final draft aug 29 2014
TRANSCRIPT
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CAN DEMOCRATIZATION AND EUROPEANIZATION REDUCE CORRUPTION IN EX-COMMUNIST REPUBLICS?
A LONGITUDINAL CASE STUDY OF BULGARIA
A MAJOR RESEARCH PAPER
PRESENTED TO
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT OF GUELPH UNIVERSITY
by
EVGENIA KARAKEHAYOVA
in partial fulfillment
for the degree of Masters of Arts
August 29th. 2014
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Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................................... 3
Chapter 1: Corruption during Communism and Corruption Today ............................................................... 5
Chapter 2: The Collapse of Communism and Political Democratization ....................................................... 9
Why the Collapse of Communism Should Have a Significant Effect on Corruption Reform ................ 9
Why the Collapse of Communism Would Fail To Have a Significant Effect on Corruption Reform14
Chapter 3: Accession to the European Union and Europeanization .............................................................. 19
Why EU Accession Should Have a Significant Effect on Corruption Reform ............................................ 19
Why EU Accession Would Fail To Have a Significant Effect on Corruption Reform ............................. 26
Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................................................................ 31
Appendix ................................................................................................................................................................................... 36
References.................................................................................................................................................................................. 40
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Introduction
Today, twenty five years after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, and seven
years after accession to the European Union (EU), Bulgaria ranks as one of the most corrupt
countries within the EU (see Appendix Table 1). Since 1997, corruption has been perceived as
one of the major societal problems in democratically governed Bulgaria (Bulanova, 54).
According to opinion polls since 1997, Bulgarians have periodically identified corruption as the
third largest problem of democracy, after low incomes and unemployment (Bulanova, 54). In an
impoverished and institutionally unstable country such as Bulgaria, corruption can have a
devastating impact on society, politics and economy, especially considering that the country is
undergoing an intensive developmental period (Bulanova, 54). In 2006 the annual loss through
corrupt transactions in Bulgaria was estimated to be 2 billion Levs per year (about 1 billion
euros) (Bulanova, 55). According to the 2006 Corruption Perception Index, Bulgaria’s corruption
level is next to countries like El Salvador and Columbia, where corruption is perceived to be the
"rule" (Bulanova, 55).
Bulgaria’s corruption levels today are puzzling when taking in consideration the major
institutional changes which occurred in 1989 and in 2007 respectively. First, 1989 marked the
collapse of communism and the institution of democratic principles and market liberalization.
Second, in 2007 Bulgaria officially acceded to the European Union. These transformations were
expected to significantly reduce corruption in Bulgaria, but so far their effect seems to have been
limited. This puzzle is the subject of this research paper, as the paper explores what scholars
have written about the anticipated effects of the processes of democratization and
Europeanization upon corruption practices in Bulgaria.
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The paper yields two conclusions. The first conclusion is that powerful domestic elites
can manipulate periods of institutional reform to their advantage thereby producing skewed
reform and limited results. The second conclusion, which is directly linked to the first one, is that
when mandated reforms are not clear and specific enough, it is relatively easy for political elites to
take advantage of the reform process. The lack of clear, specific reform and the consequent
ability of political elites to take advantage of the reform process are the main reasons why anti-
corruption efforts have produced limited results in Bulgaria, despite of the two major
transformational events considered within this literature review.
In the next three chapters, I will examine what scholars have written about the impact of
the collapse of communism and the accession to the EU upon political corruption in Bulgaria. In
Chapter 1, I will briefly summarize the legacy of communist corruption and will also briefly state
some recent instances of political financial fraud, which drew significant international media
attention and made corruption in post-communist states a highly salient subject. In Chapter 2, I
will introduce arguments from opposing sides on the expected effects of the collapse of
communism upon political corruption in Bulgaria. Similarly, Chapter 3 will present arguments
from opposing sides on the expected effects of Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union upon
political corruption.
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Chapter 1: Corruption during Communism and Corruption Today
As a departing point of this research, I would like to point out that corruption in Bulgaria
exhibits a pattern of continuity, which dates from the communist times and continues until today.
This chapter will show that corruption was indeed prevalent during communism and continues to
be such to this day. For the purpose of this research paper, the term ‘corruption’ will entail both
administrative and political corruption, unless otherwise stated. ‘Administrative corruption’ is
defined as “corrupt transactions in which lower and middle level officials receive kickbacks
(money, gifts, favors) from citizens either to provide a better service or to violate existing rules
and laws” (Stoyanov, 5). Conversely, political corruption is defined as “corruption of high level
officials in the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, typically involving manipulation of
substantial resources and more complicated corruption schemes including political party
financing” (Stoyanov, 6). Another relevant distinction is the difference between what Venelin
Ganev calls ‘cronyism’ and ‘competitive rent seeking’. Ganev defines ‘cronyism’ as a form of
rent seeking, based on personal relationships, nepotism and favoritism, where contracts are
awarded to officials based on personal preferences (Ganev, 29). In contrast, in “competitive rent
seeking” ‘opportunities for profit making are distributed across a wider spectrum of interest
groups and those who wish to offer bribes had to articulate at least a rudimentary argument as to
why the corrupt transaction with self-interested politicians might be of mutual interest” (Ganev,
29). Ganev argues, that during communism ‘cronyism’ was a widely accepted norm and was
openly practiced in the political sphere, while ‘competitive rent seeking’ was not, as this latter
type of corruption is usually associated with capitalist systems (Ganev, 30)
It is important to highlight that like Ganev, many other scholars identify the communist
regimes of the past as plagued with ‘cronyism’ and internal political and administrative
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corruption. Leslie Holmes (2009) for example, calls the communist legacy the ‘ghost from the
past’ which has socialized nation states into a culture of bureaucratic corruption and a tradition
of organized crime and has blurred the distinction between the state and the economy (Holmes,
283). Holmes adds that communist regimes left behind badly damaged public institutions,
dysfunctional state structures, and bureaucratic apparatuses bereft of administrative capacity
(Holmes, 284). All in all, corruption practices may have changed since the communist times, but
corruption has certainly not disappeared as nearly all scholars enumerated in this literature
review are in agreement that corruption remains a significant challenged for Bulgaria today.
The fact that corruption remains a significant challenge for Bulgaria becomes evident
when we briefly examine the country’s road to EU accession. First, in 2004, at the first round of
EU eastern enlargement, Bulgaria and Romania were singled out and denied accession, whilst
ten other post-communist Central and Eastern European (CEE) states were accepted into the EU.
