fighting ghost askew

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Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 32, No, 2 (2010), pp , 117-55 DOI: 10.1355/cs32-2a 2010 lSEAS ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

Fighting with Ghosts:Querying Thailand's "SouthernFire"MARC ASKEW

This article explores several key issues that remain under-examinedor problematic in assessments of T hailand's ongoing southern crisis. Itargues that the "ghosts" behind the ongoing turbulence in Thailand'ssouthern border provinces are not only mysterious insurgents, butalso the imponderable and contentious issues that continue topervade discourse and policv debate after six years of unrest. First,it addresses the problematic issue of depicting the violence solely asan ideologically-driven "insurgency", highlighting the fact of systemicinstability in the borderland. Noting the complexity of the violence,the paper also draws attention to the "politics of naming": i.e., theconcern of the Thai state to define the violence as non-politicalfor an international audience. Secondly, it outlines the insurgency-related dimensions of the violence and the enigmatic character ofthe insurgents' organization, identity and aims, which ultimately lieat the heart of the key dilemmas facing the Thai state in efforts toreduce the violence. It then considers key competing public "texts"that have em erged to define the putative causes of and solutions to thesouthern "problem", finally, the paper addresses the generally ignoredtopic of the varied positions of the Malay Muslim popu lation and theimplications of this for discussions o f the m eaning and legitimacy ofinsurgents' political violence.

Keywords: Southern Thailand, insurgency, politics of naming, political violence.Thai State.


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118 Marc AskewIt occurred to me that the true nature of war is that your declaredenemy is not your only enemy.

(Ted Morgan, My Battle of Algiers: A Memoir, 2005)Introduction: Ghostly Problems and the Spectral EnemyThe title of this paper, "Fighting with Ghosts", is based on acommon metaphor used by frustrated Thai mili tary and policecommanders to describe their struggle with assailants waging aform of guerrilla aggression against the state on a distinctivelynew clandestine organizational basis in Thailand's southern borderprovinces. This discussion, however, s tresses that the "ghosts"behind the southern turbulence are not only mysterious insurgents,but also the imponderable and problematic issues that still plaguediscourse and policy surrounding the southern borderland after sixyears of unrest. This essay explores several key issues that remainunder-examined or problematic in assessments of this crisis. First,it addresses the problematic issue of depicting the violence solelyas an ideologically-driven "insurgency", highlighting the fact ofsystemic instability and local conflicts in the borderland whichinteract with insurgent-driven violence. Secondly, it outlines theinsurgency-related dimensions of the violence and the enigmaticcharacter of the insurgents' organization, identity and aims, whichultimately lie at the heart of the key dilemmas facing the Thaistate in efforts to quell the violence. It moves on to examine theprincipal competing public "texts" that have emerged to comprehendthe southern "problem" over the years since 2002. Finally, the paperaddresses the generally ignored topic of the varied positions of theMalay Muslim population and the implications of this for discussionsof the meaning and legitimacy of insurgents' political violence andsolutions to the unrest."Insurgency" and Opportunistic Violence in a Disorderly BorderNaming InsurgencyThe situation of violent unrest in Tha iland's sou thern border provincesis now commonly depic ted as an " insurgency" (or "separa t is t


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Querying Thailand's "Southern Fire" 119and other alleged members of that organization in Thailand skewedanalysis in this direction. The upsurge of violence in the south afterthe Narathiwat arms raid on 4 January 2004, and particularly afterthe controversial attacks staged by Muslim youths in April 2004,added fuel to speculation about jihadist regional terrorist l inks.In this context, the term "insurgency" functioned as a polemicalcounter-point to the alarmist label "terrorism" (paired with jibad) andasserted tbe primacy of "local/national" in contrast to "global" scaleviolence and dynamics. ' Tbe term "insurgency" has become a neatand convenient label for journalists or academics to summarize tbeviolence in soutbern Thailand, but wbat does naming the situation"insurgency" mean precisely in tbe current context? Can tbe violenceand its sources/perpetrators be so easily packaged?

In its classic Cold War definition, and often in relation to com-munist movements, "insurgency" referred to an organized movementwbose aim is to undermine tbe autbority of an establisbed statetbrougb subversion and guerrilla warfare, witb tbe explicit objectiveof replacing tbat state with a new form of government.^ In thelast decade, bowever, counter-insurgency specialists bave revisedtbis definition in tbe face of tbe apparently more complex natureof confiict and opposition facing coalition forces in Afgbanistan,Iraq and elsewhere. Cbris North argues tbat organized movementsare bard to identify and insurgencies now include "extremists ,tribes, gangs, militias, warlords, and combinations of tbese", witbdifferent a ims. Some are networked witb loose object ives andsimply aim to enbance tbeir survival, and many do not actuallyseek tbe overtbrow of establisbed governments.^ He tbus prefers anopen-ended definition of insurgency (drawn from a US Air Forcedefinition) as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actorsfor legitimacy an d/o r influence over tbe relevan t po pu latio ns" ,' ' Insoutbern Tbailand, mucb of tbe violence and tbe motivations ofits perpetrators seems to justify a definition of "insurgency" tbatcombines tbe classical and the revised versions, based on tbreeelements: (1) ideology or legitimacy claims supporting insurgentaction; (2) an organization (bowever loose and decentred); and (3) aguerrilla-style campaign to contest state authority, togetber witb tbeuse of violence and intimidation to gain control over people and


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120 Marc AskewThe instability in Thailand's south is officially called khwammai sangop (turbulence or disturbance) and its instigators phu ko

khwam mai sangop (disturbance-makers). Significantly, there is nocorresponding single term in the Thai vocabulary for "insurgency".Key words applying to contests for state power are kabot (illegitimaterebellion), ratprahan (a successful seizure of state power) and batiwat(revolution). Then there is baeng yaek din daen (separatism), themost heinous political offence against the centralized and unitaryThai state. Interestingly, the latter term is not explicit in Thaipublic or media discourse on the current southern unrest, thoughits implication is ever-present, and the highly flexible abbreviationchon (bandit), which was formerly endorsed in a longer compoundexpression for separatist insurgents, is still habitually used in popularpress headlines.* The official term ko khwam mai sangop (makingdisturbance) refers to violent actions which may have a politicalobjective, but may also simply aim to create chaos for pragmaticends. It is only recently among a few Thai security academics.Army Staff College perso nn el an d com m and ers that ko khwammai sangop has been explicitly matched to the English expression"insurgency", i.e., to mean politically/ideologically-inspired irregularwarfare aimed at subverting state authority.' Sangkop riap roi (peaceand order) is a state/bureaucratic and middle-class value that deemsits opposite condition o khwam mai sangop (disturbance/turbulence)as deeply negative. It is an intrinsically authoritarian concept becauseit leeches political meaning from disorder." The Thai state uses theexpression khwam mai sangop as a soft euphemism for the currentunrest, which serves to downplay the political intent of the violenceby semantically uncoupling insurgent goals from their methods. Thisis hardly unique to the Thai state; it is the standard way that statesand regimes have de-legitimized opposition, and was prominent incounter-propaganda used against communist insurgent movementsafter the Second World War.^ Notably, the same term has beenproclaimed by the Democrat-led administration to de-legitimize theanti-government "red-shirt" movement."'

Thai officials are reluctant to use the English term "insurgency"or "insurgents" in briefings with foreign officials and audiences onthe current turbulence. The officially approved word used for theagents of violence is "perpetrators of violence". There is a diagnostic


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Querying Thailand's "Southern Fire" 121against officials, wbicb renders tbe movement to many officials as aspurious insurgency. Tbere is also a deliberate "politics of naming"involved." Tbe concern about tbe semantics of Tbailand's soutbernunrest in tbe international arena was made explicit in 2009 by anopinion formulated by tbe Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and passedto tbe military in tbe soutb) whicb made two points. First, that tbeagents of violence in tbe soutb sbould be designated as criminalsengaged in crimes against bumanity, as specified in recent judgementsof tbe International Criminal Gourt in cases of etbnic cleansing inthe former Yugoslavia. Tbe term "perpetrators of violence" was con-sistent witb the definition of criminal acts. Second, tbat tbe terms"insurgent/insurgency" and "separatist/separatism" sbould not be usedbec aus e of tbeir po ten tial to be conflated w itb formal definitionsof "Internal Armed Conflict", and thus elevate tbe status of tbesoutbern violence.'^ Srisompob Jitpiromsri, a prominent researcherin the soutb, is bigbly sceptical of tbis official terminology, wbicb,be argues, elides tbe political dimension of tbe violence."Opportunistic Violence and the Cha llenge to State ControlDespite its use as a device for dissimulation, tbe term khwam maisangop does bave tbe capacity to describe violent events tbatare driven by non-ideological interests . Tbere has been a longhistory of fomented and disguised disturbances and violence intbe soutb. Tbe current wave of violence is no exception to tbispattern, making a narrow (or casual) use of tbe Englisb languageterm "insurgency" inadequate to define tbe totality of tbe violence.Sometbing more tban an "insurgency" is going on in tbe currentmix of violent events. Arguably, "insurgency-centred turbulence",or "insurgency-driven violence", are more appropriate depictions,because a comprebensive disorder is being experienced, wbicb isthe legacy of a chronically exploited and disorderly borderland,witb drug rings and vested interest groups also active. ' ' ' Tbougbtbe involvement of tbese groups migbt be viewed essentially asopportunistic violence feeding off insurgent aggression and takingadvan tage of a w eaken ed state and enforcem ent struc ture, tbereare now confusing overlaps between insurgents, competing localpolitical groups and criminals. In addition to tbe agglomeration ofcriminal violence tbere is also a generic type of conflict represented


