family firm mergers & acquisitions in different legal ... · when a merger and acquisition...
TRANSCRIPT
FFI ANNUAL CONFERENCE FAMILY BUSINESS RESEARCH & EDUCATION SYMPOSIUM
OCTOBER 29, 2008, LONDON
FAMILY FIRM MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS IN DIFFERENT LEGAL ENVIRONMENTS
Isabel Feito-Ruiz Susana Menéndez-Requejo
Department of Finance. Family Business Chair. University of Oviedo. SPAIN.
CONTACT INFORMATION: Address: Susana Menéndez Requejo. Faculty of Economics. Avda. del Cristo s/n. 33071 Oviedo. Spain
[email protected] or [email protected] Phone: +34 985 10 39 12 FAX: +34 985 10 37 08
Abstract
This study analyses family versus non-family firm returns under different legal environments
when a Merger and Acquisition (M&A) is announced. The database includes M&As of
European listed firms, with target firms being worldwide public or private firms, over the
2002-2004 period.
Shareholders of bidder family firms value better the M&A announcement compared to non-
family firm shareholders. Cumulative Average Abnormal Return, in (-2,+2), is 1.18% for the
whole sample, 2.82% for family firms and 0.92% for non-family firms. Family ownership is a
positive factor in bidder shareholder M&A valuation in environments with higher shareholder
protection, better accounting standards, greater financial development (GDP) and better
corruption control.
JEL Codes: G30; G32; G34; F30.
Key Words: Mergers and Acquisitions, Family Firms, Bidder, Abnormal Return, Legal
Environment, Investor Protection.
1
1. Introduction
Competition for market share influences firm strategy, with M&As being one of the main
ways for firms to grow, yet also supposing an important challenge for family firms. Empirical
research shows mixed results in relation to firm wealth creation after an M&A announcement.
Moreover, differences in M&A market valuation between family and non-family firms, as
well as the influence of the legal environment, are incipient topics. These are the motivations
and research objectives of this paper.
The database to test the theoretical proposals considers Mergers and Acquisitions for
European listed firms over the 2002-2004 period, distinguishing between family and non-
family firms, with target firms being worldwide public or private firms. We will compare
bidder shareholder wealth creation between family and non-family firm M&As, using event
study methodology and multivariate analysis and controlling by the differences in the legal
environment of the countries of acquiring and acquired firms. This paper will also present a
database which includes not only domestic operations, but cross-border ones as well, and also
analyzes unlisted firm acquisition. In contrast with other research studies which consider
exclusively European firms, or only American firms, or exclusively listed firms, or only
financial or non-financial firms.
We have structured the paper into the following sections: in the second section, we analyze
the precedents in the financial literature related to shareholder M&A valuation, as well as the
influence of the legal and institutional environment, and propose the hypotheses under study;
in the third section, we present the database and descriptive statistics; in the fourth section, we
summarize the results of the analysis of abnormal returns and their differences according to
the legal and institutional environment; in the fifth section, we carry out a multi-variant
analysis of abnormal return determinants; and, in the sixth and final section, we present our
conclusions.
2
2. Firm acquisition valuation: Research background
One of the reasons motivating this research is that the results found in empirical studies on the
acquiring-firm shareholders valuation are contradictory. While research studies agree on the
positive valuation that acquired-firm shareholders make, the same does not occur when
analyzing the valuation of acquiring-firm shareholders. Some studies conclude that acquiring-
firm shareholders negatively value the announcement of an M&A,1 while others obtain
positive abnormal returns.2 To reflect upon the reasons for these divergences, it is necessary
to examine the differences in the analyzed databases, as well as to study the relevance of the
characteristics of the firms involved and the transactions. Among the former studies,
concerning firms listed in the USA, Travlos (1987) obtains a cumulative abnormal return for
the acquiring firm of -1.6% when payment is made in shares of stock and of -0.13% when in
cash. For the USA, Chang (1998) reports a cumulative abnormal return of 0.09% when
unlisted firms are acquired and payment is in cash, and -0.02% when the target firms are
listed. When the transaction payment is in shares of stock, the abnormal return takes the value
of 2.64%, if the target firm is unlisted, and -2.46%, if listed.
The increase in merger and acquisition operations in the European market since the 1990s
allows for comparing results with those of the American market. Several papers focus on
acquisitions carried out by European financial firms, such as Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000),
who report positive abnormal returns of 0.99% for acquiring-firm shareholders, although
there are those who obtain negative cumulative returns: Beitel et al. (2002), -0.01% for
1 Travols, 1987; Walter, 2000; De Long, 2001; Beitel and Arbour, 2002; Gregory and McCorriston, 2002; Georgen and Renneboog, 2004; Campa and Hernando, 2006; Hagendorff, Collins, and Keasey, 2007. 2 Maquieria, Megginson and Nail, 1998; Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller, 2002; Raj and Forsyth 2002; Campa and Hernando, 2004; Moeller, Schillingemann and Stulz, 2004; Ben-Amar and André, 2006; Faccio, McConnell and Stolin, 2006.
3
operations in any part of the world; Campa and Hernando (2006), -0.87% for European
operations; or Hagendorff et al. (2007), -0.32% for European and American financial firms. In
the USA, studies with databases starting from the 1980s or 90s again obtain diverse results:
Mulherin and Boone (2000), -0.37 %; Walker (2000), -0.30% for non-financial firms; and
DeLong (2001), -1.68%, while Moeller et al. (2004) obtain abnormal returns of 1.10% and
Fuller et al. (2002), 1.77% for non-financial firms.
2.1. Acquiring-shareholder valuation determinants: transaction and firm characteristics
A review of studies undertaken to date underscores the following characteristics of the
transactions and firms involved as determinants for acquiring-shareholder valuation:
a) Method of payment. If management considers that the shares of their firm are
overvalued, they will prefer to pay an M&A operation in shares of stock. Thus, the
announcement of an acquisition paid in shares of stock will be a negative sign to the
acquiring-firm shareholders and therefore valued negatively (Myers and Majluf,
1984). On the other hand, they will positively value payment in cash (Travlos, 1987;
Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003).
b) Friendly vs hostile takeover. Hostile takeovers raise the price paid for the target firm,
which determines a negative acquiring-firm shareholder valuation (Schwert, 1996;
Gregory, 1997; Schwert, 2000; Campa and Hernando, 2004).
c) Focus vs diversification. Empirical studies obtain mixed results regarding M&A
valuation which implies the diversification of business focus. Jensen and Ruback
(1983), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), Campa and Kedia (2002), and Raj and
Forsyth (2002) associate wealth creation to M&As which diversify, while Morck,
Sheleifer and Visnhny (1990), Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), and
4
Maquieria et al. (1998) conclude that diversification diminishes acquiring-shareholder
wealth due to the fact that management tends to overpay.
d) Cross-Border vs Domestic Transactions. Studies for periods following the 1990s
coincide in the positive acquiring-firm shareholder valuation of a cross-border M&A
announcement both in the United States (Francis, Hansan and Sun, 2007) and in
Europe (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Antoniu, Petmezas and Zhao, 2007),
although domestic operations generate greater returns. Integration costs and cultural
problems should be taken into account.
