fdny report on fatal fire, august 27, 2006

8/4/2019 FDNY report on fatal fire, August 27, 2006

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- -CITY OF

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FIRE DEPARTMENT CITY OF NEW YORK SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICES COMMAND

INVESTIGATIVE REPORT BRONX BOX 3-3 2797 1575 WALTON AVENUE AUGUST 27, 2006

CASE NUMBER 2006-SB-029 FATAL INJURY

LIEUTENANT HOWARD J. CARPLUK JR. ENGINE COMPANY 42

FIREFIGHTER MICHAEL C. REILLY ENGINE COMPANY 75

VOLUME I THE INVESTIGATION


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I. SUMMARY

Walton Avenue. The initial response to Bronx Box 2797 was twoompanies, two Ladder Companies and one Battalion. Engine Company 42

of a 99 store andd a 10-75. Standard firefighting operations were initiated for a fire in a

e building was a one story non-fireproof (NFP) commercial building. Thisive sided irregular shaped taxpayer. Approximately six years

July 17, 2000, a third alarm severely damaged this structure. This building

of the store and quickly extended to the. The combustible stock ignited the Masonite ceiling which was nailed

of the roof joists. Due to fire conditions, a second alarm was

V -shaped collapse of the first floor of the 99 store occurred twenty oneafter the arrival of Fire Department units. This collapse took place withoutplunging members into the collapse area. The first floor collapse was a result ofolumn failure. Following the collapse a third alarm was transmitted.

members fell into the collapse area when the collapse occurred. Fourof Engine Company 92 were immediately removed by the Firefighter Assisth Team (FAST). The six remaining members were trapped in the collapse.

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The Ladder Company 44 Can Firefighter was extricated in approximatelyfour minutes.

The Engine Company 75 Back-Up Firefighter was extricated in approximately43 minutes.

The Ladder Company 44 Officer was extricated in approximately 56 minutes. The Battalion 17 Chief was extricated in approximately one hour. Lieutenant Howard J. Carpluk, the Engine Company 75 Officer, wa


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Re-emphasize the critical need for all members to follow the MAYDAYprocedures as outlined in the Communications Manual. Chapter 9.Reinforce the procedures established in section 9.5 of the CommunicationsManual to use the Emergency Alert Tone Assisted Rescue or the FeedbackAssisted Rescue to locate missing members.Re-emphasize procedures for establishing and using a Secondary TacticalChannel for firefighting operations.Amend the Communications Manuel Chapter 9, section 9.4, to include the use ofemergency alert button by the Incident Commander to gain control of the handietalkie during MAYDAY or URGENT transmissions.Incorporate into training opportunities the strategies and tactics the IncidentCommander should consider when confronted with a collapse trapping members.Reinforce the policies established in AUC 320, Firefighter Assist and SearchTeam - FAST Unit.Ensure the Borough Communications Office assigns an additional FAST Unitwhen notified that a FAST Unit has been put to work and the fire is not "UnderControL"Develop operational procedures for conducting roll calls during operations.Amend AUC 275 Addendum 1 and Addendum 2 to address Rescue and Squadoperations including MAYDAY incidents.Reinforce the responsibilities of the Resource Unit Leader as listed in the IncidentCommand Manual. Chapter 2, Addendum 2.Re-emphasize to all members the importance of following all SCBA policies andprocedures.Amend Safety Bulletin 65 to include the personal facepiece in the Semi AnnualInspection of Safety Equipment.Reinforce to all Chief and Company Officers the importance of rotating membersand providing relief at operations when necessary.

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18. Re-emphasize to all Chief Officers that BattalionlDivision Firefighters mustimmediately relay the incident duration time to the Incident Commander.

19. Incorporate additional building construction courses into the syllabus of theFDNY training programs.

20. Establish a multi-level building construction certification program.21. Amend the Communications Manual Chapter 10 appendix C for exposure

identification of taxpayer buildings.22. Re-establish a 24-hour Imaging (Photo) Unit staffed by trained members that will

respond to multiple alarms, unusual incidents and major accidents.23. Consider requesting the Con Edison vacuum truck to respond to a similar type

collapse.24. Expand the current 7th DivisionIDOB joint taxpayer inspection pilot program

citywide.SECTIONB

25. Amend all Department Publications to address lightweight building construction.26. Ensure that Engine Company apparatus are always positioned at serviceable

hydrants or supplied by an adequate source of water at operations.27. Establish a policy defining how many hoselines can safely be supplied by a single

source of water.28. Schedule joint training opportunities between Special Operations Command

(SOC) Units and SOC Support Ladder Companies.29. Review the A-8 procedures for reporting DOB violation found by this

Department.30. Incorporate a low air warning system into the Fast Pak.31. Update the current Dispatchers Action Guide, Dispatchers Directives, and

Dispatchers Advisories.32. Mark all lumber (shoring material) used for structural reinforcement in a manner

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us in this investigation. The Investigation Team

Deterioration of the Cellar ColumnsThe building was constructed in 1927. Based on the results of the microbiologicalanalyses and resistance drillings performed by the Wood Advisory Services, Inc.,a significant amount of deterioration was observed in the columns, BC-B3,BC-B4, and BC-B5 below the cellar floor. Because the columns were in directcontact with the soil, they were susceptible to wood decay after they were initiallyinstalled. Termite damage was also evident at the base of the cellar columns.Lack of a "Due Diligence Inspection" of the StructureOne of the moral responsibilities as a Professional Engineer is to perform a "DueDiligence Inspection." This is a comprehensive inspection of the entire buildingto identify any structural deficiencies that might exist. This inspection ISperformed prior to the drawing of any architectural plans and construction.Failure to Follow Architectural Plans The roof construction of the fire building was not in accordance with the plan on

file with DOB. The partition walls on the first floor were removed and the original three stores

on Walton A venue were combined into one larger store. The B line columns onthe first floor were also removed during this construction.

Work Performed Without Architectural PlansIn order to create a level floor in the 99 store, the different floor heights of the originalstores needed to be raised approximately 18" from exposure #2 to the common wall.There were no plans on file allowing the contractor to perform this alteration.

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CAUSE OF STRUCTURAL FAILURE:

The primary cause of the collapse was the advanced decay at the base of the cellarcolumns. The majority of original columns were decayed below the cellar floor line.This advanced decaying was caused by a biological degradation and termite damage.Because of this decay many of the cellar columns (See Figure #6)' were not resting ontheir respective footings. This allowed vertical movement of the cellar columns.

1"

LA?UIhi ! I! I 6'S"

Decay I!Be A2 Be A3 Be A4 Be B3 Be B4 Be B5

",-HoIT.Sc:oIo 6" X 6" x 7' 6" x 6" x 7'9" 6" x 6" x 8'4" 7%" x 7't." x 7'4" 6" x 6" x 7'4" 5%" x 5Y." x 9'4"Figure #6Deterioration of Cellar Columns

Wood Advisory Services Inc., "Evaluation of Solid Wood and Plywood Elements at 1575 Walton Avenue, Bronx N.Y,"Appendix IV, Visual Assessment Diagram

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COLLAPSE DUE To SUBSTANDARD CONSTRUCTION:

of the connection points at the B4 column. A portion of the woodenB4 column was removed along with the removal of the metal "T"

be butted up to it. The removal of the"T" bracing weakened the connection point that attached the girder, corbel

B4 column.of the B line girder assembly. This assembly consisted of the original B

6" x 6" blocking of various heights and additional topThis girder assembly was constructed to level the first floor during the

ion. The lack of metal "T" bracing to secure the blocking to the girdersn unstable assembly. Plywood strips were nailed to the blocking

continuous girder only. These plywood strips were notblocking and did not extend to the top girders. Common nails

the top girders. (Figure #7) This nailing procedure could not withstand laterales imposed as the girder assembly became unstable. As the B4 columnB line girder assembly failed.

B5B4 B3 B2 BlExposure #1

Figure #7 B Line Columns and Girders View from Exposure #2 39 of 174


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4. bnproper nailing practice:A. An insufficient number of nails were used to join the two 2" x 10" pieces of

dimensional lumber to create the top girders in the B line girder assembly.Instead they were basically two 2" x 10" pieces of dimensional lumber nextto each other acting independently. Therefore the top girders did notpossess the structural strength of true 4" x 10" composite girders.(Figure #9)2

B. The nailing schedule as stated in Table 10-4 3 of the NYC Department ofBuildings was not adhered to when securing the plywood sub floor andflooring to the first floor joists.

C. Lack of nailing of the first floor joists to the B line top girders.

Two-1 W' x 9 Y." x 14' 9" joists nailed together, four (4) nails connecting elements together

Two-1 Yz" x 9 %" x 12' jOists nailed together, three (3) nails connecting elements together

Figure #9Nailing Pattern ofB Line Top Girders Refer to Figure #2 for Original Top Girder Placement

2 Wood Advisory Services Inc "Evaluation of Solid Wood and Plywood Elements at 1575 Walton Avenue. Bronx N.Y."Appendix IV, Visual Assessment Diagram

3 27-624 Table 10-4 Nailing Schedule42 of 174


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Improper plywood layout on the first floor of the 99 store. This was contrary tostandard construction practice. (Photo #20)

Photo #20Improper Plywood Layout

The structural members of this building were in severe distress and precariousprior to fire operations. The failure of the cellar columns, coupled with the

of the B line girder assembly, in conjunction with the lack of sufficient nailing,plywood layout all contributed to the catastrophic "V" shaped collapse of the firstof the 99 store.The lack of a "Due Diligence Inspection" by the Professional Engineer allowed

structural deficiencies of the decayed columns to exist. The contractor failed to followarchitectural plan on file for the roof and wall partitions. In addition, the contractorworking without plans for the leveling construction of the first floor. This

DL


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VI. FDNY OPERATIONS

of theof the Bronx received a telephone alarm

store fire at 1575 Walton Avenue. Engine Company 42, Ladder Company 44,17 were assigned to respond.

of a second source and Engine Company 46 wasas the third Engine. Engine Company 92 then became available and was

falling between 1200 and 1500 hours. The temperature reached a high of 74The wind was from the southeast with an average wind speed of 11 miles per

built on a grade and located on the comer of Walton A venue and East Mountof the Bronx. The building was a five sided irregularly

r. Three stores occupied the building: a 99 store, a cell phone store and aThe fire occupancy (a 99 store) was approximately 45 feet wide by 65 feet

of the fire building are shown in Figure #11.uring operations, the fire building occupancies were designated as follows:store was the fire occupancy, the cell phone store was the occupancy to the rightthe common wall, and the laundromat was adjacent to the cell phone store.

