firozabad city gate station

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ERDMP DRAFT REPORT Firozabad City Gate Station

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EMERGENCY RESPONSE

AND

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

(ERDMP)

GAIL INDIA LIMITED Firozabad City Gate Station February 2011

Prepared By

Techno Safe Consultants E-130, Greater Kailash II

New Delhi 110 048 +91 11 41589414

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Title Page No. Definitions iv Abbreviations viii

1.0 Introduction 1

1.1 Preamble 1 1.2 Legal Background 1 1.3 Objective and scope 2 1.4 Methodology 3

2.0 Facility Description for Gail Firozabad District 5 2.1 Geographical Spread of the Region and Pipeline Network 5 2.2 Gas Source & Pipeline Network 5 2.3 Network Basic Design Parameters 5 2.4 Codes & Standards 5 2.5 Asset Location and Data Sheets 6 2.6 Climatological Data 7 2.7 Demographic (Population) Profile 9

3.0 Fire & Safety Systems 10 3.1 Salient Safety Features Provided 10

3.2 Safety System at City Gas Station 10 3.3 Safety System at Sectionalizing Valve Stations 11 3.4 Pipeline Safety System 11 3.5 Hazardous Materials 13

4.0 Potential For Emergencies 14 4.1 Hazard Identification For Natural & Manmade Disasters 14 4.2 Basis for Scenario Selection 16 4.3 Consequence Calculations 17 4.4 Consequence Analysis Results 20 4.5 Risk Analysis Results 22

5.0 Emergency Management Organization 24 5.1 Organization Structure During Emergency 24 5.2 Emergency Control Centers 26 5.3 Categorization of Emergencies 29 5.4 Emergency Shut Down (ESD) Procedure of Pipeline 30

5.5 Off-site Emergency Management Organization 31 5.6 Role Of Different Authorities (External Authorities) 33

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Chapter Title Page No.

6.0 Pre Emergency Planning & Preparedness 42 6.1 Levels of Emergency Response 42

7.0 Action During Emergency 47 7.1 Actuation Of The Plan 47 7.2 Basic Action in Emergencies 48

8.0 Post Emergency Activities 51 8.1 Structural Inspections After Fires or Explosions 51 8.2 Post Incident Testing Relapse 51 8.3 Waste Disposal 52 8.4 Cleanup Of Dead or Contaminated Livestock 52 8.5 Provision of Alternate Water Supplies 52 8.6 Updating of the Plan 53

9.0 Plan Testing & Updating 55 9.1 Introduction 55 9.2 Desk-Top Exercise 55 9.3 Truncated Trials 56 9.4 Full Scale Testing 56 9.5 Plan Updation 57

Annexures Anne - 1 Emergency Response Team Anne - 2 Off-Site Emergency Response Team Anne - 3 Mock Drill Report Format Anne - 4 Material Safety Data Sheet Anne - 5 Security Threat Plan Anne - 6 Fire Fighting Equipment Details Anne - 7 Safety Equipment Anne - 8 Satellite Image Anne - 9 Pipeline Route Map Anne - 10 Location Plan of the Installation Anne - 11 Site Plan of the Installation Anne - 12 Process Flow Diagram Anne - 13 Layout of Fire water System Anne - 14 Health, Safety & Environment Policy Anne - 15 Emergency Action Plan Flow Chart

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Definitions Disaster

Any occurrence that causes damage, ecological disruption, loss of human life, deterioration of

health and health services, on a scale sufficient to warrant an extraordinary response from

outside the affected community or area.

Natural Disaster

A natural disaster is the effect of a natural hazard (e.g. flood, tornado, hurricane, volcanic eruption, earthquake, or landslide). It leads to financial, environmental or human losses.

Man-Made Disaster

Disastrous event caused directly and principally by one or more identifiable deliberate

or negligent human actions. Also call as human made disaster.

Disaster Management Plan

Disaster management aims to reduce, or avoid the potential losses from hazards, assure

prompt and appropriate assistance to victims of disaster, and achieve rapid and effective

recovery.

Emergency Response & Disaster Management Plan

Emergency preparedness for disaster management is the process of preparing, mitigating,

responding, and recovering from any emergency situation. Individuals and organizations

responsible for emergency Management use different tools to save lives reduce human

suffering and preserve economic assets before, during and after any catastrophic event.

Mitigation Minimizing the effects of disaster. Examples: building codes and zoning; vulnerability analyses; public education.

Preparedness - Planning how to respond. Examples: preparedness plans; emergency exercises/training; warning systems.

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Response - Efforts to minimize the hazards created by a disaster. Examples: search and rescue; emergency relief.

Recovery - Returning the community to normal. Examples: temporary housing; grants; medical car

Risk assessment

Hazards and emergency situations are determined with their possible effects.

Emergency Response Procedures

It includes emergency control centre, communication system and description of roles to be

played by plant people and outside agencies.

Mutual Aid Scheme

For an effective response, identification of resources and development of mutual aid

agreements with neighboring resource providers at district and state level for the extent terms

sharing of resources during emergencies.

Emergency Shut Down System

Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) is designed to minimize the consequences of emergency

situations, related to typically uncontrolled flooding, and escape of hydrocarbons or outbreak of

fire in hydrocarbon carrying areas or areas which may otherwise be hazardous.

Safety Management System

The creation of a safety management system draws attention to the safety of the companys

operations. A company analyzes past safety accidents and establishes specific procedures that

should stop a similar accident from occurring in the future.

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Consequences Analysis

A complete hazard and risk analysis study of an industry processing facility would require not

only the probabilistic analysis of frequency occurrence of hazard event but also consequence of

these events. Consequence analysis involves the determination of the physical effects of the

any undesirable event as well as the damage caused by these effects, in term of human

fatalities, injuries and property damage.

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion

The term unconfined was used to describe explosions in open areas such as process plants.

Large scale tests have demonstrated that a truly unconfined, unobstructed gas cloud ignited by

a weak ignition source will only produce small overpressures while burning.

Vapor Cloud Explosion

An explosion caused by the instantaneous burning of vapor cloud formed in air due to release of

flammable chemical.

Vented Explosion

Explosion due to high speed of venting chemicals.

Dust Explosion

Explosion resulted from the rapid combustion of fine solid particles.

Pool Fire Pool fires occurs when spilled hydrocarbon burn in the form of large diffusion flames.

Flash Fires A flash fire is the term for a slow deflagration of a premixed, truly unconfined, unobstructed gas

cloud producing negligible overpressure.

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Jet Fire A jet or spray fire is a turbulent diffusion flame resulting from the combustion of a fuel

continuously released with some significant momentum in a particular direction or directions. Jet

fires can arise from releases of gaseous, flashing liquid (two phase) and pure liquid inventories.

Hazardous Waste

The substance which is generated in the process, unused or off-specification chemicals,

container residues and spill cleanup residues of acute hazardous waste chemicals which

substantial or potential threats to public health or the environment.

Ignitability

Ignitable wastes can create fires under certain conditions, are spontaneously combustible, or

have a flash point less than 60 C (140 F). Examples include waste oils and used solvents.

Corrosive

Corrosive wastes are acids or bases (pH less than or equal to 2, or greater than or equal to

12.5) that are capable of corroding metal containers, such as storage tanks, drums, and barrels.

Battery acid is an example.

Reactivity

Reactive wastes are unstable under "normal" conditions. They can cause explosions, toxic

fumes, gases, or vapors when heated, compressed, or mixed with water.

