fifty-ninth session · 2020. 10. 13. · seventh framework programme – reply to the annual report...
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DOCUMENT C/2094 23 November 2010
REPORT
submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee by José Mendes Bota, Rapporteur (Portugal, EPP/CD Group)
FIFTY-NINTH SESSION ________
Security research in the European Union: evaluation of the Seventh Framework Programme – reply to the annual report
of the Council
DOCUMENT C/2094 23 November 2010
REPORT
submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee by José Mendes Bota, Rapporteur (Portugal, EPP/CD Group)
FIFTY-NINTH SESSION ________
Security research in the European Union: evaluation of the Seventh Framework Programme – reply to the
annual report of the Council
Report transmitted to: the President of the Council of WEU; the Secretary-General of the WEU; the President of the Council of the European Union; the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; the President of the European Commission; the EU Commissioner for institutional relations and communication strategy; the Presidents/Speakers and the Chairmen of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and European Affairs Committees of the 39 national parliaments represented in the Assembly; the Presidents of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Baltic Assembly, the Nordic Council, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, the CIS Parliamentary Assembly; the President of the European Parliament; the Secretaries General of the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe, NATO and the OSCE.
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Document C/2094 23 November 2010
Security research in the European Union: evaluation of the Seventh Framework Programme – reply to the annual report of the Council
REPORT1
submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee by José Mendes Bota, Rapporteur (Portugal, EPP/CD Group)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DRAFT RECOMMANDATION.................................................................................................. 2
on security research in the European Union: evaluation of the Seventh Framework Programme.......................................................................................................................... 2
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM .......................................................................................... 4
submitted by Mr Mendes Bota, Rapporteur (Portugal, EPP/CD Group)............................ 4
I. Summary ........................................................................................................ 4
II. European security research in the FP7 (2007-2013) ...................................... 5
III. Security research and defence research: common points, differences and prospects ..................................................................................................... 13
MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE.......................................................................................... 20
1 Adopted by the Committee on 23 November 2010.
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DRAFT RECOMMANDATION
on security research in the European Union: evaluation of the Seventh Framework Programme
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling its recommendation 782 of 21 June 2006 on security research in Europe where it was stated that research and technological development (RTD) were two determinants of national and European economic growth;
(ii) Considering the pivotal role of research and technology (R&T) and of research and development (R&D) in strengthening European security and defence capabilities;
(iii) Noting that, despite declarations to that effect, the commitments made by the member states of the European Union since 2000 to increase the share of European GDP allocated to RTD to 3% per annum have not yet been honoured;
(iv) Considering the economic crisis which is affecting many European states and which is having an adverse effect on investment in security and defence R&T;
(v) Underlining that security and defence RTD is a strategic priority at national level and has direct consequences for political, economic and military autonomy and sovereignty;
(vi) Considering, therefore, that the primary responsibility for this area falls to states;
(vii) Noting, however, that in a context of low economic growth, the high cost of security and defence RTD limits the scope of action taken by national governments, calling for the development of intergovernmental cooperation on the basis of joint projects;
(viii) Noting, nevertheless, that current levels of cooperation are insufficient to meet the security and military capability requirements set out in European declarations on internal security in the European Union and on the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP);
(ix) Considering that cooperation among European states and European firms in the sector is essential in order to counter the effects of national budget cuts;
(x) Considering the key complementary role of the European Union in R&T and R&D, particularly in the area of security, through the chapter on security in the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7);
(xi) Considering the role of the European Defence Agency in promoting cooperation among participating member states in defence R&T and R&D;
(xii) Considering that in some areas, security R&T and defence R&T pursue similar objectives, for example as regards protection against improvised explosive devices, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles for observation missions, encrypted communication networks and cyber defence;
(xiii) Considering, therefore, that it is desirable to prepare for the introduction of a chapter on defence in the Eighth Framework Programme (FP8) for 2014-2020, with a view to improving cooperation and exploiting synergies between security R&T and defence R&T;
(xiv) Considering that, given the specific character and intergovernmental nature of the CSDP, the European Defence Agency should be responsible for funding and overseeing such a chapter – with contributions from participating member states – in coordination and cooperation with the European Commission for those parts financed by Community funds;
(xv) Considering that, in the current economic climate which has slowed investment in defence capabilities, it is essential to maintain sustained efforts in security and defence R&T and R&D in order to:
– preserve European technological knowhow in this area;
– make European firms in this sector more competitive;
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– maintain jobs and expertise; and,
– ensure European operational autonomy;
(xvi) Considering that, for European security and defence R&T and R&D efforts to succeed, it is also necessary for the public at large to support funding in these areas, which in turn requires an active commitment on the part of national parliaments to monitor affairs in this area,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES, AS MEMBERS OF NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, TO:
1. Cooperate to a greater extent on security and defence research and technological development projects and programmes;
2. Maintain adequate levels of investment in security and defence R&T and R&D so as to preserve European operational autonomy, the competitive edge of industry in this sector, and specialist jobs and knowhow;
3. Develop the European Defence Agency’s ability to act in the area of R&T by providing it with increased funding in order to compensate, through cooperation, for cuts decided at national level;
4. Extend, as appropriate and where useful, European security and defence cooperation to other states with recognised capacities in these areas, in particular to allies and partners such as the United States, Canada, Israel and Russia;
5. Prepare a chapter on defence for FP8, 2014-2020, with mixed funding between the member states and the European Commission, under the supervision of the European Defence Agency in coordination with the Commission;
6. Ensure, during the next discussions on the Union’s budget, that Community investment in R&T and R&D is maintained at a high level in order to preserve and develop Europe’s capacity for technological innovation in the world.
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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
submitted by Mr Mendes Bota, Rapporteur (Portugal, EPP/CD Group)
I. Summary
1. In 2000 the heads of state and government of the member states of the European Union, meeting in Lisbon, set the strategic objective of making the European Union “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. In order to achieve this objective, the heads of state and government of the then 15 member states laid particular emphasis on research and technology, among other things, and called for the establishment of a “European area of research and innovation”.
2. 10 years on, against a background of widespread economic crisis and budget constraints that limit government investment in technological research and development at national and European level, these objectives are far from being achieved. Yet Europe remains a world leader in technology, second only to the United States, and invests (at national and EU level) more than any other non-European competitor in research and technology (R&T) and research and development (R&D).
3. The European research area foreseen in Lisbon is a reality under construction, an ambitious objective that will require a great deal of effort to achieve. It is not a question of figures, although it is true that the not even 2% of European GDP currently being invested in R&D in Europe (1.7% in 2010) falls short of the Lisbon objective of an annual 3% of GDP. Notwithstanding the progress made this last decade, European research remains fragmented and surrounded by protectionist systems at national level.
