fighting terrorism in east africa & the horn

F O C U S O N C O U N T E R T E R R O R I S M

FIGHTING TERRORISM INEAST AFRICA AND THE HORN

SIX YEARS AFTER THE BOMBINGS OF OUR EMBASSIES IN NAIROBI

AND DAR ES SALAAM, U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN

THE REGION DO NOT YET MEASURE UP TO THE THREAT.

BY DAVID H. SHINN

efore Sept. 11, 2001, most Americans paid little attention to terrorism, particularly inthe Third World. Since then, though the Middle East and Central Asia have figured most prominently in the waron terrorism, Africa is increasingly coming into focus as an important battleground.

This is especially true of East Africa (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) and the Horn of Africa (Sudan, Ethiopia,Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia), where the practice of targeting Americans for political violence has deep roots. TheBlack September organization assassinated the American ambassador to Sudan, Cleo A. Noel Jr., and his deputy

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chief of mission, George CurtisMoore, in 1973. And following theU.S. air attack against Libya in1986, Libyan terrorists retaliatedby severely wounding an Americanembassy communications techni-cian, William Caldwell, also inKhartoum. There have been anumber of other terrorist attacksdating back more than two decadesagainst Western and Israeli inter-ests in this dangerous region.

But it took the coordinatedbombings by al-Qaida in 1998 ofthe American embassies in Nairobiand Dar es Salaam to make clear the full scope of theorganization’s menace. While the attacks killed farmore Kenyans and Tanzanians than Americans, 12Americans perished in Nairobi and many were injuredin both capitals. (American and Ugandan authoritiesfoiled another attack planned against the U.S. embassyin Kampala.)

Those bombings were, in many respects, even moreof a seminal event than the 9/11 attacks for theAmerican war on terrorism in East Africa and theHorn. The State Department responded by buildingnew fortified embassies in both capitals, and inKampala, with considerably more setback from thestreet. Other embassies in the region enhanced theirphysical security, as well.

There were also policy ramifications. Prior to theembassy bombings, the U.S. had a cool relationshipwith Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi as a result ofconcerns over corruption and the pace of democratiza-tion. When senior American officials visited Africa,

they rarely went to Kenya. In sym-pathy for Kenyans killed in thebombing and in appreciation forKenya’s close counterterrorismcooperation with the U.S. follow-ing the attack, significant numbersof senior American officials trav-eled to Nairobi. President Moieven received a long-desired invi-tation to the White House beforehe stepped down at the end of2002. Tanzania also experiencedan increase in high-level Americanattention.

A Focal Point of Terrorism Unfortunately, however, U.S. counterterrorism poli-

cy perspectives and programs in the region do not yetmeasure up to the threat Islamic fundamentalism andal-Qaida activity jointly pose. There are several reasonsfor this. Most of the countries have experienced severeinternal conflict, which is frequently supported byneighbors, either directly or via dissident groups —which tends to lead to tit-for-tat support of an opposi-tion group in the offending state. Examples of thisphenomenon range from the long-standing civil war inSudan and the collapse of any central authority inSomalia to Tanzanian support for the overthrow of theIdi Amin regime in Uganda, Somalia’s invasion ofEthiopia in the late 1970s, Eritrea’s war of indepen-dence, and the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict.

Such instability prevents most governments in theregion from exercising full control over their territory,providing terrorists easy access to weapons. Somaliaremains a vacuum and is prey to any terrorist withmoney and a plan. Although Sudan appears to be near-ing the end of a civil war that dates back to 1983, it nowfaces a new and worsening conflict in the Darfurregion, along the border with Chad. Uganda has beenunable to eliminate the Lord’s Resistance Army in thenorthern part of the country. The Somali-inhabitedOgaden in southeastern Ethiopia experiences regularsecurity incidents. And the Eritrean Islamic JihadMovement seems to have refocused attention againstEritrea, operating out of Sudan.

Although the groups behind these attacks are notnormally considered international terrorists, they

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The components of the

counterterrorism

program for East Africa

and the Horn are good

as far as they go.

But the focus is not

long-term enough.

