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Flight Operations Support & Services

getting to grips with

FOMFlight Operations Monitoring handbook

Septemlbre 2007

Flight Operations Support & ServicesFlight Operations Monitoring handbookSeptembre 2003

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Proprietary document.

By taking delivery of this Brochure (hereafter“Brochure”), you accept on behalf of your com-pany to comply with the following: .No otherproperty rights are granted by the delivery of thisBrochure than the right to read it, for the sole pur-pose of information. This Brochure, its content,illustrations and photos shall not be modified norreproduced without prior written consent ofAirbus S.A.S. This Brochure and the materials itcontains shall not, in whole or in part, be sold,rented, or licensed to any third party subject topayment or not. This Brochure may contain mar-ket-sensitive or other information that is correctat the time of going to press. This informationinvolves a number of factors which could changeover time, affecting the true public representa-tion. Airbus assumes no obligation to update anyinformation contained in this document or withrespect to the information described herein. Thestatements made herein do not constitute anoffer or form part of any contract. They are basedon Airbus information and are expressed in goodfaith but no warranty or representation is givenas to their accuracy. When additional informationis required, Airbus S.A.S can be contacted to pro-vide further details. Airbus S.A.S shall assume noliability for any damage in connection with theuse of this Brochure and the materials it con-tains, even if Airbus S.A.S has been advised ofthe likelihood of such damages. This licence isgoverned by French law and exclusive jurisdic-tion is given to the courts and tribunals ofToulouse (France) without prejudice to the right ofAirbus to bring proceedings for infringement ofcopyright or any other intellectual property rightin any other court of competent jurisdiction.

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Septemlbre 2007

Getting to grips with FOM PRELIMINARY NOTE

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PRELIMINARY NOTE

This brochure is a part of a package of guidance materials and software designed to help AIRBUS operators to implement a Flight Operation Monitoring System. Its aim is to give you a general understanding of Flight Operation Monitoring and its key benefits. Additional resources are listed in the “Further information” section of this brochure. This is not a regulatory approved document and its contents do not supersede any requirements mandated by the State of Registry of the operator’s aircraft, nor does it supersede nor amend AIRBUS’ type specific AFM, FCOM, MMEL documentation or any other approved documentation. You can contact AIRBUS Customer Support - Flight Operations Support and Services Department and speak to a Flight Operation Monitoring Expert Pilot or specialist if you have any questions about Flight Operation Monitoring.

PRELIMINARY NOTE Getting to grips with FOM

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INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Getting to grips with FOM DEFINITIONS

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DEFINITIONS

The following terms are used throughout this brochure. Hazard: A source of potential harm or a situation with a potential to cause loss. Likelihood: Used as a qualitative description of probability or frequency. Monitor: To check, supervise, observe and record the progress of an activity on a regular basis in order to identify change by reference to defined standards. Risk: The chance of something happening that will have an impact upon objectives. It is measured in terms of consequences and likelihood. Risk analysis: A systematic use of available information to determine how often specified events may occur and the magnitude of their consequences. Risk assessment: The process used to determine risk management priorities by comparing the level of risk against predetermined standards, target risk levels or other criteria. Risk identification: The process of determining what can happen, why and how. Risk level: The level of risk calculated as a function of likelihood and consequence. SMS: SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. An organized approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures. AMC: ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE. JAR AMC illustrate a means, or several alternative means, but not necessarily the only possible means by which a requirement can be met. IEM: INTERPRETATIVE/EXPLANATORY MATERIAL. JAR IEM helps to illustrate the meaning of a requirement.

DEFINITIONS Getting to grips with FOM

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INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Getting to grips with FOM TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRELIMINARY NOTE ............................................................................... 1

DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................ 3

WHAT IS FOM ? ..................................................................................... 7 GLOBAL CONCEPT ........................................................................................ 7

Airline Safety Policy............................................................................................... 7 Flight Operations Risk Profile.................................................................................... 8 Flight Operation Monitoring Strategy........................................................................... 8 Flight Operation Monitoring Activities ......................................................................... 8 Safety Feedback Activities ...................................................................................... 10 FOM Concept Schema ............................................................................................ 11

BENEFITS ..................................................................................................12 Legal obligations.................................................................................................. 12 Flight operations safety standards............................................................................. 12 Economic aspects ................................................................................................. 12 Marketing advantages............................................................................................ 12 Internal process and communication .......................................................................... 13

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.............................................................................13 Flight Data Monitoring ........................................................................................... 13 Cockpit Observations............................................................................................. 14

REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS .................................................................15 International Civil Aviation Organization...........................................................15

Annex 6, Part 1, Amendment 26 ............................................................................... 15 DOC 9422-AN/923 (first edition - 1984) ....................................................................... 15

European Joint Aviation Authorities ................................................................16 JAR OPS 1 .......................................................................................................... 16 French DGAC - Arrêté OPS 1 .................................................................................... 20 UK CAA - CAP 739 Flight Data Monitoring - A Guide to Good Practice ................................... 20

United States FAA .......................................................................................21 AC120-82 ........................................................................................................... 21

Civil Aviation Authority of China .....................................................................23 Equipment and Monitoring Requirement (Chapter 2) ....................................................... 23 Organization and Personnel (Chapter 3) ...................................................................... 23 Operations (Chapter 4) .......................................................................................... 23 Civil Aviation Safety Directive No CAAC-SD2007-1 .......................................................... 23

TABLE OF CONTENTS Getting to grips with FOM

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FOM OVERVIEW ...................................................................................25 THE SYSTEM ..............................................................................................25

Human Resources ................................................................................................. 25 Tools ................................................................................................................ 27 Facilities ........................................................................................................... 30

THE SET UP PROCESS ...................................................................................31 Update Airline Safety Policy to integrate FOM............................................................... 31 Appoint a FOM Manager.......................................................................................... 32 Set up of Safety Committee (or Safety Management Body)................................................ 33 Establish Flight Operations Risk Profile ....................................................................... 33 Define FOM strategy.............................................................................................. 33 Establish the FOM process and activities ..................................................................... 33 Appoint and educate staff....................................................................................... 34

THE ONGOING PROCESS ................................................................................34 Flight Data Monitoring Channel................................................................................. 35 Flight Observation Channel ..................................................................................... 36 Actions - correctives & preventives............................................................................ 36

AIRBUS FOM OFFERING ..........................................................................37 SERVICES ..................................................................................................37

FOM assessment................................................................................................... 37 Safety & FOM training............................................................................................ 37 FOM follow-up..................................................................................................... 38 FOM operational support ........................................................................................ 38 Assisted FDM....................................................................................................... 38

SOFTWARE TOOLS .......................................................................................39 AirFASE ............................................................................................................. 39 LOAS - Line Operations Assessment System .................................................................. 41

ONBOARD FLIGHT DATA MONITORING...............................................................43 What is it designed for?.......................................................................................... 43 How does it work? ................................................................................................ 43 What are the benefits of operating this system? ............................................................ 43

FURTHER INFORMATION ........................................................................45

Getting to grips with FOM WHAT IS FOM ?

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WHAT IS FOM ?

The Flight Operation Monitoring (FOM) concept presented below is a straightforward way of managing the safety aspects of an airline’s flight operations. This it is an integral part of a Safety Management System (SMS) as mandated by ICAO from 2009. It is easily adapted to suit the differing State rules and operating environments around the world. It offers sufficient flexibility so it can be applied by small operators, yet it is sufficiently rigorous to be the foundation for flight operations departments operating complex international networks. The proposed concept is based on best safety practices in world aviation.

GLOBAL CONCEPT The goal of FOM is to monitor flight activities and warn of risks that threaten flight operations so that safety can be managed as proactively as practicable. A FOM system is an integrated set of practices and procedures for monitoring and improving the safety of flight operations. As with all systems, a FOM system involves goal setting, planning, documentation and the measuring of performance against goals. In order to be effective, the FOM system must be purposeful and appropriate to the operation. To determine the appropriate FOM level and focus, the nature and degree of safety requirement has to be determined by assessing the risks to which the airline’s flight operations are exposed. Then the ongoing Flight Operation Monitoring activities provide information to continuously be ahead of risks by proactively tailoring procedures, training and the airline’s structure in order to establish robust defenses to ensure that errors do not result in incidents or accidents. In other words, FOM helps you identify, classify and manage safety risks of your flight operations, and provides a framework on which to build a sound business. Regardless of the size of the operation, all successful FOM systems will be founded on (but not limited to) five key elements:

1. Airline Safety Policy - Top-level management commitment to safety. 2. Flight Operations Risk Profile - Map that charts the flight operations risk areas. 3. FOM Strategy - Explanation of, and rationale for the airline’s FOM activities. 4. FOM Activities - Hazards are reported and actions are taken in a timely manner. 5. Safety Feedback Activities - The effects of safety actions are evaluated.

These five key elements are described in more detail below.

Airline Safety Policy Proactive safety management requires the involvement of staff at all levels of an organization. Airline Safety Policy defines the safety standards of the operation (flight, ground and maintenance) and determines the safety culture; it is a high level statement of desired airline’s safety performance that provides:

1. Guidance to everyone in the airline who has an impact on safety; 2. Direction to enable safety related activities to be purposeful and manageable.

WHAT IS FOM ? Getting to grips with FOM

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The organizational size of the airline, the number of aircraft, and the complexity of the flight operations guide the contents of the policy. The policy should address such points as:

• The appointment of a safety officer(s). • Provision of adequate resources to address safety concerns. • Relations between the operator, its flight crews and the regulatory authority

concerning safety information.* • Communication about safety issues (information that is published outside the FOM

department must be de-identified). *(An agreement with flight crews for strict anonymity and confidentiality in use of the data, and with all other personnel involved to ensure total cooperation in the project is an essential point of safety policy).

Flight Operations Risk Profile A Flight Operations Risk Profile is a documented overview of the risks that are generally experienced by the airline flight operations. It is like a map that charts the “contours” of the risk areas so that critical elements can be proactively identified and managed. It is the basis on which the FOM system is operated. A Flight Operations Risk Profile is unique to a specific airline. The Flight Operations Risk Profile determines:

• The overall level of management needed for consistently safe flight operations; • The specific areas of higher risk that the airline may experience.

