first amended petition of quo warranto

8/14/2019 First Amended Petition of Quo Warranto

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STATE OF MICHIGAN

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF MICHIGAN,

ex relatione BEVERLY TRAN,Petitioner,

CASE NO:

v.

WILLIAM J. JOHNSON,SUPERINTENDENT,MICHIGAN CHILDREN’S INSTITUTE, et al.

Respondent,

ADDITIONAL PARTIES:

JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM, GOVERNOR;

JOHN D. CHERRY, LEUITENANT GOVERNOR;MICHAEL A. COX, ATTORNEY GENERAL;TERRY LYNN LAND, SECRETARY OF STATE;

JAMES R. STOKES, DIRECTOR OF APPOINTMENTS;ISMEAL AHMED, DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES;MARILYN KELLY, SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE;

MAURA CORRIGAN, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE;

KATHERINE HANLEY, DIRECTOR OF ADOPTIONS;

JEREMY S. STEPHENS, STATE PERSONNEL DIRECTOR;

And THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Real Party in Interest.

BEVERLY TRAN,

Private Attorney Generalon behalf of THE STATE

OF MICHIGAN

8437 LumpkinHamtramck, MI 48212313-522-8213

Michael A. Cox

Attorney General

Thomas L. Casey (P24215)

Solicitor General

Michigan Department of Attorney General

Attorney for Michigan Department of Human Services,

Michigan Children’s Institute

P.O. Box 30758Lansing, MI 48909

(517) 373-7700

FIRST AMENDED APPLICATION FOR WRIT IN THE NATURE OF QUO

WARRANTO

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES…...........................................................................................3

QUESTIONS PRESENTED………………………………………………………………7

FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO…………………...8

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES…………..…………………….19

STATEMENT OF FACTS………………………………………………………………19

A. When Was MCI Created ………………………………..…………..…………19

B. When MCI Was Modified …………...………………………………………...21

C. Why MCI Was Modified ……………...……………………………………….23

D. Lack of Administrative Oversight ………...…………………………………..26

E. The MCI and Supreme Court Partnership…………………...……………….30

F. Major Implications…………………………..…………………….………….33

ARGUMENTS………………………………………………………………..…………34

I. RELATOR TRAN HAS THE RIGHT, DUTY, AND AUTHORITY TOBRING AN ACTION IN QUO WARRANTO BEFORE THIS COURT IN

RESPONSE TO THE ULTRA VIRES ACTS OF THESUPERINTENDENT OF MCI……………………………..................…37

II. THE MCI SUPERINTENDENT WILLIAM J. JOHNSON IS ANARTIFICIAL PERSON AND THEREFORE IS REPUGNANT TO THECONSTITUTION OF MICHIGAN……………………………………..39

III. THE MCI SUPERINTENDENT WILLIAM J. JOHNSON HASUSURPED THE POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT………………...42

a. Usurpation of the Powers of the Governor ………………….……….42

b. Usurpation of the Powers of the Attorney General ……………...…..43

c. Usurpation of the Powers of the Court ………………………………47

CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………….………….51



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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Carleton v. People, 10 M. 250………………………………………………….….……40

DeRose v DeRose, 469 Mich. 320; 666 N.W. 2d 636, (2003)…………………….…….33

Diggs v. State, 49 Ala. 311……………………………………………………..………..40

Erwim v. Jersey City, 60 N. J. L. 141……………………………………………………41

In re Cotton, 1994 Mich. App 180, 526 NW 2d 601…………………………….………24

In re Miller , 433 Mich. 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161, (1989)………………………...…….33

Johnson v. Manhattan r. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 502 (1933)…………………….…………..37

King v. Dep't of Human Servs. (in Re Bell), 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 727(Mich. Ct. App., Mar. 15, 2007) …………………………………………...….…31, 34,30

Newsom v. State, 922 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. App. Austin 1996)………….…………………37

People v. Parsons, 728 N.W. 2d 62 (2007)……………….…………………………31, 27

Pulskamp v. Martinez , 2 Cal. App. 4th 854, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 607 (2d Dist. 1992)….…….37

Rastall v. DeBouse, 736 A. 2d 756 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999)…………………………….37

Smith v. Dillion, 267 A.D. 39, 44 N.Y.S.2d 719 (3d Dep’t 1943);………………………33

State v. Carroll , 38 Conn. 449…………………………………………………..……….40

State ex rel. Angelini v. Hardberger , 932 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1996)……………..………37

State ex rel. Bruce v. Kiesling, 632 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1994)……………………..……….37

State ex rel. Cain v. Kay, 309 N.E.2d 860 (1974)………………………………………..38

State ex rel. Stenberg v. Murphy, 247 Neb. 358, 527 N.W.2d 185 (1995)………………37

United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508…………………………………………………40

Wayne Auditors v. Benoit , 20 M. 176……………………………………………………41



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STATUTES

15 U.S.C. 15 (c)………………………………………………………………...………..44

Mich. Cont. Article 2 § 7………………………………………………………..……….33

Mich. Cont. Article 3 § 2……………………………………………………….………..42

Mich. Cont. Article 3 § 6…….…………………………………………………………..27

Mich. Cont. Article 5 § 1………………………………………………………..………...9

Mich. Cont. Article 5 § 3……………………………….……………………........9, 12, 43

Mich. Cont. Article 5 § 8…………….………………………………………..………....15

Mich. Cont. Article 5 § 25…………….………………………………………..………...9

Mich. Cont. Article 6 § 3…………………………………………………………….13, 30

Mich. Cont. Article 6 § 27……………………………………………………………….30

Mich. Cont. Article 6 § 29……………………………………………………………….13

Mich. Cont. Article 11 § 5……………………………………………………….………16

Mich. Cont. Schedule § 1………………………………………………………………...11

MCL 3.711……………………………………………………………………………….24

MCL 4.84………………………………………………………………………….....10, 13

MCL 14.28……………………………………………………………………………….11

MCL 14.101……………………………………………………………………………...11

MCL 16.103…………………………………………………………………………...…21

MCL 16.107………………………………………………………………………...……22

MCL 16.553………………………………………………………………..….....22, 23, 33

MCL 21.171…………………………………………………..………………………….32

MCL 333.18504………………………………………………...……………………30, 33



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MCL 333.18509…………………………………………………………...…………28, 29

MCL 400.1……………………………………………………………………………….16

MCL 400.2…………………………………………………………..………..19, 21, 22, 38

MCL 400.3……………………………………………………………………………….16

MCL 400.202………………………………………………..………….………..19, 20, 42

MCL 400.207………………………………………………………..………...…32, 39, 40

MCL 400.209…………………………………………………………….………………25

MCL 400.215……………………………………………………………….…...……….21

MCL 400.216…………………………………………………………………………….21

MCL 400.221…………………………………………………………………………….24

MCL 450.2101 - 450.3192……………………………………………………………….45

MCL 556.112…………………………………………………………………………….23

MCL 600.219…………………………………………………………………………….14

MCL 400.221…………………………………………………………………………….24

MCL 600.4501………………………………………………………..………………….38

MCL 600.4505………………………………………………………...…………………38

MCL 710.45………………………………………………………..…...……30, 37, 42, 47

MCL 712A.19b…………………………………………………………………………..25

MCL 722.131 -722.140……………………………………………………...………48, 49

MCL 722.621-722.638…………………………………………..………………………44

COURT RULES

MCR 2.102(C)…………………………………………………………………………….7

MCR 2.105…………………………..………………………..9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17



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MCR 2.203(A)……………………………………………………...……7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12

MCR 2.613(C)……………………………………………………..…………………….33

MCR 3.306……………………………………………………………………………….38

MCR 7.212(C)(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)………………………...……………………..30

MCR 7.203(C)(4)…………………………………………………………………………8

RULES

R 338.2907 -2909 et seq……………………………………………..………………28, 50

EXECUTIVE ORDERS

E.R.O. No. 1991-8………………………………………………………………….……24

E.R.O. No. 2004-4…………………………………………………………….…………16

EXHIBITS

Grant of Leave by Attorney General Cox, February 27, 2009…………………………..54

MCI Ward Adoption Consent Process CFA 820, March 1, 2009………………………..55

DHS Expedited Consent Criteria, March 1, 2009….........................................................56

MCI Expedited Consent CFA 850, March 1, 2009………………………………………57



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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. DOES RELATOR TRAN HAVE THE RIGHT, DUTY, AND AUTHORITY

TO BRING AN ACTION IN QUO WARRANTO BEFORE THIS COURT INRESPONSE TO THE ULTRA VIRES ACTS OF THE SUPERINTENDENT

OF MCI?

2. IS THE MCI SUPERINTENDENT AN ARTIFICIAL PERSON, THUS

BEING REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF MICHIGAN?

3. HAS THE MCI SUPERINTENDENT WILLIAM J. JOHNSON USURPED

THE POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT?



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FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF QUO WARRANTO

HERE COMES, Petitioner, State of Michigan, ex relatione, Beverly Tran,

citizen of the State of Michigan and Private Attorney General (hereinafter “Relator

Tran”), having been granted leave to proceed by the Attorney General Cox to bring forth

this First Amended Petition, pursuant to MCR 2.102(C) and MCR 7.203(C)(4), to apply

for issuance of Writ of Quo Warranto to Michigan Children’s Institute (hereinafter

“MCI”) Superintendent, William J. Johnson, and all other relief which this Court deems

just and proper.

