fata a most dangerous place

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principal author

Shuja Nawaz

foreword

Arnaud de Borchgrave

January 2009

FATAA Most Dangerous PlaceMeeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in theFederally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan

CSIS CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &INTERNATIONAL STUDIES


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| iii

Executive Summary v

Foreword by Arnaud de Borchgrave vi

Pre ace ix

Acknowledgments xi

List o Acronyms and Abbreviations xii

1. A Most Dangerous Place: FAA Explained 1

Why FAA Is the Way It Is 7

Te Rising Militancy 9

Basic Perceptions and Realities 10

Pakistans Role and Concerns 11

Understanding FAA Society and Dynamics 13

Role o the Mullahs 14

U.S. Actions in A ghanistan and the Region 15

2. Issues and Answers 17

Te A ghan aliban and Teir Role in FAA 17

Te ehreek-e- aliban-e-Pakistan and Other Militant Groups 18

Current Developments in FAA and the NWFP 19

U.S. Develpment Assistance or FAA 21

Political, Economic, and Social Development Challenges in FAA 22

How to Change the Situation 28

3. Searching or a Military Solution 32Changing the actics 33

Poor raining and Equipment 34

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4. What Can Be Done 36

Te Government o Pakistan 36

Te Pakistani Military 39

Te U.S. Government 40

Te U.S. Military and CEN COM 40Te Government o A ghanistan 41

5. Conclusion 42

About the Authors 44

Maps and TablesMap 1. Federally Administered ribal Areas (FAA) 3

Map 2. Ethnic Groups o Pakistan 4

Map 3. Ancient ribal Boundaries 5

able 1. Population o FAA (1998) 2

able 2. Selected Development Indicators or Pakistan, the NWFP, andFAA (2003) 8

able 3. FAA Agencies and ribes 13


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Increased militancy and violence in the border region between A ghanistan and Pakistan knownas the Federally Administered ribal Areas o Pakistan has brought FAA into sharper ocus, asU.S., A ghan, and Pakistani leaders attempt to nd solutions to the problems underlying the situa-tion there. Tis most dangerous spot on the map may well be the source o another 9/11 type o at-tack on the Western world or its surrogates in the region. Should such an attack occur, it likely willbe spawned in the militancy that grips FAA and contiguous areas in A ghanistan and Pakistantoday. Te principal actors are the aliban, in both countries; their allies ormer Soviet-era mu-

jahideen commanders including Gulbadin Hekmatyar o the Hezbe Islami and the Haqqani group(headed by Jalaluddin and his son Siraj); Sunni militants rom Central and Southern Punjab; andal Qaeda, which bene ts rom links to most o these insurgents. Te aliban leader Mullah Omaris suspected to be hiding in southwestern A ghanistan and Pakistani Balochistan. Te alibanare engaged in a struggle against oreign orces inside A ghanistan and now against the military in Pakistan. Hekmatyar has spoken against the Pakistani government but has not yet taken uparms against it. Te Haqqanis have also not provoked a battle with the Pakistani orces as yet. TePunjabi militants, however, have become ranchisees o al Qaeda and have been linked to attackson the Pakistani state and its army.

While many ideas have been put orward or tackling the issues acing FAA, too o en they rely on longer-term plans and solutions. Tis report attempts to de ne the conditions that spawnmilitancy and violence among the Pakhtun tribesmen that inhabit FAA and suggest practicableways o approaching them in the short and medium term. Concrete actions by the principalactorsthe U.S., A ghan and Pakistan governments and the U.S. and Pakistan militariesare sug-gested. Tese will need to be underpinned by a national debate in Pakistan, in particular, on thenature o the countrys polity and the need to tackle terrorism and militancy as domestic issues.But the debate will need to be rooted in a clear consensus among the civil and military leadershipon the nature o the Pakistani state and society and how to tackle the growing militancy insidethe country and in broad-based support rom major political parties and the general public. TeUnited States needs to orge a longer-term relationship with Pakistan and its people, shi ing roma transactional relationship to one built on strategic considerations and respect or Pakistanspolitical and development needs. Failure to bring peace and to restore a modicum o stability toFAA will have widespread repercussions or the region and perhaps the world.

executive summary


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Te geopolitical nexus o Pakistan-FAA-A ghanistan-India must be seen as a regional crisisthat requires a holistic politico-military approach. But suspicions and disin ormation about eachothers motives, replete with conspiracy theories, have combined to make Pakistan, the Muslimworlds only nuclear power, the most dangerous place in the world.

Pakistan is ground zero in the U.S.-jihadist war. Te countrys existential crisis is compoundedby the global nancial crisis. Now in International Monetary Fund (IMF) receivership, Pakistan(its 170 million people the second largest-Muslim population a er Indonesia) is now in danger

o becoming a ailing state unless its riends help it nancially and with training and advice. Within ation running 30 percent, grinding poverty, soaring ood prices, and a resurgent aliban on thehome ront, economic collapse would give al Qaeda additional cover against the U.S. war on ter-ror. Pakistan is too important a state to be allowed to dri or decline.

Pakistans Federally Administered ribal Areas (FA A) that border A ghanistan are at theheart o the immediate crisis, as they provide sa e havens or aliban guerrillas and al Qaedaterrorists, and have sown the seed o Islamic militancy and terror inside Pakistan proper. Many Pakistanis are convinced the United States is colluding with India to break up Pakistan, one o theworlds eight nuclear states. American observers o the South Asian geopolitical landscape havereportedly detected collusion between the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence agency) and the aliban

organization as part o a Pakistani desire to have a pro-Pakistani aliban regime in Kabul.Troughout the 1990s, ISI enjoyed a close relationship with the aliban movement that ruled

A ghanistan rom 1996 until overthrown by the U.S. invasion in October 2001. aliban chie Mul-lah Mohammad Omar gave al Qaedas Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist training camps extrater-ritorial privileges.

Pakistanis resent the United States recent nuclear deal with India, establishing India as acounterweight to China, a close ally o Pakistan. Tey also see the United States as assisting Indiaseconomic activities in A ghanistan to supplant Pakistans in uence and encircle Pakistan. Tus,the July 2008 bombing o the Indian Embassy in Kabul was seen in New Delhi and Washington asthe work o extremists linked to the ISI. Te recent Mumbai terror attacks and the ensuing war o words between India and Pakistan could well have led to an actual con ict i cooler heads had notprevailed and riendly nations not intervened. Te permutations o what South Asian players aredoing to each other would be arcical i not so dangerous when taken seriously.

How does one deal with members o Pakistans parliament who asked Gen. David M. McKier-nan, the commander o U.S. orces in A ghanistan, Why did you Americans come to A ghanistanwhen it was so peace ul be ore you got there? Many Pakistanis still consider al Qaeda and thealiban the good guys who launch suicide attacks as punishment or the Pakistani army ghtingan American war. Such views are aired on Pakistani television talk programs, where conspiracy

forewordarnaud de borchgrave


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theorists also argue that the United States is unding the aliban to tie down the Pakistan Army while the United States takes over Pakistans nuclear arsenal. Still others maintain Bin Laden is agment o American propaganda that provided the pretext or the United States to invade A ghan-istan and weaken Pakistan.

Te lawless border regions o FAA tend to get lost in the shufe o conspiracy theories. Yet

FAA is critical to the success o the NA O operation in A ghanistan and the political integrity o Pakistan itsel . As long as FA A gives cover to alibans sa e havens, the United States and itsNA O allies are bound to lose ground. Barack Obama has said that a strong, dependable Pakistanis a prerequisite to success in A ghanistan. Americas new president also avors trans erring some7,500 troops rom Iraq to A ghanistan to rein orce the 32,000 American soldiers there now, or acountry the size o France. An unsecured FAA is tantamount to an unwinnable war.

Te Pakistani army was never a willing partner o the United States against aliban in FA A.Some $10 billion in U.S. aid or Pakistan since 9/11 le Islamabad no choice but to move the army into tribal areas to take on aliban. But the mostly Punjabi army needed interpreters to dialoguewith locals. Tey also took heavy casualties. U.S. unmanned Predators appeared to be more suc-cess ul with good intelligence and missiles aimed at aliban and al Qaeda meetings, always sur-rounded by women and children, than the Pakistani military. And U.S. air strikes also ueled moreanti-Americanism in Pakistan proper.

Chairman o the Joint Chie s o Sta Adm. Michael Mullen says the longtime ri between thetwo militaries has deprived both nations o the trust needed to combat terrorism. Teres not aPakistani junior o cer that doesnt know who ormer Senator Pressler is, he told the Washingtonimes , and theres not a junior o cer in the U.S. military that knows who Sen. Pressler is. He wasre erring to the 1985 legislation sponsored by ormer Sen. Larry Pressler, a South Dakota Republi-can, which banned economic and military aid to Pakistan unless the U.S. president certi ed, on anannual basis, that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device.

Admiral Mullen said he was stunned in early 2008 when he was invited to speak to a group o 30 Pakistani war college students at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. Te majority o the questionswere about the Pressler amendment, which was passed be ore most o the students were born.

