feasibility of itq

Feasibility of Individual Tradable Quotas (ITQ)

in Managing Omani Fisheries

Fisheries Management at Crossroads:

Regulations to Markets

Purpose

Introduce the concept ITQs in fisheries management.

Assess the feasibility of adopting ITQ in fisheries management in Oman.– Legal feasibility only …– Techno-Socio-Economic feasibility latter …

Hunted Fisheries

source of high-quality food, employment and a way of life, particularly for the poor.

Source of recreation particularly for the rich.

Source of scientific marvel … fish is a vital indicator of the state of the environment …the final deposit of industrial and agricultural pollution.

Status of Fisheries: Global

Fisheries harvest has declined by about 10% over the past 15 years despite improved harvesting technology and effort.

World fish harvest was worth $70 billion and cost $92 billion to catch (FAO 1983).

Status of Fisheries: Oman

General– Largest resource based economic sector next

to oil.– Employment to 22,000 and about 200,000

indirectly dependent.– A traditional way of life.– Past 30 years Government has invested to

modernize fisheries sector

Status of Fisheries: Oman

Trends– Evidence of over-fishing and

overcapitalization (processing).– Emphasis on exports (quality problems).– Internal market efficiency could be improved.– Young people leaving the sector.– Coexistence of modern and traditional

fisheries.

Fisheries Management : Theory

Cause of the problem of over-fishing– Tragedy of the commons: Lack of property rights

“Left to themselves, fishermen will go on fishing until the contents of the net are worth less than the cost of putting the net in the sea”.

The Economist (March 19-25, 1994)

Management is to reduce/ control the catch!!! Managing the Fishermen/woman

– Command and control (Regulations)– Incentives (Markets)

Fisheries Management: Practice

Historically community based management – (Sonat Al Bahar in Oman).

Up to 1980s all countries adopted regulations. License with controls on technology, area time,

species, size to limit catch . Regulations have been ineffective. The race to

catch continued.– Over fishing– Over capitalization– Constraints market development– High risk of accidents

Fisheries Management: Practice

1982 UN Third Conference of the Law of Sea:– Established national property rights to sea– Exclusive economic zone 200 miles of sea– 90% of world’s fish catch is within the EEZ.

The national property right to the fisheries provided an incentive to change the management approach

Pass on property rights to fish to individuals.

Individual Tradable Quotas (ITQ)

Provide individuals, tradable quotas to fish, as proportions of the total allowable catch.– Not radical but common sense– Small incremental change to existing regulatory approach.– It will not substitute any of the present scientific and

administrative inputs Many ITQ variants could be thought/designed to suit

specific circumstances of fisheries, countries. The principle is providing property rights (as for land).

– ‘Only when fishermen believe that they are assured a long-term and exclusive right to a fishery are they likely to manage it in the same far sighted way as good farmers mange their land’.

The Economist (March 19-25, 1994)

ITQ: Advantages

Control catch to TAC No over-capitalization in both fishing and processing. Incentive for individual fishermen to participate in

management and investment (research). Access and exit (with benefit) to fishery to all through

market. Fish market improvements (quality, certainty of quantum

and over time). Private investments in fisheries improve (ITQ as collateral

for loans). Reduced risk of accidents.

ITQ Empirical Evidence

Country Catch Employment Capitalization Concentration Quality/ markets

New Zealand (1986)

Stable No Change +

Iceland (1979) Stable/ Increased

Reduced +

Canada (1991) Stable Reduced Yes +

Chili (1992)

Norway (1973) +

USA (1992) Reduced +

East coast (1990) Stable Reduced

Alaska (1995)

Florida (1992) +

ITQ: Concerns

Fairness in initial allocation of quotas Windfall gains to initial quota holders (government can auction

quotas). Possibility of monopolization. This is so for all enterprises. Alienating the traditional small fisherman. Community could have

quota. Implications on current management: Same Cost of enforcement: same or less Migratory species as in Oman: same Geographical spread of fisheries communities as in Oman: Same May encourage high grading of fish. Good for the market but may

increase unnecessary kills.

Legal Feasibility of ITQs in Oman

Does the Omani constitution (written or unwritten) allow for private ownership of fisheries?

The Icelandic supreme court decided that it was unconstitutional to give fisheries property rights to only those who owned boats as fisheries was property of the state.

The Icelandic supreme court also decided that a divorcee receive part of the fish quota belonging to the husband. Thus accepting quotas as private property.

The Canadian supreme court decided that ITQ was unconstitutional as it restricted the rights of aboriginal people’s access to fishery. The same is the case with New Zealand’s Maori tribes.

Legal Feasibility of ITQs in Oman

Does fisheries act of Oman allow for attributes of private property?– Clear definition of right (TAC and the

proportional right, where and when and what to fish).

– Transferability of right.

Ministerial Decree Number 3/82The Marine Fishing and Protection of the Living Aquatic Resources Law of Oman

Solely for regulatory approach of fisheries management: License

ITQs is to change license to quotas. Article 4, Item 10: Allows for determining

TAC– “Determining the limit of the quantities of the

living aquatic resources permitted for fishing in specified season according to their species.”


Article 7 allows to specify the license thus quota.– “The said license shall also specify the fishing area,

fishing season and the species and quantities allowed for fishing”.

Article 8 however prevents transfer of license.– “License must be kept … not be transferred to others”.

In Uruguay fisheries license can be sold or rented.


Administering monitoring as of now allowed by law.

Article 30 allows for setting joint plans among countries. Migratory species.

EU attempting set up joint plans, Quotas. Even right for carbon dioxide emissions

is traded, why not right to fish?

Could you do this?

Stilt Fishing In Sri Lanka

feasibility of itq

Environment