florian bieber, delayed transition and the multiple legitimacy crisis of post-1992 yugoslavia

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S O U T H E A S T E U R O P E A N P O L I C Y

Volume 2

New Approaches to Balkan Studies

Series Editors

Dimitris Keridis

Charles M. Perry



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New approaches to balkan studies

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and e Kokkalis Foundation of Athens, Greece

Brassey’s

New Approaches to Balkan Studies

Volume Edited by

Dimitris Keridis, Ellen Elias-Bursac,and Nicholas Yatromanolakis



v

Foreword ix

Larry Wolff

Preface xv Ellen Elias-Bursac

Introduction xvii

Nicholas Yatromanolakis

I. PERCEPTIONS AND IDENTITIES

Chapter

Byzantinism: The Imaginary and Real Heritage of Byzantiumin Southeastern Europe

Dimiter G. Angelov

Chapter

The Past as a Symbolic Capital in the Present: Practicing Politics of ‘Dance Tradition’ in the Florina Region, Northwest Greek Macedonia

Ioannis Manos

II. DEMOCRACY, NATIONALISM, AND CONFL ICT

Chapter

Understanding Greek-Ottoman Conflict: Statist Irredentism, Belligerent Democratization or a Synthesis?

George Gavrilis

Chapter

In Defense of the Nation: Iuliu Maniu, the National Peasant Party,and the Communist Takeover of Romania

Daniel M. Pennell

Chapter

Ethnic Tensions and the Leadership Vacuum within theYugoslav Government, -

Laurie West Van Hook

Chapter

Delayed Transition and the Multiple Legitimacy Crisis of Post- Yugoslavia

Florian Bieber



vi

N E W A P P R O A C H E S T O B A L K A N S T U D I E S

Chapter

Transition and Disruption: The Yugoslav Case in Comparative Perspective

Omer Fisher

Chapter

Three Outcomes of Ethnic Conflict: The Cases of Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Yugoslavia, -

Maria Koinova

III. POLITICS & SOCIET Y: PRACTICES & OUTCOMES

Chapter

Uslugi: The Role of Political Favors and Connections in Post-Communist

Bulgaria

Nadege Ragaru

Chapter

The Role of the International Organizations on Women’s Civil Organizationin Post-Communist Bulgaria

Kristen Ghodsee

Chapter

The Choices that Minorities Make: Strategies of Negotiation with the Majority in Post-War Bosnia-Herzegovina

Paula Pickering

Chapter

Understanding Greek Immigration Policy

Katerina Linos

Chapter

Islam and Politics in the Post-Communist Balkans, -

Xavier Bougarel

Conclusion

Dimitris Keridis

Contributors



129

Our common state is worn out, it served its term and the worst

we can say is that we lived for decades in the unfortunate illusionand that it was no life to speak of. Finally, these people will meetagain as soon as they stop examining their navels and start look-ing around them. The meeting will be more pleasant if they find away to forget Yugoslavia quickly. If the European integration goesaccording to plan, there will be a place for all of us. If it fails, Europewill share our fate and we will not be sorry in this case either. Wewill be avant-garde.Stojan Cerović , Vreme (Belgrade) , January

The Serbian questions cannot be solved while ignoring all othernational questions. Every one of these questions ceases to be dem-ocratic, as soon as a violent resolution is attempted. The path of

violence does not only lead over foreign territory, but also over thecorpses of people of different nationality.Latinka Perović, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , November

Delayed Transition and the MultipleLegitimacy Crisis of Post-1992 Yugoslavia

Florian Bieber



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I I . D E M O C R A C Y , N A T I O N A L I S M , A N D C O N F L I C T

As of October , all countries in Eastern Europe, with one exception, haveundergone a change of power through elections at least once since . Yugo-slavia was the only country in the region that did not experience a change of

government in the s, considering that the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)– the direct descendant of the League of Communists of Serbia – dominatedits political life until the fall of Miloševi in autumn .

The authoritarian nature of the regime and its ruthless use of nationalismto mobilize popular support have been offered as explanations for the ten-yeardelay in the political transition. However, as this paper will argue, this delay has instead been the result of a combination of three other important factors:the creation of a third Yugoslavia, a provisional yet lasting institutional con-struct; the perpetuation of social, economic, and political crises; and, finally,

the dynamics of the political opposition. This is not to argue that national-ism has played no role in delaying democratization. However, nationalism assuch has been instrumental in bringing about a change of power in Croatiaand other post-communist countries. It is the role that nationalism played ininteracting with the elements to be analyzed here that helped the regime topreserve its political power.