In October 1990, the Pressler amendment kicked in when President George H.W. Bush (41)could no longer certi y Pakistans non-nuclear status. U.S. and Pakistani military exchanges cameto a halt during the 1990s. Anti-Americanism in Pakistans o cer corps soon took root. Morerecently, disagreement with the U.S. invasion o Iraq and the perception that U.S. policy in SouthAsia tilts toward India, have not improved matters. Te U.S.-led war against aliban extremists inA ghanistan and U.S. pressure to ght aliban in FA A have made seamless cooperation arduousbetween the two militaries.

In the 1980s, during the Soviet occupation o A ghanistan, some 1,300 Pakistanis attendedU.S. war-sta colleges. In the 1990s, the number dropped to 300. And over the past eight years,it was a paltry 98. Senior Pakistani o cials are reluctant to accept U.S. counterterrorism trainingor to participate in combined operations. But they have accepted 25 military trainers to adviseselected members o the Frontier Corps, raised rom tribes in FAA, who will then train othersghting aliban and al Qaeda terrorists.

Te numbers are small and the FAA problem humongous. Outside o the global nancialcrisis, it is without question the most urgent problem acing the Obama administration and itsPakistani counterparts. Hence, this report.


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o assess the nature o the problem and to o er practicable short- and medium-term solu-tions, the Center or Strategic and International Studies assembled a team o experts chaired by Shuja Nawaz, a long-time expert who has been studying the relationship between the Pakistaniarmy and the countrys polity. Teir views and recommendations are distilled in this monographwritten by Mr. Nawaz.

Arnaud de BorchgraveDirector, ransnational Treats

Center or Strategic and International Studies


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Te increasing militancy and violence in the border region o Pakistan and A ghanistan and the very complex skein o realities and perceptions a ecting regional and external actors view o thesituation makes it necessary to shed light on the underlying issues in FAA, the Federally Admin-istered ribal Areas. By the same token, it is important that the national, provincial, and local gov-ernments and citizens groups, plus the international community, take action sooner rather thanlater to address the needs o FAA and contiguous areas in A ghanistan so that the local popula-tion can be won over and thus help isolate the militants. Tis will require military, socioeconomic,

and political actions and a willingness to move on all ronts.It is likely that the next 9/11 type o attack on the global stage, though not necessarily on the

United States proper, will be hatched rom this region by the oreigners under the guidance o alQaeda. Early in 2008, the ormer deputy head o Britains MI6 secret service, Nigel Inkster, namedas public enemy number one pro- aliban commander Baitullah Mehsud, who comes rom SouthWaziristan in Pakistan. 1 It is also widely believed in the West that the al Qaeda leaders Osamabin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri are also somewhere in this region or move between FAA andA ghanistan. Mullah Omar, the A ghan aliban leader, is also believed to be hiding in the regiono southwestern A ghanistan and among sympathetic tribesmen in Balochistan Province. He andormer mujahideen commanders rom the anti-Soviet jihad have now declared war on the or-eign troops inside A ghanistan. Adding to the threat is the presence o the Sunni militant groupsthat once were sponsored by the Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence in Kashmir but that nowhave allied with al Qaeda and the Pakistani aliban to attack the state. FAA truly is a dangerousplace today not only or the region but also or the world. Failure to change the current downwardtrajectory in FAA will have serious costs or Pakistan and its society and adversely a ect A ghani-stans attempts to cra a stable national entity, making FA A an even more dangerous place or theregion and the world.

Although the major responsibility or action rests with Pakistan, it is imperative that the newUnited States administration understands the gravity o the situation and the importance o help-ing Pakistan and A ghanistan to win back and empower the people o FAA and the borderingA ghan provinces. Tis can be possible only with a concerted and concentrated e ort to improve

their lives and thus help them resist success ully the inroads o militancy, religious extremism, andglobal terrorism that have made a home in that area and are spreading into the settled areas o theNorth-West Frontier Province (NWFP).

Tere is no simple or elegant solution to these problems that are rooted in history and thepower ul local tribal culture. Nor is there any single approach that can be uni ormly applied across

1. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7244817.stm, accessed October 26, 2008.

preface


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the region. Rather, both national governments and international actors, especially the UnitedStates with its huge military, economic, and political ootprint in the region, will need to take intoaccount the special circumstances o each o the seven agencies o FAA and contiguous areas inPakistan and A ghanistan to come up with measures that will help the people o the region im-prove their lives and thus help create a stable polity and growing economy.

CSIS through its O ce o ransnational Treats Projects under Director Arnaud de Borch-grave undertook a study to examine the situation in FAA and come up with some practicablemeasures that could be taken in the near term (12 years) and medium-term (35 years) and thatcould lay the ground or longer-term development and security in the region. A team led by ShujaNawaz, and comprising Ayesha Jalal ( u s University), Mariam Abou Zahab (Sciences Po, Paris),Joshua . White (Johns Hopkins SAIS), Kimberly Marten (Barnard College), and Azhar Hussain(International Center or Religion and Development), undertook to examine the situation andcome up with potential solutions. Khalid Aziz, an independent analyst in Peshawar and ormerchie secretary o the NWFP, provided much material and use ul commentary. Shuja Nawazsupplemented the work o the team by a visit to Pakistan that included meetings with civil andmilitary o cials, leading experts on FAA, U.S. embassy and aid o cials, tribal maliks, and local

news media in Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Peshawar, North Waziristan, and Malakand/Swat. JoshuaWhite also visited Pakistan in the late summer o 2008 and provided resh insights rom the eld.Te team met a number o times to pool its e orts and discuss its ndings. Arnaud de Borchgravesupervised the analytical e ort to identi y and ocus on the major issues and answers.

Te team recognizes that a number o other studies were produced on the region in the U.S.election season. We note the particular contribution o the report on FAA rom the Councilon Foreign Relations by Daniel Markey, the report by the Pakistan Studies Working Group inWashington, D.C., and the report rom the Center or American Progress, among others. Ratherthan take a long historical or 60,000- oot view o the situation, this study attempts to produce agranular view o the situation on the ground in FAA and o U.S.-Pakistan relations relating to the

region and A ghanistan. And, rather than enumerating all the ideal changes that the team wouldwant to see, this report o ers suggestions or immediate and practicable measures as the basis ormedium- and longer-term steps that can help change the socioeconomic and political landscapeo the region so that it can be trans ormed rom a dangerous place on the map to one o relativepeace and stability.


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We wish to acknowledge the help o Debbie Stroman o CSIS in the work o the team and in put-ting together the basic dra and o Roberta Fauriol o CSIS or her editorial work and or shep-herding the production o this report. We also wish to acknowledge the help given to us by numer-ous others in collecting in ormation and providing both analysis o the situation on the groundand logistic support. We wish to thank o cials o the government o Pakistan, especially GovernorOwais Ghani o the North-West Frontier Province; the sta o the FAA Secretariat in Peshawar;and National Security Advisor Maj. Gen. Mahmud Ali Durrani (retired). We wish to thank senior

o cials o the Pakistan Army at its General Headquarters in Rawalpindi and in the eld, includingArmy Chie General Ash aq Parvez Kayani; then Director General Military Operations and nowDirector General Inter-Services Intelligence Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha; Corps Commander XICorps, Peshawar, Lt. Gen. Masood Aslam; Director General Inter-Services Public Relations Di-rectorate Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas and his colleagues; and other senior Army o cers. We thank thesta o the United States Embassy in Pakistan, the U.S. Agency or International Development, andthe O ce o ransition Initiatives; Maj. Gen. Syed Ali Hamid (retired); independent analysts and journalists Rahimullah Yusu zai, Iqbal Khattak, and Imtiaz Gul; and 23 tribal maliks o North Wa-ziristan who shared their views on their basic needs. We also wish to recognize with deep thanksthe incisive commentary and use ul suggestions o CSIS Burke Chair Anthony H. Cordesman onan earlier dra o this paper. As is customary, none o these persons bears any responsibility or

this report.

Acknowledgments


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acronyms andabbreviations

ANA A ghan National Army ANP Awami National Party BCCs Border Coordination CentersCAOs civil a airs o cersCEN COM U.S. Central CommandCERF Commanders Emergency Response Funds (CEN COM)COIN counterinsurgency

FAA Federally Administered ribal AreasFC Frontier CorpsFCR Federal Crimes RegulationsFR Frontier RegionIMF International Monetary FundISAF International Security Assistance ForceISI Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)JUI Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-IslamLIC low-intensity con ictMMA Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal

MNA member o the National Assembly NWA North Waziristan Agency NWFP North-West Frontier ProvinceO I O ce o ransition Initiatives (USAID)PA political agentPAA provincially administered tribal areasPML-N Pakistan Muslim LeagueNawaz Shari PPP Pakistan Peoples Party ROZs Reconstruction Opportunity ZonesRs. Pakistani rupees

SOFA status o orces agreementSWA South Waziristan Agency NSM ehreeke-Ni az-e-Shariat-e-MohammediP ehreek-e- aliban-e-Pakistan

UAVs unmanned aerial vehiclesUSAID United States Agency or International Development


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I Pakistan loses the ght against militancy in FAA, it may ace a regional political disaster withglobal repercussions. It is imperative, there ore, that Pakistan and its allies, especially the UnitedStates, understand the nature and causes o the con ict raging there.