4. The European area of research and innovation has also been extended, particularly since 2001, to encompass security and defence. The risk of terrorism, brought home by the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 respectively, has been a driver for that inclusive approach to security research. The Preparatory Action launched by the Commission in 2004 with the support of industry led to the European Security Research Programme (2004-2006).
5. Quite logically, as a result of that initiative, a chapter on security was inserted into the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7) for 2007-2013. In parallel to that Community approach, in 2004 the EU member states also set up a defence research structure, the Research and Technology Directorate of the European Defence Agency (EDA).
6. However there is a huge discrepancy between the funding allocated at European level to security research (Commission) and to research on defence (EDA), which stand at a ratio of about 25:1. The Commission has been investing 200 million euros each year since 2007 in the FP7’s security chapter, while the EDA has a total studies budget for all its directorates of just over eight million euros in 2010.
7. The dual nature of security and defence research – what some experts refer to as the security and defence “continuum”– is the argument put forward to justify the search for points of convergence between the two. Indeed it has become a leitmotif on the strength of which the EDA and the Commission have come together for certain projects and programmes and could eventually lead to a chapter on defence being inserted into the Eighth Framework Programme (FP8, 2014-2020).
8. In the meantime, it is security research that continues to receive the lion’s share of investments, but without overcoming the fragmentation and protectionism mentioned earlier. The major difficulty remains that of transforming projects into genuine programmes with applications and products useful for the existing European security area and which, by being exported, can also strengthen Europe’s political, economic and technological influence in a fast changing world.
9. These are the questions that the Technological and Aerospace Committee intends to address in this report being submitted by Mr Mendes Bota (Portugal, Federated Group), with a view to putting forward recommendations on pursuing the European security research effort and devoting more
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resources to defence research. This report follows on from another report by Mr Mendes Bota on security research in Europe adopted by the Assembly on 21 June 2006.
II. European security research in the FP7 (2007-2013)
10. In June 2006, the WEU Assembly adopted a report on “Security research in Europe – reply to the annual report of the Council” presented by your Rapporteur on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.2 That reference document described the development of security research in Europe during the period of the major terrorist attacks at the start of the century (2001 in the United States, 2003 in Turkey, 2004 in Madrid and 2005 in London).
11. Security research was not new, but it was attracting greater attention and resources as a result of those attacks and the pervasive threat of terrorism. The European Union was a driving force behind those efforts in the field of security research. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of which it is part were strengthened by that new focus on security both within and outside the EU’s borders.
12. The insertion into the Seventh Framework Programme not only of a chapter on security, but also one on space – given the links between the two and the security aspects of the Galileo (navigation and positioning) and GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) programmes – was the culmination of an effort conducted at community and intergovernmental level and supported by industry beginning in 2004 with the launch of the Preparatory Action.
13. That Action gave rise to a small (65 million euro) programme for the period 2004-2006, a Commission-funded programme involving joint projects among various European partners: companies, research centres, universities and think-tanks. The argument concerning the dual nature of the technologies and the security and defence “continuum” was put forward in order to encourage a process of convergence with the defence research activities to be launched by the European Defence Agency from the end of 2004 onwards.
14. The extension of European research to include the field of security was the next logical step in the process of creating a more integrated European scientific and technological research area. That aim was the result of the decisions taken in Lisbon in 2000, now revised with a view to the 2020 horizon. For all the good intentions, research in Europe remains fragmented, dispersed and encumbered by red tape and protectionist barriers at national level.
15. The reasons for this are structural. The Union is composed of sovereign states sharing competences within either a Community or intergovernmental framework, or a combination of both, with European internal security falling within the last category. There are also major economic issues that are all the more relevant in the context of the current economic crisis: the pace of public investment in R&T and R&D has been slowed without private investment stepping in to fill the gap.
16. The small overall decline in R&D investments in the European Union (down from 1.86% of GDP in 2000 to 1.84% in 2010) is thus the result of a decline in private investment which in turn is linked with the process of globalisation and the attractiveness of other emerging R&T and R&D sectors in China, India and Russia, and the continued investment by European companies in the United States.
17. The European decline is due both to a sluggish national and domestic market and to increased opportunities outside Europe where European investors find good conditions (infrastructure, qualified staff, state aid and advantageous funding systems) and attractive returns on investments.
18. Overall, despite the structural constraints, national barriers and international competition, real R&D spending in the European Union rose by 14.8% between 2000 and 2006. However, that growth is marked by major disparities among European states in terms of their real contribution to the world
2 This report (Assembly Document 1931) is a reference document on the development of the security research process in the European Union from 2004 to 2006 and on the interaction between security and defence research in the first few years of the European Defence Agency’s existence.
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economy and to international R&T and R&D. Europe’s share in world R&D spending decreased by 2% (from 26.4% to 24.4%) over the same period while the percentage share of “the rest of the world” – China, Russia, Brazil, India, etc – rose considerably (+4.9%, from 16.4% to 21.3%).
19. Europe, which has the largest GDP in the world (11 800 billion euros as against 10 000 billion euros for the United States) is world leader for R&D, but it is having trouble transforming itself into a real power in the field of security and defence. The European Union is not a unified or integrated political entity and its economic, R&T and R&D potential is not being used to assert its international political role, in terms of either soft or hard power.
20. This is true of security and defence R&T and R&D: in this area Europe is lagging far behind the United States, where defence R&D represents on average 50 to 60% of the federal government’s defence spending and security R&D, less than 1% (in 2010).
21. This classic comparison between the EU and the United States also fails to take account of the fact that the US Government’s R&D spending is outstripped by that of US industry. The public and private sectors together spend over 328 billion euros (2010) compared with a little over 270 billion euros for the EU (including national expenditure). This represents 2.85% of the United States’ GDP as against 1.7% for the EU.
22. The American private sector, which includes European companies installed in the United States, accounts for 67.3% of total American R&D. For Europe the figure is 54.8%.
23. It should also be noted that the United States, which is beginning to suffer from a shortage of specialists in the high tech sector – including security and defence – is recruiting the scientists and engineers it needs from all over the world and is becoming an attractive destination for European researchers. The European states in turn have launched initiatives designed to attract scientists from other European or non-European countries, particularly in the medical and IT sectors.
24. The European Commission has proposed a “blue card” system analogous to the United States’ green card, with a view to attracting the qualified staff Europe needs to meet its industrial, scientific and technological needs. However, there are national barriers to such a system – in terms of recognition of qualifications and quota systems for allocating posts to foreign (including other European) nationals – as well as obstacles to the free movement of individuals and their establishment in countries of the European Union.
25. In the field of security and defence research – areas of national sovereignty – the constraints in the human resources area are even greater. The same is true for intellectual property rights, technology transfers and information exchanges between companies and between public and private security and defence research bodies.