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122 Marc Askeware often vote-canvassers for rival political teams) cbaracteristicallyrise in periods before and immediately following elections.^'* Copycat-style killings, including bebeadings and body burnings, bave actedto disguise private killings as insurgent killings, and a number ofscbools bave been burnt at the instigation of local politicians wboare also building contractors (e.g., in Bacbo District of Narathiwatin late August 2009, a volunteer ranger from a local army basewas paid 30,000 babt by tbe sub-district administration presidentto burn the local scbool). Tbe mucb-publicized bombing of tbe CSPattani botel in early 2008 was claimed by journalists to mark anescalation in militant violence. Evidence subsequently uneartbedby police confirmed tbat tbe bombing was undertaken by insurgentbomb-makers, but information about tbe vebicles used in tbe attack(and a simultaneous, but failed, car bomb attack in Yala) pointed totbe involvement of a prominent local Muslim politician suspectedto bave sougbt revenge against tbe botel owner (a senator] who badsupported bis political rival in a provincial election."^

Writers commonly introduce tbeir accounts of tbe violence in tbesoutb by citing tbe total number of deatbs and/or casualties, givingthe impression tbat all of tbese are due to insurgent violence. Tbisis misleading because these figures do not disaggregate private andpolitically-motivated killings from tbe total number. Internal policeestimates for tbe period January 2004 to late 2008, tbougb problematic,suggest that private killings may account for one quarter to a tbirdof all violent deatbs in tbe borderland since 2004. Over tbis period,police listed 4,296 sbooting incidents, of wbicb 950 (22 per cent) weredetermined as arising from "personal disputes", and 2,344 (54.5 percent) were classified as "security related". Significantly, in a further998 cases of sbooting incidents (23 per cent) tbe cause and culpritcould not be determined by police investigation, wbicb could maketbe percentage of personal/political motivated attacks even bigber.^'Some of tbese unattributable sbootings no doubt include cases ofclandestine assassination by police and army bit-squads.'"

The proportion of personal-political killings may be bigbertban identified in police statistics because official figures understateactual numbers for several reasons. District-level military and policecommanders note tbat cases are classified as "security-related" eventhougb clear evidence is unavailable to demonstrate cause or culprit.


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Querying Thailand's "Southern Fire" 123killings). Some police commanders and province officials suggestthat personal/political motivated killings could be responsible for40 to 50 per cent of total civilian deaths in the border provinces. Ifsuch opinions only came from state officials there would be groundsto suspect that such claims were deliberate efforts to downplay themilitary capacity of insurgents; however similar assessments onthe role of local political conflict in providing momentum to localviolence have been given to this author by insurgents, Patani UnitedLiberation Organization (PULO) members in Malaysia, Muslim rightslawyers and Muslim local politicians, people who are hardly likelyto have a vested interest in duplicating official representations.'- 'Internal police analysis using a revised classification formula of eventsintroduced late in 2009, proposed that in that year 34 per cent ofviolent events were a result of personal/political conflicts.The violence currently afflicting the southern border provinces ismultifaceted and not solely a product of insurgents, even though theirattacks are the driving core of the current instability (see Photo 1).They have nested their violence within an existing disorder, reflectingthe character of an endemically weak borderland and the genericfeatures of a violent society. Some would argue that emphasizing thispoint only distracts us from focusing on the dynamics and sourcesof an ideologically-driven insurgency against the Thai state, which isthe main game in town, reflecting the "master cleavage" of conflict,as Kalyvas describes it.^^ My point is not to deny the centrality ofMalay Muslim political violence in the south, but to point to anothercondition of disorder, which compounds the contemporary challengeto the Thai state's legitimacy and authority.The New Insurgency: Fighting with GhostsAn Enigmatic Movement ]The role of separatis t insurgents in the southern violence wassuspected even before the startling raid and theft of weapons fromthe base of the Fourth Development Battalion in Cho-Airong District,Narathiwat on 4 January 2004. From 2002, when attacks on policeand army outposts began to rise, some security personnel on theground suspected that a new insurgency was brewing, but their


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Querying Thailand's "Southern Fire" 125a well-planned operation undertaken by a new militant network(subsequently labelled by officials as the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi or BRN-C),^' but this raid did not quell prevailingsuspicions about the involvement of vested interests and criminalgroups.^' ' The move towards interpreting the unrest as organizedideologically-driven subversion gained momentum among securityagencies following the questioning of captured militants involvedin the 28 April 2004 attacks and the accumulation of insurgentdocumentation from a number of religious schools." From this time(and increasingly from 2006, when intelligence gathering improved)information revealed the comprehensive scale of a new cell-basedinsurgent network that had been over a decade in gestation.On the question of the ideology, aims and structure of theassailants' organization, the paradigms among analysts have swungfrom a speculative model of an internationally-linked and regionallymobilized jihadist terrorist movement to one emphasizing a separatistinsurgency generated by "local grievances". In the context of theanxiety generated by the 2002 Bali and 2003 Jakarta bombings aswell as the capture of Hambali in Thailand, the prominence ofthe global and regional terror theme was understandable, but thecoherence of the evidence was ultimately weak. By 2005 the broadconsensus was that this was a "local" insurgency, albeit inspiredby regional/global examples of Islamic resistance. However, thepotential for a convergence between local and international/regionalactors and agendas (e.g., connections with JI) continues to generateinterest, with commentary on this topic ranging in tone from thecautionary to the alarmist.^" The available evidence does suggestthat the current crop of Malay Muslim insurgents have rejected theovertures of outside jihadist groups from Indonesia and elsewherefor assistance.

Nonetheless, there is clearly an aggressively Islamic ideologicalbase for the insurgency, and an aim to reclaim territory for creating athoroughgoing Islamic state. The Berjihad di Patani document foundafter the 28 April 2004 attacks explicitly highlighted jihad as alegitimizing motivation for fighting the Thai state." Although thisdoomed uprising (inspired by a charismatic religious mystic) wasan eccentric deviation from the militants' preferred tactics, the callto jihad in defence of religion and to legitimize violence is broadly


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126 Marc Askewotber investigators) empbasize religious motivation as a principalimpulse and mecbanism of commitment for many recruits.^" Insurgentleaflets bave commonly demonized tbe Tbai state and Buddbistsas kafir (unbelievers), claiming tbat Muslims are under attack andtbat Tbai t roops bave been sent to tbe soutb to ki l l Muslims.Tbis commitment to jibad does not necessarily translate to "globaljibadism": it reflects botb a traditional form of mobilization expressedby M uslim com m un ities opposing external tbreats,^** togetber w ith atransformation of Malay Muslim nationalism in response to worldtrends in militant Islam. It sbould be remembered tbat calls to jibad,reflecting tbe emergence of a more tborougbgoing religious rationalefor separatism, were already evident by the mid-1980s witb tbeadvent of tbe Patani Mujabideen [Barisan Bersatu Mujahidin Patani,BBMP) and tbe Patani Islamic Liberation Front (BIPP).

Tbe "local grievances" advocates argue tbat wbat is at stakefor tbe insurgents and tbeir putative constituency is etbnic identityand tbat religion functions essentially as an etbnic marker: i.e., callsto Muslim solidarity are essentially calls to Patani Malay solidarityin tbe face of alleged marginalization and injustices to Muslims(past and present) by tbe Thai state. '" Tbe current insurgency insoutbern Tbailand can certainly be portrayed as a continuation ofMalay Muslim separatist impulses in mutated form rather tban adistinctively new pbenomenon, and tbe case for interpreting tbeescalation of violence from 2002-04 in a primarily domestic contextbas some merit. But tbere are new features, including an undeniableand powerful international context wbicb frames current events.Tbe stridently religious basis for legitimizing the new insurgency'sunprecedented repertoire of violence sbould not be underestimatedor relegated to a "rbetorical" function alone. Religious fervour wasexplicitly identified by tbe former BERSATU'' leader. Wan KadirCbe Man, as a distinguisbing cbaracteristic of tbe new insurgency.^^Moreover, it is clear tbat tbis insurgency would not bave emergedwitbout tbe nourishing examples of Islamic mobilization tbrougbouttbe wor ld and tbe region (e .g . , tbe mujabideen movement inAfgbanistan, tbe Aceh independence struggle) and the escalatingdefensiveness of tbe Islamic world, botb before and following tbeterrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 . " Sucb trends bave resonatedand imbricated witb cbanging power balances and transformations