FAA, a territory covering some 27,500 square kilometers perched on the border betweenPakistans North-West Frontier Province and southern A ghanistan and home to over 3.5 millionPashtun (also Pakhtun 1) tribesmen and some 1.5 million re ugees rom A ghanistan, continues tobe the center o global attention in the wake o the United States invasion o A ghanistan in 2001.

In recent years, FAA has become a bone o contention between the United States and Pakistan, asU.S. incursions into FAA have produced a war o words and even direct con rontations betweenU.S. and Pakistani orces on the border. FAA is also considered home to many al Qaeda opera-tives, especially the numerous oreigners rom the Arab world, Central Asia, Muslim areas o theFar East, and even Europe who ock to this war zone or training, indoctrination, and sometimesrespite rom repression at home.

FAA rests in the middle o a tough neighborhood that extends in the southwest into Bal-ochistan, a region o deep-seated political dissent against the central government o Pakistan romBaloch tribes that have requently gone to battle against the Pakistan Army. Teir insurgenciesover time have shaken and continue to threaten the political stability o Pakistan. Te Pashtun

area o Balochistan is also home to some A ghan aliban who took re uge among ellow tribes-men inside Pakistan. It and FAA proper also serve as a base or attacks against oreign orces insouthwestern A ghanistan.

But FAA is only one part o a broader set o challenges that ace Pakistan today as it strugglesto nd its eet as a democracy again a er eight years o autocratic rule. Te country is struggling tode ne its ederalism and to concede powers to the ederating provinces. But a history o autocratic,central rule (both civilian and military) rom Islamabad remains a major stumbling block. Paki-stan also aces a gigantic economic crisis, ueled among other things by global in ation and risesin the price o oil and ood that, i they produce hyperin ation, would seriously threaten Pakistanisociety. An economic meltdown may pose a more immediate danger than even the simmering andsometimes horri c bursts o terrorism and militancy that afict Pakistans northwest and parts o the hinterland. o meet these existential threats, the new Pakistani government will need to createa national consensus on all ronts and will need the support o its riends rom abroad.

Te seven agencies that constitute FAA and come under the control o the president o Pakistan through the governor o the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) are, rom north tosouth, Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan (seeMap 1, Federally Administered ribal Areas.) All except Orakzai share a border with A ghanistan

1. Both pronunciations are correct, Pakhtun being avored by northerners and Pashtun by southerners.

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and each has a dominant tribe or tribal group and economic base and physical characteristics thatdistinguish it rom the others. Immediately to the east o FAA in the settled area o the NWFP

are six contiguous Frontier Regions that also come under the control o the governor but areadministered on a daily basis by provincial representatives: FR Peshawar, FR Kohat, FR ank, FRBannu, FR Lakki, and FR Dera Ismail Khan. Abutting FAA and the NWFP to the north and westin A ghanistan is a string o nine provinces ( rom north to south: Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar,Khost, Paktika, Zabol, Kandahar, Helmand, and Nimruz), most o which are inhabited by Pash-tuns. (Nuristan, Kunar, and Nimruz have other tribal groups also present, but the ethos is largely Pashtun). Immediately beyond these nine are the heavily Pashtun provinces o Paktia and Logar.

Some 15 million Pashtuns inhabit A ghanistan while about 25 million inhabit Pakistan, o which FAA is an important part because it contains tribes that straddle the Durand Line, thedisputed border between British India and then Pakistan and A ghanistan. (See able 1, Popula-tion o FAA. See also Map 2, Ethnic Groups o Pakistan and Map 3, Ancient ribal Boundaries,showing Pashtun areas o A ghanistan and Pakistan and overlapping tribal boundaries). Pashtunsrepresent some 42 per cent o the population o A ghanistan, by ar the largest single ethnic group.O the Pashtun population in Pakistan, about 3 million live in its largest city, Karachi. Interestingly,roughly hal the population o FAA temporarily lives outside the territory as migrant labor or asdisplaced persons, another potential source o instability. 2

2. Mariam Abou Zahab (see About the Authors at the end o this report).

Table 1. Population of FATA (1998)

Agency/FR Area (sq km)Population

(total)

Populationdensity (personsper sq km)

Annual growthrate, 19811998(in percent)

FATA 27,220 3,176,331 117 2.19

Bajaur 1,290 595,227 461 4.33

Khyber 2,576 546,730 212 3.92

Kurram 3,380 448,310 133 2.50

Mohmand 2,296 334,453 146 4.28

North Waziristan 4,707 361,246 77 2.46

Orakzai 1,538 225,441 147 - 2.69

South Waziristan 6,620 429,841 65 1.95

FR Bannu 745 19,593 26 - 6.65

FR Dera Ismail Khan 2,008 38,990 19 - 2.09

FR Kohat 446 88,456 198 2.59

FR Lakki 132 6,987 53 - 4.81

FR Peshawar 261 53,841 206 2.22

FR Tank 1,221 27,216 22 -0.61

Source: Khalid Aziz, FATA Sustainable Development Plan 2006-2015, FATA Secretariat, 2006.

Note: The average annual population growth or FATA is slightly lower than the provincial average o 2.8 percent and thenational average o 2.7 percent. The average household in FATA consists o 9.3 persons, compared to 8 persons in theNWFP and 6.8 persons in the country as a whole. FR = Frontier Region


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Map 2. Ethnic Groups of Pakistan

Mixed groups are indicated by alternating tones; only selected internal administration shown. Names and boundaryrepresentation are not necessarily authoritative.

Source: Khyber Gateway (http://www.Khyber.org); adapted or this report by Robert L. Wiser.


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Map 3. Ancient Tribal Boundaries

Source: Tribal Locations o the Pathans, Khyber Gateway (http://www.Khyber.org); adapted or this report by Robert L,Wiser.


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While the A ghan government has not chosen to see it as such, the dominant element in theinsurgency and now increasingly civil war taking place inside that country is Pashtun. Te oustedaliban leaders have chosen to portray themselves as representatives o the Pashtuns, ghtingto take back their country rom an occupying orce o the United States and other oreignersand against, in their view, an unrepresentative government in Kabul that is dominated by non-Pashtuns. Whether this is a valid basis or their actions or not, it has been used to strengthenperceptions among the A ghan population and those inside FAA that the Pashtuns, who havebeen traditionally rulers o A ghanistan, have been displaced by orce. Te aliban leaders use thisperception as a uel or recruitment and or garnering support in the Pashtun territories insideA ghanistan and across the border in FAA. As a result, the aliban have allied themselves with various disa ected groups headed by ormer mujahideen commanders that operate in di erent re-gions o A ghanistan and FAA against oreign orces inside A ghanistan. Te A ghan government views the aliban and its allies as renegades that are trying to regain power and that survive largely because o sa e havens across the border in Pakistan, speci cally in FAA. In July 2008 A ghan-istan lashed out at neighboring Pakistan . . . , alleging that its intelligence service and army arebehind the bloody aliban-led insurgency, calling the security orces the worlds biggest producers

o terrorism and extremism.3

Te discord between these neighbors runs deep into history.4

Pakistan has seen itsel as a scapegoat or the ailure o the U.S. invasion o A ghanistan toeliminate the aliban. On its part, it sees A ghan involvement in FAA unrest. Re erence is madeto the A ghan Mullah Dadullah, the so-called ather o suicide bombings in Pakistan, who was amilitant leader in South Waziristan until his death in a Predator attack, and Qari Ziaur Rehman o the A ghan Kunar province who heads the militancy in Bajaur. Pakistans support or the A ghanaliban may have waned a er its own Operation Zalzilla (earthquake) in South Waziristan thatended in 2008.

As described by Shahid Javed Burki, the

Pashtun belt that A ghanistan and Pakistan share presents a unique problem to the interna-

tional community. It straddles a di cult, inhospitable, extremely underdeveloped terrain. Itis inhabited by people who have pre erred to be guided by a tribal code o behavior [Pash-tunwali] rather than by laws made by modern states or modern times. o this code that hasexisted even be ore Islam entered the area, they have added some aspects o the Islamic law,Sharia. Te combination o these two codes has produced a way o li e that has been practicedor centuries. Among its many eatures the strongest are an abhorrence to accept outside inter-erence in internal a airs, an equal amount o reluctance to be governed by a central authority that operates rom a distant place, and con dence in the ability o local leaders to provide pro-tection to their communities and to provide an environment in which they can live accordingto their own laws and practices. 5

Te tribes operate through their maliks, or in uentials, some determined by the tribes them-selves and others o cial maliks who are selected or avors by the political agent (PA) o eachagency, the o cial who represents the government and who, along with the maliks, is responsibleor local governance. Te PA provides stipends to maliks in line with their perceived status inthe governments eyes. Te number o maliks varies rom agency to agency inside FAA. North

3. Associated Press, July 14, 2008.4. See Barnett R. Rubin and Abubakar Siddique Resolving the A ghanistan-Pakistan Stalemate, Unit-

ed States Institute o Peace, Special Report. October 2006.5. Shahid Javed Burki, How to Develop the A ghan-Pak ribal Belts? unpublished paper.


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Waziristan, or example, has some 1,600 maliks. (More than 600 tribal maliks in FAA have beenassassinated by the militants.)