26. FP7 may only offer part of the answer but is nonetheless crucial to the gradual establishment of a “European area of research and innovation”. It is the first framework programme since the Lisbon Treaty and the first to encompass security and space. The sums invested in it – 2.8 billion euros for the two chapters together, at the rate of some 200 million euros each year – are considerable, even if they fall short of what many European stakeholders, industry in particular, would like to see.
27. This common European effort in favour of technological research in the area of security is complementary to efforts at national level. Overall, the mid-course results of FP7 are very positive; however, in terms of concrete applications arising out of that initiative, the results are less conclusive, because Europe is not the buyer. Indeed, it is the member states and the national institutions – the security and intelligence services – that will acquire the practical results. And, for the reasons mentioned earlier, the national preference remains the rule in areas of national sovereignty.
28. The European security market is also and above all a national market where, as is the case for the defence market, the big investors are also the major consumers: the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden account for the majority of investments and more than 90% of results in the field of security and defence research. Those countries have at their “service” their national champions which constitute powerful lobbies for maintaining qualified jobs and strengthening the national defence technological and industrial base (DTIB). Those major companies also need the
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European and international market in order to offset the limitations of the national market and, where it is profitable for them to do so, they cooperate among themselves on joint projects and within consortia to win calls for tenders at national, European and international level.
29. Those companies – for example, BAE Systems (United Kingdom), QinetiQ (United Kingdom), EADS (France, Germany, Spain), Thales (France), Rheinmetall (Germany), Diehl (Germany), Safran (France), SAAB (Sweden), Finmeccanica (Italy) and Indra (Spain) – are leaders in the fields of both security and defence.
30. FP7 like its predecessors is based on the idea of cooperation at Community level. The Framework Programme is divided into four main areas: Cooperation, Ideas, People and Capabilities. The chapter on security comes under “Cooperation”. FP7’s total budget is 50 billion euros for the period 2007-2013, in other words 7 billion euros per annum out of a total Union budget of 141.5 billion euros (5%) in 2010.
31. Security research is thus part of the process of cooperation among companies and research centres, and of the desired cooperation with the final customers such as the member states or other authorised bodies such as the EU agencies for the security of the Union’s land and maritime borders (FRONTEX), security at sea (EMSA) or data security (ENISA).
32. From the organisational standpoint the chapter on security is divided into seven principal missions, with more than 120 capabilities that have been identified as in need of development. It is a multidisciplinary and multisectoral sector covering aspects pertaining to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and to European Justice, Freedom and Security, as well as to the areas of health (bioprotection), transport, energy, communications (infrastructure), environment and civil protection.
33. The seven missions comprise four security missions and three “cross-cutting” missions, each divided into four or five areas of activity:
– “Increasing the security of citizens – technology solutions for civil protection, bio-security, protection against crime and terrorism;
– Increasing the security of infrastructures and utilities – examining and securing infrastructures in areas such as ICT [Information and Communication Technologies], transport, energy and services in the financial and administrative domain;
– Intelligent surveillance and border security – technologies, equipment, tools and methods for protecting Europe's border controls such as land and coastal borders;
– Restoring security and safety in case of crisis – technologies and communication, coordination in support of civil, humanitarian and rescue tasks;
– Improving security systems integration, interconnectivity and interoperability – information gathering for civil security, protection of confidentiality and traceability of transactions;
– Security and society – socio-economic, political and cultural aspects of security, ethics and values, acceptance of security solutions, social environment and perceptions of security;
– Security research coordination and structuring – coordination between European and international security research efforts in the areas of civil, security and defence research”.
34. The chapter on security refers to two strategic objectives: to create a safer environment for European citizens and to enhance the competitiveness of European companies in this sector. That last aspect is a leitmotif of the Framework Programme. Ideally missions and objectives are to be realised in four phases: capability projects, integration projects, demonstration and implementation. There is a timetable for each phase: two to four years, four years, from one to four years. The demonstration projects are divided into two categories:
“Phase 1 projects (either one or several projects in each of the demonstration programmes) will define the strategic roadmaps and trigger Europe wide awareness, both elements involving strategic public and private end users as well as industry and research. The strategic roadmaps will take into account relevant completed, ongoing and planned work and indicate further
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research needs for Security theme integration projects and capability projects, but also for other themes of the 7th Framework Programme or for the national level (1-1.5 years);
Phase 2 projects (either one or several projects in each of the demonstration programmes) will then technically implement the system of systems demonstration, taking already into account steps which have to follow the research, like certification and/or standardisation (if and as appropriate), development of marketable products and pre-procurement. This will mobilise a significant volume of resources (up to 4 years)”.
35. Specific actions are also planned in areas such as the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in international cooperation and the dissemination of security research among users. Thought is given to the dual nature of technologies and to the possibilities – not fully realised – for cooperation and exchanges of information with the European Defence Agency and its R&T Directorate.
36. Projects are selected by means of calls for proposals issued by the Commission, the last of which, dated 20 July 2010, concerns proposals for projects in 2011. Various events such as open days, conferences, and specialised seminars are organised on a regular basis for the relevant communities of researchers, companies and government and agency representatives.
37. The calls for proposals are issued annually. The one for 2011 is based on a budget of some 221 million euros (221 430 000 euros) and concerns 48 topics such as:
– Strategies for countering a terrorist attack in an urban environment;
– Improvised explosive device (IED) neutralisation in urban /civil environment;
– Forensic analysis of an explosion or an unexploded IED;
– Comprehensive toolbox for humanitarian clearance of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions from large civilian areas;
– Understanding of unintended consequences of global illicit drug control measures;
– Development of detection capabilities of difficult to detect radioactive sources and nuclear materials;
– Development of improved forensic tools applied to radiological contaminations;
– Airport checkpoints;
– Protection of critical infrastructure (structures, platforms and networks) against electromagnetic attacks;
– Cyber attacks against critical infrastructures;
– Intelligent surveillance and enhancing border security;
– Unmanned search and rescue solutions;
– CBRN individual protective clothing;
– Analysis of the security systems in Europe;
– Protection of European citizens abroad;
– Signs of “early warning” to detect trends and weak signals in social polarisation, violent radicalisation development and segregation;
– Assessing trends and threats in a society;
– The relationship between human privacy and security;
– Coordination of national research programmes in the area of security research;
– Effective approach between end-users and SMEs;
– Innovation and research within security organisations;
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– Definition of requirements by civil security end-users for large air transport systems;
– Development of a European training curriculum for international crisis management.
38. Some of those topics have an obvious dual character, relating to both security and defence, for example terrorist attacks in urban environments, IEDs, the detection of radioactive sources, cyber attacks, the protection of European citizens abroad, large air transport systems (C-130, C-17 and in the near future A-400M) and training for crisis management.
