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FA-142 / February 1994

Report of theJoint Fire/PoliceTask Force on

CIVILUNRESTRecommendations forOrganization andOperations DuringCivil Disturbance

FEDERAL EMERGENCYMANAGEMENT AGENCY

United StatesFire Administration

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Report of theJoint Fire/PoliceTask Force on

CIVILCIVILUNRESTUNRESTRecommendations forOrganization andOperations DuringCivil Disturbance

PREFACE

Concerned about the possible escalation in the incidents of riots and other forms of civilunrest and about the ability of firefighters to deal effectively with such situations in thecontext of the 1990s, the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA), in cooperation with the FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA), assembled a task force in June 1992 of thenation’s leading fire chiefs, who were later joined by their police counterparts.

The newly formed Task Force on Civil Unrest convened a series of meetings over the nextseven months to analyze the April 1992 Los Angeles civil disorders and to share what provedto be valuable experiences in dealing with civil unrest, from the viewpoints of both fire andpolice agencies. The Task Force was successful in reaching its goal-to formulate a plan ofjoint action to combat civil unrest in the U.S. today.

A “lessons learned” report, the document which follows was prepared in anticipation offuture civil unrest occurrences nationwide. History was made at these meetings as policiesand procedures to combat civil unrest were consolidated and refined to meet the needs oftoday’s society. We at the USFA are extremely pleased that for the first time in recentmemory, police and fire executives were able to sit and work together, to voice theirconcerns and wishes, and to come to a basic agreement on how their personnel can bestcooperate in the field. It is anticipated that numerous lives will be saved through the jointefforts of this distinguished and influential panel of police and fire executives who gatheredand worked harmoniously.

The dynamics of these meetings, from the inception of the Task Force in June 1992 inEmmitsburg, Maryland, to the culmination in a successful team effort offering solutions toaddress future civil unrest problems in January 1993 in Denver, Colorado, have made thisa remarkable and historic experience for the USFA.

Whenever a community needs help, it (more often than not) calls on its fire and/or policeservices. Our communities will benefit as a result of the findings of the Task Force on CivilUnrest, and our country will become better able to combat civil disturbances and maintainnational peace.

We are grateful to the Task Force members for their exemplary efforts in improving theability of fire and police personnel to work together and better serve communities throughoutthe nation.

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TASK FORCE ON CIVIL UNREST

FIRE CHIEFS

Rayfield AlfredChief (Ret.), District of Columbia Fire DepartmentWashington, D.C.

Donald AnthonyDeputy Chief, Los Angeles Fire DepartmentLos Angeles, California

William AustinChief, Tampa Fire DepartmentTampa, Florida

David ChamberlinChief, Atlanta Fire DepartmentAtlanta, Georgia

Michael E. DaltonDeputy Chief, Baltimore City Fire DepartmentBaltimore, Maryland

Harry DiezelChief, City of Virginia Beach Fire DepartmentVirginia Beach, Virginia

Co1. DukeChief (Ret.), City of Miami Fire/Rescue

DepartmentMiami, Florida

Gary EastonChief, San Diego Fire DepartmentSan Diego, California

Michael FreemanChief, Los Angeles County Fire DepartmentLos Angeles, California

George GeorgeAssistant Chief (Ret.), San Diego Fire DepartmentSan Diego, California

Richard GonzalesChief, Denver Fire DepartmentDenver, Colorado

Claude HarrisChief (Ret.), Seattle Fire DepartmentSeattle, Washington

Chris A. HunterChief, Long Beach Fire DepartmentLong Beach, California

Donald O. ManningChief, Los Angeles City Fire DepartmentLos Angeles, California

George MonogueChief, Portland Fire DepartmentPortland, Oregon

Frederick F. PostelChief (Ret.), San Francisco Fire DepartmentNovato, California

Neil SvetanicsChief, St. Louis Fire DepartmentSt. Louis, Missouri

Clell WestChief, Las Vegas Fire DepartmentLas Vegas, Nevada

V

POLICE CHIEFS

Phillip ArreolaChief, Milwaukee Police DepartmentMilwaukee, Wisconsin

Eldrin A. BellChief, Atlanta Police DepartmentAtlanta, Georgia

Raymond BurkartDeputy Chief, New Orleans Police DepartmentNew Orleans, Louisiana

Dean DeJongMajor, Miami Police DepartmentMiami, Florida

Melvin C. HighAssistant Chief, Metropolitan Police DepartmentWashington, D. C.

Stephen JeffriesDeputy Chief, Denver Police DepartmentDenver, Colorado

Curtis LaneDeputy Chief, Tampa Police DepartmentTampa, Florida

Thomas Maloney, SuperintendentChief, Bureau of Field ServicesBoston Police DepartmentBoston, Massachusetts

Raul MartinezAssistant Chief, Miami Police DepartmentMiami, Florida

Thomas PotterChief, Portland Police BureauPortland, Oregon

UNITED STATES FIRE ADMINISTRATION

Olin L. GreeneU.S. Fire Administrator (Former)U.S. Fire Administration

George W. Buck, Jr.Project Manager, ModeratorU.S. Fire Administration

Charles Burke11Training Specialist, Group FacilitatorNational Fire AcademyU.S. Fire Administration

Anthony D. MannoTraining Specialist, Group FacilitatorNational Fire AcademyU.S. Fire Administration

Edward WallDeputy AdministratorU.S. Fire Administration

Phyllis A. KreitzProgram AnalystU.S. Fire Administration

Dr. Burton ClarkTraining Specialist, Group FacilitatorNational Fire AcademyU.S. Fire Administration

Kenneth H. StewartModeratorStewart Training Associates

Richard AdamsModeratorRDA Associates

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CONTENTSi i i

Preface

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

O V E R V I E W

A Picture of the FutureThe Nature of Riots

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The Fire ServiceRecent Civil DisturbancesLos Angeles-A Case Study of a Large CityTampa-A Case Study of a Mid-Sized CityVirginia Beach-A Case Study of a Small CommunityAnatomy of a Riot

M I T I G A T I O N

PrioritizationP lann ingAddressing Technical and Political IssuesBuilding Strong Relationships Among AgenciesCommunicationsCommunication Between Police and Fire AgenciesCommunications EquipmentTrainingCultural Sensitivity TrainingOperations IssuesCommunity RelationsSprinkler Systems

PREPAREDNESS

How Police Chiefs and Fire Chiefs Worked TogetherPrioritizationCommunicationsPlanningTrainingEquipmentCommand and ControlAccepting RiskThe Role of the Public Information OfficerOperations IssuesCommunity RelationsHow Agencies Can Build a Relationship

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91010222425

313132323333343434353636

414142454849505050515151

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Part 5 RESPONSE

PrioritizationCommunicationPlanningCommand and ControlOperations IssuesCommunity Relations

Part 6 RECOVERY

TrainingCommunity Relations

Part 7 SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONS

MitigationPreparednessResponseRecovery

Appendixes

1 THE ROLE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES IN CIVIL UNREST 73

2 MODEL OPERATIONS PLANS 81

3 GLOSSARY 85

4 REFERENCES 89

555657575758

6365

69707071

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1

OVERVIEW

1

OVERVIEWThe Rodney King beating verdicts reached inApril 1992 by a suburban Simi Valley jury trig-gered civil unrest in cities across the nation, in-cluding Atlanta and Chicago. The most devastatingreaction occurred in Los Angeles, where fifty-three people died in the ensuing riots. The inten-sity and magnitude of the riots caught city officialsby surprise and unprepared to deal with the law-lessness and violence which followed. The result-ing mass destruction of property in the city of LosAngeles totalled over $1 billion.