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Abbreviations

ERDMP- Emergency Response & Disaster management Plan

GAIL- Gas Authority India Limited

U.P. Uttar Pradesh

CGS City Gate Station

GREP Gas Rehabilitation & Expansion Pipeline

HVJ Hazira Vijaipur Jagdishpur Pipeline

VDPL Vijaipur to Dadri pipeline

ALARP- As Low as Reasonably Practical

UKOPA- UK Onshore Pipeline Operators Association

OGP- International Association of Oil & Gas Producers

FERA- Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment

PCV Pressure Control Valve

SDV- Slam shutdown valve

PSV- Pressure Safety Valve

SV- Sectionalizing Valve

EGIG European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group

FCGS Firozabad City Gate Station

PNGRB - Petroleum & Natural Gas Regulatory Board

ASME - American Society Mechanical Engineering

API - American Petroleum Institute

ASTM - American Society for Testing and Material

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DHO - District Health Officer

ECO - Emergency Co-ordination Officer

EPO - Emergency Planning Officer

ERT - Emergency Response Team

ESD - Emergency Shut Down

FCO - Fire Control Officer

HSE - Health, Safety Environment

MSDS - Material Safety Data Sheet

OISD - Oil industry safety directorate

MSIHC Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals

PLL - Potential Loss of Life

SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

UVCE - Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTON

1.1 PREAMBLE

Gail (India) Ltd. (GAIL) has appointed Tractebel Engineering Private Limited, New Delhi

for preparing Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP) of its

Agra (UP Region) pipeline network and associated installations. The total pipeline

network under Agra (UP Region) jurisdiction is approximately 752 kilometers, with

pipeline size varying from the trunk lines of 36 inch to the smallest branch line of 2 inch

size- details are given below:

180 Kilometers section of GREP Pipeline from Chambal River to Jatauli (part of the 498

kilometers 36 inch Vijaipur to Dadri pipeline)

53 Kilometers of 10 inch pipeline from 36 inch Mainline (GREP pipeline) at Bajhera up to

Agra CGS and then 35 Kilometers of 10 & 8 inch pipeline from Agra CGS to Firozabad

CGS and 13 Kilometers of 14 inch spur pipeline from Mainline (GREP pipeline) at Lalpur

to Mathura terminal.

32 kilometers of 10 inch pipeline from 36 inch Mainline (GREP pipeline) at Ibrahimpur to

Dholpur Terminal.

228.121 kilometers section of HVJ pipeline from Chaunpur to Babrala Terminal (part of

the 24 Inch Auriya-Aonla-Babrala Gas pipeline through HVJ Pipeline network)

59.915 Kilometers section of this pipeline from Babrala terminal to Shiwali is (part of 24

inch 105.22 Kilometers Babrala to Dadri gas pipeline).

1.2 LEGAL BACKGROUND

Preparation of an emergency plan is primarily governed by legislative requirements

under the Environment Protection Act 1986 (in particular the Manufacture, Storage and

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Import of Hazardous Chemicals (MSIHC) Rules, 1989 (amended, 1994 and 2004) and

the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB) regulations 2008. In

addition, ensuring emergency preparedness is also necessary under other Acts/ Rules

such as The Factories Act, 1948 (amended 1987) and various State Factories Rules.

The format for this ERDMP is based on the MSIHC Rules and the PNGRB requirements.

1.3 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

1.3.1 OBJECTIVES In spite of the safety measures undertaken, the possibility of accidents either due

to human errors and / or due to equipment / system failure cannot be ruled out.

The lessons learnt from disasters all over the world, make it essential to draw an

Emergency Preparedness Plan (or Disaster Management Plan) to negotiate such

eventuality. The imperative of such a plan is to minimize the adverse effects of an

accident and restoration of normalcy at the earliest by providing the measures to

contain the incident and limit its consequences.

This Emergency and Response Disaster Management plan has been prepared

to address the following key objectives:-

To safeguard lives, environment and property at site and in its neighborhood;

To contain the incident and bring it under control and restore normalcy at the earliest;

To minimize damage to lives, property and environment; To rescue and treat casualties on priority; To assist the district administration in evacuating people to safe areas; To extend necessary welfare assistance to casualties.

The above objectives are sought to be achieved through some of the following

measures:

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Providing information to all concerned on the estimated consequences of the events that are likely to develop as a result of an emergency;

Warning and advising people who are likely to be affected; Mobilizing on-site and offsite resources; Calling up assistance from outside agencies; Initiating and organizing evacuation of affected people; Providing necessary first aid and other medical services that may be

required;

Collecting data on the latest developments, other information and requirements;

Coordinating action taken by various agencies.

1.3.2 SCOPE Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan describes the

organizational structure, facilities, equipment, services, and infrastructure

necessary to respond to emergency situation, which could have on-site and off-

site implications at the gas dispatch stations, junction points and terminals as well

as along 752 km long natural gas pipeline under Agra (UP Region). This plan also

applies to those participating governmental agencies that are responsible for

emergency response within the immediate area surrounding the facilities and to

those agencies, organizations, contractors, and facilities providing assistance to

GAIL in the event of an emergency.

1.4 METHODOLOGY

The methodology adopted to achieve the desired objectives is given below:

Kick off meeting at Agra Collection of relevant data and information from the key Operations, Maintenance and

Project team.

Evaluation of the site vis--vis neighboring facilities and surrounding areas of all City Gas Stations, Receiving Terminals, along pipeline route including SV, IP and RR

stations.

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Collection of data for the above related to fire fighting arrangements, safety and alarm systems, electrical and instrumentation details, etc.

Data compilation and analysis followed by identification of hazards PHA Consequence analysis to assess the damage/effect of short-listed accident scenarios

by using BP CIRRUS V6.0/ ALOHA software.

Estimating failure rate frequencies associated with the identified accident scenarios. Risk assessment using the consequence analysis results and failure probabilities Development of recommendations for risk prevention or mitigation Preparation of Emergency Response Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP) and its

submission.

Guidelines provided in Schedule 11 of MSIHC Rules 1989, of the Ministry of Environment

& Forests, Red Book of the ILO and the PNGRB regulations 2008 have been used while

preparing this document.

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CHAPTER 2 FACILITY DESCRIPTION FOR GAIL FIROZABAD DISTRICT

A brief description of the facilities coming under the jurisdiction of GAIL Firozabad District is

given below along with detailed directions for reaching (remote locations):

2.1 GEOGRAPHICAL SPREAD OF THE REGION

FIROZABAD CITY GATE STATION (FCGS) On NH2 from Agra to Firozabad, take left turn on the bye-pass (Bachhu Ashram)

road before entering Firozabad. City Gate Station is located approximately 3 Kms.

from High Way. CGS is near Jaroli Kalan village. Firozabad is approximately 45

Kms from Agra office.

2.2 GAS SOURCE & PIPELINE NETWORK The source of natural gas for GAIL in Firozabad.

Firozabad (CGS) 10&8 inch Pipeline Tap Off From Agra (CGS) 2.3 Network Basic Design Parameters

Firozabad (CGS) Pipeline Tap Off From Agra (CGS) Size 10 & 8

Material - API 5L GR X 60 , API 5L GR X 52

Wall Thickness 6.4mm, 7.8mm

Design Pressure - 92 Kg/cm2

Coating - PE Coated (Three Layers)

2.4 Codes & Standards

A host of codes and standards covering design philosophy, process design, mechanical

design and other design aspects, quality control, erection, testing, pre commissioning

and commissioning are followed at GAIL. In addition, apart from codes and standards,

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recommended practices, good engineering practices and other design aspects are made

use of for evolving an optimum and safe design. The major design codes and standards

used include:

ASME B.31.8 Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems API 5L, ASTM A 106 Gr.B & ASTM A 333 Gr.6 Covers WELDED and SEAMLESS

pipe suitable for use in conveying gas, water for natural gas industries.

DIN 30670 for Poly Ethylene coatings for steel pipes & fittings. ASTM A 153 & IS 4736 Standard Specifications for Zinc Coating; API 6D (Ball Valve), ASME B 16.34 (Globe Valve), BS 5352, 5351 & 1873 for valves

& related facilities.

ASME B 16.5 ,B16.36 & MSS SP 44 & API 590 for Flanges & Blanks & related facilities.

ASME B 16.9, MSS SP 75&97, IS 1239P2 & IS1879 for different types of fittings & welding.