A Flight Operations Risk Profile is a “living document” that must be periodically updated. A good practice is to update the Flight Operations Risk Profile every three years, and each time an operational change is introduced. Airlines with higher risk profiles require more thorough safety management strategies than those operating at lower risk levels. Even operations with a generally low risk profile experience areas where FOM activity should focus.

Flight Operation Monitoring Strategy A FOM Strategy is the flight operations department’s approach to the monitoring of safety related issues. It is the formal link between the risks identified in the Flight Operations Risk Profile and the activities that make up the FOM system. As such, it provides an explanatory summary of, and rationale for, the airline’s FOM activities. It also defines standards by which safety performance can be evaluated. The organizational size of the company, the number of aircraft, and the complexity of the flight operations will guide the contents of the strategy. The tools and activities described in the strategy must reflect the nature and level of risk identified in the Flight Operations Risk Profile. The FOM strategy will be evaluated to ensure that it is appropriate and that it is being applied.

Flight Operation Monitoring Activities In order to implement the strategy some fundamental activities have to be put in place. These activities should cover at least:

• Flight operation supervision and management • Hazard Identification • Safety Actions Tracking

If the airline has large or complex operations, or experience frequent or significant modifications in flight operations a "change management implementation process" must also be


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added to a list given above.

Flight Operations Supervision and Management The Flight Operations Supervision and Management system is the basis for consistency and reliability in an operation. It includes:

1. Systems for identifying all applicable laws, regulations and standards, including all approvals, authorizations, exemptions and permitted deviations;

2. Documentation identifying and defining flight operations department personnel responsibilities and accountabilities for safety, and for the performance or management of all flight operations' activities;

3. Manuals or other documents addressing: a. Aircraft operations and maintenance status; b. Personnel training programs and competency certification in accordance with

State requirements; and c. Aeronautical information.

4. Systems for ensuring that all flight operations department personnel have the necessary qualifications, skills, competencies, training, equipment and tools necessary to enable them to exercise their responsibilities in a safe manner;

All airlines must have a Flight Operations Supervision and Management system that is appropriate for the organizational size of the company, the number of aircraft, and the complexity of the flight operations.

Hazard Identification and Safety Actions Tracking The purpose of a hazard identification system is to proactively identify and address potential deficiencies in flight operations' safety. A hazard identification system includes:

• Data collection systems, • In flight observation program, • Voluntary, confidential reporting.

The safety actions tracking system is the mechanism to document, track, and evaluate the effectiveness of safety measures. The design of the system will depend on the size of the flight operations department and the nature of the operation. It should be integrated with all other systems especially the quality system. All operators require some type of hazard identification and safety actions tracking system. In a flight operations department with only a few people operating in a low-risk environment, it may be very rudimentary. Nevertheless, it should include a system to formally track identified hazards, and to review the trends and evolution. Airlines of a significant size with complex operational, technical, or human elements should have comprehensive hazard identification and tracking program supervised by dedicated Safety committee. Safety supervising body (such as a Safety Committee) should ensure that required actions are assigned a priority appropriate to the level of risk indicated in the company Flight Operations Risk Profile. For instance, concerns regarding weather conditions should be given high priority if wind shear during landing and take-off has been identified as a safety critical area in the company profile.

Change Management Implementation Process The purpose of change management is to proactively identify and manage the safety risks that can accompany significant change. Examples of changes that might call for active change management include:


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1. The introduction of a new aircraft type; 2. Change in the nature of the operation (e.g. dynamic business growth, a new operating

environment, etc.); 3. Changes in hiring or scheduling practices; 4. Changes to organizational structures; or 5. Significant change in the maintenance contract; etc.

A change management process normally involves some form of safety planning to demonstrate that hazards associated with the change will be systematically identified and managed, and that safety performance will be evaluated at an appropriate time and in an appropriate manner after the change has been implemented. Airlines that operate in stable low-risk environments need not maintain a change management process. It is more appropriate for larger or complex operations, or those that frequently experience significant change. The process should describe the types of changes requiring examination, and document how the hazards and risk mitigation strategies will be developed, documented and evaluated. Findings should be tracked in the hazard tracking system, and when appropriate, used to update the Airline’s Flight Operations Risk Profile.

Safety Feedback Activities Safety Audits

A Safety Audit is an independent evaluation of the Safety Management of the airline. It may focus only on the specific activity (maintenance, flight operations or management), or it may be a comprehensive audit to meet registration or regulatory requirements. In all cases, the prime purpose of the audit is to identify areas in which safety performance may be enhanced. The results are used to validate the airline’s Flight Operations Risk Profile, which in turn can be employed to evaluate corporate safety performance. Operators in a low risk environment and those that have a record of effective management of risks associated with the operation may only need an audit every three years. Those operating in a high-risk environment or those without records of effective risk management (e.g.; new operators) may need auditing annually. With demonstrated performance, the audit period can be extended. Audits should also be considered after significant changes in a company’s operational or management structure. Findings from the Safety Audit should be acted upon with a priority that is appropriate to the degree of associated risk as documented in the Airline’s Flight Operations Risk Profile, and tracked in the hazard tracking system.

Operational Reviews An Operational Review is an internal examination of one or more parts of an airline’s flight operation. The purpose of an Operational Review is to ensure that the critical aspects of the flight operations are being effectively managed. Examples of issues that can be examined by an Operational Review include company dispatch procedures, line maintenance practices, operations from a particular site, and various operational practices and procedures. Findings from an Operational Review are tracked in the hazard tracking system, and may be used to update the airline’s Flight Operations Risk Profile and the FOM system. In cases where there appears to be inappropriately high risk or ineffective risk management, an operator should conduct an Operational Review. The findings should be addressed with a priority appropriate to the degree of associated risk documented in the Airline’s Flight Operations Risk Profile.


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FOM Concept Schema

Feedback

Flight Operations Risk Profile

FOMActivities

FOMStrategy

Airline’s Safety Policy

Safety Audits

Operational Reviews

Change Management

Safety Actions Tracking

Hazard Identification

Standard Aircraft Flight Profiles

Flight Operations Supervision and Management


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BENEFITS A Flight Operations Monitoring system will assist you in meeting the following Safety related goals:

• Meet your legal obligation with reference to flight operations' safety. • Enhance the safety standards of your flight operations. • Give you a preventative insight against the costs of incidents and accidents. • Market the safety standards of your flight operation. • Improve internal processes and communication.

Legal obligations In the international air transport business, law places the responsibility for safety at senior management level of an organization. Management can no longer remain distant from practices and procedures established to identify safety deficiencies and reduce the potential for accidents. One proven way of increasing safety – and meeting legal obligations – is for an airline's management to take a leadership role in building a Flight Operations Monitoring system designed to proactively manage flight safety risks.

Flight operations safety standards The primary “Lesson Learned” from any safety investigation is that the best way to prevent accidents is to improve human performance. It is essential for everyone to continue to emphasize the old, but too easily forgotten, solutions:

• Diligent adherence to Standard Operating Procedures. • Absolute importance of good cockpit discipline.

Failure to exercise these fundamentals still remains the prevalent factor in all accidents and modern technology has done nothing to mitigate that fact. A Flight Operations Monitoring system, which respects strict anonymity and confidentiality in use of the data, is an essential point in enhancing the safety standards of your operation.

Economic aspects Few organizations can come through the economic consequences of an accident or significant incident without damage. The simplest way to reduce these costs is to proactively manage flight safety risks by operating a FOM system. There are two types of costs associated with an accident or incident. Direct costs: Mostly relate to physical damage, and include replacing or compensating for injuries, aircraft equipment and property damage. Indirect costs: Are usually higher than direct costs, but are not as obvious and are often delayed. Even a minor incident will incur indirect costs like: loss of business and damage to reputation; legal and damages claims; increased insurance premiums; aircraft recovery and clean up; loss of use of equipment.

Marketing advantages A good safety reputation can contribute to profitability and business expansion. Improved safety practices go hand-in-hand with good performance in a Safety audit.


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Internal process and communication A properly designed FOM System enhances good communication between management, flight operations and maintenance. This improves productivity, because valuable and unbiased information can be shared and used to improve training, procedures, or commercial aspects of operations (e.g. fuel consumption, payload).

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Flight Data Monitoring

Flight-Data Recorders (FDRs) use can be traced back to wartime in the early 1940s, and were legally required on civil airliners as "crash recorders" for accident investigation in the 1960s. Early FDRs recorded the basic parameters required by the mandatory crash recorder: Airspeed, Pressure Altitude, Magnetic Heading, Vertical Acceleration and Pitch Attitude. These parameters were recorded at intervals between .2 and 1 second, on a metal wire that was stored around a drum. However the information gained by accident investigations using just this basic information, such as for a UK aircraft accident at LHR in 1965, showed the great value of recorded flight data. As a result, in 1966 it was suggested by the publication Flight International that more use should be made of FDRs in normal service to “monitor pilot approach performance” and that airline managements should be persuaded that “flight recorders aren’t just crash recorders”…”they are pilot training aids”. In the late 1960s the UK CAA sponsored the Civil Airworthiness Air Data Recording Programme (CAADRP), where special recorders were fitted to the Comet, B707 and VC10 aircraft. This was to obtain data on autopilot performance, and investigate the possible values of disturbances in extreme weather conditions. Special events were triggered when specific parameters were exceeded in turbulence, and the information was shared with NASA. During this period, autoland was being developed, notably on the Caravelle and the Trident, which required new FDRs, separate from the crash recorders, to record the large amounts of data needed for certification of the autoland system for landings in low visibility. The Trident FDR, for example, had data stored in a Quick Access Recorder on the flight deck, which crews could remove after landing in order to be passed to engineering. FDR data now contained sufficient parameters to be able to monitor flights effectively, and the UK CAA sponsored the Special Events Search and Master Analysis (SESMA) programme for the Flight Data Monitoring system to be developed by British Airways. British Airways has continued to use this as its FDM programme with UK CAA involvement, and still keeps the name SESMA. By the early 1970s, all British Airways’ aircraft were monitored by an FDM programme. (FDR data was used for Cat 2/3 autoland certification for the B747 in 1971-3, and for the L1011/TriStar in 1974-77.) Air France developed its own FDM programme in parallel, and in 1974 took the significant step of obtaining a formal agreement between management and crew organizations to implement a Flight Data Monitoring programme. See about AIR FRANCE in AIRLINES EXPERIENCE chapter. Since the 1970s, both Air France and British Airways have had similar experience and benefits from their FDM programs to those seen by the FAA FOQA 1995-2000 DEMOPROJ. For example:

• Autoland certification - Safety improvement, regularity in low visibility. • Reduced rushed approaches - Speed/altitude “gates” specified on approach. • Engine life improvement - From improved autothrust usage, use of Reduced Climb

Thrust.