Relator Tran respectfully petitions this Court to grant the Writ of Quo Warranto and

doing so, order William J. Johnson forward to justify the position of MCI Superintendent

and his ultra vires acts. These acts include:

1. Violating the Constitution of the Michigan;

2. Usurping the power of the Governor;

3. Usurping the power of the Attorney General;

4. Usurping the power of the Courts.

Relator Tran, also, respectfully petitions this Court to grant compulsory joiner of her

claims pursuant to MCR 2.203(A) and doing so, order William J. Johnson forward to

produce certification of the superintending control of MCI, including:

1. Public policies and administrative rules;

2. Any and all evaluations and performance reports;

3. Annual budgetary reports;

4. Identification of internal controls;

5. Decision Making Models;



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6. Any and all information on the Michigan Children’s Institute Trust Fund;

7. Protocol for application and/or retention of Social Security numbers of adoptive

children;

8. The number of child abuse and neglect incidents of state wards committed to

MCI;

9. The number of referrals to Child Protective Services of abused and neglected state

wards committed to MCI;

10. The number of referrals made to the Attorney General or County Prosecutor for

false claims, child abuse or neglect, and death of wards committed to MCI;

11. Terms and conditions of the position of Superintendent;

12. Autobiographical statement submitted to the Senate for the 2002-2006 and 2006-

2010 terms;

13. Letters of appointment from the Governor;

14. Certificates of appointment filed in the Repository of the Great Seal;

15. Oaths of Office;

16. Employment contract, state pension, and benefit contracts;

17. Specification of his fiduciary duties in Wayne County;

18. Policies of failed adoption decisions;

19. The length of time and number of failed adoptions;

20. Duties and responsibilities of the MCI Superintendent in the process of interstate

adoptions.

In addition, Relator Tran, also, respectfully petitions this Court to grant compulsory

joiner of her claims pursuant to MCR 2.203(A) and doing so, order Governor Jennifer M.



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Granholm (hereinafter “Governor”) forward to produce the certificate of appointment of

MCI Superintendent for her 2002-2006 and 2006-2010 terms of Office, and to produce

the official organizational chart of the Office of the Governor chart for her 2002-2006

and 2006-2010 terms of said Office.


joiner of her claims pursuant to MCR 2.203(A) and doing so, order the Governor forward

to produce the Executive Orders and Certificates authorizing the transfer of parens

patriea from the Attorney General to the MCI Superintendent, for his 2002-2006 and

2006-2010 terms of said Office.

Pursuant to Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution of Michigan of 1963, the

executive power of the State is vested in the Governor. Pursuant to Article V, Section 8

of the Constitution of Michigan of 1963, the Governor is responsible for ensuring that all

executive departments and agencies within the State, including MCI, faithfully execute

and comply with applicable state law. Governor Granholm maintains her principal South

Eastern Office of the Governor at 3022 W. Grand Blvd., Cadillac Place, Suite 14-150,

Detroit, MI 48202, where she may be served, pursuant to MCR 2.105.


joiner of her claims pursuant to MCR 2.203(A) and doing so, order Lieutenant Governor

John D. Cherry (hereinafter “Lieutenant Governor”) forward to produce the letters of

advice and consent of the Senate of the appointment of the MCI Superintendent and

biographical questionnaires presented to the Senate of MCI Superintendent for his 2002-

2006 and 2006-2010 terms of said Office.



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joiner of her claims pursuant to MCR 2.203(A) and doing so, order Lieutenant Governor

forward to produce the letters of advice and consent of the transfer of parens patriea

from the Attorney General to the MCI Superintendent, for his 2002-2006 and 2006-2010

terms of said Office.


presidential power of the Senate is vested in the Lieutenant Governor. The Lieutenant

Governor is responsible for executing gubernatorial functions in the absence of the

Governor and serves as a member of the State Administrative Board.

Pursuant to MCL 4.84 the oath of office may be administered by, and taken and

subscribed before the Lieutenant Governor. Lieutenant Governor Cherry, by the principal

South Eastern Office of the Governor at 3022 W. Grand Blvd., Cadillac Place, Suite 14-

150, Detroit, MI 48202, may be served, pursuant to MCR 2.105.


joiner of her claims pursuant to MCR 2.203(A) and doing so, order Attorney General

Michael A. Cox, (hereinafter “Attorney General”) forward to produce the Action

Transmittals of the Office of Attorney General on the representation of the MCI

Superintendent, and Official Opinions of the capacity of representation of the MCI

Superintendent, and Official Opinions of the contemporaneous representation of the MCI

Superintendent in the Executive and the Judicial Branches of the State.


joiner of her claims pursuant to MCR 2.203(A) and doing so, order Attorney General

forward to produce the Official Opinions and Certificates of the transfer of parens



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patriea from the Attorney General to the MCI Superintendent, for his 2002-2006 and

2006-2010 terms of said Office.


Attorney General is the single executive heading the Department of the Attorney General.

Pursuant to the Section 28 of the Revised Statute of 1846, MCL § 14.28 et seq. the

Attorney General shall: prosecute and defend all actions, in which the State and/or the

people shall be interested. The Attorney General is responsible for ensuring that all

executive departments and agencies within the State, including MCI Department,

faithfully execute and comply with applicable federal and state law. The Attorney

General duties and responsibilities include, but not limited to: Consumer Protection and

Criminal Prosecutions Bureau; and the Child and Family Services Bureau.

Pursuant to Schedule § 1 of Constitution of Michigan, the Attorney General “shall

recommend to the legislature as soon as practicable such changes as may be necessary to

adapt existing laws to this Constitution.”

Pursuant to Section 1 of the Intervention of the Attorney General, MCL §14.101, the

Attorney General of the State is authorized and empowered to intervene in any court of

the state to protect the right and interest of the people and the state. Additional powers

and duties are vested in the Attorney General in Public Employment, Elections and Tort

Division and Education and Social Services Division. The Attorney General maintains

his principal South Eastern Office of the Governor at 3022 W. Grand Blvd., Cadillac

Place, Suite 10-200, Detroit, MI 48202, where he may be served, pursuant to MCR 2.105.


joiner of her claims pursuant to MCR 2.203(A) and doing so, order the Secretary of State



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Terry Lynn Land, (hereinafter “Secretary of State”) forward to produce from the Official

Repository of Office of the Great Seal the letters of appointment of William J. Johnson as

the MCI Superintendent, letter of appointment of the Certificate of Authority as Notary

Public, and letter of appointment of the Apostille of the MCI Superintendent.



forward to produce any and all records of public election of the MCI Superintendent.



forward to produce the from the Official Repository of the Office of the Great Seal

Official Filings and Certificates of the transfer of parens patriea from the Attorney

General to the MCI Superintendent, for his 2002-2006 and 2006-2010 terms of said

Office.


Secretary of State is the single executive heading the Department of the Secretary of

State.

The Secretary of State maintains a branch Office at 3046 W. Grand Blvd., Cadillac

Place, Detroit, MI 48202, where she may be served, pursuant to MCR 2.105.


joiner of her claims pursuant to MCR 2.203(A) and doing so, order Supreme Court

Justice Maura Corrigan, (hereinafter “Justice Corrigan”) forward to produce

documentation of any and all public appearances, including the transcripts, campaign



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material, disclosure of any and all public and private memberships, and publications,

thereof, pertaining to the MCI Superintendent.

Pursuant to MCL 4.84 the oath of office may be administered by, and taken and

subscribed before any Supreme Court Justice.

Pursuant to Article VI, Section 29 of the Constitution of Michigan of 1963, Justice

Corrigan is empowered to be a conservator of the peace. Justice Corrigan maintains an

Office at 3044 W. Grand Blvd., Cadillac Place, Detroit, MI 48202, where she may be

served, pursuant to MCR 2.105.


joiner of her claims pursuant to MCR 2.203(A) and doing so, order Supreme Court Chief

Justice Marilyn Kelly, (hereinafter “Chief Justice”) forward to produce any and all State

Court Administrative Memoranda, Supreme Court Administrative Orders and letters of

appointment of the MCI Superintendent, including any and all documents authorizing the

transfer of parens patriea from the Attorney General to the MCI Superintendent.

Pursuant to Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution of Michigan of 1963, the Chief

Justice is the Chief Administrator of the Courts and is responsible for the administering

of the state’s district courts, its judges, Court Improvement Program, Child Welfare

Services, MCI, and the Foster Care Review Board, to faithfully execute and comply with

applicable state law. Pursuant to Section 219 of the Revised Judicature MCL § 600.219,

the Supreme Court has a general superintending control over all inferior courts to

facilitate the proper administration of justice. The Chief Justice maintains an Office at

3044 W. Grand Blvd., Cadillac Place, Detroit, MI 48202, where she may be served,

pursuant to MCR 2.105.



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joiner of her claims pursuant to MCR 2.203(A) and doing so, order Director of

Appointments James R. Stokes, (hereinafter “Director of Appointments”) forward to

produce the letters of appointment of the MCI Superintendent for 2002-2006 and 2006-

2010 terms of the Governor.


Governor transacts business with the Director of Appointments. The Director of

Appointments, through the Office of the Governor at 3022 W. Grand Blvd., Cadillac

Place Suite 14-150, Detroit, MI 48202, may be served, pursuant to MCR 2.105.


joiner of her claims pursuant to MCR 2.203(A) and doing so, order Director of Adoptions

Katherine Hanley, (hereinafter “Director of Adoptions”) forward to produce any and all

documents pertaining to the duties and obligations of the MCI Superintendent, including,

in detail, the fiduciary relationship between the Director of Adoptions and the MCI

Superintendent, and all interdepartmental policies and procedures.


Governor transacts business with the Director of Adoptions. Director of Adoptions

through the office of the Director of the Department of Human Services, 3040 W. Grand

Blvd., Detroit, Michigan 48202, may be served, pursuant to MCR 2.105.


joiner of her claims pursuant to MCR 2.203(A) and doing so, order Director of the

Department of Human Services Ismeal Ahmed, (hereinafter “Director of DHS”) forward



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to produce the certificate of appointment of MCI Superintendent for 2002-2006 and

2006-2010 terms of the Governor, to produce the official organizational chart of the

DHS, and to produce any and all documents pertaining to the duties and obligations of

the MCI Superintendent.


joiner of her claims pursuant to MCR 2.203(A) and doing so, order the Director of DHS

forward to produce the Official Filings and Certificates of the transfer of parens patriea

from the Attorney General to the MCI Superintendent.

