-tinational strategy, provide a broad concept for deployment, employment, andsustainment of major forces in the command.

(1) Command organization. What is the force mandate?

(2) Area organization. What is the size and nature of the area that the forcemust control? Organized by national contingents? Major elements of the force?

(3) Campaign objectives.

(4) Phases, major events, or major operations of the campaign.

(5) Timing. Is the duration of the campaign mandated? Are phases time-sequenced?

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b. Phase I. (Timing for Phase).

(1) Operational Concept. Provide operational objectives, scheme for conduct-ing the mission, for example, separating belligerent parties or interpositioning theforce between belligerent parties, and timing for this phase.

(2) Forces Required by Function or Capability. Specify combat, combat sup-port, or combat service support forces. Will forces be committed as part of a joint,UN, or multinational force? Unilaterally?

(3) Tasks. Specify tasks of subordinate commands and contingents and tasksfor forces, as applicable. Describe tasks for subordinate non-US and US contin-gent, sector, and unit forces.

(4) Reserve Forces. Specify location and composition.

(5) Psychological. Describe psychological operations that might affect thecampaign. Refer to detailed annex.

(6) Civil Affairs. Describe civil affairs operations and organization that mightaffect the overall campaign. Refer to detailed annex.

(7) Public Affairs. Describe public affairs operations and organization. Referto detailed annex.

c. Phases II - IV. Provide information as stated above for each subsequentphase with a separate phase for each step in the subordinate campaign at the endof which a major reorganization of forces may be required and another significantaction initiated. Consider transitions and termination operations and postconflictactivities and requirements. Consider evacuation activities if appropriate. Refer todetailed annexes.

d. Coordinating Instructions. Provide instructions applicable to two or morephases or multiple elements of the force. Include CMOC organization, composi-tion, and geographic distribution, along with general liaison requirements. Referto detailed annexes.

4. Logistics. Provide a brief, broad statement of the sustainment concept of thecampaign, with information and instructions applicable to the subordinate cam-paign by phase. Logistics phases must be concurrent with operational phases.This information may be issued separately and referenced here. At a minimum,this paragraph addresses:

a. Assumptions (including UN or multinational agreements).

b. Logistics concept of operation; for example, nodes and hubs, LOGCAP,LSE.

c. Local acquisition and contracting, host nation, or other local support.

d. Finance and exchange of foreign currency. Reimbursement procedures forUN operations.

e. Receipt, storage, and issue of all classes of supply.

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f. Transportation.

g. Mortuary affairs.

h. Food services.

i. Water processing, storage, and issue.

5. Command and Signal.

a. Command.

(1) Command Relationships. Provide a general statement of the commandrelationships for the campaign or portions thereof. Show the status, authority, andresponsibilities of the force commander, subordinate commander (if applicable),national contingent commanders, sector commanders, and unit commanders.

(2) Delegation of Authority.

b. Signal.

(1) Communications. Plan communications. If UN-sponsored, determinecommunications among forces and UN headquarters. If non-UN-sponsored,determine joint force established communications links. Centralized communica-tions are the responsibility of a designated, single, national contingent. Eachnational contingent is responsible for its own internal communications system.

(2) Electronics. Plan electronics systems (may refer to a standard plan or may be contained in an annex). Include electronic policy and such other information asmay be appropriate.

Signed _________________________(Commander)

ANNEXES: As required

DISTRIBUTION:

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Glossary

AAFES

Army and Air Force Exchange System

ADA

air defense artillery

ADCON

administrative control

administrative control

the direction or exercise of authority necessary to fulfill militarydepartment statutory responsibilities for administration and sup-port; ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by service com-manders at any echelon at or below the service componentcommand; the secretaries of military departments are responsiblefor the administration and support of their forces assigned orattached to unified commands; secretaries fulfill this responsibil-ity by exercising ADCON through the service component com-mander of the unified command; ADCON is subject to thecommand authority of the combatant commander

AFCS

Army facilities component system

AIDS

acquired immune deficiency syndrome

AIFC

American Friends of Action Internationale Contre La Faim

alliance

the result of formal agreements between two or more nations forbroad, long-term objectives; see also

multinational

AMC

Army Materiel Command

antiterrorism

defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individu-als and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response andcontainment by local military forces; also called

AT

AO

area of operations

AOFDA

US Aid Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance

ARFOR

Army force

ARL

airborne reconnaissance low

armistice

in international law, a suspension or temporary cessation of hos-tilities by agreement between belligerent powers


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Army facilitiescomp

µ

onents system

the Army engineer's construction, execution, and logistics sys-tem in support of OCONUS contingency facility requirements; itprovides detailed engineer theater planning data, austere designsconsistent with joint construction standards, and logistics data forconstruction bills of material that are available in TMs 5-301through 5-304

ARSOF

Army special operations forces

ASD(ISA)

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

ASD(S&R)

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements

ASD(SO/LIC)

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict

branch

a contingency plan (an option built into the basic plan) for chang-ing the disposition, orientation, or direction of movement of theforce

buffer zone

the space controlled by the peace operations force that assures thespecified parameters (as determined by METT-T, ROE, range ofthe belligerent's direct and indirect weapons systems, and com-mander's intent) and degree of risk will not be exceeded

CA

civil affairs

CADST

civil affairs direct support team

CAO

chief administrative officer

CARE

Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Incorporated

center of gravity

the hub of all power and movement upon which everythingdepends; that characteristic, capability, or location from whichenemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physi-cal strength, or the will to fight

CID

criminal investigation division

CINC

commander-in-chief

CINCLANT

commander-in-chief, Atlantic Fleet

CIS

common item support

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civil affairs

the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence,or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities,both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian popu-lation in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in orderto facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objec-tives; civil affairs may include performance by military forces ofactivities and functions normally the responsibility of local gov-ernment; these activities may also occur, if directed, in theabsence of other military operations

civil-military operations

the complex of activities in support of military operationsembracing the interaction between the military force and civilianauthorities fostering the development of favorable emotions, atti-tudes, and behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groumps

CLO

chief logistics officer

CMOC

civil-military operations center

COA

course of action

coalition

an ad hoc agreement between two or more nations for a commonaction

combat service support

the focus of logistics at the tactical level of war; the synchroniza-tion of essential functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sus-tain soldiers and their weapon systems in an area of operations;includes but is not limited to that support rendered by servicesupport troops to arm, fuel, fix, move, man, and sustain soldiersand their equipment

combat support

operational assistance for combat elements

combatant command

the command authority over assigned forces vested in the com-manders of unified commands by Title X, US Code, Section 164,or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan(UCP); COCOM provides full authority to organize and employcommands and forces as the combatant commander considersnecessary to accomplish assigned missions; COCOM is not trans-ferable; the CINC uses COCOM to organize and employ his com-mands and forces, assign tasks, designate objectives, and giveauthoritative direction over all aspects of military operations,joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the assignedmissions; the CINC normally exercises COCOM through his ser-vice component commanders

combatting terrorism

actions taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threatspectrum, including antiterrorism—defensive measures taken toreduce vulnerability to terrorist acts—and counterterrorism—offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terror-ism

