financialization and student funding in higher education
TRANSCRIPT
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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Financialization and Student Funding in Higher Education
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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Table of Contents
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... 3
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 4
Historical brief of the U.S. field of Higher Education, 1947-‐2010 .............................. 5
Literature review ........................................................................................................................ 6
Detailing research design ........................................................................................................... 10
Research question ................................................................................................................... 10
Variables ..................................................................................................................................... 10
Empirical evidence .................................................................................................................. 12
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 17
Literature ................................................................................................................................... 18
Appendix A ................................................................................................................................. 20
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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Abstract
The paper investigates the relationship between types of higher educational in-
stitutions and student loans. It briefly reviews the expansion of higher education since
WW2 and captures other theories of welfare retrenchment and privatization of risk
around the Millennium, which argue for a substantial shift in, who and how actors pay
for higher education.
The paper explores the IPEDS dataset for 3.321 public, private non-profit and
private for-profit institutions for the period of 2000-11 and identifies that the increase
in student loans follows a general trend for the field of educational institutions, espe-
cially 4-year institutions and private for-profit institutions have steeply increased from
an average 4486 dollars to 9727.
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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Introduction
Student loans are becoming a huge issue in the United States, as they grow
and disproportionally are turned to by underprivileged groups and students, who
have a hard time repaying their education after graduation and getting a return for
their initial investment (Eaton & Stewart, 2013: 9f). Arguments have been made
that student loans put a to hard burden on students expectations for future wages
and do not reflect the realization of the current state of the American Dream and
wage premiums after graduation. Though the wage premium make it costly choice
also not to aspire for the college premium. Illustratively, Rothstein and Rouse find
that the college wage premium from 1993 to 2005 rose with 23 %, as the tuition
fees in public and private colleges rose by 63 % and 43 % (2011: 1) In this competi-‐
tive field institutions might specialize and establish niches to attract, invest in and
profit on students.
Others state that loans are a necessary precondition for educational invest-‐
ments and competitive advantages among other states, and here at Berkeley one
can see that the increase in student loans reflect an institutional change from rela-‐
tive inexpensive or free education funded by the state government to a larger eco-‐
nomical burden on the students to provide their own funding. This is what Hackert
calls an individualization of risk, where the system of higher education as one of
many institutions (another example is the pension system in the U.S. case) experi-‐
ence a shift from collective utility and risk to an individual risk (Hackert, 2004).
Higher education can also be considered a public good in the sense that it creates
positive externalities in forms of rising productivity and taxable income. These different
arguments correspond in general to the narratives we find in public media and
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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scholarly approaches emphasizing how finance disciplines borrowers (Rajan,
2011) and reshapes citizens (Davis, 2009) in the subfield of education and with in-‐
dividual impact for a long period after graduation.
Yet it is not so well theorized how increasing tuition fees and student loans
coincide with changes in the field of higher education and emergence of financiali-‐
zation. Most have been written in the field of economy, and more is needed on how
the actors interact, and loans and finance rewrite the meaning of higher education.
Another interesting next step would be to compare student loans, other household
loans and financialization of higher education internationally and situate it in the
literature of varieties of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001), because there are large
variation in different types of debt, e.g. there are Scandinavian and European coun-‐
tries with huge housing debt but little student debt that complicates a straightfor-‐
ward theory, where varieties of capitalism could explain the variation. Instead in
this paper I emphasize the U.S. and dynamics at a state level. Through the paper I
aim to explore the mechanism that links financialization and student loans, and
how it impacts different types of institutions and students.
Historical brief of the U.S. field of Higher Education, 1947-‐2010 The G.I. bill with its benefits for WW2 veterans launched the educational boom in the
U.S. in the period of 1947-65. With The Great Society program President Johnson
addressed poverty and racial injustice in 1965 but also tripled the funds for higher ed-
ucation and made a centralized funding metric to allocate the resources, instituting the
federal government as a central player across the variation from different states. In
1972 President Richard Nixon expanded the grant and loan system and established the
precondition for the today’s funding system. The system had a clear division between
grants and loans and worked as a voucher system, where individual students had a
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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right to access and direct federal and state level subsidies often mediated through edu-
cational institutions, private accredited agencies and private-public businesses, such
as the loan agency Sally Mae (Eaton et al., 2014: 8f).