e) Managerial opportunism and growth opportunities. It is more likely that firms with
free cash-flow carry out acquisitions no matter the circumstances (Harford, 1999), and
therefore that their shareholders negatively value the announcement. Lang, Stulz and
Walking (1989) show that firms with a high market-to-book ratio obtain high
abnormal returns around the acquisition announcement, while Dong, Hirshleifer,
Richardson and Teoh (2006) find to the contrary, which leads them to consider the
ratio as a proxy for overvaluation.
f) Size of acquiring firm. The greater separation between ownership and control, which
tends to exist in large firms, may favor managerial interest in M&As, even though this
be overpaid (managerial hubris hypothesis, Roll, 1986), motivating a worse valuation
on the part of the acquiring-firm shareholders (Schewert, 2000, Beitel et al., 2004,
Moeller, 2004).
g) Relative size of the target firm. On the one hand, the larger the target firm is, the more
information there will be on the firm, as well as less adverse selection problems in
their valuation (Asquith, Bruner and Mullins, 1983). On the other hand, however, this
5
will generate higher integration costs between the two firms (Agrawal, Jaffe and
Mandelker, 1992), which acquiring-firm shareholders will value negatively.
h) Target Firm Listing. The majority of studies analyze acquisitions of market listed
firms. Acquiring a listed firm generates the free-rider problem (Grossman and Hart,
1980) by attracting potential buyers, which raises the payment price. The acquisition
of an unlisted firm does not generate as much competition. Moreover, adverse
selection forces the price to drop (Akerlof, 1970). Faccio et al. (2006) obtain positive
abnormal returns, 1.48%, when the target firm is unlisted and negative returns, -0.38%
when it is listed. Chan (1998), Fuller et al. (2002), Moeller et al. (2004), and Conn,
Cosh, Guest and Hughes (2005) also show greater gains when purchasing private
companies.
2.2. Bidder ownership structure: family vs non-family firms
Bidder ownership structure and its influence on the wealth creation surrounding an M&A is
an aspect which has yet to receive attention. However, studies do relate family or non-family
ownership structure to firm performance.3
Family ownership may influence shareholder valuation of growth operation announcements,
such as M&As, especially minority shareholder valuation.
A) On the one hand, acquiring family firms may seek mainly to benefit the family's interests
at the expense of minority shareholders, and thus negative shareholder returns would be
expected when the M&A is announced (Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang, 2002). Large
shareholders, like families, may transfer assets or profits to other firms that they own (i.e.
3 McConaughy, Walker, Henderson and Mishra (1998), Anderson and Reeb (2003), Barontini and Caprio (2006), Maury (2006), Menéndez (2006), Poutziouris (2006), Villalonga and Amit (2006), Chang and Shin (2007), Millar, Le Breton-Miller and Cannella (2007).
6
tunneling) (Johnson, La Porta, López-Silanes and Shleifer, 2000). Tunneling may refer to
excessive compensation for family positions in the firm, advantageous transfer prices or
loans, loan guarantees, or M&A operations that enhance the value of other owned
companies. We call this hypothesis “family-firm opportunism in M&As”.
B) On the other hand, family firms may be characterized by long-term perspectives, given
their interest in transferring the business on to future generations (James, 1999). Thus,
strategic decisions such as an M&A would be fostered. Furthermore, reduced
management-shareholder agency conflicts in family firms may favor positive shareholder
valuation when M&As are announced (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). We call this
hypothesis “family-firm efficiency in M&As”. According to these arguments, Ben-Amar
and André (2006) find that abnormal returns around the announcement of the acquiring
firm, for a sample of Canadian transactions, are positive and greater for family versus
non-family firms, 2.1% versus 0.2% abnormal returns, respectively. They state that
market participants do not perceive families as using an M&A to obtain private benefits at
the expense of minority shareholders.
It is our aim to test these contradictory hypotheses.
2.3. Influence of the legal and institutional environment on merger-acquisition valuation
The analysis of ownership structure influence on M&A market valuation should also bear in
mind that ownership structures differ across countries and depend on the legal and
institutional environment. English (common law) countries are characterized by greater
shareholder protection and a more disperse ownership structure, with agency problems arising
especially from management-shareholder conflicts of interest. However, in continental Europe
(civil law, differentiating between French, German and Scandinavian models), less legal
protection of minority shareholders determines more concentrated ownership structures, so
7
that the most relevant agency problems are those associated with the possible wealth
expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders (La Porta, López-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Visnhy, 1997).
This study aims to examine whether shareholder M&A valuation depends on the legal and
institutional environment. We consider that two contrasting types of hypotheses may be
established and will later examine in our empirical analysis which of these predominates.
1) On the one hand, the “poorer” institutional environment of an acquired firm (low
minority shareholder protection, poor accounting standards, low creditor protection,
less developed capital markets, highly concentrated ownership, poor corruption
control) will determine a market with “less” active and “less” competitive corporate
control. In this environment, the likelihood of finding undervalued target firms
increases. Thus, bidder wealth appropriation will be valued positively by acquiring
shareholders (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Starks and Wei, 2004; Hagendorff et al., 2007;
Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Furthermore, the target
firm will adopt better corporate governance practices and will show greater degrees of
transparency and shareholder protection, which will allow the acquiring firm to pay a
lower price in the takeover (Starks and Wei, 2004; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Martynova
and Renneboog, 2008).
2) On the other hand, target firms in a “poorer” legal and institutional environment may
generate problems and decrease the value of the M&A. Low minority shareholder
protection, poor accounting standards, higher ownership concentration, poor
corruption control, poor creditor protection and less developed capital markets hinder
acquisition negotiations and increase the risk of operating in these countries.
Therefore, a negative M&A valuation will be expected on the part of the acquiring
8
shareholders (Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Rossi and Volpin,
2004; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005).
Furthermore, large shareholders, like families, may extract private benefits more easily from
minority shareholders, for example, after an M&A in legal environments with poor protection
for minority shareholders (Ben-Amar and André, 2006). Higher benefits of control would be
associated with less developed capital markets, more concentrated ownership and, in general,
a worse legal and institutional environment. In contrast, family ownership may positively
influence firm value in legal environments with greater minority shareholder protection
(Maury, 2006).
3. Database
The aim of this research study is to verify the previously expounded hypotheses and
arguments. In order to do so, we examine the database made up of listed European firms
which announced an M&A during the 2002-2004 period, with the target firm being listed or
unlisted in any country in the world, with or without the prior participation of the acquiring
firm or a subsidiary of another firm. We consider the different characteristics of the target
firms examined to be a contribution of this study, as other studies have been limited to a
specific geographical region or have not considered unlisted target firms.
We obtained our dataset from the Thomson One Banker Merger & Acquisitions Database,
DataStream, Lexis Nexis and Amadeus. Our sample meets the following criteria:
(i) Observations are made on all M&As announced by a European listed company for the
period 2002-2004 which have been completed to date; (ii) Both domestic and cross-border
transactions are considered; (iii) Target firms may be listed, private or a subsidiary of the
acquiring firm in any part of the world; (iv) The transaction involves a change in control.