This paper will not discuss the policies of the Socialist Party and their effec-tiveness. It is enough to say that, on this topic, Ognjen Pribićević has arguedthat six factors aided the preservation of power of the SPS (a, -):

. Its authoritarian political culture. Its pragmatic adaptation of policies to new circumstances: in -, it

was pro-Yugoslav and Marxist; in - it advocated a strong Serbia ina strong Yugoslavia; in - it was extremely nationalist; in - itclaimed moderation and presented itself as the “peace” party; and from onward it has been patriotic, defying outside interference

. Its use of the nomenklatura to preserve total control over the state. Its control over the media

. Its gerrymandering and the existence of beneficial election laws. Its promotion of a more positive view of communist heritage than in other

post-communist countriesThe focus of this paper rests on other elements that helped the regime sur-

vive throughout the s and that remain problematic even since the changeof power. After examining the creation of the third Yugoslavia and its impli-



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Delayed Transition and the Legitimacy Crisis in Post-1992 Yugoslavia

cations for delaying political change, the paper will turn to the role crises haveplayed in hindering democratic transition. In addition, it will explore the roleof the political opposition in the failure to formulate a coherent political alter-

native before mid-. In conclusion, the paper examines some of the rea-sons that these hurdles of democratic transition were eventually overcome inthe fall of .

The Third Yugoslavia: The Country Nobody WantedJohn Lampe entitled his recent history of Yugoslavia Twice there was a Coun-try (), yet since there has been a third country carrying once morethe name of “Yugoslavia.” It did not receive international recognition until late

, and it continues to labor under internal institutional inconsistencies anddysfunction. Consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, its construction – thoughprovisional – has lasted over nine years already. The country’s future, however,remains highly questionable. Since the change of power in Montenegro and theNATO administration of Kosovo, the reach of Yugoslav institutions extendsnot much beyond the Republic of Serbia. Even the electoral victory of VojislavKoštunica did not fundamentally alter the narrow scope of the Yugoslav gov-ernment. But even earlier, this third Yugoslavia was an oddity among the statesemerging from the end of the Cold War in Eastern Europe and from the col-

lapse of the old Yugoslavia. Its name is a triple misnomer: first, as the nameimplies, Yugoslavia sought to unite the South Slav population in SoutheasternEurope. The new Yugoslavia does not include the majority of Croats and Mus-lims (later Bosniaks), and it includes virtually no Slovenes or Macedonians andonly a few Bulgarians. Second, in the new Yugoslavia only two-thirds of the pop-ulation belongs to the two dominant nations – Serbs and Montenegrins – andthe remaining one third of the population comprises large minorities, whichcould hardly be described as South Slavs and include over million Albaniansand some , Hungarians. Although the name suggests a construction dif-

ferent from that of a classic nation-state, the position of minorities in the thirdYugoslavia hardly differs from those in classic nation-states. Third, this Yugo-slavia, despite attempts to emerge as the successor and the continuation of theprevious state, has carried with it very little from the previous Yugoslavia interms of territory, political tradition, or approaches to the national question,with the possible exception of one-party rule. Half a year before the creation of



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the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in , Stojan Cerović remarked inVreme on January that “... few [people] in Serbia believe that somethingremotely fitting the name of Yugoslavia can be preserved, ... [and the attempt to

preserve it] has more to do with the probate proceedings concerning legal andmaterial inheritance, than with any real allegiance to the idea of Yugoslavia.”Accordingly, opinion polls carried out in showed that less than two-thirdsof the population accepted the new Yugoslavia. Vera Marković has attributedthis popular discontent with the FRY to the reluctance of the regime to hold areferendum on the creation of Yugoslavia, unlike in Montenegro where such a

vote did take place (, ). Rather, one could assume the reverse relation-ship: the regime was insecure about its popular support and thus refrainedfrom holding a referendum so as to avoid a possible defeat in a referendum.

The new Yugoslavia likewise never enjoyed the full support of the political elite,especially among the opposition and national minorities. While the democraticopposition accused the regime of ignoring democratic procedures, the SerbianRadical Party (SRS) and other nationalist parties and movements objected tothe state on the grounds that it did not reflect the need to create a centralized(greater) Serbian state. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has remained a tran-sitory construction ever since.