Literature review
I believe Polanyi and Granovetter’s theory of embeddedness is an adequate
starting point to explain how state and nation play an evident and clearly embed-‐
ded role in the market of student loans and are pivotal for valuing the price and in-‐
terest rate of student loans. The case of student loans can with the terminology
from Fligstein and McAdam (2011) illustrate a strategic action field, where domi-‐
nating interests of finance has contributed to the current student distribution, and
influences, who and how students are educated and dispose over their further
work life. In this broad perspective we might also expect student loans to coincide
with lower subsidies for universities and alternative payment possibilities than
through parental saving. The definition of financialization as a dual process, where
public actors contest and imitate finance as the dominant actor, can be helpful to
understand emergence of new actors and partnerships, institutional norms, per-‐
ceptions and regulations (Scott, 1995). Based on the above assumption and the in-‐
troduction one might make some preliminary characterization about who the in-‐
debted students in the field of education are and how they provide the ongoing
cash flow:
A) Increased dependence on loans through financial channels is associat-‐
ed with a decline of 1) not indebted students and 2) students from lower
socioeconomic background.
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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B) Student loans are affected by state and federal embeddedness and po-‐
litical will to differentiate the cost and investment of higher education and
diversify control to private actors in the immediate past. New institution-‐
al actors, who can balance student tuition and expenses differently, will
therefore attract different subsamples of the student population.
Another important matter is that the division between public and private
interest and agency often is overstated. Higher education is a prominent case,
where business and public community create value and cooperate. A larger in-‐
volvement of finance and business need to be carefully comprehended, and if my
hypothesis that student loans is associated with decline from lower socioeconomic
background, turns out to be true, the socioeconomic consequences of indebtedness
can be disclosed.
By attentive studying the different types of institutions we might explore a contin-‐
uum in-‐between public and private education that can reflect how the pattern of
educational institutions over time evolve.
Lin and Tomaskovic-‐Devey (2013: 1291) argue that financialization is a
major factor for wage inequality and can explain a substantial part of the varia-‐
tion, constituting equal parts as education and deunionization. They define fi-‐
nancialization since the late 1970 as two interdependent processes, where one is
the rising dominance of the finance sector and the other is non-‐finance firms’ in-‐
volvement in financial services and investments. Thus, in the field of higher edu-‐
cation one might expect to find rising involvement by finance sector’s actors and
universities and others governance structures appropriating strategies of fi-‐
nance.
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Due to student loans’ entanglement in the financial system, one might ex-‐
pect student loans to have a similar relationship with financialization as Lin and
Tomaskovic-‐Devey find with wages. One might even expect a stronger relation-‐
ship, since student loans reflect households’ ability to pay for education with
their savings and thus consist of intergenerational asset inequality rather than
income inequality.
One might expect to find a stronger relationship between financialization
and private institutions. One might also expect to see a larger shift to financiali-‐
zation in larger institutions, which have the capacities to incubate financial in-‐
vestment and withstand external pressure and at the same time is a sizable tar-‐
get for Wall Street. Though, one might also expect community colleges and public
universities to be more receptive to communal students’ needs.
Meister (2011) states that there has been a strategical turn from Universi-‐
ty of California to accommodate more out-‐state students, from whom they profit
more, than in-‐state students. By informal agreement between UC and the State of
California the University have been allowed to treat tuition fees as capital rather
than public revenue. In this way Meister argues that the state and federal gov-‐
ernment through the Student Loan Program subsidize privatization and finan-
cialization of Higher Education.
Eaton et al. (2014) find that a rising share of spending on education is finan-
cialized and channelized as financial profit from $21 billion in 2002 to $45 billion in
2012 on Wall Street either by 1) growing interest on student loan debts, 2) through
interest paid by colleges’ on their own institutional debts, and 3) through profits ac-
crued by equity investors in for-profit colleges. The three mechanisms all impact how
the average indebted student’s prospects will look like
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Eaton et al. (2013) display that for UC debt General Revenue Bonds are
half the share and Medical Center Revenue Bonds, Limited Projects revenue
Bonds and State Public Works Board Bonds share the other half. In Swapping our
Future they argue that UC should renegotiate its swapped fixed interest rate,
since it does not reflect the current interest rate after the financial.
Mettler calls U.S. social governed programs for the submerged state, be-‐
cause the consumer does not directly interact with federal institutions (2010).
Instead private providers, who are funded, regulated and subsidized, handle the
interaction.