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combined arms

application of several arms, such as infantry, armor, artillery, andaviation

command

constitutes the authority to issue orders covering every aspect ofmilitary operations and administration; the sole source of legiti-macy for US commanders originates from the US constitution,federal law, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice and flowsfrom the President to the lowest US commander in the field; thechain of command, from the President to the lowest commanderin the field, remains inviolate (Presidential Decision Directive 25)

COMSEC

communications security

conflict termination

the process and period during which military forces transitionfrom active combat operations to postconflict activities and frompostconflict activities to redeployment

conflict

the period characterized by confrontation and the need to engagein hostilities other than to secure strategic objectives

constraint

limitations placed on the command by a higher command; con-straints restrict freedom of action for planning a mission by stat-ing what must be done

coordinating authority

a consultation relationship between commanders, but not anauthority to exercise control; the CINC and other subordinatecommanders designate coordinating authority to assist duringplanning and preparation for actual operations; the CINC speci-fies coordinating authority to foster effective coordination; how-ever, coordinating authority does not compel any agreements;within the parameters set by the CINC's organization of the the-ater and the command relationships that he establishes, the Armyorganizes itself to best accomplish its missions; the CINC has theauthority to direct certain Army organizational options but nor-mally leaves internal Army organization and command relation-ships to the ASCC

COSCOM

corps support command

counterintelligence

information gathered and activities conducted to protect againstespionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassina-tions conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations,persons or international terrorist activities, but not including per-sonnel, physical, document, or communications security pro-grams

counterterrorism

offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terror-ism

CRS

community relations service

CS

combat support

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CSCE

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CSS


CTC

combat training center

CTF

combined task force

CVS

commercial vendor services

demilitarized zone

in contrast to buffer zones, demilitarized zones are not normallyoccupied by third-party presence but are patrolled by observerteams or surveyed from observation posts; DMZs are created toneutralize certain areas from military occupation and activity;generally speaking, they are areas which are claimed by bothsides and where control by one could constitute a direct threat tothe other

DIA

Defense Intelligence Agency

direct liaison authorized

the authority granted by a commander at any level to a subordi-nate to directly coordinate an action with a command or agencywithin or outside the command; DIRLAUTH is a coordinationrelationship, not an authority through which command is exer-cised

DIRLAUTH

direct liaison authorized

DMZ

demilitarized zone

doctrine

fundamental principles by which military forces guide theiractions in support of national objectives; doctrine is authoritativebut requires judgment in application

DOD

Department of Defense

DOS

Department of State

DPKO

department of peacekeeping operations

DSAA

Defense Security Assistance Agency

end state

military end state includes the required conditions that, whenachieved, attain the strategic objectives or pass the main effort toother instruments of national power to achieve the final strategicend state; that end state describes what the NCA wants the situa-tion to be when operations conclude-both military operations, aswell as those where the military is in support of other instru-ments of national power; in the peace operations context, endstate includes the political and military conditions described bythe authorizing power as the objective of peace operations

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FAA

Foreign Assistance Act

FALD

field administration and logistics division

FAO

Food and Agricultural Organization

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

FIN

Finland

FLSG

force logistics support group

force protection

security program designed to protect soldiers, civilians employ-ees, family members, facilities, and equipment in all locations andsituations; accomplished through planned and integrated appli-cation of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations secu-rity, personal protective services; supported by intelligence,counterintelligence, and other security programs

force projection

the movement of military forces from CONUS or a theater inresponse to requirements of war or operations other than war;force-projection operations extend from mobilization and deploy-ment of forces, to redeployment to CONUS or home theater, tosubsequent demobilization

foreign assistance

assistance ranging from the sale of military equipment to dona-tions of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural andman-made disasters; US assistance takes three forms—develop-ment assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance

fratricide/friendly fire

a circumstance applicable to persons accidentally killed orwounded or equipment accidentally or mistakenly damaged inmilitary action by friendly forces actively engaged with theenemy while directing fire at a hostile force or what is thought tobe a hostile force

FYROM

former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

HA

humanitarian assistance

health services

all services performed, provided, or arranged by the Army Medi-cal Department to support, promote, improve, conserve, orrestore the mental or physical well-being of military personnel

HOM

head of media

host nation

a nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nationsand/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or totransit through its territory

host nation support

civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreignforces within its territory during peacetime, times of crisis, emer-gencies, or war; assistance provided during war is based uponagreements mutually concluded between nations

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HSS

health service support


assistance provided by DOD forces, as directed by appropriateauthority, in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters tohelp reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life andproperty; assistance provided by US forces is limited in scopeand duration and is designed to supplement efforts of civilianauthorities who have primary responsibility for providing suchassistance

HUMINT

human intelligence

IAPF

Inter-American Peace Force

IC

Irish Concern

ICRD

International Committee of the Red Cross

illum

illumination

IMC

International Medical Corps

INGO

international nongovernmental organizations

INS

Department of Immigration and Naturalization Service

intelligence

the product resulting from collection, processing, integration,analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available informationconcerning foreign countries or areas

IPB

intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield

IRC

International Rescue Committee

ISE

intelligence support element

JAG

judge advocate general

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff

joint tactics, techniques, and procedures

actions and methods that implement joint doctrine and describehow forces are employed in joint operations; joint TTP are pro-mulgated by the JCS

joint task force

a force composed of assigned or attached elements of two ormore services and constituted by appropriate authority for a spe-cific or limited purpose or missions of short duration

JOSE

joint operations support element

FM 100-23

108

J-STARS

joint surveillance target attack radar system

JTF

joint task force

JTFCEM

joint task force contingency engineer manager

letter of assist

a contractual document issued by the UN to a government,authorizing it to provide goods or services to a peacekeepingoperation; the UN agrees either to purchase the goods or servicesor authorizes the government to supply them subject to reim-bursement by the UN

liaison

that contact or intercommunication maintained between ele-ments or military forces to ensure mutual understanding andunity of purpose and action

LIC

low-intensity conflict

LNO

liaison officer

LOA

letter of assist

LOC

line of communication

LOGCAP

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program

logistics

the process of planning and executing the movement and sustain-ment of forces to execute military operations; includes the design,development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, main-tenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; logisticsincludes—

• acquisition, preparation, maintenance, equipping, movement,and health service support of personnel;

• acquisition or furnishing of services;

• acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation, and disposi-tion of facilities;

logistics is an overarching function that must encompass therange of military operations; at the tactical level, logistics focuseson the traditional CSS functions of arming, fixing, fueling, man-ning, moving, and sustaining soldiers

logistics support element

a multifaceted logistical organization that has a work force easilytailored to meet logistics requirements and can control the inter-face among strategic, operational, and tactical logistics