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• Aircraft performance - Establishing individual aircraft corrections for flight planning. • Airframe structural benefit - Monitoring 707 flap extension speed which were reduced

to 200 kts. • GPWS development - Elimination of early false GPWS warnings. • GPWS monitoring - Evaluating crew reaction to GPWS warnings. • Fuel burn & noise reduction - Early descents highlighted, together with early flap and

gear extension, causing increase in fuel burn and noise over surrounding environment. • Route mileage monitoring - Discouraging deviations for “sight seeing”. • Optimization of transition and recurrent training from in service event monitoring.

The programs continue today in much the same form, but with modern computing and communications technology the number of parameters monitored has increased from hundreds to over 2,000. Increased sampling rates and decreased processing time means that many more events can be encompassed. Whereas the complete analysis used to take some 5 weeks, now most digitally recorded data can be analyzed within a day, and a crew member could then be sent a file to display the flight, and events on his home PC.

Cockpit Observations In line with the research work performed in the field of Human Factors, there was a need for an operations observation system in order to try to identify areas of concern for safety, which, by nature, were not covered by a FDM program. Early in the 1980’s Pan American put in place observers in the cockpit. To feed its FOM package Airbus developed LOAS (Line Operations Assessment System) on the basis of the TEM (Threats and Errors Management) concept of LOSA (developed by University of Texas)

Getting to grips with FOM REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

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REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

This chapter gives some indication about regulatory requirements concerning accident prevention and flight safety programs. Like for all requirements, Authorities provide guidelines for organization and for documentation of the activity. Airlines must choose how to implement these guidelines and demonstrate to the authorities that the system put in place is in accordance with the regulations. You will notice that all these regulatory requirements stress the importance of Flight Data Monitoring.

International Civil Aviation Organization Annex 6, Part 1, Amendment 26

3.2 Accident prevention and flight safety programme 3.2.1 An operator shall establish and maintain an accident prevention and flight safety programme. Note.— Guidance on accident prevention is contained in the Accident Prevention Manual (Doc 9422) and in the Preparation of an Operations Manual (Doc 9376). 3.2.2 Recommendation.— From 1 January 2002, an operator of an aeroplane of a certificated take-off mass in excess of 20 000 kg should establish and maintain a flight data analysis programme as part of its accident prevention and flight safety programme. 3.2.3 From 1 January 2005, an operator of an aeroplane of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 27 000 kg shall establish and maintain a flight data analysis programme as part of its accident prevention and flight safety programme. Note.— An operator may contract the operation of a flight data analysis programme to another party while retaining overall responsibility for the maintenance of such a programme. 3.2.4 A flight data analysis programme shall be nonpunitive and contain adequate safeguards to protect the source(s) of the data. Note.— Guidance on flight data analysis programmes is contained in the Accident Prevention Manual (Doc 9422).

DOC 9422-AN/923 (first edition - 1984) 4.2.35 Several States routinely use flight recorder information for accident prevention. They regard this as an invaluable source of safety insights and information on the operation of their aircraft. Standard flight profiles are usually programmed into a computer along with acceptable deviations. Recorded data is then compared with these standard profiles. Significant deviations are then examined to see if hazards could be present. If so, corrective action can then be taken. This method need not require the identification of individuals, since it is often the number and type of deviations which reveal hazards.

REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS Getting to grips with FOM

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4.2.36 Some operators, who routinely examine FDR records for indications of hazards, or deviations from standard operating procedures, have the findings reviewed by a committee consisting of retired captains or flight crew. This group has the respect of both management and pilots and thus avoids direct employer/employee contact. The fear of job loss or punishment is thus avoided and the accident prevention insights are more readily obtained.

European Joint Aviation Authorities JAR OPS 1 JAR-OPS 1.037 Accident prevention and flight safety programme

(a) An operator shall establish and maintain an accident prevention and flight safety programme, which may be integrated with the Quality System, including:

(1) Programmes to achieve and maintain risk awareness by all persons involved in operations; and

(2) An occurrence reporting scheme to enable the collation and assessment of relevant incident and accident reports in order to identify adverse trends or to address deficiencies in the interests of flight safety. The scheme shall protect the identity of the reporter and include the possibility that reports may be submitted anonymously (See ACJ OPS 1.037(a)(2)); and

(3) Evaluation of relevant information relating to incidents and accidents and the promulgation of related information, but not the attribution of blame; and

(4) From 1 January 2005, a flight data monitoring programme for those aeroplanes in excess of 27 000kg MCTOM. Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) is the pro-active use of digital flight data from routine operations to improve aviation safety. The flight data monitoring programme shall be non-punitive and contain adequate safeguards to protect the source(s) of the data. (See ACJ OPS 1.037 (a)(4)); and

(5) The appointment of a person accountable for managing the programme.

(b) Proposals for corrective action resulting from the accident prevention and flight safety programme shall be the responsibility of the person accountable for managing the programme.

(c) The effectiveness of changes resulting from proposals for corrective action identified by

the accident and flight safety programme shall be monitored by the Quality Manager.

ACJ OPS 1.037 Accident prevention and flight safety programme 1. Guidance material for the establishment of a safety programme [and Flight Data

Monitoring] can be found in: a. ICAO Doc 9422 (Accident Prevention Manual); and b. CAO Doc 9376 (Preparation of an Operational Manual). c. CAP 739

[Ch. 1, 01.03.98, Amdt. 7, 01.09.04]

ACJ OPS 1.037(a)(2) Occurrence Reporting Scheme 1. The overall objective of the scheme described in JAR-OPS 1.037(a)(2) is to use reported

information to improve the level of flight safety and not to attribute blame. 2. The detailed objectives of the scheme are:

a. To enable an assessment of the safety implications of each relevant incident and accident to be made, including previous similar occurrences, so that any necessary action can be initiated; and

b. To ensure that knowledge of relevant incidents and accidents is disseminated so that other persons and organisations may learn from them.

3. The scheme is an essential part of the overall monitoring function; it is complementary to


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the normal day to day procedures and ‘control’ systems and is not intended to duplicate or supersede any of them. The scheme is a tool to identify those occasions where routine procedures have failed. (Occurrences that have to be reported and responsibilities for submitting reports are described in JAR-OPS 1.420.)

4. Occurrences should remain in the database when judged reportable by the person

submitting the report as the significance of such reports may only become obvious at a later date.

[Amdt. 3, 01.12.01]

ACJ OPS 1.037(a)(4) Flight Data Monitoring Programme 1. Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) is the pro-active and non-punitive use of digital flight data

from routine operations to improve aviation safety. 2. The manager of the accident prevention and flight safety programme, which includes the

FDM programme, is accountable for the discovery of issues and the transmission of these to the relevant manager(s) responsible for the process(es) concerned. The latter are accountable for taking appropriate and practicable safety action within a reasonable period of time that reflects the severity of the issue.

Note: While an operator may contract the operation of a flight data analysis programme to another party the overall responsibility remains with the operator’s accident prevention and flight safety programme manager.

3. An FDM programme will allow an operator to: 3.1 Identify areas of operational risk and quantify current safety margins. 3.2 Identify and quantify operational risks by highlighting when non-standard, unusual or

unsafe circumstances occur. 3.3 Use the FDM information on the frequency of occurrence, combined with an estimation of

the level of severity, to assess the safety risks and to determine which may become unacceptable if the discovered trend continues.

3.4 Put in place appropriate procedures for remedial action once an unacceptable risk, either actually present or predicted by trending, has been identified.

3.5 Confirm the effectiveness of any remedial action by continued monitoring. 4. Flight Data Monitoring Analysis Techniques: 4.1 Exceedence Detection: This looks for deviations from flight manual limits, and standard

operating procedures. A set of core events should be selected to cover the main areas of interest to the operator. A sample list is in the Appendix. The event detection limits should be continuously reviewed to reflect the operator’s current operating procedures.

4.2 All Flights Measurement: A system that defines what is normal practice. This may be accomplished by retaining various snapshots of information from each flight.

4.3 Statistics: A series of measures collected to support the analysis process. These would be expected to include the numbers of flights flown and analysed, aircraft and sector details sufficient to generate rate and trend information.

5. Flight Data Monitoring Analysis, Assessment and Process Control Tools: The effective

assessment of information obtained from digital flight data is dependant on the provision of appropriate information technology tool sets. A program suite may include: Annotated data trace displays, engineering unit listings, visualisation for the most significant incidents, access to interpretative material, links to other safety information, and statistical presentations.

6. Education and Publication: Sharing safety information is a fundamental principle of

aviation safety in helping to reduce accident rates The operator should pass on the lessons learnt to all relevant personnel and, where appropriate, industry. Similar media to air safety systems may be used. These may include: Newsletters, flight safety magazines,


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highlighting examples in training and simulator exercises, periodic reports to industry and the regulatory authority.

7. Accident and incident data requirements specified in JAR-OPS 1.160 take precedence over

the requirements of an FDM programme. In these cases the FDR data should be retained as part of the investigation data and may fall outside the de-identification agreements.

8. Every crew member has a responsibility to report events described in JAR-OPS 1.085(b)

using the company occurrence reporting scheme detailed in JAR-OPS 1.037(a)(2). Mandatory Occurrence Reporting is a requirement under JAR-OPS 1.420. Significant risk-bearing incidents detected by FDM will therefore normally be the subject of mandatory occurrence reporting by the crew. If this is not the case then they should submit a retrospective report that will be included under the normal accident prevention and flight safety process without prejudice.