The repercussions of the riots were a majorchallenge to firefighters, police officers, and sup-porting agencies, who fought large-scale propertydestruction and numerous arson fires, complicatedby violent reaction from angry citizens.

In the months following the riots, the Office ofFire Prevention and Arson Control of the U.S.Fire Administration (USFA) joined with theFederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)to convene a task force of distinguished membersof the nation’s fire and police chiefs. Their mis-sion was to study the problem of civil unrest, ingeneral, evaluate what took place in Los Angeles,and formulate innovative strategies to deal with

future instances of civil disturbance. This reportpresents the recommendations of the Task Forceon Civil Unrest for dealing with civil disorder.The Task Force is aware that the needs and re-sources of communities vary; a single set of guide-lines to address the problem of civil disordernationwide would be ineffective and difficult toimplement.

In crisis situations, concerned agencies responddifferently, stemming from variations in tasks,jurisdictions, education, geographical environment,level of preparedness, and other administrative andpolitical considerations. Consequently, they aredrawn into a crisis at different moments, withvarying viewpoints and purposes, Consideringthese divergent responsibilities, it is essential tocoordinate efforts to mitigate and control civildisorders.

One means of addressing civil unrest is to de-velop a “menu” approach for joint action betweenlaw enforcement and fire/emergency medicalservice (EMS) agencies. A list of strategies that acommunity may adopt “as is,” or interchange asneeded, is compiled. Even with this approach,joint action between police and fire personnel may

OVERVIEW 3

not be the best strategy to control a particularsituation. (In some circumstances, allowing thecrisis to run its course may be the best policy.)

In November 1976, the President’s Commissionon Civil Disorders participated in a Department ofJustice planning conference on “Prevention andControl of Civil Disturbance.” The commissionassessed police preparedness in handling civildisorders and suggested that police back-up sup-port from other agencies, such as the NationalGuard, is essential, The commission also stressedthe need for improved communications, betterintelligence information, and training in the use ofnonlethal weapons (USDOJ).

The report presented here addresses key issuesto be considered by fire and police personnel andother support agencies in their efforts to workcooperatively to save lives and property duringcivil unrest situations. These recommendationsrequire adaptation within the context of the juris-diction and the environment in which the disturb-ante occurs. A successful collaboration amongagencies will depend on:

1. Compatibility of the agencies2. Adaptation of a common technical

terminology3. A strong joint command structure

4. Regularly scheduled joint training exercises5. Effective mutual aid agreements

A PICTURE OF THE NEAR FUTURE

The 1990 census yielded a wealth of informationprojecting how the U.S. will look in the future.Demographic data forecast a rapidly integratingsociety, a sharp increase in the ratio of diversepeoples and cultures to the white majority over thelast two decades. Multicultural diversity hasthrown together many people who are compelledto interact on a daily basis.

In 1990, the U.S. population totalled 248.7million, an increase of 22.1 million since the 1980census. Table 1-1 illustrates the percentageincrease in ethnic populations between 1980 and1990.

Census experts project that population growthrates will continue to increase at an uneven ratethrough the next decade, mostly in the Southeastand West. States growing most rapidly tend tohave a high percentage of minorities, especiallyyouths, who are seeking to find their niche insociety and the American way of life. During thisadjustment process they are vulnerable to frictionwith established norms as they try to “fit in”.Because peer pressure tends to heighten this

Table 1-1. U.S. Population and Percent Change (by Race and Ethnicity), 1980-1990

Race/Ethnic GroupNumber

1990

Percent ofTotal Population

1990Percent Increase

1980-1990

(000)

Total, U.S. 248,710 100.0 9.8White, non-Hispanic 187,137 75.2 6.0Black 29,986 12.1 13.2

Native American,Eskimo, Aleut 1,959 0.8 37.9Asian/Pacific Islander 7,274 2.9 107.8Hispanic (of any race) 22,354 9.0 53.0

Source: “A Demographic Look at Tomorrow,” Hodgkinson 1992.

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friction, such groups are potentially volatile, espe-cially during the summer months when schools arein recess, jobs are scarce, and temperatures aresweltering. A minor issue deemed prejudicial toany of these groups could spark an angry reactionand lead to a violent response.

THE NATURE OF RIOTS

A riot may be defined as an unlawful assembly(several people who intend to unite for confronta-tion) which has developed to a stage of violence.Black’s Law Dictionary further defines riot as a“public disturbance involving (1) an act or acts ofviolence by one or more persons part of an assem-blage of three or more persons, which act or actsshall constitute a clear and present danger of, orshall result in, damage or injury to the property ofany other person or to the person of any otherindividual, or (2) a threat or threats of the com-mission of an act or acts of violence . . . wouldconstitute a clear and present danger of, or would

result in, damage or injury to the property of anyother person or to the person of any other indi-vidual” (Black 1990).

In general, riots are formed in several distinctstages. The first stage occurs when a group ofpeople is moved to commit acts of civil disorder.In the second stage, other individuals with nointerest in the issue join the action to take advan-tage of an opportunity to loot and destroy prop-erty. The third stage occurs when organized youthgangs join the disturbance and take it to theircommunities. Actions can range from looting toambush and sniper attacks directed against policeand fire personnel. At times, youth gangs willdesign diversionary tactics such as fires to distractpolice from the intended target(s).

Given these distinct stages in the developmentof a riot, police and fire agencies must be pre-pared to respond quickly, with adequate equip-ment, tactical plans, and sufficient personnel tocontrol potential civil unrest.

OVERVIEW 5

2

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Prop. Robert S. Scurlock, Washington Stock Photo

2

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVETHE FIRE SERVICE

Significant riot activity during the summer monthshas been recorded over the past three decades;some of the most notable occurred in Washington,D. C., Newark, New Jersey, and the Watts districtof Los Angeles. The late 1980s and early 1990shave seen similar activities, for example, theGreekfest riots in Virginia Beach, Virginia, in thelate 1980s; the disturbances in the Mount Pleasantarea of Washington, D.C., in 1991; the Los An-geles riots following the Rodney King verdicts;and the unrest in Denver, Colorado, in December1992.

The jury decision to acquit in the first RodneyKing court case sparked unrest in Southern Cali-fornia and in several other cities across the U.S.Although the major disturbance occurred in LosAngeles, other cities experienced looting, vio-lence, and property damage. Numerous fire andEmergency Medical Services (EMS) departmentsexhausted their resources in attempting to respondto calls for assistance. The Los Angeles Emer-gency Operations Department (LAEOD) reportedover 45,000 fire-related responses and fifty-three

fatalities. Current damage reports exceed $1billion.