Similarly, Morgan & Campbell phrase it a delegated state to emphasize,
how federal power and money is delegated to private providers on behalf of the
state (2011). In sum, the theories place the federal level as very central for the
field of higher education through it capability to sublease other actors, though
the system is very decentralized with many accredited and subsidized private
actors and difficult to navigate in for students as consumers.
The institute for College Access and Success reports that federal loans of-‐
ten are supplemented with private loans. So far I have only encountered good
statistics for federal loans, which also tend to be easier to distinguish from loans
and credits used for other amenities. A good reason not to emphasize on other
types of private student loans and consumer loans, can be found in Eaton et al.
(2014). Here they find that the federal government directly guarantees 90 % of
student loans and private loan originators have imploded in the market for stu-‐
dent loan (ibid. 13f).
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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Detailing research design
I need a data source, where it is possible to crosstab types of higher education
institutions with average debt levels for student. For the purpose I use a large dataset
from IPEDS, which is part of the U.S Department of Education and has been generat-
ed by the National Center for Education Statistics. The dataset has 933 variables and
consists of aggregated institutional data from 2000-2010. Unfortunately, the dataset
does not provide individual level variables on student, why it is unsuitable to explain
how race, gender and class are mediated through loan levels in different types of insti-
tutions. As mentioned initially and reported by Eaton & Stewart (2013: 9f) earlier stud-
ies clearly indicate that minorities and students with lower socioeconomic status are par-
ticularly affected and increasingly turn to student loans
Research question
How have different types of private and public institutions of higher educa-‐
tion impacted students differentially through provision of loans?
Variables
As dependent variable I choose the average student loan debt over time. Another
possibility to answer hypothesis A1 is to measure the probability for being an indebted
student. As seen below the two different variables show the same tendency and almost a
doubling in average student loans in the period from 2002 to 2012.
As data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Consumer Credit Panel shows the
average student loan debt owed by Californians rose from 16.600 $ in 2004 to 25.700 $
in 2012. Concurrently, the share of current and former students with student debt in-
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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creased from 15 % in 2004 to 23 % in 2012 (Eaton & Stewart, 2013: 8f). It is plausible
that my findings will confirm some of the above findings.
As the primary independent variable I use the different types of institutions. The
college and university system in United States consist of three different types of institu-
tions. 1) Public community colleges and universities, 2) private non-profit institutions
and 3) private for-profit institutions. The national Institute for Education science also
divides institutions according to the length of enrollment, which also is a relevant pa-
rameter for how long students can accumulate student loans. The three types of institu-
tions above are therefore in the following analysis and in the database split between in-
stitutions with enrollment length of a) 4-year and b) 2-year. There is prior evidence to
suggest that the composition of lower income groups at private institutions is higher, and
more students at private for-profit institutions turn to loans. E.g. the College Board finds
that students here cover 37 % expenses through loans compared to an average of 26 %
(College Board, March 2013).
Type of
institution
Public,
4-year
or above
Private not-
for-profit,
4-year or
above
Private
for-profit,
4-year or
above
Public, 2-
year
Private not-
for-profit,
2-year
Private
for-
profit,
2-year
Frequency
in %
15 34 10 21 4 17
Type of institution
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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Empirical evidence For the selected data there was 36534 unique cases distributed over 11 years
with 3.321 unique institutions of higher education. Public institutions form 36 % and
private not-for-profit institutions form 38 %. In contrast private not-for-profits only
represent 4 % of 2-year institutions, whereas public 2-year institutions and private for-
profit institutions represent respectively 21 % and 17 % of the institution population.
The institutional data do not adjust for how many students each institution has.
Figure 1
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
Public, 4-‐year or above Private not-‐for-‐prodit, 4-‐year or
Private for-‐prodit, 4-‐year or above Public, 2-‐year
Private not-‐for-‐prodit, 2-‐year Private for-‐prodit, 2-‐year
Total
Average amount of student loans received by full-‐time Qirst-‐time degree/certiQicate-‐seeking undergraduates *
Sector of Institution
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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Figure 2
Figure 1 and 2 show students’ amount of student loan from different types of institu-
tion. Both figures indicate that private for-profit institutions have students with the
highest amount and percentage of student loans, followed by private not for profits.
Public institutions have less student loans and are the only ones with a below average
amount. Except, for 2-year private for-profit, where the average amount of student
loans also is below the average, indicating that students in private non-profit institu-
tion tend not to accumulate too much student loans in two years. This theory is rein-
forced by a clear tendency for all 2-year institutions to be below corresponding 4-year
institutions in student loans.