As Director, he is responsible for the general supervision and operation of DHS and

the Wayne County DHS office, including oversight of the operations of the MCI.

Pursuant to Section 400.3 of the Social Welfare Act, MCL § 400.1 et seq. and

Executive Reorganization Order E.R.O. No. 2004-4, Director Ahmed is responsible for

administering all DHS child welfare services and program, assuring that all such services

and programs operate in conformity with constitutional, statutory, and regulatory

requirements. Director Ahmed maintains an office at the Department of Human Services,

3040 W. Grand Blvd., Detroit, Michigan 48202, where he may be served, pursuant to

MCR 2.105.


joiner of her claims pursuant to MCR 2.203(A) and doing so, order the State Personnel

Director of the Department of Civil Service Jeremy S. Stephens, (hereinafter “DCS

Director”) forward to produce the Civil Service Commission Certification of

Qualifications, pursuant to Article 11 § 5 of the Michigan Constitution, duties and

responsibilities of the position of the MCI Superintendent, the level of civil service



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classification and rate of pay, including any and all performance reviews, pay raises,

complaints, investigations and findings, and to produce the executed contract between the

State and William J. Johnson. The DCS Director maintains an office at the Department of

Civil Service, 3042 W. Grand Blvd., Detroit, Michigan 48202, where he may be served,

pursuant to MCR 2.105.

A full hearing on the matter is necessary to expose the actions, motives and intentions

of William J. Johnson as they relate to the exercise of his position as MCI Superintendent

in accordance with the law, the legitimacy and constitutionality of the position and MCI

itself, the superintending control, and lastly, the necessity of the position and the

organization. There exists very little information on the operations, functioning and

fiscal integrity of MCI and the Superintendent himself. It is impossible to reform child

welfare and inconceivable to end false claims without total accountability and

transparency of MCI and the Superintendent.

The position of the Superintendent of MCI continues to accelerate the precipitous

climate of destroying families in the state and false claims of federal funding. As the

alleged legal parent to the children remanded to the guardianship of MCI, the

Superintendent has perpetuated a culture for abuse, neglect and murder of children to

thrive, having proven not to be qualified for the position. Because there are pending

decision for the Superintendent of MCI to render, time is of the essence. Relator Tran

respectfully requests that she be given full mandate under Michigan Rules of Civil

Procedure to present evidence and to examine witnesses.

There is no just, speedy, or adequate remedy at law other than the issuance of a Writ

of Quo Warranto. Judicial economy and sound administration of justice demand



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issuance of the Writ as this case presents a unique opportunity for the Court to clarify an

obviously important issue of law: “By What Authority” Does The Superintendent of MCI

William J. Johnson Exercise Dominion And Control Over Children Who Are Wards Of

The State.

WHEREFORE, Relator Tran makes this request upon the attached Memorandum of

Points and Authorities, all papers and pleadings on file, and any oral argument deemed

just and proper by this Court and asks that this Court issue the Writ of Quo Warranto.

WHEREFORE, Relator Tran, also, asks this Court to issue Order dismantling MCI,

transferring authority of title of parens patriea to the rightfully granted custodian, the

Attorney General.

Dated this ________ day of _________________, 2009.

____________________________________

ex rel. Beverly Tran Private Attorney General

8437 LumpkinHamtramck, MI 48212

313-522-8213 [email protected]



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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. When Was MCI Created?

Public Act 220 of 1935. MCL 400.202: In 1935, the State of Michigan enacted

legislation, MCL 400.2021, to create what is known as the Michigan Children’s Institute

(MCI). This was a brick and mortar building, residing in Coldwater, Michigan, which

housed orphans and unwanted children.

Social Welfare Commission: Subsequent amendments in 1939, MCL 400.2,

established the Social Welfare Commission2

. This was a body of 5 citizens, appointed by

1 MICHIGAN CHILDREN'S INSTITUTE (EXCERPT)

Act 220 of 1935. MCL 400.202 Children's institute; control by social welfare commission;

superintendent, officers and employees.

Sec. 2. The said Michigan children's institute shall be under the control and management of the

Michigan social welfare commission, hereinafter referred to as “the commission”, whose

appointment and duties are provided in Act No. 280 of the Public Acts of 1939, as amended, being

sections 400.1 to 400.90, inclusive, of the Compiled Laws of 1948, and as further expressly

provided for in this act. The commission shall appoint the superintendent, and such other officers

and employees as it shall deem necessary, who shall severally hold their offices and positions

during the pleasure of the commission.History: 1935, Act 220, Imd. Eff. June 8, 1935 ;-- Am. 1944, 1st Ex. Sess., Act 8, Imd. Eff. Feb. 19,

1944 ;-- CL 1948, 400.202 ;-- Am. 1955, Act 220, Eff. Oct. 14, 1955 2 THE SOCIAL WELFARE ACT (EXCERPT)

Act 280 of 1939. MCL 400.2 Michigan social welfare commission; powers and duties; appointment,

terms, and qualifications of members; governor as ex officio member; oath; removal; vacancies; conducting

business at public meeting; notice; quorum; meetings; failure to attend meetings; designation of chairperson

and vice-chairperson; compensation and expenses; availability of writings to public.

Sec. 2. (1) The administration of the powers and duties of the state department shall be vested in a

commission of 5 members which commission shall be known as the Michigan social welfare

commission. A member of the commission shall not be a member of another commission or

board, or hold another position with a state insti tution or department. Members of the commissionshall be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, for a term of

5 years each. Of the members first appointed, 1 shall be appointed for a term of 1 year, 1 for a

term of 2 years, 1 for a term of 3 years, 1 for a term of 4 years, and 1 for a term of 5 years.

(2) Members of the commission shall be citizens and residents of this state for not less than 5

years who possess and have demonstrated sincere interest, knowledge, and ability consistent with

the responsibilities of the office, and not more than 3 of whom shall be members of the same

political party. The governor shall be an ex officio member of the commission. Each member of

the commission shall qualify by taking and filing with the secretary of state the constitutional oath

of office and shall hold office until the appointment and qualification of a successor. A member of



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the governor with advice of the legislature, with duties to oversee and appoint the

Superintendent of the Michigan Children’s Institute. The authority of delegation of

powers and duties to the Michigan Children’s Institute Superintendent was originally

delineated by what was termed as Michigan Social Welfare Commission. MCL 400.202

states in pertinent part:

Sec. 2.The said Michigan children's institute shall be under the control and management of the Michigan social welfare commission, hereinafterreferred to as “the commission”, whose appointment and duties are provided in Act No. 280 of the Public Acts of 1939, as amended, beingsections 400.1 to 400.90, inclusive, of the Compiled Laws of 1948, and as further expressly provided for in this act. The commission shall appoint thesuperintendent, and such other officers and employees as it shall deemnecessary, who shall severally hold their offices and positions during the pleasure of the commission.

the commission may be removed by the governor for misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in

office, after hearing. Vacancies in the membership of the commission shall be filled for the

remainder of the unexpired term, in the same manner as the original appointment.

(3) The business which the commission may perform shall be conducted at a public meeting of the

commission held in compliance with Act No. 267 of the Public Acts of 1976, being sections

15.261 to 15.275 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. Public notice of the time, date, and place of

the meeting shall be given in the manner required by Act No. 267 of the Public Acts of 1976. A

majority of the members of the commission shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of

business. The commission shall meet on the call of the chairperson, or on a written request to the

chairperson signed by 3 members of the commission, or at times and places as are prescribed by

the rules of the commission. The commission shall hold not less than 12 meetings each fiscal

year, with an interval of not more than 1 month between meetings.

(4) The failure on the part of a member to attend 3 consecutive meetings of the commission,

unless excused by a formal vote of the commission, shall be considered by the governor as ground

for removal of the nonattending member, and upon removal, the governor may appoint a

successor. The commission shall annually designate 1 member to act as chairperson and 1 member

to act as vice-chairperson of the commission.(5) Each member of the commission shall be reimbursed for necessary travel and other expenses,

and shall be paid $15.00 per day when in actual session, to be paid in the same manner as expenses

of other state officers are paid.

(6) Except as prescribed in sections 35 and 64, a writing prepared, owned, used, in the possession

of, or retained by the commission in the performance of an official function shall be made

available to the public in compliance with Act No. 442 of the Public Acts of 1976, being sections

15.231 to 15.246 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.

History: 1939, Act 280, Imd. Eff. June 16, 1939 ;-- CL 1948, 400.2 ;-- Am. 1978, Act 224, Imd. Eff.

June 13, 1978 Popular Name: Act 280



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This statute of 1935 designated the title of superintendent because his duty was

to superintend the actual institute: the physical building and the physical inhabitants,

orphans. The institute no longer exists as a physical brick and mortar building; the

institute is now a theoretical institution. According to The Social Welfare Act, MCL

400.2, the Superintendent is to be an appointed public official from the powers of a

public body.

Sec. 2.The administration of the powers and duties of the state department shall bevested in a commission of 5 members which commission shall be known as the Michigan social welfare commission. A member of the commission shall not be

a member of another commission or board, or hold another position with astate institution or department. Members of the commission shall be appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, for a term of 5 years each. Of the members first appointed, 1 shall be appointed for a termof 1 year, 1 for a term of 2 years, 1 for a term of 3 years, 1 for a term of 4 years, and 1 for a term of 5 years.

The duties of the Superintendent were to supervise the public school institutions

where these children resided.

B. When MCI Was Modified

Removal of Land Usage of 1955: In 1955 legislation was passed, repealing MCL

400.215 and MCL 400.216, which amended the Michigan Children Institute by removing

land usage and the name “state public school”. This was a point of dismantlement of the

physical “brick and mortar institute, itself. By this time social programming was being

formulated to take over the ideology of the state housing and caring for children by

placing them within a “third degree of consanguinity or affinity” in the counties from

which they came, or restoring the child

Government Organization Act of 1965: In 1965, MCL 16.103, a Type III transfer,

transferred the administrative duties of the Superintendent to what is now called the



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Department of Human Services and, thus, the Social Welfare Commission was abolished.