ASME B31.8 & OISD 141 for the Erection work & related facilities; EN 1776 prEN 12480 Metering Station with rotary meter. Petroleum & Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB) - Appendix I- Item 9

2.5 ASSET LOCATIONS

The natural gas received normally at about 60-80 bars pressure from the tap-offs

described above is directly led to the various stations- the operations the group of assets

are handled by the GAIL Agra (UP Region).

2.5.1 Regions The number of Sectionalizing Valve & IP Stations under the designated Regions

is given below:

S.NO. Regions Sectionalizing Valve & IP Stations 1 Firozabad Firozabad (CGS) Total 1

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2.6 Climatological Data

Firozabad Region Annual average temperature in the entire region through which the pipeline traverse

is in the range of 30 to 37degree centigrade and 40% to 60% average relative

humidity in the region.

Average High/Low Temperature of Firozabad

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Average Rainfall of Firozabad

Normal average wind speed at around entire region where the pipeline network is laid around 3 m/s.

Day: Incoming Solar Radiation

Night: Cloud Cover Wind Speed m/s

Strong**

Moderate Slight*** >50%

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Stability Class & Wind Speed

2.7 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE (source : Census Data 2001)

Firozabad

Note: Stability is D for overcast conditions during day or night.

Note: This table is for releases over land. If the release occurs over water, the stability class will be either D or E.

* Wind reference height is 10 meters.

** Strong" solar radiation corresponds to clear skies with the sun high in the sky (solar angle greater than 60 degrees).

*** "Slight" solar radiation corresponds to clear skies with the sun low in the sky (solar angle between 15 and 35 degrees).

S. No Name Population

1 Firozabad 2,97,606

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CHAPTER 3

FIRE & SAFETY SYSTEMS 3.1 SALIENT SAFETY FEATURES PROVIDED

Safety for the pipeline is provided through a mix of strong basic design and engineering,

a control and instrumentation system and through the adoption of well proven and

modern operating and maintenance practices.

Some of the Safety systems followed within GAIL are as follows:

Inspections and maintenance Work Permit Systems Accident investigation and reporting (major, minor, etc.) Emergency preparedness Job knowledge and job Training Health and Hygiene control Evaluation of safety systems Management of change (plant modifications etc.) Communications with people and in groups Promotion and recruitment policies and safety Incorporation of safety requirement in the tendering and procurement process

3.2 Safety System at City Gate Station

LEL detectors installed around process area Fire Water Network Fire extinguishers Pressure Safety Valves Slam shutdown valve CO2 Flooding System Safety Policy displayed

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First aid boxes Earth pits for electrical and electronic equipment network Cathodic protection PSVs provided for each stream with safe vent Solar lighting Telephone Vehicles

3.3 Safety System at Sectionalizing Valve Stations

First aid boxes Fire extinguishers Solar lighting Telephone Emergency telephone numbers displayed on the enclosure PSVs provided for stream with safe vent

3.4 Pipeline Safety System

The Pipelines are laid as per national/International standards with inbuilt and operational

safety features. The Safety features are as given below.

Some of the specific design safety features provided includes:

The minimum piping Class is II and extra thickness is provided as per piping class where necessary according to ASME B 31.8 standard.

A hot tapping is carried out only after a detailed Job Safety Analysis and joint study by an expert group and closing out actions arising thereof prior to commencement of

the hot tapping operation.

The entire pipeline is cathodically protected through a well engineered Cathodic Protection System.

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All welded joints are subject to Automatic Ultrasonic Testing by approved agencies and procedures to very high quality standards. The use of X-rays or gamma-rays is

restricted to safe locations not accessible by unauthorised persons.

Pipeline marking is an extremely important safety aspect and is essential to prevent unauthorized access to the pipeline and its hazards by members of the general

public. Marking out the entire pipeline route will include:

Pipeline warning signs Right of way boundary markers Kilometre Posts Ariel markers Navigable water ways Directional markers

Pipeline Warning Sign are in general be installed at National and state highway crossings Other road crossings Railway crossings Minor water crossings Valve stations And at all places deemed necessary Special care is taken in urban areas

and wherever the pipeline is laid in public areas. Reinforced concrete

walls are provided around the process area in town areas and other areas

of higher population.

Right of Way Boundary Markers are placed at regular distance on both side of the

pipeline axis to mark out the width of the Right of Way or ROW.

Kilometre Post are placed on the axis of the pipeline. Post indicates cumulative distance in Km from the reference point.

Aerial markers are placed at least every 5 km. Concrete slab is put on open cut crossings for higher integrity. Directional Markers shall be placed at every change in direction, two more directional

markers shall be installed along pipeline alignment, one on either side of the turning

point.

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All markers will be located at suitable place preferably in public area and /or at property/plot limits boundaries.

3 layer coating over the pipeline. The pipeline is laid 1 meter below Ground level. The warning tape is laid above 250mm of Pipeline. Emergency contact nos. are displayed on the warning tape Above ground Pipelines Markers with contact nos. installed. Isolation valves every 2.5 Kms.

3.5 Hazardous Materials

Natural Gas

Refer Annexure IV for Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS).

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CHAPTER 4

POTENTIAL FOR EMERGENCIES

4.1 Hazard Identification for Natural & Manmade Disasters

Location FCGS Type of Disaster A Man Made Heavy Leakage Y Fire Y Explosion Y Failure of Critical Control System Y Design deficiency Y Unsafe Acts Y In-adequate Maintenance Y B Natural Calamities Flood N Earth Quake Zone III Cyclone N Out Break of Disease N Excessive Rains N Tsunami N C Extraneous Riots/Civil Disasters/Mob Attack Y Terrorism Y Sabotage Y Bomb Threat Y War/Hit by Missiles Y Abduction Y Food Poisoning/ Water Poisoning Y

Zone-4

This zone is called the High Damage Risk Zone and covers areas liable to MSK VIII. The

IS code assigns zone factor of 0.24 for Zone 4

Zone-3

This zone is classified as Moderate Damage Risk Zone which is liable to MSK VII. The IS

code assigns zone factor of 0.16 for Zone 3.

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Causes of failure for Gas pipelines:-

The characteristics of the pipeline on which incident happened.

The leak size

Pinhole/crack: The diameter of the hole is smaller than or equal to 2cm Hole: The diameter of the hole is larger than 2cm and smaller than or equal to the

diameter of the pipe

Rupture: The diameter of the hole is larger than the pipeline diameter.

Initial cause of the incident:

External interference Corrosion Construction defect/material failure Hot tap made by error Ground movement Other and unknown The occurrence (non occurrence) of ignition

The consequences

Information on the way the incident has been detected (e.g. contractor, landowner patrol)

A free text for extra information

Additional information is also given for the individual cause:

External interference:

The activity having caused the incident (e.g. digging, piling, ground waste)

The equipment involved in the incident (e.g. anchor, bulldozer, excavator, plough)

The installed protective measures (e.g. causing, sleeves)

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Corrosion:

The location (external, internal) The corrosion type (galvanic, pitting, stress corrosion cracking SCC)

Construction Defect/Material Failure:

The Type of Defect (Construction or material) The defect detail(hard spot, lamination ,material. field weld) The pipeline type (straight, field bend, factory bend)

Ground Movement:

The type of ground movement (dike break, erosion, flood, landslide, mining, river)

Other and Unknown:

The sub cause out of categories such as design error, lighting, maintenance

4.2 Basis for Scenario Selection Accidental release of natural gas can result in possible damage. Immediate ignition could

lead to jet fires on immediate ignition and delayed ignition of flammable vapors could

result in flash fires with damage confined to within the cloud dimensions or unconfined

vapor cloud explosions with blast overpressures covering significant areas. In contrast,

fires would generally have localized consequences. Fires can be put out or contained in

most cases; there are few mitigating actions one can take once a flammable gas or a

vapor cloud gets released. The most extensive incidents generally arise consequent

upon the release of flammable gases or vapor clouds. In this study, the following Incident

outcome cases have been considered as and when applicable:

Release of natural gas at high pressures from the pipeline for different leak sizes Immediate Ignition leading to Jet fires Delayed Ignition leading to flash fires

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4.2.1 Range of Incidents

Both the complexity of study and the number of incident outcome cases are

affected by the range of initiating events and incidents covered. This not only

reflects the inclusion of accidents and / or non-accident-initiated events, but also

the size of those events. The following are evaluated in the study:

Small size holes in the pipeline or its associated components- these represent minor failures such as gasket leaks, flange leaks etc.