Exposure #1 Street - Walton AvenueExposure #2 6 story NFP MDExposure #3 2 story NFP former movie theater converted to a storefront churchExposure #4 Street - East Mount Eden Avenue

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The entrance to the 99 store had double inward opening doors. The left sidewas blocked by stock. The only entrance to the cellar of the 99 store was an

trap door in the rear. The fire occupancy was typical of a 99 store with aof stock displayed on metal shelving. Additional stock was hanging

the walls and the ceiling. Portable floor displays and free standing shelving wereated throughout the store. Four aisles ran from the front area of the store to rear

of the store. (Figure #12) A rear aisle contained four refrigeration units that wered along the exposure #3 wall. A small office (7 feet x 7 feet) was located in theof the store in the exposure #2 and exposure #3 corner. The front of the store

Drawing NOI To Scale

Figure #12Overhead view of the 99 store and the cell phone storeThe Bureau of Fire Investigation determined that the cause of the fire was heat

electrical wiring. The origin of the fire was behind the refrigeration units at the rearofthe 99 store.

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INITIAL OPERATIONSEngine Company 42 arrived at 1233 hours and transmitted a 10-75. Squad

Company 41, Ladder Company 27, Rescue Company 3, Battalion 19 and Division 6 wereassigned on the transmission of the 10-75. The Bronx dispatcher notified LadderCompany 27 that they were designated as the Firefighter Assist and Search Team (FAST).

A heavy smoke condition was pushing from the front of the 99 store and wasbanked down to the street leveL The Engine Company 42 Chauffeur positioned theapparatus at a hydrant in front of the multiple dwelling, adjacent to the fire occupancy.The hydrant was defective due to a missing 2 Y2" threaded outlet. The EngineCompany 42 Chauffeur notified the Engine Company 42 Officer and the EngineCompany 92 Chauffeur that he had a defective hydrant.

Engine Company 42 stretched a 2 %" hoseline from their apparatus to the front ofthe 99 store. The hoseline was initially charged with booster water, followedimmediately by hydrant water which was relayed from Engine Company 92. EngineCompany 92 was positioned at the hydrant on the corner of Walton Avenue and EastMount Eden Avenue. Engine Company 92 teamed up with Engine Company 42 on theinitial hoseline.

Ladder Company 44 positioned their apparatus on East Mount Eden Avenue infront of the cell phone store. The Ladder Company 44 Officer, Irons Firefighter and CanFirefighters (Inside Team) proceeded to the front of the 99 store. The LadderCompany 44 Roof and Outside Ventilation Firefighter (Outside Team) proceeded to theroof of the laundromat via a 24 foot portable ladder. The Ladder Company 44 OutsideVentilation Firefighter informed his Officer via handie-talkie that there were small airconditioning units on the roof.

Engine Company 43 began to stretch a 2 W' hoseline from Engine Company 42'sapparatus to the front of the 99 store to back up Engine Company 42. LadderCompany 59 positioned their apparatus on East Mount Eden Avenue away from the firebuilding to allow access for a tower ladder. The Ladder Company 59 Inside Team beganto force entry into the cell phone store. The Ladder Company 59 Chauffeur placed a24 foot portable ladder to the roof of the 99 store on Walton Avenue near the corner.The Ladder Company 59 Outside Team proceeded to the roof.

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Battalion 17 arrived on the scene at 1235 hours, transmitted using all-hands andadditional engine and ladder. Engine Company 75 and Ladder Company 33

respond as the additional engine and ladder. Battalion 17 observed oneof the 99 store, and an additional hoseline being

. When Battalion 17 reached the front of the 99 store, he notified the17 Firefighter to confirm the address as 1575 Walton Avenue with the Bronx

Office. Battalion 17 observed the heavy smoke condition and wased about fire extension to exposure #2, the multiple dwelling. Battalion 17

at 1238 hours.

PRIOR TO THE COLLAPSEAt approximately 1237 hours, after Engine Company 42 charged their hoseline,Company 44 vented all the display windows. Initially heavy smoke, followed by

vented out of the front entrance and display windows. The Ladder Company 44Team vented the double doors and removed the cross bars. Engine Company 42

operated the hoseline through the display window while the Ladder Company 44Team removed stock from the display windows and doorway. Engine Company 42

initiated the advance through the front entrance door of the 99 store.The Ladder Company 44 Outside Team assisted by the Ladder Company 44

began to cut the roof in the center of the fire occupancy to vent the 99 store.Ladder Company 59 Outside Team arrived at roof level and also initiated venting by

a hole in the roof near the front of the 99 store on the exposure #2 side. Due toextremely heavy smoke condition, the use of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus

) was required by Firefighters operating on the roof. The Ladder Company 59checked conditions in the laundromat while the Ladder Company 59 Irons

and Can Firefighters forced entry into the cell phone store. The Ladder59 Officer informed Battalion 17 via handie-talkie that the laundromat was notat this time.

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Battalion 19 arrived at approximately 1238 hours and was ordered byBattalion 17 to check for extension in exposure #2. Engine Company 42 advanced theirhoseline approximately 10 feet into the front section of the 99 store. The LadderCompany 44 Inside Team entered the store behind Engine Company 42. To allow forquick access and egress the Ladder Company 44 Forcible Entry Firefighter removed stockfrom the front of the display windows and door. Engine Company 43 was now positionedto back up Engine Company 42 with a charged 2 Y2" hoseline. Engine Company 46 was inthe process of stretching a 2 Y2" hoseline to the front of the 99 store from EngineCompany 92's apparatus.

Squad Company 41 reported to the Command Post at approximately 1239hours. Squad Company 41 was ordered by Battalion 17 to check for extension inexposure #2 and to assist in roof operations. The Squad Company 41 Officer split hiscompany into two teams. The Squad Company 41 Irons Firefighter and Can Firefightersproceeded to exposure #2 while the Officer, Saw, and Roof Firefighters went to the roofvia the portable ladder on East Mount Eden Avenue.

At approximately 1240 hours, Ladder Company 27, Division 6, EngineCompany 75, Ladder Company 33 and Rescue Company 3 arrived on the scene. LadderCompany 27 positioned their apparatus on the exposure #4 side of the fire building andthen reported to the Command Post as the FAST Unit. The Ladder Company 27Chauffeur raised the aerial to the roof of the laundromat. The Rescue Company 3 Officerreported in to Battalion 17 via handie-talkie. Battalion 17 ordered Rescue Company 3 tocheck the roof of the fire building. The Rescue Company 3 Officer split his membersinto two teams. The Rescue Company 3 Roof and Hook Firefighters were ordered to theroof of the fire building and the Officer, Irons Firefighter, and Can Firefighter checkedfor extension in the laundromat.

The Division 6 vehicle was parked on the Grand Concourse and Division 6, theActing Deputy Chief (ADC), began making his way to the Command Post. The LadderCompany 59 Inside Team operated inside the cell phone store. They initiated a primarysearch and checked for extension. Engine Company 75 positioned their apparatus onTownsend Avenue and reported to the Command Post.

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Division 6 assumed command of the fire. The Engine Company 46 Officer calledwater when their hoseline was in position in front of the 99 store. The Battalion 17

approximately 1241 hours, "Transmit a second alarm at this box. 1575 Walton isfire. We have a fire on the first floor ofa 1 story taxpayer, 65 X 40. Two lines are

and in operation. Primary searches are in progress. Exposure 1 is the street,6 story multiple dwelling, 3 is a similar attached 1 story taxpayer and 4 is the street.is doubtful." Battalion 19 returned to the front of the fire building and verbally

17 that exposure #2 had no windows exposed to fire and there was anthat separated the rear of the buildings.At approximately 1242 hours Engine Company 46 operated their hoseline from

sidewalk into the 99 store along the exposure #2 wall. Engine Company 46'scontinuously operated into the 99 store until the collapse of the first floor.

Company 42 continued to operate inside the 99 store hitting fire to the left, overand to the right by the counter area only shutting down to reposition their hoseline

relieve the nozzle position.The Squad Company 41 Officer arrived on the roof with his Outside Team. He

the thermal imaging camera to survey roof conditions. With the thermal imaginghe was also able to determine the location of members operating at roof level.

was near zero due the heavy smoke condition. Ladder Company 33 reported inDivision 6 at the Command Post and was assigned to exposure #2 to check forltemaon in the multiple dwelling. The Squad Company 41 Irons Firefighter was in

#2 and reported via hand ie-talkie that there was an alleyway between exposureand the fire building. He reported to his Officer that there was no exposure problem at

The Squad Company 41 Officer confIrmed that Battalion 17 received thatBattalion 17 climbed the portable ladder in front of the 99 store to assess

conditions and the layout of the roof.At approximately 1243 hours Engine Company 75 stretched a 2 %" hoseline

Engine Company 46's apparatus to the front of the laundromat on East Mount EdenBattalion 17 returned to the front of the 99 store after checking conditions onThe Rescue Company 3 Officer, Irons Firefighter and Can Firefighter werein the laundromat checking for extension. The Rescue Company 3 Roof and

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Hook Firefighters began cutting the roof of the 99 store near the comer of exposures #1and #4. Engine Company 50 arrived on the scene and positioned their apparatus on EastMount Eden Avenue near the Grand Concourse.

