final stsm londonucl report

8/18/2019 Final STSM LondonUCL Report

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21/97

MEGAPROJECT Case Study

Basic Project Information

Case compiled by: ...............................

Contact details: ...............................

Project Title High Speed 1 (HS1) – Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL)

Location LONDON-KENT, UK

Purpose Regional HSR in UK: increase rail capacity and reduce journey times between Londonand the Channel Tunnel. Link London with Paris and Brussels.

Scope Integrated with Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)

LENGTH: 113KMIN TUNNEL: 26KM

Total Project Value 9.63bn (In 2010 USD)

Project Status(i.e.. initiation, planning,

construction, operation, dismantling)

Planning start date: 1974Construction start date: 10/1998

Operation start date: 11/2007

Relevant Physical

Dimensions (e.g. height, width,volume, length)

LENGTH: 113KM; IN TUNNEL: 26KM NUMBER OF BRIDGES: 152

COST PER KM (2010 USD): 0.085BNThe Link was built in two sections – Section 1: Channel Tunnel to Fawkham Junction (constructed

from October 1998 to September 2003) and Section 2: Southfleet Junction to St Pancras (constructedfrom July 2001 to November 2007).

SECTION 1 - BASIC PROJECT INFORMATION

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Case compiled by: ...............................

Contact details: ...............................

Contractual Framework

(e.g. fixed price, cost-plus etc.)!"#$%#&' )*+ ,"-.%/ 0 12+ ,3%4567


MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification


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Stakeholder

Category

Case-Study Comments

(e.g. maturity, previous

experiences of

stakeholders, skills,influence on project)

I n t er n al

Supply-Side Client BRITISH RAIL (BR) & DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT

Financiers LCR (WITH GOVERNMENT BACKING)

Sponsors BRITISH RAIL (BR) & DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT

Client’sCustomers

General public (passengers)

Client’s Owners UK Government

Other internal

supply-side

categories

( please specify)

Category Case-Study

(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)

SECTION 2 - PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS



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Stakeholder

Category

Case-Study

I n t er n al

Demand

Side )

Principal Contractor CONCESSIONAIRE: LONDON & CONTINENTAL RAILWAYS (LCR) composed by Arup,

Bechtel, Halcrow and SystraRAIL LINK ENGINEERING/LCR. Union Railways (URL) is formed to pursue the project.

First Tier

Contractors

RAIL LINK ENGINEERING (RLE) / LCR Project Manager

General:

Union Railways (URL). The LCR (acquiring ownership of Union Railways Ltd and European

Passenger Services Ltd).

Main contractors on section 1:

Alfred McAlpine Construction, Co-contractor AMEC Civil Engineering

Eurolink JV (Miller Civil Engineering, Dumez GTM, Beton-und Monlerbau), Co-contractor

Beton- und Monierbau Gesellschaft.m.b.H. Morgan Est, Vinci Construction Grands Projects

Hochtief/Norwest Holst JV, Co-contractor Hochtief (UK) Construction Ltd, Norwest Holst

Construction. Kvaerner Construction Ltd, Skanska Construction UK Ltd. Balfour Beatty

Construction

Second Tier

Consultants

Over 40 consultants were involved together with the Treasury, DOE and DTp.

Professional

Services Providers

London Regeneration Consortium (the developers of the 135 acres of derelict railway lands at

King's Cross). Foster Associates are the Masterplanners. Sir Alexander Gibb & Partners.

Consulting service

Other internalsupply-side

categories

Category Case-StudyRailtrack is created to operate, maintain and develop the railway infrastructure of

England (and Scotland and Wales). In 1998 LCR won its concession.





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I n t er n al



MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification


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Stakeholder

Category

Case-Study Comments

E x t er n al

Public RegulatoryAgencies

Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR)LOOK FOR SAFETY REGULATORY

Local Government Local authorities along the route, Newham Council (East London) in particular.

National

Government

UK Parliament

Department for Transport (DfT) / Department of Transport (DoT)

Other internal

supply-side

categories ( please

specify)

Category Case-study

Pressure Groups

Forums & meetings (Chaired by the Minister of Transport, comprised

representatives from all local authorities along the route)Land acquisition for Section 1 was carried out by Union Railways

(South) as agent of the Secretary of State.

Private Local residents The Rail Link Countryside Initiative (RLCI)

Local Landowners RLCI

Environmentalists RLCI

Conservationists

Archaeologists

Other ExternalPrivate

stakeholders

(please specify)

Category Case-study Unsucessful Bidders, they promoted different roads

The CTRL Complaints Commissioner, was established as a result of an

Assurance given to Parliament during the passage of the CTRL Bill.

King's Cross Railway Lands Community Development Group

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification


(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)

MEGAPROJECT Stakeholder Relationship Maps


27/97

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ExternalStakeholder

External Stakeholder’s Attitudeto this Project

External Stakeholder’s Influenceon project

Impact of Projecton ExternalStakeholder

Phase of Project ofGreatest Interest

(initiation, planning,

construction,operation, dismantling)

Kent CountyCouncil

Significantly influenced thesouthern route of the Link andinsisted on the inclusion of Ashford

as one of the stations.In 1989, They refuse the routes

contained in the BR report in 1988.

Impact of fasterand more frequenttrains

Initiation/Planning

CamdenCouncil’s

In 1988, it notes the need toimprove the transport interchange,

provide housing, employment andrecreation for local people.

Initiation/Planning

National mediainterest, protestgroups formed,

Local residents

In 1988/89, public reaction waswholly adverse. Demonstrationsby S. London & Kent communities

which culminated in a majordemonstration in Trafalgar

Square.

The east London route was

extensively supported by lobbygroups such as the Stratford

Promoter Group.

82 petitions lodged in Parliamentagainst Private Bill authorisingconstruction of CTRL Terminal at

King's Cross

Initiation/Planning

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude Analysis


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ExternalStakeholder

External Stakeholder’s Attitudeto this Project

External Stakeholder’s Influenceon project

Impact of Projecton ExternalStakeholder

Phase of Project ofGreatest Interest

(initiation, planning,

construction,operation, dismantling)

LondonBorough ofNewham

Became a serious opponent of theKing’s Cross Bill, and inNovember 1989 organized a

conference as part of its efforts topromote an easterly approach with

a station rather than a terminus atStratford – an idea supported byJohn Prescott, the Labour shadow

Secretary of State for Transport.

It lobbied successfully for aninternational station at Stratford aspart of a wider urban regeneration

project.

Initiation/Planning

ECCommissioner

Infringement Proceedings arebrought against the UnitedKingdom Government for the

Environment in respect of theimplementation of EC Directive

85/337/EEC on the EnvironmentalImpact Assessments of theChannel Tunnel Rail Link.

Initiation/Planning

EbbsfleetInternationalStation

MEGAPROJECT Project Management


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Project Organisation

Client Project Team Size &Structure

Contractor Project Team Sizeand Structure

Sub-Contractor Project TeamInvolvement

Project Tools and TechniquesPlease ! if present, x if absent , leave blank if unknown

Life-Cycle Costing Approaches"

Stakeholder Involvement"

Building Information Modelling (BIM)"

Project Management Software"

Relationship Management Tools"

Project Knowledge Management Tools"

Lessons Learnt Transfers"

Team Building Tools"

Competency framework"

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HR Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information!

Procurement Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information!

Integration Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information!