Medium size holes in the pipeline or its associated components- these represent minor failures such as gasket leaks, flange leaks etc

Large holes in the pipeline or its associated components these represent catastrophic failures.

Pinhole leaks and small leakage from the pipelines or mall bore instrument tappings are not considered as they are not likely to result in any significant

injury or loss of life. Incidents such as depressurization etc. are not deliberated

since they would be carried out only very seldom, and that too, under very closely

manned/ supervised conditions.

4.3 Consequence Calculations In consequence analysis, use is made of a number of calculation models to estimate the

physical effects of an accidental release and to predict the damage (lethality, injury,

material destruction) of the effects. The calculations can roughly be divided in three major

groups:

a) Determination of the source strength parameters;

b) Determination of the consequential effects;

c) Determination of the damage or damage distances.

The basic physical effect models consist of the following.

4.3.1 Source strength parameters Calculation of the gas outflow rate for the different hole sizes (this outflow rate

determines the jet dynamics or the source strength for the flash fire or explosion scenarios).

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4.3.2 Consequential effects

Dispersion of gaseous material in the atmosphere as a function of source Strength, relative density of the gas, weather conditions and topographical

Situation of the surrounding area.

Intensity of heat radiation [in kW/m2] due to a jet fire as a function of the distance to the source.

Concentration of gaseous material in the atmosphere, due to the dispersion of gas for the case of a flash fire.

Energy of vapor cloud explosions [in N/m2], as a function of the distance to the distance of the exploding cloud.

4.3.3 Selection of Damage Criteria The damage criteria give the relation between extent of the physical effects

(exposure) and the percentage of the people that will be killed or injured due to

those effects. The knowledge about these relations depends strongly on the

nature of the exposure.

In the next two paragraphs, the chosen damage criteria are given and explained

for heat radiation and vapor cloud explosion.

Jet Fires- Heat Radiation The consequences caused by exposure to heat radiation are a function of:

The radiation energy onto the human body [kW/m2]; The exposure duration [sec]; The protection of the skin tissue (clothed or naked body)

The limits for 1% of the exposed people to be killed due to heat radiation, and for

second-degree burns are given in the table next:

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Damages to Human Life Due to Heat Radiation

Exposure Duration

Radiation energy (1%

lethality, KW/m2

Radiation energy for 2nddegree

burns, kW/m2

Radiation energy for first degree burns, KW/m2

10 Sec 21.2 16 12.5

30 Sec 9.3 7.0 4.0

The criteria utilized for this study are as follows:

% fatality Exposure duration (s) Heat intensity (kw/m2)

1 30 9.3

50 30 18.5

99 30 37.5

100% lethality may be assumed for all people suffering from direct contact with flames.

For ease of understanding and comparison with understood values, the next chart is self explanatory.

Effects Due To Incident Radiation Intensity

INCIDENT RADIATION KW/m2

TYPE OF DAMAGE

0.7 Equivalent to Solar Radiation

1.6 No discomfort for long exposure

4.0 Sufficient to cause pain within 20 sec. Blistering of skin (first degree burns are likely)

9.5 Pain threshold reached after 8 sec. second degree burns after 20 sec.

12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting plastic tubing etc.

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4.4 Consequence Analysis Results

For the study, the vulnerable distances have been calculated for 1%, 50% and 99% fatality levels. However the estimated vulnerable area for calculating the fatalities has been corrected / modified based on these distances to project a more accurate fatalities estimation and subsequent risk estimation.

A summary of the Consequence Analysis Results and estimates for section wise pipe length for the whole pipeline route are tabulated subsequently.

Scenarios for each case were considered and consequence analysis carried out for these. These scenarios include estimation of vulnerable areas in case of small/ medium as well as major or Catastrophic failures for each section for each type of incident jet fire and Flash fire.

Models used for the Consequence Analysis include CIRRUS (BP Model for jet fires and Flash fires). The consequence analysis software models used include CIRRUS developed by British Petroleum. The key features include are independent models for Source or Outflow, jet fire, Flash fire etc.

Tabulated results are given next:

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1 Agra CGS to Firozabad CGS I (34.2 Km, 10 Dia)

Jet Fire, distance in m UVCE, distance in m Flash fire

%age Fatality %age Fatality

Leak Size 1 50 99 1 50 99 100

1 19.03 13.68 9.60 52.60 14.20 9.00 9.71

3 53.50 38.59 27.79 97.50 26.20 16.00 26.17

6 98.41 70.44 50.83 147.00 39.50 24.00 47.94

2 Agra CGS to Firozabad CGS II (34.9 Km, 10 Dia)



Leak Size 1 50 99 1 50 99 100

1 18.95 13.59 9.56 52.60 14.20 9.00 9.66

3 51.84 37.81 27.32 95.80 25.80 16.00 25.41

6 92.13 67.39 48.84 141.60 38.10 24.00 45.70

3 Firozabad City Gas (31.5 Km, 8 Dia)



Leak Size 1 50 99 1 50 99 100

1 10.09 7.51 5.41 52.60 14.20 9.00 5.19

3 27.75 19.75 14.34 61.50 16.50 11.00 13.41

6 48.68 35.86 26.14 90.10 24.20 16.00 23.98

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3a Firozabad City Gas (11.0 Km, 4 Dia)



Leak Size 1 50 99 1 50 99 100

1 10.09 7.51 5.41 52.60 14.20 9.00 5.19

3b Firozabad City Gas (5.4 Km, 3 Dia)



Leak Size 1 50 99 1 50 99 100

1 10.09 7.51 5.41 52.60 14.20 9.00 5.19

3c Firozabad City Gas (6.2 Km, 2 Dia)



Leak Size 1 50 99 1 50 99 100

1 10.09 7.51 5.41 52.60 14.20 9.00 5.19

4.5 Risk Analysis Results

4.5.1 Individual Risk Individual Risk levels at various distances from the pipeline are as follows:

Section No. Section Individual Risk

1 Agra CGS to Firozabad CGS - I 2.90E-05

2 Agra CGS to Firozabad CGS - II 2.97E-05

3 Firozabad City Gas 2.68E-05

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Section No. Section Individual Risk

3a Firozabad City Gas 1.61E-06

3b Firozabad City Gas 6.81E-06

3c Firozabad City Gas 1.91E-05

These are based on an Individual being present 24/7. In practice, this will not be

the case, and the IR levels would reduce by the presence factor.

4.5.2 SOCIETAL RISK

Societal risk has been estimated for overall sections of the above locations.

Section No.

Section Potential Loss of Life (PLL)- per year

1 Agra CGS to Firozabad CGS - I 2.13E-04

2 Agra CGS to Firozabad CGS - II 2.01E-04

3 Firozabad City Gas 1.63E-05

3a Firozabad City Gas 1.13E-07

3b Firozabad City Gas 4.81E-07

3c Firozabad City Gas 1.35E-06

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CHAPTER - 5 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION

5.1 Organization Structure during Emergency

To meet emergency situations effectively, organization structures are in place. HSE structure for GAIL (INDIA) LIMITED is given next:-

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CHIEF INCIDENT CONTROLLER General Manager, Agra (U.P. Region)

SITE INCIDENT CO-ORDINATOR

EMERGENCY CO-ORDINATOR (FIRE & SAFETY)

INCIDENT CONTROLLER

WELFARE& MEDIA/ SECURITY

CO-ORDINATOR HOD (HR)

COMMUNICATION CO-ORDINATOR

HOD (GAIL)

PIPELINE MAINTENANCE

CO-ORDINATOR

FINANCE CO-ORDINATOR HOD (F&A)

MATERIAL CO-ORDINATOR

HOD (C&P)

HSE Structure in GAIL (INDIA) LIMITED AGRA (U.P. REGION)

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Emergency Management Organization Firozabad

5.2 Emergency Control Centers Emergency control room in charge deals with incoming emergency telephone calls from

emergency places in charge work closely with other members of the emergency services

such as police officers, fire fighters and emergency ambulance personnel. In charge

communicate with them using the telephone, radio and computer systems and

maintaining contact with the team at the scene of the incident to keep up to date with the

situation and ensure staff safety.