Division 6 contacted the Ladder Company 44 Roof Firefighter at 1244 hours for areport of the conditions on the roof. Battalion 17 briefed Division 6 of tacticsimplemented, the current operations in progress, and the position of the operating units.The Rescue Company 3 Officer, Irons Firefighter, Can Firefighter, and Chauffeurproceeded to the front of the 99 store to check on the progress of the hoselines. Battalion17 ordered Engine Company 43 to reposition their hoseline to the cell phone store.

At approximately 1246 hours, the Ladder Company 44 Chauffeur reported toDivision 6 that fire was in the cockloft. Battalion 17 transmitted a progress report to theBronx Communications Office stating, "2797, at this time we have 4 lines stretched andin operation. Fire is in the cockloft. Trucks are opening up checking for extension.At this time we are still doubtful. Searches are in progress K." The BronxCommunications Office acknowledged this transmission and informed Battalion 17 to"Notify the Incident Commander the duration of this incident is now one - seven,17 minutes K"

The Squad Company 41 Officer was concerned about the stability of the roofdeck. He notified Battalion 17 via handie-talkie that the roof was getting soft and thatmembers were backing off the roof. Battalion 17 acknowledged this report and orderedthe Squad Company 41 Officer to ensure that all members get off the roof. Battalion 19proceeded to the roof on hearing the report of the roof conditions from the SquadCompany 41 Officer. There were at least three ventilation holes cut and pulled on theroof of the 99 store before the members were ordered off the roof.

The Rescue Company 3 Officer, Irons Firefighter, Can Firefighter and Chauffeurleft the front of the 99 store and proceeded to the cell phone store to check for extension.Engine Company 50 stretched a 2 %" hoseline from Engine Company 46's apparatus tothe comer of Walton Avenue and East Mount Eden Ave.

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Battalion 26. the assigned Resource Unit Leader, Engine Company 71 and Engineat 1247 hours. The Rescue Company 3 Chauffeur and Irons

of the cell phone store display windows. Engineny 75 was standing fast with an uncharged hoseline in the front of the laundromat.

Squad Company 41 Officer ordered all members to back off the roof of the 99 storeroof of the laundromat.

Battalion 13, the assigned Safety Officer, arrived at 1248 hours. Division 6

outside the cell phone store. Ladder Company 45 arrived and positioned theirladder in front of the 99 store.At approximately 1249 hours, Battalion 17 contacted the Squad Company 41to ascertain if all members were off the roof. The Squad Company 41 Officer

Battalion 17 that the members were backing off to the roof of the laundromat.laundromat roof was three feet lower than the 99 store and cell phone store. It wasas a safe area of refuge for the members who operated at roof level. Battalion 19

supervising roof operations and verified that all members were off the 99 store roof.smoke condition was still extremely heavy and fire was venting through the holes cut

roof. Battalion 19 then requested a hoseline to the roof of the laundromat tothe burning membrane roof of the fire building.

The Squad Company 41 Irons Firefighter and Can Firefighters began to stretch ahoseline from Engine Company 75's apparatus to the roof of laundromat aftera verbal request from members on the roof.The Officer, Irons Firefighter and Can Firefighter from both Rescue Company 3

Company 59 were operating in the cell phone store searching and checkingUnits were pulling ceilings and forcing individual cubicles used as phone

Engine Company 43 entered the cell phone store with a hoseline and advanced

the 99 store, Engine Company 42 directed their hoseline at the helium tanksout counter. Lieutenant Carpluk yelled to the Engine Company 42 Officer

the front display window that the main body of fire was to the left on the#2 side. At this time there was heavy smoke in the store and fire was still

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The Engine Company 93 Officer reported in to the Command Post. Battalion 17ordered Engine Company 93 to supply Tower Ladder 33, and Engine Company 71 tosupply Tower Ladder 45. Members of Tower Ladder 45 began to setup their apparatusfor exterior stream operations.

At approximately 1250 hours the Engine Company 50 Officer asked the EngineCompany 75 Officer, Lieutenant Carpluk, where he was going with the hoseline.Lieutenant Carpluk informed him that Engine Company 75's hoseline was going to thefront of the 99 store. Engine Company 75 moved their hoseline from the front of thelaundromat to the front of the 99 store. Engine Company 50 was repositioning theirhose line from the comer of W alton Avenue and East Mount Eden Ave. Engine Company50 also heard the request for a hoseline to the roof and contacted Division 6 to informhim that they had a 2 Y2" hoseline in position and ready to bring to the roof. Division 6told Engine Company 50 to bring the hoseline to the front of the fire building. TheLadder Company 33 Outside Ventilation Firefighter vented the 99 store office windowthat was covered with plywood, in the alleyway on exposure #2. Members operating onthe roof of the laundromat began cutting the raised portion of the roof that separated thecell phone store from the laundromat. These openings were intended to be used forventilation and possible stream application into the cockloft.(A MASONITE CEILING WAS NAILED DIRECTLY TO THE BOTTOM OF THE ROOF JOISTS. FIREVENTING FROM THE ROOF OPENINGS GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF FIRE IN A COCKLOFT.)

At approximately 1251 hours, the Ladder Company 44 Officer informedDivision 6 that another hoseline was needed in the 99 store. The heavy smoke conditionin the 99 store prompted the Engine Company 42 Officer to transmit a handie-talkiemessage to open the roof. Fire was observed venting through the previously cut holes inthe roof by members operating at several different locations.

At 1252 hours Battalion 19 contacted Battalion 17 via handie-talkie and statedthe need for a hoseline on the roof. The hose line would extinguish the fire burning on theroof and possibly in the cockloft. Engine Company 92 relieved Engine Company 42 onthe hoseline in the 99 store. The Engine Company 42 Officer had rotated the Nozzleposition four times during hoseline operations due to fatigue and depletion of air supplyin their SCBA's. Battalion 26 reported to the Command Post.

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Engine Company 75 advanced their hoseline through the display window to theof the doorway. Lieutenant Carpluk was the Officer and Firefighter Reilly was

Battalion 13, the Safety Officer, arrived at the front of the 99 store and advised17 that he was going to move the members operating directly in front of the

store off the sidewalk due to concern of a possible parapet wall collapse.17 entered the 99 store to check on the fire conditions and progress of the

ancing hoselines. Ladder Company 59 discovered fire extending into the cell phoneat the ceiling level. Engine Company 43 operated their hoseline to extinguish the

in the ceiling of the cell phone store. Engine Company 50 was positioned in front of99 store near the comer and called for water.

At 1253 hours, Engine Company 92 advanced their hoseline down aisle #2 afterthemselves from display wires that had prevented their advancement.

Company 42 returned to their apparatus to change their SCBA cylinders.6 was positioned in front of the 99 store and observed two hoselines making

progress on the fire. After moving the members of Engine Company 46 away fromof the 99 store, the Safety Officer reported into Division 6 and discussedmembers from the fire building.

Engine Company 75 briefly operated the hoseline from a position a few feet downWhen Engine Company 75 momentarily shut down the hoseline, the Engine75 Back-Up Firefighter turned around to re-adjust the hose strap he was using to

the hoseline. At this time, Lieutenant Carpluk and Firefighter Reilly advanced aahead of the Back-Up Firefighter toward the rear of aisle #3. The Ladder44 Officer went towards the rear with the hoseline and then headed back to the

the 99 store to confer with Battalion 17 between the midpoint and the front ofThe Ladder Company 44 Can Firefighter was operating at this location. The

,"-OmpiiUlY 44 Officer informed Battalion 17 that the main body of fire was knockedthere was a small pocket fire remaining in the exposure # 2-3 comer.

conditions in the 99 store had improved significantly. This was evidentthe 99 store and the exterior of the fire building. The main body of fire was

There was a low heat condition and visibility had improved. Membersstand while advancing the hoselines.

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Rescue Company 3, Ladder Company 59 and Engine Company 43 continued tooperate in the cell phone store. The Rescue Company 3 Chauffeur left the cell phonestore and proceeded to the 99 store to check on the status of the fire. The RescueCompany 3 Chauffeur used his thermal imaging camera just inside the doorway of the99 store. He observed that the bulk of the fire was knocked down and that there werejust a few pockets of fire left. Ladder Company 33 verbally informed Division 6 thatthere was no fire extension in exposure #2 and stood fast in front of the 99 store. TheLadder Company 45 Outside Team was in the tower ladder bucket monitoring theconditions of the fire building.

At approximately 1254 hours, a V -shaped floor collapse occurred in the 99store without warning, plunging 10 members into the collapse area. (THIS WAS ASILENT COLLAPSE, THE NOISE ASSOCIATED WITII A TYPICAL COLLAPSE WAS NOT PRESENT.MANY MEMBERS OPERATING IN FRONT OF THE 99 STORE WERE UNAWARE THAT ACOLLAPSE OCCURRED.) The Rescue Company 3 Chauffeur, standing just inside the frontentrance of the 99 store, felt the floor move and watched the shelving units on both sidesof aisle #3 tilt in toward each other. Division 6 positioned directly in front of the 99store witnessed the floor collapse and transmitted via handie-talkie, "Division 6 to theFAST Unit, report to the front of the building."

hnmediately after the collapse, both the Engine Company 92 Officer andBattalion 17 transmitted MAYDAY's. Due to both members transmitting simultaneouslythe complete MAYDAY message was not received by Division 6. Division 6acknowledged by responding, "Unit with your MAYDAY, go ahead." Many membersoperating away from the collapse area heard the MAYDAY transmissions, but did notrealize a collapse had occurred. At approximately 1255 hours, the Engine Company 92Officer transmitted another MAYDAY stating, "92 with a MAYDAY, we've got acollapse on the first floor of the fire building." Battalion 17 attempted to transmit aMAYDAY message but was cut off when Engine 92 transmitted their MAYDAY.