The prime reason offered for the constitution of the third Yugoslavia wasthe legal argument that Yugoslavia was not in the process of disintegration, as

established by the legal expert for the European Community, Robert Badinter,but was decimated by secession, making the entity that remained the rightfulsuccessor to the original state. In addition, the fact that the creation of FRYoccurred nearly simultaneously with the beginning of the war in Bosnia hasgiven rise to the explanation that the new country was mostly a smokescreento dispel accusations of active involvement of Serbia and Montenegro in thewar.

The third Yugoslavia was created not only for foreign consumption; it alsoserved a significant function internally, stabilizing the political elite that came

to power in the late s and centered around Slobodan Milošević. While theSocialist Party of Serbia won strong representation in the Serbian parliamentin , the protests of March demonstrated a growing and potentially threatening opposition to the regime. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia wascreated and maintained very much as an alternative framework within whichthe SPS and its partners could extend control over the state. Its creation by



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the remnants of the remnants’ of the federal Chamber of the SFRY [SocialistFederal Republic of Yugoslavia] Assembly” (Antonić , ) – the unelectedmembers from Montenegro and Serbia of an assembly whose term expired and

whose other members left during – attested to the predominance of theSocialist Party and its unwillingness to play by democratic rules. This ques-tionable process by which the institutional framework of the third Yugosla-

via was created undermined the basic legitimacy of the new state. Its stronglinks to the Socialist regime through institution building and nomenklaturarendered the Federal Republic a vulnerable construction, challenged from a

variety of directions.Despite the pro-Yugoslav rhetoric of the Yugoslav United Left (JUL), the

neo-communist party of Mira Marokvic, it was not in an attempt to re-create

a larger Yugoslavia that the regime pursued the creation of the Federal Repub-lic. In fact, the Yugoslav idea came to an end at roughly the same time as thenew, third Yugoslavia was created. Latinka Perović, historian and secretary of the Central Committee of the Serbian League of Communists during its lib-eral phase in the early s, considered Yugoslavism after the end of Yugo-slavia as a dangerous illusion. In the November issue of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung she wrote, “After all that has happened, the idea of Yugo-slav renewal can only appear as a result of political immaturity in the heads of the partners here, who imagine that one can easily forget the realty of murder

and destruction.”The first election for the federal parliament in May was boycotted by

the opposition, with the result that the new parliament was a close replica of the previous, pre-democratic one. The subsequent elections in December and November confirmed the predominance of the SPS and its (changing)allies. More importantly, the rare meetings of the parliament provide evidenceof the impotence of parliamentary democracy in the light of authoritarian rule(Antonić (, -). By controlling two parallel institutional systems, the fed-eral and the state, the Socialist Party could shift power from one to the other,

in the event that the opposition won the elections for either. This arrangementalso allowed Slobodan Milošević to maintain the façade of legitimacy whenhe exchanged the Serbian presidency for the Yugoslav presidency in . TheFederal Republic of Yugoslavia can be thus seen as an alternative basis for thepreservation of the regime’s power. As Robert Hayden remarked, “[t]he Con-stitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia... must be viewed primarily as a



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vehicle for maintaining the personal power of Slobodan Milošević rather thana serious constitutional document” (, ). Accordingly, the election of thereformist offspring of the Montenegrin Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS)

under the leadership of Milo Djukanović in created a threat to this struc-ture, since half of the members of one of the two houses of the federal parlia-ment, the Chamber of the Republics, are nominated by the parliament of eachconstituent republic. The federal institutions proved incapable of addressing thedouble challenge to the federal system: the questioning of Slobodan Milošević’sauthority in Yugoslavia and the de facto predominance of Serbia in the jointinstitutions. The result has been federal institutions (executive and parliamen-tary) that no longer enjoy the support of one of their constituent members. Asa matter of fact, FRY had de facto ceased to exist by early . The legally dubi-

ous nature of the constitutional changes in July in preparation for the elec-tions further undermined the legitimacy of the Yugoslav state.

Alternative Plan: Yugoslavia or Serbia?

Despite the criticism from all sides of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sinceits creation – from national minorities, large parts of the Montenegrin politi-cal elite, and the democratic and nationalist opposition to the regime – few

viable alternative plans remain. A notable element of most alternative planshas been their reduction to the particular interest of the group seeking to

change the state structure. For example, most plans proposed by the Albanianpolitical elites in Kosovo were mainly focused on achieving a status for Kosovobetween far-reaching autonomy and independence (see Troebst ). Simi-larly, plans for change from Montenegro focused first on increasing the statusof the republic within the federation and later on independence. Even the Ser-bian political opposition limits its plans for reform mostly to Serbia; Yugosla-

via is conspicuously absent from party programs. Altogether, the plans of onegroup were often found to be in greater conflict with other alternative plansthan with the status quo.