(For more information on Bulgaria’s Accession Timeline, please see Appendix Table 4) Second,
in May of 2006 the European Commission sent a ‘yellow card’ to Bulgaria, strongly
recommending for the country to “seriously intensify its efforts to crack down on organized
crime and corruption” (May 2006 Monitoring Report), Third, Bulgaria and Romania were the
only countries accepted with post-accession conditionality and the Commission applied the
strictest provisions to those two member states, mainly because of their inability to control
political corruption. (Please see Appendix Table 2 for comparative outline of CEE
conditionality)
Furthermore, in 2008, one year after accession to the EU, the phenomenon of corruption
in Bulgaria enjoyed a significant amount of international media attention, when the British
newspaper ‘The Telegraph’ called Sofia “Europe’s corruption capital”. This attention was in
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direct response to a report published by the European Commission in February of 2008,
implicating Bulgarian officials in one of the most disconcerting money syphoning scandals that
the European Union had witnessed. The Commission proved that millions of euros granted to
Bulgaria during the pre-accession phase for rural and agricultural development were corruptly
syphoned off (Holmes, 282). Although the Commission had evidence to implicate a multitude of
Bulgaria officials, there was one blatant form of embezzlement which ultimately led to economic
sanctions imposed later by the EU. This was the case of Vesselin Georgiev who in 2007 and
2008 was in charge of distributing European money allocated for the upgrade of Bulgaria’s
transportation infrastructure (Ganev, 31). In 2007 and 2008 Georgiev channeled hundreds of
millions of euros into bank accounts owned by his brother (Ganev, 31-32). As a result, the
European Commission suspended a total of 825 million euros of financial assistance to Bulgaria
(Agence Europe, 2008). Bulgaria was the first EU member state to lose EU funds due to ill-use
(Agence Europe, 2008).
Scholars observing the effects of EU accession upon Bulgaria’s political corruption are in
general agreement that the country has not managed to successfully implement corruption reform
(Pashev, 2011; Bulanova, 2008; Trauner, 2009; Racovita, 2009; Spendzharova and Vachudova,
2012; Ganev, 2013; Pop, 2008). As Pashev puts it: “Corruption remains a significant problem,
and despite expectations to the opposite, the situation seems to have deteriorated since the
country’s accession to the EU in 2007” (Pashev, 413). Currently, reforming the judiciary and
improving administrative efficiency remain Bulgaria’s biggest challenge in the fight against
political corruption and organized crime (Spendzharova and Vachudova, 52). The next chapter
will take us back over two decades ago, to the initial stages of the political democratization
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process in attempts to trace the history of corruption reform in Bulgaria, even before it was
subject to EU conditionality.
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Chapter 2: The Collapse of Communism and Political Democratization
The chapter will examine a) theories as to why the collapse of communism should help
curb corruption in Bulgaria; and b) countervailing views that the collapse of communism will not
have an effect or will worsen corruption practices in Bulgaria.
It must be noted that the collapse of communism in Bulgaria had two major
consequences: first, it introduced the tenets of democratic governance, including elections
characterized by opposing political parties and the separation of legislative, executive and
judicial powers; and second, it brought the dissolution of the centrally planned and state-owned
economy. This dissolution entailed, among other things, the mass privatization of state
enterprises and the liberalization of economic activity (Peev & Mueller, 372). The potency of the
economic liberalization which occurred in Bulgaria is exemplified through the radical shift of
private versus public property ratios. From 1989 to 2005 the structure of property in the country
changed so dramatically that the ratio between state and private property of industrial assets
plummeted from 96:4 to 20:80 (Stoyanov, 5). For more information, see Appendix Table 3.
WHY THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM SHOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON CORRUPTION REFORM
There is much research, in particular based on quantitative cross-national analyses,
suggesting that one may expect to witness a reduction in political corruption after the collapse of
communism. More specifically, many scholars have found that both democratization and
economic liberalization tend to be negatively correlated with corruption levels. I will discuss
each of these points in turn.
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POLITICAL DEMOCRATIZATION
Many quantitative studies find a negative correlation between democratic governance and
levels of corruption (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000; Treisman, 2000; Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005)
Specifically, Sandholtz & Koetzle (2000) find that the level of corruption correlates negatively
with the strength of democratic institutions and the length of the experience of democratic rule.
The same correlation between longevity of democratic rule and corruption level is also
established by Treisman (2000) who finds that the longer a country has been a democracy, the
lower the perceived level of corruption.
The literature typically explains these correlations by arguing that both institutional and
normative characteristics of a democracy help suppress corruption (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 38).
On the normative side, authors claim that a society will generally not care about detecting and
punishing acts of corruption, unless the cultural and widely accepted norm is that such acts are
harmful and should be prevented (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 39). Democratic governments tend to
socialize both citizenry and officials to hold the normative view that corruption is abhorrent and
unacceptable. After all, corruption violates the fundamental democratic values of openness and
equal treatment (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 42). On the institutional side, the argument is that
democratic institutions tend to lower corruption by offering citizens effective means to detect
and punish corruption (Treisman, 2000; Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000). Two sets of democratic
institutional factors are most relevant in this regard, namely political rights and civil liberties.
Political rights include: free and fair elections of political leaders who possess real policy-
making powers; the right to form political parties; freedom from domination by the military or
other oligarchic groups; the existence of genuine political opposition; and protection of minority
rights. Civil liberties include: the right to free speech and media, freedom of assembly, the right
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to organize, and equality under the law (Sandholtz and Kotzle, 2000; (Treisman, 2000). Political
rights can decrease corruption by reducing the power of political official over the electorate and
by providing means for the electorate to accurately inform itself and to express its informed
opinions in the form of voting, without fear of persecution. Through voting, the electorate can
validate political officials’ actions. Undesirable or harmful actions can yield direct and sizeable
consequences in the form of loss of votes, loss of confidence and others. Similarly, civil liberties
can decrease corruption by permitting the existence of channels through which the electorate can
disseminate uncensored information, allowing itself to make the informed decisions necessary
for the correct validation of public officials. This is to be contrasted with communism, during
which a single political party would typically dominate parliament, prohibiting competitive
periodic elections. Without palpable competition and substantial fear of the loss of power,
communist parties tended to be disincentivized to public accountability. Likewise, communist
regimes suppressed the dissemination of uncensored information, thus disallowing the public to
think critically and to make informed decisions regarding the ruling party.
Considering both the normative and institutional features of democratic governance it is
reasonable to expect that in Bulgaria the process of democratization would have a significant and
positive effect on lowering corruption. Furthermore, in light of the established relationships
between strength of democratic institutions and length of democratic governance on the one hand
and corruption on the other hand, it is not surprising that many initially expected the period after
the collapse of communism and the adoption of both normative and institutional democratic
principles to decrease political corruption in Bulgaria.