The V-shaped floor collapse occurred approximately 10 feet from the frontentrance of the 99 store and covered an area approximately 25 feet by 30 feet. Themetal shelving units and stock fell into the collapse area trapping members. (Figure #13)

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The Engine Company 92 Officer, Nozzle, Back-Up and Door Firefighters werelocated at the beginning of aisle #2. They were able to hold onto the hoseline asthey slid down with the floor into the collapse area. They landed on top of thestock and were not entrapped.The Engine Company 75 Back-Up Firefighter, the Ladder Company 44 Officer,the Ladder Company 44 Can Firefighter and Battalion 17 were located mid-spanin aisle #3. They were surface victims entrapped in stock and shelving rangingfrom thigh to chest deep.Lieutenant Carpluk was trapped face down, bent forward, up to his waist in stockand fully covered by shelving. He was located near the rear of aisle #3.Firefighter Reilly was trapped face down and bent at the waist with his upperbody towards the rear of aisle #3. He was fully buried under stock and shelving,slightly closer to exposure #1 and deeper in the debris pile then LieutenantCarpIuk. (MEMBERS SEARCHING IN TIlE COLLAPSE AREA COULD NOT DEFINITIVELYRECALL HEARING THE PASS ALARM FROM TIlE TRAPPED MEMBERS' SCBA.)

DrawIng Not ro Seal.

Figure #13Members Location - Post Collapse57 of 174

Nsle #3 (Rear to Front)CD- Lieutenant Carpluk (E-75 Officer)CD - Firefighter Reilly (E-75 Nozzle).- Engine Company 75 Back-up0- Ladder Company 44 Officer0- Ladder Company 44 Can0- Battalion 17Aisle #2


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OPERATIONS AFTER THE COLLAPSEThe time was now 1255 hours. Battalion 19, operating on the roof, observed that

the roof was still intact. Engine Company 46 continued to operate their hose line into the99 store from their position on the sidewalk. Ladder Company 27, the FAST Unit,entered the 99 store. The Engine Company 92 Control Firefighter puJled the EngineCompany 92 Door Firefighter out of the collapse area. The Rescue Company 3Chauffeur and members of Ladder Company 27 pulled the Engine Company 92 Officer,Back-Up and Nozzle Firefighters up from the collapse area.

The Ladder Company 27 Chauffeur slid down into the collapse area and passedEngine Company 92's hoseline to the Ladder Company 27 Outside VentilationFirefighter. The Ladder Company 27 Outside Ventilation Firefighter operated thehose line to extinguish fire burning over head. The Engine Company 50 Officer enteredthe 99 store to assist the trapped members. Engine Company 50 members entered the99 store and operated their hose ine from the front of the store near the counter area toknock down fire.

After hearing the MAYDAY transmissions, the Rescue Company 3 Officer, IronsFirefighter, and Can Firefighter immediately headed to the 99 store to investigate. Theyentered the 99 store and descended into the collapse area along the common wall. TheSquad Company 41 Officer ordered his members to the front of the building to regroupand appraise the conditions requiring the MAYDAY. The Safety Officer took a positionby the front door of the 99 store and controlled access to the collapse area.

At 1256 hours Division 6 ordered all members out of the building and to preparefor a roll call. Battalion 19, after hearing the call for the FAST Unit, mounted the portableladder to descend to the street. As he looked back he noticed a middle section of the99 store roof started to sag. Battalion 19 transmitted an URGENT message to Division 6that an air conditioning unit on the roof was in danger of falling into the collapse area. Healso informed Division 6 that an Engine Company operating a hoseline in the store washitting the roof directly below the air conditioning unit. Engine Company 93 took over thestretching of the 2 Y2 inch hoseline to the roof that Squad Company 41 had started.

At approximately 1257 hours an unidentified member transmitted ahandie-talkie message requesting a roll call from Engine Company 75. Division 6 then

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on the handie-talkie to ascertain his location. Battalion 17 responded,I'm about fifteen feet in, we're trapped .. " The remaining part ofoff by another transmission. The Ladder Company 27 Chauffeur

of stock and saw the Ladder44 Can Firefighter and Battalion 17 buried in stock. The Ladder Company 44

of his. He was able to wiggle his way out of his bunker boots and free himself. He then

of stock and climbed out of the collapse area. Battalion 26 wasby Division 6 to supervise roof operations.

At approximately 1258 hours, Division 6 made 3 attempts to contact the Engineby handie-talkie. There was no recorded response from Lieutenant

k. The Squad Company 41 Officer ordered all Squad Company 41 members to theof the 99 store and to bring a 20 foot portable ladder.

The Ladder Company 44 Can Firefighter was assisted out of the 99 store andtreated and transported to Bronx Lebanon Hospital by EMS. The Engine

of his company and verbally informed6 that all his members were accounted for. The Ladder Company 44 Forcible

Firefighter took control of the FAST radio and remained near Division 6handie-talkie transmissions.

The Rescue Company 3 Irons Firefighter found the Ladder Company 44 Officere Engine Company 75 Back-Up Firefighter trapped in the collapse area. TheCompany 27 Officer and the Rescue Company 3 Can Firefighter found Battalion

It was difficult for the rescuers to identify the trappeddue to the smoke condition and the collapsed metal shelving.

At 1259 hours, the Division 6 Firefighter transmitted the following message toCommunications Office "FAST Truck has been put into place to pull out the

On the report of a MAYDAY, the Rescue Battalion, while enroutethat an additional Rescue and Squad Company be assigned. Rescue

4 and Squad Company 61 were assigned. Division 6 ordered the Division 6to transmit a third alarm.

At 1300 hours, third alarm units were assigned to Bronx Box 2797. Battalion 19Ladder Company 59 to the rear of the cell phone store to make a breach into the

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collapse area. Division 6 ordered all officers to the front of the 99 store via handie talkie. Division 6 heard two consecutive "MAYDAY-MAYDAYMAYDAY"transmissions separated by a routine message. An unidentified member transmitted,"Who's giving the MAYDAY." (THE INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT THIS MAYDAYMESSAGE WAS TRANSMITTED BY LIEUTENANT CARPLUK. THE INVESTIGATION TEAMBELIEVES THIS WAS LIEUTENANT CARPLUK'S FIRST ATTEMPT TO COMMUNICATE WITHMEMBERS AFTER THE COLLAPSE. THERE WERE NO COMMUNICATIONS WITH FIREFIGHTERREILLY AFTER THE COLLAPSE.

LIEUTENANT CARPLUK TRANSMITTED A SERIES OF MAYDA Y MESSAGES FROM1300 HOURS TO 1326 HOURS AT WHICH TIME HE WAS PHYSICALLY LOCATED BY THERESCUE COMPANY 4 HOOK FIREFIGHTER. MANY OF LIEUTENANT CARPLUK'S MAYDAYMESSAGES WERE ACKNOWLEDGED BY MEMBERS OPERATING ON THE SCENE. HOWEVER, ITCANNOT BE DETERMINED IF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN LIEUTENANT CARPLUK AND THEMEMBERS ACKNOWLEDGING HIS MAYDAY'S TOOK PLACE.)

The Squad Company 41 Officer entered the 99 store and conferred with theRescue Company 3 Officer regarding their operations. Rescue Company 3 operated inthe 99 store while Squad Company 41 searched for an alternate location to gain accessto the collapse area. Ladder Company 59 and Ladder Company 33 initiated breachingoperations at different locations on the first floor of the cell phone store.

At approximately 1301 hours, Squad Company 41 located the outside sidewalktrap door to the cellar of the cell phone store on East Mount Eden A venue. They enteredthe cellar using a search rope with the Rescue Company 3 Hook Firefighter. SquadCompany 41 encountered approximately 18 inches of water in the cellar when they entered.

The Rescue Company 3 Irons Firefighter, operating in the 99 store, transmittedthe following message to Battalion 17, "Alright this is Rescue 3 Irons, we've located 3members ofEngine 75. They are conscious; they're pinned from the waist down, we'rein the process of extricating them." (DUE TO CONDITIONS THIS MEMBER WAS UNAWARETHAT THESE MEMBERS WERE ACTUALLY THE ENGINE COMPANY 75 BACK-UP FIREFIGHTER,THE LADDER COMPANY 44 OFFICER AND BATTALION 17.) Division 6 continued to gatherinformation from the roll call being conducted and from members in front of the buildingattempting to ascertain who was trapped and who was missing.

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Safety Battalion 1 arrived on the scene at 1301 hours. After an initial size up ofthe fire operations, he conferred with the Safety Officer about the status of theMAYDAY' s. Safety Battalion 1 now assumed the role of the Safety Officer andBattalion 13 was now designated as the Assistant Safety Officer. The Safety Officerreported into the Command Post and requested three additional on duty Safety TrainedChiefs to respond.

Engine Company 93 was in position on the roof of the laundromat with theircharged 2 Yz" hoseline. The Ladder Company 45 Officer assisted the Assistant SafetyOfficer in front of the 99 store to control access. Battalion 17 informed Division 6 thatrescuers were with them in the collapse area.

At 1303 hours, Division 6 via handie-talkie ordered all Officers to report to theCommand Board for a roll call. Division 6 called Squad Company 41 on thehandie-talkie to find out their location. Squad Company 41 replied to Division 6, "We'rein the basement, we have a search rope, we're going to access the members from thebasement." Squad Company 41 began to breach the common wall between the 99 storeand the cell phone store in the cellar about 10 feet in from the outside sidewalk trap door.