0 20 40 60 80
Public, 4-‐year or Private not-‐for-‐
Private for-‐prodit, 4-‐Public, 2-‐year
Private not-‐for-‐Private for-‐prodit, 2-‐
Total
Percentage of full-‐time Qirst-‐time degree/certiQicate-‐seeking
undergraduates receiving student loans * Sector of
Institution
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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Figure 3
Figure 4
Figure 3 and 4 show a clear correlation between percentage of student with student
loans and average amount of student loans. These indicate that student is affected
equally on their tendency to collect student loans and their tendency to acquire larger
amount of student loan.
Remarkably, the percentage with student loans is constant for 2000-2003, though the
average amount increases over the whole period from 2000 to 2010. The total amount
of student loans increases significantly steep from 2008 to 2009, especially for the
total amount of student loan. Thus, the data indicate that the total amount of student
loans composes the largest variation, and the period of 2008-2009, as the financial
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 2000
2003
2006
2009
Average amount of student loans received by full-‐time Qirst-‐time degree/certiQicate-‐seeking
undergraduates * Academic Year
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 2000
2003
2006
2009
Percentage of full-‐time Qirst-‐time degree/certiQicate-‐seeking
undergraduates receiving student loans * Academic Year
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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crisis kicks in and households and educational institutions respond, has a large impact
for the amount of student loans that today’s student population faces.
All types of educational institutions follow the same trend whether you visualize
student loans as index starting in 2000 or as the total amount. Private for-‐profit 4-‐
year institutions are the only type, which deviate noticeable from the general pat-‐
tern. As the type with highest average amount of student loan they differ with a
slightly larger amount of student loans in 2000-‐2003, a steep decrease to the level
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Average amount of student loan in $ Public, 4-‐year or above
Private not-‐for-‐prodit, 4-‐year or above
Private for-‐prodit, 4-‐year or above
Public, 2-‐year
Private not-‐for-‐prodit, 2-‐year
Private for-‐prodit, 2-‐year
0
50
100
150
200
250
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Average amount of student loan (index 2000) Public, 4-‐year or above
Private not-‐for-‐prodit, 4-‐year or above
Private for-‐prodit, 4-‐year or above
Public, 2-‐year
Private not-‐for-‐prodit, 2-‐year
Private for-‐prodit, 2-‐year
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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of all other types of institutions in 2004 and a steeper increase than the rest since
then and very obvious since 2008. Thus, the private for-‐profit 4-‐year seem to re-‐
spond to the general rising trend in student loans not by lowering their relative
amount of student loans but instead expanding it. This is noticeable especially for
the two last years in the dataset, 2009 and 2010, where we see that the increase in
student loans is larger than the average annual increase. This trend is visible, as the
latest cases for all types of institutions tend to be above the trendline in figure 5
and 6.
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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Conclusion
The average debt in student loans correlates unambiguously with the length of
study and different types of institutions. Private institutions and especially for-profit
institutions tend to have student with higher odds to have student loans and a higher
average for the student loan.
The results show large increase in the overall student loan absorbed by stu-
dents. One noticeable finding is that private-for-profit institutions tend to be slightly
more responsive and vary, when exogenous chock, such as the period of 2003-2004
and the financial crisis, affect student loans over time. In this manner Mettler theory
of the submerged state and Morgan & Campbell theory of the delegated state can ac-
count for, why we see a variation in student loans by different educational institutions.
This preliminary study calls for further studies of students loan in international
perspective and analysis of the actors involved and outcomes in forms of interest rates
on loans, default for student and especially, a disaggregated analysis of the composi-
tion of student. So far we can only can assume but not substantiate, how socioeco-
nomic variables affect the analysis and the IPEDS dataset. Thus, one way forward is
to link the IPEDS data to other resources, such as the U.S. Survey of Consumer Fi-
nance.
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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Literature
College Board (2013), Visited April 16, 2014 at https://www.collegeboard.org
Davis, G. F. (2009). Managed by the markets: How finance re-‐shaped America. Ox-‐
ford University Press.
Eaton, Charlie and Stewart, Brian, (2013) Wall Street & California’s Student Debt
Crisis, Issue brief, Center On Culture, Organizations and Politics, Institute for Re-‐
search on Labor and Employment, University of California, Berkeley
Eaton, C., Goldstein, A., Habinek, J., Kumar, M., Stover, T. L., & Roehrkasse, A.