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Querying Thailand's "Southem Fire" 127It is wortb empbasizing bere tbat tbe current movement isdistinctive by virtue of recruitment metbods founded on a religious

oatb (suboh) and commitment to secrecy (a key pledge among "10discipl ines" embraced by members) , which takes place prior tomilitary training. Tbis clandestine movement emerged in tbe mid-1980s. Tb e first case of a religious oa tb of m em be rsb ip identifiedby tbis autbor was 1982, witb a larger proportion of early members'recruitment dates clustering in tbe period from 1992 onwards.^"Notably, tbe new insurgent movement was emerging wben tbeconventional armed separatist groups (including PULO and BRN-Congress) were disintegrating. Key recruiters are religious teacberswbo bave returned from study overseas, or tbeir students. It isundeniable tbat key sites for recruitment bave been religious scboolsand otber local institutions [tatika scbools) of tbe border provinces,using personal networking metbods. But none of tbese int imateconnections witb religious elites or rituals makes tbe ideologicaltexture of tbe current movement "jibadist" in tbe model of JI. AsMcCargo bas empbasized, tbe literature of the insurgency is notcbaracterized by tbeological sopbistication or uniformity, and it isnot cbaracteristically Salafist/Wahabi in inspiration.^'^ At tbe sametime, tbe saturation of indoctrination discourse witb bistorical claimstbat tbe former Patani sultanate was an "Islamic State" prior to itsdestruction by tbe infidel Buddbist Siamese state, tbougb inaccurateand simplistic, does bigbligbt tbe dominance of a religious idiomin representing an imagined sovereign territory. So too, tbe rbetoricof jihad is central in evoking tbe sacred collective duty of freeingtbe land, just as it condemns Malay Muslims wbo do not assist intbis mission. Indoctrination compact discs viewed by tbis autborsuggest tbat tbe key tbemes are very mucb in tbe mode of "folkjibad", witb struggle and resistance being compared witb tbe earlystruggles of M oba mm ad (notably tbe fligbt to M edina tbe bijra)and tbe war against early Islam's enemies;

The land of Patani is a sacred place, and this land of Patanimust make jihad to the fullest. No matter what, there must beindependence. If we die for this, we will immediately reachheaven. Every religious teacher knows this, though they don'tall speak of it.'"


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128 Marc Askewmany Malay Muslims of the borderland now accepted that theywere "Siamese", highlighting that "Malayness" was no longer asufficient ground for galvanizing resistance to the Thai state." On thisassessment, it would follow that the only effective focus remainingfor the galvanizing of a viable resistance movement against the Thaistate was religious in nature, and this is indeed what seems to haveoccurred. One analyst describes the ideological orientation of thenew insurgency as "Islamist nationalism".^" It is also appropriate,following Juergensmeyer, to describe the informing ideas of thisinsurgency as "religious nation alism " an ideology built arou nd animagined community of believers, sustained by a sense of righteousnesswhich carries with it the authority to utilize violence against thedesignated enemies of that community. '" Despite the apparently"glocalized" ideological complexion of the current insurgency, onerecent study plumps for the standard nationalist argument that thefervent religious language of the movement clothes an essentiallyold localist narrative of ethnic resistance.^"

The goals, structure and development of the insurgency werea topic of investigation and speculation since the January 2004attack and even earlier. In 2002, General Kitti Rattanachaya (formercommander. Fourth Army Region) insisted that an active separatistmovement aiming to establish an independent Patani State was wellestablished in the three provinces with a definite base of support.""In 2004 he elaborated on this claim, pointing to a well-establishedunderground coalition of largely religious-driven separatist groups(based on four levels: hardline leadership, armed forces, youth inthe religious schoo ls and a un ited front of ord inary sup po rters)that had been developing for a decade without adequate detectionby intelligence agencies."^ Kitti 's published claims were based ondocumentation found by Border Patrol Police in the home of thereligious teacher Masae Useng in 2003, which outl ined a "sevenstage plan" for implementing Patani independence. A number ofversions of this plan were found during 2004 by security officials inraids on religious schools. They all shared a set of phased objectivesbeginning with the fostering of religious and ethnic consciousnessfocusing on the ideal of a Patani state, followed by organizationbuilding, recruitment of youth for armed forces, attacks on stateofficials, and a penultimate seventh stage which combined political


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Querying Thailand's "Southern Fire" 129bead of a special intelligence group under tbe Internal SecurityOperations Command (ISOC) empbasized to tbis autbor tbat tbeinsurgents' seventb stage was targeted by its leaders for tbe year2005, but wben it bad become clear tbat networks in communitieswere not strong enougb, tbe deadline was put back to 2007. Wbentbe insurgents failed to acbieve tbis target, tbe strategy of mobilizinga people's war against tbe state was put on bold, and a new pbasewas introduced, wbicb focused on staging selective major attacksled by non-local forces (commando groups)."*From mid-2004 it became clear from interrogations of capturedmilitants tbat tbe insurgent groups were cellular in organization, tbeiractions coordinated but flexible, tbe leadersbip decentralized, andtbe identities of tbe bigber echelons beavily protected, Tbe ritualizedinduction of initiates tbrougb religious oatbs and adberence to "10disciplines" of practice (including total secrecy) was already knownby officials by late April 2004."'^ Furtber, tbe insurgent groups badno demonstrable organizational links witb older bodies sucb asPULO, despite tbe latter's public pronouncements to tbat effect. Tbeinsurgency's cbaracter is markedly distinctive from earlier separatistmovements wbicb featured clear manifestos of aims, knowledge ofleaders' identity among ordinary cadre, and permanently armed forces(except for specialized commando forces). It is tbis clandestine featureof tbe organization and its various wings (operating at village, districtand province level) tbat bas stymied tbe Tbai state in its efforts toneutralize it or gain access to a demonstrable leadersbip,

Tbe BRN-C, a faction of tbe former BRN, has been a favouritecan did ate in tbe searcb for a pr in c ipa l ove rarcbing insurge ntorganization , and its leading role is reaffirmed in tbe army's m ostrecent operational documents."'* Kitti argued tbat BRN-C was centralin tbe progressive mobilization towards implementing tbe seven-stage plan, focusing initially on propagation and indoctrination ofyoutb, but from 2001 turning to armed insurgency,' ' ' Major-GeneralSamret Sirirai, former Deputy Commander of tbe Fourtb RegionArmy, produced a report in 2007 affirming tbe BRN-C claim, usingselective documentation from intelligence sources, including confessiondocuments. Samret's report was distributed widely among journalists,'"'But tbere bas been skepticism in some quarters about tbe BRN-Ctbesis, witb critical academics and journalists claiming tbat tbe Tbai


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130 Marc Askew

identified it as tbe leading if not the broad umbrella group.'"Most insurgents wbo have been interviewed by researchers , orinterrogated by officials, confess to not knowing the specific nameof tbe movement to which they belong. On the other hand it ishardly surprising that cadre, including tbe juwae (guerrilla figbters)should have little knowledge of either tbe BRN-C or the identitiesof leaders, given tbat cell-based organizations operate on a strictlyneed-to-know basis, functioning to contain knowledge and protectidentities.

During 2005 tbere was increasing knowledge of broad functionalgroupings connected to the insurgency including tbe "PERMUDA"(youth) movement. In 2006 tbe outl ine of an "unifying body"known as tbe DPP [Dewan Pembabasan Patani, or Patani LiberationCounc i l ) was found in cap tu red insu rgen t documents wh ichofficials argued represented the overarcbing structure of tbe currentmovement.^' Tbe secret council of the DPP topped a pyramidalcontrol structure comprising a set of divisions (military, economy,youth, public relations and propaganda) leading down to cells attbe district and village level. Tbe document represented an idealstructure, but it did correspond in some respects to the reality onthe ground, tbat is, in certain areas de facto government, supportnetworks and influence were maintained by tbe insurgents. Somesources estimated tbat by 2006 tbe number of people engaged inthe movement at all levels amounted to 40,000, with its militarywing comprising perhaps 30 bomb-making experts and up to 3,000armed fighters. In 2007 tbe army maintained a list of 217 villagesbelieved to be insurgent s trongholds ("establisbed" vil lages) orvulnerable to insurgent influence (of a total of 1,300 villages in tberegion). Tbe police maintained tbeir own list, with a larger estimateof 319 "infiltrated villages". Estimates for insurgent strength in lateryears have varied. In mid-2008 one high-ranking military sourcein ISOC Forward Command stated that tbere remained about 300active armed insurgents (with a further 3,000 trained but inactive),no less tban 30,000 supporters, and up to 40 principal leaders,some living in Malaysia.'^^

Intelligence gathering on insurgents improved from 2007, largelydue to assistance from local Muslims alienated by insurgent violence.Extensive lists of insurgent suspects were compiled by tbe police,


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Querying Thailand's "Southern Fire" 131Table 1Estimate of Insurgent groups in the Three Border Provincesand Four Districts of Songkhla |(March 2009)

i4cjViesPropagandistsOperational CommandersArmed fightersSupportersOther leadersTotal

Numbers2791881,8854,9631,000

8,315Source: Southern Border Provinces Police Bureaurecords, 2009.