Lieutenant Carpluk transmitted another MAYDA Y message which wasimmediately followed by five routine transmissions from other members. His MAYDAYwas a faint transmission which was probably not heard by some operating units.(THIS WAS EVIDENT BY TIIE MUFFLED RECORDING AND LIEU1ENANT CARPLUK'SHANDlE-TALKIE IDENTIFIER CAPTURED ON THE BATTALION HANDlE-TALKIE RECORDER.)Division 6 and another member acknowledged the MAYDAY, Division 6 was unable todetermine who transmitted it. Division 6 made additional attempts to contact the memberwho transmitted the MAYDAY.

At 1304 hours, Division 6 was limiting the amount of members operating in thecollapse area. Division 6 ordered everyone out of the 99 store except Engine Company50, Ladder Company 27, Rescue Company 3 and Squad Company 41. He orderedEngine Company 50 to have only two members operating the hoseline inside the99 store. This hoseline provided protection for the rescuers and trapped members.

Division 6 continued to try to contact the member transmitting the MAYDAY.another MAYDAY was transmitted by Lieutenant Carpluk, "MAYDAY, MAYDAY,responded, "Who's giving the MAYDAY?" Lieutenant

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CarpI uk transmitted, "Engine 75, 15 feet in running out of air." The Assistant SafetyOfficer transmitted, "Engine 75 is Rescue in there with you?" There is no recordedresponse from Lieutenant Carpluk.(THE INVESTIGATION TEAM DETERMINED THAT SOME TRANSMISSIONS AT THE SCENE WERENOT RECORDED BY THE BATTALION HANDlE-TALKIE RECORDERS. THE HANDlE-TALKIEIDENTIFIER FOR A RECORDED TRANSMISSION IS NOT ALWAYS CAPTURED BY THE BATTALIONRECORDER. THE INVESTIGATION TEAM BELIEVES THAT SOME TRANSMISSIONS RECORDEDON THE BATTALION RECORDERS WERE NOT HEARD BY SOME MEMBERS OPERATING.)

At 1305 hours, the Rescue Company 3 Officer conducted a quick search of thecollapse area. He was unable to locate additional members and returned to supervise theremoval of the surface victims. Division 6 ordered all ladder companies to bring theirFast Paks to the front of the fire building. All other units not operating were ordered tobring additional SCBA's to the front of the fire building. Lieutenant Carpluk transmittedanother MAYDAY message trying to give his location, "you see where the line went in,there's a hole for me to get air, we need a mask toward the back." An unidentifiedmember acknowledged, "Alright we're coming to get you brother." Battalion 19 enteredthe collapse area of the 99 store to assess conditions.Note: During the rescue effort there were simultaneous operations occurring inside the

collapse area, in the exposures, in the street, and on the roof. From this pointforward, the operations will be described first by places of occurrence and then bychronological time.

OPERATIONS IN THE CELLAR AREA OF THE CELL PHONE STORE

Squad Company 41 completed the first breach, the Squad Company Officer andthe Rescue Company 3 Hook Firefighter entered into the cellar of the 99 store atapproximately 1306 hours. The members in the breach thought they had located thetrapped members and made the following transmission to Division 6, "We've located themembers in the basement from the Mount Eden side." Division 6 contacted the SquadCompany 41 Officer to try to clarify who was located. During this exchange, anotherMAYDAY was transmitted by Lieutenant Carpluk, " .. .on that side, further back, a little

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.. ., looking for a mask." An unidentified member replied to the MAYDAY, but

The Squad Company 41 Officer had received information from a Firefighterin the breached area that he had found a trapped member. The Firefighter

41 Officer. Once this was verified, the Squad41 Officer immediately informed Division 6. Squad Company 41 then began a

15 feet into the cellar of thell phone store. Figures #14 & #15 illustrates the layout of the cell phone store cellar ande breaches made in the common cellar wall separating it from the 99 store.

Cell PlIo.. . 810.. . Cellar Top VIew

Cell Phone StoreCommon Wall Breach Locations Drawing Not To ScaleFigure #14

ROOF LEVEL

The Ladder Company 59 Chauffeur and Roof Firefighters, assisted by membersother companies, tied off the air conditioning compressor unit that was in danger of

of the 99 store. Members continued to useto open up the raised portion of the roof from the laundromat. Conditions on the

At approximately 1311 hours, Division 6 contacted Battalion 26 for a report onconditions. Battalion 26 reported that the air conditioning compressor was tied off

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with a utility rope, there was a large hole in the roof and that all members were off theroof of the 99 store and cell phone store. Division 6 ordered Battalion 26 to monitor theair conditioning compressor for any movement.

OPERATIONS IN THE COLLAPSE AREA OF THE 99 STOREThe fire conditions varied from smoldering fires to small pockets of fire breaking

out at different locations. A heavy rainfall hampered the smoke from lifting. The smokecondition continuously changed between moderate to heavy throughout the rescue effort.

Engine Company 46, operating from the sidewalk, and Engine Company 50,operating from inside the 99 store, provided protection for the rescue effort by operatingtheir hoselines as needed. At times Engine Company 42's hoseline, the initial attackhoseline, was operated in the collapse area by various members to extinguish pockets offire and to cool the debris pile around the trapped members.

Members recognized that it would be a difficult and time consuming removaloperation due to the type and amount of stock that was entrapping the members. Thedifficulty in the removal of stock was due to the slippery nature of the soap products andsimilar items mixed with water that coated the stock. Initially SCBA's were passed intothe collapse area for three trapped members. A short time later several Fast Paks werepassed into the collapse area to replace the SCBA's.

OPERATIONS IN THE STREETDivision 6 transmitted a progress report to the Bronx Communications Office

at 1300 hours, "Make this box a r alarm. Have the units respond in from the GrandConcourse. We have a MAYDAY, there are firemen trapped. Rescue has been put intoplace checking for the member. Member was removed from the building. We hadpartialcollapse ofthe taxpayer at this time. Trucks are now going in for searches again K."

Sawzalls, shovels, partner saws and other rescue equipment were staged in frontof the fire building for use by members performing rescue operations.

At 1307, the Field Communications Unit Officer transmitted a handie-talkiemessage for all Officers to report to the Command Post. The Assistant Safety Officercontacted the units operating on the roof and ordered them off the roof.

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At 1309 hours, the Rescue Battalion and Ladder Company 31 arrived on thee. Lieutenant Carpluk transmitted a MAYDAY stating, "MAYDAY MAYDAY

The Assistant Safety Officer replied, "Unit with MAYDAY go ahead."artial transmission was recorded stating " ...over there in the back." Division 6

of the handie-talkie network by stating, "All handie-talkieThere was no recorded response from

At 1310 hours Lieutenant Carpluk transmitted, "Engine 75 MAYDAY"."Engine 75 go ahead with your MAYDAY message." Lieutenant

" ...you gotta go 10 - 15 feet from where they're working." The

6 replied, "10-4, Engine 75 we read you, go ahead with your75, go ahead with your MAYDAY." Lieutenant Carpluk's identifier

captured and "Engine 75" was recorded by a handie-talkie recorder.From inside the collapse area, Battalion 19 contacted Division 6 via handie-talkie

verified the members trapped as surface victims. "Yeah-We have reports now of aoffive trapped members in the basement, one member is in the process of comingfour more are still trapped." When Battalion 19 returned to the street a verbal

change was made with Division 6 and the Assistant Safety Officer. He informed themLieutenant Carpluk and Firefighter Reilly may be further back in the basement.

Company 3 and Ladder Company 27 were working on removing the Engine75 Back-Up Firefighter, the Ladder Company 44 Officer, and Battalion 17.

TIONS IN THE CELLAR AREA OF THE CELL PHONE STOREFor the next 10 minutes, from 1310 to 1320 hours, Squad Company 41, with

members from Rescue Company 3 and Squad Company 61, breached twoU l ~ l V H ' < . L l openings in the cinder block wall in an attempt to find a void that would

access to Lieutenant CarpI uk and Firefighter Reilly. It was during this timethat the Squad Company 41 Officer contacted Division 6 for a second time and

....." . . .vu that his earlier report of locating a trapped member in a void was inaccurate.

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OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF mE 99 STOREAt 1311 hours, Lieutenant Carpluk transmitted another short MAYDAY

message; "MAYDAY, go further back." Approximately 90 seconds later, LieutenantCarpluk again transmitted a MAYDAY message; "75 to [alpha], MAYDAY, you have togo further back, MAYDAY, further back." Division 6 immediately acknowledged theMAYDAY, "Division 6 to Engine 75, Division 6 to the unit with the MAYDAY." TheAssistant Safety Officer then attempted to contact Lieutenant Carpluk, "Battalion 13 toEngine 75." There was no recorded response from Lieutenant Carpluk.

Division 6 attempted to determine the location of Lieutenant Carpluk andFirefighter Reilly from Battalion 17. Division 6 asked Battalion 17 to provide hislocation and if he had contact with any additional members trapped. Battalion 17informed Division 6 that Rescue Company 3 and Ladder Company 27 were working onfreeing him, the Lieutenant from Ladder Company 44 and one member of EngineCompany 75. Division 6 was trying to ascertain if anyone had made contact withLieutenant CarpI uk or Firefighter Reilly. Car 4 Adam arrived on the scene and assumedcommand of the operations. Car 4 Adam ordered the Field Communications Unit tospecial called an extra Squad, Rescue and a Collapse Pod. The Field CommunicationUnit Officer only ordered the Rescue and Collapse Pod; he did not hear the request forthe extra Squad.

OPERATlONS IN THE COLLAPSE AREA OF THE 99 STOREAt 1313 hours, Lieutenant CarpI uk again transmitted a MAYDAY message;

"75 MAYDAY." This MAYDAY message was not acknowledged. Division 6 continuedto gather more information on the condition of Battalion 17 and the other members trappedwith him. Battalion 17 informed Division 6 that all members with him were conscious.