Pursuant to MCL 400.2 the Michigan Court of Appeals has recognized the legitimacy of

the Michigan Children’s Institute, “The Michigan Children’s Institute is under the

control and management of the Michigan Social Welfare Commission, which is in charge

of the administration of the powers and duties of the Family Independence Agency.”

The issue of legitimacy becomes a public issue pursuant to MCL 16.553 of Public Act

380 of 1965 where the Michigan Social Welfare Commission was abolished:

“The Michigan social welfare commission and the office of director of the statedepartment of social welfare created under sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 280 of the

Public Acts of 1939, as amended, being sections 400.2 and 400.3 of the Compiled Laws of 1948, are transferred by a type III transfer to the department of social

services and the Michigan social department of social welfare are abolished.”

These type III transfers are defined pursuant to MCL 16.107 § 7(b) Public Act

380 of 1965 to specify the executive allocation and reallocation of duties and functions,

limitations, administrations, and rules:

“Except as provided by law or within this act, when any department, commissionor board or other agency is transferred by a type II or type III transfer to a

principal department, commission or board or other agency shall be

administered under the direction and supervision of the head of the principal

department. When a department, commission, board or other agency istransferred by a type II or type III transfer to a principle department all

prescribed statutory functions of rule making, licensing and registration including the prescription of rules, regulations, standards and adjudications shall be

transferred to the head of the principal department into which the department,commission, board or agency has been incorporated.”

What is remiss in this portion of the Executive Organization Act of 1965 is the

transfer of Executive powers of appointment for the position of Superintendent of the

Michigan Children’s Institute. The transfer of Executive powers to appoint the

Superintendent to represent the State of Michigan were never iterated; hence, William J.

Johnson has unconstitutionally granted consent and denied consent to adoption, devoid of



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any Executive authority of the Governor. Nowhere in MCL 16.553 is there clarification

or specificity of the transfer of powers of appointments. In accordance to MCL 556.112

§ 2 (c):

“Power of appointment means a power created or reserved by a person having property subject to his disposition which enables the donee of the power to designate,

within any limits that may be prescribed, the transferees of the property or the sharesor the interests in which it shall be received; but it does not include a power of sale, a

power of attorney or a power of amendment or revocation.”

This statute is applied as a civil designation and not one of a democratically elected

public official or as of an official granted powers by the Governor. Whereas, in respect

to these aforementioned laws, the position of the Superintendent of the Michigan

Children’s Institute is unconstitutional, making this an issue of the public.

C. Why MCI Was Modified

Governor G. Mennen Williams: Governor Williams was a staunch supporter for

dismantling commissions that were futile. His belief was to compress the functions of

government to allow greater access to citizens. During his terms of office, Governor

Williams focused energy in providing services to children to keep them in their

communities and families. This is apparent in the creation of children services for the

deaf and blind that exist to this day.

The Governor’s concern for children led him to dismantle the Social Welfare

Commission, the last annual report published in 1965. By dismantling MCI, disabled

children were no longer channeled through the institution of MCI for adoption, but were

able to remain in the family and community with availability of services.

Superintendent Richard Higley, 1975: As far as one can ascertain information of

MCI is dearth. It seems that sometime around the enactment of the 1974 Child Abuse



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Prevention Treatment Act, the state exhumed and reanimated the institution of MCI as an

administrative structure for adoption purposes by designating Richard Higley as

superintendent in 1975.

In 1978, Public Act 87, transferred of powers and duties of the Office of Children

and Youth Services as a single-purpose entity within the Department of Social Services to

the Department of Social Services, see E.R.O. No. 1991-8, compiled at MCL 400.221.

Finally, dismantling the remnants of the theoretical entity of MCI.

In 1984, The Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC), MCL 3.711 et

seq. was enacted into law stipulating that “appropriate authorities” are the actors in this

agreement between states for the placement of children. There exists no statutor y

provision for the MCI Superintendent to function in the decision making process for

interstate adoptions.

Superintendent Susan Leahy 1994: The powers of the Superintendent were

augmented In re Cotton, 1994 Mich App 180, 526 NW 2d 601, under the leadership of

Susan Leahy to implement the doctrine of “arbitrary and capricious”. This is applied to

challenge the decision of the Superintendent for adoption; it is not the “correctness” of

the decision, but if the decision was whimsical.

Superintendent William J. Johnson 1996: In 1996, William J. Johnson, took over

the helm of MCI. The intention of the Adoption and Safe Families Act is to clarify

Congress’s position regarding child welfare, including the requirement of “reasonable

efforts” and reaffirm its commitment to family preservation and reunification while

ensuring the safety of children. This Act shortens the time frames that a child may spend



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in the child welfare system and provides for increases in financial incentives for placing

children in adoptive homes.

Through the Binsfield Legislation Michigan passed the amendment to the Probate

Code of 1939 (Act 288 of 1939) that set a timeline for Termination of Parental Rights as

12 months, MCL 712A.19b3

in 2001. The federal government had already set a timeline

that ranged from 15 to 22 months for Termination of Parental Rights to be filed.

Michigan strongly departed from federally established policy for family preservation by

severely reducing the timeframe for parents to obtain assistance for reunification,

expanding the powers of the Superintendent. A point of departure was established for the

increase in the number of children being placed under the authority of the Superintendent,

as well as the causal linkage of uncapped federal funding being received under Social

Security Title IV-E.

Amendments to MCL 400.209, Public Act 470 of 2004 states in pertinent part:

(2) On the effective date of the amendatory act that added this subsection, the

family independence agency shall discontinue the Michigan children's institute preliminary consent denial review process. (emphasis added.)

Inasmuch as the entire decision making process is unknown being non-accessible

to the public, it becomes impossible to ascertain to exactly what is or is not the

“preliminary consent denial review process”, thusly making it arbitrary and capricious for

3 Act No. 232, Public Acts of 2000, Michigan Legislation, January 1, 2001. AN ACT to amend 1939 PA

288, entit led "An act to revise and consolidate the statutes relating to certain aspects of the family divisionof circuit court, to the jurisdiction, powers, and duties of the family division of circuit court and its judgesand other officers, to the change of name of adults and children, and to the adoption of adults and children;to prescribe certain jurisdiction, powers, and duties of the family division of circuit court and its judges andother officers; to prescribe the manner and time within which certain actions and proceedings may be brought in the family division of the circuit court; to prescribe pleading, evidence, practice, and procedurein certain actions and proceedings in the family division of circuit court; to provide for appeals from certainactions in the family division of circuit court; to prescribe the powers and duties of certain statedepartments, agencies, and officers; and to provide remedies and penalties," by amending the title andsection 19b of chapter XIIA (MCL 712A.19b), the title as amended by 1997 PA 163 and section 19b of chapter XIIA as amended by 2000 PA 46, and by adding chapter XII.



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lack of public clarity, public scrutiny, and the ability to subject the “process” to robust

analytical methodology.

D. Lack of Administrative Oversight

Question of Supervision: According to Black’s Law Dictionary, Superintendent

means “one who superintends or has the oversight and charge of something with the

power of direction; a manager”. The Michigan Children’s Insti tute fails to report to any

public body. How does this Superintendent derive its powers when it has not been

mandated by the Legislature? The question becomes: “Who superintends the

superintendent?” This authorization of the authority of the position is illogical. The

chain of responsibility is not clearly established; therefore, his authority is arbitrary and

capricious. Chain of command is in question and the MCI Superintendent’s decision(s)

to withhold consent of adoption should not be binding.

The Superintendent is documented as a civil servant, manager level, with an

annual salary of $73,2744, with a letter of designation of appointment from Marianne

Udow, the Director of the Department of Human Services. However, the appointment to

the position of Superintendent is stated in the statute to serve at the pleasure of the Social

Welfare Commission. The Social Welfare Commission powers have now been granted

to a singular individual: The Director of DHS. The appointment of the Superintendent

William J. Johnson is, therefore, unconstitutional. In light of the fact there is no Social

Welfare Commission, the Director of the DHS has usurped the authority of the Governor

and the Legislature in the personal appointment of the Superintendent.

4 Department of Civil Services



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This begs the question of enforcement and oversight, because complaints to

Michigan Children Institute are handled internally by Michigan Children Institute, as a

process of apparent self-review, furthering substantive evidence of arbitrary and

capricious decisions by the Superintendent. This challenges the abilities of the DHS

Director, who is not licensed in this area of Masters Level Macro and Clinical Social

Work. Therefore, the Superintendent of Michigan Children’s Institute reports to another

“superintendent”, the Director of the DHS, who has no authority to grant supervisory

powers to the superintendent without the authority and approval of the Governor and

the Senate. This is not a matter of public record because such an action of appointment of

the MCI Superintendent is not found in the official acts of the governor or the legislature.

Failure to Report: The current Superintendent is William J. Johnson, who,

according to state law, is not properly licensed and is not appointed by the Governor. He

has never generated an annual report of expenditures and has no oversight, meaning he

answers to no one. The other two staff members. Mary E. Rossman, whose duties are

unclear and Bruce Hoffman, who is now the Assistant Superintendent, for which his role

and duties are omitted from state policy, filled in as Superintendent until William J.

Johnson returned and continues to execute the duties of the MCI Superintendent by leave

of the MCI Superintendent.

The actual budget and expenditures for the department is a mystery, as is written

policy and procedures. In initial review of the adoption program, it is recognized as

successful if the state meets its previous years benchmarks in numbers of children

adopted to secure the projected fiscal year federal budget allocations. In deeper, cursory

analysis, the media tells an entirely different story. The number of injuries and deaths of



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children under the auspices of the state leads one to believe, with credibility, that the

program is not functioning properly.