Mr. Sushil Kumar Sr. Manager (O&M)

Mr. Pankaj Brahma Dy. Manager (Electrical)

Mr. Manish Mathe Sr. Eng. (Inst.)

Mr. P.Prakash Jr. Eng. (Mech.)

FCGS

Mr. Jitendra Jain Manager (Electrical)

FIROZABAD CITY GATE STATION

FIRIZABAD REGION

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They are responsible for:

Dealing with incoming emergency calls and prioritizing them. Taking necessary information from the caller. Recording details of incidents on computer systems. Assessing the urgency and priority of each individual incident. Providing necessary advice and guidance

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Emergency Control Centers are given below:- FCGS LOCAL

CONTROL ROOM

AGRA MAIN CONTROL ROOM

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5.2.1 Emergency Response Team (ERT)

Manager (Manager Control room) Fire, Safety Coordinator. Technical Coordinator. Medical, Security, Transport & Rescue Coordinator. Mutual Aid and off site Coordinator. Incident Coordinator Media / PR Coordinator. Incident Site Controller. First Responders Incident Recorder

Name and phone numbers of Emergency Response team members attached in Annexure I

5.3 Categorization of Emergencies

The emergency situations have been classified in to 3 categories depending upon the

magnitude and consequences of the situation, namely.

Minor Emergency: Emergency situation arising in any SV/ dispatch/ receiving station section which is minor in nature, and can be controlled within the affected

section itself, with the help of GAIL own resources. This could include for example a

minor gas leak due to gasket failure, flange leak and small fires, which can be

controlled by portable fire extinguishers. Essentially, this category is for scenarios for

which there is no need for any external help.

In these situations, all coordinators will not need to respond- only the Incident Controllers

and Chief Coordinator , after getting message from the Incident Coordinator, will

respond to the site with required personnel and attend the same.

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Major Emergency: Emergency situation arising in any SV/ dispatch/ receiving station section which has the potential to cause serious injury or damage to property

or environment or to the nearby areas this may include scenarios such as medium

and major leakage or guillotine rupture with or without fire. Supplemented by

assistance from Local Authorities and Mutual Aid Members.

In the above major emergency situations, ALL coordinators would have to respond and discharge their duties. The Chief Coordinator and Incident Controllers, after getting

message from Incident Coordinator, would rush to the site and with the help of

Functional Coordinators, control the incident.

Other Emergency: Emergency situation arising in any section of GAIL customers or other nearby industries, which are serious in nature, and endanger or affect GAIL

stations or pipeline system integrity and for which a partial or complete shut down is

required to be taken by GAIL.

In these situations, all coordinators will not have to respond and only the Chief

Coordinator and Incident Controllers, after getting the message from Incident

Coordinator, would respond to the site with required personnel and take action to

shutdown the GAIL station operations, if the situation warrants. If required they will assist

to Mutual Aid personnel to extend available resources for controlling the incident. All

other Coordinators and employees including contract workers should assemble at their

respective Assembly Points and act as per the instructions of Chief Coordinator/Incident

Controllers.

5.4 Emergency Shut Down (ESD) Procedure of Pipeline

The operation of pipeline is stopped without any notice if accidental situation occurs

somewhere along the pipeline. This is called emergency shut down (ESD) of pipeline,

and any necessary action to protect the pipeline system will be followed after shut down.

ESD will be categorized into several levels depending on the size and also the location

of accident. If the cause of ESD is localized, only a small section of the pipeline system

requires shutdown. All other parts of the pipeline will, in such a case be maintained

under normal operating condition as much as possible.

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The ESD of pipeline system suggested for this ERDMP is defined as follows:

(1) Total ESD of pipeline system The shutdown of the entire pipeline system all facilities along the pipeline will

stop their operation. This level of ESD is initiated when the major accident takes

place in areas / places / locations along the pipeline.

(2) Localized ESD of Pipeline System The shutdown of the limited facilities along the pipeline. This level of ESD is

initiated when the cause of ESD is limited to a small area in the pipeline system.

5.5 Off-site Emergency Management Organization The basic responsibility of preparation of an Offsite emergency management plan is of

the district authorities. Individual units have to be prepared for emergencies that may

result in consequential damage to people or property in surrounding areas.

As per the MSIHC Rules, any incident which has a potential of causing Offsite damage

must be indicated to the District emergency authority (the District Magistrate and his

emergency response team).Since GAIL has a gas network where pipeline passes

through several populated areas. It is understood that GAIL would actively lead and

participate in the Offsite emergency control measures.

Once it is evident that a failure has occurred along the route, the particular District Collector, Inspector of Factories, Police Authority, Fire Brigade and Chief Medical Officer

should be immediately informed and kept on alert. They should then be given

instructions (through previous interactions and training) to contain and control the

incident. This should be done with the aid of Mutual Aid Members and other members

and resources of the District Crisis Group till the technical people from GAIL arrive at the

location for issuing further technical actions to contain the incident and mitigate the

effects.

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District Collector District Emergency Authority

Dy. Chief Inspector Factories Member Secretary

Supdt. Of Police Security Coordinator

Dy. Supdt. Of Police

Associated Security Coordinator Divisional Fire Officer

Fire Service Coordinator

Chief Fire Officer Associate Fire Service

Coordinator Member

Safety Coordinator

Member Chief Civil Defense

Rescue Coordinator

GM Telecom

Communications Coordinator Rep. of Municipal Corp.

Evac. & Rehab. Coordinator Material Coordinator

Member RTO

Transport Coordinator

District Information Officer Liaison & PR Coordinator

Member

Supdt. Engineer PHED Public Works Coordinator

OFF-SITE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

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5.6 Role of Different Authorities (External Authorities)

5.6.1 Role of the Emergency Co-ordination Officer The various emergency services will be coordinated by an Emergency Co-

ordination Officer (ECO). The ECO will liaise closely with the Works

Incident Controller of the area. Again depending on local arrangements,

for very severe incidents with major or prolonged off-site consequences,

the external control may pass to a senior local authority / administrator or

even an administrator appointed by the District Collector.

The Emergency Control Centre of the area or / and any other control centre

may be utilized by the ECO to keep liaison with the Works Incident

Controller and Site Coordinator in an Emergency.

Accountability Procedures for Emergency Evacuation

Designated Evacuation Assembly Areas: Groups working together on or in the same area should meet outside the building in the prearranged designated Evacuation Assembly Area. Emergency Coordinators will conduct head counts once evacuation has been completed and report to the Incident Coordinator. The Emergency coordinator of the installation is responsible to do an immediate head count (not later than 2 mins) and report to the person in charge of the facility (Incident Commander) who is normally from Security unless the Authorities have taken over the situation.

Again, all trained personnel should be made aware of employees with disabilities that may need extra assistance and of hazardous areas to be avoided during emergencies. Before leaving, the Emergency Coordinator are to check rooms and other enclosed spaces in the workplace for other employees who may be trapped or otherwise unable to evacuate the area, and convey this information to emergency personnel.