Approximately 1314 hours, the Rescue Battalion, supervising the removal ofBattalion 17, the Ladder Company 44 Officer, and the Engine Company 75 Back-UpFirefighter contacted Car 4 Adam and reported that members were heavily entrapped. Herequested that a third Rescue Company be special called. Car 4 Adam acknowledged andinformed him that an additional Rescue Company, Squad Company and a Collapse PODwere responding.

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Immediately after this transmission from Car 4 Adam, the Battalion recorderpicked up a faint message - " ...we need a mask further back." This message was notacknowledged. Ninety seconds later Lieutenant Carpluk transmitted another MAYDAYmessage, "Engine 75 MAYDAY." Lieutenant Carpluk's MAYDAY message was notacknowledged.

At approximately 1316 hours, Division 6 ordered all Officers not operating toreport across the street from the fire building for a roll call. Division 6 contacted theRescue Company 3 Officer and requested the status of removal operations. The RescueCompany 3 Officer responded "We have access to 3 definite members, we believe thereis one more behind them. We're working on it now." The Rescue Company 3 Officeralso requested air masks, sawzalls, and fresh rescue personnel. Division 6 informed theRescue Company 3 Officer that equipment was being brought to the front of the building.Relief was in the process for Rescue Company 3 and Ladder Company 27. In preparationfor the removal of the entrapped members, Ladder Company 31 set up a stokes stretcherwith a 2: 1 advantage in front of the 99 store.

At approximately 1319 hours, Lieutenant Carpluk transmitted "Engine 75MAYDAY." Car 4 Adam was the first to acknowledge him "Go 75." Division 6 thenreplied "Division 6 to Engine 75, go ahead with your MAYDAY." Lieutenant Carpluk'snext transmission was "Mask, get it back here, I'm out of air." Division 6 replied

the MAYDAY talk to me." Lieutenant Carpluk transmitted "75 to ...ahYeah you can reach up with a mask and hand it to me. Reach down that

"Division 6 tried to contact Lieutenant Carpi uk, "Division 6 to Engine 75." There wasrecorded response from Lieutenant Carpluk.

Operations in the 99 store were focused on the extrication of the three located.."'.. .v'"'...... heavily entrapped in the collapse area. The extrication effort was hampered by

need to remove the shelving units and large amounts of stock from around the trappedThe slippery mixture of different types of soap and water on the stock

i l l lL1llU\. ,U to complicate the removal efforts. It was necessary to place the loose stockbuckets and shopping baskets for removal from the collapse area.

At 1321 hours, Lieutenant Carpluk attempted to contact the Engine Company 75for a mask Lieutenant Carpluk made the following handie-talkie..""L>.",,.VJlJ., "Engine 75 to alpha, make it 75 keep coming back, you're here, a mask

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in the void in the back." Lieutenant Carpluk made another transmission stating, "goover the debris, 75 MAYDAY, over the debris to get to the void in the back."

At 1323 hours, Lieutenant Carpluk transmitted, "MAYDAY." An unidentifiedmember responded, "Go with the MAYDAY." Lieutenant Carpluk made the followingtransmission, "75 Engine, keep coming straight back here, we only need a mask,there's a voidfor me, come here you'll see it. All I need is air Bro."

Another transmission was made fifteen seconds later, "go left of the pile, at theend of the pile." Lieutenant Carpluk had made additional handie-talkie transmissionsattempting to give his location. At 1324 hours Lieutenant Carpluk transmitted "75MAYDAY," Division 6 acknowledged, "Go Ahead, 75 with the MAYDAY." LieutenantCarpluk continued with his MAYDAY transmission, "come on, see the guy with theline. Forget the water give me the mask first and turn around and hit it. You go downthe left side, 75 MAYDAY, go down the left side, you'll see me sticking out my hand."(THE INVESTIGATION TEAM BELIEVES LIEUTENANT CARPLUK WAS ABLE TO HEAR THERESCUERS WORKING AROUND HIM AND ATTEMPTED TO COMMUNICATE WITH THEM VIA HISHANDlE-TALKIE. )

OPERATIONS IN THE CELLAR OF THE CELL PHONE STOREThe Squad Company 41 Roof and Saw Firefighters left the cellar of the

cell phone store to replace their SCBA cylinders. Rescue Company 4 entered the cellarof the cell phone store at approximately 1320 hours.

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Cell Phone SID... CellarTopVlew

Cell Phone StoreDrawing Not To ScaleCommon Wall Breach Locations

Figure #15 Squad Company 41 finished the second breach in the cellar and discovered that it

not provide void access. Squad Company 41 and Squad Company 61 started a thirdin the middle of the cellar. Rescue Company 4 assisted completing this breach.

third breach permitted access to a small void area which a member from Rescue4 and Squad Company 41 entered to search. This breach led to the collapse

in the 99 store where Rescue Company 3 and Ladder Company 27 were extricatingtrapped members. These members remained at this location and assisted in the

of the Engine Company 75 Back-Up Firefighter and the Ladder Company 44(Figure #15)

The 4th breach was started by Rescue Company 4. This breach led to the areaLieutenant Carpluk and Firefighter Reilly were located. Ladder Company 33 andCompany 59 entered the cellar of the cell phone store via the interior trap door.

assisted in the breaching operation. Members used mauls to breach the wall and theleml[)ers needed to be rotated frequently. (Figure #15)

Engine Company 43 repositioned their hoseline into the cellar of the cell phonevia the outside sidewalk trap door. Battalion 19 entered the cellar area via the

sidewalk trap door and supervised operations. The water level was

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approximately 18 inches deep. Members were operating in a low heat and the smokecondition varied from moderate to heavy.

OPERATIONS IN THE VOID SPACE OF THE CELLAR OF THE 99 STOREAt 1325 hours, Lieutenant Carpluk transmitted, " Give me a mask," he

repeated, "75 MAYDAY, give me the mask here." This transmission was notacknowledged. (LIEUTENANT CARPLUK'S HANDlE-TALKIE TRANSMISSION WAS CAPTUREDON THE BAITALION HANDlE-TALKIE RECORDER, BUT WAS NOT NECESSARILY HEARD BYMEMBERS OPERATING AT THE SCENE.)

After the 4th breach was completed it gave access to a void area that the RescueCompany 4 Hook and Roof Firefighters entered to search. The Rescue Company 4 HookFirefighter searched this void and came across what he believed to be a large metalstorage cabinet. (THE INVESTIGATION TEAM FOUND THIS CABINET TO BE AN AIR HANDLINGUNIT WHICH HAD BEEN MOUNTED AT THE CEILING LEVEL ON THE FIRST FLOOR OF THE99 STORE PRIOR TO THE COLLAPSE. THIS UNIT WAS APPROXIMATELY 2 FEET HIGH BY2 FEET WIDE AND 5 FEET LONG AND WEIGHED APPROXIMATELY 120 POUNDS. THIS AIRHANDLING UNIT WAS IN A VERTICAL POSmON ON TOP OF THE DEBRIS PILE AND WASLEANING TOWARD EXPOSURE #2 OVER LIEUTENANT CARPLUK. THE AIR HANDLING UNITWAS NOT IN CONTACT WITH LIEUTENANT CARPLUK BUT PREVENTED MEMBERS FROMSEEING HIM.) As the Rescue Company 4 Hook Firefighter crawled past the air handlingunit he was grabbed on his leg by Lieutenant Carpluk. The Rescue Company 4 HookFirefighter was unable to see Lieutenant Carpluk due to the air handling unit, plywood,shelving, and stock. The time was approximately 1326 hours.

The Rescue Company 4 Hook Firefighter made verbal contact with LieutenantCarpluk, who identified himself as the Lieutenant of Engine Company 75. LieutenantCarpluk immediately told the Rescue Company 4 Hook Firefighter that his NozzleFirefighter (Firefighter Reilly) was buried underneath him. The Rescue Company 4Hook Firefighter relayed this information verbally to his Officer and called for a SCBAto be passed into the void area.

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The Rescue Company 4 Officer made a transmission to the Rescue Battalion"Chief, we are operating in the basement. We are in contact with one of the

we are in the basement ofexposure #4." The Rescue Company 4 Officer was juste the fourth breach when he made this transmission. The rescuers still had no visual,

ce, or physical contact with Firefighter Reilly.The Rescue Company 4 Hook Firefighter was unable to see Lieutenant Carpluk

e to the air handling unit and other debris that shielded him from his view. When the4 Hook Firefighter passed the

epiece to Lieutenant Carpluk through a small opening. Lieutenant Carpluk was able to4 Hook Firefighter and don it himself. The

4 Hook Firefighter called for a Fast Pak and attempted to move the air

At approximately 1331 hours the Rescue Company 4 Hook Firefighter passedregulator of the Fast-Pak into the void. Lieutenant Carpluk removed his SCBA

ulator and replaced it with the Fast Pak regulator. Lieutenant Carpluk again informedhe rescuers that Firefighter Reilly was underneath him. He was extremely concernedabout Firefighter Reilly.

OPERATIONS IN FRONT OF THE 99 STOREAt 1321 hours Division 6 contacted the Rescue Company 3 Officer to verify

which member of Engine Company 75 they were assisting. The Rescue Company 3Officer infonned him that they were trying to identify him.

The Rescue Company 3 Officer requested an air cart to be set up in front of the99 store. The Squad Company 41 Roof Firefighter was at Squad Company 41' sapparatus changing his SCBA cylinder and heard this transmission. The Squad Company41 Roof Firefighter brought their air cart to the front of the 99 store. Two air lines fromthe air cart with confined space facepieces were brought into the collapse area via thefront entrance of the 99 store.

Car 4 Adam contacted the Rescue Battalion at 1326 hours and asked "AlrightGeorge how are we making out?" The Rescue Battalion replied, "Good, We got two ofthe brothers partially buried, they are right here. They are communicating with us. Ithink we're also starting to make some progress breaching from the exposure #4 and

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Rescue 4 is giving me reports that they are in contact with the members there." Car 4Adam replied, "Alright, currently we believe that we are missing five members, theNozzle team and the Boss from 75, the Boss of44, and [the ChiefJ from the 17th."