Privately, bowever, police empbasize tbat tbese figures need tobe regarded as a minimum estimate, given tbat many individualsinvolved in the insurgent networks remain unknown, particularlynewly-trained recruits, wbo are added eacb year. Tbe actual numberof trained fighters are likely to number 3,000 or more. A largeproportion of individuals on warrants (often multiple) are in biding inotber locations and periodically move across tbe border to Malaysia.Wbile it can be suggested tbat tbe authorities are no longer figbting"gbosts" because tbe identities of many insurgents are now known,the perpetrators of attacks remain elusive and difficult to prosecute.Despite increasing use of forensic evidence, an estimated 40 per centof security cases judged by tbe courts bave been dismissed on tbegrounds of insufficient evidence.*'A Panoply of Texts: The Struggle for the High Ground of IVuthTbere bas never been an autboritative "text" defining tbe dynamics,causes and solutions to tbe soutbern problem, one tbat is acceptedby all tbe actors engaged in debate surrounding its comprehension,wbetber tbey are politicians, bureaucrats, tbe military, academics,the press, advocacy groups, or leaders of various stripes in tbebord erland , m uc b less ordinary peop le of tbe region. I mean by


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132 Marcand murky, but also because tbe "problem' is bigbly politicized anddriven by varied interests. Tbis section considers tbe key "official"texts and opposing and alterative texts over tbe period 2004-08to bigbligbt convergences and differences in bow tbe violence, itsdynamics and origins, bave been represented.Tbe First Official Tex ts: From Band itry to a Security andDevelopment ProblemOfficial texts on tbe southern problem since 2004 reflect tbe imperativeof governments to affirm overall control of tbe defining narrativeof tbe situation in order to legitimize policy. Tbe most prominent"official" cbaracterization of tbe soutbern problem prior to 2004was undoubtedly former Prime Minister Tbaksin Sbinawatra's briefand now widely-derided claim in 2002 tbat "common bandits"were behind tbe increasing number of violent attacks in tbe borderprovinces.^" It was tbe corollary of tbe claim tbat ideologically-inspired separatism in Tbailand's soutb was virtually extinct. Tbiswas the key justification given by Tbaksin for his disbanding of theSoutbern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) in 2002and tbe Civilian-Police-Military Task Force 43 (CPM-43) togetberwitb tbe transfer of principal security duties away from tbe militaryto tbe police. Tbaksin's claim about "bandits" distilled tbe formalpreamble to bis Prime Ministerial Order dissolving tbe SBPAC.Tbougb disputed even tben, tbis preamble represents tbe dominantofficial "text" of tbe soutbern "problem" before 2004. Tbe main taskin tbe soutb, it claimed, was to address economic and educationaldeficiencies and stamp out "dark influence" causing disturbancesin tbe borderland.^^After tbe Naratbiwat arms raid of 4 January 2004, and as tbeviolence subsequently cl imaxed in tbe controversial police andarmy crackdown on assailants on 28 April at tbe Kru Se mosque,Tbak sin back -pedalled som ew bat from bis earlier "b andit "-centredtbesis, tbougb be continued to claim tbat criminal and influencegroups were cboreograpbing tbe violence. Tbaksin 's s tatementsin bis weekly radio broadcasts in tbe first balf of 2004 bigbligbtinterlinked tbemes of underdevelopment and crime as key causesof instability in tbe soutb. '* As ide from radio state m ents and tbe


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r1IQuerying Thailand's "Southern Fire" 133Happiness in the Three Southern Border provinces" (approved inMay), which set the framework for ending the disturbances andre-establishing stability within three years. Drafted by then DeputyPrime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, the order was spurred byThaksin's meeting with the King in February, when he was enjoinedto approach the southern crisis according to the three principles of"Understanding", "Reaching Out" and "Development".The preamble began by stating that post-Gold War geopoliticshad stimulated a global confrontation based on belief, nationality andidentity, with inequality being the major condition for its emergence.It continued by noting that within the border region, the specialethno-religious, linguistic and cultural characteristics of the MalayMuslim population had been exploited by various "movements" bothwithin and outside the country to foment opposition to the authorityof the Thai state among young people. Among "external factors", abroad hostility in the Muslim world to the West had exacerbatedincreased violence which might bring foreign terrorists into Thailand.Disturbances in the border provinces occurred continuously, withtheir origins stemming from "movements" (they are not specified asseparatists), local influence groups, and the state's inability to reducecriminality, so that state authority was persistently undermined. Asa result, officials were not receiving cooperation from local peoplein solving the unrest. Further, there was no unity or initiative inthe action of security agencies, leading to further demoralization ofofficials, business people and the population generally. The urgent tasksof the government were to: (1) destroy the structure of the variousinsurgent, influence and criminal groups, particularly by "gainingvictory through thought" (i.e., psychological operations) and avoidingactions that would exacerbate the trend of violence; (2) give thestate the opportunity to establish sustainable peace and developmentand; (3) do so with a commitment to embracing cultural diversityand emphasizing the cooperation of all Thais in furthering nationaldevelopment. The latter goal anticipated numerous government andmilitary declarations over the next four years about undermininginsurgent networks and "taking the initiative"." The events of 28 Apriland the tragedy at Tak Bai in October showed how distant officialpractice was from nicely-phrased policy principles.

I


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134 Marc AskewTbaksin's government and bureaucracy. Tbese dissonant texts reflectedbotb a crystallization of opposition to Tbaksin's policies tbat badbeen emerging since 2002 as well as reactions to more immediateevents sucb as tbe imposition of martial law, tbe police abduction ofMuslim rigbts lawyer Somcbai Neelapbaicbit (in Marcb), tbe securitycrackdown on 28 April, and tbe Tak Bai incident of October, Tberewere otber texts of tbe soutbern problem circulating at tbis time, buttbe most conspicuous fell into two complementary clusters.^^ Mostprominent was tbe narrative tbat can be labelled "Tbe Draconianand Sbort-sigbted Tbaksin State". Tbis targeted Tbaksin's leadersbipand policies as tbe primary factors escalating tbe unrest, particularlytbe extrajudicial police killings associated witb Tbaksin's 2003 "waron drugs" campaign and tbe disappearances of borderland Muslimsduring tbis period, wbicb bad supposedly provoked Muslim hostility.In addition, Tbaksin's dissolution in 2002 of tbe SBPAC and CPM-43 allegedly removed a critical mediating and intelligence-gatberingapparatus, permitting militant separatist activity to get out of control.Further, Thaksin was criticized for employing a "heavy-handed"military approach, as reflected in the state's response to tbe attacksof 28 April and tbe treatment of protesters at Tak Bai. Tbis text wasproduced by Bangkok intellectuals, civil society and buman rigbtsadvocates, soutbern Muslim leaders and tbe largely soutbern-basedopposition Democrat Party,

Anotber closely related text can be described as "Tbe MarginalizedSoutbern Muslim and tbe Hegemonic Tbai Buddbist State". SoutbernMalay Muslims were represented as suffering marginalization andvictimization in botb current and bistorical terms. Tbis was exempli-fied in data appended to Deputy Prime Minister Cbaturon Cbaisaeng'speace plan (presented in April 2004 and sbelved by Tbaksin)sbowing tbat at tbis stage local Muslims believed most killings werebeing committed by state officials, and by statements of Tbailand'sHuman Rigbts Commission. Citing tbeir own well-worn tbemes,various Muslim academics and public figures pronounced tbat tbeviolence was a reflection of tbe long-term cultural and linguisticmarginalization of soutbern Muslims by tbe Tbai state.^"The Beconc iliation Text: Clam ouring from the Outside


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Querying Thailand's "Southern Fire" 135became a platform for a coalition of leading civil-society advocatesand moderate Muslim intellectuals drawn from Bangkok and thesoutb. Led by tbe bigbly-respected former Prime Minister AnandPanyarachun, the NRC adopted a stance opposed to insurgency-focused assessments of tbe crisis.Tbe NRC's final report was released in June 2006, tbough itsconclusions had been determined months earlier. Tbe leading peaceacademic Cbaiwat Satba-Anand who penned the report also framedits approach to tbe problem. Violence [khwamrunraeng] was describedas an ailment afflicting society: it was a systemic problem for wbicball Tbais were responsible. "Reconciliation" tbrougb non-violencewas tbe cure for tbis ailment, witb tbe aim to reduce tbe conditionsproducing anger and resentment, and to promote forgiveness andacceptance of differences. Causes of tbe violence, it was argued,could not be pinned down to "separatism", wbicb played a minorrole in tbe current turmoil. Tbe task of peacemaking was to address"structural" factors and long-term solutions tbat involved, amongotber tbings, promoting educational and economic developmentconsistent with tbe "culture and religion" of tbe majority Muslimpo pu lat ion of tbe tb ree provinces.**" Em bodied in tbe report and itsrecommendations were all tbe key axioms of grassroots participatorydevelopment and peace theory.