Ambassador David Shinn was a Foreign Service officerfrom 1964 to 2000, serving as ambassador to BurkinaFaso and Ethiopia, among many other postings. Hewas also State Department coordinator for Somaliaduring the American intervention there. Now anadjunct professor at The George WashingtonUniversity (from which he earned a Ph.D. in politicalscience in 1980), Amb. Shinn’s research interestsinclude Africa (particularly East Africa and the Horn),terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, conflict situationsand HIV/AIDS.

engage in terrorist tactics and some, such as the EIJM,are believed to have links with al-Qaida. Recentactions by these groups illustrate conclusively that thesecurity and intelligence services in all of the countriesare underfunded and ill-equipped to counter terroristtactics by local organizations or international terrorists.

Geography also plays an important role. Most ofthese states are located near, and have longstanding tiesto, the Arabian Peninsula, the source of many of today’sIslamic militants. It is easy to move between thePersian Gulf states and this region by air and sea. Thegovernments are virtually incapable of monitoring thelengthy coastline from Eritrea to Tanzania. The landborders between all of the states are unusually porous,as well.

Further, the region sits on a religious fault line ofChristianity, Islam and traditional African beliefs. Alleight of the countries are either predominantly Muslimor have important Muslim minorities. Sudan, Djiboutiand Somalia, including self-declared independentSomaliland, are heavily Muslim. Ethiopia and Eritreaare about half Islamic. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzaniacontain significant Muslim minorities, some of whosemembers have become radicalized in recent years. Itis true that Sufism, which tends to resist the ideas ofIslamic fundamentalists, remains strong throughoutthe region. This traditionally moderate form of Islamhas not always been sufficient, however, to overcomethe appeal of fundamentalism, especially when it isbacked with funds from Saudi Arabia and the GulfStates. As a result, nearly all of the international ter-rorism in the region, as opposed to local groups thatuse terrorist tactics, has ties to extremist Islamic ele-ments.

Poverty, Social Injustice and Political Alienation

Finally, the region’s endemic corruption is anotherfactor that attracts terrorists, allowing them to buy offimmigration and local security officials. TransparencyInternational surveyed 133 countries in 2003 as part of itscorruption perceptions index. Five of the eight countrieslocated in the region ranked poorly. Ethiopia andTanzania received the best ranking of the five, tied withseveral other countries at the 92nd position. Sudan tiedwith a number of countries for position 106, whileUganda tied with others for 113. Kenya, although its

standing improved from past years, tied with Indonesia at122. (Transparency International did not rank Eritrea,Djibouti or Somalia.)

The fact that East Africa and the Horn are home tosome of the poorest countries in the world, with highlevels of social injustice and political alienation, is fre-quently cited as a reason why the region has become abreeding ground for terrorism. But not everyoneagrees that poverty is closely linked to international ter-rorism. State Department Coordinator for Counter-terrorism Cofer Black, during a May digital videocon-ference with journalists and government officials inDar es Salaam and Addis Ababa, downplayed the linkbetween terrorism and poverty. He cited the Saudiswho took part in the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., pointingout that they tended to come from middle-class fami-lies and had access to a university education. He con-cluded that they “turned into terrorists because theyfell under the influence of the wrong people andbecame seriously misguided.”

Yet while this may be true, it misses the point, atleast as far as East Africa and the Horn are concerned.The environment created by poverty, social injusticeand political alienation enhances the ability of religiousextremists to export their philosophy and of terroriststo find local support for their nefarious acts. Blackwent on to say that instead of blaming economic condi-tions, “we need to encourage moderation” and followguidelines “our mothers and fathers taught us.” Goodluck!

To be sure, poverty may not be a direct cause of ter-rorism. To dismiss its role, however, is misguided.Together with abysmally low wages for immigrationand security personnel, poverty significantly increasesthe prospect of widespread corruption that, in turn,creates a climate amenable to terrorism. Even thePresident’s National Security Strategy issued inSeptember 2002 commented that although povertydoes not make poor people into terrorists, “poverty,weak institutions and corruption can make weak statesvulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels with-in their borders.” In a recent issue of Foreign AffairsSenator Chuck Hagel, R-Neb., argued that terrorismfinds sanctuary in “the misery of endemic poverty anddespair.” He added that “although poverty and despairdo not ‘cause’ terrorism, they provide a fertile environ-ment for it to prosper.” In East Africa and the Horn,

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and probably much of the rest of the world, it is time toaccept the important role that poverty plays and put inplace long-term measures to deal with it.