Rescue Company 1 arrived on the scene at 1328 hours and contacted theCommand Post for orders. Rescue Company 1 was ordered to report to the front of the99 store. Car 4 Adam notified the Rescue Battalion that Rescue Company 1 was on thescene to relieve Rescue Company 3 if they need relief.

Squad Company 61 was ordered by the Rescue Battalion to attempt a breach fromthe cellar of multiple dwelling into the cellar of the 99 store. The breach was notfeasible, and they returned back to the front of the building a short time later.

The Queens Borough Commander, Car 9, and a Battalion Chief responded from aRiker's Island Prison DrilL They arrived at approximately 1340 hours and reported into the Command Post. The Queens Borough Commander was ordered to superviseoperations on the exposure #4 side. The Battalion Chief with Car 9 was ordered to thecellar of the cell phone store.

Carbon Monoxide (CO) levels in the cellar area were monitored by members withCO detectors throughout the operation. The CO levels varied from approximately 30 to100 parts per million (PPM).

OPERATIONS IN THE COLLAPSE AREA OF THE 99 STORERescue Company 3 called the Command Post and requested more buckets be sent

into the 99 store. Members continued to dig by hand trying to extricate the threetrapped surface victims. Similar to a trench collapse, as the rescuers removed the stock,more stock would slide back around the trapped members. This greatly hampered theremoval process. Rescuers had difficulty maintaining their footing while operating onthe quicksand-like mixture of wet stock.

At 1327 hours, the Engine Company 75 Back:-Up Firefighter's Emergency AlertTone was inadvertently activated during his removaL Car 4 Adam heard the tone alertand made the following transmission, "4 Adam to 75 MAYDAY, go." The RescueCompany 3 Irons Firefighter replied, "We're working on the guy transmitting theMAYDAY. We're trying to [unlcover him. We're depressing the button by accident."4 Adam replied, " 1 0 ~ 4 . It should be Engine 75 B a c k ~ U p . "

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The Rescue Company 4 Officer transmitted an URGENT transmission to theRescue Battalion, "we found the offrcer of 75 Engine, we're in contact with him. We'retalking to him, we're in the process of trying to get him out." The Rescue Battalionreplied, "alright, is he was entrapped or just separated from the Engine?" the Rescue 4Officer replied, "that's affirmative, "he's entrapped, we're putting the Fast Pak on himat this moment." The Rescue Battalion gave Car 4 Adam the following update, "I havethe BackUp from 75 Engine. I have the Officer from 44 and we have the Chief. Theyare all trapped from their waist down. They are conscious and alert at this time. Weare operating to get them removed. "

Car 4 Adam replied, "I think we are still missing the Nozzlemanfrom 75. Couldhe be in the same area? Is he (the Rescue Company 4 Officer) in contact with him?"Rescue Battalion replied, "You might want to check with Rescue 4.I believe they are talking to the Officer from 75."

At 1332 hours, based on information received from Lieutenant Carpluk, theRescue Company 4 Officer made the following URGENT transmission to the RescueBattalion, "Alright, we also contacted the Nozzleman from 75 Engine. He isunderneath the Officer. K." (FIREFIGHTER REILLY HAD NOT BEEN PHYSICALLY LOCATED"AT THIS TIME.) Division 6 asked, "Alright 104, are they talking to you? Car 4 Adamasked, "Is the Nozzleman conscious K?" Division 6 stated "Alright 104, let me knowwhat you need."

Rescue Company 1 entered the 99 store to relieve Rescue Company 3. RescueCompany 3, heavily involved in the rescue effort, maintained their position removing thetrapped members. Rescue Company 1 searched past the ongoing rescue efforts andclimbed down into a void area towards the rear of the store. This gave them access to apoint directly above the location ofLieutenant Carpi uk. Rescue Company 4 was already incontact with Lieutenant Carpluk and attempting to locate Firefighter Reilly beneath him.

At approximately 1333 hours the Ladder Company 27 Can Firefighter and then..,.,"u.... Company 3 Hook Firefighter were in a void on the exposure #2 side removing

from around Lieutenant Carpluk's left leg. The void they were operating in was~ x m ~ m e : l . , constricted. The 6 inch by 12 inch B line continuous girder separated theseeSCllers from Lieutenant Carpluk. They had to dig under and around this girder to gain

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access to Lieutenant Carpluk's position. (Figure #16) The Rescue Company 3 HookFirefighter identified Lieutenant Carpluk by his handie-talkie case label, E-75 Off.

Drawmg No!To_

/4 th Breach, , /

"B " Line Girders

Figure #16

T - Denotes Top ofI Failed ColumnsColumnsCD -LIeutenant Carpluck0- Firefighter Reilly

Girder and Column Location - Post CollapseNote the Approximate Location of Lieutenant Carpluk and Firefighter Reilly

The rescuers extricated the Engine Company 75 Back-Up Firefighter at1337 hours. They assessed his condition in the collapse area and he was able to climbout of the collapse area under his own power. He was treated by EMS on the scene andtransported to Jacobi Medical Center where he was treated and released.

OPERATIONS IN THE CELLAR AREASAt approximately 1334 hours members of Squad Company 41 and Rescue

Company 4 were in the void space in the cellar of the 99 store attempting to freeLieutenant Carpluk. The Squad Company 41 Officer was working on removing the airhandling unit entrapping Lieutenant Carpluk. Due to the amount of debris pinningLieutenant Carpluk the Squad Cpmpany 41 Officer contacted the Command Post to haveUrban Search and Rescue (USAR) Medics sent into the cellar of the cell phone store.Division 6 acknowledged and requested the EMS Division 2 Duty Captain to assignHaz Tac Medics to the cellar of the cell phone store.

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In order to alleviate the water build up in the cellar of the cell phone store, theof Safety (Car 12) ordered the Ladder Company 45 Inside Team to breach the wall

the cellar between the cell phone store and the laundromat. The hole in the wallwater to drain, lowering the water level. The Chief of Safety entered through the

le in the wall into the cell phone store cellar. The Ladder Company 45 Inside Teamto enlarge the opening and then climbed through. The Ladder Company 45

33 Inside Team began another breach into theof the cell phone store. They were ordered to discontinue the breach

19.For an extended period of time, members worked on removing the air handling

Reilly. This operation was hampered due to the water from the heavy raint was draining into the cellar voids. The removal of debris was made more difficult

to the type of stock (soaps, oils, rice, and canned products) entrapping bothCarp1uk and Firefighter Reilly. These materials were very slippery and

THE COLLAPSE AREA OF THE 99 STOREThe operations to remove Battalion 17 and the Ladder Company 44 Officer were

75 Back-Up Firefighter was removed to the street1340 hours. Both Battalion 17 and the Ladder Company 44 Officer

using the confined space facepieces supplied by the air cart. The hole created byremoval of the Engine Company 75 Back-Up Firefighter opened up an area for theris to be moved into. The use of additional buckets and shopping baskets enabled the

The members who were working on the removal of the Engine Company 75of the Ladder Company 44

ficer. To assist in his removal, webbing was placed around the chest of the Laddermpany 44 Officer. An attempt to pull him out was unsuccessful. The position of thedder Company 44 Officer's legs hampered his removal. More of the stock needed toremoved in order to free his legs.

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The rescuers continued to cut shelving and remove the stock. Once the stock wasremoved, a second attempt was made to pull him out and this effort was successful. Thetime of Ladder Company 44 Officer's extrication was approximately 1350 hours. TheLadder Company 44 Officer was then placed into a stokes stretcher and pulled out of thecollapse area to the street. EMS treated the Ladder Company 44 Officer and transportedhim to Jacobi Medical Center. After the removal of the Ladder Company 44 Officer,Ladder Company 31 relieved Ladder Company 27.

Some of the members who worked on the Ladder Company 44 Officer thenassisted in the efforts to remove Battalion 17. The removal of Battalion 17 was expediteddue to the ability to throw stock into the voids created by the previous removals. Atapproximately 1355 hours, Battalion 17 was placed into a stokes stretcher and removedto the street level. He was treated by EMS on scene and transported to Jacobi MedicalCenter.

The Rescue Battalion notified Car 4 Adam that the trapped members in his area(the Engine Company 75 Back-Up Firefighter, the Ladder Company 44 Officer, andBattalion 17) had been removed. (LIEUfENANT CARPLUK AND FIREFIGHTER REILLY WERESTILL TRAPPED IN ANOTHER AREA OF THE 99 STORE.)During the removal operations, several exhaust fans were utilized at differentlocations to assist in venting the 99 store and the cellar of the cell phone store.Numerous sawzalls, replacement batteries, and blades were required to cut the metalshelving entrapping the members. Hoselines were used to protect the trapped membersand rescuers, extinguish pockets of fire, and for ventilation.

EXTRICATION OF LIEUTENANT CARPLUK AND FIREFIGHTER REILLYAll members operating in the collapse area now concentrated their efforts on

removing the debris entrapping Lieutenant Carpluk and locating Firefighter Reilly.Battalion 19 was supervising the operations in the void area and was relieved by theBattalion Chiefwho had arrived with Car 9.

Lieutenant Carpluk repeatedly told the rescuers that Firefighter Reilly wasbeneath him. Three separate rescue teams were operating to extricate Lieutenant Carplukand locate Firefighter Reilly.

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Their positions were as follows: Members from Rescue Company 4 and Squad Company 41 were operating

through the 4th breach in the cellar of the cell phone store to extricateLieutenant Carpluk.

Members from Rescue Company 1, Rescue Company 3, and LadderCompany 31 operated to extricate Lieutenant Carpluk through a void from thetop of the collapse area in the 99 store. Rescue Company 1 Officer realizedLieutenant Carpluk's removal would be time consuming and requestedoxygen for Lieutenant Carpluk at 1349 hours.