Pashtun society has changed over the years with greater interaction between inhabitants o FAA and other parts o Pakistan and the Middle East, largely through migration o laborers andprovision o transport services inside Pakistan proper. Yet, elements o these old traditions con-

tinue to hold sway over portions o FA A.Most o the aliban leadership o A ghanistan and ollowers o at least two major mujahideen

commanders 6 o the A ghan war against Soviet occupation during the 1980s are believed to havetaken re uge in FAA among their ellow tribesmen, where they continue to prosecute their waragainst the United States and the new A ghan government. In the past, the A ghan aliban notice-ably avoided getting into direct battle with their Pakistani hosts in the southern part o FAA, andthe Pakistan Army appears to have returned the avor. But that is now changing. In the north, inBajaur in particular, there is clear evidence o A ghan leadership o some o the aliban insurgen-cy. And, increasingly, it is becoming di cult to di erentiate between the A ghan aliban and thelocal variety. In addition, elements o al Qaeda, the global terrorist conglomerate, continue to useFAA as a base and training ground or al Qaeda and its ranchisees, including the extreme right-wing Sunni extremist groups rom Central and Southern Punjab inside the Pakistani hinterland.Tere is some empathy or al Qaeda in FAA in general and among the aliban. Tere are alsoreports that the aliban and al Qaeda have ormed an e ective military alliance o convenience.U.S. military sources point to the presence o Uzbeks, Arabs, and other oreigners in recent at-tacks inside A ghanistan. 7

Adding to the witches brew o terror and militancy in FAA is the emergence o a homegrownehreek-e- aliban-e-Pakistan ( P) under a renegade leader rom South Waziristan namedBaitullah Mehsud. Mehsud is orming a regional alliance across the region and hooking up withSunni extremist militants in the settled areas o the NWFP, or example Dir, Malakand, and Swat.He has also established links to the A ghan aliban o Mullah Umar. Te Ps avowed aim is to

establish a religious state in Pakistan based on its own interpretation o Islamic jurisprudence (Sh-aria) but more closely linked to tribal custom or rivaaj . Te P and its a liates have taken thebattle against the Pakistani state into the hinterland and are widely believed to have been behindsome o the more spectacular and horri c attacks inside Pakistan proper, including the assassina-tion o ormer prime minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007 in Rawalpindi and the bombingo the Marriott Hotel in September 2008 in Islamabad.

Why FATA Is the Way It IsOne o the poorest and most disen ranchised regions o Pakistan, FAA has become a breedingground o militancy and discontent and poses a serious threat to both A ghanistan and Pakistan.Almost all the socioeconomic indicators o FAA (health, access to doctors and health acili-ties, education, etc.) are nearly hal those o Pakistan as a whole and much below the levels o the

6. Jalaluddin Haqqani, ormerly o the Maulvi Khalis group within the Hizb-e-Islami and then a mem-ber o the aliban government, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar o the eponymous group o the Hizb-e-Islami.Haqqani has ties to North Waziristan. Hekmatyar does not have a permanent base.

7. Brie ng at the Newseum, Washington, D.C., by Gen. David McKiernan, Commander, NAO Inter-national Security Force in A ghanistan, October 1, 2008; Washington Post , October 2, 2008.


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NWFP. (See able 2, Selected Development Indicators.) FAA has su ered rom lack o proactiveand participatory governance mechanisms and has been subject to an anachronistic, top-down ad-ministrative system that served the colonial British power but is not suitable or a modern society.Because o these conditions and general neglect by successive central governments in developingthe economies and polity o the region, it will continue to provide a avorable environment or ter-rorism and militancy. Tis will create a contagion e ect spreading into the heartland o Pakistan i the underlying conditions that spawn violence and provide a haven or the A ghan aliban and alQaeda are not addressed urgently.

Yet FA A remains one o the more misunderstood areas o the region despite its crucial loca-tion and key role in the current wars within A ghanistan and now Pakistan. Seven years a erthe U.S. invasion o A ghanistan and the removal o the aliban regime and dislocation o the alQaeda leadership into the border regions o A ghanistan and Pakistan, the war against terror andmilitancy in this region appears to be more o a game o blind mans blu than a well planned po-litico-military campaign in an area and a situation marked by layers o complexity. A major reasonor this is the absence o involvement by the people o FAA in plans or their own development orpolitical participation. Most plans are being made or them, o en rom a ar.

FAA has had very limited participation in the political system o Pakistan. Until 1997, its rep-resentatives in the National Assembly (and brie y in the provincial assembly when West Pakistanhad a single assembly) were selected by the tribal maliks. In 1997 universal ranchise was extendedto FAA. But it could only send representatives to the ederal legislature. oday it has 12 memberso the National Assembly and 8 senators. But there is no representation to the provincial assembly o the NWFP because FA A, unlike the contiguous provincially administered tribal areas (PA A),does not come under the government o the province. Te Pakistan Political Parties Act does notapply to FAA and o cially political parties cannot operate or campaign inside its boundaries(although their ags can be seen ying on many houses in FAA). Tis has given a ree eld o operation to the religious groups, a liated with various political parties in Pakistan, who use the

Table 2. Selected Development Indicators for Pakistan, the NWFP, and FATA (2003)

Indicator Pakistan NWFP FATA

Literacy ratio (both sexes, in percent) 43.92 35.41 17.42

Male literacy ratio 54.81 51.39 29.51

Female literacy ratio 32.02 18.82 3.00

Population per doctor 1,226 4,916 7,670

Population per bed in health institutions 1,341 1,594 2,179

Roads (per sq km) 0.26 0.13 0.17

Source: Imtiaz Sahibzada, Adviser to the Prime Minister on Tribal Areas, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Strengthening and Rationalization of Administration) Dra t Report 2006, Islamabad, April 2006, pp. 6365.

Note: Literacy rates according to 1998 census; all other gures or 2003. NWFP = North-West Frontier Province.


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Friday prayers, among other things, to spread their word and garner support. Paradoxically, thestate o Pakistan has not only used FAA as a bu er zone between itsel and A ghanistan but alsoemployed its tribesmen as a reserve orce that has been deployed or insurgency operations inIndian-held Kashmir. raditionally, FA A political representatives tended to side with whatevergovernment was in power in Pakistan. But the lack o political participation has also created asense o deprivation o rights and alienation rom Pakistan proper. Te intrusion o religion-basedpolitics in the region has changed the situation now and the state can no longer rely on blind sup-port rom FAA representatives. Te militants use their own interpretation o Islam as a bindingand legitimizing orce or their activities against the state.

The Rising MilitancyTe balance has been swinging in avor o the militants and terrorists inside both A ghanistanand Pakistan. A ghanistan is now acing a dramatic change rom insurgency to civil war, with theNA O- and U.S.-supported government losing control o larger swathes o territory. 8 Pakistan toohas lost its ability to manage FAA to its ends as it did in the past and is ghting desperately to

regain control even over parts o the NWFP where home-grown militancy has created a parallelgovernment o terror. In 2002 the regime o President and Chie o Army Sta Pervez Musharra moved the regular Pakistan Army into FAA or the rst time since the army was withdrawn a erindependence in 1947. oday there are the equivalent o six in antry divisions in the area, witha combined military orce o some 120,000 made up o members o the Pakistan Army and theFrontier Corps (FC), a ederal paramilitary orce recruited mostly rom the tribal areas. Te move-ment o the military into FAA severely compromised the writ o the political agents, who areresponsible or handling the tribes in the seven agencies and six FRs. Te diplomatic manipulationthat a political agent uses was replaced by a supra authority that damaged the political commandand control system. Pakistan lost control, which was replaced by management through coercion.But it did not work and caused the re o militancy to spread not only inside FAA but also intothe settled districts o the NWFP.

Adding to the explosive mixture has been the presence o sectarian violence in FAA, speci -cally in the Parachinar area o the Kurram Agency, where a proxy war was waged or many yearsbetween Iranian and Saudi-supported Shia and Sunni orces. Te con ict now is locally supported.Te injection o Punjabi Sunni militants into the area has urther worsened the situation, as havethe links between those elements and al Qaeda. Tese Sunni militants rom the Punjab were oncethe chosen vanguard o the o cially trained and sponsored groups that Pakistans Inter-ServicesIntelligence (ISI) directorate used to prime the pump o Muslim unrest in Indian-held Kashmirand thus to stoke the res o resistance and con ict against Indian rule in that disputed territory.Tat patron-client relationship continued well into the regime o President Musharra but o late

has been severed, with evidence emerging that these groups have been implicated in attacks oneven the Pakistan Army itsel inside Pakistan proper. A global dimension to this volatile situationhas emerged rom the al Qaeda connection, with FAA now serving as a magnet or disa ectedsocial and political rebels rom Western societies (some British o Pakistani origin and some Ger-mans) and escapees rom the repressive regimes o Central Asia that have made FAA their homeor training under the aegis o al Qaeda as well as or rest and recuperation rom struggles inside

8. See, or instance, Anthony Cordesmans report Losing the A ghan-Pakistan War? Te Rising Treat ,CSIS, Washington, D.C., September 18, 2008.


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their own countries. Te A ghan aliban and the P have concentrated their actions against theU.S. orces in A ghanistan or the Pakistan Army and civilian targets respectively.