Credibility of Social Workers: Problematic conditions in Michigan’s child welfare

system have manifested in the public outcry for enhanced mechanisms to ensure the

credibility of those actors who protect children who have been placed under the auspices

of state care. Reactionary legislation has been established to conduct more in depth

criminal background checks for foster care licensing, but this never addressed the

systemic conditions of lack of administrative oversight. Numerous county social service

workers handling delicate matters concerning the protection and well-being of children

and families are not licensed in accordance to state statutes and the MCI Superintendent

relies upon these entities to make his decisions as he does not physically meet the

petitioners personally involved, pursuant to MCL 710.45.

Licensing Regulation: From an initial investigation, it was found that the majority

of County Department of Human Services staff, dealing with Children and Family

Services, do not possess licensing, as outlined in General Rules of Social Work for the

State of Michigan, R 338.2907 -2909 et seq. of June 24, 2005. Public Act 61 of 2004,

effective July 1, 2005, MCL 333.18509, changed the regulation of the social work

profession under the authority of the Department of Community Health. Unfortunately,

the Bureau of Health Professions, Complaint and Allegation Division on has the power to

regulate the Community Health Agency. There is no provision for any complaint filed

against a direct child welfare worker due to the protection of Freedom of Information Act

regarding the release of information pertaining to child welfare. Therefore, complaints

are handled under civil servants codes, and for private institutions, complaints are



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handled internally. Thus, there is no formal venue to file grievance against the MCI

Superintendent.

Lack of Licensing: The question of competency arises when inappropriately

trained, uneducated, and unlicensed actors are not held to the same standards of

“providing for the necessary needs of the child” as birth parents. An extension of the

aforementioned question must be presented to focus attention to the problematic concerns

of operational efficiency. The institutional norms of the DHS have allowed the veiled

efficacy of the licensing statutes to perpetuate the practices of false claims. The genus of

protecting our children originates with the acceptance of accountability and proper

management of the system. Until oversight is achieved, there can be no legitimacy of

operations. There is no oversight of the MCI Superintendent.

William J. Johnson only possesses a Bachelor's of Social Work and has proven

incapable of performing the duties of a Master of Social Work (Clinical and/or Macro).

The other individual, and the only other administrative staff person, Bruce Hoffman,

does not even possess a Bachelor of Social Work. The responsibility of guaranteeing

Michigan meets its previous year’s benchmarks in number of adoptions are placed in the

hands of individuals who are unlicensed by law.

A licensing search was conducted through the Department of Community Health

to verify the licensing of William J. Johnson. It was found that he only possesses a

Bachelor’s of Social Work. Since he is not in possession of the proper education and

training, he executes the duties of a person in a supervisory position in an arbitrary and

capricious manner. According to the Public Health Code, Public Act 61 of 2004, MCL

333.18509, there is a definition of the practice for each level of regulation. In the capacity



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of Superintendent, the responsibilities mandate Macro and Clinical Master Social Work

licensing.

Pursuant to the Public Health Code, Public Act 368 of 1978, MCL 333.18504,

amended as Public Act 61 of 2004, effective July 1, 2005, it explicitly states:

(1) An individual shall not engage in the practice of social work at the bachelor'sor master's level or use a title described in section 18503 unless licensed orotherwise allowed under this part.(2) The department shall issue a license or registration under this part for aduration of 3 years.

As of April 30, 2007, Superintendent William J. Johnson’s licensing for Bachelor

Level Social Work has lapsed.

E. The MCI and Supreme Court Partnership

Supreme Court Administrative Office: The question of supervision was previously

addressed as nonexistent, but in further analysis, the duty of oversight belongs to the

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Article 6 § 3 of the Michigan Constitution, who

appoints the Chief Administrator for the State Court Administrative Offices (SCAO), the

judicial, not the executive branch. SCAO oversees the Foster Care Review Board

(FCRB), on which the Superintendent of MCI, William J. Johnson, functions as a

decision maker. Neglecting to provide the public with concise written statement of

ministerial obligations over the FCRB and decision making associations with the MCI

Superintendent provides ground to question the impartiality of the Chief Justice

participating in the decisions to deny Petitioners pursuant to MCL 710.45, of any and all

child welfare matters leave to appeal. People v. Parsons, 728 N.W. 2d 62 (2007).

Public Judicial Advocacy for a Defendant: On June 15, 2007, Justice Maura

Corrigan publicly advocated the activities of the Superintendent of Michigan Children’s

Institute, on radio station WJR 760 AM. Justice Corrigan publicly denied having any



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knowledge pertaining to the question of authority of the MCI Superintendent, when the

very matter, King v. Dep't of Human Servs. (in Re Bell), 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 727

(Mich. Ct. App., Mar. 15, 2007) was simultaneously pending before the Michigan

Supreme Court.

Justice Corrigan, further, went on to publicly defend the administration and

functioning of Michigan Children’s Institute in a commentary to the Detroit News, July

2, 2007. In the public pronouncements she jeopardized her ability to decide the case at

the very same time that the court was faced with an internal decision: the opportunity to

protect children in the foster care process. Justice Corrigan purported her own public

issue of a successful foster care system in one of Michigan’s largest newspapers, rather

than remaining impartial on a matter pending before the Court that rendered its decision

in King v. Dep't of Human Servs. (in Re Bell), supra, on July 18, 2007, reconsideration

denied September 24, 2007. The private membership of Justice Corrigan on the Pew

Foster Care Commission 2004 should not have allowed her to decide on any public

matter dealing with foster children and adoption as it challenges the integrity of Article 3

§ 6 of the Michigan Constitution. Neglecting to provide the public with a timely concise

written statement of previous ministerial obligations over the FCRB and decision making

associations with the MCI Superintendent, as former Chief Justice, who also has run her

campaign for Chief Justice on the privately funded platform of foster care and adoption,

provides ground to question the impartiality of Justice Corrigan participating in the

decision to allow Relator Tran’s application for issuance of Writ of quo warranto.

People v. Parsons, supra.



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Further reading of the act will demonstrate that no money of the trust goes to

children, but to programs for the prevention of child abuse and neglect. Annual reports

do not detail the activities of the Michigan Children’s Trust Fund because they have just

recently been made available to the public because it had previously been a mystery when

inquiring into the names of membership. The Michigan Children’s Trust Fund does not

philosophically function as it was originally designed under the Michigan’s Children’s

Institute Trust Fund: it does not operate to benefit the children of MCI.

There is no available information to confirm the life existence of the MCI trust.

F. Major Implications

Invalidity of Court Decisions: It is the responsibility of the lower court to

establish the credibility of witnesses who appear before it, MCR 2.613 (C); see also In re

Miller , 433 Mich. 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161, (1989). Lower courts neglect to examine the

proper licensing required for the position of Superintendent. Public Health Code Act 368

of 1978, MCL 333.18504. Therefore, family courts fail to establish the credibility of the

Superintendent and due account should be taken of the rule of prejudicial error in the

revisiting of all adoption decisions made under this Superintendent. DeRose v DeRose,

469 Mich. 320; 666 N.W. 2d 636, (2003).

Denial of a Public Issue: It has now become a public issue since the Supreme

Court has failed to address the public issue of the authority of the MCI Superintendent.

This judicial body should have seen the open and obvious question of authority in the

abolishment of the Social Welfare Commission in 1965. MCL 16.553 of Public Act 380

of 1965. The mandate in answering this public question of authority is enumerated in the

Michigan Constitution Article 2 § 7. The common law and the statute laws now in force,



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not repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own

limitations, or are changed, amended or repealed. Principles of common law and

tradition to uphold the constitution and protect the well being of citizens are challenged

when, due to conflict of personal interests, Justices do not recuse themselves.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is proper when addressing the authority of

a public official. William J. Johnson is not a public official and has not been appointed

by the Governor, with advice and consent from the Legislature; therefore, from a

technical analysis, the court is correct in its statement that this is not the proper

jurisdiction. In addressing the legitimacy of authority, this Court erred to respond to a

public issue, made apparent in the public postulations of Justice Corrigan in the media.

King v. Dep't of Human Servs. (in Re Bell), 2007 Mich. App. LEXIS 727 (Mich. Ct.

App., Mar. 15, 2007); In re Bell Minors, Michigan Supreme Court Case Nos. 06-21802,

06-21803, 06-21804, Where the case caption was identified by the Clerk of the Court to

be a question of superintending control of the MCI Superintendent, pursuant to MCR

7.212(C)(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8) and (9). The application for leave was denied with no

finding of facts or conclusion of law. In essence, the silence of the Justices “appoint”

authority of the MCI Superintendent, contrary to the Article 6 § 27 of the Constitution of

Michigan.

ARGUMENTS

Below, Relator Tran demonstrates to this Court the need for intervention and a

more definite statement of the authorities and superintending control of the

Superintendent of MCI, William J. Johnson. Quo warranto is the vehicle for this Court

to properly litigate this matter. The Superintendent has no authority to represent the State



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of Michigan as the de facto legal guardian of children who are wards of the State; the

MCI Superintendent has no authority to function as the de facto final decision maker in

matters of adoption; the MCI Superintendent has no authority to hold the title of

Superintendent.

For the first time in the history of the State of Michigan the veiled functioning of

Michigan Children’s Institute (MCI) is being addressed. Because there has been

absolutely no administrative oversight since its inception in 1935, the time has come to

present to the general public the arbitrary and capricious pattern of practice of the sole de

facto legal guardian of Michigan's children awaiting adoption as a result of termination of

parental rights: William J. Johnson, the sole de facto guardian of almost 7,000 children

under the auspices by the state and is the de facto legal representative for the State of

Michigan of all children entrusted to the Michigan Children’s Institute.

As the de facto legal representative for the State of Michigan of children, whose

parents’ rights have been terminated, the Superintendent is neither appointed, elected, or

a servant of the court. The position is classified as a civil servant, not a public official.