Members of Rescue Company 3, Rescue Company 1 and the LadderCompany 27 Can Firefighter had entered an opening in the front of thecollapse area and operated to extricate Lieutenant Carpluk via a void along theexposure #2 cellar wall.

All three teams simultaneously attempted to locate Firefighter Reilly as theyworked to extricate Lieutenant Carpluk.

' , . ; '-:T' ......"~ . ,"

Photo #21First Floor Collapse Area77 of 174


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In order to remove the air handling unit, members were required to cut thecollapsed plywood floor and the double 2"x 10" B line top girder. (Photo #21) The use ofthe partner saw was attempted but was difficult to maneuver. A chain saw was brought inand proved to be more effective. With the B line top girder cut, the air handling unit wasable to be passed out into the cell phone store cellar at approximately 1359 hours.Members continued to cut metal shelving with sawzalls and remove stock by hand. Theseoperations continued to be labor intensive and time consuming.

At approximately 1400 hours, the Squad Company 41 Roof Firefighterpositioned himself by Lieutenant Carpi uk' s head and observed him without a donnedfacepiece, unconscious, and with labored breathing. With the assistance of anothermember, the Squad Company 41 Roof Firefighter placed his SCBA facepiece onLieutenant Carpluk and fully opened the purge valve. The Squad Company 41 RoofFirefighter was able to cut Lieutenant Carpluk's name off his bunker coat and a positiveidentification was provided to the Command Post at approximately 1402 hours.

Members operating in the void above Lieutenant Carpluk continued to removestock from around his legs. Lieutenant Carpluk's left leg was positioned in such a waythat it prevented the members from pulling him out. The Rescue Company 1 Officer tiedwebbing around Lieutenant Carpluk's left leg in order to maintain its position. TheRescue Company 1 Irons Firefighter held the webbing and maintained this position whilethe members dug around his legs. Members maneuvered a backboard under LieutenantCarpluk. Several attempts were made to pull Lieutenant Carpluk out; after each attemptmore stock had to be removed. During these removal attempts, Lieutenant Carpluk'sface piece kept becoming dislodged and his bunker coat was pulled off. On the fourthattempt Lieutenant Carpluk was freed and removed into the void where Rescue Company4 and Squad Company 41 were operating.

At 1415 hours, Lieutenant Carpluk was passed through the 4th breach on abackboard into the cell phone store cellar and placed into a stokes stretcher. EMSimmediately administered oxygen to Lieutenant Carpluk. At 1417 hours, Battalion 6notified Car 9 that the Engine Company 75 Officer was removed and was in the processof being transported to the street. Lieutenant Carpluk was removed to the street via theoutside sidewalk trap door. CPR was initiated as he was being brought to the ambulance.He was transported to Bronx Lebanon Medical Center in cardiac arrest.

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Rescue Company 5 relieved Rescue Company 4 and Squad Company 288relieved Squad Company 41. As Lieutenant Carpluk was pulled out, members continuedto search for Firefighter Reilly. The Rescue Company 3 Hook Firefighter was using hisflashlight to search for Firefighter Reilly in the small space created by the extrication ofLieutenant Carpluk. He saw what he believed to be a reflection from a helmet in a smallhole in the side of debris. The Rescue Company 1 Irons Firefighter looked into the holeand verified it was a Firefighter's helmet. The Rescue Company 1 Hook Firefighter dugdeeper in the pile, removed stock and debris from around the area where the helmet wasfound, and discovered Firefighter Reilly.

At 1416 hours, the Rescue Company 3 Officer transmitted a MAYDAY that theylocated the member from Engine Company 75. At approximately 1418 hours, afterremoving debris, Firefighter Reilly was found facedown, unconscious, and unresponsive.His helmet was on, and his chinstrap, hood, and facepiece were in place. The RescueCompany 1 Irons Firefighter heard air flow from Firefighter Reilly's facepiece when heremoved it. Members observed that Firefighter Reilly was not breathing and did not havea pulse. The Rescue Company 1 Hook Firefighter administered oxygen and called for aBag Valve Mask (BVM). The Rescue Company 3 Hook Firefighter administeredventilations to Firefighter Reilly with the BVM during removal operations.

Members operating from above removed the stock from on top of FirefighterReilly. The name on his bunker coat became visible and Firefighter Reilly's identity wasconfirmed and transmitted to the Command Post at 1426 hours by the RescueCompany 3 Officer.

Members tried to remove Firefighter Reilly but were unsuccessful due to his bodyposition. Firefighter Reilly's legs were pointing down; he was bent forward at the waistwith his upper body toward the rear of the building. More stock was removed, theRescue Company 5 Officer tied a rope around one of Firefighter Reilly's legs. Themembers pulled on the attached rope and Firefighter Reilly's personal harness to free hislegs. Once his legs were free Firefighter Reilly was able to be extricated.

Firefighter Reilly was placed into a stokes stretcher and removed through thefront of the 99 store at 1435 hours. CPR was initiated as he was being brought to theambulance. He was transported to Bronx Lebanon Medical Center in cardiac arrest.

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As noted on the Certificate of Death for Probationary FirefighterMichael C. Reilly, the date and time of death was August 27, 2006 at 3:17 P.M. Thecause of death was asphyxiation due to compression of the chest.

As noted on the Certificate of Death for Lieutenant Howard J. Carpluk Jr., thedate and time of death was August 28, 2006 at 10:42 A.M. The cause of death waspositional asphyxia and aspiration of blood due to blunt impact of head with fracture ofthe cribriform plate.

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VII. FINDINGS The failure of cellar columns initiated a V-shaped collapse in the 99 store twentyone minutes after the arrival ofunits. The structural components in the cellar werenot affected by the fire on the first floor. There was no fire in the cellar.The two air conditioner compressor units and the heat pump on the roof were notthe cause of the collapse. The air handling unit attached to the first floor ceiling ofthe 99 store was also not the cause of the collapse. The ceiling mounted airhandling unit in the rear of the 99 store did not fall from the ceiling until afterthe collapse of the first floor.The first floor collapse caused the loss of a portion of the roof support system.Fire burning through the roof openings combined with the first floor collapsecaused the roof to gradually sag and eventually drop down.The first floor rescue efforts were hampered by the amount and type of stock thatwas piled up in the collapse area. This "V" shape collapse was similar to a trenchcollapse because as stock was removed, the spaces that were created were quicklyfilled in by other stock. Members involved in the rescue operation had to dig byhand around trapped members and utilize buckets to remove the stock.The Safety Investigation Team supervised the construction crew thatsystematically dismantled 1575 Walton Avenue to examine, label and documentthe structural components. An inspection and evaluation was conducted of allstructural wood components and plywood located within the fire building. Thefollowing results were found by the Safety Investigation Team based on theirobservations and the review of a study by an independent team of woodspecialists that were contracted by DOB to analyze the structural wood.4 Visible advanced wood decay and termite damage was present in many of

the cellar columns in the collapse area in the 99 store. The greatestamount of deterioration was at the base of each column where they wereimbedded in the soil below the cellar floor.

of Solid Wood and Plywood Elements at J575 Walton Avenue, Bronx N.Y."81 of 174


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The seams of the plywood floor and sub-floor of the 99 store were notstaggered and the second layer of plywood was not placed perpendicularto the first layer.

The nailing schedules and types of fastener used in the alteration were not in accordance with NYC Building Code. The nailing pattern was haphazard. Insufficient and incorrect types of fasteners (nails/screws)were used.

An insufficient number of nails were used to join the two 2" x 10" pieces of dimensional lumber to create the top girders in the B line girder assembly. This caused the two 2" x 10" pieces of dimensional lumber to act independently. The top girders did not possess the structural strength of true 4" x 10" composite girders.

Rough sawn 6" x 6" Poplar wood columns were used to support the ledger supporting the first floor of the 99 store. Poplar wood was also used as blocking in the B line girder assembly. This type of wood is a soft wood not commonly used as timbers in building construction.

6. Ten members initially fell into the collapse area when the collapse occurred. Fourmembers of Engine Company 92 were immediately removed and the other sixmembers were trapped in the collapse. The following are the trapped member'scompany, assignment and removal time: The Ladder Company 44 Can Firefighter was extricated in approximately

four minutes. The Engine Company 75 Back-Up Firefighter was extricated m

approximately 43 minutes. The Ladder Company 44 Officer was extricated m approximately

56 minutes. The Battalion 17 Chief was extricated in approximately one hour. Lieutenant Carpluk, the Engine Company 75 Officer was extricated m

approximate1y one hour and 21 minutes. Firefighter Reilly, the Engine Company 75 Nozzle Firefighter was

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The FAST Unit was immediately assigned to locate and rescue victims after thecollapse occurred. The FAST Unit was in position near the Command Post andwas available for rapid deployment into the fire building. Another FAST Unitwas not designated or assigned as required by AUC 320.Rescue operations after the collapse were conducted in accordance with All UnitCircular (AUC) 291 Rescue Operations. Reconnaissance and Survey: Secondary collapse potential was assessed

by members operating at several different locations throughout the rescueeffort.

Immediate Rescue: Removal of surface victims. Surface victims werelocated and eight members were removed.

Exploration: Search all voids and accessible crawl spaces for possiblevictims. Exploration of voids and breaching operations were conducted atseveral locations.

Selected Debris Removal: Certain structural members needed to be cutand selected debris removed to facilitate the removal of LieutenantCarpI uk and Firefighter Reilly.

General Rubble Clearance: The debris and structural components of thebuilding were methodically removed to allow for a forensic examinationof the building to determine the cause of collapse.

A number of different approaches were initiated to gain access into the collapsearea. Rescue Company 3 and t

fdny report on fatal fire, august 27, 2006

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