finals case digest in persons & family relations

Divino B. Miag-ao First Year LlB Persons and Family Relations Atty. Jansyl Lovan P. Tumanda

FINALS CASE DIGEST

Marcelo Castillo, Jr. vs. Macaria PascoG.R. No. L-16857 May 29, 1964

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

In this case, a fishpond is the bone of contention by the petitioners headed by Marcello Castillo Jr. on one hand and Macaria Pasco, his mother. Petitioners contend that the fishpond in question was acquired during the marriage of Marcelo Castillo Sr. and Macaria Pasco thus, should be considered conjugal for its having been acquired during coverture. The CA found that the fishpond was acquired thru Macaria’s own money being a woman of means even before she married Marcelo Castillo, Sr.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE:

Whether or not the fishpond is a property solely owned by Maria Pasco.

SUPREME COURT’S DECISION

It is not gain said that under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that was the applicable law in 1932, the property acquired for onerous consideration during the marriage was deemed conjugal or separate property depending on the source of the funds employed for its acquisition. Thus, Article 1396 of said Code provided:

ART. 1396. The following is separate property spouse:1…2…3…4. That bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife or to the husband.

On the other hand, Article 1401, prescribed that:

ART. 1401. To the conjugal property belong:

1. Property acquired for valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses only.

As the litigated fishpond was purchased partly with paraphernal funds and partly with money of the conjugal partnership, justice requires that the property be held to belong to both patrimonies in common, in proportion to the contributions of each to the total purchase price of P6,000. An undivided one-sixth (1/6) should be deemed paraphernalia and the remaining five-sixths (5/6) held property of the conjugal partnership of spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco.

It follows from the foregoing that, as the fishpond was undivided property of the widow and the conjugal partnership with her late husband, the heirs of the latter, appellants herein, were entitled to ask for partition thereof and liquidation of its proceeds. The ultimate interest of each party must be resolved after due hearing, taking into account (a) the widow's one-sixth direct share; (b) her half of the community property; (e) her successional rights to a part of the husband's share pursuant to the governing law of succession when the

husband died; and (d) the widow's right to reimbursement for any amounts advanced by her in paying the mortgage debt as aforesaid. All these details must be settled after proper trial.

WHEREFORE, the dismissal of the original complaint is hereby revoked and set aside, and the records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this opinion.

Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio LantinG.R. No. L-22320 May 22, 1968

SUMMARY OF FACTS

Petitioner Damaso P. Perez (Damaso for brevity) owed to respondent Ricardo P. Hermoso (Ricardo for brevity) for the latter’s failure to pay his purchases of leather materials used in his shoe manufacturing business. As a result Ricardo commenced a civil case in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge) against the petitioner Damaso. The petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money judgment by repeatedly invoking Article 160 of the New Civil Code which provides that "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT ISSUE

Whether or not the shares of stocks is conjugal property that cannot be levied in order to pay for a spouse’s indebtedness.


After a thorough review of the record, we hold that the respondent Judge acted correctly in refusing to quash the writ in dispute.

xxx xxx xxx

It bears emphasis that in CA-G.R. 29962-R, Damaso Perez practically asserted exclusive ownership of the levied shares; although he challenged the legality and propriety of the levy with respect to its excessive coverage, he never raised the question of the conjugal nature of the levied shares. Having represented himself before the court a quo and in the Court of Appeals as the exclusive owner of the shares in dispute, he is now precluded from asserting that the levied shares are conjugal assets, an assertion that he should have advanced with expected alacrity when he first question the legality of the levy.

Coming now to the other petitioner, Mrs. Perez, although she was not a party in CA-G.R. 29962-R, the judgment therein similarly binds her for she stands in privity with her husband. Moreover, she cannot feign utter ignorance of the affairs of her husband as to justify her delay in questioning the legality of the levy on the ground aforestated in civil case 7532, which case was commenced only on January 22, 1963, 17 months after the original levy was made on August 23, 1961.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby dissolved. Treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel.

Jose Modequillo vs. Hon. Augusto V. BrevaG.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990

SUMMARY OF FACTS

Petitioner Jose Modequillo was the defendant in CA-G.R. CV No. 09218 case entitled "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al. whose decision ordered Jose Modequillo to pay by way of compensation and other damages for the death of plaintiff’s son. The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay.

A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by Petitioner alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code.

In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by defendant and this was denied for lack of merit on September 2, 1988.


Is the family home of Petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited.


No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.

As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

Joey D. Briones vs. Maricel P. MiguelG.R. No. 156343. October 18, 2004

SUMMARY OF FACTS

Petitioner Joey D. Briones had an illegitimate son by Loreta P. Miguel in the latter’s custody. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan. In the school year 2000-2001, the petitioner enrolled him at the nursery school of Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City, where he finished the nursery course.

As alleged by Petitioner, respondents came to the house of the petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and requested that they be allowed to bring the said child for recreation at a mall. They promised him that they will bring him back in the afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring him back as promised by them. After efforts to recover custody of the child proved futile, Petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda


Whether or not Petitioner, as the natural father, should have custody of the child.


Obviously, Michael is a natural (“illegitimate,” under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing in the records showing that his parents were suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to Article 176, parental authority over him resides in his mother, Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his father’s recognition of him.

David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a case, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.

There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has the right to keep him in her company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she may not even renounce or transfer it “except in the cases authorized by law.”

Dionesio Naldoza vs. Republic of the PhilippinesG.R. No. L-55538 March 15, 1982

SUMMARY OF FACTS

Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto who were born on October 23, 1970 and July 22, 1973, respectively were children of Dionesio Divinagracia and Zosima Naldoza. Dionesio left Zosima after he was confronted about his previous marriage with another woman and never came back to their conjugal home. Dionesio was rumoured to have allegedly swindled a congressman and two other persons thereby earning the moniker “swindler”. Desirous of erasing the discomfiting link between her two minor children and their father, Zosima filed a petition wherein she prayed that the surname of her two children be changed from Divinagracia to Naldoza, her surname. After due publication and hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition.


Whether Dionesio Divinagracia, Jr., and Bombi Roberto Divinagracia should be allowed to discontinue using their father's surname and should use only their mother's surname.


The minors Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto, who are presumably legitimate, are supposed to bear principally the surname Divinagracia, their father's surname (Art. 364, Civil Code).

To allow them, at their mother's behest, to bear only their mother's surname (which they are entitled to use together with their father's surname) and to discard altogether their father's surname thus removing the prima-facie evidence of their paternal provenance or ancestry, is a serious matter in which, ordinarily, the minors and their father should be consulted. The mother's desire should not be the sole consideration.

The change of name is allowed only when there are proper and reasonable causes for such change (Sec. 5, Rule 103, Rules of Court). Where, as in this case, the petitioners are minors, the courts should take into account whether the change of name would redound their welfare or would prejudice them.

We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for change of name. The reasons adduced for eliminating the father's surname are not substantial enough to justify the petition. To allow the change of surname would cause confusion as to the minors' parentage and might create the impression that the minors are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only. That would be inconsistent with their legitimate status as indicated in their birth records (Exh. C and D).

finals case digest in persons & family relations

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