39. In the fields of IEDs and search-and-rescue operations using unmanned aircraft, the European Defence Agency also has various projects under way, such as a field laboratory for IED research in Afghanistan, the development of a maritime UAV system and MIDCAS (mid-air collision avoidance system), the “sense and avoid” system for UAVs.
40. Education and training for crisis management is particularly important for European crisis-management capabilities, strongly marked by Europe’s comprehensive civil-military approach.
41. That topic is also useful for the preparation of national security and other (firefighting, medical, civil protection) forces likely to be deployed on external operations. This is an interest shared by NATO which is seeking to develop a security and civilian component for its missions, drawing in particular on the lessons learned in Afghanistan.
42. Since the launch of FP7 more than 45 projects have been selected, not including the 2010 call for proposals. Several of these have a dual character and match both current and foreseeable future defence requirements:
– AMASS: Autonomous Maritime Surveillance System;
– COPE: Common Operational Picture Exploitation;
– CREATIF: a network of testing facilities for security-related products and services focused on CBRNE [Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, Nuclear, Explosive] detection;
– EFFISEC: Efficient Integrated Security Checkpoints;
– EULER: European Software Defined Radio for wireless joint security operations;
– iDetect 4ALL: Novel Intruder Detection and Authentication Optical Sensing Technology;
– LOTUS: Localisation of Threat Substances in Urban society;
– OPERAMAR: An InterOPERAble Approach to European Union MARitime Security Management;
– OPTIX: Optical Technologies for Identification of Explosives;
– SECTRONIC: Security System for Maritime Infrastructure, Ports & Coastal Zones;
– TALOS: Transportable Autonomous patrol for Land bOrder Surveillance system;
– UNCOSS: UNderwater COastal Sea Surveyor;
– WIMA2S: Wide Maritime Area Airborne Surveillance.
43. The sums invested in these research programmes are out of all proportion to the EDA’s annual R&T spending (10 million euros), most of which goes on studies. This does not mean, however, that the research effort funded by the Commission is a guarantee of Europe’s success in this area.
44. An area that is crucial to the success of security research is that of standardisation in order to ensure the interoperability of the applications and systems arising from these projects. Security and defence have common requirements in this area, in a Europe that remains fragmented, with national standards, evaluation criteria and processes for developing operational readiness that vary among the different countries according to their particular experience, doctrines and conditions of use.
45. The Union’s Framework Programme constitutes a response to that situation, just as the Commission uses directives on public defence procurement and intra-community transfers of defence
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information and technologies to make the European security and defence market more competitive and flexible. On the intergovernmental side the European Defence Agency represents the member states’ contribution to the common effort to strengthen European security and defence capabilities.
46. That approach is actively supported by European companies of all sizes as well as foreign firms active in Europe’s security and defence sectors, such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin. Security research also has an international dimension, with incentives to encourage partnerships between member states’ companies and research centres and those of candidate states and third countries like the United States and Russia.
47. FP7 and security research therefore involve a broad community of participants and stakeholders that make an active contribution to the establishment of a European area of research and innovation with a view to horizon 2020 (10 years later than the Lisbon objectives).
48. In September 2007 that community which brings together companies, research centres, research scientists and experts set up an important forum for exchanges and discussion, the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF), which defined itself as a “European strategy group in the civil security research domain”. ESRIF was founded with the aim of contributing to the development of a medium and long-term strategy for security research.
49. ESRIF was supported from the outset by governments, the European Union (the Commission), the scientific research community and industry. It involved three categories of participants:
– “Demand side: ‘Those that will use and apply the achievements of security research – knowledge, technologies and products (often large systems): European, national and regional authorities, police, fire brigades, all kinds of emergency organisations and first responders, private and public operators of critical infrastructure etc’;
– Supply side: ‘Those that perform security research and turn its outcome into technologies and products: universities, research establishments, industry, including SMEs’;
– Civil society: ‘And representatives of the citizens, often non-governmental organisations or special think tanks, that are affected by both potential security incidents as well as the efforts to ensure their security’.”
50. The third category is a major target for security research efforts, as many projects, technologies and applications in this area have a direct impact on peoples’ daily lives in terms of their rights, freedoms and privacy. Video surveillance, GPS tracking of individuals, body scanners and the tapping and recording of telephone and electronic communications are some well-known examples of the way in which technology and security applications can encroach on peoples’ private lives, their freedom to come and go and their private communications.
51. The Forum was designed to be small and flexible (involving 64 people assisted by more than 600 experts), limited in duration and with clear guidelines for identifying the prospects and requirements for horizon 2030. In order to organise its work the Forum set up 11 working groups on:
1. Security of the citizen: to protect the citizen against terrorism and organised crime;
2. Security of critical infrastructures: to protect critical infrastructures and utilities;
3. Border security: the control of air, land and sea borders in the context of integrated border management;
4. Crisis management: the preparedness to react to catastrophic incidents;
5. Foresight and scenarios: give input to all the political mission areas; to address also the need for research in support of foresight;
6. CBRNE: to address technologies and methods to detect chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear substances and explosives;
7. Situation awareness & the role of space;
8. Identification (including tracking) of people and assets;
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9. Innovation issues: to address the security industrial and technological base, the European security equipment market and interoperability and regulatory measures;
10 Governance and coordination: to look at security policy making and implementation of security research at EU and national levels;
11. Socio-economic and ethical issues: to address human and societal aspects of security.
52. ESRIF’s objective was to produce a strategy in the form of a set of recommendations on security research addressed to the Commission, European Parliament and EU Council, to be announced at the same time as the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. On that date the Forum published its final report and terminated its activities.
53. Its 324-page report is an important source of information about the state of security research in Europe and the possible avenues for strengthening and developing activities in this area. It contains several references to the links between security research and defence research and highlights the external dimension of European civil security.
54. It includes a number of annexes that clearly show the implications for security of the work being done by the EDA, OCCAR (Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation) and NATO; these may be either direct or indirect (technological spin-offs). The final report is divided into two parts, the first being a general synthesis that includes the final recommendations.
55. The second part concerns the results of the working groups, each in their specific fields. The main message of the report is an appeal to set up, between 2010 and 2030, a European Security Research and Innovation Agenda, ESRIA.
56. ESRIA encompasses existing and planned capabilities and technologies, in order to respond to a wide range of present and future challenges in fields ranging from the day-to-day security of individuals to the use of space for security purposes (observation, communications, navigation/positioning).
57. The Agenda is founded on the principle of cooperation and coordination in a trans-European framework analogous to the trans-European networks that exist in other areas (e.g. transport).
58. It calls for that purpose for funding to the tune of a billion euros per year (a recurrent request since the launch of the Preparatory Action in 2004). Currently, under FP7, the funding for security research does not exceed 200 million euros annually.