Scope Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information!

Time Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information!

Cost Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information!

Quality management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information!

Communications Management

Processes

Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information!

SECTION 3 - PROJECT MANAGEMENT

!

MEGAPROJECT Project Performance


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Aspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Project Right

Original Targets and changes to targets Actual Achievements Against

TargetsPerformance relating to

timeConstruction start:

Section 1 – Forecast: 1998, Actual: 1998

Section 2 – Forecast: 2001, Actual: 2001

Construction completion:

Section 1 – Forecast: 2003, Actual: 2003Section 2 – Forecast: 2007, Actual: 2007

Months in planning: 264Months in construction: 109

Project completed: 48 months

behind schedule

SECTION 4 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE



34/97


Original Targets and changes to targets Actual Achievements

Against TargetsPerformancerelating to

cost

BR’s cost estimates for the Link increased steadily from GBP0.4bn in 1986 to GBP 1.255bn for Section 1 alone in 1990.

At Royal Assent in December 1996, the estimated construction

cost of the Link was GBP 3bni (USD 6.13bn at 2010 prices).

In 1998 the target construction cost agreed between LCR and the

UK Department of Transport, for sections 1 and 2 includingallowances for inflation, was GBP 5.233bnii.

The final cost for Sections 1 and 2 was GBP 5.8bn (USD 9.63bn

at 2009 prices) – 10% above the cost agreed in 1998 and 57%

above the cost estimated at Royal Assent in 1996, adjusted forinflation.

Costs (in 2010 USD)Predicted cost: 6.14bn

Actual cost: 9.63bn

Project completed: 57%

over budget




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Original Targets and changes to targets Actual Achievements Against Targets

Performancerelated to achieving

specification

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Aspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right Project

Stakeholder orStakeholder Grouping

Original Aims of ProjectInvolvement and Changes to these

Aims

Achievement of these Aims

Described in PROJECT PROFILE


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MEGAPROJECT Project Environment


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Legal and Regulatory Environment

Legal and

Regulatory ProjectEnvironment

(regionally, nationally

and Europe wide)

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Political Environment

PoliticalProject

Environment

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Economic Environment

EconomicProject

Environment

The project’s reliance on private sector funding dates from its conception and was at the insistence of the Prime Ministerof the time (Margaret Thatcher). This situation (at least in its rhetoric) continued beyond 1997, despite the change ingovernment. LCR was responsible for financing its construction and operation, but the government agreed to provide

GBP 1.7bn funding and development rights around Kings Cross and Stratford stations, and guaranteed LCR’s debt.However, LCR was unable to raise the GBP 0.8bn equity and GBP 3-4bn debt finance needed to build the Link.

Escalating costs and reduced passenger forecasts were cited as reasons. The government refused to provide more grantfunding, but agreed a financial restructuring with LCR, involving the sale and leaseback of trains, in 1998. Revenue andpatronage have continued since to be below forecast. In 2010, the 30 year concession was sold to a Canadian pension

plan for GBP 2.1 bn.

SpecificEconomic

Events

impacting on

the project

/

Financing

and funding

1987: The Channel Tunnel Act specifically said that no Government support would be forthcoming for the construction ofa new rail link.The fixed link was to be privately financed, owned and operated – no public subsidy could be given. But, under the

Channel Tunnel act the public sector was legally obliged to:- procure, at its own expense, substantial (connecting) new and upgraded infrastructure works plus rolling stock

for international passenger and freight services;- set (jointly with SNCF) fixed tolls (subject to a guaranteed minimum) revenue to Eurotunnel for a given period

in return for half the operating capacity (necessary for Eurotunnel to raise finance).

1991: The BR & Eurorail joint venture had originally required £1,900 million of public sector money to be either committedor placed at risk during the early stages of construction. The Government felt that some of the risks could be better

managed by the private sector and therefore decided that the project should proceed as part of the Private FinanceInitiative (PFI).1997: LCR approached the Department of Transport to obtain a relaxation of the contract – this effectively asked the

Department to increase its financial risk in the project by £230 million.LCR's announcement that second stage financing could not be reached, the Department of Transport considered itsoptions and instructed its advisers to scrutinise the demand forecasts for Eurostar UK.

1998: The Deputy Prime Minister announced the failure of LCR to raise funds to build the CTRL without a further sum of£1.2 billion from the Government. LCR would have to find the money some other way.

1999: Re-financing completed with a successful bond issue (£2.65bn).

SECTION 5 - PROJECT ENVIRONMENT

MEGAPROJECT Project Key Events and Activities Timeline


40/97

Events and activitiesrelating to project

stakeholders


management

6%`7

SECTION 6 - PROJECT TIMELINE

2*12

CONCEPTION:British Railways(BR) & French

Railways (SNCF)work on

combined rail

scheme between2 capital cities

BR proposed a

new terminal. AnInterchange inSellindge (Kent)

was alsoproposed by BR

should Frenchtrains not be ableto penetrate

further into UKwithout theconstruction of a

new line.

2*1)

CONCEPTION:BR firstproposes link

2*1X 2*1\2*YX

INITIATION:British andFrench

Governmentsagreed that a

bored railtunnel underthe Channel

would be a

good

investment.

2*YY

INITIATION: An agreementwas signed

for the privatesector to build

and finance atunnel –Government-

guaranteed

loans would

cover most ofthe cost.

INITIATION: The UK andFrench

governments,SNCF, BR and

the British andFrench tunnelcompanies

signed

contracts,

which ;laterresulted in aTreaty (1986)

Major publicoppositionresulted, in light

of fears about theimpact of faster

and morefrequent trains.

INITIATION:TheGovernment

abandoned theChannel Tunnel

idea anddecided toconcentrate

(with France)

which was an

easier politicaloption.


environment


performance


6%`7


41/97


stakeholders


management

6%`7


CONTEXT:UK andFrance sign

ChannelTunnel Treaty

2*[Y 2*[1

CONTEXT:Channel Tunnelact rules out

public funding forinternational

services

2*[2

INITIATION:BR andSNCF

reachedagreement to

build atunnel.

INITIATION: Secretary of Statefor Transport of

both countriesannounce willing

to give thenecessary politicalguarantees to

facilitate fixed link

(however withoutpublic financialsupport).

2*[X

The ChannelTunnelconcession was

awarded to TransManche Link (later

Eurotunnel).

Constraintpoints forpassenger

services at Ashford were to

be remodelled

and a newInternational

Stationconstructed.

INCEPTION: BR study of routeand terminal

capacity.Four terminal

options was

defined: White City,King's Cross,

London Bridge andStratford.

INCEPTION: BR invitestenders for

joint venturepartner.

Eurorailselected

2*[[ 2*[*

Governmentestablished theprinciple of private

sector involvement.


environment


performance


6%`7


42/97


stakeholders


management


performance


environment

6%`7


2**_

DELAY:BR’s jointventure with

Euroraildisbanded

2**2

Evaluation ofroute options

Governmentannounces

constructionwill be jointventure under

private finance

initiative

Publicconsultationon preferred

route.Channel

Tunnel RailLink bill inparliament

2**X 2**\ 2**Y

CONTEXT:Thamesgateway

planningframework

published

CTRL bill gainsroyal assent.Environmental

impact study.LCR

Appointed asconcessionaire(./3 AIaD


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stakeholders


management


performance


environment

6%`7


2**10*[

DELAY:LCR unable toraise sufficient

finance. Financialrestructuring

agreed

CONSTRUCTION:Construction ofstage 1 begins

)__2

The Deputy PrimeMinister signsagreement to

secure completionof the CTRL.