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ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION
Regression analyses also tend to find that economic liberalization and mass privatization tend
to be associated with a decrease in corruption (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000; Whitehead, 2002;
Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Sandholtz & Taagepera, 2005). Sandholtz & Koetzle claim that
economic liberalization encompasses the following economic rights: freedom to hold property,
freedom to earn a living, freedom to operate a business, freedom to invest one’s earnings,
freedom to trade internationally, and freedom to participate in a market economy (Sandholtz and
Koetzle, 41). Considering the features of economic liberalization, Sandholtz & Koetzle
establish two strong and significant empirical correlations (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 37-40): First,
they find that the degree of integration into the international economy correlates negatively with
the perceived level of corruption (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 37). Second, they find that the degree of
state control of the economy correlates positively with corruption (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 40).
The latter correlation is also established by Whitehead (2002) who also proves that the inverse
relationship holds true, asserting that “interventionist economic systems encourage high-level
corruption” (Whitehead, 801).
The literature explains the aforementioned correlations in several ways. First, it has been
argued that competitive markets (Ades & Di Tella, 1999) and openness to trade (Sandholtz &
Koetzle, 2000) reduce corruption by shrinking the pools of rents available for giving or taking
bribes, or, put differently, by increasing the costs of corrupt actions (Sandholtz & Taagepera,
2005). This is because in a free market, bribes function as a form of value-added tax, thus
decreasing the competitiveness of services and products. In this way, competition created
through economic liberalization penalizes bribery and can therefore be expected to reduce
overall corruption levels (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 39). Second, a free market is likely to restrict
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access of political officials to licenses, permits and waivers which they could otherwise exchange
for bribes in order to gain unfair advantage (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 39). In a free market, such
administrative goods are treated as any other good and are thus “produced” by accredited bodies
and “sold” to qualified purchasers who can afford to pay the price of the administrative good. In
this way, such administrative goods are not reserved to certain political officials and since the
process involves several independent bodies competing for the same good, preferential treatment
is unlikely. Similarly, Whitehead (2002) claims the there exists a stark contrast between liberal
market economy and interventionist economy in that “while interventionist economic systems
encourage high-level corruption by manipulating markets and allowing public officials to
distribute profits, transitions to open market economies reduce public & private actors' political
opportunities while augmenting public accountability” (Whitehead, 801). Finally, economic
liberalization tends to be accompanied by an inevitable insertion into international markets and a
consequent adoption of international trade rules and norms. International trade is dominated by
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and is based on
transnational, “Western” business norms. Consequently, within the realm of OECD-dominated
international trade, corruption is a prohibited act and an obstacle to economic optimization
(Sandholtz & Koetzle, 40).
In short, many scholars observed that economic liberalization works against the proliferation
of corruption. The findings of (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000; Sandholtz &
Taagepera, 2005; and Whitehead 2006) all support the hypothesis that the collapse of
communism and the democratization and market liberalization reforms which followed should
exert a positive and significant effect on curbing corruption levels in Bulgaria.
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WHY THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM WOULD FAIL TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON CORRUPTION REFORM
Some scholars question the optimistic suggestions reviewed above by pointing out that (1)
rapid democratization imports only a minimal conception of democracy; and (2) economic
liberalization may in some cases actually increase opportunities for corruption.
MINIMALIST CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY A significant body of literature asserts that the type of democracy instituted in Bulgaria
shortly after the collapse of communism can be classified as a ‘minimalist’ democracy
(Bulanova, 2008; Grabbe, 2001; Haughton, 2007; Rose, 1994; Spendzharova and Vachudova,
2012; Stoyanov, 2006; Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005). A minimalist democracy is a system of
government in which citizens give teams of political leaders the right to rule in periodic
elections, but where deeper, more profound democratic features are lacking. A minimalist
democracy may lack normative features, such as public trust in government institutions, the
belief that minorities deserve to be included and respected, and an active civil society. According
to this literature, a ‘genuine’ democracy is the product of a myriad of long term historical,
cultural and institutional norms, and cannot be imported through a simple adoption of democratic
structures. The lack of these normative democratic features within a ‘minimalist democracy’ can
obstruct the success of anti-corruption reform (Bulanova, 2008; Spendzharova and Vachudova,
2012).
Spendzharova and Vachudova argue that following the end of Communist rule, “an
illiberal democracy took hold in Bulgaria [in which winning parties] warped democratic
institutions, sabotaged economic reform and fostered intolerance in their efforts to concentrate
and prolong their power” (Spendzharova and Vachudova, 38). Similarly, they claim that ‘in
Bulgaria, the revolution of 1989 was an internal communist coup where second-tier opportunists
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reinvented themselves as transitional democratic leaders, and then used the power of the state to
win early elections" (Spendzharova and Vachudova, 40). The view that a superficial democratic
model was adopted in Bulgaria is further supported by Bulanova, who asserts that there exists a
strong link between a ‘minimalist democracy’ and failure of anti-corruption reform:
It is undisputable…that the “minimalist concept of democracy” […] is not enough in order to establish a functioning, sustainable democracy. Democracy does not only mean that people can vote in free and fair elections, but that they can influence public policy as well. I suggest that state failure in anticorruption corresponds directly to the quality of the established (achieved) democratic model (Bulanova, 56-59).
Similarly, Stoyanov describes another feature of Bulgaria’s minimalist democracy in
claiming that for decades, the Bulgarian public had been accustomed to living within a culture
where corruption was the norm (Stoyanov, 10). In a society where corruption perpetuates to be
perceived as the norm for a significant period of time, it becomes an effective means of solving
problems and further increases both the citizenry and officials’ inclination to engage in corrupt
behavior (Stoyanov, 10). In accordance with Stoyanov’s argument, Rose describes yet another
feature of Bulgaria’s minimalist democracy in claiming that besides the acceptance of corruption
as the norm, the Bulgarian public suffers from profound and widespread mistrust in political
institutions (Rose, 19): “Substantial majorities of citizens in post-communist regimes… find that
their societies lack a key ingredient: trustworthy institutions capable of mediating between
individuals and the state” (Rose, 19). Rose and Stoyanov both point to the lack of soft, cultural
norms in Bulgarian society as fundamental obstacles to successful corruption reform. While
Stoyanov emphasizes the acceptance of corruption as a cultural norm, Rose points to the
widespread and persistent public distrust in political institutions. The presence of such cultural
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attitudes within Bulgarian society is in accordance with the definition of a ‘minimalist democracy’.