Fire Department personnel responding to fireemergencies received minimal or no proper policeprotection from the rioters. The protection ofcitizens and responding fire service personnelbecame a primary issue. Faced with the possibilityof more riots and other forms of civil unrest, andconcerned with the ability of firefighters to dealeffectively with such situations in the future, theUSFA’s Office of Fire Prevention and ArsonControl assembled and convened the Task Forceon Civil Unrest. The first meeting was attended bysome of the nation’s leading fire chiefs, who werelater joined by their police chief counterparts. Atthe first joint meeting, the group analyzed the LosAngeles incident and shared valuable experiencesin dealing with civil unrest, from both fire andpolice points of view. A major goal of the TaskForce was to formulate a joint plan of action forfirefighters and police officers to address civilunrest today. A steering committee met in St.Louis, Missouri, and two follow-up workshopswere held in San Diego, California, and Denver,

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 9

Colorado, The Task Force members developed theframework of issues addressed in this report.

RECENT CIVIL DISTURBANCES

Some instances of civil unrest which haveoccurred during the last five years are listedbelow, with their resulting consequences, followedby a discussion of five significant civil disorders.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

1992-Los Angeles and other cities nation-wide: thousands arrested; some deaths; bil-lions of dollars in property damage; lawenforcement, the National Guard, and federaltroops called in to assist.1991-Crown Heights, New York City, NewYork: 142 arrested; 105 civilians and policeinjured,1991-Mount Pleasant, Washington, D.C.:245 arrested; 40 businesses damaged/destroyed; 69 police vehicles damaged, 7destroyed.1989-Virginia Beach, Virginia: hundredsarrested; dozens injured; 100 stores looted;damage reported at $1.4 million; 1,200National Guard troops and police called in.1988-Tomkins Square Park, New YorkCity, New York: 9 arrested; 18 policeofficers injured.

LOS ANGELES-A CASE STUDY OF ALARGE CITY

At approximately 1:00 p.m. on April 29, 1992,the Los Angeles District Attorney’s office wasinformed that the verdicts had been reached by thejury deliberating the Rodney King beating trial.Although the outcome of the verdicts wasunknown, the prosecutors learned that the jury hadnot reached verdicts on all counts. At the requestof the prosecutors, the judge ordered a two-hourdelay in announcing the verdicts-to enable themedia, which was providing unprecedented livecoverage of the trial, to ready itself to broadcastthe event.

When the jury’s verdicts were read at 3:00p.m., they were broadcast simultaneously to theentire city, The reaction in many areas was one ofshock and anger. Although there were limitedexpressions of support for the verdicts and the

criminal justice system, many who had seen thetaped beating replayed repeatedly during the pre-ceding weeks and months reluctantly accepted theoutcome.

In South Central Los Angeles, crowds began tocongregate almost immediately to protest theverdicts. The street corner protests began to growin number and size-first angry and thenviolent-a situation dramatized by the beating of awhite truck driver four hours after the verdictswere announced. During the next six days, thereaction escalated into a terrifying reign of vio-lence, widespread looting, and mass destruction ofproperty in many communities across the city. Theswiftness and ferocity of these events stunned theentire city and nation.

The first incident, which occurred within anhour after the verdicts were announced, took placein the Hyde Park neighborhood of the 77th StreetPolice District. The intersection of Florence andNormandie, considered one of the “flash points,”was the scene of repeated violent activity begin-ning before 4:00 p.m. The events there werecovered by live television and reached their peakat approximately 6:45 p.m., when several youngAfrican-American males dragged Reginald Denny,a passing motorist, from his truck and beat himclose to death. The violence and lawlessnessescalated and spread to the north and west.

By 6:30 p.m., a crowd had gathered outsideParker Center, Los Angeles Police Department(LAPD) headquarters, which had been stormedand vandalized within the hour. This incidentgripped the attention of police commanders. Fire-fighters were being attacked-one was shot andhospitalized in the early evening while respondingto a call. The lawlessness involved physical vio-lence, looting, and arson, which resulted in mas-sive destruction of property. According to the Cityin Crisis, the rioting was cyclical in nature andoccurred with equal intensity in daylight hours andduring the night, unlike past civil disorders. Dis-turbances which began in the morning gatheredmomentum during the day and reached a highpoint in the evening, declining during the earlymorning hours. Destruction was most severe onthe second day and tapered off only on the fourthand fifth days. By the time the violence waned,

10

fifty-three people were dead, over 869 structureswere burned, and some $1 billion in property waseither damaged or destroyed. For many days after,it was impossible for people living in SouthCentral and Koreatown to purchase the minimumnecessities (Webster and Williams 1992).

The initial response of many city officials wasmarked by uncertainty, confusion, and lack ofcoordination. Within the LAPD, there was nomeaningful integration with any other arm ofgovernment. The LAPD was uncharacteristicallyhesitant in responding to initial incidents of disor-der-which later would be considered a majorfactor in their inability to control the unrest.

In August 1993, William Webster, SpecialAdvisor City to the Board of Police Commission- ers, City of Los Angeles, reported, “. . . the FireDepartment performed admirably under the mostadverse possible circumstances. As the fires spread’across Los Angeles beginning in the late afternoonof Apri1 29, 1992, unprecedented demands wereplaced on the Los Angeles City Fire Department,in’ particular, because it was forced to respond tocalls for assistance while confronted at times byhostile individuals and crowds armed with assortedweapons. The firefighters were severely hamperedby the response time and level of escort supportwhich the Los Angeles Police Department wasable to muster. This circumstance is alluded to inour report, the City in Crisis . . . The LAFD hadprepared internally for a civil disturbance and hadattempted to initiate planning activities with theLAPD. We must recognize that during a riot orcivil disturbance the responsibility to fight firesand deliver emergency medical service rests notonly with the Fire Department, but also with theLos Angeles Police Department, which is chargedwith the critical responsibility of protecting fire-fighters and paramedics from the threat of armed,hostile individuals. Fire Department personnel donot carry weapons; they depend on law enforce-ment to protect them and, without adequate protec-tion, they simply cannot do their job” (Webster1993).

The nature of the city

The Rodney King incident did not occur in avacuum but within the context of the entire social,

economic, and political climates of Los Angeles.Tensions that existed in these climates undoubt-

edly had a profound impact on the public’s percep-tion of and reaction to the videotaped beating andon the nature of the LAPD command staff’s re-sponse to the lawlessness that followed the jury’s“not guilty” verdicts.

In the past decade, Los Angeles has experiencedrapid demographic and economic changes. Themake-up of the population has shifted to 40 per-cent Hispanic, 37 percent white, 13 percent Afri-can American, 9 percent Asian American, and 1percent Native American. As the ethnic make-upof the city has changed, so has the economicstratification of its population. By 1990, more than

“Tensions that existed. . .had a pro-

found impact on the public’s percep-

tion and reaction to the videotaped

beating and . . . to the lawlessness that

followed the jury’s verdicts.”

18.5 percent of the city’s residents were livingbelow the poverty level. According to the City inCrisis, these demographic changes have causedsignificant stratification of the city by neigh-borhood. The areas of South and Central LosAngeles, overwhelmingly populated by AfricanAmericans and Hispanics, have experienced des-pairingly high unemployment-20 to 40 percent ofthe residents live below the poverty level. Bycontrast, several of the communities on the westside remain fairly homogeneous white neighbor-hoods with minimal levels of poverty. Thesecircumstances have contributed to strong economicand social tensions, the most notable being theconflict in South Central between African Ameri-cans and Korean Americans. The two groups havelived alongside one another for the past decade buthave experienced dramatically different economicchanges (Webster and Williams 1992).