9
Of the 511 merger and acquisition operations initially identified, we eliminated those
transactions in which:
(i) The share price is not available in Datastream (175 operations). (ii) There are relevant
discrepancies regarding the announcement dates between Thomson One Banker and Lexis-
Nexis (27 operations). (iii) The acquiring firm announces more than one operation in the
event window, (-20, +20) (49 operations). (iv) There is no change in control in the acquired
firm (5 operations). (v) The beta parameter of the market model is not significant at the 95%
confidence level (79 operations).
The final sample of M&A announcements consists of 176 transactions involving firms from
25 countries, with a total market value of over US$ 2666.962 billion. Acquiring firms paid, on
average, US$ 661.37 million for target firms.
In order to classify firms as family or non-family, we checked ownership data in Thomson
One Banker, Lexis Nexis, the company annual report, the company website and the stock
exchange in the country of each firm. 33 firms do not have information about shareholder
structure available in any of those sources. The remaining 143 firms are classified as family
firms when the major shareholder is a family group or an individual, being non-family firms
otherwise. 45 firms are classified as family (31%) and 98 as non-family firms (61%).
3.1. Sample description
Table 1 shows M&A distribution according to the geographical area of both the acquiring and
target firm. 31.25% of all operations are carried out in the United Kingdom. Domestic
transactions in Sweden (6.81%) and France (6.25%) are also noteworthy.
10
Table 1. Geographic distribution of the mergers and acquisitions Database: Thomson One Banker. Number of merger and acquisition operations for the 2002-2004 period in both the country of the acquiring firm (listed firms in Europe) and that of the target firm (listed and unlisted firms around the world).
+ 33 firms could not be classified, as family or non-family, due to the unavailability of their ownership data.
Table 2 shows the transaction distribution depending on whether the acquiring firm is a
family or non-family firm. Panel A refers to the characteristics of the transaction, according to
payment method, whether the M&A is hostile or friendly, whether the acquisition has the
same business focus or, to the contrary, represents a diversification, and whether it is
domestic or cross-border. Panel B classifies operations according to whether or not the target
firm lists on the market and the acquiring firm has had previous participation in the target
firm. We do not observe differences between family and non-family firms regarding the
percentage which each type of operation represents. 76% of the target firms do not list on the
Bidder country Total+ Family Non-family Target country Total
176 45 98 176 Austria 2 - 1 Austria 2 Belgium 2 1 1 Belgium 4 Denmark 1 - 1 Bermuda 1 Finland 6 - 5 Bulgaria 1 France 18 9 8 Canada 1
Germany 15 7 6 China 2 Greece 3 - 2 Demark 3 Ireland 4 1 2 Finland 8
Italy 6 - 5 France 13 Netherlands 3 1 2 Germany 14
Norway 8 - - Greece 2 Poland 1 - - India 1 Spain 6 6 - Ireland 5
Sweden 16 4 9 Italy 7 Switzerland 4 1 3 Japan 1
United Kingdom 81 14 49 Luxemburg 1 Netherlands 2 Norway 5 Poland 1 Portugal 1 Spain 4 Sweden 17 Switzerland 3 United Kingdom 60 United States 17
Domestic 109 29 56 Domestic 109 Cross-border 67 16 42 Cross-border 67
11
market. Around 90% of the transactions do not imply previous bidder participation in the
target firm (non-subsidiary). 95% are friendly takeovers, while 59% represent acquisitions
with the same business focus. 43% of non-family firm M&As are cross-border transactions
versus 36% for family firm M&As.
Table 2. Transaction characteristics Number of M&As according to transaction characteristics of the target firm and according to whether the bidder is a family or non-family firm. Listed European acquiring firms, 2002-2004 period.
Table 3 includes the statistical descriptions for the entire M&A dataset, distinguishing
between family and non-family firms as well as between domestic and cross-border M&As.
The differences between family and non-family firms are not statistically significant. Neither
are they between domestic and cross-border operations, except for larger size in reference to
the target firm (transaction value, in millions of US dollars, divided by the acquiring firm
market value four weeks prior to the operation, in millions of US dollars), greater cash flow
availability and the greater weight of private target firms in domestic transactions.
Panel A: Transaction characteristics
Transactions Cash Equity Mixed Others Hostile Friendly Focus Diversif. Domestic Cross-
border Family 45 12 6 4 23 1 44 26 19 29 16 Non-Family 98 37 14 14 33 6 92 58 40 56 42 Total 143 49 20 18 56 7 136 84 59 85 58 Panel B: Target characteristics
Transactions Public Private Subsid. Non-
subsid. Family 45 10 35 2 43 Non-Family 98 25 73 9 89 Total 143 35 108 11 132
12
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics Sample of 176 M&A announcements by European listed firms, target firms being listed and non-listed firms worldwide, for completed transactions between 2002 and 2004. We distinguish: 45 family firms, 98 non-family firms and 33 firms with unavailable ownership data. 109 are cross-border transactions and 67 are domestic. The table shows the average value (as percentage, or dollars for some variables), with the standard deviation below in parentheses. Non-parametric Mann-Whitney test of differences (p value).
All+ (N=176)
Family (N=45)
Non family (N= 98)
Difference Test (p value)
Cross-border
(N= 109)
Domestic (N= 67)
Difference Test (p value)
Panel A: Transaction Characteristics
Cash payment (%) 30 (0.46)
27 (0.44)
37 (0.48) (0.19) 30
(0.46) 30
(0.46) (0.95)
Equity payment (%) 15 (0.36)
13 (0.34)
14 (0.35) (0.88) 10
(0.31) 17
(0.38) (0.21)
Mixed payment (%) 15 (0.36)
8 (0.28)
14 (0.35) (0.37) 13
(0.34) 16
(0.36) (0.70)
Others means of payment (%)
40 (0.49)
51 (0.51)
34 (0.48) (0.06*) 47
(0.50) 37
(0.48) (0.21)
Friendly (%) 96 (0.21)
98 (0.14)
94 (0.24) (0.32) 96
(0.21) 95
(0.21) (0.97)
Tender offers (%) 15 (0.36)
13 (0.34)
18 (0.39) (0.46) 19
(0.40) 13
(0.34) (0.24)
Related businesses (%) 59 (0.49)
58 (0.50)
59 (0.50) (0.87) 64
(0.49) 56
(0.50) (0.28)
100% acquired (%) 94 (0.24)
98 (0.15)
91 (0.29) (0.13) 96
(0.21) 93
(0.26) (0.45)
Value of transactions (mil $)
661.37 (4736.75)
500.80 (2369.35)
814.46 (6082.63) (0.78) 414.46
(1956.10) 813.35
(5827.19) (0.95)
Relative size 1.25 (8.47)
1.32 (5.47)
1.43 (10.70) (0.21) 0.29
(1.39) 1.84
(10.68) (0.00)***
Panel B: Bidder Characteristics
Total assets (mil $) 12829 (69819.81)
13161.06 (61709.37)
13173.78 (79671.97) (0.12) 11462.14
(51413.04) 13673.41
(79315.95) (0.40)
Cash flow to total assets
3.89 (44.54)
0.33 (0.47)
6.55 (59.06) (0.92) 0.30
(0.41) 6.02
(56.22) (0.04)*
Market to Book 112.08 (1289.68)
390.30 (2548.39)
16.76 (67.71) (0.51) 292.03
(2104.04) 4.11
(17.23) (0.25)
Panel C: Target Characteristics
Public target (%) 24 (0.43)
22 (0.42)
26 (0.44) (0.67) 30
(0.46) 21
(0.41) (0.19)
Private target (%) 52 (0.50)
49 (0.51)
53 (0.50) (0.64) 43
(0.50) 57
(0.50) (0.08)*
Subsidiary target (%) 24 (0.42)
29 (0.46)
21 (0.41) (0.33) 27
(0.45) 22
(0.42) (0.47) + 33 firms could not be classified due to the unavailability of their ownership data. *,*** significant at the 10% and the 1% level.