DELIVERY:Stage 1 opens

)__Z )__1 )__*

DELIVERY:Stage 2 opens

DELIVERY:Impact study

)_2_

DELIVERY:Concessionsold to

Canadianpension plan

CONSTRUCTION:Construction ofstage 2 begins

MEGAPROJECT Case StudyCase compiled by: ...............................

! )*+,- . 0 2.3


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Contact details: ...............................

Project Title !"#$%&' )*&+ ,-./012304.526

Location '#&78"+9$:#'#& ,;!#&978)7-6

Purpose *2?/.2@A52@B ?.@20C5.? BD2E F.@209#1.5C/@2 &/?G5.EH;.500945.3/. ./ID52@B 3/J/B5CK/2?)5L@B @D.C5.? BD2E

Scope TransnationalIntegrated with Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)

Total Project Value MHNO42 9 ?122/B0P OHQ42R [email protected]/P OHSS42R 4.D3I/0P NHT42 (in 2010 USD)

Project Status(i.e.. initiation, planning,

construction, operation, dismantling)

Planning start date: 1984Construction start date: 10/1993

Operation start date: 07/2000

Relevant PhysicalDimensions (e.g. height, width,volume, length)

F!F8) )#&>F=P UM+7"8*)P MV+7 R "!8'P SV+7 R W"*'>#P UHX+7 R F%&)P M+78"F*Y*;*8) *$)8&'P NHS+7V


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MEGAPROJECT Case StudyCase compiled by: ...............................C d il


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Contact details: ...............................

ContractualFramework(e.g. fixed price,cost-plus etc.)

Y%&'*&>P NOOZ


46/97

Stakeholder

Category Case-Study Comments

(e.g. maturity, previous experiences of

stakeholders, skills, influence on project)

I n t er n al

Supply-Side Client Denmark and Sweden Governments /The Oresundbro Consortium (OC)

Financiers The Oresundbro Consortium

Sponsors The Oresundbro Consortium, OC (AS Oresund,

Denmark and Svedab AB, Sweden)

Ownership was split equally between theSwedish and Danish states. was

responsible for performing theenvironmental impact assessment (EIA),

projecting, financing, negotiatingcontracts, constructing and operating the

fixed link.

Client’s

Customers General public (passengers)

Client’s Owners Danish and Swedish Governments

Other internal

supply-side

categories

( please specify)

Category Case-Study


Stakeholder Case-Study Comments

MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)


47/97

Category (e.g. maturity, influence on project)I n t er n a

l

Demand

Side ) Principal Contractor Oresund Consortium (SPEs) was responsible for negotiations

with the contractors

First TierContractors

Consortia:The Öresund Tunnel Contractors, a consortium consisting of NCC AB (SE), Dumez-GTM SA (F), John Laing Ltd (UK), E. Pihl & Søn(DK), and Boskalis Westminster (NL) AndÖresund Marine Joint Venture, a consortium of Per Aarsleff A/S(DK), Ballast Nedam Dredging b.v. (NL) and Great Lakes Dredge &Dock Co (USA).

were responsible for theconstruction of the artificial islandand dredging

AndSundlink Contractors, a consortium of Skanska AB (SE), Højgaard &

Schultz (DK), Monberg & Thorsen (DK), and Hochtief AG (Germany)

Responsible for the construction ofthe bridges.

Second Tier

Consultants Consultant VBB VIAK Conducted investigations covering

topics such as sedimentary and

mapping of environmentally

polluted areas

Consultants COWI and VKI Provided investigations and impact

analysis regarding marine fauna

and flora.

Professional

Services Providers

IVL, the Swedish Environmental Research InstituteSwedish national rail administration and Peab AB

Consulting services

Other internal

supply-side

categories

Category Case-Study


MEGAPROJECT Internal Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct legally sanctioned relationship with the project)


48/97

I n t er n al

78*& ;!&F"8;F$


MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)


49/97

Stakeholder


(e.g. maturity, previous

experiences of


E x t er n al

Public RegulatoryAgencies

Swedish National Board for EnvironmentProtection (SNBEP)

Local Government The municipalities of Malmö and Copenhagen. Responsible forplanning tasks such

as land acquisitions.

NationalGovernment

Department of communications (DOC) and the Ministry of traffic (MOT) in theSwedish and Danish governments.

Representatives and officials from the Swedish Road Administration (SRA), the

Swedish Rail Administration (SRAIL), the Swedish State Railways (SSR) andtheir Danish counterparts (DSB)

Denmark Parliament (responsible for juridical authority)

responsible forbackground

investigations andreports as well as

negotiations belowminister level in the

early stages of thepre-construction

phase.

Other internal

supply-side

categories ( please

specify)

Category Case-study

The WRC and the SNBEP were the two main juridicalauthorities for the SwedishEIA.


MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Identification(Stakeholders with a direct interest in the project but with no legal contract)


50/97

Stakeholder


e.g. maturity, previous

experiences of


E x t er n al

Private Local residents

Local Landowners

Environmentalists Environmental Protection Act (EPA), the Natural Resources Act (NRA) and theWater Act (WA). Organized Groups.

Conservationists

Archaeologists Municipality of Malmö Carry out extensivearchaeological

investigationsOther External

Private

stakeholders

(please specify)

Category Case-study was very active inlobbying for the fixed

link.Chamber of Commerce and Industry of SouthernSweden

Private regional actor

The Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute(SMHI) and the Danish Hydraulic Institute (DHI)

were deeply involvedin hydrologicalinvestigations



51/97

MEGAPROJECT External Stakeholder Attitude Analysis External

StakeholderExternal Stakeholder’s Attitude to

this ProjectExternal Stakeholder’s

Influence on projectImpact ofProject onExternal

Phase of Project ofGreatest Interest(initiation planning


52/97


External

Stakeholder

(initiation, planning,construction, operation,

dismantling)

Danish policy Not to allow a link across theOresund before one had been builtacross the Great Belt.

Wider political issues influencedthe timing of the project.

The controversy overenvironmental impacts delayedthe approval process in Sweden.

Initiation/Planning

Swedish NationalRailway Administration

The fixed link across the Oresundwould not imply any strategicimprovement unless a promise of alink across the Fehmarn Belt wasalso discernable somewhere alongthe line.

Initiation/Planning

Department offinance (DOF)

A principal issue was the pricingmechanisms for road and rail traffic.The Danes were adamant that thepricing mechanism for road trafficshould be based on the ferry taxes.

Blocked many proposals andagreement texts.

Initiation/Planning

European Round

Table ofIndustrialists (ERT)

Comprising several important

business representatives, arguedfor a fixed link in its ScanLinkproposal.

Initiation/Planning

The organisationStoppabron(stop the bridge)

They were opposed to the link. Initiation/Planning


ExternalStakeholder

External Stakeholder’s Attitude to this Project External Stakeholder’sInfluence on project

Impact of Projecton ExternalS

Phase of Projectof Greatest


53/97


Stakeholder Interest

The socialdemocratic

leadership ofthe Swedishgovernment

Were strong proponents of the combined road andrailway link between Copenhagen and Malmö, but

there were deep rifts within the party and the issuecaused lots of controversy.