Existing tensions in this community were heigh-tened by the Harlins-Du incident just monthsbefore the King verdict. The sentence of five-years’ probation imposed on a middle-aged


Korean-American grocer, who was found by ajury to be guilty of fatally shooting a fifteen-year-old African-American girl, deeply angered andcaused many in the African-American communityto lose confidence in the law enforcement andjudicial systems. This case contributed to the tenseatmosphere preceding the unrest.

On the eve of the verdicts, Los Angeles was inthe midst of a spiraling economic downturn.Although the strain of the deepening recession hadbeen hard on the entire city, it was especiallysevere on the African-American community. Thedisproportionately high levels of unemploymentand poverty in the African-American neighbor-hoods were, by most accounts, giving rise togrowing levels of tension, frustration, and angerthat contributed to the tense atmosphere precedingthe unrest.

According to the City in Crisis, the atmospherepreceding the verdicts was also characterized bywidespread tension between minority communitiesand the LAPD. African Americans, especiallyyoung males, felt they were frequently the victimsof police mistreatment, racism, and abuse, a feel-ing also shared by leaders of the Hispanic commu-nities, Korean Americans held a similar view andbelieved that they did not receive adequate protec-tion from the LAPD. In general, there was awidespread perception within the minority commu-nities that the police gave priority to protectingaffluent white neighborhoods over minority com-munities such as South Central, the Pica-Unionarea, and Koreatown (Webster and Williams1992).

The city’s emergency frame work

Under the Local Emergencies Ordinance, the LosAngeles City Council established the EmergencyOperations Organization (EOO) and placed itunder the exclusive direction of Mayor TomBradley. The City Council established the Emer-gency Operations Board (EOB), composed of theprincipal city departments whose services wouldbe needed in an emergency. Police Chief DarylGates, as deputy director of the EOO and perma-nent chair of its board, was placed in charge ofresponse operations, subject to the mayor’s direc-tion. The City Administrative Officer (CAO), as

EOO Coordinator, was placed in charge of thecity’s preparation activities. To assist in this ef-fort, the Board appointed the Emergency Manage-ment Committee, which constitutes the workingstaff of the EOO and is directed by a member ofthe CAO’s staff. In the event of an emergency, thecity’s response is coordinated in the EmergencyOperations Center (EOC), located in a concretebunker four floors beneath City Hall East andstaffed by LAPD officers, representatives of theLos Angeles Fire Department (LAFD), and otheragencies whose personnel assume these additionalresponsibilities. Figure 2-l illustrates the make-upof the city’s Emergency Operations Organization.

Law enforcement actions-LAPD tactics

It was not until approximately 6:45 p.m. on April29 that the LAPD called a department-wide tacti-cal alert. At about the same time, the commandingofficer of the LAPD Support Services Bureauresponded to the EOC-the designated departmentchief arrived an hour later. On-duty police officerswere outnumbered by rioters and stood by aslooters made several trips into stores.

At 9:00 p.m., after a briefing by LAPD com-manders on the rapidly deteriorating situation,Mayor Bradley declared a dusk-to-dawn local stateof emergency. Bus service in the South Centraldistrict was halted and the area’s 700 publicschools were closed. The National Guard wasnotified and immediately began mobilizing troopsin the California National Guard armories through-out the state.

In early afternoon, Thursday, April 30, the firstNational Guard troops were sent into the streets.At Police Chief Gates’ request, the guard wasready and prepared for action, Within two days ofthe first request and after two additional call-upsof 2,000 troops, the National Guard had approxi-mately 7,000 troops available to quell the disturb-ance. The troops moved into action relativelyquickly. This show of force was a significantfactor in the subsequent dissipation of disorder,rioting, and looting.

On May 1, President George Bush issued anExecutive Order federalizing the National Guard.This action placed the guard under the commandof the U.S. Army. Federalization consolidated the

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Figure 2-1

Emergency Operations OrganizationCity of Los Angeles

Source: City in Crisis, 1992.HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 13

operations of all federal agencies (e.g., the Bureauof Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms [ATF] and theBureau of Prisons) under the direction of the Fed-eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Before thePresident’s Executive Order, other federal agen-cies were operating independently. The FBI,which became the lead agency for coordinatingfederal response, has a well-established relation-ship with the LAPD, which augured well in expe-diting an end to the disturbance.

The ATF prepared and disseminated an updatedlist of all firearm licensees in the city. Approxi-mately 200 ATF agents (along with the CaliforniaHighway Patrol) assisted patrol officers and pro-tected firefighters. Additional support was pro-vided by the Bureau of Prisons, whose agents arespecially trained to handle riot situations andhostage negotiations, and the U.S. CustomsService, which mobilized 200 agents,

The LAFD’s response

Statement from Donald O. Manning, Chief Engi-neer and General Manager, Los Angeles City FireDepartment:

“The 1992 Los Angeles Civil Disturbance Firesthat began on April 29, 1992 were, without ques-tion, the most devastating and challenging in thehistory of Los Angeles and the nation, Given thespecific conditions at the fire and rescue scenes,how our firefighters managed to limit the fires tothe structures known to date is beyond comprehen-sion I have been informed of numerous testi-monies of dramatic and heroic actions committed

“The Los Angeles.. fires that began

on April 29... were, without question,

the most devastating and challenging

in the history of Los Angeles and the

nation. ”

by or witnessed by our firefighters and paramed-ics. It is a miracle that only thirty firefighters andparamedics were injured, given the tremendouspotential.

“In my view, the true-to-life drama that the cityand, indeed, the nation witnessed is a story thatmust be memorialized. To achieve this will requireproper documentation that details specific namesof persons and events wherein our firefighters andparamedics, in the performance of their duties atthese fires and rescues, performed heroic acts atextreme personal risk” (Los Angeles City Fire De-partment 1992).

One of the first actions taken by the LAFD wasto establish executive command at departmentheadquarters and identify and staff key commandpositions. The full-service comprehensive com-mand and control system consisted of six keydepartments:

n Incident Commander (Department Command)n Command Staffn Operations Sectionn Plans Sectionn Logistics Sectionn Finance Section

“One of the first actions taken by

the LAFD was to establish execu-

tive command...”

The information below was compiled from theLAFD’s Communications Center (OperationsCommand), staff reports, command post documen-tation, individual department members’ accounts,and written reports from outside agencies.

The decision to establish department commandwas a means to prevent the duplication of tasks.The entire operation was managed as a singleincident that consolidated command functions andallowed for more effective planning and logisticalsupport.

Executive command structure

The LAFD executive command structure includes:

nn Chief Engineer and General Manager -Donald O. Manning

n Deputy Chief, Commander of Operations -Gerald L. Johnson

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n Deputy Chief, Commander, Bureau of FireSuppression and Rescue - Donald F. Anthony

n Deputy Chief, Fire Marshal, Commander,Bureau of Fire Prevention & Public Safety -Davis R. Parsons

n Deputy Chief, Commander of Support Serv-ices - Rey T. Rojo

n Chief Paramedic, Commander, Bureau ofEmergency Medical Services - Alan R.Cowen

The Incident Command System (ICS)-executing command and control

The Command and Control System focused onfour basic elements which contributed to the suc-cessful deployment and support of resources.

n Incident, strategy, and tacticsn Resource management through the Incident

Command System (ICS)n Mutual aid coordinationn Communications

In the first thirty-six hours of the disturbance,6,529 emergency incidents were recorded by theFire Department’s dispatch center; 863 massivestructures burned in the 105-square-mile areazone.