Te United States and its coalition partners in A ghanistan under NA O via the UnitedNations-mandated ISAF (International Security Assistance Force in A ghanistan) have been ght-ing on the military and economic ront to help rebuild war-torn A ghanistan since 2001. Roughly

70,000 oreign troops are currently deployed, but not all are involved in military operations.Almost all the ghting against the aliban is being done by the United States, Britain, Netherlands,and Canada. Te rest o the orces have been operating under some 70 caveats imposed by theirparliaments or governments against aggressive military operations. Te United States shi ed itsocus rom A ghanistan to Iraq soon a er the invasion o A ghanistan in 2001 in the quest to ridIraq o Saddam Hussein and eliminate the potential threat o suspected weapons o mass destruc-tion. Tis move created despondency in the region, especially in Pakistan, which saw this moveas a reprise o the U.S. withdrawal rom the region ollowing the 1989 retreat rom A ghanistano the Soviet 40th Army under Gen. Boris Gromov, leaving behind a messy civil war that a ectedPakistans border regions as well and drew its intelligence service into action on behal o avoredsurrogates inside A ghanistan.

Basic Perceptions and RealitiesCertain basic perceptions and realities emerge rom the experience o the United States in A ghan-istan a er 2001 and Pakistans oray into FA A:

Te United States went into A ghanistan without a comprehensive plan or winning the warbeyond the military ouster o the aliban (evidenced by its shi o ocus to Iraq), or or thesocioeconomic rehabilitation o the country a er decades o war.

Te United States ailed to see the proactive need to help Pakistan trans orm its own army and

Frontier Corps into a counterinsurgency orce or help equip and train them or that purpose; Ithas been in reactive mode ever since 2001.

A ghanistan has shown no willingness to address the grievances o the aliban against theexcesses o the Northern Alliance orces in the wake o the U.S. invasion. Tis keeps the angero the aliban and their Pashtun supporters alive.

Te United States cannot win the war in A ghanistan without the ull and willing participationand support o Pakistan, its army, and the general population, especially with a new civilianadministration in place. It certainly cannot win by aligning itsel to any one Pakistani leader,political or military, as evident in the past reliance on President and General Pervez Musharra .

Te United States depends or more than 80 percent o cargo and 40 percent o its uel in

A ghanistan on transit shipments via Pakistan 9; Uzbekistan has expelled the United States; andRussia has the ability to block over ights to reach urkmenistan or ajikistan and then intoA ghanistan. Te only other relatively shorter land route is via Iran rom Chahbahar on theArabian Sea. But U.S. hostility toward Iran makes that an impossible alternative. Tis severely limits the United States options in taking military action inside Pakistan that could provoke abacklash, including the closure o this supply route into A ghanistan.

9. U.S. Secretary o De ense Robert Gates, UPI.com, September 23, 2008.


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Pakistan, its army, and the ISI have maintained an ambivalent position regarding the A ghanaliban, based on the twin supposition that the United States would exit the region yet again,perhaps a er capturing or killing some key al Qaeda leaders, and that the Pashtun alibanwould return to power in Kabul. Tey would rather have a neutral or riendly Pashtun govern-ment in power, even i it is the aliban.

On its part, A ghanistan ears a Pakistani desire to maintain control over A ghanistan becauseo its land-locked status and as a client state.

Another power ul and persistent perception inside Pakistan is that rival India has chosen todevelop civil and military ties with A ghanistan and even to uel militancy inside Pakistan inretaliation or past (and perhaps current) Pakistani support or militants in Indian-held Kash-mir. Many Pakistanis see a conspiracy to encircle and weaken Pakistan in the region.

Yet neither con rontation nor capitulation by Pakistan to U.S. interests in A ghanistan andFAA is the right approach. Rather, engagement and a joint e ort to eliminate the militanciesinside A ghanistan and Pakistan is the best approach.

Te Pakistan Army is seen as an alien orce inside FA A. Te Frontier Corps has lost its e - cacy over the years. Both the army and the FC are ill-equipped and ill-trained or counterinsur-gency (COIN) war are. Compounding their di culty is the act that they are operating insidetheir own borders against their own people.

Te traditional system o governance inside FAA involving the governments political agentsinteracting with largely compliant tribal maliks, who are on the o cial payroll, has been sup-planted by a reer system under which renegade leaders have emerged and the religious leadershave taken on greater import. Te old system cannot be restored in its entirety nor or the longrun.

No plan or FAA will work unless it involves the local people and they are given a responsiblerole in its implementation. However, all e orts will need to be made to ensure that the tradi-tional leakage o unds or resources to the privileged ew is prevented or reduced and thatthere is equitable sharing o opportunities and nances.

Pakistans Role and ConcernsTe United States and its NA O allies have been pressing Pakistan to do more to stop the A ghanaliban and al Qaeda rom seeking sanctuary in FAA and the northern reaches o the NWFP a -ter the U.S. invasion o A ghanistan in 2001. o sweeten the incentive, the United States since 2001has provided more than $10 billion subvention to Pakistan to o set the cost o moving troopsinto the region. (Te Pakistan Army now maintains that most o these nancial ows did not, in

act, go to the army but were absorbed by the Ministry o Finance during the regime o GeneralMusharra or budgetary or balance o payments support. Te army calculates that it received nomore than $300 million o U.S. Coalition Support Funds in 2008. 10) Te United states has also o -ered to help Pakistan retain and re-equip the Frontier Corps and even the regular army. Pakistanundertook to train the FC rst. And agreement was reached among Pakistan, A ghanistan, and theUnited States to set up coordination mechanisms. But the United States suspects and alleges that

10. Interviews by Shuja Nawaz with senior Pakistan Army o cials.


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Pakistan has not done enough because it continues to support the A ghan aliban or elements o the ISI continue to look the other way, i not actually assist these aliban in their missions in-side A ghanistan. Following growing attacks in A ghanistan, the United States moved to send indrones to attack selected targets inside FAA and on September 12, 2008, launched an incursionwith Special Forces that landed helicopters near Angoor Adda in North Waziristan and attackeda suspected militant hideout inside Pakistani territory. Immediately, Pakistan stopped the passageo supplies to the United States and NA O via the Khyber Pass, ostensibly or security reasons andnonpayment o tolls. But the point was made, and U.S. troop movement into Pakistan stopped orthe time being. A perception emerged inside Pakistan that the United States wished Pakistan toght militancy on the border to aid U.S. e orts in A ghanistan. In other words, Pakistan was beingorced to ght Americas war.

Adding to this is an abiding ear in Pakistan is that the United States will vacate A ghanistanagain be ore the country is stabilized politically and economically and Pakistan will have to bearthe brunt o the costly and bloody blowback o that move. In many ways that blowback rom theU.S. invasion o A ghanistan has already started with the rise o alibanization inside Pakistan andthe terrorists taking the battle to the heart o Pakistans capital, Islamabad, and even targeting the

armys so targets in di erent cantonments or military reservations.Compounding the di culty o Pakistan in collaborating with the U.S. and other oreign orces

inside A ghanistan is the long-standing dispute o the A ghan government with the Durand Line,which it sees as an arti cially imposed border by the British 11. Without recognition o the DurandLine as the border, Pakistan-A ghanistan collaboration cannot take place as e ectively as it couldi the border were o cially sanctioned and could serve as the basis o collaborative e orts to seal itrom both sides. 12 Currently some 1,000 border posts on Pakistans side attempt to monitor move-ment across this di cult and porous border. Pakistani military sources maintain that only 84 co-alition and A ghan National Army border posts exist on the A ghan side. Te tribes that straddlethe border do not recognize the border as anything more than a bureaucratic hindrance to their

movements or amily and tribal unctions and relationships. Indeed, the so-called re ugees romthe A ghan-Soviet War, some 1.5 million o whom still reside on the Pakistan side o the DurandLine, resent being called re ugees, as they believe they are living in their own vatan or homeland.

As mentioned above by Burki, A ghans historically tend to coalesce against any oreign occu-pying orce. Tough divided into strong ethnic regions and tribes and subtribes to whom A ghansshow strong allegiance, A ghanistan is one o the ew countries in the region with a strong senseo territorial unity resulting rom a historically autonomous provincial system o governmentwith a weak central authority, having been a conjoined political entity or almost 200 years. Be ore

11. Te history o the Durand Line that was set in 1893 is o en orgotten in the current contretempsbetween A ghanistan and Pakistan about this boundary. Indeed, the A ghan ruler or amir, Abdur Rehman

Khan, invited the British to help demarcate the border, leading to Sir Mortimer Durands expedition underorders rom the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne. A ghan clerics opposed their amirs decision, and he too realizedhe would lose large areas o his tribal territory: Chagi, oba Achakzai, Kakar Khorasan, Waziristan, Kurram,irah, Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur, and Chitral. Te survey o the border began in 1894 and lasted two years.Te Mohmands re used to allow the actual survey work to be conducted because the proposed line wouldhave cut their tribe in hal , leaving the boundary in that agency between Shilman and Nawa unmarked tothis day. (Details courtesy o a background note prepared by the late Lt. Col. M. Yahya E endi (ret.).)

12. A ormal border would allow the setting up o o cially sanctioned border crossing points andeliminate the current ree movement across the border. Anyone not using a ormal crossing point could thenbe easily targeted as a militant.