During the 30th social democratic party congressheld in 1987 the issue was hotly contested. Manywithin the party were highly sceptical toward thealternative favoured by the leadership, a commonlypreferred alternative consisting of the railway tunnelbetween Copenhagen and Malmö.

The referendumregarding the

leadership!s proposalwas postponed and aninternal study groupresponsible for furtherinvestigations wasappointed.

Initiation/Planning

Danishsocialdemocrats

Who, although not in government at the time, wereseen as crucial actors.

Danish social democrats. The general opinionseemed to favour a railway tunnel, but the opinionwould however eventually swing in favour of thecombined road and railway link after intensepressure from the Swedish delegation.

Unless the Danish socialdemocrats were positiveabout the project therewas no way for thegovernment in power tosecure support for theproposal in the Danishparliament.

Initiation/Planning

The

Chamber ofCommerceand Industryof SouthernSweden

which, together with its

Danish counterpart, wasvery active in lobbyingfor the fixed link.

Initiation/Planning


ExternalStakeholder

ExternalStakeholder’s Attitude

t thi P j t

External Stakeholder’s Influence on project Impact of Projecton ExternalSt k h ld

Phase of Projectof Greatest

I t t


54/97


to this Project Stakeholder Interest

The Swedish

National Boardfor EnvironmentProtection(SNBEP)

In 1993, they rejected the application for

permission to build and operate the fixed link(from OC) on the following grounds:•

the project might harm the ecologicallysensitive Baltic Sea;

• it might also harm the immediatelysurrounding sea, which was an importantfishing area of national interest; and

• it was viewed as counter-productiveregarding strategies towards an

environmentally adapted transport system.

Initiation/Planning

The municipalityof Malmö

The municipal level hasa very strong position inthe Swedish planningsystem.

Land use reservations for the link and connectinginfrastructure were made as early as themid-1950s.


55/97

Risk Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !

HR Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !

Project Processes


56/97

Procurement Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !

Integration Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !

Scope Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !

Time Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !

Cost Management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !

Quality management Processes Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !

Communications ManagementProcesses

Present (describe below ) !Not Present ! No Information !

SECTION 3 - PROJECT MANAGEMENT

!




57/97

Original Targets and changes to targets Actual Achievements AgainstTargets

Performancerelating to time

Construction start:Forecast: 1993

Actual: 1995

Construction completion:

Forecast: 2000 Actual: 2000

Months in planning: 112Months in construction: 81

Project completed:

#$ %&'()*+(





58/97

Original Targets and changes to targets Actual AchievementsAgainst Targets

Performancerelating to

cost

The main source of cost overrun is the connecting infrastructureon the Danish side, which was close to 70% higher than theestimates made in 1991, but the actual coast-to-coast link andthe connecting infrastructure on the Swedish side were alsosubject to substantial cost overruns.

Costs predicted:

1987: $#+ QHS42 ,#%" NHUM42 D2 VOOU C.DL/061991: $#+ NTHXVT42 ,#%" VHN42 D2 VOOU C.DL/061997: '++ NMHUT42 ,#%" VHSQ42 D2 VOOU C.DL/062000: #%" SHOQU42

The escalating costs are attributed to maritime safety efforts,environmental protection and a third category simply labelled

“other”. Maritime safety efforts account for around 42% of theescalation, while the other two categories account for 34% and24% respectively.

Costs (in 2010 USD)Predicted cost: 2.96 bn

Actual cost:

Total: 4.10 bnTunnels: 0.9BN

Marine: 0.33BNBridges: 1.5BN

Project completed:

SQZ ![#" W%'>#F




O i i l T t d h t t t A t l A hi t


59/97


Performancerelated toachieving

specification

FORECAST TRAFFIC

(2007):

Road: 15,732 VPDRail: 28,000 PPD

ACTUAL TRAFFIC

(2007):





Original Targets and changes to targets Actual Achievements


60/97


Performancerelated toachieving

specification

(cont.)

FORECAST TRAFFIC

(2007):


ACTUAL TRAFFIC

(2007):



Aspects of Performance Concerned with Doing the Right Project

Stakeholder or Original Aims of Project Achievement of these Aims


61/97

Stakeholder orStakeholder Grouping

Original Aims of ProjectInvolvement and Changes to these

Aims

Achievement of these Aims


!,- ./0 12 3456 728- 97-


Legal and Regulatory Environment


62/97

Legal andRegulatory

ProjectEnvironment

(regionally,nationally andEurope wide)

The Oresund link was the first infrastructure project in Sweden entirely financed outside thestate budget. According to a paragraph in the budgetary law, infrastructure should normally be

paid for by state grants using state revenue as the only source of funding.

In Sweden the formal procedure implied that the project had to be tested against different legalframeworks in several juridical instances before gaining approval.Georg Andersson, then minister of communications, explained that the environmental inquirycould influence the shape and design of the fixed link, but not the actual building of it.

In Denmark a special law is usually passed for large projects. This law, which is formulated by

the responsible ministry (in this case the ministry of traffic), regulates the entire project andconsists of elements from the legislative framework which are deemed appropriate for theproject.

The level of user fees for road traffic are regulated by the Oresund Consortium but according tothe 1991 agreement between the governments the price for crossing the link must be set usingthe price of the ferry route between Helsingborg and Elsinore as a point of departure.

Specific Legal

and Regulatoryevents

impacting on

the project

1985: Denmark signed the EC directive regarding environmental impact assessments (EIA).1991: The preparations of the law concerning the fixed link a number of environmentalinvestigations were carried out which were presented in the report Miljö Öresund



Political Environment


63/97

PoliticalProject

Environment

Since the 1950s a great number of investigations and reports (more or less realistic and/orpolitically feasible) about the benefits of a fixed link across the Oresund were produced in both

Sweden and Denmark. An agreement to build a fixed link was signed by the governments in1973, but the energy and economy crisis, as well as Denmark!s decision to join the EC andincreasing environmental awareness meant that the plans came to a halt.

Since a fixed link across the Oresund had been a vision backed by the political establishmentin Malmö for a much longer time than in Copenhagen the matter of land acquisition differs quitesubstantially between the two municipalities. In Malmö land for the connecting infrastructurehad been reserved since the 1950s. In the 1956 general plan a zone was reserved for the

connecting infrastructure (then thought of as a highway).

SpecificPolitical

Events

impacting on

the project

1987-1991: The handling of the project was shifted towards the political sphere with theleading politicians in the Swedish and Danish social democratic parties as the main players(Both countries regarded the need to get approval for the project within the social democraticparties. Initially there was widespread resistance to the project amongst the social democratsin both countries.)

1994: The OC handed over the revised plans and the government gave permission for theproject to proceed. The minister of environment stepped down from his post, but the centreparty remained in the government and thus a political crisis was averted. Elections were heldand the coalition lost power to the social democrats.



Economic Environment

Economic The combined road and railway link was recommended by the OD on it was the best solution


64/97

Project

Environment

from an economic viewpoint given the evaluation of traffic volumes at the time.

Despite the fact that it is common practice in Sweden to use socio-economic cost-benefit analysisas a basis for decisions regarding infrastructure investments, this was never the case for theOresund link. The analyses that were carried out focused on economic profitability, since this wasa prerequisite given the loan-based financing of the project. The funding structure based on userfees for road traffic as the main source of financing meant that the volume of road traffic and theprice level of user fees in relation to the construction cost became the ultimate criteria forappraisals.