9. The data recovery strategy should ensure a sufficiently representative capture of flight

information to maintain an overview of operations. Data analysis should be performed sufficiently frequently to enable action to be taken on significant safety issues.

10. The data retention strategy should aim to provide the greatest safety benefits practicable

from the available data. A full data set should be retained until the action and review processes are complete; thereafter, a reduced data set relating to closed issues can be maintained for longer term trend analysis. Programme managers may wish to retain samples of de-identified full-flight data for various safety purposes (detailed analysis, training, benchmarking etc.).

11. Data Access and Security policy should restrict information access to authorised persons.

When data access is required for airworthiness and maintenance purposes, a procedure should be in place to prevent disclosure of crew identity.

12. Procedure Document; this document signed by all parties (airline management, flight crew

member representatives nominated either by the union or the flight crew themselves) will, as a minimum, define: a) The aim of the FDM programme. b) A data access and security policy that should restrict access to information to

specifically authorized persons identified by their position. c) The method to obtain de-identified crew feedback on those occasions that require

specific flight follow-up for contextual information; where such crew contact is required the authorised person(s) need not necessarily be the programme manager, or safety manager, but could be a third party (broker) mutually acceptable to unions or staff and management.

d) The data retention policy and accountability including the measures taken to ensure the security of the data.

e) The conditions under which, on rare occasions, advisory briefing or remedial training should take place; this should always be carried out in a constructive and non-punitive manner.

f) The conditions under which the confidentiality may be withdrawn for reasons of gross negligence or significant continuing safety concern.

g) The participation of flight crew member representative(s) in the assessment of the data, the action and review process and the consideration of recommendations.

h) The policy for publishing the findings resulting from FDM. 13. Airborne systems and equipment used to obtain FDM data will range from an already

installed full Quick Access Recorder, in a modern aircraft with digital systems, to a basic crash protected recorder in an older or less sophisticated aircraft. The analysis potential of the reduced data set available in the latter case may reduce the safety benefits obtainable. The operator shall ensure that FDM use does not adversely affect the serviceability of equipment required for accident investigation.

Appendix to ACJ OPS 1.037 (a)(4)


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The following table provides examples of FDM events that may be further developed using operator and aeroplane specific limits. The table is considered illustrative and not exhaustive.

Event Group Description

Rejected take-Off High Speed Rejected take-off

Take-off Pitch Pitch rate high on take-off Pitch attitude high during take-off

Unstick Speeds Unstick speed high Unstick speed low

Height Loss in Climb-out Initial climb height loss 20 ft AGL to 400 ft AAL Initial climb height loss 400 ft to 1 500 ft AAL

Slow Climb-out Excessive time to 1 000 ft AAL after take-off

Climb-out Speeds Climb out speed high below 400 ft AAL Climb out speed high 400 ft AAL to 1 000 ft AAL Climb out speed low 35 ft AGL to 400 ft AAL Climb out speed low 400 ft AAL to 1 500 ft AAL

High Rate of Descent High rate of descent below 2 000 ft AGL

Go-around Go-around below 1 000 ft AAL Go-around above 1 000 ft AAL

Low Approach Low on approach

Glideslope Deviation under glideslope Deviation above glideslope (below 600 ft AGL)

Approach Power Low power on approach

Approach Speeds Approach speed high within 90 sec of touchdown Approach speed high below 500 ft AAL Approach speed high below 50 ft AGL Approach speed low within 2 minutes of touchdown

Landing Flap Late land flap (not in position below 500 ft AAL) Reduced flap landing Flap load relief system operation

Landing Pitch Pitch attitude high on landing Pitch attitude low on landing

Bank Angles Excessive bank below 100 ft AGL Excessive bank 100 ft AGL to 500 ft AAL Excessive bank above 500 ft AGL Excessive bank near ground (below 20 ft AGL)

Normal Acceleration High normal acceleration on ground High normal acceleration in flight flaps up (+/- increment) High normal acceleration in flight flaps down(+/- increment) High normal acceleration at landing

Abnormal Configuration Take-off configuration warning Early configuration change after take-off (flap) Speed brake with flap Speedbrake on approach below 800 ft AAL Speedbrake not armed below 800 ft AAL

Ground Proximity Warning GPWS operation - hard warning GPWS operation - soft warning GPWS operation - windshear warning GPWS operation - false warning


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TCAS Warning TCAS operation – Resolution Advisory

Margin to Stall/Buffet Stickshake False stickshake Reduced lift margin except near ground Reduced lift margin at take-off Low buffet margin (above 20 000 ft)

Flight Manual Limitations Vmo exceedence Mmo exceedence Flap placard speed exceedence Gear down speed exceedence Gear selection up/down speed exceedence Flap/ Slat altitude exceedence Maximum operating altitude exceedence

[Amdt. 7, 01.09.04]

French DGAC - Arrêté OPS 1 JAR OPS 1 is adopted into French legal framework as “Arrêté du 12 mai 1997 (OPS 1)”. This "Arrêté" was updated by "Instruction du 23 juillet 2003" which includes all AMC and IEM. The French version of OPS1 includes a national variant of article 1.037. The variations are:

• Starting 1st January 2000 there is an obligation to set up a Flight Data Monitoring activity for turbine-engine airplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass of 10 000 kg or more, or a maximum passenger seating configuration of 20 or more.

• Events are subject to analysis • An event's report is transmitted to the Authority. • The system has to be confidential and anonymous.

UK CAA - CAP 739 Flight Data Monitoring - A Guide to Good Practice This Document outlines good practice relating to first establishing and then obtaining worthwhile safety benefits from an Operator’s Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) programme. The Definition of Flight Data Monitoring: Systematic, pro-active and non-punitive use of digital flight data from routine operations to improve aviation safety. Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) programmes assist an operator to identify, quantify, assess and address operational risks. Since the 1970’s the CAA’s Safety Regulation Group (SRG) has helped develop and support such systems and used FDM information to support a range of airworthiness and operational safety tasks. Through this co-operative development work many farsighted operators have demonstrated the safety benefits of FDM such that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) have recommended their use for all Air Transport operations in aircraft of over 20 tonnes maximum weight. Since 1st January 2005 FDM has been a standard for all operations over 27 tonnes and is enshrined in UK law. The UK, in continuing its policy of applying ICAO standards, will make this a requirement under UK law and other European regulators are also expected to comply. The UK Air Navigation Order 2000 (ANO 2000) Article 34A requires the establishment and maintenance of an Accident Prevention and Flight Safety Programme (AP&FSP) and includes the requirement for FDM. The content of safety programmes, including FDM, will need to be confirmed as acceptable by the CAA’s Flight Operations Inspectors. It is recognised that there is a wide range of operators covered by these requirements and that there is no “one size fits all” system. The size and age of aircraft may determine the parameters available for analysis. The programme effectiveness and efficiency of a small fleet or operation may be helped by pooling analysis within a group of similar operations. While


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retaining responsibility for risk assessment and action, some operators may wish to contract out the basic analysis due to lack of expertise or resources. As an aid to operators, Appendix D provides a checklist of guiding principles that highlight some of the fundamental concepts that should be considered when putting one of these pro-active safety processes in place. In a similar manner to the ICAO Accident Prevention Manual (Doc 9422), this document outlines good practice and indicates what may constitute an operator’s FDM programme system that is acceptable to the CAA. It is intended to be regularly reviewed and revised by CAA in consultation with Industry as widespread FDM experience develops. This document includes the following elements: Chapter 1 Flight Data Monitoring - Introduction Chapter 2 Objectives of an Operator’s FDM System Chapter 3 Description of a Typical FDM System Chapter 4 FDM within a Safety Management System Chapter 5 Planning and Introduction of FDM Chapter 6 Organisation and Control of FDM Information Chapter 7 Interpretation and Use of FDM Information Chapter 8 Legislation and Requirements Related to FDM Chapter 9 Legislation Related to FDM Information Chapter 10 Mandatory Occurrence Reporting and FDM Chapter 11 Maintaining Aircraft FDM Systems Please refer to the CAP 739 for more information.

United States FAA AC120-82

1. PURPOSE. This advisory circular (AC) provides guidance on one means, but not necessarily the only means, of developing, implementing, and operating a voluntary Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program that is acceptable to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

a. FOQA is a voluntary safety program that is designed to make commercial aviation safer

by allowing commercial airlines and pilots to share de-identified aggregate information with the FAA so that the FAA can monitor national trends in aircraft operations and target its resources to address operational risk issues (e.g., flight operations, air traffic control (ATC), airports). The fundamental objective of this new FAA/pilot/carrier partnership is to allow all three parties to identify and reduce or eliminate safety risks, as well as minimize deviations from the regulations. To achieve this objective and obtain valuable safety information, the airlines, pilots, and the FAA are voluntarily agreeing to participate in this program so that all three organizations can achieve a mutual goal of making air travel safer.

b. A cornerstone of this new program is the understanding that aggregate data that is

provided to the FAA will be kept confidential and the identity of reporting pilots or airlines will remain anonymous as allowed by law. Information submitted to the FAA pursuant to this program will be protected as “voluntarily submitted safety related data” under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 193.

(1) In general, aggregate FOQA data provided to the FAA under 14 CFR part 13, section 13.401 should be stripped of information that could identify the submitting airline prior to leaving the airline premises and, regardless of submission venue, should include the following statement:

WARNING: This FOQA information is protected from disclosure under 49 U.S.C. 40123


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and part 193. It may be released only with the written permission of the Federal Aviation Administration Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification.

(2) However, if an airline voluntarily elects to provide the FAA with aggregate FOQA data that includes airline identifying information, then it should include an additional statement that it is the proprietary and confidential property of [Airline Name].

c. As defined in this AC, operator FOQA programs include provisions for the identification

of safety issues and development and implementation of corrective actions. FOQA can provide objective safety information that is not otherwise obtainable. No aircraft operator is required to have a FOQA program. No operator that conducts a FOQA program is required to obtain FAA approval of that program. However, an aircraft operator that seeks the protection available in part 13, section 13.401 from the use by the FAA of FOQA information for enforcement purposes must obtain FAA approval of its program. For that purpose:

(1) The elements of a FOQA program are set forth by an aircraft operator in an Implementation and Operations (I&O) Plan that is submitted to the FAA for review and approval. Guidance on the appropriate content of a FOQA I&O Plan is provided in appendix A of this AC.