59. The Forum’s final recommendations are summed up in five points in an effort of clarity and concision that is all the more commendable in view of the complexity of the security research area:
“5.1 Common European Capabilities
The EU must draw on its collective strengths and knowledge by developing common capability via enhanced transnational cooperation.
1. (…) close consultation across Europe among supply, demand and end-user stakeholders across the planning, execution and review cycles of security research policy. The demand side in particular – governments and end-users – needs organisational realignment to both shape and respond to security innovation.
2. (…) ESRIF recommends, notably with a view to the implementation of ESRIA, that the EU maintains the current rate of growth of its security research programmes – with the aim of reaching an annual budget of one billion euros (…).
(…) Regarding the necessary research and industrial synergies, technical compatibility and interoperability of new security solutions, a significant effort is required to ensure the coherence of national and EU efforts through enhanced coordination.
3. Research programmes should be complemented by additional implementation programmes. Success on the global market strongly depends on EU market procurement references. Pre-
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commercial procurement of innovative solutions should be exploited as a mechanism to bring research results closer to the market.
5.2 New Policy Initiatives
4. New initiatives and programmes should include:
– Creation of knowledge centres such as CBRN expert groups to guide research
– Preparations to meet foreseeable needs for pan-European network-enabled capabilities and complex systems in early warning and response readiness that deal with natural and man made incidents
– Expanded critical infrastructure protection programmes
– Evaluating the applicability and efficacy of the numerous initiatives available to the EU and its Members States such as: a Lead Market initiative, Trans European Networks for Security, the creation of an Internal Security Fund or a ‘European Security Label’
– The early engagement of all stakeholders and transparency of the regulatory environment, including standards to stimulate private sector investments in security research (…)
5.3 Integrated Approach to Security
Effective civil security must embrace interoperability, standardisation, certification, validation, communication with the public, education & training, exchange of best practices, consultations on privacy issues and other factors that cut across public and private spheres and provide synergies between civil security and defence research fields.
5. A holistic approach must include:
– Efforts to ensure that the social, cultural, legal and political aspects of security research and development are taken into account. Research programmes should (…) promote overall “societal coherence
– The promotion of a security by design approach in any newly developed complex system or product, ensuring that security is addressed at the point of conception, as it has been the case for safety by design
– Programmes to raise societal awareness of security threats, risks and vulnerabilities – and the security and safety impact of emerging critical technologies
5.4 The Global Dimension
The EU’s civil security is a collective responsibility touching government, societal organisations, industry and individual citizens. It cannot stand in isolation from the world.
6. The globally inter-related nature of security calls for:
– A strong and independent technological and scientific base for the EU to safeguard the interests of its citizens and ensure that its industry is able to provide products and services in a competitive manner
– Giving high priority to security’s external dimension and closer home affairs/defence consultation. Research and innovation programmes should support peacekeeping, humanitarian and crisis management tasks, including joint initiatives with other regions and international organisations, notably as regard the development of global standards
5.5 Security Research: The Future
The proposed European Security Research and Innovation Agenda – ESRIA – should be seen as a living document.
7. For ESRIA to evolve with Europe’s internal and external threat environments:
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– A transparent mechanism involving all stakeholders should be set up to implement ESRIA in a balanced and rigorous manner
– ESRIA should be revisited and evaluated on a regular basis (…)”.
60. That comprehensive approach, to use the current popular term, is also the result of the gaps and shortfalls that arise when a single state tries to respond to all requirements in a context of increasingly limited financial, human and technical resources. Solidarity – provided for by the Lisbon Treaty – and cooperation are the solution. The need for cooperation on security research and defence research, in areas where the two come together, is recognised by the relevant authorities and experts, but in practice there are still numerous obstacles to overcome.
61. The focus on security research in the Framework Programme for 2007-2013 is a major step in the right direction but the real test will be the inclusion of a chapter on defence in the Framework Programme for 2014 to 2020. It is not so much a question of whether this will be done, as how, given that the different players are more divided among themselves than is the case for civilian security research, which is conducted in a scientific environment and in a political and economic framework that is more open and transparent and where, given the incentives in terms of returns on investment and the more homogenous nature of the market, there are major financial resources.
III. Security research and defence research: common points, differences and prospects
62. The dual nature of technological research and development in the fields of security and defence is an established fact. To take a simple example, the biometric identification techniques developed for civilian purposes are now being used by the military during external operations in order to identify and monitor dangerous elements.
63. The fight against IEDs involves both forensic technologies and military means for the location, identification and defusing of mines, bombs and other conventional or non-conventional explosive devices. The fingerprint and DNA-based techniques popularised by certain forensic science TV series are used to identify the builders and planters of IEDs.
64. Internal and external security also converge when an analysis/synthesis of the intelligence gathered at national level and within a theatre of operations reveals the existence of human combatant and support networks that are based for various reasons on the territory of a European state and have links to regions in conflict.
65. Such convergence is not new but has developed considerably since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States with the fight against terrorism. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the small and large “clashes” of civilisations and religions have exacerbated the desire for total security.
66. The war in Afghanistan illustrates the line of reasoning that the United States and Europe can better guarantee their security by sending their troops to that central Asian state to fight terrorism. The argument is debatable, given the complexity of the local and regional situation, but it is used by European governments to justify their actions in a process in which internal and external security considerations are intermeshed.
67. The security-defence continuum has thus become an accepted notion in national strategies: France’s 2008 White Paper on security and the United Kingdom’s October 2010 National Security Strategy are a case in point. The United States’ reference in 2003 to preventive and pre-emptive wars in order to protect its internal security takes this notion particularly far.
68. Nonetheless, from the point of view of scientific and technological research, the two areas remain quite distinct in Europe. While civilian research at national level has quite naturally been extended to the European level through the Framework Programmes and the Commission-funded network of research centres that makes up the Joint Research Centre (JRC), defence research remains confined to individual member states that cooperate only rarely and on a case-by-case basis.
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69. Even within NATO’s R&T and R&D agencies the security constraints that apply to the sharing and dissemination of information, discoveries and progress prevent “universal” access by all member states to the results. Cooperation on defence research is developing more on the basis of very specific projects and programmes, often confined to a limited number of states with equivalent levels of scientific and technological development.
70. Hence, although there are points of convergence between security and defence, they are not yet being exploited to the full. The situation in this instance is clearly to the advantage of the United States as a single political, economic, legislative entity with a single set of standards, which is not the case for the European Union.
71. American defence research at all levels, from R&T to practical applications, embraces a huge network of public and private institutions, specialised laboratories and even universities and companies keen to work in this sector.
72. DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) is one such flagship structure for which there is no equivalent in Europe and whose example has failed to convince the European states, which even within NATO have still not been able to look beyond their selfish national interests in order to create a similar structure.