SpecificEconomic

Events

impacting on

the project

1985: Regarding financing it was agreed that the project had to be financed outside the statebudgets and to be profitable on business economic (rather than socio economic) terms.

1989: A report was presented and two premises were guiding: the condition that no state budgetgrants should be used (business economic profitability); and that the structure of the link shouldnot affect the water flow in the Sound.

1991: The agreement between the Swedish and Danish governments is signed. The chosen

alternative of a combined road and railway link between Sweden is viewed as the best alternativefrom an economic perspective. The agreement also states that the connecting infrastructureshould be funded by revenues from the coast-to-coast section of the link.



F*7#

NQXT NQXa NQXU NQQONQUS NQXM NQQN


65/97


stakeholders


management


CONCEPTION:Swedish-Danishgovernmentsagree to buildfixed link


environment


performance

CONTEXT:European roundtable perceivedas lobbying forroad link

INCEPTION:Oresunddelegation

appointed

CONCEPTION:DelegationproposesHelsingborg-HelsingørRailway Tunnel &Malmö-CopenhagenRoad Bridge.

State fundingruled out

CONTEX:Great beltbridge decisionbreaks Danishdomestic policyblock on otherfixed links

CONCEPTION:Delegationrecommendscombined road/rail bridge butcontinues toconsider railtunnel option

INCEPTION:Swedishparliamentsupportscombinedbridge option,Danish leadersfollow suit

INCEPTION:Negotiationson fundingstructure

INCEPTION:Twogovernmentssign bindingagreement.Constructionto start in1993 andfinish in 2000


F*7#

NQQM NQQTNQQV NQQS NQQUbX NQQQ VOOO


66/97


stakeholders


management


INCEPTION:Redesignapproved bySwedishGovernment

INCEPTION:OresundbroConsortiumformed,applies forplanningpermission


environment


performance

CONSTRUCTION:Danish LandInfrastructure worksin preparation

DELAY:Permissionrefused bySwedish NationalBoard, finallygranted by waterrights court butconditional onredesign

CONSTRUCTION:Construction starts.OC contracts withthree consortia

CONSTRUCTION: 1997: First tunnelsection in place

1998: First bridge

section in place

DELIVERY:First cardrivesthroughtunnel

DELIVERY:Handoverandinauguration

The finished structuredid not affect thewater flow betweenthe North and BalticSeas – Zero impact“solution!


67/97


68/97


69/97


70/97

!"#$%&%'( *+,%('(- .,(/( %0 #12 341%56/(0(1& *+&7/ #0 8%(4(10 #19 :/((1;(#+(< =,#& #/( &,( 86>0 ;/(0(1& %1 3?>:* @#0( 8&"9%(0<

A>:>BC-

B3 !" $% &'" ()*%*&"

D>8 !" $% ()*%*&"

UNITED KINGDOM DENMARK-SWEDEN GERMANY FRANCE NETHERLANDS

CHANNEL TUNNEL RAIL LINK The Oresund Link Motorway A20 TGV Mediterranean BENELUXLIJN (Metro line)

YES YES NO NO NO

No mentioning of Siemens in OMEGA reports.But, Siemens is stated as supplier of signaling

No mentioning of Siemens in OMEGA reports.But, Siemens is stated as a supplier of some

No mentioning of Siemens in OMEGAreports. Plus, I didn't find any reference of

No mentioning of Siemens in OMEGA reports. Plus, Ididn't find any reference of Siemens on Internet

No mentioning of Siemens in OMEGA reports. There issome information on Internet: The signalling is

3?>:* @(1&/( @#0( 8&"9%(0


71/97

, pp g g

and train control systems on the website:

, pp

equipment.

p , y

Siemens on Internet regarding this project.

y

regarding this project.

g g

supplied by Alstom. All lines have been constructedbefore the Beneluxlijn are supplied by Siemens.

http://www.railway-technology.com/projects/chunnel/ Siemens trains was meant to go on services fromFrankfurt to southern France via the new LGV Rhin-

Rhône, and subsequently within Germany and onother international services to France, Belgium,Switzerland and the Netherlands. No mentioning of

Siemens in TGV Mediterranee line.

http://retmetro.nl/cms/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id

=260&Itemid=62

http://www.railway-technology.com/features/feature-top-ten-fastest-

trains-in-the-world/

YES YES YES NO YES

No mentioning of any existing environmentalgroup activities in OMEGA reports. However, in

the book: Environmental Protest in WesternEurope, Oxford University Press 2007, page 48, it

is said: 1988.-1989, the number of Greenpeacesupporters increased almost two times and in1992. the protests were more organized.

No mentioning of Greenpeace in OMEGA reports.On Internet we found the follow: International

groups such as Birdlife International andGreenpeace & Transport & Environment have also

looked into the issue of the Oresund link.Environmental groups, who worried thatconstruction of the link would disturb the flow of

water and ecosystem of the Baltic Sea, still worryabout increased auto emissions. "We activelycampaigned against the bridge for three years

until the final decisions were made by thegovernments," says Mats Abrahansson, aspokesman for Greenpeace.

It is mentioning in OMEGA Centre reports."Many environmental agencies, such as

BUND and Greenpeace, as well as smallerlocally organised agencies, criticized the A

20. The strongest point of criticism is theroute option chosen in Schleswig-Holstein".

No mentioning of Greenpeace in OMEGA reports.Plus, I didn't find any reference of Greenpeace on

Internet regarding this project.

No mentioning that any organization opposed theproject in Omega reports. It is written there public

consultation was conducted. During the design andconstruction phase, intensive external project

management was carried out. From previousexperience, the project team understood theimportance of good communication.

http://books.google.rs/books?id=8ybVHakcYQkC&pg=PA48&lpg=PA48&dq=greenp

eace+protests+channel+tunnel+rail+link&source=bl&ots=dZqzILv8go&sig=d8Pct-

K3LLXG3uMIn4jS14cO9Cg&hl=en&sa=X&ei=yckNU_HUD4KM7AbAtoHgBA&ved=

0CC8Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=greenpeace%20protests%2

http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/oresund.htm

There is some information on the Internet:

http://www.csmonitor.com/1997/0410/041097.intl.intl.3.html/(pag

e)/2

http://sepp.xylou.de/a/DgA/23093a69/fr%C3%BChen_20._Harkenblec

k_.html

OMEGA report: A wide array of different

organisations opposed to the link were organisedunder the umbrella organisation Stoppabron (stopthe bridge). The organisation comprised of over 30

individual organisations ranging fromenvironmental NGOs to the labour.

YES YES YES YES NO

CONCESSIONAIRE: LONDON &CONTINENTAL RAILWAYS (LCR) composedby Arup, Bechtel, Halcrow and Systra

The Oresundbro Consortium, OC (AS Oresund,Denmark and Svedab AB, Sweden)

Federal Road Agency (DEGES) SNCF (Société Nationale des Chemins de ferFrançais; "French National Railway Company")

Two public sector organisations were responsible forconstruction: Gemeentewerken for the rail track, andRijkswaterstaat for the tunnel section.

Act of Aceleration of Transport

Infrastruture Planning (VerkPBG)

SNCF, as a public rail agency formed special entity for

project management on this project, was responsiblefor the project and the future operator of the high

speed line.