5.6.2 Role of the Local Authorities Generally the duty to prepare the off-site plan lies with the local authorities.

They may have appointed an Emergency planning officer (EPO) to carry

out this duty as part of the EPOs role in preparing for a whole range of

different emergencies within the local authority area. The EPO will need to

liaise with the works to obtain the information to provide the basis for the

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plan. This liaison will need to be maintained, to ensure that the plan is

continually up to date.

It will be the responsibility of the EPO to ensure that all those

organizations which will be involved off site in handling the emergency

know of their role and are able to accept it by having, for example,

sufficient staff and appropriate equipment to cover their particular

responsibilities.

Rehearsals for off site plans are important for the same reasons as on-site

plans and will need to be organized by the EPO.

It will be the duty of the local authority to inform public, road / rail traffic,

news media etc. while operating off-site plan. It will also announce public

protection measures, beginning and termination of emergency and

subsequent public precautions. A good public awareness system will be

developed.

5.6.3 Role of the Fire Authorities The control of a fire is normally the responsibility of the Senior Fire

Control Officer (FCO) who would take over the handling of the fire from

the incident controller on arrival at the site. The senior fire control officer

may also have a similar responsibility for other events, such as

explosions and toxic releases. Fire authorities having major hazard works

in their area should have been involved in on-site emergency rehearsals

both as participants and, on occasion, as observers of exercises

involving only site personnel.

Functions and duties of fire control team are:

1. To fight fire, control it and quench it completely. If uncontrollable, to

stop its spread and to report to the FCO for further help from outside.

The team should have Walkie-Talkie or similar instrument to

communicate directly with the Head quarters.

2. The members are here to take charge of fire fighting. Therefore, they

have their teams, fighters and equipment ready. They should always

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check that whether their fighters, equipment and staff etc. are of

required size, type, number etc. and they are capable of quenching

any type of fire.

3. On receiving information of fire, the FCO will instruct other members

also and they will reach immediately to the spot and quench the fire

completely. They will not leave the place without the permission of

Incident controller / FCO and will also work with outside fire team if it

is required to call and such team is working in joint efforts.

4. With the help of Utility and Engineering Services Team the damaged

area due to fire or explosion will be made clean and accessible.

Power, Water, heavy vehicles, diesel pumps etc. will be used as per

need.

5.6.4 Fire Stations and Equipment Details of all fire stations and equipment should be kept. Fire fighters /

tenders, portable fire extinguishers, fire pumps and engines, hoses,

flanges and couplings, crosses, asbestos clothing, water jel, blankets,

risers, ladders, reels etc. all necessary equipment self - breathing

apparatus shall be included. The chief fire officer of each district shall

prepare and maintain this data. Fire Station attached in Annexure II

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Fire Services Coordinator

Fire Officers of all Fire Stations

Fire Officers of neighboring units Mutual-aid Members Voluntary Organizations

Fire Fighters

Rescuers

Fire Fighters

Rescuers

FIRE MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

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5.6.5 Role of the Police and Evacuation Authorities The overall control of an emergency is normally assumed by the police, with

a senior officer designated as Emergency Co-coordinating officer (ECO).

Formal duties of the police during an emergency include protecting life and

property and controlling traffic movements to maintain law and order, to

remove mischief mongers and law breakers.

Their functions include controlling bystanders, evacuating the places badly

affected or likely to be affected, to shift the evacuated people to safe

assembly points and to rehabilitate them after the disaster is over and safe

signal is given. They have to identify the dead and deal with casualties, and

inform relatives of dead or injured.

Necessary vehicles, wireless or mobile phones and instruments for quick

communications shall be maintained and used as per need. A list of all

police control points shall be maintained. All details should be inserted in it

and it shall be kept upto date and handy. The help of utility and engineering

team may be taken, if necessary for the purpose of making the area clean,

removing any structure, incidental work for evacuation and rehabilitation,

use of water, power, heavy machinery etc.

Police station and Chowkies

All police stations, outposts and the control points including highway petrol

(control) points shall be included in the plan. It shall be maintained at all

such points and at the residencies of all members for inter communication

and help. The police may revise it and keep up to date. Police Contact

Number in Annexure II

5.6.6 Role of the Health Authorities Health authorities have a vital role to play following a major accident, and

they should form an integral part of the plan. For major fires, injuries will be

the result of the effects of thermal radiation to a varying degree and the

knowledge and experience to handle this in all but extreme cases may be

generally available in most hospitals. Health authorities consist of doctors

for medical help to the injured persons because of the disaster.

Functions and duties of the health authorities are:

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1. To give medical help to all injured as early as possible.

2. Civil Surgeon is the secretary, who will organize his team. He may take

help from the District Health Officer (DHO) and other surgeons,

consultants and experts.

3. On receiving information from the collector of the ECO to rush to the

spot, he will immediately inform his team and will proceed with all

necessary equipment, medicines etc. as early as possible. The

collector or ECO shall simultaneously inform DHO and he will also start

similarly.

4. First aid and possible treatment shall be given on the spot or at some

convenient place or to shelter or assembly points and the patients may

be advised to shift to the hospitals for further treatment. Ambulance

vehicles shall be kept ready and used for this purpose.

5. All efforts shall be on war basis to save maximum lives and to treat

maximum injuries. The team in charge shall employ sufficient doctors,

equipment etc. for this purpose.

6. All members shall increase their knowledge to treat health hazards due

to various chemicals.

7. Continuity of treatment shall be maintained till the disaster is controlled

and the flow of injured is stopped.

8. Sick and injured persons kept at assembly points shall also be treated

for medical help.

Major off site incidents are likely to require medical equipment and facilities additional to

those available locally and a medical mutual aid scheme should exist to enable the

assistance of neighboring authorities to be obtained in the event of an emergency. A list

of doctors, hospitals, health centers, blood banks, ambulance centers, antidotes and

vehicles will be maintained for ready reference by the health authorities.

Medical Officer Contact Number attached in Annexure II

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CHAPTER 6 PRE EMERGENCY PLANNING & PREPAREDNESS FUNCTIONS The pipeline traverses across the length and breadth of Firozabad district. Any emergency that

occurs along the pipeline route, SVs or at any of the CGS stations may have on-site/off-site

effects and would need the involvement of a host of officers and staff of GAIL.

6.1 Levels of Emergency Response

Level 1: The Station Manager/operator/technician & Engineering Head/owner initiates Level 1 response after receipt of the emergency complaint. Response is site specific and covered by GAIL emergency procedure already displayed at each of the installations.

Information to be passed to Control room in charge

Level 2: Level 2 response is activated when the control room in charge (or his respective F&S in charge) and senior person on site, after assessment and initial

actions, conclude that the situation requires escalation to a higher authority due to

severity, inadequate resources or adverse business implications e.g. attention of local

population, media etc. ERP (this plan) is activated in this case (Ref.: below escalation of

this section).

Level 3: Level 3 response is activated when the Additional / Dy. Manager (F&S) after implementation and assessment of ERP concludes that the local resources are not

capable to cope-up with an emergency situation. There are adverse business

implications and media, local population is getting concerned about the situation, and the

situation is drawing more and more adverse attention. OFF SITE EMERGENCY is

activated in this case. Situation requires escalation to corporate authority level & to

General Manager/Chief General Manager (F&S & O&M).

Escalation of an Emergency LEVEL-2 is escalated as mentioned below: The emergency has to be escalated in the following cases:

Evacuation of the affected area. A fire, explosion, major injury of any kind. Substantial escape of gas.

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Involvement of outside agencies, e.g. Media, police, mob, etc. Person(s) are affected by the gas or its combustion products. Rapid deterioration of the situation on site.

In above cases immediately contact Manager and update him on the situation.

Based on the assessment of the situation manager to contact ERT (Emergency

Response Team) chairman to activate the ERP (Emergency Response Plan)

ERT Chairman shall activate the ERP and shall ensure that all members of the ERT will

resume their roles and ensure all necessary actions and resources to control the

situation.

In other way if Manager & Engineering/owner ERP Chairman (General Manager), ERT

Member to follow this for communication and notification of an emergency in case it

escalates or has a potential to escalate.