(2013 A). Bankers in the Ivory Tower: The Financialization of Governance at the
University of California.
Eaton, Charlie, Jacob Habinek, Mukul Kumar, Tamera Lee Stover and Alex Roehr-
kasse, (2013 B) Swapping our Future
Eaton, Charlie, Dioun, Cyrus, Godoy, Daniela García Santibáñez, Goldstein, Adam, Habinek, Jacob and Osley-Thomas, Robert (2014). Financialization
and Higher Education: Accumulation from Postsecondary Education Activities to the
Financial Sector, 2002 to 2012
Hall, P. and Soskice, D., Varieties of Capitalism, 2001; p. 1-68
Hacker, Jacob S. The Divided Welfare State: The Batle over Public and Private
Social Benefits in the United States. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
2002.
Hacker, J. S. (2004). Privatizing risk without privatizing the welfare state: The hidden
politics of social policy retrenchment in the United States. American Political Science
Review, 98(02), 243-260.
Fligstein N. and McAdam, D., “Towards a theory of strategic action fields”, 2011,
Sociological Theory
Granovetter M., “Economic action and social structure: the problem of embed-‐
dedness” American Journal of Sociology
Lin ,K. and Tomaskovic-‐Devey, D. “Financialization and U.S. Income Inequality,
1970–2008” American Journal of Sociology 2013 118: 1284–1329
Meister, B. (2011). Debt and Taxes: Can the Financial Industry Save Public Uni-‐
versities?. Representations, 116(1), 128-‐155.
Morgan, K. J., & Campbell, A. L. (2011). The delegated welfare state: Medicare,
markets, and the governance of social policy (Vol. 1). Oxford University Press.
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Mettler, S. (2010). Reconstituting the submerged state: The challenges of social poli-
cy reform in the Obama era. Perspectives on Politics, 8(03), 803-824.
Polyani K., The Great Transformation, 1944
Rajan, R. G. (2011). Fault lines: How hidden fractures still threaten the world econ-‐
omy. Princeton University Press.
Scott W.R. “Contemporary institutional theory” ch. 3 in W.R. Scott Institutions
and Organizations, Sage, 1995
The Institute for College Access & Succes (2014)
(http://projectonstudentdebt.org -‐ visited April 16, 14)
Rothstein, J., & Rouse, C. E. (2011). Constrained after college: Student loans and
early-‐career occupational choices. Journal of Public Economics, 95(1), 149-‐163.
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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Appendix A
Sector of Institution
Frequen-
cy Percent Valid Per-
cent Cumulative
Percent Valid 1 5393 14,8 14,8 14,8
2 12247 33,5 33,5 48,3 3 3454 9,5 9,5 57,7 4 7575 20,7 20,7 78,5 5 1459 4,0 4,0 82,5 6 6406 17,5 17,5 100,0 Total 36534 100,0 100,0
Average amount of student loans received by full-time first-time degree/certificate-
seeking undergraduates * Academic Year Average amount of student loans received by full-time first-time degree/certificate-seeking un-dergraduates Academic Year Mean N
Std. Devia-tion
2000 3333,26 3092 1704,347 2001 3460,23 3139 1817,024 2002 3689,80 3205 1974,977 2003 4017,58 3269 2429,492 2004 3954,13 3286 1918,094 2005 4209,67 3282 2023,039 2006 4500,14 3409 2443,316 2007 4793,82 3464 2605,908 2008 5530,84 3518 2535,083 2009 6691,60 3165 2726,120 2010 6696,00 3705 2571,083 Total 4662,19 36534 2557,583
Average amount of student loans received by full-time first-time degree/certificate-seeking
undergraduates * Sector of Institution Average amount of student loans received by full-time first-time degree/certificate-seeking under-graduates
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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Sector of Insti-tution Mean N
Std. Devia-tion
1 3909,56 5393 1500,209 2 4937,14 12247 2237,736 3 7210,15 3454 3500,506 4 2882,42 7575 1245,056 5 4336,23 1459 2286,051 6 5575,16 6406 2736,077 Total 4662,19 36534 2557,583