Anand empbasized tbat there was no guarantee tbat the measuresproposed by the NRC would lead to a diminution of tbe currentviolence in tbe immediate future, but tbat tbe NRC bad addressed tbe"root causes" or conditions for violence, based on an investigationof border Muslims' needs. "The southern problem is not a conflictabout religions or separatism", he noted, "But these two issues havebeen exploited to advance respective concerns. Certainly, separatismremains an issue there but it is not the root cause."**' Having subsumeddaily killings by militants into tbe generality of "violence", tbe NRCsidestepped tbe bard questions about tbe identity, motivations andsupport base of insurgents. Sbort-term solutions proposed by tbe NRCincluded withdrawing the military and establisbing unarmed "peaceteams''."*^ The NRC proposed that parliament consider passing an"Act on Peaceful Reconciliation in the Soutbern Border Provinces"whicb would autborize tbe establisbment of tbree bodies to serve asinstruments to reduce violence and mistrust. Tbey included a Soutbern


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136 Marc Askewof stronger recommendations wbicb were discouraged by a "bigperson" most likely tbe President of tbe Privy Gouncil, retiredGeneral Prem T insulanond wbo bad w arned Anand not to proposeanytbing smacking of regional autonomy."Tbe NRG's leading members, tbougb vocal in tbe public arena,were poli t ical outsiders and tbe Tbaksin government 's sbelvingof tbeir report confirmed this. However, following tbe coup ofSeptember 2006, former NRG outsiders were given greater attention.Tbeir vocabulary strongly informed tbe new conciliatory official texton tbe soutbern problem and its solutions, although they remainedunbappy tbat tbeir full peacemaking formula was not adopted."The Conciliatory Text of Surayud's Post-coup GovernmentAfter tbe September 2006 coup, Gbairman of tbe Gouncil for NationalSecurity, General Sontbi Boonyaratkalin, and tbe junta-installed PrimeMinister Surayud Gbulanont, empbasized botb reconciliation and tberule of law in tackling tbe soutbern problem. Tbese objectives wereembodied in Prime Ministerial Order 206, entitled "Tbe Policy toPromote Peace in tbe Soutbern Border Provinces", and Order 207,wbicb re-established tbe SBPAG and tbe Givilian (i.e., civil service)Police and Military Gommand as well as a new army-based ISOGRegion 4 Forward Gommand. Tbe preamble to Order 206 declaredtbat tbe soutbern turbulence was confusing and multidimensional,but it asserted tbat tbe key basis of tbe unrest was tbe activity of asmall group "wbo are using conditions of identity ... to expand tbeirimpact and creating an atmospbere of fear and mistrust until mostpeople have fallen into a state of fear, wbicb has become an obstacleto cooperation in solving problems and developing tbe area". Tbeorder obediently declared a commitment to follow the King's royalinjunction to enact policy tbrougb "Understanding", "Reacbing Out"and "Development". In many ways it resembled Tbaksin's Order68/2547 in its diagnosis: movements were distorting religious ideas,playing on etbnic solidarities and spreading disinformation to erodetrust in tbe state, tbough crime and influence groups were notmentioned as culprits. Tbe principal difference was tbat Surayud'sdeclaration incorporated tbe core issues and associated buzz wordstbat bad been enunciated over tbe previous two years by public


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Querying Thailand's "Southern Fire" ' 137tainted Tbaksin administration. To tbis end, in early November 2006,Surayud publicly "apologized" to tbe borderland Muslims for tbe"mistakes" of tbe previous government.A keystone of tbe coup-government's policy for peace-building intbe soutb was tbe resuscitation of tbe SBPAC as a civilian organizationof bureaucrats (nominally under tbe Ministry of tbe Interior) focusingon development activities, paired witb tbe military and its morebard-edged security role.'"' In reality, in its aim to reconfigure itsrelationsbip witb tbe borderland population, tbe army focused asmucb witb development projects as security and military interdiction.Under tbe new administrative umbrella laid out by tbe army-backedgovernm ent, tbe SBPAC was firmly subord inated to tbe army -controlledISOC Region 4 Forward Command wbicb autborized its budget.SBPAC officials soon complained tbat tbeir work was bampered bytbeir organization's limited budgetary autbority. This complaint wassoon ecboed by otber analysts, bolstering a standard army-basbingcritique based on tbe conviction tbat military-led solutions to tbeunrest were fundamentally vn-ong-beaded. Nonetbeless, tbe SBPACwas given a considerable budget, and entbusiastically spent 30 percent of its first year's allocation on conferences.Continued Critique and the Limits of the Conciliatory TextTbe Surayud government's reconciliation initiatives were welcomedas tbey moved towards accommodating formerly marginalized voicesand views, and placed "justice" front and centre in tbe principles andrbetoric underlying soutbern policy. But tbougb key soutbern Muslimleaders and rigbts activists were selected for tbe appointive NationalLegislative Assembly (NLA), an oppositional text on tbe soutbernproblem persisted. In November 2006 tbe NLA establisbed a specialcommittee to "investigate and study tbe state of tbe disturbancesin tbe soutbern border provinces". It included prominent figuresassociated witb peace advocacy and Muslim rigbts, including formermembers of tbe defunct NRC. Tbe committee's 105 page report wassubmitted at tbe end of 2007, as tbe Surayud government was leavingoffice. It represented a distinctive and uncompromising text of tbesoutbern problem, focusing on victims and laying tbe blame for tbeunrest primarily on deficiencies in government security policy andpractice. Tbe report contained a summary of persistent complaints as


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138 Marc Askewapparent mistreatment of suspects by officials. As for the issue ofinsurgents, they were mentioned only three times in the report, andwere lost among all the references to the negative impacts or faultsin government policy. The southern problem, it seemed, had littleto do with insurgent-driven violence.The nu b of the report's message wa s that "justice" and "peacefulm ean s" were not being fully em ployed by the state, and th is deficiencyexplained the persistence of violence. According to the ideology ofpeacemaking embraced by the report writers (the introduction waslifted from an essay by the academic and philosopher Mark Tarmthai,former subcommittee chairman of the National Security Gouncil andally of the report writer Jiraphorn Bunnak), peace was only possiblewith full public participation and delegation of power to localities.The introduction extolled the virtues of the National Security Policyfor the Southern Border Provinces (1999-2003) which had embodiedthe principles of their "peacemaking" approach. This innovativesecurity policy, they claimed, had failed to prevent violence fromre-emerging in 2004 because it had not been genuinely appliedand accepted by off ic ia ls . Peacemaking dogma could not admitthe possibility that its principles could be wrong, so by this logicconflict could only occur because the principles had been ignoredor poorly applied.'*''

The period from late 2006 saw the forging of an officially-sponsored conciliatory text of the southern problem and its solutions,centred on categorical aff irmations of " just ice", "part ic ipat ion","peace" and "peaceful means". From 2008, the governments ledby Samak Sundaravej, his ill-fated successor Somchai Wongsawat,and following this the Democrat party-led coalition under AbhisitVejjajiva (which came to power in December 2008), have maintainedthis broad public text of the southern problem and its solutions.Peacemaking buzzwords flooded the borderland, appearing on roadsidesignboards of ISOG and the SBPAG, and have ever since dominatedthe language of workshops, seminars and conferences. However, thisrhetorical profusion has not signalled unanimity about their meaningor their application.Development, Security and the Numbers Game


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Querying Thailand's "Southern Fire" 139demoralizing botb tbe local population and state officials so tbatlocal administration and scbools could function. Once violence wasreduced, state agencies could deliver tbe development programmesdeemed to hold the answer to winning the hearts and minds of tbelocal population, Tbe purpose of all sucb "development" programmesbas been to affirm tbe legitimacy of tbe Tbai state and tbe unity ofall Tbais, regardless of religion and etbnic origins, Tbe intimatelyconnected cballenge bas been to catcb tbe rigbt culprits and to doso witbout alienating tbe local population,Tbe major security operations of Generals Sontbi Boonyaratkalin(2006-07) and Anupong Paocbinda (late 2007-present) bore fruitin reducing violence and disrupting insurgent networks, Tbougbeven tbe s tauncbest cr i t ics of mil i tary-centred policy admit totbis decline, tbe uncomfortable fact is tbat botb insurgent-violenceand opportunistic killings bave continued."^" In early 2009, at tbeanniversary of tbe sixtb year of tbe turbulence, critics pointed to tbeexpenditure of considerable sums in a bost of development projectsdelivered by botb military and civilian agencies. Tbe new Democrat-led administration proclaimed tbat it was pioneering a distinctive"politics leading tbe military" approacb, Tbis ambivalent sloganwas purloined from tbe name of the Thai military's own treasuredCold War counter-insurgency doctrine,"^ Effectively, the Democrat'smeasures were not spectacular: they amounted to empowering theSBPAC as an independent agency, flooding the borderland witbanotber swatbe of development projects (63 billion babt over tbreeyears) and foresbadowing tbe possible lifting of tbe Emergency Lawand Martial Law.'" However tbe persistence of insurgent attacks overtbat year proved to be a continuing taunt to tbe government andits proclamations, A controversial mass killing at a village mosquein Cho Airong d is tr ic t of N arathiw at p rov ince on 8 June 2009 thoug h sub sequen tly discovered to have been a locally-inspiredcivilian revenge attack exposed tbe sluggisbness of governm entspokesmen in report ing culpri ts . Just as embarrassing were thebombs and insurgent propaganda signs and slogans (claiming thatthe region was part of Malaysia) that accompanied Prime MinisterAbbisit on bis visit to the south with Prime Minister Najib Razakof Malaysia in December 2009 (see Pboto 2)." Anotber developmentwas tbe resurgence of debate on alternative governance for tbe


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oICL.