RFF (Réseau Ferré de France)

As owner of the rail network, RFF is responsible fordevelopment and maintenance as well as usage

charges and timetable management.

The SNCF operates the country's national railservices. Its functions include operation of railwayservices for passengers and freight, and maintenance

and signalling of rail infrastructure owned by RFF.

Siemens

Greenpeace

SPEs(Graham Winch's

definitions)

!"#$%&%'( *+,%('(- .,(/( %0 #12 341%56/(0(1& *+&7/ #0 8%(4(10 #19 :/((1;(#+(< =,#& #/( &,( 86>0 ;/(0(1& %1 3?>:* @#0( 8&"9%(0<

A>:>BC-

B3 !" $% &'" ()*%*&"

D>8 !" $% ()*%*&"

NETHERLANDS NETHERLANDS GREECE GERMANY GERMANY

HSL ZUIDRANDSTADRAIL, THE HAGUE-

ROTTERDAMAthens Metro (Sepolia - Dafni &

Monastiraki - Ethniki Amyna)New ICE Cologne– Rhine/Main line Tiergarten Tunnel - Berlin

YES NO YES YES YES

No mentioning of Siemens in OMEGA reports.Plus, I didn't find any reference of Siemens on

The OMEGA material mentioned that Siemens are mentioning in OMEGA reports :"Equipment technology works, including

Siemens are mentioning in OMEGA reports:Siemens was one of the contractors working on

3?>:* @(1&/( @#0( 8&"9%(0

Siemens are mentioning in OMEGA reports: The trackand signaling systems were developed by Infraspeed


72/97

Internet regarding this project. catenaries, signalling equipment,telecommunications, switching stations, powersupply and electric engineering, were carried

out by a group headed by Siemens PLC (nowSiemens Transportation Systems)".

road tunnel.

Electromechanical WorksSIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSHAFT BERLIN-MUENCHEN

are one of the members of the consortiumOLYMPIC METRO (the contractor of theproject).

YES NO YES ? NO

No mentioning of Greenpeace in OMEGAreports. Plus, I didn't find any reference of

Greenpeace on Internet regarding this project.

No mentioning of Greenpeace in OMEGAreports. However, on internet we found a report

of Greenpeace which say: "A new metro linehas been built, gas-fuelled buses have been

introduced (Athens has now the largest gas-fuelled bus fleet in Europe), and some 3 billion ! have been spent in public transport (extension

of metro, introduction of tramway and suburbanrail, modernisation of bus and trolley fleets,tripling of bus-only lanes)".

No mentioning of Greenpeace in OMEGAreports. However, on Internet, Greenpeace are

conected to the project.

No mentioning of Greenpeace in OMEGAreports. Plus, I didn't find any reference of

Greenpeace on Internet regarding this project.

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect

/cmtran/writev/rail/m94.htm

NO NO YES ? ?

Attiko Metro SA, a government-ownedcompany, was set up in 1991 to act as clientand project manager.

Siemens

Greenpeace

SPEs(Graham Winch's

definitions)

(a consortium of Fluor Infrastructure, SiemensNederland, Koninklijke BAM Groep, Innisfree andHSBC Infrastructure), under a DBFM contract.

Not Greenpeace but others: "Influential in thedebate, but not so much for the end result, was the co-

operation between several interest groups fromdifferent backgrounds. This broad coalition, as it was

called in the media, consisted of Stichting Natuur enMilieu, an environmental group, the ANWB, a union forusers of transport with wheels, LTO Nederland, an

organization for agri- and horticultural entrepreneursand employers, the Chambers of Commerce of theregion of The Hague, and the WWF. This coalition

started a strong lobby campaign in favor of the linkingof infrastructure along existing tracks and with a stopin The Hague."

It seems there was not an SPE formed, but there arestrong elements of it: The transport ministry remained initiator, client and main financier throughout

the project, and owns the line. The project teamworked under its supervision and included employees

of its implementation agency, Rijkswaterstaat, andexternal consultants.

Management of the project was shared betweenthe two regional governments, their transportoperators, and the local governments

concerned, and a project management teamrepresenting the various organisations was set

up to co-ordinate construction. The regionaltransport provider, RET, was responsible forconstruction of the Rotterdam sections, and the

city of The Hague for the sections under itsownership (as the transport provider, HTM, hadbeen privatised).

GFR (DB AG from 1992) acted ascommissioning client and project manager, andDE Consult was responsible for design. The

Federal Railways Agency, established in 1994,took over supervisory and approval roles.

Although the inter-agency planning team wasresponsible for co- ordinating the project as awhole, the city government oversaw the

construction of the road tunnel and DB AG therail connection and stations. There was no main

contractor, with separate contracts let forspecific parts of the project.


73/97

STSM Report

5.6.

Quantitative analysis comments for UK Channel Tunnel Rail Link and Oresund Bridge


74/97

1. PROJECT TITLE: CHANNEL TUNNEL RAIL LINK, LONDON‐KENT, UK

RESPONSE (DEPENDANT)

VARIABLE is PROJECT

PERFORMANCE

CHANNEL

TUNNEL

RAIL LINK,

LONDON‐

KENT, UK

Comments

Project Phase In operation

Planned Completion date 2003 It is said actual completion was 48 months later than planned. And actual completion was 2007.

Actual

Completion

date 2007

It

is

operation

start

date

Planned Budget 6.4bn 2010 prices

Actial Budget 9.63bn 2010 prices

CTRL OVERBUDGT 1

DELAY during the construction phase

1

Delay during the planning phase 1 The planning phase was also prolonged and lasted 264 months.

A1

2.1

Stakeholders ‐

Project has a foreign EPC

company

0

STSM Report

Internal

Siemens is involved as a

contractor in the project

0

No mentioning of Siemens in Omega material. But, Siemens is stated as supplier of signaling and train control systems for the CTRL on the web site:


75/97

A2

contractor in the project http://www.railway‐technology.com/projects/chunnel/ Also, some of the trains are bought from Siemens.

A3

THE CLIENT IS ALSO THE EPC OR

MAIN CONTRACTOR

0

A4

The EPC has a clear goal ???

Instead of EPC, a Concessionaire is present here (London and Continental Railways – LCR). The contract model is BOT. Therefore, a new attribute is proposed: BOT (yes ‐1, no – 0). Regarding the "Clear goal" attribute, no information in Omega material, no information on LCR's website.

The

project

is

mono

Cultural

(SEE

BELOW)

A5

A) CLIENT AND EPC HAVE THE

SAME NATIONALITY (N/A IF

THEY ARE THE SAME)

1

Client and Concessionaire are the same nationality. Those are top two levels when the project is delivered as BOT, such as this one. The third level would consist of design and construction companies. They were

international.

A6

B) CLIENT AND EPC AND ALL THE

IMPORTANT FIRST TIER

CONTRACTOR

HAVE

THE

SAME

NATIONALITY

0

A7

More than 50% share of the

client is under goverment

control (EVEN IF FOREIGN

GOVERNMENT)

1

A8

An experienced project director

is present

N/A No data in Omega Material, nor on web.

A9

2.2

Stakeholders ‐

External

ALREADY EXISTING

ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP (SUCH

AS GREENPEACE) HAVE

OBJECTED TO THE PROJECT

1

No mentioning

of

any

existing

environmental

group

activities

in

Omega

Centre material. However, in the book: Environmental Protest in Western Europe, Oxford University Press 2007, page 48, it is said: 1988.‐1989, the number of Greenpeace supporters increased almost two times and in 1992. the protests were more organized.