For a number of opposition parties, the territorial question plays an impor-tant role and concerns Yugoslavia less than the Serb nation. In its post-Daytonparty program, the Serbian Renewal Movement (Srpski Pokret Obnove, orSPO) declares demonstratively that it leaves “the renewal of Yugoslavia... todreamers and future generations.” While rejecting any attempt to recreate Yugo-slavia, its program insists on “just borders” with Croatia, the impossibility of



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drawing borders with Muslims (“We cannot draw borders with the Moslems,because our roots are intertwined and because we live together in Bosnia andHerzegovina, Raška, Montenegro and Macedonia.”), and close relations with

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia without defining themin any detail (SPO ). The alternative vision of the Serbian Renewal Move-ment draws on anticommunist conceptions and foresees the reestablishment of a constitutional monarchy headed by Crown Prince Aleksandar Karadjordjević.The territory to be occupied by this new state remains undefined and is opento the interpretations of the party’s leader.

The Democratic Party (Demokratska Stranka, or DS), on the other hand,acknowledges the existence of the third Yugoslavia in its program and refrainsfrom objecting to the state per se. However, it insists on “the right of the Serb

people to self-determination in the former Yugoslav republics in the samemanner in which this right was exercised by the Slovenes, Croats, Macedo-nians and Moslems” (DS ). The practical implications remain limited to aplea for integration in practically all fields between Yugoslavia and the Repub-lika Srpska. The Democratic Party, like most of the other opposition partieswith the exception of the Serbian Radical Party, insists on the peaceful meansof achieving the inclusion of Serb territories in the state, according to interna-tional rules (DS ). Representing the majority of the democratic opposition,the Democratic Party supports decentralization of the new country.

The Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska Stranka Srbije, or DSS) underthe leadership of Vojislav Koštunica, also pleaded for the regionalization of Serbia as a solution for the Kosovo crisis before it escalated in . This pro-posed decentralization, however, stopped short of a federal arrangement involv-ing Kosovo and would have been unacceptable to the Albanian community (DSS ). The DSS clearly tried to break with the Yugoslav state and insistedthat any new state to be created by a constitutional assembly should “includethe Serb national name”(DSS ).

After the electoral success of the DS and DSS as part of the Democratic Oppo-

sition of Serbia (Demokratska Opozicija Srbije, or DOS), the parties did not for-mulate a coherent platform on the re-creation of Yugoslavia or the establishmentof a new institutional structure. DOS launched the idea of a Union of Serbiaand Montenegro soon after the electoral victory (Reuters Oct. ), but inthe subsequent months, the new authorities insisted on the reform of existingstate structures instead of the creation of a new political entity. Despite the



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insistence of the vast majority of Serbian political actors that Kosovo remainas part of Yugoslavia, neither the Milošević government nor the new authori-ties presented a coherent plan for how Kosovo could be effectively reintegrated

into a Yugoslav state. One of the more colorful alternative plans from the Albanian community

was the one proposed by the Kosovo Albanian politician Adem Demaçi tocreate a state called “Balkania.” He launched this project in March whilepresident of the Parliamentary Party of Kosova (Bota Sot April ). Theplan foresaw a confederation created out of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.Such a newly constituted state would have encompassed Montenegro, Serbia,Kosovo, and possibly Vojvodina and Sandžak as constituent units. Demaçi alsoexpressed the possibility of Macedonia joining this new confederation (FreeB

Vesti April ). This proposal has to be seen mostly in the context of Kosovo:it attempts to maintain the demand for full independence of Kosovo and atthe same time seeks to open a back door by which the Yugoslav governmentcould accept such an arrangement through some degree of joint institutions.All constituent parts would have the right to secede and maintain independentmembership in international organizations (Vreme May ).

The plan did not fare very well and was not even mentioned in the finalcommuniqué of the meeting of representatives from the Serbian oppositionand Kosovo Albanian leaders – including Demaçi – in New York a few weeks

later, in April (PER a, b). The Balkania proposal illustrates someof the challenges regarding the conception of an alternative state construction.The name itself reveals the awkwardness of alternative names for Yugoslavia,and the combination of a confederation and independent sub-units demon-strates the gap in positions of the Kosovo Albanian political spectrum and theSerbian opposition, not to mention the government. The war in renderedBalkania an even more utopian idea than back when the plan was launched.