As Sandholtz & Taagepera assert:
“The swift transition to democratic political reform at the collapse of communism, could not obliterate corruption in post-communist societies…Communism had produced a culture of corruption; entire populations had been socialized into norms and expectations that made corruption part of their way of life. Those cultural legacies of communism were unlikely to simply vanish with the political system that engendered them” (Sandholtz and Taagepera, 110 & 127).
In short, one of the main explanations in the literature for the limited effect of
democratization on corruption is that the simple adoption of a democratic model is not sufficient
to erase corrupt practices arising from cultural customs and behavioral habits, since such habits
change slowly trailing behind even the most comprehensive political and institutional shifts
(Sandholtz and Taagepera, 127)
PRIVATIZATION MAY INCREASE CORRUPTION
Conversely, a group of scholars hold that mass privatization following the collapse of
communism actually created new opportunities and incentives for corruption (Holmes, 2006;
Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005; Sokhey and Yildirim, 2013).One reason why corruption could
increase along with economic liberalization is that post-communist countries are likely to
experience a phenomenon that Holmes refers to as “nomenklatura privatisation” and Sokhey &
Yildirim refer to as “crony economic liberalization”. This is when the old communist power elite
attempt to become the new economic elite by distributing resources amongst each other, under a
new government structure. The old elite may use the privatization process for their own
advantage, selling formerly state-owned enterprises at low prices, either to friends and relatives,
or to themselves (Holmes, 286). Indeed, Sokhey and Yildirim (2013) claim that the “crony
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economic liberalization” in Bulgaria was controlled by small elite of ex-communist party
officials who redistributed the country’s assets and enterprises amongst themselves (Sokhey &
Kildirim, 2013). In essence, Sokhey and Yildirim argue that the communist party that dictated
economic policy before the collapse of communism had successfully adapted to the now
seemingly democratic and capitalist environment. Thus, in Bulgaria, the true tenets of economic
liberalization were not met, but instead, a superficial government decrease in market intervention
was exhibited, in which the elites “maintained extremist ideological core standing in opposition
to democracy and the free market” (Sokhey and Yildirim, 3).
Furthermore, state officials may attempt to benefit from the process of privatization in
another way, namely by demanding bribes for the sale of certain enterprises. As Sandholtz &
Taagepera claim, “when state officials distribute state properties and enterprises to private
owners, bribes and payoffs become the preferred method for the allocation of the richest assets”
(Sandholtz and Taagepera, 114). A World Bank study in 2000 found that the dual transitions of
economic liberalization and privatization, coupled with democratization removed whatever
mechanisms had been in place to control corrupt behaviors (Pradhan and Anderson, 26). The
report concluded that:
‘the simultaneous transition processes of building new political and economic institutions in the midst of a massive redistribution of state assets have created fertile ground for state capture and administrative corruption… Numerous examples exist in all countries in transition where ownership or control of key state assets was transferred through nontransparent means to those with political influence; corruption played a key part in this process’ (Pradhan and Anderson, xix)
Lastly, it has been theorized that since all of the post-communist states experienced
significant economic hardships throughout the 1990s, it made corruption during privatization a
highly attractive option (Holmes, 282). This is because economic hardships create incentives for
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engaging in corrupt behavior, as relative poverty can increase the motivation for both citizens
and officials to enhance their incomes through corruption (Sandholtz and Koetzle, 40).
To summarize, the literature shows that the economic liberalization which occurred in
Bulgaria after the collapse of communism created a multitude of opportunities – mostly through
mass privatization - for asset grabs and for a crony distribution of state property, dominated by a
monopoly of political elites. Many scholars point out that the period after the collapse of
communism in Bulgaria was characterized by a chaotic transition, in which “the combination of
poor state control with widespread despair and economic hardship was a powerful explicator of
increased rates of general crime and corruption” (Holmes, 282).
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Chapter 3: Accession to the European Union and Europeanization
The chapter will examine a) arguments as to why EU accession should help curb
corruption in Bulgaria; b) countervailing views that that EU accession will not have an effect or
will worsen corruption practices in Bulgaria.
First, it must be noted that once a country enters into EU accession negotiations, it agrees
to concede certain areas of policy making to supranational authority. (For more information on
Bulgaria’s Road to accession, see Appendix Table 4.) Policy-making within the European Union
is a complicated process, referred to as a “balancing act between the European level, the national
level and the sub-national level” (Warleigh-Lack & Dranchenberg, 200). The EU exercises
exclusive supranational competence over policy areas relating to the economic market, but
allows members to exercise considerable national sovereignty over other areas like
administrative coordination and the judiciary (Warleigh-Lack & Dranchenberg, 201). In policy
areas where the EU allows national sovereignty the bulk of the responsibility for reform lies with
the member states themselves.
WHY EU ACCESSION SHOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON CORRUPTION REFORM
A rich body of existing literature suggests that EU accession can help curb corruption
levels in Bulgaria through [1] The adoption of the ‘acquis communitaire’, which requires certain
standards of administrative, and judiciary governance; and [2] The mechanisms of pre-accession
conditionality and post-accession verification.
First, it must be noted that in 1993, the European Commission established a set of
quantifiable criteria (known as the Copenhagen Criteria) that candidate members were required
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to implement in order to successfully accede. These criteria consist of (Accession Criteria,
European Commission, 2009): [a] Political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; [b]
Economic criteria: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and
market forces; [c] Administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the ‘acquis
communitaire’ and the ability to take on the obligations of membership. As was the case with
Bulgaria in 1997, failure to comply with the conditions outlined in the Copenhagen Criteria
results in postponement of the invitation to join or an overall rejection of candidacy (see
appendix Table 4).
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REFORM
Literature contends that when the European Union demands from its candidate members
to build the administrative and institutional capacity to adopt and transpose the ‘acquis
communitaire’ within domestic law, the EU also demands a certain standard of good governance
within public administration (Grabbe, 2001; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2004;
Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2009; Haughton, 2007; Vachudova, 2009). The content of the acquis
itself does not provide a specific administrative model to be followed by candidates, nor does it
explicitly specify corruption control. However, in various policy areas, the acquis commands the
creation and establishment of administrative structures required in order to successfully
implement prescribed policy reform. The creation and establishment of these administrative
structures requires a functioning, transparent, accountable and efficient public administration
system. Thus, in an indirect way, and without being explicitly outlined within its content, the
acquis may positively affect the transparency and accountability of Bulgarian public
administration. As Papadimitriou and Gateva claim, ‘through a mixture of formal and informal
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mechanisms of applying pressure, the acquis could exert tremendous influence on corruption
practices’ (Papadimitriou and Gateva, 5-6).