(2) The guidelines contained herein are based on the extensive experience of the FAA and the airline industry in developing FOQA programs and constitute a compilation of best practices. The provisions of this AC neither add nor change regulatory requirements or authorize deviations from regulatory requirements.

2. BACKGROUND. In recent years, the FAA and the air transportation industry have sought

additional means for addressing safety problems and identifying potential safety hazards. Based on the experiences of foreign air carriers, the results of several FAA-sponsored studies, and input received from government/industry safety forums, the FAA has concluded that wide implementation of FOQA programs could have significant potential to reduce air carrier accident rates below current levels. A reduction in the already low U.S. airline accident rate is needed to preclude a projected growth in the number of accidents, which is expected to occur due to increased future traffic volume. The value of FOQA programs is the early identification of adverse safety trends that, if uncorrected, could lead to accidents. A key element in FOQA is the application of corrective action and follow-up to assure that unsafe conditions are effectively remediated.

3. SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY. The information contained in this AC applies primarily to air

carriers that operate under part 121 or 135, but may be applicable to operators under other parts. The aircraft operator voluntarily enters into a FOQA program.

4. RELATED REGULATIONS (14 CFR).

Part 13 Part 119 Part 193

Please refer to the Advisory Circular AC120-82 for more information.


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Civil Aviation Authority of China Equipment and Monitoring Requirement (Chapter 2)

Article 9: Any civil aviation aircraft, which is certified / validated according to CCAR Part 25 “Airworthiness Standard of Transportation Airplane”, Part 29 “Airworthiness Standard of Transportation Rotary-Wing Aircraft”, should install Quick Access Recorder (QAR) or other equipment having the function of quickly accessing records.

Organization and Personnel (Chapter 3) Article 16: Airlines should create flight quality monitoring organization.

Operations (Chapter 4) Article 23: Airlines must establish detailed and feasible flight quality monitoring procedures and rules and regulations and submit them to the regional administration bureau and CAAC Aviation Safety Office on file, respectively.

Civil Aviation Safety Directive No CAAC-SD2007-1 This directive has been issued in accordance with Civil Aviation Law of People’s Republic of China and Production Safety Law of People’s Republic of China as well as China Civil Aviation Safety Regulations and is the mandatory measure by which CAAC, CAAC Regional Administration implement the industrial administration to aviation enterprises and institutions. I. Title: Regarding the implementation with the directive of “The Flight Operation Quality assurance (FOQA) Items Specifications on Boeing and Airbus Family Aircraft” . II. Applicability: All the airlines and relevant enterprises and institutions that have been required to perform flight operation quality assurance as per “The Administrative Regulations on Flight Operation Quality assurance (FOQA)” in China Civil Aviation. III. Purpose: The directive aims to require the airlines to implement two latest industry standards into their flight operation quality assurances operation, which have been recently published in China civil aviation, i.e., “Flight Operation Quality Assurance Items Specifications Part 1: Airbus Family Aircraft” (MH/T 2005.1—2007) and “Flight Operation quality assurance Items Specifications Part 2: Boeing Family Aircraft” (MH/T 2005.2—2007). It aims to further implement “The Administrative Regulations on Flight Operation Quality Assurance” in China Civil Aviation by exercising these standards and to guide the airlines to properly revise their respective assurance items and standards, to improve the control quality of flight crews and the comprehensive administration level of technique administration divisions, to facilitate to achieve with the general safe operation of airlines. Meanwhile, the above-mentioned two industry standards also provide relevant basis for the safe administration of CAAC authority. The Flight Operation Quality Assurance Items Specifications of Airbus Family Aircraft and Boeing Family Aircraft has been based on the reference with ICAO standards, recommendations, measures and relevant standards of aircraft manufacturer type manuals and Chinese domestic airlines. CAAC has organized relevant divisions and the managerial individuals and specialists who have undertaken flight operation quality assurance s for a long term, in accordance with Chinese actual status, to jointly study and develop a unified assurance items and standards for the same aircraft type. These standards have replenished and matured the relevant assurance standards and requirements in “The Administrative Regulations on Flight Operation Quality Assurance” in China Civil Aviation and have been furnished with superior feasibility and operability.


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IV. Requirements: Each airlines and relevant enterprises and institutions shall comply with these two industry standards of “Flight Operation Quality Assurance Items Specifications Part 1: Airbus Family Aircraft” (MH/T 2005.1—2007) and “Flight Operation quality assurance Items Specifications Part 2: Boeing Family Aircraft” (MH/T 2005.2—2007) and base on the status quo of aircraft type being operated in their own entity to properly organize their respective revisions and implementations. The revised assurance items specifications on aircraft types shall not be less restrictive than the industry standards. Each CAAC Administration shall base on the requirements of The Administrative Regulations on Flight Operation Quality Assurance and refer to the items or articles of these two standards to periodically inspect and specify the airlines flight operation quality assurance, to continuously summarize the actual experience of flight operation quality assurance, to improve administration level and ensure with aviation operation safety. V. Effective date: May 1, 2007 VI. Publication date: March,19, 2007

Getting to grips with FOM FOM OVERVIEW

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FOM OVERVIEW

THE SYSTEM The Flight Operations Monitoring System described here is centered on Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) complemented by crew observation and reporting tools in order to cover as many safety related elements as practically possible. Flight Data Monitoring follows directly from the data recorded in the aircraft. It is currently the most powerful monitoring tool, providing complete, accurate and objective flight safety data that can cover all flights within an airline, with risk events being detected automatically. However, FDM systems have their limitations: they cannot give information about event environment like weather, ATC and communication difficulties, or passenger disruptions. FDM systems cannot also detect certain events like navigational errors or assess the crews’ Human Factors skills displayed on the flight deck. These "environmental" conditions can only be assessed by in flight crew observation or through the initiative of individuals to report events. Therefore, accurate and comprehensive Flight Crew Reports are a fundamental part of any flight safety program. In addition to handling the mandatory Air Safety Reports, that are legally required to be filed for an incident, Flight Crew Reports should also include voluntary and confidential Human Factors Reports. To be really meaningful, crew observations should be taken from as wide a source as possible. Airline resources would not normally allow extra flight crews as observers on many routine flights. However on routes where difficulties are known to exist, for example if significant FDM events had been triggered, observer flights could be scheduled to establish the "environmental" conditions of the problems. A FOM system requires, as any system, dedicated personnel, with ad hoc tools and facilities to perform specified tasks. These mandatory "components" act in conformity with process defining activities, interactions with other departments and conditions of performance.

Human Resources Depending on the airline structure a specific Flight Operations Monitoring department can be created. Otherwise, the FOM team can be incorporated in the Flight Safety or Quality Assurance Departments. The size of the team involved in the FOM system will be defined in relation with the airline operations' complexity (size and organization of the airline, the technology that will be implemented to record and analyze information). In all cases, three functions have to be manned: FOM Manager, Flight Operation Analyst and a System Engineer (to cover FDM aspects). The FOM Manager is responsible for the overall management, administration, security, and maintenance of the FOM program. FOM Manager duties are:

• Interface with the Authority, vendors, and other entities • Address the FOM data needs and reporting requirements of Flight Operations, Training,

FOM OVERVIEW Getting to grips with FOM

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and Safety departments • Coordinate with maintenance engineering regarding Flight Data Acquisition • Coordinate actions concerning problems discovered during data analysis • Develop and maintain appropriate documentation to support FOM operations • This documentation will be used to provide reference for the process and facilitate any

personnel transitions that may occur • Maintain an archive of the data and results that come from the FOM program

Qualifications required for the FOM Manager position are:

• Good knowledge of global organization and corporate practices • Excellent knowledge of System Management • Knowledge in aeronautic principles and technology • Computer literacy

Note: It is essential that the post holder has the trust of both crew and managers with

respect to integrity and good judgment. The Flight Operation Analyst is a pilot, type rated on the aircraft, and having extensive knowledge of the airline's routes, aircraft characteristics, airline SOPs, safety requirements, and various operational environments. He/She is responsible for the operational aspects of the analysis. Flight Operation Analyst duties are:

• Confirm events for operational validity • Review high risk events in detail, contacting crews through agreed procedure if

necessary • Participate in producing statistical reports, safety trend and risk analysis • Include operational comments an/or suggestions in reports when appropriate

Qualifications required for Flight Operation Analyst position are:

• Air Transport Pilot, type rated on the aircraft to be analyzed • Wide experience of routes and type of operation • Computer literacy • Qualified in Human Factors • Sound knowledge of Quality Management

Note: The Flight Operation Analyst must be approved by the pilot community, as he acts as

a gatekeeper and ensures confidentiality of the data. The System Engineer is in charge of flight data recorder serviceability and PC analysis programs. System Engineer duties are:

• Run systems, perform data fine filtering, and confirm event detection • Ensure that all data generated is securely stored • Participate in production of statistical reports

Qualifications required for System Engineer position are:

• Electronic data processing experience • Knowledge in aeronautic principles and technology • Good knowledge of global operating practices

Once again, selecting personnel to staff the FOM program depends on the program’s scope, the size and organization of the airline, and the technology that will be implemented to record and analyze information. A typical program includes a FOM manager, one or more Flight Operation Analysts, and one or more System Engineer. FOM team members should be technically proficient and have excellent communication and problem-solving skills. Any person involved in FOM has to demonstrate a high degree of integrity.


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Tools FOM system consists of onboard (in-flight data acquisition) and ground-based (data analysis) elements.

Onboard the aircraft The on-board side of the system is essentially dedicated to data acquisition. The quality and the quantity of data will govern the reliability of FOM to a great extent. Two procedures for data acquisition are used:

1. Manual recording of in-flight facts through Crew Observation or Crew Reports. To avoid irrelevant points strict recording rules have to be defined and applied.

2. Automatic recording of flight data through the onboard aircraft equipment. This procedure is a compulsory data acquisition method for FDM.