Figure 2-2 shows the organization of the LAFDIncident Command System.

Strategy

Four tactical strategies were maintained during theheight of the disturbance:

n Prioritize incidents and mitigate the potentialfor conflagrations

n Protect the city’s infrastructuren Protect exposed buildings, especially habita-

tional structures where incidents exceedavailable resource capability

n Protect firefighters

“The LAFD has in place a well-honed and fre-quently exercised ICS,” according to WilliamWebster. This system enables the Department torespond quickly and efficiently, both intradepart-mental and interagency, to emergency situations.“The ICS was developed in the early 1970s tocontrol and direct resources committed to an inci-

dent. In this manner, incident objectives can beaccomplished in priority order. Prior understand-ing of the ICS, by both LAFD personnel andMutual Aid officers allowed large numbers of re-sources” to be efficiently and effectively managedduring the civil unrest (Webster 1993).

“The LAFD had prudently updated its standingTactical Alert plans and attempted to developevent-specific plans for potential unrest followingthe verdict in the Rodney King trial. The LAFDdetermined that its riot response would be depend-ent on police protection. All the planning andtraining of the LAFD alone, however, is insuffi-cient in situations where firefighters require policeprotection in order to respond to emergency calls.Under normal conditions, firefighters routinelyrespond without police protection to emergencycalls, however, the civil unrest in April 1992sharply demonstrated that firefighters simply can-not function without police protection in the faceof hostile crowds” (Webster 1993),

At the LAFD’s only meeting with the LAPD,the police told the Fire Department that protectionof firefighters was the LAPD’s third priority-after countersniper activity and barricaded sus-pects-and that police escorts during the first fourto six hours of the disturbance would be providedby local divisions and, thereafter, could be ar-ranged for individual responses. The police be-lieved that any riot would start slowly and wouldbuild over several days, as the Watts riots had.The LAPD explained that they had not discussedtraining or preparation with the National Guardbecause they did not want to unnecessarily alarmthe public or the news media.

The City in Crisis also stressed that a significantchange must occur in all areas of emergency prep-aration so that interdepartmental and mutual aidefforts become an integral part of the city’s prepa-ration program (Webster and Williams 1992).

Tactics

To ensure the safety of personnel and limit de-struction of the city, the LAFD developed manyground tactics to be used as operational guidelinesby field commanders, who were given the authori-ty to make decisions based on a given situation.Tactical guidelines were established during the


Figure 2-2

Incident Command System

City of Los Angeles Fire Department

16

initial phases of the civil unrest:

Work in organized groups with police escorts-Strike teams-Tactical teamsHit-and-run firefighting (quickly knock downthe fire and move to the next prioritizedincident)Modify the Standard Operating Procedures(SOPS), e.g.-No Fire Department personnel on roofs-No laddering of buildings-Deactivate aerial ladder truck companies inthe impact area

-No overhauling of fires-No interior fire attack-No air packs

Managing resources

The ICS is a management system designed tocontrol and direct the resources committed to anincident. This system helps to ensure that incidentobjectives can be accomplished effectively and inorder of priority. The need is identified by thefirst officer on the scene and the procedure isestablished with the arrival of the basic apparatusfrom the ICS.

The Incident Commander (IC) is allowed greatflexibility in deploying resources. However,beyond the basic functions, the IC implementsonly those elements of the system that are needed.Use of the ICS to manage the resources assignedto the disturbance proved to be an essential man-agement tool. Prior understanding of the ICS, byboth LAFD personnel and mutual aid officers,helped to execute activities in an organized, effi-cient manner.

During the disturbance, an LAFD helicopterflew to an Army National Guard base in San LuisObispo, about 125 miles north of Los Angeles,and returned with 300 pieces of body armor. Asimilar shipment of body armor came from an AirNational Guard base south of Los Angeles fordistribution to county firefighters and mutual aidcompanies.

When rioting first broke out, police called onthe LAFD to set up a trauma center at its com-mand post at 54th and Arlington to care for the

injured. This command post was a Rapid TransitDistrict (RTD) bus yard, which was both largeand safe enough (protected by walls) to house thecommand function and the EMS/trauma centerfunctions (e.g., staging, refueling tanks, and re-hab). During the riots, the LAFD’s role quicklychanged. As fires broke out, the Incident Com-mand expanded to include a Fire Division alongwith EMS. The area’s mutual aid plan was putinto effect and eventually victims were transporteddirectly to area hospitals and not to the traumacenters or specialized facilities.

Because the fire incidents were so widespread,the county, working with the Office of EmergencyServices (OES), established its own command postat its headquarters in East Los Angeles to respondto fires not covered by the city. The affected areawas divided into five zones. Other county fire-fighters, dispatched as mutual aid to the city,worked directly with the Arlington ICS; the re-mainder were under regional command. Fire-fighters from as far away as the San FranciscoBay area and San Diego responded to the calls forassistance.

Battalion Chief Tim Manning, the first incidentcommander at the Arlington Command Post, re-ported, “Recognizing that we had large numbersof structures burning and limited amounts ofresources, our strike teams (originally consistingof five engines and a battalion chief but laterreduced) were given very specific direction to stopconflagration. We didn’t want a single building tospread and take multiple city blocks of structures.Another priority was to stop the fire from pro-gressing and moving to our residential area-recognizing our priority was life, then property.Another issue that we had to address early on wasthe safety of our personnel” (Lin 1992).

Although the city had a disaster plan in effectfor many years, both the city and county wereconcerned early on about the lack of police escortsfor firefighters. Departing Police Chief DarylGates later admitted his department had madeseveral mistakes, including waiting too long to calla “tactical alert” to bring in more forces sooner.

Whenever city firefighters needed protection,the police were responsible for coordinating theescort duty. Deputy Chief Davis Parsons stated,


“The way we ultimately managed that . . . we hada fire department battalion chief in the policedepartment command post who was able to workface-to-face with the person in the police depart-ment, who would send the message to their stagingarea to provide the officers and the vehicles neces-sary. We also provided a battalion chief at thepoint of dispatch, where the strike team was as-sembled, so that when the assembled police offi-cers came forward, they had somebody to look forand the two units would be mated and then theywould leave” (Lin 1992).

Since the civil unrest, the state has convenedseveral meetings with fire chiefs and law enforce-ment personnel to improve response time andcooperation between the fire and police depart-ments.

Mutual aid coordination

The Los Angeles Mutual Aid Plan works as fol-lows:

Area A can supply approximately five or sixengine companies. If more resources are needed,the region is asked to send assistance; then theOffice of Emergency Services, which taps otherregions’ resources, is asked. These resourcesarrive as an entity, under the charge of unit cap-tains and battalion chiefs as strike team leaders.They then fit into the incident command system.

The ongoing riots required the rapid mobiliza-tion of resources from the entire State of Califor-nia, One hundred eighty agencies throughout thestate participated for the duration of the civilunrest, mobilizing eighty-five strike teams, whichrepresented 2,000 firefighters from California’s sixregions.

“Hit-and-run tactics allowed fire sup-pression resources to be used to theirmaximum capabilities in protectingpersonnel from exposure...”

It must be noted that the use of the Fire MutualAid System contributed greatly to the confinementand extinguishment of fires. The system func-tioned efficiently, as reported in the City in Crisis.