In regards to the acquis itself, the document consists of 80,000-pages of supranational
law, which must be transposed into domestic law (Haughton, 238). Applicant countries have
virtually no bargaining power when it comes to adoption and transposition of the acquis
communitaire, as it is a non-negotiable process in which the acquis takes precedence over
national law (Grabbe, 2001). The largest share of the acquis relates to the functioning of the
internal market, including economic liberalization (Vachudova, 50) (see also the discussion
above on the possible effects of economic liberalization on corruption). Thus, despite of the lack
of a working model in the area of administrative reform within the acquis, the acquis can be
expected to indirectly affect Bulgarian public administration through the demand for a
functioning and transparent administrative capacity.
The judiciary is a second area where the acquis is expected to positively affect corruption
practices. Scholars argue that during the pre-accession negations, the EU demanded from
Bulgaria a solidified establishment of the democratic principle of the separation and
independence of the judiciary, which at the time required deep judicial reform (Frison-Roche and
Sodev, 2005; Grabbe, 2001). In fact, it is argued that in order to meet acquis standards, Bulgaria
has undergone a deep transformational and restructuring process of the judiciary, beginning in
the early ‘90s. First, during the very initial EU accession talks in 1991, Bulgaria adopted the
first- of- its- kind article of the constitution which made official the separation of judicial,
administrative and executive powers for the first time. Article 8 of the Constitution stipulated
that ‘State power is separated into the legislative branch, executive branch and judicial branch’ –
a separation that did not exist during communism (Frison-Roche and Sodev, 72). This separation
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can be attributed to reforms outlined within the ‘acquis communitaire’. Second, in 1994,
Bulgaria adopted the basis for its first democratic judicial system and created the Courts of
Appeal, the Administrative Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Cassation (Frison-Roche
and Sodev, 71). In the period from 2001 until 2005, under EU directive, Bulgaria undertook
another significant long term commitment to further reform and improve the transparency and
impartiality of its judiciary, “replacing the old criminal-procedures code which dated back to the
Communist era; ensuring the openness of the judicial system and reviewing the functioning of
the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and improving the training, recruitment and assessment of the
magistrates” (Frison-Roche and Sodev, 71).
Several scholars have argued that these judicial reforms can be expected to hamper
corruption through creating a system of checks and balances, which would decrease favoritism
and nepotism towards political elites implicated in charges of fraud or corruption (Frison-Roche
and Sodev, 2005). For Bulgaria, establishing a satisfactory level of judicial independence and
functionality is crucial, as several authors point to the inefficiency of the judiciary at persecuting
and sentencing corrupt political officials as one of the major contributors to the perpetuation of
corrupt practices (Frison-Roche and Sodev, 2005; Popova, 2012; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008).
It can be argued that for a country with a significant legacy of nepotism and favoritism between
political elites and magistrates, establishing the principle of the separation of powers and
solidifying the independence of the judiciary can aid in increasing the instances of successful
persecution and sentencing of corrupt political officials, thereby resulting in an overall reduction
of corruption (Frison-Roche and Sodev, 2005; Popova, 2012).
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PRE-ACCESSION CONDITIONALITY AND POST-ACCESSION VERIFICATION
The literature also claims that EU membership could reduce corruption in Bulgaria in two
different phases and through two different mechanisms: first, during the pre-accession phase the
EU utilizes a mechanism of conditionality which involves gate-keeping and monitoring, and it
also utilizes peer pressure and mutual persuasion in order to promote good governance or to
reduce corruption. Second, in the case of Bulgaria (and Romania as well) the EU also utilizes a
mechanism of verification and cooperation to ensure post-accession compliance.
First, the pre-accession phase is marked by conditionality and gate-keeping. Gate-keeping
has been argued to be the EU’s most powerful and most commonly used conditionality tool as it
functions by restricting candidate members from advancing in the accession process if they fail
to comply with certain criteria (Grabbe, 1022). In analysis of the effectiveness of gate-keeping,
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2004) hypothesize that EU gate-keeping functions based on
an external incentives model, in which the EU sets rules as conditions that members must fulfill
in order to advance to the next step of the accession process or to receive EU rewards. EU
rewards may come in the form of financial aid, trade and co-operation agreements and
investments. Bulgaria is highly economically incentivized to join the EU and to comply with all
EU conditionality, even if it conflicts with national interest or if it necessitates profound reform
(Grabbe, 2001; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Haughton, 2007; Spendzharova and Vachudova,
2012 ) Grabbe elaborates that “EU aid in particular – both current receipts and the prospect of
future transfers – has a direct impact in creating new governance structures [in candidate
countries]” (Grabbe, 1023). Moreover, Noutcheva claims that market sanctions, in the form of
low foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and high costs of external borrowing, combined with
EU sanctions make it very costly for Bulgaria to deviate from the prescribed conditional reform
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pathway (Noutcheva and Bechev, 116). In short, as Spendzharova puts it, Bulgaria simply does
not possess resources to negotiate compliance with EU conditionality (Spendzharova and
Vachudova, 43). Thus, the economic benefits of joining the EU and the gate-keeping tool of
conditionality provide a strong incentive to meet the requirements as they are presented (Grabbe,
2001). In this way, the use of gate-keeping as an essential conditionally tool during the pre-
accession phase, can have a significant and positive impact upon good governance practices and
can thus be expected to reduce corruption.
The second conditionality tool that the EU utilizes during the pre-accession phase is
monitoring. Monitoring is a key mechanism involving continuous official assessment of how
prepared each candidate is in particular policy area. Monitoring is carried out in the form of
‘Regular Reports’ published by the European Commission (Grabbe, 1021). The European
Commission is committed to the reduction of corruption as exemplified in the following quote:
“It is the Commission's firm intention to reduce corruption at all levels [, i.e. political corruption,
corrupt activities committed by and collusively with organized crime groups, private-to-private
and so-called petty corruption] in a coherent way within the EU institutions, in EU Member
States and outside the EU” (“Fight Against Fraud”, 9) Thus, the European Commission utilizes
monitoring during the pre-accession phase in order to point out areas that necessitate reform so
as to incite candidate members to comply with the Commission’s anti-corruption mandate. In
short, considering the Commission’s commitment to the fight against corruption, it can be
expected that monitoring during the pre-accession phase can also aid in reducing corruption in
candidate member states.