Sonja Biserko, head of the Serbian Helsinki Committee, has described Serbia“as a state [that] is still in the making. The territorial question still predomi-nates the political life” (, ). It would be too simplistic to attribute tonationalism alone the dominance of the territorial question and subsequently the issue of who is a citizen of the state. The creation of the clearly transitory third Yugoslavia in did not remove the disputes over territory of any future (Serbian) state from the political agenda, but rather insured their con-tinuing presence. The lack of any consensus on the size and thus the nature of



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the state has significantly delayed other political decisions and played a detri-mental role in preventing a close cooperation among the opposition and withnational minorities across the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Perpetuating CrisesAn additional feature of Slobodan Milošević’s regime was the perpetuation of numerous crises. The s were marked by continuous economic, social, andpolitical crises. In a Danas (Belgrade) piece published on November ,Slobodan Samardžić from the Institute of European Studies described Yugo-slavia appropriately as a “... federation [that] has emerged from a crisis, it hasoperated in a crisis, and it is a crisis that marks its disintegration.” While these

crises have been to some degree the result of international response to the dis-solution of Yugoslavia (in the form of sanctions, for instance), the regime tookadvantage of the crises and used them to preserve its power. The crises andinstability have introduced two important trends into everyday political lifein Serbia: insecurity and the elimination of alternatives.

Insecurity has penetrated all spheres of public life in Serbia. Continuinginflation, culminating in the hyperinflation of –, wiped out the middleclass, destroyed savings, and reduced economic life to subsistence levels. Atthe same time, pyramid schemes and smuggling criminalized the economy,

not only enriching the ruling nomenklatura, but also increasing the feeling of insecurity among the population. The regime carefully positioned itself as amoderate force, with the alternatives being portrayed as either too radical andthreatening (Serbian Radical Party) or treacherous (Civil Alliance and Demo-cratic Party). This perception of insecurity was frequently reinforced by thepolicies of the opposition (see below) and the establishment of ill-defined andunpopular institutions. Such insecurity and fear were visible throughout theMilošević era. In a survey carried out half a year after the end of the Kosovowar, percent of the respondents feared a further decline in the quality of

life; percent feared inflation; percent feared not finding a job; percentfeared sickness and lack of sufficient health care; and percent were appre-hensive about a new war. The proliferation of fear is visible if one considersthat percent feared hunger and over half of those surveyed lived in fear of becoming refugees.



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The ongoing state of crisis not only perpetuated a feeling of insecurity, butalso allowed the regime to eliminate and marginalize possible alternatives toits rule in all spheres of life (Gordy ). The de facto state of war during the

conflict in Croatia and Bosnia allowed the regime to draft potential or activeopponents to the government’s policy. In addition, the crises justified calls forunity, which presented opposition to the government as treachery and betrayalof the country. Srbobran Branković has summarized the atmosphere as suchthat “[t]o accuse someone of ‘shattering the unity of the Serb people’ becameone of the worst insults a politician could utter in the new-old value system”(, ). This rendered the position for the opposition extremely difficult,often forcing them to try to appear more patriotic than the government. Inthe sphere of the media, the crises prevented the development of an indepen-

dent media able to reach the entire population of Serbia. Limitations due to thecrises ranged from paper “shortages” for independent newspapers to repressivelegal measures (Gordy , -). In the light of the escalating conflict inKosovo the Serbian parliament passed an extremely restrictive media law inOctober , prohibiting the redistribution of foreign news reports (ANEM, -). The law resulted in the closure of the most important indepen-dent media outlets, such as the independent daily Naša Borba, or their mar-ginalization through the imposition of extremely high fines. Later, during thewar in Kosovo, the remaining independent media were either shut down or

forced to adopt a less confrontational line towards the regime. The wars onthe periphery of the country thus effectively strengthened the control of theregime in the core areas.

On the political level, numerous elections exhausted the electorate rather thaninducing energy for democratic change. In the eleven years of the Milošević eratwelve elections and referenda took place (Goati ):

• Serbian presidential elections without participation of the opposition,November

• Referendum on the order of constitution and multiparty elections, July

• Serbian parliamentary and presidential elections, December • Yugoslav parliamentary elections, May • Yugoslav parliamentary elections, local elections, and Serbian parliamen-

tary and presidential elections, December



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• Serbian parliamentary elections, December • Yugoslav parliamentary elections and local election, November • Serbian parliamentary and presidential elections, September • Serbian presidential elections (second round, invalid), October • Serbian presidential elections (in two rounds), December • Referendum against foreign intervention in Kosovo, April • Yugoslav parliamentary and presidential elections, September None of the elections, except for the last election, effected a change of power,

but Serbia nevertheless saw a high degree of rotation in political offices, withnearly ten different Serbian and Yugoslav prime ministers and five presidents.The frequent elections helped to discredit the political process, as did the lack of

power of the Serbian and Yugoslav Parliaments, and consequently reduced thewillingness of large segments of the population to participate in elections.