LPT

logistics-preparation-of-the-theater

LSCS

Logistics Support Command, Somalia

LSE

logistics support element

LWR

Lutheran World Relief, Incorporated

FM 100-23

109

MARFOR

Marine force

MCC

movements control center

MEDCOM

medical command

METL

mission-essential task list

METT-T

mission, enemy, troops, terrain and weather, and time available

MFO

multinational force and observers

MINURSO

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

MP

military police

MSF

Medicines Sans Frontiers

MSR

main supply route

MTT

mobile training teams

multinational

pertaining to activities of both alliance and coalition organiza-tions

multinational operation a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forcesof two or more nations; typically conducted within structures ofcoalitions or alliances

MWR morale, welfare, and recreation

nation assistance diplomatic, economic, informational, and military cooperationbetween the US and the government of another nation, with theobjective of promoting internal development and the growth ofsustainable institutions within that nation; corrects conditionsthat cause human suffering and improves the quality of life of thenation's people

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC nuclear, biological, chemical

NCA National Command Authorities

NEO noncombatant evacuation operations

NGO nongovernment organization

nongovernmentorganization a professional association, foundation, multinational business or

other group with an interest in improving the quality of life ofpeople

NOR Norway

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NORD Nordic

NSC National Security Council

NSE national support element

OAS Organization of American States

OCONUS outside the continental United States

OMA operations and maintenance Army

ONUC United Nations Operations in the Congo

ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique

ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador

OOTW operations other than war

OPCON operational control

OPCOM operational command

operational command(NATO) used to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to

deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate OPCONand/or TACON as deemed necessary; OPCOM does not includeresponsibility for administration or logistics; OPCOM maydenote the forces assigned to a commander

operational control (US) as discussed in joint doctrine, operational control is a slightlybroader authority than OPCOM; OPCON, in addition to theauthorities of the NATO operational command, includes theauthority to prescribe the chain of command; organize commandsand forces; suspend or reassign officers; delineate functionalresponsibilities; and delineate geographic AORs; the CINC usesOPCON to delegate the most authority with which subordinatescan direct all aspects of military operations and joint trainingneeded to accomplish any assigned mission; a commander withOPCON may control forces from one or more services; OPCONdoes not normally include the authority to direct logistics, admin-istration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training; duringOPCON the service component commander retains this serviceauthority

operational control (NATO) the authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned

so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or taskswhich are usually limited by function, time, or location; furtherincludes the deployment of units concerned and the retention or

FM 100-23

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delegation of tactical control to those units; does not includeauthority to assign separate employment of components of con-cerned units; neither does it, of itself, include administrative orlogistical control

operational control (PDD 25) a subset of command given for a specific time frame or mission;

includes the authority to assign tasks to US forces alreadydeployed by the President and assign tasks to US units led by USofficers; within the limits of operational control, a foreign UNcommander cannot change the mission or deploy US forces out-side the area of responsibility agreed to by the President, separateunits, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote indi-viduals, or change the internal organization of units

operations other than war military activities during peacetime and conflict that do not nec-

essarily involve armed clashes between two organized forces

OPLAN operations plan

OPORD operations order

OPSEC operations security

PA public affairs

PAO public affairs officer

PDD Presidential decision directive

PDF Panamanian Defense Force

PE peace enforcement

peace operations an umbrella term that encompasses three types of activities; activ-ities with predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy,peacemaking, peace building) and two complementary, predomi-nately military, activities (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement)

peace-building postconflict actions, predominately diplomatic, that strengthenand rebuild civil infrastructure and institutions in order to avoida relapse into conflict

peace-enforcement the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normallypursuant to international authorization, to compel compliancewith resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restorepeace and order

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112

peacekeeping military operations undertaken with the consent of all major par-ties to the dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implemen-tation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, etc.) and supportdiplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement

peacemaking a process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms ofpeaceful settlement that arranges ends to disputes and resolvesissues that led to conflict

PHS Public Health Service

PK peacekeeping

preventive diplomacy diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis andaimed at removing the sources of conflict before violence eruptsor to limit the spread of violence when it occurs

principles of war the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine that provides generalguidance for the conduct of war at the strategic, operational, andtactical levels

procedures a standard and detailed course of action that describes how toperform a task

psychological operations planned operations to convey selected information and indica-tors to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives,objective reasoning, and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign gov-ernments, organizations, groups, and individuals; the purpose isto induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable tothe originator's objectives

PSYOP psychological operations

PVO private voluntary organization

QRF quick reaction force

ROE rules of engagement

rules of engagement directives issued by competent military authority that delineatethe circumstances and limitations under which US forces will ini-tiate and/or continue combat engagement with other encoun-tered forces

SAM surface-to-air missile

SCF-UK Save the Children Federation-UK

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SECDEF Secretary of Defense

SECSTATE Secretary of State

security assistance groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, asamended, or other related statutes by which the United Statesprovides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtheranceof national policies and objectives

SF Special Forces

SFODA Special Forces operational detachments-A

SIGINT signals intelligence

SJA staff judge advocate

SO special operations

SOF special operations forces

SOFA status of forces agreement

SOMA status of mission agreement

SOP standing operating procedures

special operations actions conducted by specially organized, trained, and equippedmilitary and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, eco-nomic, or psychological objectives by nonconventional militarymeans in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas; they areconducted in peace, conflict, and war, independently or in coordi-nation with operations of general purpose forces; politico-mili-tary considerations frequently shape special operations, requiringclandestine, covert, or low-visibility techniques and oversight atthe national level; special operations differ from conventionaloperations in degree of risk, operational techniques, mode ofemployment, independence from friendly support, and depen-dence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets

specified command a command with a broad, continuing mission under a single com-mander normally composed of forces from one service

split-based logistics dividing logistics management functions so that only those func-tions absolutely necessary are deployed, allowing some manage-ment functions to be accomplished from CONUS or anothertheater

SRSG special representative to the secretary general

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STANAG standardization agreement

status of forces agreement an international agreement that demonstrates the legal relation-

ship between the armed services of sending states and the hostnation; determines a standard legal treatment and provides abasis for solving legal problems required by the presence of for-eign forces abroad

strategy the art and science of employing the armed forces and other ele-ments of national power during peace, conflict, and war to securenational security

support relationships for one force to aid, assist, protect, or logisticallysupport another force; the supporting force gives the needed sup-port to the supported force; establishing supported and support-ing relationships among components is a useful option toaccomplish needed tasks; this concept applies equally to alldimensions of the joint force organized by the CINC; categories ofsupport include— Mutual support describes actions that units render one anotheragainst an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their positionsrelative to one another and to the enemy, and their inherent capa-bilitiesGeneral support provides designated support to a supported forceas a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof; the mostcentralized support relationship; for combat units, this relation-ship provides the most flexibility for influencing the battle duringconduct of operations and is used when the enemy situation isunclear; more commonly used in the defense rather than theoffenseDirect support provides designated support to a specific force andauthorizes the supported force to directly seek this support; asupporting force is designated to directly assist a supported force;this is accomplished by providing support on a priority basis tothe supported force; however, the supporting force may providesupport to other forces when it does not jeopardize the mission orput at risk the supported force; authority to accomplish supportof other than direct supported forces rests with the higher tacticalor operational commander but also may be delegated asdescribed by doctrine, the operations plan, or operations order;for example, this support includes the elements of a general sup-port artillery brigade assigned a direct support mission and tem-porarily diverted to support a force other than the designatedforceClose support is that action of the supporting force against targetsor objectives sufficiently near the supported force as to requiredetailed integration or coordination of the supporting action withthe fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force