Financing TerrorismCharities sponsored by Saudi Arabia and several

other Persian Gulf states have probably financed mostof the international terrorist activity in the region, withfunds coming both from private individuals and gov-ernments. In the case of Saudi Arabia, and to a lesserextent Qatar, the charities are closely linked to effortsto promote the fundamentalist Sunni Islamic creedknown popularly as Wahhabism. Toward that end, in1962 Saudi Arabia created the state-financed MuslimWorld League to underwrite mosques, schools,libraries, hospitals and clinics around the world. SaudiArabia’s grand mufti, its highest religious authority,serves as the organization’s president.

The League encompasses a wide range of entities,including the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation and the

International Islamic Relief Organization. These chari-ties have been active in East Africa and the Horn foryears, building mosques and implementing useful socialprograms. But some of their branches have also funneledmoney to al-Qaida and associated terrorist organizations,and the U.S. has accused the former director of al-Haramain in Tanzania of planning the 1998 attacks on theembassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.

After the 9/11 attacks, Washington stepped up pres-sure on Saudi Arabia to control these charities. In2002, the two countries jointly designated the Somalibranch of al-Haramain as an organization that had sup-ported terrorist groups such as al-Qaida and theSomali-based al-Ittihad al-Islamiya. Early in 2004 bothcountries notified the U.N. Sanctions Committee thatthe branches of al-Haramain in Kenya and Tanzaniaprovide financial, material and logistical support to al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations. They askedKenya and Tanzania to seize the assets of both branch-es. At the request of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, the

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government of Tanzania recentlydeported the two top al-Haramainofficials and closed the office. Inmid-2004 Saudi Arabia and theU.S. designated the al-Haramainbranch in Ethiopia as a financierof terrorism. At the same time,under pressure from the U.S.,Saudi Arabia outlined plans to dis-mantle its network of internationalcharities and place their assetsunder a new Saudi NationalCommission for Relief andCharity. It remains to be seen ifthis crackdown by Saudi Arabia will put an end to thediversion of charitable donations to terrorists.

A Major Change in Policy toward SudanU.S. relations with Sudan began a downward spiral

after an Islamic government entrenched itself in power inthe early 1990s and stepped up the war against southern-ers. Sudan opened the door slightly in 1996, however,when it responded positively to a U.S. request to expelOsama bin Laden, who had lived in Khartoum since1991. This offered the possibility for improved relations,but there was no follow-through by the Clinton adminis-tration. The nadir in the relationship then occurred in1998 following the bombing of the embassies in Nairobiand Dar es Salaam, when the U.S. launched cruise mis-siles against a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum. TheU.S. linked the factory to the production of chemicalweapons based on a soil sample containing a precursorfor the production of weapons found outside the factory.The U.S. also alleged there were ties between the facto-ry owner and al-Qaida. Sudan strongly denied any linkand a number of experts who studied the case have raisedserious questions about the rationale for the attack. TheClinton administration, which had been under pressurefrom domestic groups to take a hard line toward Sudan,nevertheless made overtures in 2000 to Khartoum con-cerning possible cooperation on counterterrorism.Sudan responded positively; by the time the Bush admin-istration took power, the scene was set for improved ties.

Following the 9/11 attacks, Khartoum quickly con-cluded it was in its interest to increase cooperation withthe U.S. on counterterrorism. This provided the Bushadministration an opportunity to advance the war on ter-

rorism and make progress on end-ing the long-standing civil war inSudan. President Bush named for-mer Missouri Senator JohnDanforth as his special envoy forSudan in an effort to end the civilwar. This appointment and policynot only neutralized the Americandomestic constituency that wantedstrong action against Sudan, butturned Sudan into an important allyin the war against terrorism.

By all accounts, the regime’scooperation on counterterrorism

has been excellent. In addition, it and the Sudan People’sLiberation Movement, under pressure from the U.S. andothers, have also made enormous progress in ending thecivil war. Consequently, Secretary Powell announced inMay that the U.S. had removed Sudan from a blacklist ofcountries deemed not to be cooperating fully on coun-terterrorism. There is still in place a maze of Americansanctions, including the listing of Sudan as a “state spon-sor” of terrorism, but this was the first step in unravelingU.S. sanctions against Sudan. The policy change proba-bly would not have occurred except for the traumaticevents of 9/11. However, a new crisis in the Darfurregion in western Sudan threatens to set back significant-ly the improvement in relations.