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142 Marcadministration's opposition to tbe idea. But tbe cat was now outof tbe bag; academics and NGOs promoted public discussion, andformer General Cbavalit Yongcbaiyudb of tbe opposition PbeuaTbai Party went soutb witb a proposal for elective self-governmentunder tbe rubric of "Nakbon Pattani" to tbe disapproval of Abbisit.' '^Meanwhile, tbe army sbowed no sign tbat it was ready to relinquisbits numerous development projects in tbe borderland. In November2009 General Picbet Wisaijorn, commander of tbe Fourtb ArmyRegion, proclaimed to a bemused audience of foreign journalists tbatbis "Learning Centre for tbe Sufficiency Economy", was a spearbeadprogramme in tbe effort to reduce tbe number of insurgents andtheir sympathizers, claiming tbat violent events bad been reducedby 28 per cent over tbe previous year (see Pboto 3).'^

Numbers bave featured conspicuously in assessments of conditionsin tbe soutb and in arguments confirming or denying progress bygovernments, security agencies and tbeir critics. However, calculationsof events and casualties vary for tbe years between 2008 and 2009,making unequivocal judgments problematic. Variations among keyagencies, state and non-state, are bigbligbted in Tables 2, 3 and 4.

Table 2Est imates of Total Number of Violent Events in Southern Border Provinces

2008-09

Year Police (ISOC )* Min. Interior Deep South Watch200 8 1,370 964 1,056 82120 09 1,347 735 99 5 1,031Note: 'Pe riod October 2007-S eptem ber 2008, October 2008-Septem ber 2009 (financialyear period)Sources: Issara News, 13 January 2010; Deep South Watch data base; National PoliceBureau statistics.

Table 3M ain Types of Violent Events in the Southern Border Prov inces , 200 9

Estimating Agency Shootings Bom b Attacks Arson


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Querying Thailand's "Southern Fire" 143Table 4Comparing Estimates of Deaths as a Result of Violence, 2008-09

Year Police Min. Interior Deep South Watch2008 605 546 4632009 606 510 522Source: As for Table 2.

If judged on the basis of the frequency of violent events and thenumber of casualties when compared to the previous year, the mostreasonable assessment of the state of play in 2009 would be thatthings had remained much the same. Though figures have beencited by some officials to support claims of "overall" improvement,the variation in statistics prompts reservations. Thus, General PichetWisaijorn's claim in November 2009 that there had been a 28 percent decline in incidents over the year was only valid in relationto ISOG and Ministry of Interior statistics. But the claim did notmatch police enumeration according to calendar year, which suggestedonly a slight reduction by twenty-three incidents during 2008-09.Deep South Watch enumerations showed an increase of nearly200 events for 2009. Glearly, agencies apply different principles inidentifying, labelling and enumerating incidents. If the police statisticsare regarded as a median standard, then we must conclude thatthe frequency of inciden ts de cline d in 2009, bu t only marginally.Moreover, the number of deaths enumerated in the police figuresfor the years 2008 and 2009 remained constant (at 605 and 606respectively). This highlighted common observations that fatalitiesand injuries had increased per incident, specifically in the caseof bom bing s. Th is problem of vari ation s in official en um era tionfinally led, in late 2009, to a reorganization of categories and amove to coordinate data collection under police direction. In thisenvironment, the dispute has continued as to whether the southerncrisis is abating, and whether the state is winning enough heartsand minds in the borderland.

Where is the "Malay Muslim"? A Persist ing Lacuna


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144 Marc Askewidentification, relations with and experiences of the Thai state, andattitudes towards separatist-inspired insurgency? There has been noshortage of advocates, both outside and inside the region, who claimto speak for the "Malay Muslim" but most commentary remainsappallingly oversimplified, and the qualifications of these advocatesto represent large groups of people is in question. So too, detailedand nuanced portrayals of the structure of Malay Muslim society, itscompeting elites and its internal dynamics, remain woefully sparseand oversimplified (though some recent research by Duncan McCargohas begun to explore this)/ ' ' In the highly charged atmosphere ofthe southern unrest, reification of the Malay Muslim has been thenorm, whether among academics or Malay Muslim "leaders". Politicalgroups (conspicuously the Democrat Party) have pandered to thesereifications, and state officials have deferred to them, as reflectedin habitual use of the standard phrase "culture and way of life" asa summary for a sacrosanct and irreducible Muslim identity in thethree border provinces.

My own sustained encounters with many Malay Muslims in adiverse range of settings over the past four-and-a-half years leaveme unable to characterize in simple terms the positions of MalayMuslims, who vary in their views of the origins and meaning of theviolence. For every Malay nationalist who regards the Thai state asthe perpetrator of injustice there is another who resents insurgentgroups and affirms the claim to belong to an entity called "Thailand".For every Malay Muslim who may recount part of the historicalnarrative of loss or suffering flowing from the defeat of the Patanisultanate by Siam two hundred years ago there are many more whoprofess no interest in the past. "Ordinary" Malay Muslims (i.e., non-elite Muslims) are not the apathetic or unthinking mass of peasantsdepicted by Surin Pitsuwan in his elite-centred account of Islam andMalay nationalism over twenty years ago. They are a highly mobilepopulation with a diverse range of occupations and experiences,and their orientations towards the different Islamic movements thatcompete in the region are also diverse. The essentializing anecdote"Scratch a Malay Muslim and you find a separatist underneath" (citedby McCargo)" marginalizes a host of variant views and positions. Itis just as common to scratch a Malay Muslim and hear one usingthe expression Rak Chart (love the country/Thailand) and happy to


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oIQ .


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146 Marc Askewand otber services in tbe region tbat criticism (comm on alsoamong local Tbai Buddbists) is ultimately separable from tbe issueof allegiance to a broader national community. Indeed, given tbeTbai state's legacy of dysfunctionality, it is perbaps remarkable tbata comprebensive uprising bas not emerged. As one Malay Muslimvillager expressed tbe matter wben I raised tbe issue of separatism:"If we wanted to separate we [Patani Muslims] would bave doneit by now, because we are tbe great majority bere, and it couldeasily be done." It is an exaggerated claim, but it makes a point.Micbiko Tsuneda's recent etbnograpbic researcb in tbe Tbai-Malaysianborder-crossing district of Sungbai-kolok (Naratbiwat), higbligbts greatdiversity among Malay Muslims in tbe far soutb. Sbe concludes berstudy witb tbe remarks:

The recent regional unrest has once again led the Thai governmentand media to portray the Nayu [i.e. "Melayu", or Malay] populationin the southern border region as a monolithic mass. Militants alsocall for a unity of the ethno-religious minority in the region. Yet... such portrayals discount the diversity that exists within theregion and the sense of membership to Thailand that many Nayuresidents have cultivated over the years. The Nayu population inthe southeastern border region of Thailand is diverse, and holdscompeting notions of past and present, as well as notions of whatit means to be Muslim, Malay, and "Thai.""*Tbe tendency to simplify Malay Muslim attitudes was bigbligbtedtwenty years ago by tbe antbropologist Andrew Gornisb in bis rarestudy of Malay Muslim interactions witb Tbai officials in Yala.He criticized elite-centred studies of separatism, whicb posited a

bifurcation between peasant apathy and tbe Malay elite leadersbip ofnationalist movements, proposing instead tbat rural Malay attitudesfitted neitber separatist nor loyalist models." In tbe context of tbecurrent insurgent-driven unrest and tbe positions people take vis--vistbe Tbai state, it is far too simple to group Malay Muslims intotbe two camps of allegedly "authentic" Malays and tbe deferential"Uncle Toms" wbo support tbe state, as tbe journalist Don Patbanbas done. '^ Nor bave Tbai and Malay neighbours been polarizedto tbe level predicted in tbe wake of tbe violence. Tbe babitualclassification of communities into "Buddbist" (minority) and "Muslim"(majority) does not necessarily correspond to neigbbours' perceptions


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Querying Thailand's "Southern Fire" 147in some mixed neigbbourhoods tbat bave been determined to resistpolarization.^'^ Neigbbourbood-focused loyalty is expressed in somepurely Muslim areas where groups fervently oppose insurgents .In districts of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala provinces, some MalayMuslim groups have taken matters into their own hands by organizingbit squads to e l iminate Muslim insurgents . Tbis pbenomenon issometbing tbat bas never been discovered by commentators, wboseem intent on identifying s tereotypes of solely Tbai Buddbistvigilante "militias", tbereby reproducing comfortable etbno-religiousbinaries in tbeir representations. Aside from tbese, tbere are Muslimvillage beadmen and sub-district cbiefs (kamnan) wbo bave openlyopposed insurgents in tbeir localities. What are we to make of them?To refer to them as "Muslim Uncle Toms" would be a mistake.Commentators' easily digestible moral and romantic etbno-religiouspolarities are cballenged by tbe plurality of Malay Muslim allegianceand identification. "Patani Malay identity" has become an unexaminedclicb. It is ironic tbat, at a time wben scbolars and intellectuals arefervently criticizing essentialist categories of "Malayness" across tbeborder in Malaysia, large numbers of commentators on Tbailand'sMalay Muslims uncritically embrace assumptions of irreducible andprimordial etbnic consciousness as a basis of common interest andgrievance."'