The fact that the State Fire Mutual Aid System hasfrequently been implemented (to combat wildlandfires) and uses common terminology validates theimportance of interagency preparation, planning,and training (Webster and Williams 1992).

Through the mutual aid system, eighteen addi-tional strike teams entered the city limits andassisted in containing and extinguishing fires.Without their presence, the loss of property wouldhave been significantly greater.

Joint activities with police

The mutual aid system functioned as planned,Following the “not guilty” verdicts in the RodneyKing trial, the LAPD began to develop a FieldCommand Post at the RTD bus yard located at54th Street and Arlington Avenue and requestedFire Department resources to establish a MedicalCommand Post.

Initially a paramedic rescue ambulance andengine company were dispatched and a battalionchief was sent to assess the need for additionalresources. At 7: 15 p.m., Battalion Chief TimothyV. Manning (Battalion 3) arrived at 54th andArlington and observed 200 to 300 police officersdonning riot gear, loading weapons, and organiz-ing into groups. Battalion Chief Manning deter-mined that the potential existed for a large numberof casualties and requested additional resources todevelop a medical group. The command post wasidentified as Arlington IC. As additional resourceswere responding, Battalion Chief Manning ob-served several distant fires and molotov cocktailsbeing thrown over the RTD bus compound walls,igniting parked buses.

Several fire suppression companies under thecommand of Battalion Chief 13 Terrance Manningcame under attack as the units responded to areported structure fire at 68th Street and Norman-die Avenue. Battalion Chief Terrance Manningrecognized the need to obtain police escorts anddirected his units to respond to Arlington IC. At8:00 p.m., Battalion Chief Timothy Manningexpanded his command structure to incorporate aFire Division, a Police Liaison Officer, and aStaging Officer.

The Fire Department had committed sixty-threecompanies to the impact area to combat twenty-

18

four active structure fires. Department commandceased commitment of truck companies into theimpact area because of exposure to gunfire andobjects hurled at the aerial ladder trucks’ tilleroperators.

Hit-and-run tactics by firefighters allowed firesuppression resources to be used to their maximumcapabilities in protecting personnel from exposureand stopping conflagrations. This tactic allowedlosses to occur only within involved structures inorder to prevent the fire from spreading to adja-cent buildings. The LAFD accomplished its inci-dent objectives in this manner. Field officers weregranted the flexibility of deviating from standardSOPS, which allowed them to make critical life-saving decisions.

The City in Crisis report recommends thatfirefighter escort during a civil unrest situationshould be exclusive; that is, those units should notbe called off escort duty to perform other policefunctions at the cost of leaving fire resourcesunprotected. LAPD dispatch and jurisdictionalprocedures should be adjusted to allow escorts totravel from fire to fire along with the fireresources, without regard to geographical bound-aries. Plans should be made for in-field shiftchanges of LAPD escorts, to avoid leaving firestrike teams unprotected. In addition, the reportconcurs that the LAPD and LAFD need to developcommon communication capabilities.

Caring for personnel in the field

Arlington IC, located in the impact area, presentedspecial logistical and personnel safety issues.Feeding of personnel and establishing mechanicalsupport for the apparatus were critical at thispoint. Over 3,000 meals were purchased throughcaterers under contract with the department, andlocal restaurants and the Red Cross donated foodto sustain field personnel. Close coordination withpolice escorts for moving personnel was neces-sary. The obscure location of the command postprevented certain support functions and causedcompanies to move through the impact area toreach the staging area. However, it was necessaryto coordinate operations from that location due tothe inability to establish police escorts for fire andEMS resources.

The height of the civil disturbance occurred onThursday, April 30, at 11:00 p.m. The FireDepartment had 203 companies committed to theincident, 90 provided through the mutual aidsystem, including 18 strike teams. A total of 950line fire-suppression and EMS personnel werecommitted to the incident by this time. EMS re-sources were dispatched into the impact areas fromthe Arlington Medical Group, the Fremont Medi-cal Group, and OCD, the city’s operation controldispatch center. The following figures indicate thenumber of incidents handled by the two medicalgroups:

Arlington Medical Group471 incidents146 patient transports

Fremont Medical Group14 incidents

6 patient transports

Figure 2-3 summarizes the occurrence of civildisturbance-related critical injuries over the five-day period.

In order to provide personnel with an acceptablelevel of security, actions were taken to groupresources, provide law enforcement escorts, andequip each individual with body armor. Due toviolent attacks on Fire Department personnel, allstrike teams leaving the Arlington IC were to beaccompanied by police escorts; however, a bottle-neck occurred while dispatching the staged striketeams due to a lack of police escorts. All on-dutyLAFD personnel (stationed in the most violentareas of the city) were provided with body armor.Continuous efforts were made to procure morefrom the Army National Guard’s Reserve Base inSan Luis Obispo and the Los Alamitos Air ForceReserve Center in Seal Beach.

Air reconnaissance

Air reconnaissance missions were executed toestablish the true boundaries of the disturbanceand to prevent the duplication of dispatches to thesame incidents.


Figure 2-3

Civil Disturbance Related Critical Injuries

April 29 - May 3, 1992

Source: Historical Accounts of the Los Angeles Civil Disturbance, 1992.

Communications

The LAFD uses an eighteen-channel 800 MHzradio system to dispatch resources and to providecommunication access from unit to unit, Duringnormal operations, two channels are used to dis-patch fire units throughout the city.

Anticipating the magnitude of the civil unrest,department command had predetermined that themetropolitan area could be split by incorporatingan additional dispatch channel for that area. At ap-proximately 8:00 p.m. on April 29, the radio planfor the city’s metropolitan area was implementedand Channel 9 was devoted to the 105-square-mileimpact area. This allowed OCD to communicatewith units operating in the initial impact area ofthe disturbance on a separate channel. This place-ment limited the radio traffic on various OCD dis-patch channels and proved beneficial to the FireDepartment.

Faced with an inundation of calls, the OCD, atthe direction of Deputy Chief Anthony and thefield commanders, took the following steps tocoordinate communication:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Divisions 1 and 2 were split, and each as-signed its own dispatch area responsibilityand radio frequency.Division 2, where most of the rioting wastaking place, was further divided into com-mand posts where resources could be safelymanaged and deployed independent of OCD.Communication Van 1 was dispatched to thecommand post at 54th and Arlington, and waseventually staffed with experienceddispatchers.The OCD computer was set in “degradedmode” (earthquake mode), which resulted inthe dispatching of only one company perincident, thereby conserving resources city-wide.Citywide tactical alert procedures wereestablished.Fire companies and EMS resources in theimpact areas were formed into strike teams,each under a common command, and weredispatched as a unit.

LAFD staff was involved extensively in EOCactivities, including providing and exchanging

information with various agencies, providing acommunications link with different agencies,coordinating escorts, procuring body armor,providing relief of members, satisfying logisticalneeds, and serving assisting agencies.

Media and press relations

Shortly after the outbreak of violence, BattalionChief Dean Cathey, LAFD Community LiaisonOfficer, contacted Chief Engineer Manning toconsult with him on the effects of the developingsituation, and a media strategy was developed andsuccessfully implemented. It provided the mediaand the police with an accurate picture of whatfirefighters and paramedics faced. The mediastrategy changed from harsh and frequent criti-cisms of the Fire Department during the earlyhours of the civil disturbance to more complimen-tary and even laudatory comments later that nightand in the days following.