STSM Report

THERE WAS PUBLIC

ACCEPTABILTY TO THE PROJECT

AT NATIONAL LEVEL (NO

0

1974. Major public opposition in light of fears about the impact of faster and more frequent trains.


76/97

A10 PROTEST)

A11

THERE WAS PUBLIC ACCEPTABILTY TO THE PROJECT

AT LOCAL LEVEL (NO PROTEST)

0

A12

Environmental activists and

regulators have been engaged

ex‐ante, not ex post (N/A never

engaged or don't know)

1

Comprehensive Environmental Statement was prepared and then, as authorisation was obtained through the Parliamentary process that resulted in the CTRL Act, a series of ‘environmental standards’ were agreed. Also: The RLCI was set up as an independent charity to support local communities, landowners and organisations to realise their ideas for environmental enhancement along the CTRL route. The

Initiative received initial funding of £2m from the CTRL developers.

And also:

"Local authorities affected by the CTRL route and station options development process were variously consulted throughout the project preparation period. Their prime focus was on avoiding and mitigating potential environmental impacts within their areas."

A13

LOCAL LEVEL PROTESTS

OCCURED DURING

CONSTRUCTION OR

COMMISSIONING NOT DURING

PLANNING (N/A IF NO PROTEST

AT ALL)

0

5.1 Project

Environment ‐

Legal

The project has a strong

regulation system as evidenced

by:

B1

a) The authority stopped the project or similar projects in

0 Not sure if the Government can be considered as the authority here. If yes, then it is 1, because:


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STSM Report

Institute of Economic Affairs, 2007, Chapter 6 The Channel Tunnel (1985‐1994‐2007), pages 131‐132) D R Myddelton notes that the d i i t d ith th Ch l T l ( d b i ti th


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decision to proceed with the Channel Tunnel (and by association the CTRL) spanned several different governments in the UK, as follows: “In the twelve years 1964‐75 the party in power in the UK changed three times and there were six different ministers of transport. Given BR’s lukewarm attitude towards the Tunnel, so much chopping and changing can hardly have helped. But the project itself was not party‐political. Douglas‐Home’s Conservative government started it, Wilson’s (first) Labour government signed an agreement ‘in principle’, and Heath’s Conservative government signed legal contracts and the Treaty. Finally

Wilson’s (second) Labour government cancelled the first high quality rail

link to London, then the

Tunnel itself.

In the early 1980s Mrs Thatcher expressed interest in a fixed link between England and France, which she had supported as a member of the Heath government. The French were keen, in order to regenerate the Nord‐Pas de Calais region. At first she and Francois Mitterand, the French President, preferred a road to a rail link (as had Heath): he wanted a bridge while she favoured a drive‐through tunnel. But she ruled out any government finance, and doubted whether

a private enterprise tunnel would pay.” Not sure what should be the values for this attribute and values for

attributes b, c, d.

B7

b) Support of the local government NO CENTRAL

0

STSM Report

GOVERNMENT

C) SUPPORT BY BOTH 0


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B8

LOCAL

AND

CENTRAL

B9

D) NOT SUPPORTED BY EITHER LOCAL AND CENTRAL

1

C1

3. Project

Manangement

THE MEGAPROJECT IS

COMPOSED OF MORE THAN 1

IDENTICAL INDEPENDENT UNIT

(E.G. WIND TURBINES TO MAKE

A FARM, 2 NUCLEAR PLANTS IN

THE SITE,

10

LARGE

ASHIPS

ETC…)

0

C2

Heavy usage of planning by

milestones

N/A No data. Omega centre did not go into details about PM aspects.

C3

Heavy usage of Formal project

management tool and technique

N/A No data. Omega centre did not go into details about PM aspects.

C4 Usage of performance metrics

N/A No data. Only some about environmental planning. Omega centre did

not go into details about PM aspects.

C5

LUMP SUM

‐Turn

key

contract

between Client and EPC (main

contractor)

(N/A IF CLIENT AND EPC ARE THE

SAME)

0

C6

There was a formal litigation

procedure (e.g. international

chamber of commerce) during

the contract

between

Client

and

EPC (IF THEY ARE DIFFERENT ‐ IF

THE SAME OR PROJECT STILL IN

PLANNING STAGE THEN N/A)

0

C7

Project has a well developed

FEED

???

STSM Report

Modular project ‐ consider only

the related sentences below ‐

D1

a) The project is modular ‐dependent modules

0


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7. Technology

D1 dependent modules

D2

b) The project is modular ‐

independent modules 1

The project was split into 2 independent sections (see below), but inside the sections, modules were dependent (such as tracks and stations). "The 1998 restructuring split the construction of the Link into two sections: Section 1 (the southern part, from the Channel Tunnel to near Ebbsfleet on the outskirts of London) and Section 2 (the northern part, from near Ebbsfleet to St. Pancras). For contractual purposes the construction of the sections were undertaken in separate LCR subsidiaries: Section 1 by Union Railways (South) Ltd and Section 2 by Union Railways (North) Ltd."

D3

FOAK WIDE DEFINTION: FOAK

AT LEAST IN THE COUNTRY (e.g.

the first EPR reactors in the

country) OR FOR THE EPC OR

UNIQUE (LIKE THE MOSE IN

VENICE)

1

Britain’s first high‐speed railway

D4

FOAK STRONG, NARROW

DEFINITION: FOAK EVER (first

EPR ‐OL3)

or

unique

Project

(like

Venezia mose)

1

It is not the first high speed rail ever, but it could be considered as the first high speed rail trough the channel under the sea, connecting two countries. It depends how we define the attribute. It has the following

elements of strong FOAK: In 1994, the American Society of Civil Engineers elected the tunnel as one of the seven modern Wonders of the World (wikipedia). St Pancras International Station is the largest of its kind in Europe and is expected to handle some 50 million passengers per year (omega material).

It is aslo said: "In 2007, it will take just 7 minutes to get from St Pancras to Stratford

STSM Report

International station, which is a platform for creating Stratford City ‐ the largest single mixed‐use urban regeneration project in Europe.


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in Europe.

The upgraded transport infrastructure was instrumental in London winning the bid to host the Olympic Games."

E1

Not classificad

OFFSHORE PROJECT 0

E2

Financial Support from the

European Union

0

E3

Financial Support from the

national governament

1

F1

RESPONSE

(DEPENDA

NT)

VARIABLE is

EXTERNAL

PRIVATE

STAKEHOLD

ER

ACCEPTABILITY

Previous national similar project

was ON TIME AND BUDGET (N/A

FOR foak)

N/A

F2

Unemployment in the area

above national average

0?

I suppose the unemployment rate in London was not higher than national average, but I could not find exact figures. There are also following doubts about this attribute: When it is about the line infrastructure projects, there could be differences in unemployment rate between areas through which the

infrastructure goes. In case of CTRL, it is said that

Economic development and employment opportunities were some of the

main arguments for the project.

"The Channel Tunnel Rail Link presents the opportunity to provide high speed services for commuters into London, with significantly reduced journey times. This will attract new business and employment opportunities and open up access from Kent for employment opportunities in Stratford, the Lower Lea and Docklands, and opportunities for reverse commuting."