The statutory standard of authority has been exhumed and reanimated without legislative

review. The Social Welfare Commission grants authority to the position of the MCI

Superintendent through appointment. Powers of appointment for the Social Welfare

Commission hail from the Governor, with advice and consent of the Legislature, but in

1965, the Social Welfare Commission was abolished. This is the year of the last annual

report of MCI. There has never been an audit of MCI.

The Superintendent has come to claim authority from the Supreme Court, under

the supervision of the Chief Justice for the Supreme Court Administrative Office



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(SCAO). As a de facto finial decision maker in the court process of adoption, the

Superintendent simultaneously holds authority of review with membership of a citizen

review board, Foster Care Review Board (FCRB).

Not possessing the proper licensing or education, as required by state law, the

Superintendent practices certain areas of social work, including development of policy, in

concert with the Supreme Court Justices. To date, the Supreme Court refuses to respond

to the public question of the legitimacy of authority of the Superintendent of MCI in its

refusal to review and hear any and all cases of child welfare. The Superintendent has

never been held accountable for the deaths of children under his care, nor has he been

held accountable for the malfeasance and misfeasance of his decisions.

Michigan Attorney General has been usurped of the authority of parens patriae by

the Superintendent in representing the State as the legal authority of children committed

to the state as wards by the courts. It is the Attorney General that possesses the proper

authority, as executed only in Wayne County, the Child and Family Services Bureau and

the Adoption Section, where the courts are the final decision makers in whether to grant

or withhold consent to adopt. Unlike the rest of the state where the Superintendent is the

final decision maker in state ward adoptions, the Attorney General represents Wayne

County Department of Human Services by presenting the recommendations of the

contractual child placing agencies in adoption decisions to the court. The Attorney

General Division of the Child and Family Services Bureau is proof that the position of

MCI Superintendent and the MCI are financially futile, an illegitimately redundant waste

of state resources, fiscally irresponsible expenditure, and a multiplicative catalyst in the

shrouding of federal false claims.



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I. RELATOR TRAN HAS THE RIGHT, DUTY, AND AUTHORITY TO

BRING AN ACTION IN QUO WARRANTO BEFORE THIS COURT IN

RESPONSE TO THE ULTRA VIRES ACTS OF THE

SUPERINTENDENT OF MCI.

The common law remedy of quo warranto is brought to bear in determining the right

of an individual to hold public office or to challenge a public officer’s attempt to exercise

some right or privilege derived from the state. The United States Supreme Court had this

to say regarding the action:

Quo warranto is addressed to preventing a continued exercise of authority

unlawfully asserted, not a correction of what already has been done under it or tovindication of private rights. It is an extraordinary proceeding, prerogative in

nature, and in this instance could have been brought by the United States, and byit only. For there is no statute delegating to an individual the right to resort to it.

Johnson v. Manhattan r. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 502 (1933); see also, State ex rel. Bruce v.

Kiesling 632 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1994); Rastall v. DeBouse, 736 A. 2d 756 (Pa. Commw. Ct.

1999) (quo warranto complaint is a vehicle designed to test whether a person exercising

authority is legally entitled to do so); State ex rel. Angelini v. Hardberger , 932 S.W.2d

489 (Tex. 1996). Quo warranto is intended to prevent the exercise of powers that are not

conferred by law. State ex rel. Stenberg v. Murphy, 247 Neb. 358, 527 N.W.2d 185

(1995).

An action in the nature of quo warranto is derived from the common law writ

used in England by the King’s Attorney General to test the validity of franchise on claims

asserted by subjects of the crown. Pulskamp v. Martinez , 2 Cal. App. 4th 854, 3 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 607 (2d Dist. 1992). The ancient writ was a high preogative writ of right for the

King against one who usurped, misused, or failed to exercise some office or franchise.

Smith v. Dillion, 267 A.D. 39, 44 N.Y.S.2d 719 (3d Dep’t 1943); Newsom v. State, 922

S.W.2d 274 (Tex. App. Austin 1996), reh’g overruled, (June 12, 1996) and writ denied,



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(June 27, 1997). Even in its ancient form, the writ of quo warranto safeguarded of

governmental functions; a proceeding in nature of quo warranto was an action by the

crown inquiring “by what authority” an office-holder supported his claim. State ex rel.

Cain v. Kay, 309 N.E.2d 860 (1974).

Michigan’s version of the ancient writ is defined by statute and reads in pertinent

part:

MCL 600.4505 (1) In actions brought against persons for usurpation of office, the judgment may determine the right of the defendant to hold the office. If

a party plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to the office, the court may decide whichof the parties is entitled to hold the office.

(2) If judgment is rendered in favor of a party who is averred to be entitled to

the office, he is entitled, after taking the oath of office, and executing any official bond which is required by law, to take the office. Such party shall be given all the

books and papers in the custody of the defendant, or within his power, belonging to the office.

MCL 600.4501 The attorney general shall bring an action for quo warranto when

the facts clearly warrant the bringing of that action. If the attorney general receives information from a private party and refuses to act, that private party

may bring the action upon leave of court.

Relator Tran has been granted leave to proceed in this instant action for quo warranto

by the Attorney General. This jurisdiction is proper pursuant to MCR 3.306.

Relator Tran has more interest in this matter than that of a public issue. It has become

a personal issue, as a citizen of the State of Michigan and a graduate student of Wayne

State University Department of Political Science, a public institution, to proceed in this

matter of quo warranto as part of her formal research as a policy analyst.

Quintessentially, this matter of quo warranto is the intellectual property of the State of

Michigan as a tool in the reform of child welfare policies in the state.



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Therefore, Relator Tran’s ask that a Writ of Quo Warranto be issued to MCI

Superintendent William J. Johnson.

II. THE MCI SUPERINTENDENT IS AN ARTIFICIAL PERSON, THUS

IS REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF MICHIGAN.

As William J. Johnson has never been appointed by the Governor with advice and

consent from the Senate; as he has never been appointed by a public body of a

commission; as he has never been elected by the people; the causal connection has

delineated him to be an artificial person in an artificial position. MCL 400.207 (2) states

in pertinent part:

“The superintendent is the authorized agent of the department to implement this

act.” (emphasis added.)

Authorization of the MCI Superintendent to be an agent for DHS originates from

the principle entity, the Social Welfare Commission, which has been dismantled. As it

stands, the MCI Superintendent has never, nor is currently, empowered by statute or by

the people to represent the State of Michigan. Beyond the lack of public authorization to

be an agent of DHS, the issue stands that there needs to be identification of the principle

to fully establish the fiduciary relationship of the Superintendent to the Director of DHS

and the people of Michigan. MCL 400.207 § 7(6) states in pertinent part :

“An agreement entered into with a person for the care of a child who is a ward of the Michigan children's institute shall provide that the department may cancel the

agreement if, in the department's opinion, the interest of the child requires it. If a parent or relative within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity of a child

who is a ward of the institute establishes a suitable home and is capable and willing to support the child, the department may restore the child to his or her

parent or relative. The institute may assist the parent or relative with the support of the child if the aid is less than the cost of care the institute would otherwise

provide.” (emphasis added.)



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Without further invoking clarity on the matter of the superintending control of the

MCI Superintendent, reason is called upon to scrutinize why, even if William J. Johnson

does aver his legitimacy to hold the position, he has never followed the rule of law, MCL

400.207 § 7(6), to “restore” and “assist”, which is absolutely contrary to the execution of

his de facto position as MCI Superintendent.

The de facto doctrine is based on the paramount necessity of protecting the public.

State v. Carroll , 38 Conn. 449. With regard to the public the acts of a de facto officer are

as valid as those of a de jure officer. (where no officer de jure is provided for there can be

no officer de facto: Carleton v. People, 10 M. 250. To force outsiders to deal with the

former at their peril or to try his title to office on every occasion would be grossly unfair

and thoroughly impracticable. Such considerations have led the courts to extend the

older and more technical definition of de facto officer to include any one who without

legal authority is performing the duties of an office, and “has the reputation of being the

officer he assumes to be.” The public is also more fully protected if such an officer is

held to strict accountability. His defective title, therefore, does not release him from

liability from such acts would be torts or crimes, if done by the de jure officer. ( Diggs v.

State, 49 Ala. 311.) The MCI Superintendent shall be considered a de facto artificial

entity.

Although he might thus incur many burdens, the common law gave him no

corresponding benefits. For he could not deny that he was in fact an “officer.” In this

matter the common law was rigid but perfectly consistent. A public office was a

delegation of certain sovereign powers (United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508.) and was

treated in a way analogous to a grant of land. The holder was said to be “seised of his



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office.” If he was removed, his office still continued. If a salary was annexed, it was an

office “coupled with an interest.” Under such a view, the de facto holder was no better

than a disseisor, and it followed logically that he was not entitled to any salary, or if it

had, in fact, been paid, it could be recovered from him by the de jure officer. Such is the

prevailing law at the present time. The MCI Superintendent has never been delegated

certain sovereign powers; ergo, he cannot be the legal guardian of the child wards of the

state. William J. Johnson has never been granted any authority, particularly granted

sovereign powers of parens partiea, which were granted exclusively to the Attorney

General; ergo, he is de facto granting and withholding consent of adoptions.

But there has been a certain tendency to treat offices, and particularly the minor

ones, as analogous to contracts of employment. ( Erwim v. Jersey City, 60 N. J. L. 141.)

Certain courts have felt that an officer is a servant of the people, his salary ought to

depend upon the services he has rendered them. Such considerations have caused them

to relax the older common-law rule and permit the de facto officer to recover the salary of

the office where there was no de jure claimant. The MCI Superintendent is a civil

service classification. The only true de jure claimant is the Attorney General.