73. This Federal Agency was created in 1958 within the Department of Defense in response to the USSR’s launch of the Sputnik satellite. DARPA, which enjoys a high degree of autonomy in its decision-making, has been instrumental in giving the US defence sector the lead it enjoys over the rest of the world, including its European allies.
74. And yet it is a relatively small structure with only 240 directly employed staff and an annual budget of just over three billion dollars (3.2 billion in 2010, 3.1 in 2011). Among other discoveries it is known for its contribution to the Internet through certain defence projects such as ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency Network) in the 1960s and 1970s. However, DARPA is just one of several agencies in the field of defence research.
75. In practice, DARPA has links in the United States with the whole scientific community, in particular through thousands of projects and programmes ordered and funded by the US Department of Defense, its various agencies (for example in the field of ballistic missile defence) and the different branches of the armed forces, in particular the US Air Force. All areas are covered, from basic research to optimising the logistics chain using such technologies as radio frequency identification (RFID).
76. With more than 50% of federal investment in R&T and R&D in the United States being funded by the Department of Defense, to the tune of over 50 billion dollars a year – including more than eight billion for R&T (compared with 2.5 billion for all EU states together) – clearly defence research and its resulting applications receive direct and indirect support from the whole US scientific and technological community, with outside contributions from allied and other states with which the United States engages in various forms of scientific cooperation.
77. There is nothing comparable in Europe, where the attempts to build something akin to a European defence R&T and R&D area have failed and continue to be hampered by the NATO and EU member states.
78. The reasons are numerous, ranging from the classified nature of research in such sensitive areas as nuclear energy, communications, munitions, computerised command and control (C2) networks, to economic protectionism, intellectual property rights, export advantages or international (bi- and multilateral) agreements on the transfer of defence technologies.
79. The European Defence Agency launched in 2004 was intended to provide the beginnings of an answer to the lack of a European defence research policy. Structures exist at national level but the large number of barriers is detrimental to the overall coherence needed for the European Union to be able to act as a multiplier of the member states’ power at international level.
80. Defence research could help to improve interoperability, and perhaps even lead eventually to greater homogeneity among the equipment and capabilities of the national armed forces which provide
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the basis for the EU’s “hard” power. Since research is the first phase in any project or programme in the field of defence equipment and technologies, if it were possible to introduce a degree of cooperation and Europeanisation into the capability process, this could be conducive to synergy and to (much needed) economies of scale.
81. The Research and Technology Directorate of the European Defence Agency therefore endeavours to promote cooperative European RTD solutions in response to the capability requirements declared by the participating member states (pMS) (Denmark being the only non-pMS, while Norway enjoys a special status allowing it to participate in the EDA’s activities), which aim:
– “to catalyse more European R&T collaborations, focussed on improving defence capabilities ; and
– to develop policies and strategies to strengthen defence technology in Europe”.
82. To guide those activities the Directorate adheres to operating rules defined by its Steering Board in 2005:
“Capability orientation: Segmentation of the technology (…) in three major blocks corresponding to the three major capability domains [information acquisition and processing knowledge; guidance, energy and materials; environment, systems and modelling]. Mapping of these three blocks through different Capability Technologies (CapTech) areas where cooperation should develop (…)
Network centric management: Establishment of a network of pMS experts, including industry and research centre representatives, for each CapTech, and its development according to changing needs. (…) Organisation (…) of meetings of CapTech networks, including workshops and seminars (…)
Transparency through monitoring and reporting: The Steering Board to approve on a regular basis an updated R&T roadmap, proposed by the Agency and based on an R&T strategy, as part of EDA long-term vision. (…)
Embracing valuable existing cooperation and networks: Existing networks and working groups are invited to transfer their activities to EDA’s R&T organisation, provided they accept above-mentioned structure and management principles. (…)
Effective interface with dual-use and civil research: CapTechs expertise and networks to contribute identifying where synergies with dual-use and non-defence security research exist, and where there could be a risk of duplication on dual-use research funding. EDA to provide advice on priorities for security research
Involvement of industry: Participation of industry in each of the CapTech networks under specified conditions (identification of companies and experts in liaison with EDA I&M Directorate). Ideas and proposals from industry (bottom-up) to be recognised and stimulated. (…) Visits of industrial sites and facilities organised when needed for CapTechs purposes (…)
Using EDA contracting capacity for R&T: The Agency to fund and manage R&T studies and projects, (…) to provide support, including contracting if asked, to R&T co-operative projects proposed by a limited number of pMS (…)”.
83. That huge programme was confirmed at the level of the member states which drew up a Framework for a European Defence Research & Technology Strategy in November 2007. This short (seven-page) document lays the groundwork for a common European approach to stimulate cooperation in this area and strengthen the dual character of security and defence technologies in the sense of the security and defence “continuum”.
84. The participating member states agree on three principles based on a previous process of reflection on the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB):
“a. (“Investing more…”) substantiate the level of spending required to fulfil the needs of [participating Member States, pMS] reflected in the targeted EDTIB characteristics which apply
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to a large extent to the defence technology base, namely: capability driven, competent and competitive;
b. (“Investing better…”) help to focus Defence R&T investment at European level on areas not already covered by civil investment, and therefore influence the convergence and alignment of national policies; it should also promote best practice, improving efficiency in collaborative Defence R&T ;
c. (“Investing more together…”) help to make European R&T activities more transparent, supporting a step change in R&T collaboration, identifying where interdependencies among the pMS would aid the development of the required capabilities and the strengthening of the EDTIB”.
85. Five investment priorities are defined by the member states:
“The translation from military capability needs into R&T objectives (…);
The analysis of impact from the technology push: that is identifying where technology (emerging or to be developed) could help “change the capability or industrial game” and make a significant difference to the defence R&T capability;
The identification of those scientific and technical skills (providing actually an indirect benefit for the user) needed to support the capability needs of armed forces;
The reinforcement of the EDTIB to satisfy needs for autonomy and operational sovereignty;
The identification of opportunities for effective collaboration (…)”.
86. To implement this process of European cooperation on defence R&T, four aspects are underlined:
“Improve integration of the defence technology base into the wider technology base; [...] Acknowledging there is ‘spin-in’ and ‘spin-out’ between the defence and civilian/security arenas (increasingly from civilian to military) (…);
Promote technology push; […] There is a need to balance the capability-driven perspective with sufficient technology push: science and new technology often lead to unforeseen and unexpected applications of emerging, sometimes disruptive technologies – in turn driving capabilities. Therefore, capability requirements cannot define the whole R&T spectrum relevant to defence and security. R&T is a valuable source for policy makers, and stakeholders, for identifying challenges in their own missions (…);
Improve the effectiveness of R&T collaboration; […] Based upon an objective analysis of the obstacles to collaboration in defence R&T and on the need to strengthen the EDTIB (…);
Implement the R&T Strategy into roadmaps; […] When correctly used, roadmaps can be an important tool in transitioning from the technology strategy level, through to the “make it happen” level (…)”.