STSM Report

It is probable that unemployment rate was different in London than in South‐eastern part of England, where the line goes. However, more jobs in relation to this project are probably offered in and around London. Even in the city there could be areas with different unemployment rate.


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y p y

For example, it is also said for area around Ashton: "Local economic performance has lagged behind a rising rate of housing development despite a generous supply of employment land."

And unemployment rate can change over time also. That is interesting for this case, because the project was developed in a very long period of

time. About the project, it is written: "CTRL project workforce totaled some 8,000 persons (max) When completed, CTRL will have consumed some 50 million man‐hours."

F3

THE MAJORITY OF THE

NATIONAL POPULATION

TRUST

THE NATIONAL AUTHORITY

N/A

No data about the trust to authorities in Omega material. It is already mentioned about protests and that even the Government itself stopped the project. On wikipedia, it is said that much more support to the project in early

phases (1987) was given in France, with its long tradition of infrastructure investment. In contrast to the situation in UK, the project garnered widespread approval. In April 1987 the French National Assembly gave unanimous support (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Channel_Tunnel).

F4

The Compensation of local

community above 0,1% of the

total budget

0

It is 0, if the following can be considered as the compensation for local community: The RLCI was set up as an independent charity to support local communities, landowners and organizations to realize their ideas for environmental enhancement along the CTRL route. The Initiative received initial funding of £2m from the CTRL developers.

F5

The density of population of the

province is below the national

average

0 Both London and region of South East have the population density above the national average.

STSM Report

G1 EXTRA LINES

AVAILABLE

The project is nuclear 0

G2 SPE

1


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NEW ATTRIBUTE PROPOSED:

1.

BOT: 1 (yes), 0 (no)

IMPORTANT COMMENTS ON EXISTING ATTRIBUTES DEFINITION:

1.

Regarding INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS attributes: Instead of levels:

Client

EPC

First Tier Contractors

More general level names are proposed, which would be adequate also for BOT model:

The first level (Client)

The second level (EPC or Concessionaire, depends on the contract model)

First Tier Contractors (contractors, or design and construction companies, depends on the contract model)

2.

Regarding the attributes: support of the central/local Government:

What if the attitude changed over time, as in this project ? (Kent Community Council at one point refused all the proposed

routes alternatives. How to consider this ? Is this no support from local government ? And the central Government also gave up

from project at one point.) – Giorgio answered it should be considered as no support from local Government.

NO DATA IN OMEGA MATERIAL ABOUT:

Project Management

National trust to the authorities

Some aspects of stakeholders, both internal and external (such as Siemens and Greenpeace)

STSM Report


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0


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STSM Report

It was not foreign, but it was international consortium. The two governments signed an agreement in 1991, committing them

both to form state‐owned stock companies. The companies would


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A1

2.1

Stakeholders ‐

Internal

Project has a foreign EPC

company

0

form a consortium responsible for the financing, design, construction and operation of the link, with loans raised on the international finance market, repaid by revenues from user fees and guaranteed by the two states. The Oresundbro Consortium (AS Oresund, Denmark and Svedab AB, Sweden) signed contracts with three consortia: Oresund Tunnel Contractors; Oresund Marine Joint Venture, for construction of the artificial island and dredging; and Sundlink Contractors, for bridges. Consortium ownership was split equally between the Swedish and Danish states.

A2

Siemens is involved as a

contractor in the project

0

No mentioning of Siemens in Omega material. But, Siemens is stated as a supplier (not a Contractor) of some equipment (file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/342_acee490f4574a9f696014a385

5e32709.pdf) on the Web.

A3

THE CLIENT IS ALSO THE EPC OR

MAIN CONTRACTOR

1

A4

The EPC has a clear goal 1?

No data about this in Omega material. The EPC is the Consortium, which is an SPE. However, on the web, it is written that the company's main purpose is to run an efficient and safe link between Denmark and Sweden and to create a sustainable business. (http://uk.oresundsbron.com/page/1103)

The project is mono Cultural

(SEE BELOW)

A5

A)

CLIENT

AND

EPC

HAVE

THE

SAME NATIONALITY (N/A IF

THEY ARE THE SAME)

N/A

A6

B) CLIENT AND EPC AND ALL

THE IMPORTANT FIRST TIER

CONTRACTOR HAVE THE SAME

NATIONALITY

0

The OC was responsible for negotiations with the contractors. After negotiations held from July to November 1995, deals were signed with three consortia. The Öresund Tunnel Contractors, a consortium consisting of NCC AB (SE), Dumez‐GTM SA (F), John Laing Ltd (UK), E.


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STSM Report

completion. Even though other issues such as the impact on traffic volumes and land use initially were seen as important, the main issue has been the question of how the structure would affect the water flow between the Baltic and the North Sea.

N d t b t l l t t i O t i l b t th i t


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A11

THERE WAS PUBLIC

ACCEPTABILTY TO THE PROJECT

AT LOCAL LEVEL (NO PROTEST)

0

No data about local protests in Omega material, but the impact on the nearby ecologically sensitive island of Saltholm was also a matter of concern. It was deemed that the construction work would cause serious disturbance to 24 nesting bird populations. The existing seal population of the island was deemed to be in danger of being permanently removed from the area. on the web (http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/oresund.htm) it is

written:

After the Water Court gave its approval,the Swedish Environmental Minister, Olof Johanssen, opposed this project so strongly that he resigned his position. (13) Even with the approval of the Water Court, Johanssen felt that the delicate balance of the Baltic Sea would be upset. (14) He was concerned about the possible effects of the bridge on the wild birds inhabiting an island in the sound and the effects of a decrease in water flow on the fish and other living

organisms in the sea. Environmental groups in Sweden felt the same way. Most environmentalists and biologists in Sweden are still opposed to building the crossing. As recently as July and September of 1996, these groups have staged protests against this project, still feeling that water flows and species within the Oresund Sound will be disturbed.

A12

Environmental activists and

regulators have

been

engaged

ex‐ante, not ex post (N/A never

engaged or don't know)

0

The project remained controversial in Sweden, particularly as the

environmental impact assessment took place only after the agreement to build the link was signed.

A13

LOCAL LEVEL PROTESTS

OCCURED DURING

CONSTRUCTION OR

0 Environmentalist groups from both Denmark and Sweden have opposed this project from the beginning. (http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/oresund.htm)

STSM Report

COMMISSIONING NOT DURING

PLANNING (N/A IF NO PROTEST

AT ALL)

The project has a strong


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5.1 Project

Environment ‐

Legal

regulation system as evidenced

by:

B1

a) The authority stopped the project or similar projects in the same country

0

The Swedish National Board for Environmental Protection refused planning permission, but its competence was questioned and the government referred to the Water Rights Court instead. The WRC

granted permission, on condition that the project had no impact on water flow: this necessitated a redesign and further approvals.

This

became

known

as

„the

zero

impact

solution‟

,

and

as

a

result

the

OC had to adjust the construction plans and submit these to the WRC again.

B2

b) The authority fined the EPC (main contractor) or one of the internal stakeholders in the project

0

No information that this occurred.

B3

c) ACTIONS FROM THE AUTHORITY POSTPONED THE

FINAL COMPLETION OF THE

PROJECT

1

It is 1, although I am not sure about the difference between this

attribute and

the

one

before

the

previous

(a).

The Swedish National Board for Environmental Protection refuse

final stsm londonucl report

Documents