Table 4 shows the number of operations in the database, classifying them in accordance with
the legal system of both the acquiring and target firm countries. Following La Porta et al.
(1998), we classify countries by the subsequent system: English (common law) and German,
Scandinavian, French, and communist (civil law). In the sample there is no transaction in a
13
country with a communist legal system. The greatest number of operations takes place among
countries with the same legal system. Note should be taken of the number of transactions
carried out among firms pertaining to the English legal system (74 transactions out of the 176
which make up the sample), that is to say, those belonging a strong shareholder protection
environment.
Table 4. Sample distribution according to legal origin Number of transactions according to both bidder and target legal origin, following classification by La Porta et al. (1998).
Bidder Legal Origin Target Legal Origin English French German Scandinavian Total
Total (176) 85 35 23 33 176 English 74 5 4 2 85 French 4 28 3 2 37 German 6 2 14 1 23 Scandinavian 1 - 2 28 31 Same origin 144 Panel A: Family firm sub-sample (45) Total 15 17 8 5 45 English 14 3 3 - 20 French 1 13 1 - 15 German - 1 3 - 4 Scandinavian - - 1 5 6 Same origin 35 Panel B: Non-family firm sub-sample (98) Total 51 18 11 18 98 English 42 2 2 1 47 French 3 13 1 - 17 German 4 1 8 2 15 Scandinavian 2 2 - 15 19 Same origin 78
4. Acquiring firm shareholder valuation
We shall now examine the valuation that capital markets make of M&As, following the event
study methodology. We estimate abnormal returns at around the transaction announcement
date.
We obtain M&A announcement dates from Thomson One Banker and Lexis Nexis. We
calculate the abnormal return for each announcement (AR) in the event window (-20, +20) as
14
the difference between daily returns and expected returns according to the market model,
estimated in the period (-200, -21) before the announcement date. Datastream provides the
daily return index for each firm, adjusted by dividends and splits. This return index allows
estimating daily return. We follow the method of Dodd and Warner (1983) and Corrado
(1989) for small sample size in order to verify the existence of significant daily abnormal
returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR).
Table 5 shows the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for bidder firm shareholders
around the announcement of the M&A. The abnormal return for bidder firm shareholders on
the day of the merger or acquisition transaction announcement (t=0) is 0.30% for the entire set
of firms, 0.52% for family firms and is not statistically significant for non-family firms. The
results for the entire set of firms is consistent with Chang (1998), Fuller et al. (2002), Moeller
et al. (2004), Faccio et al. (2006), and Martynova and Renneboog (2006). In the interval
(-2,+2) the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for the whole sample is 1.18%, 2.82% for
family firms and 0.92% for non-family firms, all cases being statistically significant.
Therefore, bidder firm shareholder valuation is positive for the entire set of public firms in
Europe. Acquiring family firm shareholders value the M&A more than non-family firm
shareholders. The CAARs obtained are similar to those obtained by Ben-Amar and André
(2006) for the Canadian market. These results support the hypothesis of family firm efficiency
in M&As (long-term objectives, greater ties to the future of the firm) as opposed to the
hypothesis of family shareholder opportunism (using M&As to obtain private benefits at the
expense of minority shareholders).
15
Table 5. Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) for the acquiring firm surrounding the M&A announcement Sample of 176 M&A announcements by European listed firms, target firms being, listed and unlisted firms worldwide, for completed transactions between 2002 and 2004. 45 family firms, 98 non-family firms, 33 firms with unavailable ownership data.
***, **, *: significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
4.1. Bidder shareholder valuation according to transaction characteristics
In accordance with the aim of this paper, we will now analyze the valuation made by
shareholders in more detail. We examine the differences in said valuation, comparing family
and non-family firms, according to whether the target firm is public or private, and
discriminating by whether the transaction is domestic or cross-border and by method of
payment.
Table 6 shows the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for bidder shareholders in (-2, +2).
The difference between the CAAR for family and non-family firms is not statistically
significant, as neither is the difference in the CAAR for domestic and cross-border M&As. As
regards the method of payment, and in accordance with other studies, the CAAR is positive,
1.25%, when the M&A is paid in cash and statistically different from the CAAR when the
Event window
CAAR % Total
Dodd & Warner
Test
Corrado Test
CAAR % Family
Dodd & Warner
Test
Corrado Test
CAAR % Non-Family
Dodd & Warner
Test
Corrado Test
0 0.30% 2.85*** 2.02** 0.52% 1.72* 0.68 0.12% 1.23 1.26 (-1,+1) 0.70% 3.68*** 2.58*** 1.38% 2.76*** 1.08 0.44% 1.44 1.32 (-2,+2) 1.18% 3.87*** 3.06*** 2.82% 3.22*** 2.57** 0.92% 1.99** 1.57 (-2,+4) 1.32% 3.32*** 2.30** 3.08% 2.89*** 1.95* 0.95% 1.65 1.24 (-4,+4) 1.37% 8.16*** 2.06** 3.28% 8.51*** 1.97* 0.73% 2.55** 0.79 (-5,+5) 0.65% 1.41 1.13 3.30% 2.77*** 1.56 -0.34% -0.72 -0.27
(-10,+10) 0.32% 1.23 0.94 4.81% 3.00*** 2.40** -1.41% -0.80 -0.58 (-20,+20) 4.37% 1.67 0.96 -0.39% 0.53 0.71
(-2,0) 0.74% 2.73*** 2.03** 1.24% 1.85* 1.59 0.52% 1.21 0.85 (-3,0) 0.56% 1.55 1.57 1.42% 1.95** 1.74* 0.09% -0.15 0.25 (-4,0) 0.79% 1.84* 1.61 1.45% 1.88* 1.57 0.30% 0.13 0.26 (-5,0) 0.34% 0.70 0.83 1.29% 1.67 1.05 -0.34% -1.18 -0.48 (-6,0) 0.66% 1.34 1.15 1.78% 1.88* 1.32 0.01% -0.52 -0.31 (-7,0) 0.50% 0.86 1 1.67% 1.68* 1.18 -0.09% -0.67 -0.02 (0,+2) 0.74% 3.91*** 3.06*** 2.10% 3.30*** 2.13** 0.52% 2.07** 1.81* (0,+3) 0.70% 3.34*** 2.1** 1.66% 2.74*** 1.38 0.55% 1.81* 1.34 (0,+4) 0.88% 3.08*** 2.05** 2.35% 2.69*** 1.39 0.55% 1.56 1.29 (0,+5) 0.61% 2.06** 1.29 2.53% 2.78*** 1.35 0.13% 0.70 0.56 (0,+6) 0.38% 1.70 0.94 2.59% 2.49** 1.01 -0.10% 0.22 0.34 (0,+7) 0.46% 2.02** 1 2.51% 2.43** 1.09 -0.07% 0.62 0.37
16
method of payment is through equity, being negative in this case, though not statistically
different from zero. The differences are also significant when the payment method is in cash
and the bidder is a private firm, 1.58%, versus a public firm (not statistically different from
zero).