Returning to tbe question of Malay Muslim "elites", we can notetbat tbeir orientations to Islam and matters connected to tbe soutbernunrest and its solutions vary, as Srisompob Jitpiromsri discoveredin survey researcb on tbe question of regional governance."^ Norcan we extrapolate from elites tbe views of tbe wider population.Tbis assumes tbat elites bave authority to speak for them, which isquestionable. It is a truism, often propounded by Tbai Buddbists, tbemilitary and bureaucrats (sucb as tbose in tbe SBPAC), tbat MalayMuslims "follow their leaders". Tbe autbor bas not found tbis to betbe case in villages be bas studied in Pattani province. Tbere, peopletake little notice of village headmen or even of tbe local imam. Tbeongoing efforts of officials to engage with Muslim "leaders" (throughinnumerable seminars) are based on tbe presumption tbat tbey willreturn to neigbbourboods and communicate tbe government's messageto ordinary people. Tbis does not usually bappen. It is even lesstbe case tbat ordinary people bave access to, or are interested in


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148 Marc Askewactivist to my poin t that the ordin ary M uslims I had spok en toshowed no interest in the themes of Malay Muslim identity, whichso animated Muslim public intellectuals. His response was that thisdid not matter; it was "the duty of the elites to guide them". Asfor the villagers, they had never heard of this activist, despite hispublications on the southern question.This question "who do the Malay Muslim elites speak for?" canalso be asked of putative separatists, who by their actions positionthemselves as presumptive elites. Here we confront a void. In thecase of the current insurgency we are faced with the mystery notonly of what the insurgents ultimately want, but who they actuallyspeak for (through their violence as a political an d symb olic language).When commentators talk of the insurgency as essentially "local"and based on "local grievances", there is an unstated assumptionthat the insurgents are the de facto privileged bearers of the greatburden of Patani 's problematic past and they somehow representa great number of people. That, however, is an assumption whichneeds demonstration. The Muslim elites have long competed amongthemselves. Their struggles have often not been visible to thoseoutside the region both because of a fatal lack of interest by mostThais in this "other country" of Thailand, and also because theseelites themselves have an interest in obscuring such matters fromoutsiders' view. One thing is very clear: questions of religion andidentity are an important ground of political capital for competingMalay Muslim elites, and the separatist option has been anotherground for legitimacy at various times. The question of just whatthis means for ordinary Muslims still remains obscure and under-examined.

Conclusion: Over Six Years on, a Glass Half-empty or Half-full?By mid-2010, half-way into the seventh year of unrest in Thailand'sMuslim majority border provinces, the Thai state still faces twodisturbing "ghosts" despite a palpable reduction in violent attacks:(1) a clandestine militant organization that has proven highly resilientto the authorities' efforts to neutralize it, whether by interdictionor development blandishments; and (2) an elusive, multifaceted anddisputed "problem" of the south.


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Querying Thailand's "Southern Fire" 149legal and human rights, critical challenges to the state's mission todemonstrate that it is fundamentally just and law-abiding? Thesecharges feed into insurgent propaganda which takes advantage of anyslip-up in security operations to confirm rumours that the authoritiesare draconian. Realists in the military have argued that it will bea hard slog to fully extinguish the violence (at least ten years), butthe press and other monitoring groups have been less patient, withany new bombing or beheading attracting speculation that it maybe a prelude to a new "spike" in the violence and demanding ananswer to the impossible question "when will i t end?""' ISOC's"Combat Lessons Learned" report at the end of 2008 pointed outthat insurgents' cheapest and most effective weapon against the Thaistate was Thailand's public media: "which reports ever-repeatedlywhenever our side makes a mistake"."' '

This paper has stressed that there has never been unanimity aboutthe "Southern problem" of the south since the earliest signs of thenew insurgency and the wave of opportunistic personal and politicalviolence that has accompanied it. The fact that this discursive log-jam persists in public, scholarly and journalistic narratives highlightsnot only prosaic differences of perspective, but most critically acombination of deep denial (in the case of some Muslims and otheradvocates), ideological difference, political opportunism, as well asthe persisting academic fashion of blaming the Thai state as thesole culprit."^ Partisan disputes and blame-games aside, we cannotimagine away the persistence of violence or the fact of an insurgencythat expresses through its violence a defiance of the Thai state'sauthority and legitimacy. Various organs of the Thai state are alsocentrally involved in the politics of naming. Thai official's calculatedavoidance of the terminology of "insurgency" derives not only fromthe fact that much southern violence is messy, and tied up in non-ideological disputes. It derives as much from a deliberate effort toreduce international attention from what may be construed as an"internal armed conflict", a definition with international legal andhumanitarian ramifications.'"

I have argued that, while strident claims have been made todefine the "problem" from various angles, the most glaring lacunais in understanding the concerns of ordinary Malay Muslims, whosevaried positions are routinely simplified in the polemical quest to


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150 Marc Askewchallenges at hand. The recent push to consider alternative governancemodels for the south directly addresses the issue of empowermentand legitimacy, offering the possibility tbat it will give pre-eminentresponsibility for solving tbe soutbern "problem" to the local populace.But there is no guarantee that any initiative in this direction willreduce violence below its current level. Tbe major "ghost" yet tomaterialize is any insurgent political wing, clear leadership or setof demands that can be brougbt forward for negotiation. Until sucbtime, the driving force of the current turbulence remains incboateand spectral.

NOTESSee Peter Chalk, "The Indigenous Nature of the Thai Insurgency", TerrorismMonitor 4, no. 1 (12 January 2006): 5-7; International Crisis Croup, SouthernThailand: Insurgency, not Jihad, Asia Report no. 98, 18 May 2005.Jeffrey Record, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win (Washington, D.C.: Potom acBooks, 2007), p. ix.Chris North, "Redefining Insurgency", Military Review (January-February 2008),p. 117.Ibid.See Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2006), pp. 195-209.Notably, "separatist" was extracted from the official name "Bandit SeparatistMovement" in 1972 and replaced with the pathologizing expression "BanditTerrorist Movement". In 1995, the word "movement" was removed, to leavesimply "Bandit Terrorists" {Chon Kokanrai).Maj-Cen Samret Srirai, "The BRN-Coordinate Movement and the Insurgency inthe three border provinces and 4 districts of Songkhla province in the period2005-2007" [ in Thai], unpublished research dissertation, National DefenceCollege, Thailand, 2008, p. 7; Surachart Bamrungsuk, Insurgency in SouthernThailand [in Thai] (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 2008).See for example, Nithi Ieowsriwong, "Thai Political Culture" [in Thai], paperdelivered to the 9th Annual Congress of King Prajadhipok's Institute, Bangkok,8-10 November 2007.Phillip Deery, "The Terminology of Terrorism: Malaya, 1948-52", Journal ofSoutheast Asian Studies 34, no. 1 (2003): 231-47; Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence,op. cit., p. 17.Marc Askew, "Confrontation and Crisis in Thailand, 2008-2010", in LegitimacyCrisis in Thailand, edited by Marc Askew (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books,


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Querying Thailand's "Southern Fire" 151" Au thor's person al com m unica tion with officer of the M inistry of Foreign Affairs,18 December 2009." Srisom pob Jitpiromsri, "Sixth Year of the Sou thern Fire: Dynam ics of Insurgencyand Formation of the New Imagined Violence", Deep South Watch, 10 March2010 ." See Marc Askew. "T haila nd's Recalcitrant Sou thern Bo rderland: Insurgency,Conspiracies and the Disorderly State", Asian Security 3, no. 2 (2007): 99-120." See Marc Askew, "Th e Killing Fields of the Deep Sou th: A Deadly Mix",Bangkok Post, 9 August 2009.'" See, for exam ple. Ab dulloh Wangni and Pakorn Pueng net, "A Revelation ofFalsification of Causes of Violent Incidents in the Deep South: Involved withCriminals and the Local Mafia", !ssara News Center. 8 May 2009 : WassayosNgamkham, "Southern Crimes 'Mimic' Insurgents: Police say Extent of RebelViolence in Region Overstated", Bangkok Post. 25 January 2010." National Police Forward Comm and Centre, Yala, "Summ ary of disturbance eventsin the 4 southern border provinces 2004-July 2008" [in Thai).'" On the issue of clan destin e official killings of insurgent suspec ts, see "ExtrajudicialKillings are not an Achievement", ssara News. 16 April 2010 ."* Au thor's interview with cap tured insu rgen t fi'om Rangae District, Na rathiw at,