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the arrival o the aliban as an Islamist orce that wanted to meld the di erent tribes into a singlereligious agglomeration, A ghanistan worked as a nation through a national compact or meesak-e-milli that recognized the pluralistic nature o the country and ceded the central role o governmentin Kabul to a ruler rom the Durrani tribe. 13

Understanding FATA Society and DynamicsWhile it is tempting to consider FAA as a single entity, it would be a mistake to do so. Each o the seven agencies within FAA has its special tribal, geographic, socioeconomic, and religiouscharacteristics and these a ect the level and nature o the militancy in each. (See able 3, FAAAgencies and ribes.) And FAA as a whole, as was shown in able 2, is on a much lower levelo socioeconomic development than the rest o Pakistan, even the North-West Frontier Province.Most o the agencies contain a dominant tribe, with well- de ned subtribes and clans that demandprimary and absolute loyalty. While recent developments have created ssures in these tribalstructures, with religious leaders and transregional leaders such as Baitullah Mehsud emergingin FAA, tradition continues to play a part in individual and group decisionmaking. In religiousterms alone, there is a loose de nition o Islamic traditions mixed with tribal customs o en domi-nated by interpretations by local mullahs, or religious leaders, who themselves belong to di erentsects or subsects o Islam. Predominantly Sunni, the inhabitants o FAA are urther split amongthe Deobandi and Barelvi schools o jurisprudence. A small but power ul Shia minority in the Par-

rots Beak area o Parachinar in the Kurram Agency has been the target o Sunni attacks, addinganother layer o complexity to the troubles in the region.

Shia-Sunni con ict has produced more than 1,500 deaths in the Kurram Agency, 14 withthe Shia coming under attack rom the Sunni locals aided by Punjabi militants belonging to the

13. Interestingly, even A ghan president Hamid Karzai belongs to a subtribe o the Durrani. Elementso this tribe have held leadership positions in Pakistan as well.

14. 1,500 killed and 500 injured. As reported by News International , October 9, 2008,http://www.thenews.com.pk/.

Table 3. FATA Agencies and Tribes

Agency Major Tribe Nature of TroubleBajaur Tarkani, Utmankhel Militancy

North Waziristan Utmanzai Wazir, Daur Militancy and tribal confict

South Waziristan Ahmedzai Wazir, Mehsud Militancy

Khyber A ridi, Shinwari Militancy

Kurram Toori, Bangash Sectarian

Mohmand Mohmand, Sa Militancy and tribal confict

Orakzai Orakzai Tribal confict

Source: Adapted, with permission, rom Centre or Research and Security Studies (CRSS), Islamabad, Pakistan.


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Sipah-i-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and other extremist groups once trained by the ISI or war inKashmir, as well as the aliban rom South Waziristan. Tis con ict has its roots in history, goingback to the creation o the Durand Line between A ghanistan and British India. Currently some 40percent o the 500,000 inhabitants o Kurram are Shia belonging to the uri tribe. Te dominantSunni tribes are Mangal and Bangash. Over time, the in ux o A ghan re ugees during the Sovietinvasion tilted the balance in avor o the Sunnis. Although the Shia initially aided the PakistanArmy in tracking down the aliban and al Qaeda escapees rom ora Bora in A ghanistan, dur-ing the more recent sectarian clashes, the government orces have not intervened on their behal ,blaming the violence on mysterious oreign hands. Te Sunnis termed the Shia traitors andagents o the United States and the Punjabi-dominated Pakistan Army and made them the targeto horri c attacks and punishment. Tese included beheadings that were videotaped, with DVDso those actions distributed widely to spread terror among the population o the region. Frustratedin their inability to get help rom the authorities, the Shia have turned to A ghanistan or succor,relying on A ghanistan as an escape route and also as a supply route or ood and other essentialsthat cannot reach them through the Kurram Agency.

Role of the Mullahsraditionally in Pashtun areas, tribal mullahs or clerics did not have a lot o political author-ity. Tey o en sat outside the circle at a tribal gathering or jirga and were asked only to lead theprayers or success o whatever course o action was decided by the maliks 15 or elders at eachmeeting. I a tribal area was threatened by outside invasion, mullahs might be called on to rally thetribesmen and lead a jihad in response. But or the most part, the mullahs were impoverished andilliterate, and they depended on the maliks to provide them with both income and security ( orexample, by protecting their mosques rom raiders). Te mullahs did not have an independentpolitical voice.

Tis changed radically starting in 1979. At that time, Pakistani leaders eared that two out-side in uences could challenge state security: growing extremist Shiite in uence in the regionthat resulted rom Ayatollah Khomeinis revolution in neighboring Iran, and the large presence o Soviet orces in A ghanistan a er December 1979. Pakistan eared that the Soviets might rekindlethe Pashtunistan idea o a separate homeland or the Pashtuns o A ghanistan and Pakistan andprepare the ground or territorial control and access to the warm waters o the Arabian Sea andIndian Ocean. As a result, Pakistan poured state and private money and armaments into a variety o largely Sunni mujahideen movements. Iran supported the Shia mujahideen on the Westernborder o A ghanistan. Soon Pakistans e orts were supported by huge in uxes o money romSaudi Arabia and the United States; eventually $6$8 billion would be distributed to the clericswaging jihad.16 For the rst time in history, the mullahs were not dependent on the maliks or

their survival.Te Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence directorate believed that it could control how these

unds were used by setting up a group o o cial mujahideen parties, much as the British had

15. As mentioned earlier, maliks are not tribal chie s but elders, many o them appointed by the govern-ment and placed on the o cial payroll in return or services. Some have hereditary positions. Others areelected rom within their own tribes and unction as equals in tribal gatherings. Te titular head o a tribeis more o en than not a primus inter pares.

16. Michael Bhatia and Mark Sedara, A ghanistan, Arms, and Con ict (London: Routledge, 2008).


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set up o cial hereditary maliks. But over time, these movements mutated out o state control.Within a decade, the mujahideen in ghting and chaos had spawned the aliban 17 in 1994amovement o radical madrassa (religious school) students who were willing to work with the Paki-stani state when it served their interests, but also able to undermine that same state when Pakistanthrew its lot in with the United States in the war against al Qaeda. International support contin-ued long a er the United States and Saudis lost interest and the Soviets were driven out o A ghan-istan. Some oreign unds were given to the mullahs by sympathetic Pakistani emigrants in theWest, particularly in the UK; more recently, the work o the militants has been nanced by the rentand service payments they receive rom the al Qaeda operatives they have helped hide inside theFAA, smuggling, drug-running, and collection o taxes in the areas under their control. Onceagain, outside unding that was intended or a particular short-term political purpose provokedlasting and unintended social consequences that undercut the intentions o its original nan-ciers. In recent years these mullahs have adopted a Kalashnikov culture, heading up militias thaten orce their obscurantist interpretations o Sharia law even in villages and city neighborhoodsbeyond FAA, in the nearby settled areas o Pakistan. Tey have killed more than 600 maliks 18 inthe past two years, and they regularly lead deadly raids against military and police installations.

Adding to the militancy is the presence o remnants o the Maoist Mazdoor Kissan Party that isueled by unhappiness with the unequal distribution o land in the region.

U.S. Actions in Afghanistan and the RegionAnother element in the increasing disa ection inside FAA and the NWFP has been the ratchet-ing upward o U.S. actions along the border and inside that region. Unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs) or drones launched rom A ghanistan have been regularly used by U.S. orces to targetspeci c al Qaeda and other targets inside FAA with Hell re missiles. While these attacks havebeen success ul in many cases in eliminating their intended targets, in some case they have pro-duced collateral civilian damage and deaths o innocent women and children. Tis has created ahuge backlash among the tribesmen and even among the general population o Pakistan. State-ments rom U.S. leaders about reserving the right to pursue and attack aliban and other targetsinside Pakistan have urther set local populations and even the Pakistan Army against the UnitedStates, as all such actions re ect badly on the armed orces o Pakistan and their ability to protectthe borders with A ghanistan.

Pakistan has been either unable or unwilling to stop the cross-border activity o aliban andallied orces operating out o FAA. Apart rom the lack o capacity o Pakistani orces, there aresigns that local tribal ties and ambivalence o Pakistani intelligence operatives inside FAA towardA ghan aliban or mujahideen commanders may be responsible or the inability o Pakistan tocontrol these militants.

Te United States, or its part, believes that it is owed support and allegiance by the Pakistaniarmy and other orces because it has covered the costs o moving the 120,000 Pakistani troops intoFAA. Pakistan measures its costs not only in the movement o troops and loss o public support

17. aliban is the plural o talib or student or more generally someone who seeks knowledge. Tiscollective name o the group has begun to be used erroneously o en as a singular noun in the West, or ex-ample when re erring to a single person as the American aliban.

18. Khalid Aziz.


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or its action but also in deaths o more than 1,300 soldiers since the army moved into FAA andadjoining areas in the NWFP.

Te lack o a single U.S. commander in charge o the ghting inside A ghanistan means thereare o en con icting tactical and strategic considerations at play, especially in dealing with Paki-stan. Te U.S. Central Intelligence Agency controls many o the drones that attack inside Pakistan.