Lastly, the final tool utilized by the EU during the pre-accession phase is peer pressure
and mutual persuasion. Authors Nicolescu-Waggonner and Bowler claim that pre-accession
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conditionality tools can indirectly reduce corruption by changing the predominant norms and
beliefs in candidate countries: “Conditionality may be a sufficient condition for good governance
through the spread of norms and ideals” (Nicolescu-Waggonner and Bowler, 6). The EU
employs two main anti-corruption bodies, namely the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and
the “Working Group on Bribery and the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption”
(GRECO) who function based on the principles of peer pressure and mutual persuasion. These
bodies do not contain legal sanctions to ensure compliance. Nevertheless, they can reduce
corrupt practices through the ‘softer’ mechanisms of peer pressure and mutual persuasion
(Nicolescu-Waggonner and Bowler, 6). Several authors show evidence that peer pressure and
mutual persuasion may be sufficient in encouraging the development of good governance
practices and in reducing corruption (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2004). In sum, various
literature claims that it can be expected that pre-accession conditionality will reduce corruption
practices in Bulgaria through gate-keeping and monitoring and also though peer pressure and
mutual persuasion.
Now, I will discuss the EU’s impact on corruption practices during the post-accession
period. It has been argued that the EU can continue to positively affect corruption practices in the
post-accession phase by employing benchmarking. Benchmarking is part of the European
Commission’s “Cooperation and Verification Mechanism” (abbreviated as CVM), which was
established in 2007 as the first strong enforcement mechanism to monitor corruption. The CVM
is a highly specialized, unique and unprecedented mechanism, developed and utilized for the first
time as a clause within the Accession Treaty of Bulgaria and Romania (Grabbe, 2001).
According to the Commission, the main purpose of CVM is ‘to smooth the entry in the EU and
at the same time safeguard the workings of the EU’s policies and institutions’ (Vachudova, 53).
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The CVM periodically establishes specific benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the
fight against corruption and organized crime (Grabbe, 1022). It sets up teams to monitor
domestic developments in these areas and to publish their findings in periodic reports. The first
such report was published in June 2007 (Vachudova, 53). Bulgaria and Romania are the only two
EU members accepted with such post-accession conditionality requirements and the Commission
applied stricter provisions and conditions to those two candidates than to any other previous
candidate (Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008). (For a comparative outline of accession conditionality,
see Table 2) The CVM is a direct, highly specific, and quantifiable post-accession mechanism to
control and curb corruption. The CVM is linked to direct punishment in the form of economic
sanctions. Unsurprisingly, therefore, many authors have expected its effects on corruption levels
in Bulgaria to be sizeable.
WHY EU ACCESSION WOULD FAIL TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON CORRUPTION REFORM
In sharp contrast to the arguments reviewed above, a significant body of literature
maintains that EU accession may fail to have a significant impact on corruption reform in
Bulgaria, because [1] the acquis’ vagueness in the area of administrative coordination and
judiciary is likely to result in unsuccessful reform, and [2] EU’s incentive-based model of
conditionality is likely to cease to be effective after accession.
VAGUENESS OF THE ACQUIS
Many authors have argued that the criteria for administrative reform within the ‘acquis
communitaire’ have been too vague to bring about any real change. Jacoby, for example, claims
that “The extent to which EU-prescribed reforms were successful was not universal across all
applicant countries, due to several factors pertaining to the nature of the acquis itself” (Jacoby,
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16). Where the EU’s requirements are clear, specific and directly linked to a reward, the reforms
are more likely to be successful, but where requirements are embodied in vague or unsettled
sections of the acquis, only limited change occurs (Haughton, 243). An area where the acquis
lacks sufficient clarity is administrative coordination, which can be directly linked to the failure
of effective implementing capacity:
“… the EU does not have competence over the administrative structures and procedures of current member states. Consequently, it lacks any formal rules on the meaning of the concept of effective implementation and/or enforcement. This uncertainty about implementation makes it difficult for the EU to shape particular institutional solutions” (Grabbe, 1019).
Furthermore, it is maintained that in a policy area where the EU has limited competence, its
progress evaluations fail to be effective, because they are unsuccessful in outlining specific goals
to be achieved:
“…the most important aspects are the Commission’s assessments of administrative capacity …. However, the goals are often vague, citing a need for ‘increasing capacity’ or ‘improving training’, rather than stating detailed institutional preferences…candidates are often asked to ‘prepare a national strategy’ in a particular area, with no further details on what it should contain or what the features of particular institutions should be” (Grabbe, 1022).
The outlining of specific goals that need to be achieved in a certain policy area is a crucial part of
the effectiveness of conditionality. Without clear delineation of the next steps to be achieved in
an area, a candidate member is likely to struggle in complying with conditionality requirements.
A World Bank study reported that in the case of Bulgaria, the acquis produced numerous pieces
of legislation which “courts, lawyers, regulatory bodies and others charged with implementation
had difficulty understanding, applying and enforcing,” leading to a serious “implementation gap”
(Noutcheva and Bechev, 133).
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Secondly, literature shows that besides the vagueness of the acquis in the area of
administrative reform, the acquis is also relatively vague in the area of judicial reform. As
Noutcheva and Bechev claim "unfortunately, the EU acquis could not prescribe one single model
of a judiciary system for Bulgaria to follow" (Noutcheva and Bechev, 133). However, as it has
been previously noted, during the pre-accession phase Bulgaria did make some significant strides
in the area of judicial reform, making its judiciary more compliant with democratic principles.
Nevertheless, judicial independence and efficiency remain a key challenge in Bulgaria: “The
judicial systems of both Bulgaria and Romania were considered as slow and inefficient with
trials lasting for years ... the Commission pointed out the reform of the judiciary in almost every
Regular Report”(Noutcheva and Bechev, 133). It can be hypothesized that the incomplete
success of judicial reform can at least in part be attributed to vagueness of the acquis
communitaire in the regard. Without a clear, specific and functioning judicial model to follow, a
candidate member such as Bulgaria, whose judiciary has traditionally not been politically
impartial and has been classified as ‘corrupt and ineffective’, will likely not be able to
successfully reform independently. In summary, it has been argued that the EU’s transformative
capabilities have been limited in the administrative and judicial branches of Bulgarian
government because of a lack of a clear and specific reform model to follow. Since the acquis
does not specify exactly how the judiciary and administration should be reformed, it can be
expected that the EU will not have a sizable effect on corruption in those two sectors.