12 March 2009: interview with PULO member (resident of YalaJ in KualaLumpur, 25 February 2010: interview with lawyer from Muslim Attorney Center,Yala province, 3 May 2010. "Statistics of Events in the Three Border Provin ces, 2009 " |in Thai], police recordsviewed by the author." Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence, op. cit., p. 384." Interview s with Border Patrol police perso nne l wh o served in Na rathiwatduring these years, together with army intelligence officers. Early identificationof youth-hased insurgent networks during 2001-02 is mentioned in Nanthadet

Meksawat, Secret Action to Que nch tbe Fire in the South (in Thai] (Bangkok:Ruamduai Chuaikan, 2006), pp. 57-60." Samret, "The BRN-Coordinate", op. cit., pp . 90 -95 ." Marc Askew, Conspiracy, Politics and a Disorderly Border: The Struggle toComprehend Insurgency in Thailand's Deep South (Washington, D.C. andSingapore: East-West Center and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007J,pp. 15-26." Initial Results of Interrogations. Disturbances in the Southern Borde r Provinces:April-September 2004 (in Thai], Police Security Center Region 9, 2004. For an exam ple of the former style, see "SE Asia m ilitants fieeing to Ph ilipp ines -analyst", Reuters, 20 January 2009


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152 Marc Askew" Au thor's interviews with captured insurgent leaders. Police Forward Comm andHeadquarters, Yala, March 2009. Also see interview with insurgent in Issara News,24 April 2009. Sascha Helbardt, "Anatomy of Southern Thailand's Insurgency:

Some Preliminary Insights", New Mandola, 21 January 2010 .^' Sana Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo Afghan Borderland (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 2007).' David Kilcullen , The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst ofa Big One (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 213-14. Kilcullenhere follows the assessment of McCargo, for which see Duncan McCargo, TearingApart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 2008), pp. 176-81." Barisan Bersatu Kemerdekaan Patani (United Front for Patani Independence)." "Dr. Farish Noor interv iew s the head of the Pata ni BERSATU m ove m ent" ,16 June 2005 ." The same emp hasis is made in intelligence findings recounted in Nathadet,Secret Action, op. cit., pp. 8-9, 57-60." Based on the author's assessment of interrogation records and interviews withcaptured insurgents.'^ McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land, op. cit., pp. 176-81.'" Translated excerpt from insurgent indoc trination video comp act disc entitled"Tindakan Penjuang Patani" [Action of the Patani Warriors] in the possessionof the author." "Aku Anak Patani", 23 July 2001 (no longer accessible). Hum an Rights W atch, No One is Safe: Insurgent Violence o n Civilians inThailand's Southern Border Provinces 19, no. 13 (C) (August 2007): 18.

^' Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts theSecular State (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 32-33.*" Joseph Chinyong Liow and Don Pathan, Con fronting Gho sts: Thailand's ShapelessSouthern Insurgency (Double Bay, NSW: Lowy Institute for International Policy,2010)." Phuchatkan Baiwan, 29 March 2002." Kitti Rattanac haya, Bevea ling the Igniting of the Southern Fire: Establishing aPattani State [in Thai] (Bangkok: Phichit Printing, 2004), pp. 127 ff." Harn Leenanon d, "Que nching the Southern Fire (3)" [in Thai[, Matichon Baiwan,19 January 2005; Surachart, Insurgency, op. cit., pp. 69-72." Au thor's intervie w with Royal Thai Army colo nel, head of ISOC spe cialintelligence team, 21 April 2010.


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Querying Thailand's "Southern Fire" 153" Sam ret, "The BRN -Coordinate Movem ent", op . cit.*' See McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land, op. cit., pp. 169-72; Suphalak Kanchanakhun,"Organizing Bandits in the Imagination: Speaking about a knowledgeable Thaisoldier concerning insurgents in the south" [in Thai], Fadeiowkan Magazine 7,no. 1 (2009): 56-71.' HRW, No One is Safe, pp. 7-8, 18-28." The docum ent was found in the possession of Deulomae Jamadibu, a religious

teacher at the Samphanwitthaya School in Cho Airong District of Narathiwat,in 2006.

" Au thor's interview with a senio r com ma ndin g officer, ISOC Region 4 Forw ardCommand, May 2008.

" "High percentage of cases dismissed by the court in deep South a cause ofserious concern", Issara News, 25 February 2010 ." Chris Baker and Pasuk Phon gpaichit, Thaksin: The Business of Politics inThailand (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. 2005), p. 237.

" Prime Minister's Office Order 123/25 45. "Adjusting Civil Ad min istration in theSouthern Border Provinces" [in Thai], 30 April 2002, para. 1.5" "How the Situation in the South is Improving", summary of weekly radiobroadcast by Thaksin Shinawatra, 15 May 2004, in Inside Thailand Review2004, Public Relations Department of the Foreign Office, Thailand." Prime M inister ial Order 68/25 47, "The Policy for Prom oting Peace andHappiness in the Three Southern Border Provinces", text reproduced in BunkromDongbangsattan, The Last War of General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh [in Thai]

(Bangkok: Offset Press, 2005), pp. 184-92.' ' For an early characterization of differing narratives, see Chang Noi, "Interpreting

the South", The Nation, 10 May 2004." See Askew, Conspiracy, op. cit., pp. 8-12." National Reco nciliation Com mission (NRC), "Defeating Violence with the Power

of Reconciliation" [in Thai], draft final report, NRC, Bangkok, 10 October 2005,especially pp. 12-16, 71-77." Achara Ashayagachat, "NRC han ds in plans for deep South", Bangkok Post, 6

June 2006." "Sum ma ry of the NRC report on solving the problems of the south su bm itted

to the Prime Minister" [in Thai), Krung Thep Thurakit, 5 June 2006."' Author's interview with prominent NRC member, resident of Pattani, 16 September

2006." See Chaiw at Satha-A nand , "Un tying the Gordian Knot: The Difficulties of SolvingSouthern Violence", in Divided over Thaksin: Thailand's Coup and Problematic


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154 Marc Askew" "Special Committee of the National Legislative Assembly, Report of the Findingsof the Investigation and Study of the State of Disturbance in the SouthernBorder Provinces" [in Thai], Office of the National Legislative Council, December

2007."" Srisom pob, "Sixth Year of the Sou thern Fire", op. cit. Marc Askew, "The Dem ocrats and the Sou thern M alaise", Bangkok Post, 13September 2009. "PM mu lls end to martial law in Sou th", Bangkok Post, 29 May 2009. MartialLaw was lifted in the four Muslim-Majority districts of Songkhla and replacedby the Internal Security Act as a preliminary experiment in softening securitymeasures. However, conditions in these districts were far less violent than thethree provinces." Blasts greet PM Najib", Bangkok Post, 10 December 2009." "Nakhon Pattani: Big Jiew, an old face speaking anew ", ASTV Phuchatkan,3 November 2009; "Mark hits out at Big Jiew 'Nakhon Pattani' will createconfusion" [in Thai], Thai Bath, 4 November 2009." "Strategies for Com bating the Sou thern Insurg ency ", lecture given to the ForeignCorrespondent's Club of Thailand by Ceneral Pichet Wisaijorn, Bangkok, 18November 2009." McCargo, Tearing Apart the Land, op. cit." Ibid., p. 4. M ichiko Tsu neda , "Navigating Life on the Border: Cend er, Migration, and Identityin Malay Muslim Communit ies in Southern Thailand", Ph.D. dissertat ion.University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2009, p. 368." Andrew Cornish, Whose Place is This? Malay Rubber Producers and ThaiCovernment Officials in Yala (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1997), pp. 109-25." On Don Pathan's "M uslim Unce Tom" references, see "Do not oversimplify thesouthern troubles". The Nation, 27 June 2005; "Two years on and few signs ofhope". The Nation, 4 January 2006." Marc Askew, "La ndscap es of Fear, Ho rizons of Trust: Villagers Dealing w ithDanger in Thailand's Insurgent South", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 4,no. 1 (February 2009): 59-86.'" See International Crisis C roup, Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries,Asia Report no. 140, 23 October 2007." Th is point is briefly ma de by Michael J. Montesano and Patrick Jory, "Introduction",in Thai South and M alay North: Ethnic Interactions on a Plural Peninsula,edited by M.J. Montesano and P. Jory (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), p. 2; SeeFarish Noor, What Your Teacher Didn't Tell You: The Annex Lectures vol. I(Petaling Jaya: Matahari Books, 2009)." Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Duncan McCargo, "A Ministry for the South: NewCovernance Proposals for Thailand's Southern Region", Contemporary Southeast


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Querying Thailand's "Southern Fire" 155"* Gombat Lessons, op. cit., p. 513."" Montesano and Jory, "Introduction", op. cit., p. 4."> Significantly, tho ug h. Tha i officials recognized that the inv isib ility of a tangib leinsurgent leadership cadre and a coherent movement manifesto actually reducedthe technical applicability of the classification "internal armed conflict", afeature that highlights a critical political weak point in the insurgent movement

itself. The point was made in a memorandum circulated from the Ministriesof Foreign Affairs and Defence to ISOC senior personnel in early June 2007.Insisting that the turbulence needed to be defined as an "internal" probleminvolving "criminal" activity, it did express concern that an increasing level ofviolence would open the way for foreign intervention in various humanitarianguises.


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