At the tactical level, the relatively small number o U.S. orces in A ghanistan produces rustrationsor local commanders, leading them to attack Pakistani positions in areas rom where they seeattacks being launched into A ghanistan by the aliban. Inside A ghanistan, the absence o an exitstrategy has prolonged the con ict and thus not allowed the allies (and the A ghan government) toshi the blame on to the aliban or not agreeing to negotiate a solution to the war.

As stated earlier, the United States wants Pakistan to do more. Tere is some basis or thisstance. Te United States sees Pakistan as taking action selectively against some but not all militantgroups and certainly re raining rom attacking those A ghan aliban who seek sanctuary insideFAA but do not ght against the Pakistan military. Te perception on the Pakistani side is thatthe United States wishes Pakistan to do all! Civil and military o cers state that the United Stateshas not devoted the quantum o orce inside A ghanistan necessary to turn the tide militarily against the insurgency or attempt to seal the border rom the A ghan side. Some also believe thatthe U.S. presence in A ghanistan uels the militancy inside that country and Pakistan. Te A ghanNational Army (ANA) o roughly 80,000 is also not seen as trained enough to take on the ghtingor the patrolling e ectively. Te strong perception in Pakistan is that the ANA is predominantly composed o non-Pashtuns and there ore unwelcome in the nine largely Pashtun provinces thatabut the Pakistan-A ghanistan border near FA A.

While the United States has attempted to set up collaborative mechanisms to bring Pakistan,A ghanistan and U.S. or NA O orces together, this e ort did not begin in earnest until someve years a er the invasion. A er much discussion and debate and oot dragging on the Pakistanside, plans were nalized to set up Border Coordination Centers (BCCs) and to train trainers who

would then train members o the Frontier Corps inside FAA. Only one BCC had been set up by all 2008, and the training program o selected Frontier Corps trainers had just begun in October.Some progress in cooperation was evident when Gen. Ash aq Pervez Kayani, the Chie o Army Sta o Pakistan, attended a meeting o the tripartite commission in Kabul in August 2008 andhosted another meeting the next month in Rawalpindi. Despite Pakistans complaints against theUnited States or its lack o support, a key actor hindering Pakistans ability to ght the insurgency has been its own orces lack o training and indoctrination or ghting an insurgency inside itsown borders. Still clinging to its sel -image as a conventional army, Pakistans military has not ully accepted the need to change to counterinsurgency mode. Although its commanders in the eldhave shown the capability or learning by doing, Pakistan still needs to make a concerted e ort toaccumulate the lessons rom the eld and incorporate them into a doctrine.


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The Afghan Taliban and Their Role in FATATe A ghan aliban rely on tribal ties to set up bases inside FAA. Te Haqqani network, orinstance, uses North Waziristan as its re uge rom the war inside A ghanistan. Here it bene tsrom tribal loyalties, even rom the Frontier Corps lower ranks, who are, a er all, o en mem-

bers o the same Wazir or Daur tribes o that agency or rom FC units rom other FAA agencies.Similarly, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar also has well-established links inside FAA, dating back to hisdays as a rebel, trained and equipped by the ISI against the communist A ghan government andlater against the Soviet orces in A ghanistan. He also has well-developed ties to old ISI handsrom the aliban era. Tese ISI hands are o en recruited as contractors to develop intelligence andmaintain ties at local levels by the novice army o cers rotated into ISI rom the regular ranks o the Pakistan Army. (Many o the Soviet-era ISI hands are now less active and e ective in dealingwith aliban ghters, many o whom were not even born when the Soviets entered A ghanistan in1979.) Cleverly, the A ghan aliban have chosen not to enter the ray against the Pakistan Army or state in most o FAA, except Bajaur where an A ghan is leading the militants. Te army may have returned the avor. Te FC certainly nds it di cult to attack the A ghan aliban who may

be ellow tribesmen, creating a paradoxical situation with regard to the sealing o the border. U.S.observers on the A ghan side believe that FC personnel either do nothing or sometimes providecovering re or ingress or egress o A ghan aliban ghters. One reason or the ine cacy o the FC border posts is that they are isolated and poorly manned and cannot be de ended againstconcentrated attacks by militants. FC soldiers nd it wiser sometimes to look the other way whenwell-armed aliban bands cross the border near them. Tese de ciencies are being addressed jointly by Pakistan and the United States.

Inside A ghanistan, the aliban have increased their area o in uence, o en with local sup-port. Teir nancing is robust, with money likely coming rom a thriving opium trade and taxesimposed by local warlords, and contributions rom the Pashtun diaspora and Arab supportersin the Middle East. Te inability o the A ghan government to success ully draw the aliban intotalks on governing the country and thereby separating the extremists rom the moderate elementsin the movement has allowed the con ict to continue. alks between the A ghan governmentand the aliban in Saudi Arabia late in 2008 o er some hope o a change that may help dilute thestrength o the aliban. Historically, the aliban resist instructions rom any oreign government,Muslim or non-Muslim.

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The Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan and OtherMilitant GroupsMany people in the North-West Frontier Province o Pakistan retain positive associations re-garding the aliban movement o the 1990s, which they saw as bringing stability and traditional

Pashtun values to A ghanistan a er years o civil war. Teir view o the contemporary alibanmovement in A ghanistan is somewhat more complex but still largely positive. Tere is a great dealo con usion, however, about Pakistani aliban groups such as the P. On the one hand, theircriminality and willingness to resort to suicide attacks against other Muslims belie their Islamicmessage; on the other hand, their violent resistance against the Pakistani state is unsettling tomany Pashtuns in both the settled and the tribal areas o the rontier.

Baitullah Mehsud, who originated the idea o the P in South Waziristan and broke out o the normal boundaries o tribal leadership and the con nes o his native area in South Waziristan,has created a transregional movement. He has aligned himsel with di erent disa ected localgroups and even some criminal elements to produce a network o militants across the NWFPand FAA and has been linked to operations inside the settled areas o Pakistan. He aced initialdi culty in recruiting or his movement but admitted to a journalist that U.S. Predator attacksthat killed civilians helped his recruitment e orts tremendously: I spent three months trying torecruit and only got 1015 persons. One U.S. attack and I got 150 volunteers! 1 Te P acessome local opposition rom other militant groups, including Mullah Nazir in South Waziristan,who is Ahmedzai. Te Mehsuds largely stayed away rom the insurgency in 20032004 led by Nek Mohammad Wazir.

In the Khyber and Mohmand areas, other local militant groups have been ghting each other,some even under the guidance o the ISI and other o cial sponsors with a view to keeping themoccupied and away rom any alliances with the P. Te reasons or these skirmishes are o enlocal, criminal, or or control o local markets and taxes on commercial activities. In some

cases the ghting is based on di erences o opinion on religious dogma (Deobandi versus Barelvischools o Sunni Islamic thought, or example).

Te rise o ad hoc anti-aliban lashkars (militia) in recent months, and the relatively mutedresponse o the public in the NWFP to the militarys operations in Swat, Bajaur, and Mohmand,suggest that the tide o public opinion may be slowly turning against the insurgents . Now that thesheer criminality o these insurgent groups is becoming widely known and acknowledged, publicpatience is wearing thin. Te government o Pakistan has wisely begun to re er to these alibangroups as criminals and dacoits (quaint old Anglo-Indian term or robbers, derived rom thelocal word dakoo), re using to brand them with religious labels. Another quaint old English term,miscreant,2 has been in vogue in the Pakistan Army since 1971, when the independence-seekingBengalis were labeled as such. Te religious basis o this word may not be the reason it was chosenthis time by the military spokesmen, but most Pakistanis and even audiences in English-speakingcountries around the world have a hard time understanding this outmoded term! Tis conver-gence between the discourse o the state and that o the common people vis--vis the insurgents isan important and positive development.

1. Based on an interview that Baitullah Mehsud gave to Iqbal Khattak o the Daily imes (Lahore).2. Middle English word or disbeliever or heretic.


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Current Developments in FATA and the NWFPLocal communities are beginning to mobilize against militant groups . Tis is happening spo-radically, in places like Bajaur, Dir, Buner, and Peshawar, but it has made quite an impression onprovincial elites. Citizen mobilization programs have the potential to play an important role incounterinsurgency (COIN) e orts in the Frontier, since most communities have both the legiti-mating mechanisms ( jirgas or tribal conclaves) and means (small arms) to mobilize quickly. TeU.S. government might want to consider ramping up support or provincial programs that cantake advantage o this trend, including the training o well-equipped, rapid-response police orcesthat can be deployed in support o citizen groups, while ensuring that these e orts are not seenas American-managed but as locally managed. Te emergence o tribal lashkars in Bajaur againstmilitants in the all o 2008 was a sign o the success o this movement. Yet there is a potentialdanger that the leaders o these groups may become independent local warlords, equipped by thestate.