SWE Sweden

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SYG secretary general

TACAIR tactical air

TACON tactical control

tactical command (NATO) the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces

under his command for the accomplishment of the missionassigned by higher authority; differs from TACON in thatTACON involves only the necessary control of movements andmaneuvers to accomplish a previously assigned mission

tactical control the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of move-ments or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasksassigned; in general, the delegation of tactical control is only nec-essary when two or more units not under the same operationalcontrol are combined to form a cohesive tactical unit; a com-mander having tactical control is responsible for formulating theplan and issuing the necessary orders to the unit; the CINC usesTACON to limit the authority to direct the tactical use of combatforces; TACON is normally detailed and specifies local directionof movement and maneuver to accomplish an assigned task;TACON does not provide organizational authority or administra-tion and support responsibilities; the service component nor-mally retains this authority; both NATO and US joint doctrineshare the same definition for TACON

tactics the employment of units in combat; the ordered arrangement andmaneuver of units in relation to one another and/or to the enemyin order to use their full potential; for example, a commander des-ignates a unit as a reserve and plans for its use

techniques the general and detailed methods used by troops and/or com-manders to perform assigned missions and functions, specifically,the methods of using equipment and personnel; for example, atactic of covering an obstacle with direct and indirect fires may beexecuted by emplacing machine guns on the flanks to fire downthe length of the obstacle and mortars firing on the obstacle ini-tially then beyond it to cutoff withdrawal of an opposing force

tenets a basic truth held by an organization; the fundamental tenets ofArmy operations doctrine describe the characteristics of success-ful operations

TOR terms of reference

total mission awareness the ability of commanders at all levels to consider everything thataffects their operation; applies to operations other than war andwar

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TSP training support package

UN United Nations

UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission

UNCIVPOL United Nations civilian police

UN-DMT United Nations Disaster Management Team

UNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs

UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Childrens' Fund

unified command a command with a broad, continuing mission under a single com-mander and composed of significant assigned components of twoor more services

UNIFIL United Nations Intervention Force in Southern Lebanon

UNIKOM United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission

UNITAF unified task force

UNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti

UNMO United Nations military observers

UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Force in India and Pakistan

UNOMIG United Nations Mission in Georgia

UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia

UNOMUR United Nations Mission for Uganda-Rwanda

UNOSOM United Nations Operations in Somalia

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force

UNSC United Nations Security Council

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UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

USACIC criminal investigation command

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USCG United States Coast Guard

USCINCCENT United States Central Command

USD(A) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition

USD(P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

USDA Department of Agriculture

USFORDOMREP United States Forces Dominican Republic

USFORSOM United States Forces, Somalia

USIA United States Information Agency

USIS United States Information Service

USYG under secretary general

versatility the ability of units to meet diverse challenges, shift focus, tailorforces, and move from one role or mission to another rapidly andefficiently

VIP very important persons

war a state of open and declared armed hostile conflict between polit-ical units such as states or nations; may be limited or general innature

WFP World Food Program

WHO World Health Organization

WVRD World Vision Relief and Development, Incorporated

118

References

SOURCES USED

Strategic Publications

National Military Strategy,

January 1992.

National Security Strategy,

July 1994.

Charter of the United Nations,

26 June 1945.

The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations

(Presidential Decision Directive 25), May 1994

Public Law 79-264 (as amended),

The United Nations Participation Act of 1945.

Joint, Multiservice, and Foreign Publications

Joint Publication 1-02,

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,

23 March 1994.


Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations,

12 October 1993.


Doctrine for Joint Operations,

9 September 1993.


Doctrine for Joint Special Operations,

28 October 1992.


Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War

(Final Draft), July 1994.

Joint Publication 3-07.1,

Foreign Internal Defense,

20 December 1993.


Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Antiterrorism,

25 June 1993.


Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations,

29 April 1994.


Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense,

15 March 1993.


Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,

30 July 1994.


Joint Doctrine for Operations Security,

15 April 1994.


FM 100-23

119


Command and Control for Joint Operations,

(Proposed Final Publication) 21 January 1994.


Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs

(Proposed Final Publication), October 1993.


Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations,

September 1992.


Health Support Logistics in Joint Operations,

15 January 1991.


Joint Doctrine for Civil EngineeringSupport,

(Proposed Final Publication) 24 June 1994.


Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations

(Final Coordinating Draft), July 1994.


Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Campaign Planning

(First Draft), 1 July 1994.


Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures,

September 1991.

FM 100-23-2/FMFRP X-XXX/USACOM Pam XX/NDC TACNOTE 3-07.52/ ACCP 50-XX/USAFEP 50-XX/PACAFP 50-XX,

Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations

(Final Draft), March 1994.

AJP-1,

Allied Joint Operations Doctrine,

First Draft.

Strawman,

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Enforcement, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance, Joint/Combined/Interagency Operations,

Center for Low-Intensity Conflict (CLIC), December 1992.

British Military Doctrine

(Draft), 12 May 1994.

Operations

(includes Peacekeeping and Wider Peacekeeping), Draft Chapter Seven, UnitedKingdom, Spring 1993.

Draft Army Field Manual,

Wider Peacekeeping,

United Kingdom, (Fourth Draft Revised),August 1994.

Quadripartite Study on Peace Support Operations,

United Kingdom, April 1993.

Peacekeeping Pamphlet No 1,

Peace Support Operations,

Australian Defence Force, June 1993.

The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping,

Second Edition, New York, 1990.United Nations.

UN Training Guidelines,

Summer 1993.

Peacekeeper's Handbook,

International Peace Academy, New York, 1984.

Expeditionary Forces Conducting Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations,

COMSURFWARDEVGRU USMC TACMEMO (Draft), 1993.

FM 100-23

120

Nordic UN Tactical Manuals,

Volumes 1 and 2, 1992.

CFP 301 (Interim),

Land Force Peacekeeping Operations,

Canadian Force Publication, Spring1993.

NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations,

(Draft) 22 February 1994.

MC-327,

NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations

(For Official Use Only).

MC-319,

NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics.

MC-326,

Medical Support Precepts and Guidance for NATO.

MCM-CIJ-001-94,

NATO Commanders Authority Over Logistics Resources

(new Annex A,MC-319).

Draft Concept of Involvement of Army Units in Humanitarian and Peacekeeping Activities, FrenchArmy,

15 October 1992.

Army Publications

DA Circular 11-88-2,

Policies for the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers,

1 February 1988.

DA Circular 11-90-4,

The Sinai Multinational Force and Observers,

10 August 1990.

DA Pamphlet 27-1,

Treaties Governing Land Warfare,

7 December 1956.

DA Pamphlet 700-15.