He only is an “officer” to whom the sovereign power has delegated sovereign

functions. A person actually obtaining an office with the legal indicia of title is a legal

officer until ousted, so far as to render his official acts as valid as if his title were not

disputed: Wayne Auditors v. Benoit , 20 M. 176. Alas, William J. Johnson has never

obtained, nor has he made any effort to obtain legal indicia of the title of MCI

Superintendent.



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III. THE MCI SUPERINTENDENT WILLIAM J. JOHNSON HAS

USURPED THE POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT

A. Usurpation of the Powers of the Governor

A search of the public record has not indicated a public appointment from either

the Governor or the Legislature of the Superintendent and as such it is clearly evident the

Superintendent is not a “representative”. This Section 710.45 is part of the Probate Code

of 1939. The term “representative” is then to be understood as a designee or

appointment of the court. As written in MCL 400.202, the Superintendent is to be

appointed by the Commission established under MCL 400.2. Section 710.45

immediately becomes clearly evident as constitutionally invalid, for it violates the

separation of powers of the branches of state government, enumerated in Article 3 § 2 of

the Michigan Constitution. The position of Superintendent derives and exercises powers

GRANTED by the Governor and therefore cannot “exercise powers properly belonging

to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.”

An elementary understanding of sunken costs is when one continuously pumps

more money into a dysfunctional system. A more graduate understanding of sunken

costs is when a collective body opens new funding streams to flow into a dysfunctional

system that has zero performance indicators and only meet the previous year’s

benchmark to meet the federal mandates for the future year’s funding. In this regard, the

MCI Superintendent wields the budgetary power of the state by exceeding the previous

year’s adoptions of state wards by granting consent to maintain and or exceed the



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previous year federal funding, a furtherance of the usurpation of the Governor. More

intuitively understood, authorizing the legitimacy of MCI by increasing budgetary

appropriations is constitutionally repugnant and may only be corrected with the issuance

of Writ for quo warranto.

He is not a representative of the people of Michigan through a democratic process

of election and in not appointed by public designation of the official duties, or rather, the

best interests of children. The official powers of the Governor and the Senate have been

usurped by the Michigan Children Institute, not in accordance with the just powers

delineated in Article 5 § 3 of the Michigan Constitution. William J. Johnson serves at the

pleasure of no one, not even the public.



B. Usurpation of the Powers of the Attorney General

Parens patriae is a Latin term for "father of the people". In law it is the set of

rules or norm of conduct, which forbid, permit or mandate specified actions and

interpersonal relationships among human and organizations. For this area of public

policy, it is applied to the fundamental principles that underpin the operation of the child

welfare legal systems in the State.

It is the Attorney General, as comparatively analyzed amongst the states, who

represents a state in child welfare matters; it is the Attorney General who petitions to

courts decisions surrounding matters of protecting its citizens.

A legal guardian is a person who has the legal authority to care for the personal

and property interests of another person, called a ward, or informal caregiver, and to act



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as the parent of any child or individual who is in need of protection, such as a child

whose parents are unable or unwilling to take care of him or her, or an incapacitated and

dependent individual. The MCI Superintendent William J. Johnson assumes this de facto

role of legal guardian of state wards. By and through the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust

Improvement Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. 15 (c), granted the moniker of parens patriae to

permit the State attorney general to bring parens patriae suits on behalf of those injured

by violations of Child Protection Law, MCL 722.621 - 722.638. In this manner, the

Attorney General executes the duties of representing the State, protecting its citizens, and

superintending the legal obligations, and the state wards, of the adoption process as the

guardian of the Constitution, and not the MCI Superintendent. The execution of these

parens patriae powers are visibly demonstrated in the Children and Youth Family

Services Division of the Office of Attorney General in Wayne County, yet there is no

statewideness in the execution of the parens patriae, as these powers have been usurped

by the MCI Superintendent, making all other counties a de facto territorial franchise, as

the prosecution of child welfare matters are handled by the Counties Prosecutor, with

judicial decision made by the MCI Superintendent.

A furtherance of usurpation of the Attorney General will demonstrate an

unnecessary economical burden placed upon the State. As it currently stands, the

Superintendent is the legal guardian of over 7,000 children committed to MCI. It is

physically impossible for one individual to “superintend” the administrative functions

necessary to “protect and serve” this many children. A matter of this magnitude has

created temporal obstacles in establishing permanent placement (adoption), causing

children committed to MCI to linger in foster care. An immediate transference of the



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parens patriae powers to the Attorney General will reduce the lengths of stay for children

who have been adjudicated to be wards of the state, because:

1. The Children and Youth Family Division has in its possession an existing

model to achieve state uniform adoption protocol;

2. The quantity of Assistant Attorney Generals, in the aforementioned division, to

state wards is a far better term than the 1:7,000 relationship with the MCI

Superintendent to state wards, thereby significantly reducing by expedition the

transitional period from foster care to adoption.

3. The courts are made whole again as arbitrators and final decision makers.

4. The Attorney General will become empowered through legitimacy of the

parens patriae powers to solicit and access an increase in federal funding, further

bringing accountability and transparency to child welfare in the Michigan.

The Nonprofit Corporation Act 162 of 1982, MCL 450.2101 - 450.3192, created

duties for certain state agencies. For the purposes of the matter of unlicensed social

service individuals, the Attorney General possesses the regulatory authority to monitor

contract compliance for child welfare agencies, and in this situation, counties. It is

evident from the results of licensing check for social workers dealing with the lives of

children and families, that there has been a lack of monitoring of statutory compliance.

This lack of monitoring of statutory compliance is due to the usurped powers of

the Attorney General by the Superintendent of MCI. Empowered by the Supreme Court

through its Administrative Offices, the Superintendent is the individual to negotiate,

grant, and monitor state contracts of child placing agencies through his position of

Adoption Services.



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C. Usurpation of the Powers of the Court

Through what act of Michigan Legislature does the Superintendent derive his

judicial powers? This begs the question from whence of the Michigan public body oes

the Michigan Children Institute Superintendent derive his power for granting authority to

adoption. The MCL 710.45 does not acknowledge that the Superintendent is a

representative of any public body or court and does not denote his established powers to

grant or withhold consent for adoption. These powers were self-granted, in essence,

under no Michigan public body’s review. The powers have been self executed with little

or no basis of credibility and all cases decided by the MCI Superintendent since his

usurpation of the position should be revisited.

MCL 710.45 explicitly states:

(1) A court shall not allow the filing of a petition to adopt a child if the consent of arepresentative or court is required by section 43(1)(b), (c), or (d) of this chapterunless the petition is accompanied by the required consent or a motion as provided in subsection (2).(2) If an adoption petitioner has been unable to obtain the consent required bysection 43(1)(b), (c), or (d) of this chapter, the petitioner may file a motion with thecourt alleging that the decision to withhold consent was arbitrary and capricious. A motion under this subsection shall contain information regarding both of the following:

(a) The specific steps taken by the petitioner to obtain the consent required and the results, if any.(b) The specific reasons why the petitioner believes the decision to withhold consent was arbitrary and capricious.

(3) If consent has been given to another petitioner and if the child has been placed with that other petitioner according to an order under section 51 of this chapter, amotion under this section shall not be brought after either of the following:

(a) Fifty-six days following the entry of the order placing the child.

(b) Entry of an order of adoption.(4) In an adoption proceeding in which there is more than 1 applicant, the petition for adoption shall be filed with the court of the county where the parent's parental rights were terminated or are pending termination. If both parents' parental rightswere terminated at different times and in different courts, a petition filed under thissection shall be filed in the court of the county where parental rights were first terminated.(5) The court shall provide notice of a motion brought under this section to all interested parties as described in section 24a(1) of this chapter, the guardian ad



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litem of the prospective adoptee if one has been appointed during a child protection proceeding, and the applicant who received consent to adopt.(6) Upon the filing of a petition to adopt a child and the motion described insubsection (2), the court may waive or modify the full investigation of the petition provided in section 46 of this chapter. The court shall decide the motion within 91days after the filing of the motion unless good cause is shown.

(7) Unless the petitioner establishes by clear and convincing evidence that thedecision to withhold consent was arbitrary and capricious, the court shall deny themotion described in subsection (2) and dismiss the petition to adopt.(8) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the decision to withhold consent was arbitrary and capricious, the court shall issue a written decision and may terminate the rights of the appropriate court, child placing agency, ordepartment and may enter further orders in accordance with this chapter orsection 18 of chapter XIIA as the court considers appropriate. In addition, thecourt may grant to the petitioner reimbursement for petitioner's costs of preparing, filing, and arguing the motion alleging the withholding of consent was arbitraryand capricious, including a reasonable allowance for attorney fees. (9) If the consent at issue is that required of the court under section 43(1)(c) of thischapter, the motion shall be heard by a visiting judge assigned according to section

8212 of the revised judicature act of 1961, 1961 PA 236, MCL 600.8212.(10) The court's decision on a motion brought under this section is appealable byright to the court of appeals.

The power to withhold consent for adoption is vested in a “representative” or a

“court”. There is no definitive explanation as the Superintendent being this

“representative”. The Superintendent has taken on these powers without any authority

enumerated in the Michigan Constitution. Who is he representing, when he is not a

qualified member of the required level of the academic community; thus, he has not

achieved proper levels of authority, since he has not been granted licensing of Masters

Level Macro and Clinical Social Work by the State. The Superintendent has seized the

role of a policy maker sans the will of the people.

William J. Johnson is a member of the Foster Care Review Board. The

Superintendent is a member and a stakeholder of the decisions of this body. The

Superintendent failed to disclose the conflict of interest by being a participant in the

decisions of a citizen review board. The Foster Care Review Board, MCL 722.131 -



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722.140, is to be comprised of the members of the community. As Michigan Children

Institute Superintendent is tasked with being the sole legal guardian of Michigan’s

children whom are awaiting adoption, yet he advocates for foster care in his official

capacity Superintendent. He is not to advocate foster care because he is supposed to

remain objective, but he thus enters the legal arena with skewed objectives. He is required

to enter into these important decisions of human lives without prejudices, but his very

membership on the Foster Care Review Board belies otherwise. The Superintendent is

the final decision maker in adoption decisions, with the authority to override the decision

of a judge.