Te provincial government has gained a measure o public support or anti-insurgent opera-tions. Te Awami National Party-led governments attempted peace deals in Swat succeeded by

ailing. Even though the deals in Swat with the ehreek-e-Ni az-e-Shariah-e-Mohammedi ( NSM)and the P ell apart rather spectacularly, they were both necessary and productive: by dem-onstrating a good- aith e ort, the government won substantial public support or more kineticoperations o the kind that are currently being conducted in Swat by the army and in the Bajauragency by the Frontier Corps. Te ANP-led government, however, remains vulnerable on a num-ber o ronts. Most directly, aliban groups have begun speci cally targeting the ANP in an at-tempt to weaken its resolve. argeted actions against ANP politicians and their amilies, as well asANP-a liated businesses, have already caused a number o party workers to dampen their publicrhetoric and question more aggressive action against the militants. On the political ront, the ANPis highly vulnerable on the right rom religious parties and rom the actions o the mainstreamPakistan Muslim League. I the security situation does not improve noticeably in the next six to

nine months, this government may be in trouble.Te United States can also help Pakistan develop a comprehensive communications strategy to

counter the militants propaganda. Lack o access to speedy justice, tentative responses by policeto insurgent activity, and dys unctional systems o local government are all important secondary drivers o the aliban insurgency in the Frontier. Te U.S. government should do an initial needsassessment with the government o Pakistan to see i there are any practical ways that the UnitedStates and the international community could support targeted justice re orm e orts.

Fighting Militancy in the Frontier Region

Although the militants in FAA and the NWFP have tried to paint their struggle in Islamic terms,at heart the issues that have spawned unrest and violence in the region are economic and political.Te extended neglect o the needs o the local population or economic development and political voice has made FAA an area that is ripe or militancy as a means o asserting the rights o its in-habitants. Te traditional system o political administration and intermediary maliks was riddledwith corruption with resources diverted by the privileged maliks to their own uses rather than tothe needs o the tribes. Te political agents and the government were complicit in these arrange-ments, as they used bribery and corruption to urther their control over the maliks and the tribes


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in FAA. It was common knowledge that many maliks and other leaders o the tribal communi-ties had established residence in Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Hangu, and even Islamabad. Tey andtheir amilies were on the o cial dole and o en served as ghost employees o various govern-ment-sponsored projects. A celebrated recent case challenged the credentials o a member o theNational Assembly rom FAA who continued to be shown as a caretaker o a local governmentschool. Pakistani rules prohibit anyone in government service rom being able to contest electionsor at least two years a er retirement or separation rom such a post.

Interaction between FAA tribesmen and their counterparts in the settled areas o the NWFPand Pakistan proper provided evidence o the vast economic and social disparities that existbetween FA A and the rest o Pakistan (as was shown in able 3 in chapter 1) . Such disparities asliteracy rates (almost 44 percent or Pakistan as a whole versus 35.4 percent in the NWFP and 17.4percent in FAA) provide ertile ground or militancy in the name o religion and social justice.ribesmen who traveled to the settled areas ound it hard to compete with their brethren or jobsin the marketplace or places in higher educational institutions.

Making the sense o deprivation o the local population worse is the continuation o an

anachronistic legal system that operates in FAA. Te Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) inheritedrom the British applies in FAA. Not that the criminal justice system o Pakistan provides speedy

justice to Pakistanis in general. However, onerous local rules that apply colonial solutions andpunishments to crimes committed in FAA persist under the FCR. For example, a whole tribe may be held responsible or the actions o an individual. Tis has helped the militants gain avor amonglarge numbers o disa ected people who see such rules as un air and unjust. While the new civil-ian government announced its intention to amend the FCR, progress has been slowed by locally vested interests, including FA As current representatives who would tend to lose some o theirin uence i the system o governance were to be changed.

Changes within FATAPakistan used FAA as a bu er zone between itsel and A ghanistan, and so long as troubles re-mained con ned to FAA they did not concern the government deeply. Tat situation has changednow with violence and militancy spilling over into the settled areas. FAA can no longer be com-partmentalized.

Te separation o FAA rom the government o the NWFP also makes it di cult to treatmilitancy in both FA A and the NWFP in a coordinated manner, with FA A being managed romIslamabad via the Governors House in Peshawar rather than rom the provincial government o the NWFP. Economic planning is also complicated, since FA A has a separate secretariat and aseparate development plan that is not easily dovetailed into provincial e orts.

Certain basic changes have occurred in FAA that need to be recognized and dealt with:

Te weapons balance has shi ed. Except or tanks and airplanes, insurgents all have goodweapons and communications systems, including satellite phones.

Insurgents are very mobile, relying on all-terrain double-cab pickup trucks, o en smuggled inrom A ghanistan.

Demographic pressure in FAA has emerged rom a rising youth bulge that is largely


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unemployed and ripe or conversion to the mission o the militants. 3 New power centers haveemerged within each agency, as local warlords have supplanted traditional tribal maliks. FAAis no longer an isolated area. It contains big towns now. Miranshah, in North Waziristan, orexample, with a population o 70,000, is ten times the size o the newly amous town o Wasillain Alaska. Te chain o tribal command has become less clear as a result o the changes in thedemographics and resultant social dynamics o FA A.

Te Frontier Corps was built or a peacetime environment or policing activities not to ght acounterinsurgency campaign. Tey need local o cers, not o cers imported rom the PakistanArmy, as well as better training and heavier weapons systems.

Administrative re orms are now a compulsion. Te electoral system needs to be revamped also,tying the region to the NWFP perhaps or giving it a status similar to the provincially adminis-tered tribal areas, or PA A.

U.S. Development Assistance for FATATe recent shi o emphasis to economic development with assistance rom the United States tothe government o Pakistan represents a late realization that economic and political developmentare symbiotic. Te ow o unds has been much delayed, however, and is proceeding at a trickle.Complicated project implementation procedures o U.S. AID (designed to ensure proper use o unds) and sta ng shortages in the FAA Secretariat, as well as the inability o secretariat sta tooperate in individual FAA agencies because o security considerations, make the whole processsclerotic and slow. Economic and social development requires a presence in the eld and an ability to draw the local population into the process o selecting projects and helping implement them,not basing them on academic approaches cra ed in Washington or Islamabad. According to localo cials, one o the most e ective elements o the United States development e ort is operated by the Narcotics A airs Section o the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, which has been in the eld since

1987 and has a strong presence in and knowledge o FA A, especially in Bajaur, Mohmand, andKhyber agencies. It has helped Pakistan eradicate poppy cultivation and its e ectiveness is basedon its relatively simple processes and action-oriented approach.

Some success ul though small projects along these lines have been launched by the O ce o ransition Initiatives (O I) o USAID. Tese have provided unding to the government o Paki-stan or speci c projects, such as the provision o non- ood items to internally displaced personsin ank, just outside FAA, and involving the local community in Hangu to oversee a develop-ment project. But O I has yet to replicate these e orts inside FAA. According to Pakistanio cials some 3038 percent o O I nancing actually reaches the a ected people at the groundlevel in the area. USAID maintains that only 2030 percent o project unds do not actually reachthe target populations and some o these are spent on hiring locals to help administer the project.Moreover, the FAA Secretariat does not have the sta to audit or monitor projects e ectively. TeAnnual Development Programme or FAA has grown rom Rs. (Pakistani rupees) 1 billion in2001 to Rs. 78 billion in 2008. Tis is roughly equivalent, however, to only $103 million, a smallproportion o what the region needs and minuscule when compared to the cost o waging war inthe region. 4

3. Some 15 percent o the population o FAA alls into the youth category.4. It costs $343 million per day or the war in Iraq. http://www.nationalpriorities.org/costo war_home,

accessed October 3, 2008.


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Regardless o these issues, a key actor in the eventual success o all development e orts insideFAA remains the ability o local actors, including governmental bodies, to deliver most o theaid rom domestic and overseas sources to the recipients and to reduce the leakage that occurs enroute. Tere is much nger-pointing between military and civil authorities about the preponder-ance o aid money being spent on acquisition o vehicles and setting up o ces rather than deliv-ering services to the needy inside FAA. Lack o security has also deterred civilian o cials rom venturing deep into the territory to assess and meet needs.

Political, Economic, and Social DevelopmentChallenges in FATAMost studies dealing with the tribal areas explain the developments o the last two decades by o-cusing on the external actors without taking into account the local dynamics. Te importance o external actors should not be underplayed, but they can only work in a conducive atmosphere. By ocusing on one key part o FA AWaziristanthat has become the center o militancy, we canunderstand the major actors at play in ostering the rise o militancy. 5

Te alibanization o Waziristan might be analyzed as the outcome o a social movementamong the Wazir tribesmen that started in the 1970s and was accelerated in the post9/11 contextby the emergence o tribal entrepreneurs who took advantage o a change o political opportuni-ties and o their access to resources to contest the traditional tribal leadership. It is a movement o the kashars (the young, the poor, and those belonging to minor lineages) against the mashars (thetribal elders) and the political agent and also a movement o the kashars against those who have aninterest in the status quo, namely the ma a o maliks, transporters, and tra ckers. (See also box,Changes in the Demographic Structure o Waziristan, on page 24).

A er Pakistans declaration o independence in 1947 and the withdrawal o military orcesrom FAA, there was an increase in lawlessness in Khyber and Kohat pass. Jirgas o all the impor-tant tribes were held by Sir George Cunningham, the governor o the NWFP, to reach agreementwith the tribes to accept the new government o Pakistan as their suzerain on the same termsas had existed with the British. Finally an all-tribal jirga was held with Muhammad Ali Jinnah,the ounder and rst governor general o Pakistan, on Apr

fata a most dangerous place

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