Logistics Support of United Nations Peacekeeping Forces,

May 1986.

FM 5-114,

Engineer Operation Short of War,

13 July 1992.

FM 7-20,

The Infantry Battalion,

6 April 1992

FM 7-85,

Ranger Unit Operations,

9 June 1987.

FM 7-98,

Operations in Low Intensity Conflict

, 19 October 1992.

FM 8-10,

Health Services Support in a Theater of Operations.

1 March 1991.

FM 8-42,

Medical Operations in Low Intensity Conflict,

4 December 1990.

FM 8-55,

Planning for Health Service Support,

15 February 1985.

FM 12-50,

US Army Bands,

6 September 1991.

FM 19-4,

Military Police Battlefield Operations,

7 May 1993

FM 19-5,

Civil Disturbances,

28 November 1985.

FM 21-10,

Field Hygiene and Sanitation,

22 November 1988.

FM 21-10-1,

Unit Field Sanitation Team,

11 October 1989.

FM 21-11,

First Aid for Soldiers,

27 October 1988.

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121

FM 27-10,

The Law of Land Warfare,

18 July 1956.

FM 27-100,

Legal Operations,

30 September 1991.

FM 31-20,

Doctrine for Special Forces Operations,

20 April 1990.

FM 33-1,

Psychological Operations,

18 February 1993.

FM 34-2,

Collection Management and Synchronization Planning,

8 March 1994.

FM 41-10,

Civil Affairs Operations,

11 January 1993.

FM 63-6,

Combat Service Support in Low-Intensity Conflict,

21 January 1992.

FM 90-4,

Air Assault Operations,

16 March 1987.

FM 90-8,

Counterguerrilla Operations,

29 August 1986.

FM 90-14,

Rear Battle,

10 June 1985.

FM 90-10-1,

An Infantrymen's Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas,

12 May 1993.

FM 100-5,

Operations,

14 June 1993

FM 100-7,

Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations,

(Final Draft) 4 April 1994.

FM 100-8,

Multinational Army Operations

(Draft), 4 April 1994.

FM 100-16,

Army Operational Support

(Draft) 4 April 1994,

FM 100-17,

Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization,

28 October 1992.

FM 100-19/FMFM 7-10,

Domestic Support Operations,

1 July 1993.

FM 100-20/AFP 3-20,

Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict,

5 December 1990.

FM 100-25,

Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces,

12 December 1991.

TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9.

Blueprint of the Battlefield

(with additional operations support of warfunctions integrated [draft]), 21 May 1991.

TRADOC Pamphlet 25-34,

Desk Guide for Doctrine Writing,

24 January 1992.

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-56,

Planners Guide for Military Operations Other Than War,

1 September 1993.

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter,

Operations Other Than War: Peace Opera-tions and Peace Enforcement,

December 1993.

CALL Newsletter,

Fratricide Risk Assessment for Company Leadership,

March 1992.

CALL Newsletter,

Force Protection (Safety),

December 1993.

CALL Newsletter,

Operations Other Than War: Humanitarian Assistance,

December 1992.

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122

CALL Lessons Learned Report:

Operation Restore Hope,

15 November 1993 (For Official UseOnly).

XVIII Airborne Corps SOP in Support of the MFO, (Unofficial), 1993.

Wings for Peace: Airpower in Peacemaking Operations,

Major W. Bruce Member, USAF, School of Advance Military Studies (SAMS) Monograph, 17 December 1992.

Operation Provide Comfort: A Model for Future NATO Operations,

LTC John P. Cavanaugh, SAMS Monograph, 28 May 1992.

Does the Army Have A Peacekeeping Doctrine for the 1990s,

Major Charles Taylor, SAMS Monograph, 29 June 1992.

Civilians in Support of Military Field Operations,

J.E. Condrill, US Army War College Study Project, 15 April 1993.

The Relationship Between War and Peacekeeping,

Major V.M., Robinson, USA, SAMS Monograph, 13 May 1992.

Conflict Termination: Integrating the Elements of Power in Today's Changing World,

LTC W. Wodjakowski, USAWC Study Project, 15 April 1993.

Tactical Implications for Peacemaking in Ethnic Conflict

, Major John M. Kelley, SAMS Monograph, 7 April 1993.

White Paper,

The Application of Peace Enforcement Operations at Brigade and Battalion,

US Army Infantry School, 31 August 1993.

Somalia Lessons Learned: Light Cavalry,

US Army Armor Center, September 1993.

Peacekeeping: A Selected Bibliography,

USAWC, January 1994.

Peace Operations Sourcebook,

Inspector General DOD, 29 July 1994.

Recommended Readings

An Agenda For Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping,

Report of the Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, 17 June 1992.

A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993,

John Mackinlay and JaratChopra, The Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University,1993.

Military Operations To Restore Peace and Maintain Order,

COL John W. McDonald, USA (Ret), AUSA Land Power Essay, 1993.

“The United Nations in 1992: Problems and Opportunities,” Brian Urquhart,

International Affairs,

1992.

UN Peacekeepers: Soldiers with a Difference,

A. Norton and T. Weiss, Foreign Policy Association, Spring 1990.

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123

Partners for Peace: Strengthening Collective Security for the 21st Century,

UN Association of the USA, October 1992, (Woolsey Commission Report).

“New Challenges for UN Military Operations: Implementing an Agenda for Peace,” Thomas G. Weiss,

The Washington Quarterly,

Winter 1993.

The United Nations and Collective Security in the 21st Century,

William J. Durch, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, February 1993.

Military Organization in the 1990's - A New Logic for War,

R.M. Connaughton, Routledge, 1993.

Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond,

Gareth Evans, Allen, and Unwin, 1993.

Multinational Peacekeeping Operations: Background and Effectiveness,

David R. Segal and Robert J.Waldman in

The Military in New Times: Adapting Armed Forces to a Turbulent World

, Ed.James Burk, Westview Press, 1993.

The Social Construction of Peacekeeping in America,

David R. Segal, Mary Weschler Segal, and Dana P. Eyre,

Sociological Forum 7,

1992.

124

Index

A

AC-130 aircraft, 42

acts of aggression, 2, 75

ADA. See air defense artillery

air assault operations, 7

airborne reconnaissance low, 39

air defense, 42

air defense artillery, 42

air defense forces, 8

air interdiction, 9, 43

airlift, 15

air surveillance, 39

alternatives to use of force, 17, 34

ambassador’s authority, 29

ambassador/chief of mission, 78

AMC. See Army Materiel Com-mand

American Council for VoluntaryInternational Action (Interac-tion), 83

American Friends of Action Inter-nationale Contre La Faim, 84

application of force, 15

arbitrator, 34

ARFOR operations, 7

armored forces, 40

arms control agreements, 5

Army Materiel Command, 14

Army special operations forces,40

ARSOF. See Army special opera-tions forces

artillery fires, 42

Assistant Secretary of Defensefor Special Operations andLow-Intensity Conflict, 77

Assistant Secretary of Defensefor Strategy and Require-ments, 76

attack helicopter assets, 40

attack helicopters, 42

augmentation, 39

authority, 21

B

band support, 59

battle command, 43

battle laboratory experiments, 39

battlefield stabilization, 4

belligerent parties, 12, 39, 42

centers of gravity, 46

forcible separation of, 11

lethality of weapons, 12

black-market activities, 46

Boxer Rebellion, 21

budgeting considerations.