Confirm whether incident can be managed locally. Are all resources required are available and sufficient with individual

group/locally?

If answers are 'NO' then ESCALATE TO HIGHER LEVEL OF RESPONSE i.e. communicate to higher authorities of ERP and after that corporate authority level

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Emergency Handling Levels & Responsibilities LEVEL: - 1

INCIDENT

INCIDENT CONTROLLER Manager /Control Room in charge

CHAIRMAN ERT

Manager/operator station INCIDENT COORDINATOR

Manager/Operator

FIRE & SAFETY COORDINATOR Fire Man

FIRST RESPONDERS Security

guards, Technicians, Manager

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LEVEL: - 2

INCIDENT

INCIDENT CONTROLLER Manager

/Control Room in charge

CHAIRMAN ERT Manager/operator station MEDIA & PR CO-ORDINATOR Marketing

manager

INCIDENT COORDINATOR

Manager/Operator

FIRE & SAFETY COORDINATOR

WELFARE & FINANCE COORDINATOR Finance manager

FIRST RESPONDERS

SECURITY COORDINATOR

Security in charge/HR

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LEVEL: - 3

INCIDENT

INCIDENT SITE CONTROLLER

Chief General Manager (marketing)

Emergency chief coordinator MD/DC

Chief coordinator GM

INCIDENT COORDINATOR

Chief General Manager marketing

FIRE & SAFETY COORDINATOR DGM (F&S)

FINANCE COORDINATOR

Finance manager

FIRST RESPONDERS

F&S team, Fire service, police

SECURITY COORDINATOR Admin/HR

INCIDENT RECORDER DGM (C&P)

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CHAPTER 7 ACTION DURING EMERGENCY

The pipeline traverses across the length of Firozabad district. Any emergency that occurs along

the pipeline route, installations or at any of the City Gate Stations may have on-site/off-site

effects and would need the involvement of a host of officers and staff of GAIL.

To effectively manage the emergencies

7.1 Actuation of the Plan Any emergency starts as a small incident which could become a major accident if not

controlled in time. Clearly, the best time to manage the emergency is at its incipient

stage.

Some of the incidents identified that could result in emergency include:

Leakage through any valve, equipment (such as metering skids, filter etc.), small bore connection or flange/ gasket/ joint (such as Insulation joint) in the over ground

sections at the SV, Dispatch or receiving stations.

Leakage from pipeline section piping in either the underground or over ground section.

Sudden opening of safety valve in the over ground section. Escape of gas during maintenance/repairs carried out During gas venting at the stations.

Some common causes of fire (ignition sources) are given next for guidance purpose:

Electrical Causes

Short-circuiting due to loose wiring in the area. Use of non-flame proof fittings such as lights, torch, motors, fan, telephone,

temporary lighting etc. (Note: Flame-proof fittings become non-flame proof due to

poor maintenance e.g., increase in gap in junction boxes, due to missing nuts bolts

or improper glands used for connection to junction box, or sealing compound not

used in junction boxes etc.)

Static electricity as a result of improper bonding or equipment or piping grounding.

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Others

Landing of crackers (flying type) in hazardous areas. Chiseling / hammering or other activities resulting is sparks. Spark from studded shoes, with steel button by friction against ground/metal. Lighted incense sticks in maintenance trucks and smoking. Excessive release of vapors beyond safe limit and fire due to outside source of

ignition.

Lightening

7.2 Basic Action in Emergencies Leakage could occur either within the various GAIL stations (Receiving, SV, RR, IP etc.)

or in any of the pipeline sections. Immediate action is the most important factor in

emergency control because the first few seconds count the most, as gas fires develop

and spread very quickly unless prompt and efficient action is taken. In the event of

fire/gas leak within the GAIL stations, within proximity of the stations or in the pipeline

sections, the following actions shall be taken as quickly as possible:

7.2.1 Gas Leakage without fire- actions Immediate action is the most important factor in the emergency control because

the first few seconds count the most.

Take immediate steps to stop gas leakage and raise alarm simultaneously so as inform the Main Control Room (for valves closure). Stop all local operations close

to the leak point and ensure closure of all isolation valves, as necessary, on

manual activation.

Be aware that fire is possible in case an ignition source is found- keep close watch on ignition sources and attempt isolation where possible

Initiate action based on gravity of the emergency. In case of unmanned stations (only security), the Security Guard on duty would

carry out the operation in close consultation with the GAIL duty engineer at the

maintenance base and ONLY under his instruction. Security guard should not

operate the valves locally without proper permission. Ensure that security guard

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is aware of the nearest communication point and keeps people at bay and away

from the incident site.

Attempt isolation of valves locally to reduce the gas inventory on both sides of the leak.

Plant personnel without specific duties should assemble at the nominated place. All vehicles except those required for emergency use should be moved away

from the operating area, in an orderly manner at pre-nominated route.

Main Control Room to advise connected (relevant) consumers to draw as much as possible after leakage to drop the pressure after isolating the sectionalizing

valves.

Attempt depressurization of the line carefully under close supervision of expert team from GAIL. During gas venting, at least 50m area must be kept CLEAR and

area cordoned off. The depressurization may be done through the vent valves.

As gas fires develop and spread quickly, all out efforts should be made to contain the spread of leakage.

Saving of Human lives will get priority in comparison to any valuable asset. Electrical system except the lighting and fire fighting system should be isolated at

the station if necessary.

In case the leak catches fire, if the feed to the fire cannot be cut off, it is better to control the fire and not try to extinguish it.

Block all roads in the adjacent area and enlist police support for the purpose, if warranted.

7.2.2 Gas leak with fire- actions

Enlist support of local fire brigade and neighboring industries. Extinguishing Fires a small fire at the point of leakage should be extinguished by

enveloping with a water spray or a suitable smothering agent such as carbon

dioxide or dry chemical powder. Please note that gas fires should not, except

under exceptional circumstances, be extinguished until the escape of gas has

been stopped.

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The Fire fighting procedure would vary depending upon various factors such as nature, sources, size, location, etc. of fire. The decision would need to be taken

on the spot.

Fire fighting personnel working in or close to un-ignited vapor clouds or close to fire must wear protective clothing and equipment including safety harness and

manned life line. They must be protected continuously by water sprays. Water

protection for fire fighters should never be shut off even though the flames

appear to have been extinguished until all personnel are safety out of the danger

area.

If the only valve that can be used to stop the leakage is surrounded by fire, it may be possible to close it manually. The attempt should be directed by trained

persons only. The person attempting the closure should be continuously

protected to means of water spraying (through fog nozzles), fire entry suit, water

jel blanket or any other approved equipment. The person must be equipped with

a safety harness and manned lifeline. Fire entry suit and operation must be

performed only by highly trained personnel- otherwise, it must not be done.

Any rapid increase in pressure or noise level of product discharged through safety relief valve of the vessel/pipeline should be treated as a warning of over

pressurization. In such cases all personnel should be evacuated immediately.

As in case of any emergency situation, it is of paramount importance to avoid endangering human life in the event of fire involving or seriously exposing

equipment or serious leakage of gas without the fire.

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CHAPTER 8 POST EMERGENCY ACTIVITIES

As mentioned earlier, an emergency has pre planning and post emergency phases. Restoration

of normalcy following an incident is a very important activity and confidence building measures

with the community post accident are extremely vital in overcoming the demoralization that

occurs due to an incident of large proportion.

Once the situation at site has been brought under control and it is ensured that there is no

emission of gas to the atmosphere, no possibility of re-ignition etc. and an ALL CLEAR

indication is available; post emergency actions come into effect.

8.1 Structural Inspections after Fires or Explosions Action: Technical Coordinator

A major explosion could damage or destroy numerous buildings and any nearby

structures and other objects. In the same way, large fires can have major effects over a

vast area. In either case, residents of partially damaged buildings will want to know if the

structures are safe to occupy while they await repairs. Questions pertaining to the safety

of highway or bridges must be resolved quickly to avoid traffic complications.