The Superintendent is a member and a stakeholder of the decisions of this body.

The Superintendent fails to disclose the conflict of interest by being a participant in the

decisions of a citizen review board. The Foster Care Review Board is to be comprised of

the members of the community. As Michigan Children Institute Superintendent Johnson

is tasked with being the sole legal guardian of Michigan’s children awaiting adoption, yet

all the while he has advocated for foster care for children in his official capacity

Superintendent. He is not to advocate foster care because he is supposed to remain

objective, though he enters the legal arena with skewed objectives. He is required to enter

into these important decisions of human lives without prejudices, but his very

membership on the Foster Care Review Board belies otherwise.

The powers and duties of the local foster care review board, MCL Public Act 422

of 1984, section 722.137, are so extensive that the Superintendent is required to disclose

his affiliations with the Foster Care Review Board with the lower court. This calls into



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question the honesty of his responses to questioning of the attorneys of record. The

superintendent is on the advisory committee of the Foster Care Review Board for the

state; therefore, his participation in recommendations to the Governor and the Legislature

becomes a clear and convincing fact of evidence that there is bias inherent in decisions,

taken or advised. The following section is taken from the Foster Care Review Board

Annual Report 2003-2004:

“Michigan’s Foster Care Review Boards have been given the responsibility for the first level of appeal. A panel of at least three FCRB members is convened to

hear from both the foster parents and DHS, or private agency staff. The panel then decides whether they agree with the agency decision to move the child or

whether they agree with the foster parents. If FCRB agrees with the agency, the process ends with that decision. If FCRB agrees with the foster parents, the

matter is set for a hearing before a judge/referee, or, if the child is a state ward,

the subsequent review is done by the Michigan Children’s Institute (MCI).

(emphasis added).

William J. Johnson is holds no Juris Doctorate nor is he registered with the

Michigan State Bar, yet, he usurps the powers of the judiciary as a final decision maker

throughout the State, with the exception of Wayne County, where the courts are the final

decision makers. William J. Johnson has represented as a member of the Adoption

Services, the Foster Care Review Board, and as Superintendent of Michigan Children

Institute, and therefore, functions in an arbitrary and capricious pattern, as a result of

conflicting interests. From an initial investigation, it was found that the Superintendent,

William J. Johnson of Michigan Children’s Institute, directly while dealing with Children

and Family Services, does not possess the appropriate licensing, as outlined in General

Rules of Social Work for the State of Michigan, R 338.2907 -2909 et seq. of June 24,

2005. Public Act 61 of 2004, effective July 1, 2005, which changed the regulation of the

social work profession under the authority of the Department of Community Health.



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Unfortunately, the Bureau of Health Professions, Complaint and Allegation Division only

has the power to regulate the Community Health Agency. There is no provision in

Michigan law for any complaint filed against the Superintendent to be investigated. Thus,

this state’s courts have over burdened with oversight of decisions taken by the

Superintendent without oversight by the public representatives who were rightly

beholden for their actions to the citizens of Michigan.



CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Relator Tran respectfully submits that under the circumstances there

is no just, speedy, or adequate remedy at law other than the issuance of a Writ of Quo

Warranto. Judicial economy and sound administration of justice demand issuance of the

Writ as this case presents a unique opportunity for the Court to clarify an obviously

important issue of law: “By What Authority” Does The Superintendent of MCI William

J. Johnson Exercise Dominion And Control Over Children Who Are Wards Of The

State?”

1. Order William J. Johnson to relinquish his position of MCI Superintendent;

2. Order the Attorney General to assume the powers of parens patriae in the

transference of all duties and responsibility of the MCI Superintendent to the

Office of Attorney General Children and Youth Division.

3. Order the State Auditor General to conduct a single program audit of MCI;

4. Order the Director of DHS to refer any and all violations of material provisions of

law and policy by MCI to the Attorney General for investigation and prosecution;



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5. Order the Attorney General to make immediate recommendation and opinion to

the Legislature to review and take immediate action of all MCI statutes;

6. Order the Courts to assume its rightful powers as final decision makers in all

adoption decisions;

7. Order review of all decision to grant consent and withhold consent of adoptions

made under the de facto tenure of the MCI Superintendent William J. Johnson.

Each and every question is continuing in its application. Accordingly, Relator Tran

respectfully submits that no authority exists for the MCI Superintendent William J.

Johnson to perform any of these functions. Therefore, Relator Tran’s ask that a Writ of

Quo Warranto be issued to MCI Superintendent William J. Johnson.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated this _______ day of __________________, 2009

____________________________________

ex rel. Beverly Tran Private Attorney General

8437 LumpkinHamtramck, MI 48212

313-522-8213 [email protected]



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MICHIGAN CHILDREN’S INSTITUTE (MCI) WARD ADOPTION CONSENT

PROCESS CFA 820

ADOPTION SERVICES MANUALCFA 820 2 of 2 MICHIGAN CHILDREN’SINSTITUTE (MCI) WARD ADOPTION CONSENT PROCESS ADOPTION

SERVICES MANUAL STATE OF MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF HUMANSERVICES CFB 2009-003 3-1-2009

1 of 2 STATE OF MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES CFB 2009-003 3-1-2009 OVERVIEWThe authority to grant consent to adoption for state wards rests with the MCIsuperintendent. State wards include children who have been committed to the statethrough involuntary termination of parental rights in the Family Division of a CircuitCourt (1935 PA 220), or through release of parental rights by the legal parent(s) or private child placing agency to whom the child has been previously released (1974 PA

296).The request for consent from the placing agency is a recommendation that a specifiedfamily be granted consent by the MCI superintendent. In requesting consent for theadoption of a child, PCA 309, Consent to Adoption by Agency/Court, and DHS-3217,Adoption Consent Request (RFF 3217), must be completed and sent with requireddocumentation to the MCI superintendent in the Department of Human Services (DHS)central office. The Michigan Children’s Institute (MCI) superintendent must review andapprove or deny the recommendation for adoption of any MCI ward.Best Interests of the ChildThe following “best interests” factors [MCL 710.22(g)] may be considered by theMichigan Children’s Institute (MCI) superintendent (or the court for a permanent court

ward) when granting or denying consent to an adoption:•The love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the adopting individual(s)and the adoptee.•The capacity and disposition of the adopting individual(s) to educate and create anenvironment that fosters the religion, racial identity and culture of the adoptee.•The capacity and disposition of the adopting individual(s) to provide the adoptee withfood, clothing, education, medical care (or other remedial care recognized and permittedunder Michigan laws in place of medical care), and other material needs.•The length of time the adoptee has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and thedesirability of maintaining continuity.•The permanence as a family unit of the proposed adoptive home.•The moral fitness of the adopting individual(s).•The mental and physical health of the adopting individual(s).•The home, school and community record of the adoptee.•The reasonable preference of the adoptee, if the adoptee is 14 years of age or older.•The ability and willingness of the adopting individual(s) to adopt the adoptee’s siblings.



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1 of 1 STATE OF MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES CFB

2009-003 3-1-2009 EXPEDITED CONSENT CRITERIA

Expedited consent requests allow for expedient processing of approvals to avoid delays inachieving permanency. A request of the Michigan Children’s Institute (MCI)superintendent for “expedited” consent may be granted when the request meets certain

criteria and there are no extenuating circumstances involved.All requests for expedited consent must have supervisory approval that verifies all of therequirements below are met:•The recommended family is the only family requesting to adopt the child. There are nocompeting families for adoption.•The child is residing in the adoptive home and all his/her physical and emotional needsare being satisfactorily met.•This is the only child available for adoption or all available siblings (i.e. permanent courtwards or MCI wards) are being adopted together.•Record checks and clearances for all adults residing in the home are current. (See CFA520, Background Checks, Clearances, Criminal History Checks, and Fingerprinting.)

•There is no history of criminal arrests or convictions.•The family has no previous foster home licensing or CPS complaints involving the careof a child.•Three references recommending the family for adoption of the children have beenreceived.•There are no “circumstances requiring additional documentation” as defined byAdoption Family Assessment policy. (See CFA 510, Circumstances Requiring AdditionalDocumentation/Review.)•Marriage and divorce verifications and medical evaluations of the adopting parent(s) arein the case record.



EXPEDITED CONSENT CFA 850

ADOPTION SERVICES MANUAL

1 of 1 STATE OF MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES CFB 2009-003 3-1-2009 INTRODUCTION

The superintendent of the Michigan Children’s Institute (MCI) represents the state asguardian of state wards beginning with the date of the child’s commitment andcontinuing until the age of 19 (MCL 400.203). The MCI superintendent is authorized toconsent to adoption, juvenile guardianship, medical procedures, marriage, or emancipation (MCL 400.209 and 712A.19c).MEDICAL CAREThe superintendent is authorized to consent to elective medical care for an MCI ward if the procedure requires the approval of a guardian. These procedures include:•Elective surgical procedures.•Administration of anesthesia.•Consent to abortion.

•Decisions to limit, restrict or terminate medical care.Policy and procedure details for Medical Care for MCI wards are found in CFF-722-11,Foster Care - Delegation of Parental Consent.Routine Medical CareRoutine medical care must be monitored and approved by the child-placing agency that isresponsible for case management services. (See CFF 722-11, Foster Care - Delegation of Parental Consent.)Authorization for Psychotropic Medication and Informed ConsentSee CFF-722-11, Foster Care - Delegation of Parental Consent for specific policiesregarding psychotropic medications and Informed Consent.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF MICHIGAN CHILDREN’S INSTITUTE

(MCI) CFA 800

ADOPTION SERVICES MANUAL •Any other factor considered to be relevant to a particular adoption proceeding.

first amended petition of quo warranto

Documents