Table 6. Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) for the bidder firm according to firm and transaction characteristics Sample of 176 M&A announcements by European listed firms, target firms being, listed and unlisted firms worldwide, for completed transactions between 2002 and 2004. 45 family firms, 98 non-family firms, 33 firms with unavailable ownership data. The results of the Dodd and Warner T-test (1983) and the Corrado non-parametric test (1989) are included respectively in parentheses below the CAAR. The test for difference is the Mann-Whitney non-parametric test.
CAAR (-2,+2)
Domestic (N=109 )
Cross-border. (N=67 )
Difference (p value)
Cash (N=53 )
Equity (N=26)
Mixed (N=26)
Others (N=71)
Difference cash vs equity
Panel A: All (N=176)
CAAR (Dodd-Warner)
(Corrado)
1.18% (3.87***) (3.06***)
1.22% (3.68***) (2.64***)
1.11% (1.57) (1.57)
(p=0.67) 1.25%
(3.11***)(1.89*)
-1.84% a
(0.04)
1.45% a
(2.08**)
2.13% (2.98***) (2.06**)
(p=0.09*)
Panel B: Family vs non-family
Family (N=45)
2.82% (3.22***) (2.57**)
3.21% a
(2.42**)
2.12% a
(1.34) (p=0.60)
2.50% a
(1.19)
4.63% a
(1.51)
-1.03% a
(0.36)
3.19% a
(1.92*) (p=0.57)
Non-family (N=98)
0.92% (1.99**) (1.56)
0.88% (1.52) (1.15)
0.98% (1.28) (1.08)
(p=0.88) 0.71% (1.38) (1.02)
-0.24% a
(0.49)
1.20% a
(0.47)
1.53% (1.72*) (1.23)
(p=0.27)
Difference (p value) (p=0.20) (p=0.23) (p=0.64) (p=0.81) (p=0.22) (p=0.60) (p=0.50)
Panel C: Public vs private target
Public (N=43)
0.88% (0.78) (1.48)
1.42% a
(1.06)
0.25% a
(1.11) (p=0.75)
0.341% a
(0.41)
0.45% a
(1.27)
-0.17% a
(0.67)
1.94% a
(0.80) (p=0.81)
Private (N =133)
1.28% (4.01***) (2.73***)
1.17% (3.77***) (2.57**)
1.47% (1.64) (1.16)
(p=0.76) 1.58%
(3.29***)(2.07**)
-3.27% a
(-0.95)
1.75% a
(1.83*)
2.18% (2.90***) (1.81*)
(p=0.04**)
Difference (p value) (p=0.64) (p=0.83) (p=0.86) (p=0.51) (p=0.32) (p=0.36) (p=0.99)
***, **, *: significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. a: the results are not shown due to the reduced size of the sub-sample.
4.2. Cross-border transaction valuation according to differences in the institutional
environment
In this section we contemplate the analysis of cross-border transactions, considering the
characteristics of the legal and institutional environment of both the acquiring and the target
17
firm. The variables which we take into consideration for each country are the following:
shareholder protection, accounting standards, corruption control, ownership concentration,
GDP per capita and creditor protection.
a) The degree of shareholder protection (PSHAREHOLDER). We define this following
Rossi and Volpin (2004) and Hagendorff et al. (2007) and multiply the revised anti-
director index (La Porta et al., 2008) by a measure of the rule of law which rates the
law-and-order tradition (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007).
b) The quality of accounting standards (ACCOUNT). We use the index from the Center
for International Financial Analysis and Research (La Porta et al., 1999, 2000).
c) Economic development (GDPpc). We consider the gross domestic product per capita
for each country and year (at constant prices from the year 2000), obtained from the
World Economic Outlook (International Monetary Fund).
d) Ownership concentration (OWNCONC) in each country. Calculated by La Porta et al.
(1998) as the average of the participation of the three major shareholders in the ten
largest, privately-owned, non-financial firms in each country.
e) Corruption control (CCORR). Variable defined by Kaufmann, et al. (2007) for the
control which a country’s political system exercises to avoid distortions in the
economic and financial environment, inefficiency in government and business, and
instability in the political processes which obstruct foreign investment.
f) Creditor protection (PCREDITOR). We multiply the creditor rights index defined by
Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2003), proxy for the possibility of debt financing, by
the measure of legal efficiency (rule of law ).
Table 7 shows the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for bidder shareholders according
to the differences between the respective institutional environments of the acquiring and the
18
target firm. This univariate analysis only obtains significant cumulative returns for domestic
transactions or between firms from countries with the same legal and institutional
environment. Neither do we observe significant differences when we compare family and
non-family cumulative returns. However, before reaching any conclusions, in the following
section we will carry out a multivariate analysis, which will allow us to take all the possible
determinants into consideration as a whole.
Table 7. Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) (-2,+2) for the acquiring firm, according to the differences in the legal and institutional environment Sample of 176 M&A announcements by European listed firms, target firms being, listed and unlisted firms worldwide, for completed transactions between 2002 and 2004. The results of the Dodd and Warner T-test (1983) and the Corrado non-parametric test (1989) are included respectively in parentheses below the CAAR. The test for difference is the Mann-Whitney non-parametric test. Panel A :Shareholder protection
Greater in bidder country (1) Equal (2) Less in bidder country (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3) 0.79% (0.80) (0.59)
(N=46)
1.22% (3.69***) (2.69***) (N=110)
1.85% a
(2.00*) (N=20)
(p=0.41) (p=0.67) (p=0.14)
Panel B: Accounting Standards Higher in bidder country (1) Equal (2) Lower in bidder country (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3)
1.32% (2.16**)
(1.68) (N=45)
1.36% (3.83***) (2.81***) (N=111)
-0.13% (-0.78) (-0.08) (N=20)
(p=0.92) (p=0.19) (p=0.16)
Panel C :GDP per capita Higher in bidder country (1) Equal (2) Lower in bidder country (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3)
2.45% a
(1.91*) (N=30)
1.21% (3.69***) (2.69***) (N=110)
-0.12% (-0.29) (0.09)
(N=35)
(p=0.44) (p=0.16) (p=0.06*)
Panel D: Ownership concentration Greater in bidder country (1) Equal (2) Less in bidder country (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3)
0.78% a
(0.65) (N=24)
1.30% (3.90***) (2.90***) (N=109)
1.58% (1.95*) (1.79)
(N=38)
(p=0.28) (p=0.95) (p=0.28)
Panel E: Corruption control Greater in bidder country (1) Equal (2) Less in bidder country (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3)
0.78% a
(0.65) (N=24)
1.30% (3.90***) (2.90***) (N=109)
1.58% (1.95*) (1.79)
(N=38)
(p=0.28) (p=0.95) (p=0.28)
Panel F: Creditor protection Greater in bidder country (1) Equal (2) Less in bidder country (3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3) (1)-(3)
0.61% (0.79) (0.87)
(N=43)
1.22% (3.69***) (2.69***) (N=110)
2.05% a
(1.52) (N=23)
(p=0.46) (p=0.84) (p=0.34)
*, **, ***: statistically significant at the 90%, 95 % and 99 % confidence level, respectively. a: the results are not shown due to the reduced size of the sub-sample.