See

funding considerations

buffer zones.

See

demilitarizedzone

C

CA.

See

civil affairs

CADST.

See

civil affairs directsupport teams

campaign plan, 31, 33

campaign plan, sample, 97–100

Catholic Relief Services, 84

cease-fire agreements, 42

cease-fires, 5

censuses, 5

centers of gravity, 33

chain of command, 65

Chapter VI operations.

See

peacekeeping

Chapter VII operations.

See

peace enforcement

charitable organizations, 37

Charter of the United Nations, 1

checkpoints, 17, 37, 38

chief administrative officer, 52

chief logistics officer, 52, 54

CINC.

See

commander-in-chief

civil affairs, 7, 11, 17, 39, 48

direct support teams, 14, 58

units, 40

civil authority, 6, 7

civilian

casualties, 42, 59

population, 42

civil-military operations, 14

civil-military operations center, 16,26, 27

claims and liability, 49

coalition of forces, 21, 22

collateral damage, 35, 37, 42

combat actions, 6

combat forces, deployment of, 4,7

combat functions, 39

air defense, 42

battle command, 43

fire support, 42

mobility and survivability, 43,44

combat service support forces,4,14, 31, 47

combat support forces, 4,14, 31

combat training centers, 38


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combat units, 11

combatant commander, 29

combined arms assets, 38

Combined Task Force (CTF) Pro-vide Comfort.

See

OperationProvide Comfort

command arrangements

types of, 20

with US as lead nation, 20

with US in support, 20

unilateral US, 20

of US forces, 20

command relationships, 21

command, control, coordination,liaison, 20–30

commanders

combatant commander, 29

commander-in-chief, 45

and unity of effort, 16

commercial vendor services, 60

common goal, 23

communications, 39, 43, 45

commercial, 43

security, 36

computers, 39

COMSEC.

See

communicationssecurity

confidence-building.

See

battle-field stabilization

conflict, 2

conflict resolution, 9

consensMus, 20

consensus-building, 16

consent, 1, 12

contingency forces, 46

contingents, 55

contracting elements,joint or mul-tinational, 60

contracting support, 60

contractors, 43

convoy escort, 7, 38, 40

Cooperative for American ReliefEverywhere, Incorporated,84

coordinating authority, 21

cordons and searches, 7

corps support command, 58

criminal investigation division,38, 42

crisis management, 42

CS.

See

combat support

CSCE.

See

Conference on Secu-rity and Cooperation inEurope

CSS.

See


CTCs.

See

combat training cen-ters

D

deception, 37

de-escalation, commanders and,17

Defense Intelligence Agency, 47

Defense Security AssistanceAgency, 78

demilitarization measures, 6

demilitarized areas.

See

demilita-rized zones

demilitarized zone, 5,11

demobilization, 6

demographic analysis, 45

demographics, impact of, 46

demonstrations, 17

Department of Agriculture, 81

Department Of Defense, 76

Department of Defense, 29

Department of Justice, 81

Department of State, 29, 33, 78

Department of Transportation, 81

deployment, 65

deterrence, 17, 34, 40

DIA.

See

Defense IntelligenceAgency

digitization and information tech-nology, 43

dignity, preserving, 34

disaster relief, 15

disease, 14

disengagement, 5

disengagement line.

See

demilita-rized zone

disengagement process, 4

dislocated civilians, 14

disputes, 2

Doctors Without Borders/Medicines Sans Frontiers, 84

E

early warning, 4

early warning observers, 3

economic reconstruction, 2

elections, monitoring of, 5, 26

electronic emissions, 9

electronic spectrum, 43

emergency drawdown of militarydepartment inventory stocks,56

end state, 12, 16

enforcement of sanctions, 7, 8

engineer forces, 43

engineer operations, 44

engineer unit Class IV acquisitionand storage, 44

environment, 37

espionage, 36

evacuation, of peacekeepingforces, 37

exchange of prisoners of war, 5

exchanging information, 5

extract of the UN Charter, 75

F

face-saving measures, 34

field artillery, 42

finance elements, 60

finance operations, 59

financial support, 15

Firefinder, 42

fire support, 42

fire support coordination, 42

FM 100-23

126

fiscal considerations, 49

fixed-wing operations, 43

fixing, 58

FLSG.

See

force logistics supportgroup

Food and Agriculture Organiza-tion of the United Nations, 83

food distribution, 15, 46

force, use of, 12, 33

force commander, 64

force commander's directive, 68

force headquarters, and logistics,54

force logistics support group, 54

force projection, 47

force protection, 15, 36, 40

force tailoring, 13, 38, 45

force training, 38

force-tailoring mix, 12

forcible separation of belligerentparties, 6, 7

Foreign Assistance Act,

56

former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia, 3, 21, 59

fratricide, 37

freedom of navigation, 8

funding considerations, 41

funding limitations, 49

FYROM. See former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia

G

Geneva Conventions, 49

geopolitical situation, 14

guarantee and denial of move-ment, 7, 8

H

HA.

See


health, 37

helicopters, observation/scout, 42

historical perspectives

Boxer Rebellion, 21

United Nations Force inCyprus 6

Operation Able Sentry, 59

Operation Provide Comfort,10, 41

Operation Restore Hope, 7,38, 44, 49, 59

Panama, 8

psychological operations, 41

United Nations Operation inthe Congo, 7

host nation, 14

humanitarian assistance, 6, 7, 10,14

humanitarian relief, 3

hunger, 14

protection of, 8

and Special Forces, 40

I

ICRC.

See

International Commit-tee of the Red Cross

Immigration and NaturalizationService 82

impartiality, 1, 5, 12, 13, 33, 88

incapacitant, use of 35

incidents resulting in loss of life35

incoming and outgoing forces,sequencing of 33

information.

See

intelligence

infrastructure, analysis of 46

inquisitiveness, 88

integration, 29

intelligence, 8, 39, 45

analysis of, 45

augmentation of staff, 45

collection and synchroniza-tion planning, 47

counterintelligence, 39

dissemination of, 47

foreign, 86

human, 38

for multinational peace oper-ations, 47

officer, 45

and Special Forces 40

intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield 45

intent 35

interagency coordination, 29

interagency operations, 29

International Committee of theRed Cross 85

International Federation of RedCross and Red CrescentSocieties, 85

The International Medical Corps,84

International Red Cross Move-ment, 85

International Rescue Committee,84

interoperability, 37, 42, 44

investigation of complaints andviolations, 5

Irish Concern, 84

J

joint forces, 42

joint headquarters, 8

joint intelligence doctrine, 45

joint operations support element,45

joint surveillance and targetattack radar system 39

joint task force commander 43

joint task force contingency engi-neer manager 43

JOSE. See joint operations sup-port element

J-STARS. See joint surveillanceand target attack radar sys-tem

JTFCEM.