Quandary over SomaliaAmerican and allied forces intervened massively in

Somalia late in 1992 to end a famine. They stopped thefamine, and all U.S. troops left Somalia by March 1994following the “Blackhawk Down” episode in Mogadishu.The U.S. and international community effectively aban-doned the failed state, though 9/11 and the war againstthe Taliban in Afghanistan briefly brought Somalia backinto prominence in 2002, due to fears that the vacuumthere would provide a safe haven for al-Qaida supportersbeing chased from Afghanistan. Some of the ideas beingdiscussed in the government for dealing with the countrywere wildly off the mark, however — no surprise giventhe loss of expertise that occurred during the post-1994interregnum. Fortunately, calmer minds prevailed andWashington did not do anything really stupid in Somalia.

That said, the country is still a failed state where ter-rorist elements can move with impunity. Somalia has

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Charities sponsored by

Saudi Arabia and other

Persian Gulf states have

probably financed most of

the international terrorist

activity in the region.

been home to al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, a fundamentalistorganization that has carried out terrorist attacksagainst Ethiopia and is believed to have connectionswith al-Qaida. The U.S. added al-Ittihad in 2001 to itsComprehensive List of Terrorists and Groups. It alsoincluded the Somali money transfer organization, al-Barakat, on the list. There is evidence that an al-Qaidacell based in Mogadishu took part in the 2002 attack onan Israeli-owned hotel outside Mombasa and a simul-taneous but unsuccessful attempt to shoot down anIsraeli charter aircraft. At the same time, Somalis gen-erally are not predisposed toward Islamic fundamental-ism or entreaties by international terrorists. The situa-tion in Somalia is worrisome and merits close monitor-ing, but it is not even close to the threat once posed byTaliban-governed Afghanistan. There appears, howev-er, to be no agreed-upon U.S. policy for dealing withSomalia. It is long past time to adopt one.

A Base in DjiboutiThe U.S. embassy in Djibouti has traditionally been

small and sleepy. But that changed after 9/11. Thecountry now hosts the only U.S. military base in Africaand welcomes coalition forces from France, Germany,Spain and Italy. Some 1,800 American military andcivilian personnel currently occupy a former FrenchForeign Legion facility at Camp Lemonier outside thecapital city. Established in October 2002 and known asthe Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, it isresponsible for fighting terrorism in Djibouti, Ethiopia,Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Yemen, and in thecoastal waters of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and theIndian Ocean. CJTF-HOA’s stated mission is to detect,disrupt and defeat transnational terrorist groups, tocounter the re-emergence of transnational terrorismand to enhance long-term stability in the region. Theestablishment of the base represents a dramatic changefor U.S. security policy in Africa since the closure manyyears ago of the Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya andKagnew Communications Station in Ethiopia.

CJTF-HOA has devoted most of its effort so far totraining with allied forces and the armies of Djibouti,Ethiopia and Kenya. It has conducted an impressivenumber of civic action programs that refurbish schoolsand clinics and provide medical services in the samethree countries. CJTF-HOA established a temporarytraining facility for the Ethiopian military outside Dire

Dawa in the southeastern part of the country. Traininghas begun for the first of three Ethiopian anti-terrorismbattalions. It is less clear how much terrorist interdic-tion CJTF-HOA has accomplished. Without providingdetails, the departing commander stated in May thatthey have captured “dozens of terrorists” and averted atleast five terrorist attacks.

Although a good effort, the operation is not free ofproblems. Relations with Sudan, especially after dis-agreements over the new conflict in Darfur, have notimproved sufficiently to engage in military cooperation.Somalia remains in too much disarray to think in terms ofprojects in country except for the more peaceful and self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland. The U.S.has so far been unwilling to undertake activities inSomaliland that might suggest it recognizes the country.Eritrea claims to seek cooperation with the U.S. on coun-terterrorism, but there have been problems translatingthis intention into action. There are also some opera-tional issues. Turnover of CJTF-HOA personnel is toofrequent, and area and indigenous language expertise arein short supply. American ambassadors in the region,most of whom have only dealt with a military attaché ontheir own staff, are still learning how to interact with anindependent military commander.

The East Africa Counterterrorism InitiativeAfter 9/11 the State Department’s Office of

Counterterrorism identified East Africa and the Horn,especially Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenyaand Tanzania, to be at particular risk. In response, in2003 the U.S. created a $100 million East AfricaCounterterrorism Initiative. This encompasses mili-tary training for border and coastal security, programsto strengthen control of the movement of people andgoods across borders, aviation security, assistance forregional programs to curb terrorist financing, policetraining and an education program to counter extrem-ist influence. There are separate programs to combatmoney laundering.