EU’S INCENTIVES AFTER ACCESSION
The literature shows a pessimistic outlook regarding the continuous effectiveness of
conditionality-driven reform after Bulgaria’s approval for accession (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2007 ;
Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2004; Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 2002; Dimitrova
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2004; Vachudova, 2009; Spendzharova, 2004 ). As Alina Mungiu-Pippidi bluntly proclaims: “As
for the day after accession, when conditionality has faded, the influence of the EU will vanish
like a short-term anesthetic” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 1). Likewise, Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier
(2004) predict that the incentive-based model utilized in pre-accession conditionality is likely to
cease to be effective once accession is achieved. “The absence of these incentives should
significantly slow down or even halt the implementation process” [after accession]
(Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 676). Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2004) explain that
while adherence to EU rules prior to accession is in the best interest of candidate members, as it
is the most rational option to maximize their own power; this no longer becomes the case once
accession is achieved (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 678). This is because once accession is
achieved, new members have significantly less to lose – in terms of both economic rewards and
other forms of rewards – should they choose to deviate from EU rules. Thus, employing a
rational cost-benefit calculation, Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier (2004) expect that
conditionality-driven reform in Bulgaria will see a significant slowdown or even a standstill after
accession. Several other authors support Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier’s predictions in
claiming that once membership is achieved, the externally imposed costs of not pursuing reforms
or complying with the EU will diminish (Dimitrova, 47); and “the most likely lesson will be that
EU leverage is more powerful well before accession than after it, regardless of the EU’s new
tools to encourage post-accession compliance” (Vachudova, 44).
In terms of encouraging post-accession compliance, as previously discussed, the most
powerful post-accession EU compliance tool is the CVM. It must be noted that the CVM has not
enjoyed significant attention in the literature and the authors cited in this literature review have,
for the most part, not discussed its effectiveness. The CVM’s benchmarking mechanism does
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indeed create an incentive for Bulgaria to carry out specifically outlined reform and it also
presents the threat of economic sanctions and cessation of financial aid in case that Bulgaria fails
to carry out these reforms. However, inferring from the incentive-based model, it can be argued
that the power of post-accession sanctions is weaker than the threats presented during the pre-
accession phase. Once accession is granted, not only does a candidate country receive entrance to
EU markets, but it has already built significant capital through pre-accession funds. It seems that
the stakes are much higher at the threat of denial of accession, as compared to the threat of
cessation of certain post-accession funds. For this reason, although the CVM does provide some
incentive to continue the path of reform, this incentive may not be as strong as pre-accession
conditionality and it can be expected that reform implementation process may significantly slow
down or even come to a halt once accession has been granted. If the CVM is not powerful
enough to incentivize continued reform after accession, it can be expected that the EU’s
influence upon reducing corruption will be limited as “substantial improvements in the rule of
law and in the fight against corruption require a sustained domestic commitment to institutional
change, which does not seem to be present in Bulgaria, especially after the incentives of EU
accession conditionality disappear” (Spendzharova and Vachudova, 45). However, as mentioned
above, few scholars have investigated the conditionality effects of the CVM in detail, and
therefore much of this reasoning remains speculative in the absence of systematic research on the
subject.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Political corruption remains a significant issue in Bulgaria both in the views of the
domestic Bulgarian public, and according to CPI statistics (see Appendix Table 1). Despite the
large scale anti-corruption campaign launched in the course of the democratization and
Europeanization processes, Bulgaria continues to fail to effectively counter political corruption
(Bulanova, 53). In this literature review, I showed that Bulgaria’s communist era was a period
plagued with political corruption and crony distribution of resources (Holmes, 2009; Ganev,
2013). When communism collapsed in 1989, many anticipated the introduction of good
governance. Scholars anticipated that the collapse of communism would be followed by the
spread of democratic principles, including the rise of a civil society, the overall reduction of
corrupt political practices, and increased accountability and transparency to the public. The
accompanying market liberalization, insertion into international markets, and increased
economic competitiveness were also expected to reduce corruption practices within the ex-
communist republics. As time shows however, scholars who held more pessimistic views
regarding the impact of the collapse of communism upon good governance practices proved to
be closer to the truth. The importation of democracy brought only limited democratic change and
was not sufficient to reinvent longstanding cultural practices held by political officials and by the
public. Privatization created numerous opportunities for asset grabs and for corrupt resource
distribution, while the public remained distrustful of public institutions.
Attempts to reduce corruption intensified when Bulgaria acceded to the European Union.
Scholars anticipated that the EU’s pre-accession conditionality and post-accession verification
mechanism would have sizeable effects on good governance practices in Bulgaria, as the EU
requires candidate members to be on par with European standards. Although Bulgaria’s judiciary
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and public administration systems saw some improvement as a direct result of EU pressure, the
effects of pre-accession conditionality seem to have lost potency since accession has been
achieved. A temporary reduction in corruption was observed in Bulgaria as a result of EU
pressure, but the longevity of this effect is yet to be tested.
The most important lessons we can learn from this review are twofold. The first lesson is
that powerful domestic elites can manipulate periods of institutional reform to their advantage. We
have seen much evidence for this in the period immediately after the collapse of communism when
economic privatization and political democratization were carried out as a ‘clientelistic, internal
coup’ throughout which political elites manipulated power in order to gain personal advantage
(Vachudova, 2009; Haughton, 2007; Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Bulanova, 2008).
Consequently, both the economic liberalization and political democratization of the 1990s
produced limited results and artificial reforms, as a direct consequence of the political elite’s
unwillingness to commit to profound reform. More recently, during the period of accession to the
EU, we have seen that powerful elites have taken advantage of the reform process by selectively
implementing some mandated reforms but not others. EU conditionality and the overall EU
accession reform process in Bulgaria were carried out in a selective manner, with political elites
implementing only so much reform as to comply with top-down supranational norms, while
maintaining as much of the old ‘backdoor’ politics as they could (Trauner, 2009; Andreev, 2009;
(Noutcheva and Bechev, 2008; Vachudova, 2009). As Trauner claims, we can observe a
persisting dominance of “old” political elite which signed up for (EU-oriented) reforms in
rhetoric, but not in action (Trauner, 2009). Thus, by selectively introducing compatible norms or
by prolonging the transition period during which the rules of the new system were rewritten, the
predatory elites profited from their stay in office and diverted public resources toward favored
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interest groups and political clientele (Noutcheva and Bechev, 115). This resulted in corrupt state
institutions, mismanagement of the economy and partially reformed polities (Noutcheva and
Bechev, 115). In other words, political elites managed to transform corruption practices in
Bulgaria over the last two decades to comply with norms institutionalized through the political
democratization and accession to the EU, but they did not display sincere commitment to reform
(Ganev, 31).