See

joint task forcecontingency engineer man-ager

L

land forces, 10

FM 100-23

127

language

orientation, 30

linguistic assistance, 33

qualifications, 30


laws of war, 48

leader development, 87

legal services, 60

legitimacy, 1

legitimizing authority, 16

level

of consent, 12, 13

of force, 12,13

liaison, 5, 29, 39

centers, 22

and civil affairs units, 40

officers 29, 37, 43, 58


light air defense artillery, 42

lines of communication, 50

linguistic assistance.

See

lan-guage

LNOs.

See

liaison officers

local authorities 42

LOCs.

See

lines of communica-tion

LOGCAP.

See

Logistics Civil Aug-mentation Program

logistics, 47, 50–60

and civilian authorities orcontractors, 51

functions, 56–60

intelligence, 9

and multinational operations,52

and nongovernment organi-zations, 51

and private voluntary organi-zations, 51

and UN assessment teams,50

and United Nations opera-tions, 52

in UN missions, 50

multinational support, 50

shared, 52, 53

support 15, 56

training for, 50, 51

transition of functions, 51

Logistics Civil Augmentation Pro-gram 44

logistics operations

for contingents, 55

multinational, 53

planning, 52

logistics-preparation-of-the-theater 50, 58

logistics support element 14, 56,57

LPT.

See

logistics-preparation-of-the-theater

LSE.

See

logistics support ele-ment

Lutheran World Relief, Incorpo-rated, 84

M

maintenance automation, 58

maintenance.

See

fixing

mandates 4, 5, 12, 31, 46, 64, 66

Non-United Nations, 66

United Nations, 66

maneuver, 39

maneuver warfare 40

media coverage, 14

mediation, 2

mediation and negotiation, 34

medical units, 58

memoranda of agreement, 68

METL.

See

mission-essential tasklist

METT-T.

See

mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and timeavailable

MFO.

See

multinational force andobservers

military observer groups.

See

observers

military police, 36, 42

military staff committee, 62

military support to diplomacy.

See

support to diplomacy

military-civilian relationship, 16

military-to-military relations, 2

mine fields, 37

minorities, 10

mission analysis, 31

mission, enemy, troops, terrain,and time available 12, 37, 39

mission-essential task list, 86

mobile training teams, 38

mobility and survivability, 43

monetary systems andcurrencies, 46

monitors.

See

observers

morale, 37

morale, welfare, andrecreation programs, 39

movement

and maneuver, 23

control, 57

inland, 58

movements control center,multinational, 57

MPs.

See

military police

MSC.

See

United Nations MilitaryStaff Committee

MTTs.

See

mobile training teams

multinational efforts, 21

multinational force and observers,4

multinational forces, 42, 43

multinational operations, 11, 43

Boxer Rebellion, 21

categories of, 21

in Dominican Republic, 21

effectiveness of, 21

multinational partners, capabili-ties of, 23

FM 100-23

128

N

nation assistance, 2

National Command Authorities,76

national contingents.

See

contin-gents

national law, 68

National Military Strategy, iii

National Security Council, 76

NATO.

See

North Atlantic TreatyOrganization

natural disasters, 14

negotiation, 2, 5, 6

mediation, 5

negotiators, 34

teams, 39,

neutrality, 36

NGOs.

See

nongovernmentalorganizations

night observation devices, 44

night vision devices, 39

night vision light-intensifierdevices, 37

no-fly zone, 8

noncombat actions 6

nongovernment organizations,14, 15, 16, 16, 37, 41, 45, 47,60, 76, 83

North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-tion, 21, 26

logistics doctrine, 56

logistics principles, 55

operations, 55

NMS.

See

National Military Strat-egy

O

OAS.

See

Organization of Ameri-can States

observation

and monitoring, 39

and reporting, 86

of truces and cease-fires, 4

posts, 37, 40

observers, 4

Office of the Secretary ofDefense, 29

offshore or regional coalitionstrike force, 4

ONUC.

See

United Nations Oper-ations in the Congo

OOTW.

See

operations otherthan war

OPCOM.

See

operational com-mand

OPCON.

See

operational control

Operation Able Sentry, 21, 23

Operation Nimrod Dancer, 8

Operation Provide Comfort, 10,21

Operation Restore Hope, 21, 31.

See also

Somalia

operational command, 21

operational control, 21, 65

operational environment, 1

operational-level commanders,13

operational variables, 13

Operations Desert Shield/Storm,44

operations other than war, princi-ples of,15

operations security, 36, 48

OPSEC.

See

operations security

ordnance, 42

ordnance, unexploded, 42

Organization of African Unity, 26

Organization of American States,21

P

Pacific Settlement of Disputes, 75

Panama Canal Treaty, 8

patrolling and securing borders, 4

PE.

See

peace enforcement

peace building, 2

peace enforcement, 2, 6, 13, 14,36

and differences from peace-keeping, 12

example of, 7

forces, 7, 40

intelligence function, 45

missions, 7

phases, 7

peacekeeping, iii, 1, 2, 13

and differences from peaceenforcement, 12

information officer, 45

traditional, 5

peacemaking, iii, 2

peace operations

doctrinal framework for, 1

fundamentals of, 1

legal aspects of, 66

tenets of, 1

the variables of, 1,12, 13, 43

peace operations principles, 1

legitimacy, 18

mandate and terms of refer-ence, 15

objectives, 15

perseverance, 17-18

restraint 17

security 16

unity of effort, 16

peace treaties, 6

personal awareness, 36

personnel services, 59

personnel vulnerabilities, 36

photography, 36

PK.

See

peacekeeping

planners, engineer 43

planning, 31

plebiscites, 5

political loyalties, 46

population

distribution, 46

at large 14

and resource control, 34

FM 100-23

129

port authority, 57, 58

postconflict activities, 33

postoperations training, 38

Presidential Selected ReserveCall-Up, 38

preventive deployments 2, 3, 4

preventive diplomacy 2

Principles of Humanitarian Actionin Armed Conflict, 28

private voluntary organizations,14, 15, 16, 26, 37, 41, 60, 76,83

professionalism, 88

protected zone

establishment and supervi-sion of 7, 9

example of, 10

protection of humanitarian assis-tance 7

psychological operations, 7, 11,17, 40, 48

PSYOP.

See

psychological oper-ations

public affairs, 17, 47, 48

Public Health Service, 82

public opinion, 33

Purple Storm, 8

PVOs.