The two significant challenges to the regime arose in late and in thefall of , with the latter being ultimately successful. Both times Serbia hademerged from a war the previous year, Bosnia and Croatia in and Kosovoin , in which Serbia was the loser. At the same time both phases marked a(modest) improvement in the previously state-of-war economy. In mostsanctions had been lifted and political developments in Southeastern Europeseemed to point towards normalization. The position of Serbia and Yugoslavia

seemed more promising in the first year after the war than at any time since thedissolution of Yugoslavia began six years earlier. It was precisely at this pointthat the failures of the regime could no longer be disguised by the state of warand sanctions – leading to demonstrations lasting throughout the winter of -. The failure of the protests could be largely attributed to the oppo-sition and its failure to capitalize effectively on popular discontent with theregime. The success of the opposition in the fall of was largely a result of learning from the failures of the winter -.

The Role of the Opposition in Delaying TransitionJust as the s saw numerous personnel changes in the government and theregime and multiple programmatic shifts, the opposition experienced disorderand constant change as well. The political opposition in the s was markedby two trends: a high degree of personal continuity, and structural fragmenta-



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tion and discontinuities. Most of today’s leading opposition politicians begantheir political careers during the early phase of multiparty democracy and haveworked together in various parties and coalitions (such as DEPOS in -,

Zajedno in -, and Savez za Promene in -). Similarly, all partieshave undergone numerous splits, leading to a proliferation of parties in theopposition. The Democratic Party, now headed by Zoran Djindjić, for example,suffered the departure of the Vojislav Koštunica and the creation of his Demo-cratic Party of Serbia, the departure of Kosta Čavoški and the creation of the(unsuccessful) Liberal Party, and the departure of Dragoljub Mićunović andthe emergence of the Democratic Center. This high degree of fragmentation,mostly based on conflicts of personality rather than on any political substance,stands in stark contrast to an often-invoked call for unity among the political

parties. This has been aptly described by Srbobran Branković: “The national-ist opposition also insisted on ‘unity,’ pointing out that what distinguished theSerb nation from others was its sabornost [spirit of unity or community]. Thistraditional feature is represented as a key difference between Serb political cul-ture and newfangled western notions, including multiparty systems” (, ).Some have argued that it was not only the classical institutions of power pres-ervation (army, media, and so on) that upheld the Yugoslav regime, but also theopposition. Dušan Pavlović has described the opposition as the “fourth pillar”on which the government rested (Vreme September ).

Before the first elections that took place in December , the opposi-tion, then led by Vuk Drašković – who ran in simultaneous presidential elec-tions against Milošević – was convinced that the elections would follow thesame pattern as in the surrounding countries, discarding communism. Theoverwhelming victory of the Socialist Party (. percent to . percent of the next-strongest party, the Serbian Renewal Movement) threw the opposi-tion into disarray from which it took nearly a decade to recover. Unlike othercountries in transition, Serbia never established a roundtable or similar insti-tutions of power sharing between government and opposition. Furthermore,

the constitution and the electoral laws were drawn up by the communist Par-liament without consultations with the opposition. By riding on the populistanti-bureaucratic wave of the late s, Milošević had successfully convinceda large segment of the electorate that the political transition had already takenplace with his ascent to power. Another change in favor of the opposition wasthus no longer required. Consequently, the opposition failed to take a consis-



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tent line after this defeat. During various periods it alternated between rejec-tion of the institutions and cooperation with the regime. Since , both theRenewal Movement and the Democratic Party have used demonstrations and

alternative parliaments to question the legitimacy of the Serbian and Yugoslavparliament and government. However, the parties participated in some elec-tions, while boycotting others, failing to take a clear line on its relationship tothe political framework dominated by the Socialist Party.