The second main lesson that we can take away from this literature review is directly linked
to the first lesson, and it is that when mandated reforms are not clear enough, it is relatively easy
for political elites to take advantage of the reform process. For example, neither political
democratization nor accession to the EU provided clear and specific administrative and judicial
models to be followed in order for Bulgaria to transform its public administration and judicial
sectors into functioning transparent bodies (Noutcheva and Bechev, 128). While political
democratization left administrative practices in a chaotic state, the European Union could do
little in providing Bulgaria with sufficient guidance for this sector. Although the judiciary saw
some successful reforms, including three sets of constitutional reforms to solidify its
independence, to this day the Bulgarian judiciary remains politically dependent and inefficient at
persecuting and sentencing corrupt officials (Noutcheva and Bechev, 128). The entrenched
sociopolitical structures continue to hinder complete success in the judicial sector, with
persecution and sentencing of corrupt political officials being limited and ineffective (Noutcheva
and Bechev, 128). Thus, much evidence exists that in areas (such as public administration and
the judiciary) where transformational processes do not mandate clear, specific and tangible
reforms, political elites are at liberty to maneuver and to utilize these transformational processes
for their own advantage. In sum, the second lesson that we can take away from this literature
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review is that when mandated reforms are not clear and specific, it is easy for political elites to
manipulate the reform process.
Two questions which remain unanswered in the literature and may require further
attention are: a detailed evaluation of the effectiveness of the post-accession Cooperation and
Verification Mechanism (CVM) and the progress and evaluation in the area of administrative
reform. First, in terms of the CVM, many scholars have expressed the anticipation of a negative
outcome and a limited effectiveness of the CVM. Yet, aside from media articles, little scholarly
critical pieces have been written evaluating the observed effects of the CVM upon political
corruption in Bulgaria. Second, there is a significant gap in the literature regarding
administrative reforms in Bulgaria, possibly because public administration practices are largely
chaotic and difficult to observe. Also, the fact that administrative reform is a ‘grey’ area within
the EU’s ‘acquis communitaire’ renders the measuring of reform in this sector relatively
challenging. Thus, more scholarly attention is recommended on the topics of CVM effectiveness
and administrative reform for a more complete overview of corruption reform in Bulgaria.
In closing, with this paper, I attempted to understand why the processes of political
democratization and Europeanization produced limited results in reducing corruption in
Bulgaria. The puzzle that was the focus of this paper can be summed up as ‘why two major
transformational events, which are typically accompanied by successful corruption reform, have
not produced the same results in Bulgaria?’ The final take away points in response to this puzzle
are [1] when political elites are interested in pursuing their own advantage they may skew the
process of institutional reform and [2] lack of specific, clear reform allows for political elites to
do so. The lessons learned in this literature review can be applied to the future EU rounds of
accession. Currently, there are six ex-communist Eastern European republics which politically
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democratized and economically liberalized at the same time and through a similar process as
Bulgaria. Also, like Bulgaria, these republics are strongly incentivized to become part of the EU
and have posed their candidacy for accession. The ex-communist republics currently in line for
EU accession are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and
Serbia. Should these republics be accepted in the EU, they would make up roughly 4% of the
total EU population (Agence Europe, 2008). Like Bulgaria, these republics struggle with political
and administrative corruption and unfair distribution of resources. Thus, in applying the lessons
learned through this literature review, it is advisable to adopt a more critical view when
anticipating the success of EU-lead corruption reform in these future candidates. In other words, we
must attempt to curb our enthusiasm and to view future EU enlargement to the east with increased
scrutiny. I recommend for the European Union to mandate very clear and specific reform goals for
these future candidate countries. Likewise, I would recommend for the political elites in those
countries to display sincere and sustained commitment to the reform process as tangible results
in reducing corruption require profound domestic commitment to change.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Corruption Perception Indices of EU Members and Candidates
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Table 2: Pre-accession and post accession conditionality of Hungary, Poland, Czech & Slovak Federal Republic, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia,
Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania
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Table 3: Collapse of Communism Timeline
1989 Winter
Todor Zhivkov, Bulgaria’s dictator for over 35 years resigns as Communist Party leader. This event marks the collapse of communism in Bulgaria.
1989 Spring
Former communist party is restructured under the name Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)
1990
Spring
BSP resigns after opposition parties refuse to join coalition until free elections are held. BSP wins first free, democratic elections.
1990
Spring
Process of privatization begins. Bulgaria’s most powerful conglomerate MultiGroup is formed. Board of directors include many former high-ranking government officials
1990
Fall
Zhelyu Zhelev, a communist era dissident, founds a new party called Union of Democratic Forces (SDS)
Name of country is officially changed from “Peoples Republic of Bulgaria” to “Republic of Bulgaria”
1991
Winter
Bulgaria adopts Article 8 of its Constitution, stipulating that ‘State power is separated into the legislative branch, executive branch and judicial branch’ – a separation that did not exist during communism
1991
Spring
First Parliamentary elections held under new constitution; SDS wins a plurality of seats
1992 SDS-led government collapses; BSP replaces failed cabinet
1994 BSP cabinet also collapses and President dissolves the government. Parliamentary elections are held. BSP wins election with a majority of seats
1997 SDS wins elections with a large victory, forming the first post-communist government that did not collapse and managed to carry out a full four year term until 2001.
Sources: (Thomson-Reuters, 2007) (Frison-Roche & Sodev, 72) (Sokhey and Yildirim, 2013)
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Table 4: Bulgaria’s Road to Accession Timeline
1990: Grand National Assembly of Bulgaria passes a resolution expressing the country’s will to become a member of the European Community.
1993: The formal transformational process begins in Copenhagen, where the formal accession conditions are set.
1995: Bulgaria receives 476.5 million euros from the EU in aid through the PHARE program aimed at assistance for economic restructure
1997: Bulgaria fails to Meet Copenhagen Criteria. Five other states from the CEE region are invited to begin negotiations
1999: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia are invited to start accession negotiations at the Helsinki European Council
2004: Ten post-communist CEE states are accepted into the EU. Bulgaria and Romania are not accepted yet
2004: Bulgaria completes the accession negotiations of the thirty-one chapters or 80,000 pages of the EU acquis
2005: Accession Treaty with Bulgaria and Romania is signed. In June the Commission sends a “yellow card” to Sofia and Bucharest complaining about the “insufficient speed” of reforms
2006: Bulgaria is strongly recommended to “seriously intensify its efforts to crack down on organized crime and corruption” (May 2006 Monitoring Report), yet the Commission recommends accession on 1 January 2007 for both Bulgaria and Romania, with CVM and Postponement clause provisions
2007: Bulgaria and Romania become officially join the EU
Sources: (Brussels: EuropeanCommission, 2006) (Smilov 2006, 162-163). (Noutcheva, 2006, 118, 123-124). (Haughton, 238)
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