Percentage of full-time first-time de-
gree/certificate-seeking undergraduates re-ceiving student loans * Academic Year
Percentage of full-time first-time de-gree/certificate-seeking undergraduates receiv-ing student loans Academic Year Mean N
Std. Devia-tion
2000 50,22 3092 27,623 2001 50,43 3139 27,765 2002 50,63 3205 27,780 2003 52,75 3269 27,850 2004 54,07 3286 28,219 2005 54,82 3282 27,535 2006 55,85 3409 27,187 2007 55,73 3464 27,637 2008 57,28 3518 27,546 2009 61,00 3165 26,831 2010 61,96 3705 26,846 Total 55,11 36534 27,784
Percentage of full-time first-time de-gree/certificate-seeking undergraduates re-ceiving student loans * Sector of Institution
Percentage of full-time first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduates receiving student loans Sector of Insti-tution Mean N
Std. Devia-tion
1 47,06 5393 18,829 2 63,40 12247 20,452 3 74,94 3454 22,345
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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4 22,51 7575 19,709 5 60,06 1459 24,711 6 72,79 6406 21,542 Total 55,11 36534 27,784
Report Average amount of student loans received by full-time first-time degree/certificate-seeking undergraduates in $ Sector of Insti-tution
Academic Year Mean N
Std. Devia-tion
1 2000 2866,87 490 1015,366 2001 2966,89 493 982,162 2002 3067,33 490 935,236 2003 3175,59 491 945,381 2004 3368,72 493 968,678 2005 3683,27 496 1150,010 2006 3815,44 501 1142,004 2007 4040,43 501 1185,269 2008 4770,86 505 1289,201 2009 5633,01 414 1483,663 2010 5760,65 519 1336,418 Total 3909,56 5393 1500,209
2 2000 3720,21 1087 1715,900 2001 3673,97 1105 1495,679 2002 3889,55 1112 1527,956 2003 4263,88 1130 1948,487 2004 4353,13 1116 1721,282 2005 4587,84 1125 1785,506 2006 4816,44 1134 2203,309 2007 5062,65 1141 2153,391 2008 6019,39 1149 2131,352 2009 7057,91 997 2237,234 2010 6956,91 1151 2025,312 Total 4937,14 12247 2237,736
3 2000 4485,96 217 1784,267 2001 5372,19 237 2488,786 2002 5964,73 246 3109,786 2003 6403,31 265 3845,409 2004 5453,76 270 2815,619
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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2005 6145,16 276 3094,431 2006 6764,60 344 3802,136 2007 7490,94 350 3931,571 2008 7913,78 375 3240,379 2009 9500,87 414 2497,272 2010 9727,27 460 2464,490 Total 7210,15 3454 3500,506
4 2000 2168,66 690 984,023 2001 2196,87 689 1043,926 2002 2353,46 704 984,004 2003 2501,03 690 963,116 2004 2601,61 704 938,304 2005 2685,69 693 954,314 2006 2706,48 694 920,638 2007 2808,64 714 1016,879 2008 3410,94 720 1052,261 2009 4042,68 555 1193,568 2010 4384,76 722 1283,012 Total 2882,42 7575 1245,056
5 2000 3439,25 136 2246,451 2001 3295,99 136 1903,054 2002 3591,32 139 1603,591 2003 3972,29 146 2553,334 2004 3864,68 148 1626,278 2005 3884,70 139 1695,965 2006 4347,89 127 2034,569 2007 4598,34 133 2111,171 2008 5130,95 126 2351,098 2009 6173,47 111 2405,660 2010 6135,29 118 2386,493 Total 4336,23 1459 2286,051
6 2000 4068,29 472 1779,156 2001 4392,73 479 2125,173 2002 4619,26 514 2361,552 2003 5033,89 547 3025,956 2004 4681,77 555 2184,473 2005 4937,96 553 2032,329 2006 5271,08 609 2370,107 2007 5706,03 625 2701,978 2008 6317,08 643 2730,680
Malte Nyfos Mathiasen University of California at Berkeley May 12, 2014 Professor Neil Fligstein SOC 280Q
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2009 7340,96 674 2870,390 2010 7411,15 735 2654,706 Total 5575,16 6406 2736,077
Total 2000 3333,26 3092 1704,347 2001 3460,23 3139 1817,024 2002 3689,80 3205 1974,977 2003 4017,58 3269 2429,492 2004 3954,13 3286 1918,094 2005 4209,67 3282 2023,039 2006 4500,14 3409 2443,316 2007 4793,82 3464 2605,908 2008 5530,84 3518 2535,083 2009 6691,60 3165 2726,120 2010 6696,00 3705 2571,083 Total 4662,19 36534 2557,583