19
5. Determinants of bidder abnormal returns
After the above univariate analysis, in this section we will carry out a multivariate analysis
which allows us to test the determinants of the acquiring-firm shareholders’ valuation of the
M&A announcement as a whole. Besides considering transaction and firm characteristics, we
will also examine the influence of the family nature of the acquiring firms, as well as the legal
and institutional environment of both the acquiring and the target firm.
5.1. Explanatory model of the acquiring-firm shareholders’ valuation
The specification of the model to test the hypothesis is as follows:
jiiiiiji INSTIFAMILYXINSTIFAMILYCAR ,43210, * εααααα +++++=
The dependent variable (CARi) is the estimated 5-day (-2,+2) cumulative abnormal return of
acquiring European firms around the announcement date of a transaction.
Family (FAMILY) is a dummy variable taking the value of one when an individual or family
is the major shareholder, or zero otherwise.
Ownership (OWNER) is the percentage of shares held by the majority shareholder.
Ownership2 (OWNER2) is the square of ownership.
The INSTI variable groups together variables concerning the legal and institutional
environment characteristics of both the acquiring and the target firm, as defined in the
preceding section. The explanatory variables are defined as the difference in each
characteristic between the acquiring and the target firm4: Shareholder protection
(DFSHAREHOLDERBT), Accounting standards (DFACCOUNTBT), Economic development
4 We also consider the variable for the acquiring and the target firm separately. However, the results are not significant in this case.
20
(DFGDPBT), Ownership concentration (DFOWNCONCBT), Corruption control
(DFCCORRBT), and Creditor protection (DFCREDITORBT).
The FAMILY*INST variable reflects the interaction between family ownership and the
characteristics of the legal and institutional environment. In accordance with the previous
hypotheses, we expect that a “better” legal environment in the bidder country, when the
bidder is a family firm, will positively affect the acquiring-firm shareholders’ valuation.
The Xi variable is a variable vector which incorporates both firm and transaction
characteristics and includes the following variables, defined as dichotomous variables:
Method of payment (CASH), which has a value of 1 if financing is exclusively in cash; Bidder
attitude regarding the takeover (FRIEND), which has a value of 1 if friendly; Focus activity
(FOCUS), which has a value of 1 if the main line of business for both firms is the same, two
digits of the SIC code; Cross-border transactions (CROSS), which has a value of 1 if the
transaction is cross-border; Acquiring firm size (SIZE), which has a value of 1 if the firm falls
within the first quartile of market capitalization at the end of the semester prior to the
transaction announcement; Target firm listing (LISTED), which has a value of 1 if the target
firm lists on the market; Managerial opportunism (CFLOW), defined as cash flow between
all acquiring firm assets; Growth opportunities (MB), approximated as the market-to-book
ratio of the acquiring firm; and Relative size of the acquired firm (RSIZE), calculated as a
logarithm of the value of the transaction divided by the market value of the acquiring firm
four days before the transaction.
5.2. Results: determinants of the acquiring-firm shareholders’ valuation
In this section we develop the cross-sectional regression analysis to examine the impact of
family ownership on bidder abnormal return, considering the influence of the legal and
institutional environment, as well as firm and transaction characteristics, as control variables.
21
The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (-2, +2) for bidder shareholders at
announcement. The explanatory variables are those described in the previous section.
Table 8 shows the results of the regression analysis. The fact that the acquiring firm is a
family firm has a positive and significant effect on the valuation made by bidder shareholders
(models 1, 4, 5). This result is consistent with the “family firm efficiency in M&As”
hypothesis that we established previously. The long-term perspective of family firms and their
lesser degree of manager-shareholder agency conflicts are in accordance with this result.
Shareholders do no perceive families as using M&As to obtain private benefits at the expense
of minority shareholders, contrary to the “family firm opportunism in M&As” hypothesis.
We also find a non-monotonic relationship between the level of ownership concentration and
acquiring firm abnormal returns. The ownership2 variable has an expected negative and
significant sign (Model 2). At higher concentrations of ownership by large shareholders, the
relationship becomes negative (the entrenchment effect becomes dominant).The high
correlation between family and ownership variables causes said variables to lose significance
in Model 3.
Among the classic explanatory variables, the following results are significant: the fact of
being a friendly takeover (FRIEND), which has a positive effect, and the existence of
investment opportunities (MB), which has a negative effect, consistent with Moeller et al.
(2004).
The positive effect of the family variable is maintained when we incorporate the variables for
the legal and institutional environment of both the acquiring and the target firm, as well as
their difference (Table 8 shows the estimates defining institutional variables as differences
between the environment of the bidder and that of the target firm). Among the institutional
variables, only the difference in corruption control between the countries of the firms
22
involved in the M&A is significant. This result is consistent with the possibility of
shareholder wealth expropriation in the target firm country. The high correlation between the
institutional variables and the family variable leads us to verify the significance of the
interaction variable between both sets of variables (Table 9).
Table 8. Determinants of Bidder Abnormal Returns: Family Ownership Least squares regressions. Dependent variable: cumulative abnormal return in the event window (-2,+2). Explanatory variables: family ownership, legal and institutional environment, and control variables. The sample consists of 124 M&A announcements by European listed firms (2002-2004).
*, **, ***: statistically significant at the 90%, 95 % and 99 % confidence level, respectively.