87. That Framework for a European Strategy, officially called the “Strategy” as of November 2008, is a useful reference document but in practice, three years on, its implementation continues to suffer from the fragmented and dispersed nature of the European security and defence technological and industrial base (ESDTIB) and its chronic underfunding, and the fact that it remains concentrated in a small number of countries and therefore benefits only a small number of industrial champions and scientific and technological research establishments at national level.
88. The major problem, however, is posed by the funding of that strategy in the current climate of economic crisis, with reduced defence budgets and a lengthening of the timeframes for current and future equipment replacement and armed forces modernisation programmes. When it comes to budgetary choices at national level, interdependence and technical specialisation are only rarely considered as feasible short- and medium-term options.
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89. The concentration of financial, human and research resources in a small number of states is also conducive to bilateral cooperation among partners with a comparable technological level and able to invest significant funds, or with partners chosen for purely political reasons. The prospect of implementing pan-European cooperation programmes based on pooling and specialisation is at the same time set aside and referred to vaguely as a long-term objective.
90. Thus the European Defence Agency budget allocates eight million euros to R&T, which goes essentially on studies. Tangible projects and programmes such as forces protection, radio software and sense and avoid systems for UAVs (MIDCAS, MID-Air Collision Avoidance System) are funded directly by the participating states.
91. For its part, the European Commission, which has an annual budget of 200 million euros for security research, has a certain appeal for the Agency and above all for European security and defence companies and the relevant scientific and technological research bodies.
92. That relative imbalance is offset by the fact that an equivalent sum to that spent under FP7 is spent each year on defence R&T projects conducted in cooperation among the EU member states (more than 200 million euros out of total defence R&T spending in Europe of 2.5 billion euros).
93. The difference is that in the area of defence research, European cooperation is fragmented and unlike in the United States – leaving aside the question of military superiority – there is no knock-on effect or spur to economic growth. Hence many experts, backed up by industry, share the common belief that Europe does not spend enough on defence R&T. Indeed, the United States’ defence budget is three times that of all the EU member states put together.
94. An additional aim of promoting a convergence between security and defence is to finance defence research activities with Community funds – a praiseworthy initiative if those funds are to supplement spending at national level or in cooperation projects.
95. However, in a context of severe economic crisis in Europe, there is a risk that states might cut back on investment in this area in order to make savings or simply because they do not see their defence needs in terms of technology and are unaware of the implications for their defence autonomy of acquiring technology from elsewhere.
96. Technological autonomy in the area of defence and security is a major goal shared by the member states and the Commission in the Framework for a European Defence R&T Strategy and features in the strategic objectives of FP7. The latter also includes a chapter on space, with annual funding of up to 200 million euros as for the chapter on security.
97. The use of space applications for security and defence purposes – observation, communications and navigation/positioning – is of strategic importance for the European Union and its member states. Space applications play a major part in the EU’s decision-making autonomy and operational sovereignty in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). They are also invaluable for those member states taking part in external operations in coalitions.
98. While the space and security chapters are separate and have distinct funding under FP7, they were often linked in speeches and discussions during the preparatory process and implementation of the Framework Programme. It was a means, albeit indirect, of introducing an element of research with defence implications in a Community programme.
99. In 2010, half way through FP7, it is not so much a question of whether a defence research chapter should be included in the next Framework Programme for 2014-2020, but rather on what terms.
100. Despite the institutional limits of the CSDP which some member states are set on keeping as an intergovernmental policy, the European Commission has made repeated attempts to extend its competences in the area of defence. Its angle of approach was defence industries and technologies and in 2009 the Commission adopted two directives: one on defence procurement and the other on security and defence technology transfers between member states. In principle, these two texts should come into force in 2011 and will give the Commission, the market watchdog, joint oversight with the
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national governments of defence procurement and intra-community transfers of security and defence technologies.
101. Including a chapter on security research in the 8th Framework Programme would strengthen the role of the Commission in the area of defence, barring the political and operational aspects. It would have to cooperate more closely with the European Defence Agency which nevertheless intends to remain focused on the CSDP and keep its autonomy.
102. The majority of firms in the security and defence sector are generally in favour of the Commission being more involved in these areas. This might pave the way in the future for Community funding of defence research programmes or even defence industry subsidies.
103. On 18 May 2009 the Agency’s Steering Board, meeting in defence ministers’ formation, took a necessary step towards closer collaboration between the Agency and the Commission in security and defence research. The Steering Board considered that:
“The Agency has increased its efforts to seek synergies between its defence R&T work and the Commission’s activities on civil security research, e.g. in the area of the Software Defined Radio, force protection and Space. The Agency was tasked by the Steering Board in Defence Ministers formation to prepare, working together with the European Commission, a European framework cooperation for synchronising defence and civilian security-related research activities, taking fully into account the respective competences and decision-making procedures of the different institutions”.
104. The European Defence Agency proposed to the Commission – as well as other institutions such as the European Space Agency (ESA) – to work together to launch a monitoring programme called Situation Awareness (SA). This concept covers a broad range of technologies and applications aimed at detecting and anticipating situations, which can be broadly summarised as being a set of cognitive processes in a dynamic environment.
105. The Situation Awareness programme involves sensors, the dissemination and processing of data, command and control procedures and computer communication networks. All these elements and functions, with sector-specific variations, are common to the fields of internal and external security and defence.
106. The idea behind the cooperation between the EDA and the Commission is explained by the Agency as follows:
“The cooperation between the EC and EDA varies in depth and shape, and increasingly encompasses taking into account work done within the frameworks of other organisations like the European Space Agency or Eurocontrol. This working together is not an objective on its own – the cooperation aims at building the capabilities that meet the needs of the defence and civilian security communities. Where comprehensive capabilities are addressed, where requirements converge, where duplication must be avoided, and where the compatibility of defence and security related technologies and systems is paramount, the European Commission’s and the European Defence Agency’s Frameworks need to synchronise the implementation of their programmes”.
107. What has changed since 2009 is that cooperation between the two bodies is destined to become closer and more regular. The Agency and the Commission are already discussing areas of common interest such as software defined radio, the integration of unmanned aerial vehicles in regulated (civil) airspace, the use of space and maritime surveillance.
108. Yet there are major structural imbalances between the EDA and the European Commission in terms of political influence, capacity for action and the ability to attract working partners, in particular from industry and the scientific community, as well as regards financial resources – the sinews of war. The amounts allocated for the security and space chapters of FP7 (2 800 million euros over six years) correspond to 90 years of the Agency’s current budget (31 million euros).
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109. The Agency invited ESA and the Civil Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) to participate in the first meeting set up to explore the modalities of the new cooperation between the EDA and the Commission.