During the first three days of the disturbance,over 150 interviews were conducted by the FireDepartment’s spokespersons with print, radio, andtelevision news media. Many of these interviewswere broadcast nationwide and to Europe, theUnited Kingdom, and Australia.

The LAPD’s response

Through community meetings and citywide tele-phone surveys, the authors of the City in Crisisfound that the public perceived much of the blamefor the inadequacies in the planning and prepara-tion for civil disorder was directed at the LAPDand that much of the blame aimed at the LAPDwas justified. The planning failures were notlimited to the LAPD but extended broadly acrossthe city’s political structure and to the highestoffices of the city government. In general, the cityfailed to prioritize its procedures-a critical pro-cess.

Priorities must be established. Are the prioritiesto rescue victims, to protect firefighters, to arrestlooters, to contain a rioting crowd, or to securecertain vulnerable and important facilities? Theseare some of the competing demands for policeservices that arise in the context of unrest. Theextent of the LAPD’s planning for a department-wide response to civil unrest was limited to the


Tactical Manual and the “standing plans” of thepolice. The Tactical Manual only mentions that itis the responsibility of the person holding aparticular position to develop plans to respond to acertain situation. It assumes there will be time todevise a plan once the action starts.

TAMPA-A CASE STUDY OF A MID-SIZEDCITY

“Tampa is the city where the good life gets betterfor many. It is also the city where the bad life getsworse for some,” ‘according to Bob Gilder, alongtime NAACP leader in the city. “Tampa’scentral city neighborhoods are getting poorer,blacker, and younger, and a dearth of role modelshas led to the exit of the black middle class fromthe older neighborhoods. ” In addition, federalbudget cutbacks have left fewer ways for the poorto help themselves.

The bustling metropolis of Tampa experienced aseries of civil disturbances during 1987 whichraised public attention nationwide. These incidentswere sparked by racial tension in the poorer neigh-borhoods over the controversial death of MelvinHair, a twenty-three-year-old mentally disturbedman accused of threatening his family with aknife. Mr. Hair was the third of several black menkilled in confrontations with white officers in1987. Racial disturbances were mostly restrictedto twelve city blocks around the College Hill low-income housing project where Melvin Hair livedand died.

On the night that Mr. Hair died, the lead storyon the local television news was about a newly re-leased report by the city attorney blaming NewYork Mets pitcher Dwight Gooden (who is black)for starting a widely publicized melee with whiteTampa police officers in December 1986. Thisencounter left Gooden swollen and bruised. As theevening news continued, the teens hanging out atthe street corner (where medics had been unable torevive Hair) grew angrier and angrier about whathappened to Hair and Gooden, a neighborhoodhero who grew up a few doors away. Someone setfire to a dumpster, and a crowd gathered and soonbecame a mob. Rock-and-bottle throwing started,leaving ten people injured and eighteen arrested,mainly juveniles.

Nearly one-quarter of black Tampans live inpublic housing projects in Hillsborough County,including the College Hill and Ponce de Leoncomplexes. The population of the nine censustracts where these projects are located increasedby 17 percent from 1970 to 1985-twice the rateof increase in other black neighborhoods. In thosetracts, 4 of 10 residents are under the age ofeighteen, compared to 2.4 of 10 for Tampa as awhole. The black middle class has moved fromthis section of Tampa to what are newer black,neighborhoods; while the whites who lived theremoved to the suburbs.

Few federally funded social services remain inthis “other” Tampa. Most that were cut have notbeen replaced by local or state efforts.’ Joblessrates among youth are critically high. Accordingto the State Labor Department, unemployment forblack males, ages sixteen to twenty-four, is four tofive times the overall rate and twice the rateamong white males in the same age group. Evenmore black females in the age group are withoutwork.

In this section of Tampa, the police are oftenviewed as a hostile force that does not distinguishbetween criminals and other residents. The deathof Melvin Hair on February 18 was the spark thatignited a fire that had been smoldering for months.(The choke hold that was used to subdue Hair andwhich caused his death has since been banned bythe Tampa Police Department.) Protests continuedthroughout the year. Several police officers andfirefighters were injured in violent encounters,which alerted the city to the urgency of its socialproblems. Police reported the following series ofevents:

Thursday morning, February 20, many studentsgathered to create disturbances and conspired toopen fire on police on Friday or Saturday night. Alocal grocery store was looted, several housesoccupied by whites and a McDonald’s restaurantwere struck with rocks and broken into, andthreats were made on people’s lives.

Police at 18th Street and East Buffalo Avenueactivated a command post in the area and firedepartment supervisors joined them soon after.Police officers were advised that all evening shiftswould be held over. The roads were closed after

22

several news personnel were attacked and injured.The media was later advised that if they enteredthe restricted area they would not receive policeprotection. Incidents escalated as fire bombs werethrown at police and houses were rocked. Groupsof thirty to forty people, armed with rocks andbottles, looted stores. Two people were arrested,fighting broke out in the streets, and shots werefired. As the violence escalated, other groups,such as the Ku Klux Klan, began to protest. Inview of the increasing unrest, two additionalphone lines were installed the next day at thecommand post. Police responded to continuedincidents of looting and the beating of a whitecouple who were dragged from their car, whichwas later demolished.

In police reports of two separate incidents laterin October, two young black females were at-tacked and run off the road by white females.There were six incidents of rock-and-bottle throw-ing in the area of 22nd Street and Lake. Policereceived approximately forty calls related to inci-dents in the area. Major thoroughfares wereordered closed and four midnight squads weredeployed from neighboring districts to stage afield-force formation to control the area.

Fire and police personnel worked effectivelytogether during this civil unrest. Firefighters wereattacked with rocks while attempting to put outvehicle and building fires; two police officers werelater assigned to the fire station for security.Police displayed a greater show of force andarmed themselves with riot gear to confront thecrowds. This show of force, combined with thearrival of black community leaders on the scene,helped to bring the situation under control. Duringthis incident, one police officer and two fire-fighters were injured, and six police units weredamaged.

In another incident in 1989, a suspect in asoured undercover drug bust resisted arrest in aviolent struggle with two undercover officers afteran informant made a drug buy in the College Hillhousing area. The suspect died while in custody,after a delay in treatment during the ensuing dis-turbance. A crowd of about 150 youths hurledrocks, torched and looted a grocery store, andfired two shotgun blasts at a news van during an

hour-long disturbance. Officials cordoned off fourintersections in the twenty-two-block housingdevelopment and summoned 100 police officers.

Steps taken to remedy Tampa’s situation

This section of Tampa now is receiving moreattention from government officials. Calls havecome to increase the number of black police offi-cers (now 9 percent of the police force) to moreclosely reflect Tampa’s 24 percent black popula-tion. Mayor Sandy Freeman promised that thisgoal would be accomplished. The critical need isto address these issues before the city experienceswidespread conflict in a far greater magnitude thanjust sporadic incidents. Federal officials said thecity could better prepare for racial disturbances bymonitoring community activities that might triggerturmoil. Black civil rights leaders continue toscramble for support for aid programs and the cityplans an expanded summer jobs program. Moreblack police officers and an independent panel toreview complaints against police are among twen-ty-three steps the U.S. Justice Department suggest-ed to diffuse Tampa’s racial tensions. More thanhalf of the suggestions, many of which involvepolice, are already in place (Washington Post,March 9, 1987).