Table 9 reports the interaction between family and legal and institutional characteristics of the
bidder country. We separately estimate 6 models, given the high correlation between the
variables. When the bidder is a family firm, we observe a positive effect in the bidder
shareholder valuation when its legal and institutional environment offers greater shareholder
protection (Model 1), better accounting standards (Model 2), financial development (GDP)
(Model 3) and corruption control (Model 5). In these environments, management-shareholder
and majority-minority shareholder agency conflicts are less serious. Likewise, there is less
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) FAMILY 0.0237* 0.0231 0.0250* 0.0250* OWNER 0.0017 0.0013 OWNER2 -0.0000* -0.0000 CASH 0.0143 0.0129 0.0147 0.0141 0.0146 FRIEND 0.0467** 0.0531** 0.0480** 0.0462** 0.0459** FOCUS 0.0156 0.0131 0.0164 0.0146 0.0149 CROSS-BORDER -0.0019 -0.0073 0.0003 CFLOW -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 MB -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** SIZE 0.0514 0.0539 0.0565 0.0504 0.0512 RSIZE 0.0024 0.0030 0.0025 0.0026 0.0028 LISTED -0.0069 -0.0074 -0.0078 -0.0064 -0.0058 DFPSHAREHOLDER BT 0.0013 DFACCOUNT BT DFGDP pcBT DFOWNCONC BT DFCCORRBT 0.0104* DFPCREDITOR BT YEARS YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 124 124 124 124 124 Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-square 0.1426 0.1324 0.1565 0.1441 0.1486
23
operational risk in said environments. These results are consistent with the positive influence
of family ownership in legal environments with better minority shareholder protection
(Maury, 2006).
Table 9. Regression: Bidder Abnormal Returns and Family Ownership Least squares regressions. Dependent variable: cumulative abnormal return in the event window (-2,+2). Explanatory variables: family ownership, legal and institutional environment, and control variables. The sample consists of 124 M&A announcements by European listed firms (2002-2004).
*, **, ***: statistically significant at the 90%, 95 % and 99 % confidence level, respectively.
We do not observe any differences in the results for other event windows of the cumulative
abnormal return or for alternative definitions of legal and institutional environment variables
(such as dummies).
6. Conclusions
This study explores the influence of family ownership on the abnormal return of European
bidder firms, taking into account the legal environment of the acquiring firm and the possible
differences with that of the country of the target firm.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) FAMILY*PSHAREHOLDER 0.0038* FAMILY*ACCOUNT 0.0003* FAMILY*GDP 0.0000* FAMILY*OWNCONC 0.0452 FAMILY*CCORR 0.0122* FAMILY*PCREDITOR 0.0040 CASH 0.01315 0.0156 0.0146 0.0129 0.0134 0.0093 FRIEND 0.0478** 0.0440** 0.0467** 0.0465** 0.0474** 0.0505** FOCUS 0.0156 0.0157 0.0158 0.0137 0.0152 0.0138 CFLOW -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000** MB -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** SIZE 0.0517 0.0470 0.0502 0.0491 0.0515 0.0503 RSIZE 0.0024 0.0016 0.0024 0.0025 0.0025 0.0024 LISTED -0.0055 -0.0080 -0.0071 -0.0086 -0.0071 -0.0059 YEARS YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 124 120 124 123 124 123 Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-square 0.1487 0.1414 0.1430 0.1199 0.1401 0.1281
24
The sample includes M&As announced by European listed firms throughout 2002-2004.
Target firms are listed and unlisted firms worldwide. This is a broader sample in comparison
to other research studies. Another contribution of this paper is the analysis of cross-border
M&As, considering legal and institutional environment characteristics in relation to
shareholder protection, accounting standards, financial development, ownership
concentration, corruption control and creditor protection.
Family firm control may impose costs on minority shareholders, such as tunneling earnings or
favoring sub-optimal investments. However, family ownership may enhance long-term
strategies and diminish agency conflicts between shareholders and management. Our results
are in accordance with a positive influence of family ownership on acquiring shareholder
valuation of M&A announcements. Cumulative Average Abnormal Return, in (-2,+2), is
1.18% for the whole sample, 2.82% for family firms and 0.92% for non-family firms.
Multivariate Analysis, considering legal and institutional environment characteristics, also
shows that family ownership is a positive factor in bidder shareholder M&A valuation in
environments with greater shareholder protection, better accounting standards, more financial
development (GDP) and better corruption control.
7. References
Agrawal, A.; Jaffe. J.; Mandelker, G. (1992). The post-merger performance of acquiring
firms: a re-examination of an anomaly. Journal of Finance, 47, 1605-1621.
Akerlof, G.A. (1970). The market for “lemons”: quality uncertainty and the market
mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488-500.
Anderson,R.C.; Reeb, D.M. (2003). Founding-family ownership and firm performance:
Evidence from S&P 500. Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1301-1328.
Antoniou, A.; Petmezas, D.; Zhao, H. (2007). Bidder gains and losses of firms involved in
many acquisitions. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 34, 1221-1244.
25
Asquith, P.; Bruner, R.; Mullins, D. (1983). The gains to bidding firms from merger. Journal
of Financial Economics, 11, 121-139.
Barontini,R.; Caprio, L. (2006).The effect of family control on firm value and performance:
Evidence from continental Europe. European Financial Management, 11(1-2), 689-723.
Beitel, P.; Arbour, P.H. (2004). Explaining M&A success in European banks. European
Financial Management, 10, 109-139.
Ben-Amar, W.; André, P. (2006). Separation of ownership from control and acquiring firm
performance: The case of family ownership in Canada. Journal of Business Finance and
Accounting, 33 (3/4), 517-543.
Berger, P.G.; Ofek, E. (1995).Diversification's effect on firm value. Journal of Financial
Economics, 37, 39-65.
Bradley, M.; Deai, A.; Kim, E.H. (1988). Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and
their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms. Journal of
Financial Economics, 21, 3-40.
Bris, A.; Cabolis, C. (2008). The value of investor protection: Firm evidence from cross-
border mergers. The Review of Financial Studies, 21, 605-649.
Campa, J.M.; Kedia, S. (2002). Explaining the diversification discount. Journal of Finance,
57, 1731-1762.
Campa, J.M.; Hernando, I. (2004). Shareholder value creation in European M&As. European
Financial Management, 10, 47-81.
Campa, J.M.; Hernando, I. (2006). M&A performance in the European financial industry.
Journal of Banking; Finance, 30, 3367-3392.
Chang, S. (1998). Takeovers of privately held targets, method of payment, and bidder returns.
Journal of Finance, 53, 773-784.
Chang, J.J.; Shin, H.H. (2007). Family ownership and performance in Korean conglomerates,
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 15 (14), 329-352.
Claessens, S.; Djankov, S.; Fan, J.; Lang, L.H.P.(2002). Disentangling the Incentive and
Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholders. Journal of Finance, 57, 2741-71.
Conn, R.L.; Cosh, A., Guest, P.M.; Hughes, A. (2005). The Impact on UK Acquirers of
Domestic, Cross-border, Public and Private Acquisitions. Journal of Business Finance;
Accounting, 32, 815-871.
26
Corrado, C.J. (1989). A nonparametric test for abnormal security-price performance in event
studies. Journal of Financial Economics, 23, 385-395.
Cybo-Ottone, A.; Murgia, M. (2000). Mergers and shareholder wealth in European banking.
Journal of Banking and Finance, 24, 831-859.
Dahlquist, M.; Pinkowitz, L.F.; Stulz, R.M.; Williamson, R. (2003). Corporate governance
and the home bias. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 87-110.
De Long, G.L. (2001). Stockholder gains from focusing versus diversifying bank mergers.
Journal of Financial Economics, 59, 221-252.