Flight Data Recording System

Based on AIRBUS A320, there are two "paths" for automatic flight data collection: one through Flight Data Recording System (FDRS) and second through Aircraft Integrated Data System (AIDS). These acquisitions "paths" may vary as a function of different system architecture. The Flight Data Recording System (FDRS) is used to record aircraft mandatory parameters. The FDRS consists of a Flight Data Interface Unit (FDIU) connected as shown below to a Solid State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR) and an optional Quick Access Recorder (QAR). The Flight Data Interface Unit (FDIU) receives discrete and digital parameters and processes them. The functions of the FDIU are: conversion, comparison and check. The FDIU converts the input parameters into a recordable format for recorders:

• HARVARD BIPHASE for the Solid State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR), • BIPOLAR RZ for the optional Quick Access Recorder (QAR).

The FDIU compares the data that it sends with the data recorded by the SSFDR. The recorded data is transmitted back to the FDIU through the playback data bus. The FDIU checks the integrity of the mandatory parameters during the flight. After the flight, engines shutdown, only the Linear Accelerometer signal check is done. The FDIU includes BITE and monitoring functions. The Solid State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR) stores data which the FDIU has collected during the last 25 hours. The data is recorded in data frames. Each frame contains data received during one second. The SSFDR includes BITE functions. The SSFDR status signal is sent to the Centralized Fault Display Interface Unit (CFDIU) through the FDIU and to the ECAM through the System Data Acquisition Concentrators (SDACs). The SSFDR energization is controlled through the power interlock circuit. The Underwater Locator Beacon (ULB) located on the front face of the SSFDR enables the location of the recorder if the aircraft is immersed in water following an accident. The ULB is equipped with a battery which is activated by both fresh and salt water. The Quick Access Recorder (QAR) stores the same data as the SSFDR for on ground performance, maintenance or condition monitoring tasks. The data frames stored in the QAR are identical to the SSFDR data frames. The QAR status signals (QAR MEDIA LOW, QAR FAIL) are sent to the lamps on its front face and to the CFDIU through the FDIU. The QAR power up is controlled through the power interlock circuit. The QAR is not crash protected. This unit is designed to provide quick and easy access to a removable medium, such as an optical disk or PCMCIA card, on which flight information is recorded. QARs have now been developed to record an expanded data-frame, sometimes supporting 2000+ parameters at much higher sample rates than the FDR. The expanded data-frame greatly increases the resolution and accuracy of the ground analysis programs.


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Aircraft Integrated Data System

The Aircraft Integrated Data System (AIDS) is used to monitor various aircraft system parameters in order to make maintenance easier and to allow formulating operational recommendations. The AIDS consists of a Data Managements Unit (DMU) connected as shown below. An optional Digital AIDS Recorder (DAR) may be installed. The Data Management Unit (DMU) is basically equipped with 2 microprocessor boards:

• The first one (master) is in charge of the data input/output and the processing of reports.

• The second one (slave) is in charge of the Digital AIDS Recorder (DAR) and Smart AIDS Recorder (SAR) processings. The SAR memory is part of this board.

Digital AIDS Recorder (DAR) is designed to provide easy access to a removable medium, such as an optical disk, cassette (50 hour magnetic tape), or PCMCIA card, on which parameters are recorded.


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Aircraft Integrated Data System Note: Compare to the basic DMU, the extended DMU is equipped with a slave

microprocessor board for customer programmable functions and interface to upload, download and record data on PCMCIA card.

Flight Data Interface and Management Unit

In certain airplanes the FDIU/AIDS architecture is regrouped in a one Flight Data Interface and Management Unit (FDIMU), with integrated PCMCIA interface. FDIMU records mandatory parameters complying with the applicable Airworthiness Requirements as well as engines, APU and other systems' parameters for performance and operational analysis. The data management function enables:

• Recording the AIDS data on an optional external Digital AIDS Recorder (DAR) • On request, recording / downloading of pre-programmed compressed data files (SAR

data files) and reports • Uploading of operational software and customer database.

The flight data interface function enables:

• Recording of mandatory parameters required by the Airworthiness Authorities on a Solid State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR) or on an optional external Quick Access Recorder (QAR).


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On ground Ground-based elements of the FOM system are essentially dedicated to data processing, analysis and storage. For the FDM part, a PC based system:

1. Collects raw data recorded by the on-board recorder; 2. Processes raw data and transcribes them into engineering values; 3. Analyzes all of the engineering values, using specific software models and algorithms,

to check that the aircraft is being flown within its safety envelope by marking unusual deviations and grade the severity of them;

4. Automatically prioritizes the diagnostic results in accordance with user-specific criteria to spot any possible deviations that could adversely affect flight safety;

5. Creates periodic customized reports. For Crew Observation and Pilot Self Reporting:

1. Observation data is inserted into dedicated software by the Observer, or Trained persons in the case of Pilot Self Reports.

2. Creates periodic customized reports For both FDM and Crew Observation or Pilot Self Reporting the trends of events are monitored to highlight "areas of concern". If a critical deviation is identified the Gatekeeper is the first means of identifying (by questions, or interview) any reasons that may exist for the deviation. According to the response the matter finishes there, or is passed on to the Flight Safety Manager for further action.

Facilities The information generated by the FOM system is highly confidential so its protection is an absolutely critical area that should be carefully organized by the management. All FOM equipment and data must be secured and protected against unauthorized data disclosure, alteration, misuse, or destruction. All systems, offices, equipment, workstations, computers, and peripherals associated with the FOM have to be secure and with controlled access. Additionally, secure storage areas have also be provided for of all FOM-related materials, including paper, media, and backup devices.


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THE SET UP PROCESS This chapter describes the key steps to integrate a FOM system into an airline's flight operations. The information presented is not a prescriptive “formula” and operators should use this information to customize a FOM to suit their operation. In order to integrate a FOM system into your operation, the following 7 basic steps have to be considered:

1. Update Airline Safety Policy to integrate FOM 2. Appoint a FOM Manager 3. Set up a safety committee (or Safety Management Body) 4. Establish Flight Operations Risk Profile 5. Define the FOM strategy 6. Establish the FOM process and activities 7. Train and educate staff

These elements will only be effective if they are integrated seamlessly into your flight operation and organizational culture.

Update Airline Safety Policy to integrate FOM Integration of FOM in the airline safety policy requires the involvement and commitment of senior management. Regardless of size, and complexity of flight operation, senior management must:

• Develop the FOM policy • Set the FOM objectives • Allocate sufficient resources to FOM • Facilitate the flow of information

FOM policy development The purpose of developing the FOM policy is to set out what the organization is striving to achieve, and how it is going to get there. The FOM policy should outline the methods and processes the organization will use to achieve the desired outcomes. Senior management should consult widely with flight crews when preparing the FOM policy. Consultation ensures that the policy is relevant to the staff and operation. To be effective the policy should be a commitment to action. It has to:

• Contain the general intentions of management and the approach (management’s commitment to the FOM program).

• Integrate agreement with the flight crews for strict anonymity and confidentiality. This is an essential part of the policy.

• Cover the arrangements for implementing the policy (responsibilities and accountabilities for directors, managers and employees).

• Become the criteria upon which the organization bases its actions (outcomes expected of staff, managers and contractors).

It should be signed by the senior person in the airline, usually the Chief Executive Officer or Flight Operations Director. It is a tangible indication that senior management is committed to the FOM program. Your safety policy should be reviewed periodically to ensure that it remains coherent with your safety objectives, and relevant to your operation.


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Set the FOM objectives Objectives set operational standards. They need to be specific, measurable, realistic and agreed by those who have to deliver them. Both short- and long-term objectives should be set and prioritized against safety and business needs. The FOM objectives are outcome-based to meet the organization's safety policies. For example, you may have an objective (for the ensuing six months) to monitor 95% of all your flights. By communicating your target in advance you will foster a common goal for all persons concerned with FOM to achieve.

Allocate sufficient resources to FOM When planning the implementation of the FOM program, it is important to look at the resources available and those that need to be provided. Resources required include:

• Time – for meetings, information gathering, planning and communication • Expertise • Training

Frequently time is the resource most difficult to allocate, particularly when starting the implementation of the FOM program. Meetings will be required to establish roles and responsibilities. Time must also be taken to communicate the intention of the program to all flight crews. The next important resource you need to devote to the operation of your FOM is expertise. You will need to involve people from across your flight operations with the expertise to address safety related issues. All staff involved in the FOM program should be trained to understand the purpose of your FOM program and to perform their role. Once the FOM system is running and hazards start to be identified, senior management must be prepared to commit resources to address those hazards. If hazards are not properly addressed, enthusiasm for the FOM program will quickly wane.

Appoint a FOM Manager The FOM Manager is the person within the organization who is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the FOM system. Depending on the size of the organization, the responsibilities of the FOM Manager may require a full-time appointment, or may be added to existing duties of the Flight Safety Officer. The FOM Manager requires the assistance of people from the Maintenance department and the Information Systems department to run the FOM System. The FOM Manager/Flight Safety Officer should have an open line of communication with all the departments. This ensures that reports and recommendations are afforded the proper level of attention, and that appropriate solutions are implemented in a timely manner. The FOM Manager/Safety Officer must have the Chief Executive Officer’s assurance that any safety issue can be raised without fear. The FOM Manager/ Flight Safety Officer should be technically competent in the company's flight operations. Regardless of technical expertise, if the job of FOM Manager/ Flight Safety Officer is forced on someone who does not have a keen interest in safety, then it is unlikely that others within the organization will buy in to FOM. The FOM Manager's responsibilities are listed above in FOM System - Human Resources Sub Chapter. Note: The responsibilities and authority of the FOM Manager/ Flight Safety Officer must be


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clearly understood in order to prevent any conflicts. The appointment of a FOM Manager/ Flight Safety Officer does not relieve the organization’s key personnel from discharging their legal obligations. The FOM Manager/ Flight Safety Officer is appointed to administer the FOM and safety program. The responsibilities include the identification and reporting of safety hazards, but may not include operational authority.