See

private voluntaryorganizations

R

radars, 39, 42

ranger forces, 40

rationalization, standardization,interoperability, 22

rebuilding physical infrastruc-tures, 2

Red Cross, 60

referendums, 5

refugees, 5, 10

regional alliance, 51

reimbursable items, 56

reinforcement capability, 4

relief organizations, 15

relief supplies, distribution of, 14

religious beliefs, 46

religious observances, 46

religious support, 59

reporting and monitoring, 4

reserve components, 43

resource management,56

respect, for multinational partners, 21

restoration and maintenance oforder and stability, 7

restoring civil authority, 2

restraint, 34

rewards and penalties, 34

riot batons, 35

riot control agents, 35

roadblocks, 17, 36, 38

ROE.

See

rules of engagement

RSI.

See

rationalization, stan-dardization, interoperability

rules of engagement, 15, 31, 35,37, 42

changes in, 35

development of,35

dissemination of,35

execution of, 36

in multinational operations,35Operation Provide Comfort,95

Operation Restore Hope, 90

ROE card for Somalia JointTask Force, 95

sample ROE, 90

in varied circumstances, 35

wargaming of, 35

S

safety, 37

SAMs.

See

surface-to-air missiles

sanctions, enforcement of, 6, 9

Sand Fleas, 8

satellites, 39

Save the Children Federation, 85

scout aircraft, 39

sea interdiction, 9

sealift, 15

seaport operations.

See

portauthority

Secretary of Defense, 76

Secretary of State, 78

security, 17, 37, 51

assistance, 2

measures, 37

of main supply routes, 38

operations, 7

to threatened minorities, 3

Security and Cooperation inEurope, 26

self-defense, 34

sensors, 39

service judge advocate, 56

SF.

See

Special Forces

SFODA.

See

Special Forcesoperational detachments-A

shows of force, 2, 17

signal support,43

simultaneous application of com-bat power, 34

sites, accommodations, anddefensive positions, 36

situational advantage, 39

situational dominance, 13

SJA.

See

staff judge advocate

sniper threats, 37

SOF.

See

Army special opera-tions forces

soldiers, sustaining, 58

Somalia,7, 21, 44.

See also

Oper-ation Restore Hope

Special Forces, 40

Special Forces OperationsDetachment A, 14

special operations forces, 30

special operations forces.

See

Army special operationsforces

FM 100-23

130

special operations units, 14

split-based operations,45

staff judge advocate, 35

STANAGs.

See

standardizationagreements

standardization agreements, 42

standardized exchange systems,47

State Department, 78-80

status of forces agreements, 66

status of mission agreements.

See

status of forces agree-ments

status-of-forces agreements, 59

strategic context, 1

supervision of truces 4, 5

supplies

automation of, 58

distribution of, 41

and services, 56

support relationships, 21

support to diplomacy, 2, 13

peace building, 2

peacemaking, 2

preventive diplomacy, 2

surface-to-air missiles, 42

surveillance and communicationcapabilities, 4

surveillance cameras.

See

warn-ing devices

sustainment training, 17

T

10th Mountain Division (LightInfantry), 31

TACAIR.

See

tactical air

TACOM.

See

tactical command

TACON.

See

tactical control

tactical air, 42

tactical command, 21

tactical control, 21

tactical level decisions, 1

tactical mobility, 4

tactical surveillance and monitor-ing, 3

teamwork, 20, 38

technology, 39

terms of reference, 15, 31, 46, 65

development process, for 65

for US Forces Somalia, 69

terrain, 37, 46.

See

also mission,enemy, terrain, troops, andtime available

terrorist activities, 45, 86

thermal imagery devices, 44

thermal sights, 39

threats

courses of action, 46

evaluation of, 46

to life, 14

TOR.

See

terms of reference

training 86–89

peace enforcement, 87

peacekeeping, 87

predeployment,86

individual, 88

sustainment, 88

unit, 87

training support packages, 38

transition

to peacekeeping, 33

from one kind of operation toanother, 31

transportation 39,44, 57

treaties, 5

troop units, 43

truce supervisory forces, 5

truces, 5

TSPs.

See

training support pack-ages

U

UAV.

See

unmanned aerial vehicles

UN.

See

United Nations

UN Charter.

See

Charter of theUnited Nations

UN SYG. See United Nationssecretary general

UNFICYP 6

UNFICYP. See United NationsForce in Cyprus

UNHCR. See United NationsHigh Commissioner for Refu-gees

unilateral operations, 1, 20

unit training, 87

United Nations, 61-83

chief procurement officer, 60

Department of HumanitarianAffairs, 63, 82

Department of PeacekeepingOperations, 62, 63

Department of PoliticalAffairs, 63

Development Program, 83

Disaster Management Team,82

Field Administration andLogistics Division, 64

United Nations forces 15

General Assembly, 61, 62

as a legitimizing authority, 16

Military Staff Committee, 62

organization and functions of,1, 61

organizations, 82-83

planning process, 64

reimbursement to the US, 57

secretariat, 62

secretary general, 61

Security Council, 61

United Nations Childrens' Fund,83

United Nations Force in Cyprus, 6

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 41, 82

United Nations Mandate Resolution, example of, 74

United Nations Operation inSomalia.

See

Somalia

FM 100-23

131

United Nations operations

Kuwait and Iraq (1990-1991),2

Korea (1950-1953), 2

The United Nations ParticipationAct of 1945

,15

United Nations Task ForceSecurity Operations, 32

United Nations Truce Supervi-sion Organization, 4

United States Army CriminalInvestigation Command, 51

United States Government Organizations, 76-82

Department of Defense, 76-78

Department of State, 78-80

Department of Agriculture, 81

Department of Justice, 81

Immigration and Naturaliza-tion Service, 82

National Command Authori-ties, 76

National Security Council, 76

Organization of AmericanStates, 22

Public Health Service, 82

United States Agency forInternational Development,15, 29, 33, 80

United States Aid Office forForeign Disaster Assistance,81

United States InformationAgency, 33, 81

unity of command, 16

unmanned aerial vehicles, 39

UNSC.

See

United Nations Secu-rity Council

UNTSO.

See

United NationsTruce Supervision Organiza-tion

USAID. See US Agency for Inter-national Development

use of force, 34

USIA.

See

United States Informa-tion Agency

USYGs.

See

United Nationsunder secretary generals

V

variables of peace operations, 13

versatility, 1

vulnerability to disaster,15

W

warfighting skills, 6, 86

warning devices, 46

warnings 34

weapons

systems, 4,12

confiscation of, 38

heavy, 9

weather, 46

withdrawal, 12

withdrawal of belligerent forces, 5

World Food Program, 83

World Vision Relief and Develop-ment, Incorporated, 85

FM 100-23

30 DECEMBER 1994

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

GORDON R. SULLIVAN

General, United States ArmyChief of Staff

Official:

MILTON H. HAMILTON

Administrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11E, requirements for FM 100-23 (Qty rqr block no 5347).


FM 100-23[Date]By order of the Secretary of the Army:GORDON R. SULLIVANGeneral, United States ArmyChief of StaffOfficial:MILTON H. HAMILTONAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the ArmyDISTRIBUTION:Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11E, requirements for FM 100-23 (Qty rqr block no ).

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