In this light, the high degree of fragmentation of the opposition should notcome as a surprise. Similarly, the grand opposition coalitions that toppled theCommunist Party in Central and Eastern Europe fell apart, often shortly aftertheir electoral victory (Civic Forum/Public against Violence in Czechoslova-kia, Solidarity in Poland, for example). In Serbia it wasn’t until the summer

of that such a broad coalition succeeded. It failed before because of theabsence of a minimal consensus over the future of the state, with the territorialdimension sidelining the democratic one. In addition, some opposition partieseither expected electoral success without a broad coalition or had been granteda privileged status by the regime. However, even the relatively broad coalitions,such as DEPOS and Zajedno, could not be sustained beyond the elections. Elec-tions in Serbia under the Milošević regime reflected in only a limited way thestrength and influence of parties among the population, because of electoralengineering, fraud, and boycotts. The elimination of marginal political parties

that occurred in other Central and East European countries never took place inSerbia. As a result, many small opposition parties remain potentially relevant,as their possible strength was never truly tested. The delayed transition hasfurthermore prevented the broad change of opposition party leadership thatoccurred in post-communist countries. During this change, opposition intel-lectuals were often replaced with more experienced technocrats, frequently members of the old nomenklatura. As a result, the Serbian opposition leader-ship has remained unchanged in the past decade, and despite its long presencein political life, it had hardly any experience with political power before it took

office in October . For example, if one excludes Zoran Djindjić’s stint asmayor of Belgrade for less than half year and Vuk Drašković’s brief term as(powerless) deputy prime minister of Yugoslavia, neither have had any expe-rience in office at all.

The opposition’s electoral success in was the result of a process of increased cooperation among the parties belonging to the opposition, the for-



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mulation of a political alternative, and the mobilization of civil society. Whilethis process started with the joint declaration of the opposition in January (Betaweek (Belgrade) January ), this development did not promise polit-

ical change before the summer of . Among the reasons for the success of the opposition one can distinguish between the development of the Miloševićregime and the ruling parties and the course taken by the opposition. The regimeitself became more authoritarian in the year following the Kosovo war, increas-ing the polarization of Serbian society. The assassination attempts against VukDrašković and the disappearance of Ivan Stambolić left little room for a rap-prochement between the regime and some opposition parties. In addition,the regime’s rhetoric took an increasingly hysterical tone. The regime regu-larly “revealed” conspiracies and accused the opposition, minorities, and above

all Otpor of conspiring against Serbian interests. Simultaneously the regimeclaimed, in numerous ceremonies, to be rebuilding the country after the Kosovowar, while little significant reconstruction took place; this fact did not go unno-ticed in the population.

More significant than the change of the regime’s behavior was the opposition’ssuccess at capitalizing on the popular dissatisfaction with the regime that pre-ceded the Kosovo war. Civil society organizations, in particular Otpor, succeededin mobilizing broad segments of Serbian youth, which had become inactive inpolitics after the failure of Zajedno in . Students, frustrated with the oppo-

sition’s infighting in and the failure of the student protests, adopted a dif-ferent strategy by not holding large street protests, but by mocking the regimethrough small, well-planned performances. These acts revealed some of thefundamental weaknesses of the regime and of authoritarian regimes in gen-eral. By not possessing a hierarchical organizational structure, Otpor evadedboth repression by the regime and co-optation by the opposition, rendering itthe force most harshly suppressed by the regime throughout its rule. Frequentarrests of Otpor members and those who simply wore their T-shirts in early helped the movement reach wider segments of the population through-

out Serbia. By July , according to interviews with leading Otpor mem-bers Slobodan Homen and Milja Jovanović, it could count on some , to, activists, local branches, and regional centers. Through its work,Otpor has consistently tried not only to place the regime on the defensive, butalso to force the opposition parties to refuse to cooperate in any way with theregime (Otpor ; Republika ).



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borders Serbia should exist is not only a legacy of the Milošević era, but alsoof the internal divisions of the Serbian national movement of the s ands (Pavković ).

N C S

Only the new government renounced the claim of the Federal Republic of Yugoslaviato be the only legal successor to the old Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

As Yugoslav opinion polls tend to under-represent members of national minorities,especially Albanians from Kosovo, the rate is probably significantly lower (Marković, ).

On the creation of FRY see Thomas (, -).

For further details on procedural and constitutional problems of the Yugoslav institu-tional setup, see Guzina (, -).

In the aftermath of Koštunica’s electoral victory in September , some commenta-tors suggested that Milošević might attempt to preserve power by resuming a politicalfunction in Serbia (as Serbian prime minister); the popular protests on October prevented any continuation of Milošević in power.

Koštunica, as president of the DSS, emphasized the need for a new constitutionalarrangement of Yugoslavia shortly before becoming president and “defender” of thesame constitution. See Koštunica .