Set up of Safety Committee (or Safety Management Body) The size and nature of flight operations or the complexity of the organization may justify the setting up of a Safety Committee. In larger organizations with for example several operational centers, safety committees are vital to the operation. Smaller organizations may discuss and resolve safety matters in a less formal way as long as there is good communication, and people are willing to provide advice and assistance to the FOM Manager/ Flight Safety Officer. The committee can:

• Act as a source of expertise and advice • Review the progress of the FOM program, and monitor the actions taken. • Review the status of hazard/risk reports, and review the actions taken. • Make safety recommendations to address hazards. • Review internal audit reports. • Help identify hazards and propose defensive actions. • Prepare and submit reports to the Chief Executive Officer for review.

The size of the operation will determine the makeup and number of members in the Safety Committee. The committee should include at least:

• A senior management representative who has the authority to approve recommendations

• The FOM Manager/ Flight Safety Officer • Flight operations representative (Chief Pilots for the respective fleets, Crew Rostering

Officer, etc.) • Maintenance representative • Training representative

Establish Flight Operations Risk Profile Risk is the chance that a hazard will result in damage or harm. It is measured in terms of consequences and likelihood. There will always be risks involved in aviation operations. Some risks can be accepted, some can be eliminated, and others can be reduced to the point where they are acceptable. A Flight Operations Risk Profile is a documented overview of the risks that are generally experienced by the airlines flight operations. It is like a map that charts the “contours” of the risk areas so that critical elements can be proactively identified and managed.

Define FOM strategy A FOM Strategy is the flight operations department’s approach to the monitoring of safety related issues in flight operation. As such, it provides a summary explanation of, and rationale for, the FOM tools and activities. It also defines standard by which safety performance can be evaluated. The organizational size of the company, the number of aircraft, and the complexity of the flight operations will guide the contents of the strategy.

Establish the FOM process and activities FOM tools and activities have to be put in place. These activities should cover at least:

• Hazard Identification • Safety Actions Tracking


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Hazard identification includes:

• Flight Data collection systems, • An in flight observation program, • Voluntary, confidential reporting.

Safety actions tracking system is the mechanism to document, track, and evaluate the effectiveness of safety measures. It should be integrated with all other systems especially the quality system. An airline should ensure that required actions are assigned a priority appropriate to the level of risk indicated in the company Flight Operations Risk Profile.

Appoint and educate staff The FOM Manager should appoint sufficient qualified personnel. The FOM Manager and tools provider(s) should conduct induction training. It should be customized to the airline organization and include information about the FOM system, Safety Committee (or Safety Management Body) and the responsibilities of all employees in the team. The training should cover new technology or equipment and changes in flight operations induced by the program. Keeping the FOM team informed and educated about current safety issues (through providing relevant literature and sending them to FOM related courses and seminars) improves the safety standard of your organization.

THE ONGOING PROCESS The ongoing FOM process, independently of its complexity, can be broken down into three basic steps: Measurement, Analysis and Corrective / Preventive Actions. This process is a continual and iterative one, and all activities will likely be occurring simultaneously.

Now we will review an ongoing process in which the hazard identification is based on two complementary channels: Flight Data Monitoring and Crew Observation.


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Flight Data Monitoring Channel Measurement

The Measurement step of the Flight Data Monitoring Channel can be split into three substeps: 1. Data acquisition 2. Data recording & storage 3. Data retrieval or transmission

Data Acquisition

In this substep, the data acquisition unit collects flight parameters from the aircraft systems and sensors. Then, the data acquisition unit converts the data into digital format for output to the flight data recorder (FDR) and also to second recorder. It is this second recorder, which provides the data for the aircraft condition monitoring.

Data Recording & Storage

Once the flight data are converted they are sent to a device where it is recorded and stored onboard the aircraft. The most utilized devices are the "quick access recorders" (QAR) using either a removable magneto-optical disks or PCMCIA card to record data. Another option for recording and storage is a wireless QAR that is a fully automated system and transmits data automatically via mobile telephone networks.

Data Retrieval or Transmission

In this sub-stage the flight data is transferred from the recording device onboard the aircraft to an analysis workstation. Depending on the recording device used, this happens in one of two ways:

• Manual retrieval and return of physical media to and from the aircraft in order to transfer the data to an analysis facility. Retrieval is usually done between 1 to 5 days depending of the data recording media.

• Automatic, wireless transmission from a wireless recorder to the analysis facility after the aircraft is at the gate (transmission happens automatically from anywhere in the world when the required infrastructure is in place).

Analysis The Analysis step of Flight Data Monitoring can be split into two substeps:

1. Events identification 2. Information Reporting

Events identification

The primary goal of the Analysis step is to identify any events or deviations from predefined limits ("excedences") that may have occurred during flight. These limits are determined by the combination of the aircraft limitations and the operator's flight operations procedures. Since there can be over 150 such events that must be checked for every flight, computer analysis software is used to scan for events where trigger values may have been exceeded. A the end of this substep qualified Flight Operation Analysts and System Engineer eliminate flight or events which are irrelevant (recorder or sensor problems, etc.) in order to not to populate the database with illogical events. Events that have been identified are stored for further analysis, in accordance with operator policy.

Information Reporting

In this substep the analysis software generates reports that yield statistical information, trend analysis, and risk assessment on a routine, periodic basis. If a third party has done the analysis and prepared reports these are sent electronically to the operator to assist them in interpreting flight data. Turning data into information is where the real value resides.


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Flight Observation Channel Measurement

The Measurement step of the Crew Observation Channel can be split into two substeps: 1. Data Acquisition 2. Data Recording

Data Acquisition

Two means are utilised to gather information for the database. Either a qualified Observer rides in the cockpit, or the flying pilots themselves report events that require active management. Unobtrusively the observers record the threats and errors that affect the flight as a series of "bullet points".

Data Recording After the flight the Observer enters his data in dedicated software by means of specific "keywords" for various aspects of the flight. If the pilots themselves have a report the data is likewise entered into the database by trained personnel.

Analysis During this step the data is processed with the dedicated software, which yield a series of weighted scores in each operational category. Keywords are sorted to highlight areas of operational concern. The frequency of the keywords indicates the magnitude of the CRM and/or operational problems. Statistical information and trend analysis can be traced by reference to the reports that are programmed to be generated on demand.

Actions - correctives & preventives The receipt of the reports by the Safety Committee or Flight Safety Officer is not the final stage in the FOM process, but is a critical one, as the reports empower the Safety Committee / FSO by giving the necessary information to improve the overall operational safety of their operations. A Safety Committee or group led by the FSO and comprising relevant flight personnel, analysts and working parties (maintenance, ground operations, rostering, etc.), can now review key issues and events, confirm their validity, and further investigate the circumstances surrounding these events, should this prove desirable. The involvement of the pilots of the aircraft at the time of the event greatly improves the value of the information. The full participation of the pilots and any other personnel involved in the operation of the flight is a requirement for good insight into events. There should be no fear of recrimination so that an open and non-punitive investigation can ensue. With the information gained from the Line Operations Assessment System , an operator now has the means to provide meaningful feedback and make decisions that improve flight safety. Critical safety areas within the airline such as flight operations, flight training, maintenance, engineering, as well as functions outside the organization such as air traffic control, airports, and manufacturers can be informed or updated. Corrective and preventative actions can be implemented, and the effectiveness of these actions followed-up.

Getting to grips with FOM AIRBUS FOM OFFERING

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AIRBUS FOM OFFERING

SERVICES Airbus proposes a wide range of services designed to help the implementation of Flight Operation Monitoring programs. Such services are tailored to the Operator’s needs and will contribute to significantly reducing the Operator’s effort. Several types of services are offered:

• Assessment of the Airline’s needs and of possible solutions for a Flight Operations Monitoring program.

• Training for Safety and Flight Operations Monitoring Managers. • Assistance in the implementation of Flight Operations Monitoring programs.

FOM assessment Overview

FOM assessment gives a clear view of current airline operation, the organization, skills, methods and tools already in place, or required.

It includes the following activities:

• A presentation of FOM concepts and tools to key airline personnel • Review of the Airlines Flight Operations Monitoring and Safety Policy • Methods and means for Flight data monitoring • Methods and means for Airline incident reporting tools • Methods and means for crew observation • Review of risk assessment and reporting process • Communication on lessons learned and on the impact of action taken

It is a 5-days on-site service performed by an AIRBUS FOM engineer and by an AIRBUS pilot from the FOM team.

Documentation supplied to the airline

• Getting to grips with Flight Operations Monitoring • Assessment Report that provides:

- Status of the Airlines Flight Operations Monitoring situation. - Proposal of an Action Plan to enhance the situation, if needed.

Safety & FOM training This training is designed for Regulatory Authorities and Safety and Flight Operations Managers. It includes definition and management of the implementation of Flight Operations Monitoring system in an airline, based on the AIRBUS philosophy, methods and experience. It is a 4-day training provided in the Toulouse Training Center by Airbus FOM experts including pilots and engineers.

AIRBUS FOM OFFERING Getting to grips with FOM

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The training covers the following items:

• General overview of accident Prevention • AIRBUS FOM concept • Flight Operations Monitoring and Safety regulations • Flight Operations Monitoring (Company organization and skills) • FOM tools presentation (Flight Data Monitoring, Crew Observation and Safety reporting) • Risk assessment and situation awareness • Lessons learned-Identification and Implementation • Airline operational experience on FOM

FOM follow-up This assistance is addressed to the airline pilots and analysts, who will participate in the FOM program. After 3 months of data processing with AirFASE (at least 200 flights are required) AIRBUS proposes the following:

• Detailed presentation of the flight profiles. • Assistance for the first Flight Data Analysis - How to verify the events raised in AirFASE. • Statistical reporting preparation and subsequent interpretation. • Customization of key values and reporting with the engineer.

It is a 5-day on-site service performed by an AIRBUS FOM engineer and by an AIRBUS FOM pilot. The objective is to support the first step of AirFASE data interpretation, and to optimize the use of AirFASE applications to get accurate results and make pertinent risk assessment. This service is highly recommended to the operators implementing AirFASE to alleviate any implementation problems.

FOM operational support The FOM operational support is tailored according to the FOM assessment results and benefits from AIRBUS operational and technical expertise. It includes:

• FOM engineering assistance performed by a FOM engineer. The engineer helps the Airlines IT, Operational, Safety and Maintenance Departments in the design and implementation of the FOM program.