Djankov, S.; McLiesh, C.; Sheleifer, A. (2003). Private credit in 129 countries. Journal of
Financial Economics, 84, 299-329.
Djankov, S.; La Porta, R.; López-de-Silanes, F.; Shleifer, A. (2008).The law and economics
of self-dealing. Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.
Dodd, P.; Warner, J.B. (1983). On corporate governance- A study of proxy contests. Journal
of Financial Economics, 11, 401-438.
Dong, M.; Hirshleifer, D.; Richardson, S.; Teoh, S.H. (2006). Does investor misevaluation
drive the takeover market? Journal of Finance, 61, 725-762.
Faccio, M.; McConnell, J.; Stolin, D. (2006). Returns to acquirers of listed and unlisted
targets. Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis, 41, 198-220.
Francis, B.B.; Hasan, I.; Sun, X (2007). Financial market integration and the value of global
diversification: Evidence for U.S. acquirers in cross-border mergers and acquisitions.
Journal of Banking and Finance, forthcoming.
Fuller, K.; Netter, J.; Stegemoller, M. (2002). What do returns to acquiring firms tell us?
Evidence from firms that make many acquisitions. Journal of Finance, 57, 1763-1793.
Goergen, M.; Renneboog, L. (2004). Shareholder wealth effects of European domestic and
cross-border takeover bids. European Financial Management, 10, 9-45.
Gregory, A. (1997). An examination of the long-run performance of UK acquiring firms.
Journal of Business Finance; Accounting, 24, 971-1002.
Gregory, A.; Mc Corriston, S. (2002). Foreign acquisitions by UK limited companies: long-
run performance in the US, Continental Europe and rest of the world. Working Paper.
Financial Market Research Centre, University of Exeter.
Grossman, S.; Hart, O. (1980).Takeover bids, the free-rider problem and the theory of the
corporation. Bell Journal of Economics, 10, 20-30.
27
Hagendorff, J.; Collins, K.; Keasey, K. (2007). Investor protection and the value effects of
bank merger announcements in Europe and the US. Journal of Banking and Finance,
forthcoming.
Harford, J. (1999). Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions. Journal of Finance, 54, 1969-
1997.
James, H.S. (1999). Owner as manager, extended horizons and the family firm. International
Journal of the Economics of Business, 6 (1), 41-55.
Jensen, M.C.; Ruback, R.S. (1983).The market for corporate control: the scientific evidence.
Journal of Financial Economics, 11, 5-50.
Johnson, S.; La Porta, R.; López-Silanes, F.; Shleifer, A. (2000).Tunneling. American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 90, 22-27.
Kaufmann, D.; Kraay, A.; Mastruzzi, M. (2007).Governance Matters VI: Governance
Indicators for 1996-2006. World Bank Policy Research June 2007.
La Porta, R.; López-de Silanes, F.; Shleifer, A.; Vishny, R.W. (1997). Legal determinants of
external finance. Journal of Finance, 52, 1131-50.
La Porta, R.; López-de-Silanes, F.; Shleifer, A.; Vishny, R. (1998). Law and Finance. Journal
of Political Economy, 106, 113-1155.
La Porta, R.; López-de-Silanes, F.; Shleifer, A. (1999).Corporate ownership around the world.
Journal of Finance, 54, 471-517.
La Porta, R.; López-de-Silanes, F.; Shleifer, A.; Vishny, R. (2000). Investor protection and
corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 3-27.
Lang, L.H.P.; Stulz, R.M.; Walking, R.A. (1989). Managerial performance, Tobin's Q, and
the gains from successful tender offers. Journal of Financial Economics, 24, 137-154.
Lang, L.; Stulz, R.M. (1994). Tobin's Q. Corporate diversification and firm performance.
Journal of Political Economy, 102, 1248-1280.
Maquieria,C.; Megginson,W.; Nail, L. (1998). Wealth creation versus wealth redistributions
in pure stock-for-stock mergers. Journal of Financial Economics, 48, 3-33.
Martynova, M.; Renneboog, L. (2006). Mergers and acquisitions in Europe: the fifth takeover
wave, en: Rennebog, L. (dir), Advances in Corporate Finance and Asset Pricing. Ed.
Elservier, Amsterdam.
Martynova, M.; Renneboog, L. (2008). Spillover of corporate governance standard in cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Corporate Finance, forthcoming.
28
Maury, B. (2006). Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Western
European corporations. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12 (2), 321-341.
McConaughy, D.L.; Walker, M.C.; Henderson, G.V.; Mishra, C.S. (1998). Founding family-
controlled firms: Efficiency and value. Review of Financial Economics, 7 (1), 1-19.
Menéndez, S. (2006).Ownership structure and firm performance: evidence from Spanish
family firms. Handbook of Research on Family Business. Ed. Edward Elgar.
Millar, D.; Le Breton-Miller, I; Cannella Lester, R.H.; Cannella, A.A. (2007). Are family
firms really superior performers? Journal of corporate Finance, 13 (5), 829-858.
Moeller, S.B.; Shilingemann, F.P.; Stulz, R.M. (2004). Do shareholders of acquiring firms
gain from acquisitions? Journal of Financial Economics, 73, 201-228.
Moeller, S.; Schlingemann, F. (2005). Global diversification and bidder gains: A comparison
between cross-border and domestic acquisitions. Journal of Banking and Finance, 29,
533-564.
Myers, S.; Majluf, N. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have
information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187-221.
Mock, R., Shleifer, A.; Vishny, R.W. (1990). Do managerial objectives drive bad
acquisitions?. Journal of Finance, 45, 31-48.
Mulherin, J.H.; Boone, A.L. (2000). Comparing acquisitions and divestitures. Journal of
Corporate Finance, 6, 117-139.
Poutziouris, P. (2006). The structure and performance of the UK family-business PLC
economy. Handbook of Research on Family Business. Ed. Edward Elgar.
Raj, M.; Forysth, M., (2002). UK horizontal takeovers and bidder gains. Mimeo Aberdeen
Business School.
Roll, R. (1986). The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of Business, 59, 197-
216.
Rossi, S.; Volpin, P.F. (2004). Cross-country determinants of mergers and acquisitions.
Journal of Financial Economics, 74, 277-304.
Schwert, G.W. (1996). Mark-up pricing in mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Financial
Economics, 41, 153-192.
Schewert, G.W. (2000). Hostility in takeovers: In the eyes of the beholder? Journal of
Financial Economics, 41, 153-162.
29
Starks, L.; Wei, K. (2004).Cross-border mergers and differences in corporate governance.
European Finance Association Meeting Proceeding.
Sudarsanam, S.; A.A. Mahate (2003). Glamour Acquirers, Method of Payment and Post-
acquisition Performance: The UK Evidence. Journal of Business Finance; Accounting,
30 299-342.
Travlos, N.G. (1987).Corporate takeover bids, method of payment and bidding firms´ stock
returns. Journal of Finance, 42, 973-963.
Villalonga, B.; Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, control and management affect
firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2), 385-418.
Walker, M. (2000). Corporate takeovers, strategic objectives, and acquiring-firm shareholder
wealth. Financial Management, 29, 53-63.