The reform of the Federal Republic was for the first time an electoral issue for the fed-

eral election in ; see Slavujević (, -). Montenegro, for example, has vehemently opposed the demand for a status of republic

for Kosovo, for fear of being further marginalized in a Yugoslav state.

The role of the Serbian Radical Party is not examined here. As a coalition party of theSocialist Party (- and since ) it has largely supported the regime and actedas its nationalist alter ego. It has presented the most concrete yet unrealistic territorialconceptions of a future Serbian state. See Cohen and Thomas (, -).

A platform for change was produced by a number of advisors to Koštunica (Reuters January ), based on a proposal written by the Institute for Liberal Studies insummer (Mijatović, Popović, and Samardžić ).

In May Deputy Prime Minister Nebojša Čović proposed the creation of two“ethnic” entities in Kosovo with differing degrees of autonomy. This call for recogni-tion of the de facto partition of Kosovo did, however, lack the support of the Serbiangovernment, the Albanian community, and the international organizations active inKosovo; nor was it part of a coherent plan (FreeB Vesti May ).



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The plan has not resurfaced since. Demaçi later shortly became the spokesman of theKosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) and was increasingly marginal in the political spec-trum after rejecting the Rambouillet accords.

In the wake of the Kosovo war, stronger calls for a renewed autonomy in Vojvodinaemerged (PER ).

This dynamic became visible with the Socialist Party increasing its share of the vote inthe December election, at the height of hyperinflation and virtually complete eco-nomic collapse (Pribićević b, -).

Matić asserts that in view of these fears, “normal” fears, such as the fear of flying,became rare: “They have their more immediate fears which resulted from the misfor-tunes they have lived with for a whole decade” (Matić ; Bjekić ).

The trigger of the protests was the crude attempt by the government to falsify electoraldefeat in local elections. On the protest and the values of the protesters see Lazić .

For an overview of the main developments of parties in Serbia see Vukomanović (,-) and Pribićević (c).

Goati (, ) seeks to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant parties by dif-ferentiating between groups that could secure more than percent of the electorateand those whose support is lower. As fair elections never took place before Decem-ber and as many parties participated in coalitions, this measurement is difficultto sustain. Furthermore, some parties have been able to exert considerable influencethrough their programmatic strength (for example, the Civic Alliance). There also canbe little doubt that the regime deliberately set up parties as a way to fragment the polit-ical spectrum in Serbia. Furthermore, it successfully managed to split the opposition

coalitions in order to co-opt some of their members to support the government (NewDemocracy Party in ) or to participate in elections (Serbian Renewal Movement in).

Few analysts and scholars, including this author, would have predicted the opposition’ssuccess in the spring of . Most remained highly critical of the opposition’s appar-ent disunity and lack of strategy. In the version of this paper presented at the Kokka-lis workshop in February , I wrote, “Most of the opposition’s energy is currently devoted to garnering a degree of unity which would allow it to engage in a joint strat-egy against the regime and prevent the desertion of parts of the opposition to the gov-ernment. What the strategy itself could be remains uncertain.” The failure to mobilize

massive public support after the closure of Studio B in May seemed to confirmthis point of view.

This applied in particular to JUL. The party of Mira Marković gained influence despitea broad dislike for the party, even among members of the SPS. In the summer of the International Crisis Group (ICG) claimed it had over two hundred thousand mem-bers. Most members had joined the party to increase their economic prospects or were“encouraged to do so as employees of state-owned enterprises” (ICG ). In the



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Serbian elections in December , the support for JUL was less than . percent(FreeB Vesti December ).

The Yugoslav minister for information, Goran Matić, was particularly notorious for

the conspiracies he regularly “revealed.” The plots included, among others, mercenariesattempting to assassinate Milošević and foreign agencies smuggling forged money intothe country to destabilize the Yugoslav dinar.

Otpor, for example, distributed medals to Belgrade citizens after the regime began tohonor “heroes” of the Kosovo war. For further examples see http://www.otpor.net andhttp://www.otpor.com.

The use of the clenched fist as a symbol consciously evokes fascist/communist symbol-ism, reminiscent of the Slovene band Laibach and the Neue Slovenische Kunst (NewSlovene Art) movement, which used similar techniques in the early s in Slovenia.See Thompson (, -).

On the reasons for the success of the opposition, see also Gordy .

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florian bieber, delayed transition and the multiple legitimacy crisis of post-1992 yugoslavia

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