• FOM pilot assists the airline's pilot with the interpretation of flight data, supports the decision-making processes and the implementation of adequate corrective and preventive actions.

This operational support is highly recommended to guarantee a smooth and efficient implementation of the FOM program.

Assisted FDM For Airlines who do not want to implement in-house Flight Data Monitoring software, Airbus can propose the services of independent companies. The selected company processes the flight data provided by the Airline, analyzes it, and delivers regular reports to the Airline. For the purpose of operational analysis validation access to the AIRFASE reporting and analysis module can be provided by the selected company with appropriate security protection. The selected companies use the Airbus AirFASE tool and Airbus FOM methodology. The proposed services allow the Airline to implement the Airbus FOM concept with the support of the company selected by the Airline.


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SOFTWARE TOOLS AirFASE Overview

Jointly developed and supported by Teledyne Controls and Airbus, AirFASE® (Flight Analysis and Safety Explorer) offers a comprehensive measurement, analysis, and reporting tool that can benefit all types of aircraft operators. Designed to meet the most demanding requirements for FDM (Flight Data Monitoring) - part of FOM (Flight Operations Monitoring) and FOQA (Flight Operations Quality Assurance) - AirFASE® translates the data collected from an aircraft into meaningful information. By accurately processing and analyzing flight data, AirFASE® allows operators to evaluate flight operations trends, identify risk precursors, and make information-based decisions to enhance operations and increase safety. AirFASE® performs all the major functions of the flight data monitoring process, including data processing, flight analysis and reporting, and flight data animation. AirFASE® Transcription Program decodes the recorded data and translates the information into engineering values. A sophisticated Flight Analysis Program (FAP) enables to quickly and easily reconstruct the flight, compare the recorded data with the recommended values retrieved from the flight profile, and highlight abnormal events and deviations. Advanced AirFASE® Visualization Tools, including 3D animation and Airport Visualisation, allow for the easy replay and review of flight information, while a powerful and user-configurable Reporting Module provides a suite of comprehensive and customizable reports. To ensure data security, AirFASE® has the capability to de-identify flight data, leaving the de-identified fields only viewable by authorized users. AirFASE® supports a wide range of data recording devices and can virtually handle all types of recording media available on the market today.

Key Functions Data Processing

Transcription of raw flight data into engineering values. Comparison between recorded flight data and flight profile specifications (flight profiles are determined by combining engine type, aircraft, and flight procedures characteristics). Detection and Validation of abnormal events and deviations. Database Loading: once validated, the event data is automatically stored in a SQL event database in order to be further analyzed. Data De-identification. Secure Data Access & Storage.


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Flight Analysis

Flight Data and Events Views: the events and flight parameters may be viewed in a numerical or/and graphical format

Flight Path: graphical views of altitude/distance, geographical flare & geometric path, aircraft position, synchronized with graphic representations of color-coded deviations. Statistical Analysis of the events, such as events by phase of flights, single deviation events, combined events, risks detection events, etc.

Categorization: of the events based on their level of severity (from yellow to red for low to high severity).

Flight Data Animation

Cockpit-like Instrument Display: replays flight parameters as seen on the cockpit instruments by the pilot. Interactive 360º 3D Animation: 3-dimensional views of the aircraft and its environment, with zoom and flight path trace views. Special Close-ups for critical phases of flights, such as 3000 ft to touchdown, landing and roll out, etc. VCR Type Replay , plus second-by-second manual Forward and Back. All functions are synchronized to all graphs through cursors.

Reporting Ready-to-use Reports: automatic access to standard reports, such as overall data statistics reports, trends reports, airport statistics reports etc. Report Editor: allows users to create customized reports that can be printed or displayed on the screen. Automatic periodic reports in MS Word™ Format Data Exporting to other software applications


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LOAS - Line Operations Assessment System What is it designed for?

LOAS is an observation system, which is designed to assess routine line operations, from dispatch to post flight using either qualified observers, or flying pilots to monitor cockpit, cabin, maintenance and ground crews. Flight crew observation on continual basis provides airlines with valuable information to improve procedures and training as well as compliment Flight Data Monitoring (e.g. AirFASE).

How does it work? Observations are performed by trained observers, or by the flying pilots themselves, and the threats that affect the aircraft or the errors made that have an effect on the aircraft operation are annotated and after flight are recorded in dedicated software. The areas encompassed are: 1. Flight crew response 2. Operational Support 3. Cabin and Cabin crew 4. Operating Environment (Ramp Operations, enroute facilities such as Navigation aids,

Taxiway and Runway condition, and ATC handling and communications)

LOAS was conceived as a flight operations management system using a four-point scoring scale for selected parameters. The criteria for grading each parameter are established in:

• The aircraft operational documentation, • Appropriate industry practice established by ICAO and JAA (JAR-OPS) • Specific company practices published in the company Flight Operations Manual.

The grading is complemented by the use of specific key words for each item graded. Then, the total grades are processed with LOAS software, which yield a series of weighted scores in each operational category. Keywords are also sorted to highlight areas of operational concern. The frequency of the keywords indicates the magnitude of the CRM and/or operational problems.


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What are the benefits of operating this system? Periodic crew observations using LOAS enable the continual monitoring of line operations complementing the Flight Data Monitoring system. The LOAS program is run in-house by the airline. As there are no external costs (apart from the licence fee) it can be run on a continual basis. As opposed to an Audit which only gives a snapshot of a situation the LOAS program allows for a continual insight into an airlines operation and thus a trend analysis can be performed.


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ONBOARD FLIGHT DATA MONITORING

What is it designed for? On-board Flight Data Monitoring (OFDM) is a concept invented and developed by Airbus. It is aimed at providing the pilots, right after engines shutdown, with the appropriate data, which they can then use to contribute to the analysis of the flight. As it was already said, Flight Data Monitoring tells WHAT happened, only to the extent of identifying exceedances from a standard flight profile. It does not tell WHY, it happened. The analysis needs the expertise of the Flight Operation Analyst. In addition, the contribution of the crew is essential. The problem is that the pilots are not always aware of an event having been triggered during their flight. And if they think it was the case, their understanding of the facts is most of the time shady. It is due to the limitations inherent of the human brain. In many of the flight situations where an exceedance occurs, and because the pilot brain capacity of processing flight data (the cognitive process) is limited to less than 10 parameters (7 to 8 at best), it is difficult for the pilots to report the actual values of numerous parameters which are necessary for the understanding of the facts. This is even more difficult because of the dynamics of such a situation, the pilot brain being often close to cognitive saturation. In the standard FDM process, it takes much of time (often several weeks) before a crew can be asked to give its contribution to the analysis of the flight. The memory of the facts is then obviously downgraded. Even when a pilot is spontaneously reporting, the quality of his report is also limited by the very nature of this cognitive process and its limitations.

How does it work? After engines shutdown an on-board Airfase (Airbus FDM software) engine will process the raw data and produce a file (called a “loms” file), transforming the raw data in engineering values, identifying deviations and grading the severity of them (the highest severity is colour coded in red).

The crew can then replay this file on the Onboard Information Terminal (OIT) in a AirFASE flight replay type of interface.

Here will be displayed the red events of the flight (if any), and he’ll be able to precisely locate the events during the flight, reading the actual values of the parameters. For this he can use the parameters window. The crew has the possibility of printing the events, or to export the file to a debriefing room on the ground.

What are the benefits of operating this system? The confidentiality is enforced by an auto erasure of the file after a countdown defaulted at 20’ (the pilot should not have to stay in the cockpit for too long a time after the flight), or by erasure at any time on pilots’ decision. Thus, pilots will be given critical information to better analyze the events: They will be able clarify their own cognition of events, they will avoid misinterpretation, they will avoid


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discrepancies in their analysis. Hence OFDM is helping to circumvent many of the above-mentioned cognitive limitations. Using OFDM right after engines shutdown leaves the history of the flight fresh in pilot’s memory. Thanks to OFDM we may expect an enhanced reporting by pilots: It should be more systematic (more frequent), and of a much better quality. Ultimately, it will improve the FDM analysis process, significantly enhancing the understanding of the facts. With OFDM, Airbus is pioneering in the field of proactive safety.

Getting to grips with FOM FURTHER INFORMATION

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FURTHER INFORMATION

AIRBUS Flight Profiles Specifications AirFASE User's Guide Event Analysis Guidelines AIRBUS Flight Safety Manager’s handbook AIRBUS Operations Policy Manual, chapters 2.03 Accident Prevention

FURTHER INFORMATION Getting to grips with FOM

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INTENTIONALLY BLANK

Flight Operations Support & Services



Septemlbre 2007

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Proprietary document.

By taking delivery of this Brochure (hereafter“Brochure”), you accept on behalf of your com-pany to comply with the following: .No otherproperty rights are granted by the delivery of thisBrochure than the right to read it, for the sole pur-pose of information. This Brochure, its content,illustrations and photos shall not be modified norreproduced without prior written consent ofAirbus S.A.S. This Brochure and the materials itcontains shall not, in whole or in part, be sold,rented, or licensed to any third party subject topayment or not. This Brochure may contain mar-ket-sensitive or other information that is correctat the time of going to press. This informationinvolves a number of factors which could changeover time, affecting the true public representa-tion. Airbus assumes no obligation to update anyinformation contained in this document or withrespect to the information described herein. Thestatements made herein do not constitute anoffer or form part of any contract. They are basedon Airbus information and are expressed in goodfaith but no warranty or representation is givenas to their accuracy. When additional informationis required, Airbus S.A.S can be contacted to pro-vide further details. Airbus S.A.S shall assume noliability for any damage in connection with theuse of this Brochure and the materials it con-tains, even if Airbus S.A.S has been advised ofthe likelihood of such damages. This licence isgoverned by French law and exclusive jurisdic-tion is given to the courts and tribunals ofToulouse (France) without prejudice to the right ofAirbus to bring proceedings for infringement ofcopyright or any other intellectual property rightin any other court of competent jurisdiction.

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SEPTEMBER 2007PRINTED IN FRANCEREFERENCE A237/07© AIRBUS S.A.S. 2007

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