The major beneficiary so far of this funding has beenKenya. The U.S. is working with Kenyan officials todevelop a comprehensive anti-money laundering/coun-terterrorist financing regime. The State Department’sTerrorist Interdiction Program has established a com-puter system that is now operational at select airportsin Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia, and is scheduled to go

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online this year in Djibouti andUganda. The TIP system providesnations with a state-of-the-art com-puter network that enables immi-gration and border control officialsto identify suspects attempting toenter or leave the country. TheU.S. is also funding a police devel-opment program in Tanzania,Uganda and Ethiopia, developing atraining and equipment programfor Kenya’s law enforcement agen-cies, and setting up forensic labora-tories in Tanzania and Uganda.

As welcome as this new assistance is, it has notstemmed complaints from countries in the region.Uganda claims it is being shortchanged because it hasdealt successfully with international terrorist threats on itsown. In addition, Kampala’s priority is dealing with localterrorist groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army andAllied Democratic Front, while Washington is focused oninternational terrorists like al-Qaida. Eritrea offered theU.S. access to its port facilities and, together withEthiopia, joined the “coalition of the willing” against Iraq.But it now finds itself frozen out of counterterrorist assis-tance because of U.S. concerns over the continued deten-tion of two Eritreans employed by the American embassyand other human rights issues. Both Eritrean andEthiopian cooperation on counterterrorism are alsolinked to the two countries’ desire to gain favor with theU.S. on their festering border demarcation disagreement.

Looking AheadThe resources and attention devoted to counterterror-

ism in East Africa and the Horn are impressive but inad-equate. At a House subcommittee hearing on terrorismin April, Chairman Ed Royce, R-Calif., emphasized thatthe U.S. needs to devote more resources for counterter-rorism in Africa. He is correct. President Bush’s FY 2005international affairs budget request has as its top prioritythe winning of the war on terrorism. Exclusive of Iraqand Afghanistan, it requests $5.7 billion for assistance tocountries around the world that have joined the war onterrorism and another $3.5 billion that indirectly supportsthe war by strengthening the U.S. ability to respond toemergencies and conflict situations. The $100 millionEast Africa Counterterrorism Initiative and several other

modest programs just don’t mea-sure up to the threat.

The components of the coun-terterrorism program for EastAfrica and the Horn are good as faras they go. But the focus is primar-ily short- and medium-term: catch-ing bad guys, providing trainingand, to a limited extent, building upcounterterrorism infrastructure.What is missing is a major, new,long-term program to reducepoverty and social alienation.

U.S. foreign assistance worldwide in constant dollarshas declined about 44 percent since 1985 and another18 percent since the collapse of the Soviet Union in1991. Until the U.S. and the international communitygenerally are prepared to put far more resources intoimproving the environment that encourages terrorism— namely poverty — it is difficult to see lastingprogress against this enemy. If only the U.S. had hadthe foresight years ago to devote to counterterrorismand economic development the equivalent cost of over-throwing the Taliban and rebuilding a destroyedAfghanistan!

Assuming adequate financial assistance from outside,countries in the region must bear the primary responsi-bility for curbing terrorism. They know the different cul-tures, speak the local languages and control the securityforces. Foreigners will never be able to function as effec-tively in the native environment as local nationals.Accordingly, action on the recent recommendation bythe Africa Policy Advisory Panel (organized by theCenter for Strategic and International Studies) for anannual $200-million Muslim outreach initiative in Africais long overdue.

Finally, the U.S. has allowed its language and areaexpertise among foreign affairs personnel to degrade todangerous levels. The time has come to rebuild thisexpertise. In the case of East Africa and the Horn, thereshould be adequate numbers of Arabic, Somali, Swahiliand Amharic speakers from State, the CIA, USAID andthe military assigned to appropriate countries. Only thenwill the U.S. be able to engage in reliable information-gathering and increase the public affairs outreach tocommunities where Islamic fundamentalism and sympa-thy for terrorists are taking hold. n

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It took the coordinated

bombings in 1998 of

Embassy Nairobi and

Embassy Dar es Salaam to

make clear the full scope

of al-Qaida’s menace.

fighting terrorism in east africa & the horn

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