110. The aim of the meeting was to determine the areas, priorities and modalities of cooperation, in accordance with each participant’s institutional framework. There will be no joint investment fund among the different institutions until at least 2014:
“The aim will be to synchronise research and allow for mutual use of results, as technologies are increasingly of a dual-use nature for military and civilian end users. First activities will start in 2010, and the last commitments would likely be made in 2014, bridging to the next framework programme. (...)
As for the topics to be covered, a selection of the most promising ones has been agreed to start with. CBRN and unmanned air systems (UAS) are recognised as prioritary [sic] but situation awareness (SA) will also be looked into by experts from the three frameworks even if it has been considered as a difficult subject”.
111. Should this first formal cooperation prove successful, it might well be followed by a defence research chapter which could be structured and divided into categories along the same lines as the security chapter of FP7.
112. Funding arrangements remain to be determined. It also has to be decided which body would take de facto responsibility for the strategic and operational management of defence research: either the Commission which has institutional influence within the European Union, or the European Defence Agency which, despite having its role considerably reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty, still has limited capacities and human and material resources.
113. For the governments it is essentially a political matter in which European security and defence firms, and researchers and scientists will have a say. The research and scientific community stand to gain considerably from a synergy between the EDA and the Commission: more money will be invested in security and defence research which will go to improving the capabilities of the European Union and its member states.
114. In the meantime, the Commission is continuing with the work set out in the security chapter of FP7: there are 78 programmes underway which by 2013 will have used up the allocated 1 400 million euro budget. Some of these programmes will go into the demonstration phase and, if there is a demand from the governments, new applications will be ready to be deployed in the coming years whose purpose is to better ensure the internal and external security of the citizens of the member states.
115. Continuing such efforts in 2014-2020, together with an added defence research chapter, will go a long way to maintaining Europe’s cutting edge in technological innovation. The European Union and its member states will gain in decision-making and operational autonomy in an era which has been justly termed “an age of uncertainty” in the United Kingdom’s 2010 Nation Security Strategy.
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MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Chairman Mr Axel E. FISCHER, MdB (DE) (PPE/CD)
Titular Members
Mr Alejandro ALONSO NUNEZ (ES) (Soc) Mr Daniel BACQUELAINE (BE) (Lib) Mrs Deborah BERGAMINI (IT) (PPE/DC) Mr Fernand BODEN (LU) (PPE/DC) Mr Erol Aslan CEBECI (TR) (PPE/DC) Mr Alain COUSIN (FR) (Fed) Mr Geraint DAVIES, MP Mr Patrick DE GROOTE (BE) Mrs Blanca FERNÁNDEZ-CAPEL (ES) (PPE/DC) Mr Giuseppe GALATI (IT) (PPE/DC) Mr Tamas GAUDI NAGY (HU) Mr Paolo GIARETTA (IT) (Lib) Lord GLENTORAN Mr Stanislaw GOGACZ (PL) (Fed) Mr Attila GRUBER (HU) (PPE/DC) Mr Joachim HÖRSTER, MdB (DE) (PPE/DC) Mr Reijo KALLIO (FI) Mrs Birgen KELES (TR) (Soc) Mr Charles KENNEDY, MP Mrs Sarmite KIKUSTE (LV) (Fed) Mr Jozef KLIM (PL) (Fed) Mr Jean-Pierre KUCHEIDA (FR) (Soc) Mr Jean-François LE GRAND (FR) (Fed) Mr Arminas LYDEKA (LT) (Lib) Mr Jovan MANASIJEVSKI (MK) (Lib) Mr Radu Catalin MARDARE (RO) Mr Waclaw MARTYNIUK (PL) Mr Alan MEALE, MP (UK) (Soc) Mr Patrick MEINHARDT, MdB (DE) (Lib) Mr José MENDES BOTA (PT) (PPE/DC) Mr Ionas NICOLAOU (CY) (PPE/DC) Mrs Tuija NURMI (FI) (PPE/DC) Mr Holger ORTEL, MdB (DE) (Soc) Mr Dimitrios PAPADIMOULIS (GR) Mrs Vassiliki PAPANDREOU (GR) Mr Germinal PEIRO (FR) (Soc) Mr Rudolf PETAN (SI) (Fed) Mrs Adoración QUESADA BRAVO (ES) (Soc) Mr Giacinto RUSSO (IT) (Lib) Mr Imre SOOÄÄR (EE) (Lib) Mr Mehmet TEKELIOGLU (TR) (PPE/DC) Mr Angel TILVAR (RO) (Soc) Mr Noel TREACY (IE) (Soc) Mr Luuk BLOM (Soc)
Alternate Members Mr Adam ABRAMOWICZ (PL) (Fed) Mrs Fatima ABURTO BASELGA (ES) (Soc) Mr Ruhi AÇIKGÖZ (TR) (Fed) Mr Miguel ARIAS CAÑETE (ES) (PPE/DC) Mr Mario BARBI (IT) (Lib) Mrs Doris BARNETT, MdB (DE) (Soc) Lord BOSWELL (UK) (Fed) Mrs Patrizia BUGNANO (IT) (Lib) Mrs Sylvia CANEL, MdB (DE) (Lib) Mrs Ann COFFEY, MP Mr Michael CONNARTY, MP Mr Armand DE DECKER (BE) (Lib) Mrs Josette DURRIEU (FR) (Soc) Mrs Gisèle GAUTIER (FR) (PPE/DC) Mr Kestutis GLAVECKAS (LT) Mr Michael GLOS, MdB (DE) (PPE/DC) Mrs Claude GREFF (FR) (PPE/DC) Mrs Anette HUBINGER, MdB (DE) (PPE/DC) Mr Jean HUSS (LU) (Soc) Mrs Sadije ILJAZI (MK) (Fed) Mrs Florina Ruxandra JIPA (RO) (Soc) Mrs Liana KANELLI (GR) Mr Nicos KATSOURIDES (CY) Mr Haluk KOC (TR) (Soc) Mr Tiny KOX (NL) (Soc) Mr Jaakko LAAKSO (FI) (Soc) Mr Markku LAUKKANEN (FI) (Lib) Mr Ian LIDDELL-GRAINGER, MP Mr Krzysztof MATYJASZCZYK (PL) Mr Pasquale NESSA (IT) (PPE/DC) Mr Brian O'SHEA (IE) (Lib) Mrs Elissavet PAPADIMITRIOU (GR) (PPE/DC) Mr Yves POZZO DI BORGO (FR) (PPE/DC) Mr Gabino PUCHE RODRÍGUEZ (ES) (PPE/DC) Mr Luc SEVENHANS (BE) Mr Witold SITARZ (PL) (Fed) Mr Adrian SOLOMON (RO) Mr Mustafa UNAL (TR) (PPE/DC) Mr Giuseppe VALENTINO (IT) (Fed)