It is important to note that inspection personnel may require special precautions (i.e.,

protective gear) in addition to normal safety equipment in those cases where the

structure may still be contaminated by hazardous residues/smoldering fires.

Fire and safety coordinators shall be responsible for inspecting the structural integrity of

damaged buildings, bridges, or other structures in the aftermath of a fire or explosion.

8.2 Post Incident Testing Relapse Action: Safety Coordinator

This covers site inspections and confirmation that no fires exist that can again relapse

into an emergency. The fire & safety coordinator shall undertake to equipment,

structures and facilities for possible relapse and smoldering fires.

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8.3 Waste Disposal Action: Safety Coordinator

It may become necessary for public authorities to undertake disposal of hazardous

wastes. This requires knowledge of the Hazardous Waste (Management, Handling and

Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2008 under the Environment Protection Act, 1986 of

the Ministry of Environment & Forests, Govt. of India, and the location of approved and

authorized disposal sites and the proper procedures for transporting and transferring

wastes to these sites. Local governments should seek assistance from the state

department of environment. These departments will have considered such problems in

their own statewide or regional emergency response plans. The items unfit for human

consumption will also form part of the Hazardous waste, which needs to be disposed off

in accordance with the above mentioned rules. The Regional Officer of the PCB should

decide the strategy.

8.4 Cleanup of Dead or Contaminated Livestock Action: Public Works Coordinator/ Medical Coordinator

Animal carcasses can pose a variety of health hazards to the public at large. State and

local public works agencies can provide assistance in planning for this activity. Local

veterinarians and animal conservation groups may also be helpful, but in all cases, it is

the responsibility of medical coordinator to ensure that personnel will not be placed at

risk of adverse safety or health impacts by their actions.

8.5 Provision of Alternate Water Supplies Action: Transport Coordinator

There may be circumstances under which a potable water supply may get disrupted due

to explosion causing damage to supply lines and require replacement. This is most

commonly accomplished by bringing in supplies of bottled water and/or tankers/trailers

capable of carrying water from the Municipal Corporation. It is the responsibility of

transport coordinator in association with the Social workers for arranging potable water

for consumption of personnel engaged at the incident site. The potential sources of

potable water are alternate sources in nearby areas such as overhead tanks and

pumping stations of water supply department. Wells, ground water etc.

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The activities listed in the following Table 8 are essential for restoration of normalcy.

Post Emergency Activities

Activity Responsibility

Check the Station for possible secondary effect of

delayed relapse.

Technical experts

Restoration of water, electricity and gas supplies Utilities coordinator

Arrange for transportation Transportation coordinator

Restoration of law and order in the affected areas Security coordinator

Hold press conference Public Relations Coordinator

Hold public meetings for answering their queries PR coordinator in association

with concerned officials

Arrange for providing interim relief to the affected

people

District Collector

Undertake accident investigation and

documentation

Technical coordinator

Arrange further relief to the affected people based

on claim applications

District Collector

Plan updating, if so required F&S Deptt. Of GAIL

Provide training to community and staff F&S Deptt. of GAIL

8.6 Updating of the Plan Mock drills activating the Emergency Preparedness Plan would be conducted

periodically for ensuring its efficiency during emergency as well as for refinement and

updating. The above drills based on the plan will help achieve the following objectives:

To familiarize emergency response personnel with their roles and duties to be performed.

To ensure the efficiency of the emergency response mechanism.

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To check the coordination of reactions and response of emergency service. To gain experience and confidence.

These mock drills will enable the organization to assess the capability of the individual

and performance as a group. The frequent discussion and drills will help in eliminating

the confusions / shortcomings if any.

The Works Incident Controller is responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of the

Disaster Management Plan. The evaluation will help to identify the loopholes and to

assess the response, capability of the location. A regular review of the plan (at least

once a year) should be carried out to update the information or to incorporate the results

of the mock drills. However, essential information like change in names / addresses /

telephone numbers of the persons / members detailed in the plan shall be updated as

and when the change comes to notice through amendments to the Plan.

Mock Drill Report Format attached in Annexure IV

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CHAPTER 9 PLAN TESTING & UPDATING

9.1 Introduction

An emergency response plan is developed to deal with largely unexpected events.

Those involved in planning and preparing for emergencies must undertake periodic

exercises to test the plan. Any plan remains a paper plan until it is put to test, as

there are bound to be omissions and faults. Testing exercises vary in type and scope.

The simplest type is a desk-top exercise; the most complicated is the full-scale mock

drill.

9.2 Desk-Top Exercise

Such an exercise basically involves development of a written accident scenario

wherein all members of the response team take part in a paper exercise to ensure that

each of them knows his/her role as well as that of other members. The written

scenario shall clearly identify the following:

Objective of the drill Components of the plan to be tested List of participants Sequence of events Level of simulated hazard and Exercise evaluation checklist. The written scenario shall be as realistic as possible and shall be taken from the

sequence of events from an actual or likely emergency.

The plan should be modified to rectify the shortcomings highlighted by the drill. A desk-

top exercise is particularly useful for testing a new plan for the following reasons:

A new plan is likely to have many shortcomings, which can be readily discovered through such an exercise.

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The participants in the exercise will get an opportunity to work together and develop understanding to cooperate during real emergency.

Desktop exercises are far less expensive than full-scale emergency drills. 9.3 Truncated Trials

Truncated trials are an extension of the desktop exercises. It is a mock drill of an

accident scenario, mobilizing limited resources and involving only selected response

agencies. Factories Inspector (Member Secretary of the LCG) should take the

initiative in organizing such exercises for all the Terminals or City Gate Stations in his

jurisdiction.

This exercise gives a near accurate picture of the level of preparedness and

familiarization of roles and responsibilities by individuals involved in emergency

operation. It gives an opportunity to identify gaps in the plan and areas of overlapping

responsibilities.

9.4 Full Scale Testing

A full-scale emergency drill is the best mechanism for identifying gaps in an

Emergency Response and Disaster management Plan. Careful planning, preparing a

mock scenario and defining the evaluation process are critical elements of full scale

testing. The drill may focus on one or more interacting aspects of the plan. Some

examples are given below:

Test the use and performance of emergency equipment such as fire extinguishers, breathing apparatus, decontamination equipment, fire engines,

ambulances, etc.

Test the level of preparedness of various Station and services involved in plan implementation

Estimate time taken for various activities such as notification, alarm, response, resource mobilization, deployment, etc.

Test the knowledge gained by response personnel who have been imparted specialized training in emergency management

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Test the feasibility of the formulated evacuation and rehabilitation plan.

A full-scale mock drill could consider all the above aspects in one go and thus bring

out practical bottlenecks in implementation of the plan. Such exercises are therefore

essential in improving the practicability of the plan.

9.5 Plan Updation

The Emergency Response and Disaster management Plan should be updated after

one or more of the following activities:

Desk-top trial

Truncated trials

Full-scale mock drill

Establishment of a major population center such as a residential colony, supermarket, hospital, etc. in the vulnerable zone

Construction of any new road/rail line or by-pass in the area

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ANNEXURE-I Emergency Response Team

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Annexure 1

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM (MAIN CONTROL ROOM, AGRA)

EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM FIROZABAD (CGS)

S. NO. NAME DESIGNATION Mobile Number

1 Mr. N. K. AGARWAL

GENERAL MANAGER (Chief CO-Ordinator)

9897765666

2 Mr. N.K. Chhabra DY. GENERAL MANAGER ( Emergency CO-Ordinator) (Incident Controller)

9927027023

3 Mr. B.BARIK DY. MANAGER (F&S) 9927900822 4 Mr. R K

BHILWARIA CHIEF MANAGER (HR)

firozabad city gate station

Documents

emergency response team

installation anne

safety equipment anne

annexures anne

water system anne

security threat plan

levels of emergency

safety environment policy