Suggestions concerning the Police Departmentinclude wider community involvement, recruitmentof more blacks and other minorities, establishmentof goals to ensure that blacks and other minoritiesare represented in command ranks, increasedservice training and human-relations courses, andtraining and simulation exercises for response tocrowd disorder.

Police called meetings to coordinate generalemergency preparedness, and representatives ofthe Tampa fire and police departments, the Hills-borough County Sheriff’s office, and the FloridaNational Guard all attended. These meetings wereprompted by a U.S. Justice Department recom-mendation to review training programs on lawenforcement response to crowd disorder (MiamiHerald, March 4, 1987).


VIRGINIA BEACH-A CASE STUDY OF ASMALL COMMUNITY

Background to the 1989 disturbance

In 1981 a small group of students from Virginia’smostly black colleges gathered for a Labor Daycelebration in the exclusive residential coastalcommunity of Croatan Beach, approximately twomiles south of the more commercially orientedVirginia Beach community. Theodore Holloway, aconcert promoter, sponsored an event at theDome, a Virginia Beach hall, which was attendedwithout incident by 500 students.

By the mid- 1980s, this had grown into an annu-al event. The loosely organized gathering inCroatan Beach had grown immensely through“word-of-mouth” and Holloway’s entrepreneurialdesign to organize events based on the image ofblack Greek-letter fraternities and sororities, thecenter of many black students’ social lives. Thisconnection to the Greek-letter chapters helpedmake the event a national black student attraction.

In 1986, approximately 8,000 people attendedthe Croatan Beach Labor Day party. Hollowaysponsored a “Greekfest ‘86, Step Show and Party”at the Dome, The hall was filled to capacity with1,800 students, with an additional 2,000 outsideunable to gain admittance. Some minor pushingand shoving began among the frustrated crowdoutside.

Holloway recalled that after the pushing andshoving began, the local police showed up inforce, which he called “unnecessary.” He attrib-uted this force to the police and the community’smisunderstanding of the activities of the fraterni-ties and sororities.

After the 1986 Labor Day gathering, CroatanBeach officials and residents, now concerned withthe growing numbers of revelers, requested thatthe event be held in the larger area of VirginiaBeach. In November, city officials met with repre-sentatives of participating universities and neigh-borhood civic groups, and it was decided thatCroatan Beach was no longer a suitable venue forthe celebration.

September 1987

Thousands of students gathered for Labor Day

weekend at the oceanfront beaches. About 300remained at Croatan Beach. Promoter Hollowaymoved the event to the 7,500-capacity Pavilionand expanded it to two nights. No major problemswere reported.

City officials sent letters to local universitiesand Pan Hellenic councils after agreeing thatstudents would be directed again to oceanfrontbeaches the next year. The Pavilion was rented tothe promoter for a third night of events.

September 1988

The third night at the Pavilion drew an above-capacity crowd of 9,000, an additional 3,000gathered outside. The facility was damaged andminor injuries occurred when people rushed thedoors. Traffic gridlock prevented Fire Departmentemergency vehicles from reaching the building.

Police reported disorderly behavior, throwing ofbottles and other missiles at police from hotels,and confrontations between crowd and hotel/motelemployees over parking in private lots.

Later, city officials met with promoterHolloway and agreed to ban use of the Pavilionfor future Greekfest gatherings.

Preparing for future confrontations

By 1988, the festival was viewed by attendees as a“black” event. It attracted both college studentsand nonstudents, as well as a small group of “un-desirables.” After the 1988 Labor Day weekend,city merchants circulated a petition calling for aprohibition of Greekfest in 1989; the City Councilpassed three ordinances expanding police powerover public gatherings and behavior. City officialsand national black community leaders were unableto arrange meetings to discuss issues raised byGreekfest ‘88, each side blaming the other for notfollowing through. The city government hired aformer Washington, D.C., deputy police chief toadvise the police force on crowd controlprocedures.

On August 15, 1989, the Governor’s chief ofstaff met with city officials to discuss the possibledeployment of the National Guard during theLabor Day weekend. A week later, Virginia BeachChief of Police Charles Wall appeared on localcable television and announced that the Police

24

Department was prepared to address any riotsituation which might arise. The National Guardwould be readily available, if needed. On Friday,August 31, at the request of Virginia Beach cityofficials, Governor Gerald L. Baliles signed anExecutive Order placing the National Guard onstandby status for traffic and crowd patrol. Asexpected, a major disturbance took place (Virgin-ian-pilot, Ledger Star, Washington Post 1989).

The role of the Fire Department

Chief Harry Diezel of the Virginia Beach FireDepartment reported to the Civil Unrest TaskForce that 28 percent of those arrested during thedisturbance were white, although Greekfest is ablack Greek-letter event. The police viewed therole of firefighters as incidental. “Firefighterswere referred to as ‘redheaded stepchildren’, ”according to Chief Diezel. The Fire Departmenthad no “buckstep operators,” and there were noplans to protect firefighters from the crowds, whowere hostile to anyone in uniform.

Chief Diezel reported that Virginia Beach hadno formal mutual aid agreements and no policeprotection was planned for the firefighters. Manyfirefighters left the scene when the crowds gath-ered and showed hostility towards them.

ANATOMY OF A RIOT

Civil unrest can generally be attributed to extremefrustrations arising out of an atmosphere of socialand economic oppression. When these feelings ofoppression are left unabated, the atmosphere forunrest develops and smolders until triggered,usually by a single, isolated incident.

The late James Hundley, Jr., assistant professorof the Department of Sociology, Michigan StateUniversity, in a paper presented at the annualmeetings of the American Sociological Associationin 1967, identified five general factors that mustbe present in a community before civil unrestoccurs :

1. Those concerned “must perceive that a crisisexists. ”

2. Community members must perceive that allreasonable channels for bringing about effec-tive change are closed to them, for example,

3.

4.

5.

no representation in the local governmentand/or lack of support and protection fromthe police.Community members must believe that riot-ing and violence will force those in authorityto listen to and heed their demands. Formany rioters, this stage is reached becausethey have simply taken all they can and donot know what else to do, or they no longercare.The community must be relatively close-knit.(This point is arguable, since this was not thecase in the 1992 Los Angeles riots.)There must be a substantial breakdown inpreviously accepted relationships betweenpolice and fire personnel and the community.

Hundley further listed four main factors that couldbe immediate causes for rioting:

1. The creation and circulation of rumors offer-ing a riot as one solution or possibility.

2. The occurrence of a given event that typifiesthe kinds of complaints and grievances that acommunity has.

3. The convergence of large numbers of peoplearound a precipitating event.

4. The communication of specific grievancesthroughout the forming crowd so that definitecourses of action emerge and are followedamong a substantial number of the convergingcrowd (Hundley 1967).

The 1968 Kerner Commission (PresidentLyndon Johnson’s National Advisory Commissionon Civil Disorders, formed in 1967) cited thenews media as having a significant impact on civildisturbances.

The news media are an important factor ininfluencing an already tense situation by ofteninadvertently acting as provocateur. “One definiteeffect of the media seems to be the determinationin time and place that latent tensions will surfaceinto disorder " (National Advisory Commission onCivil Disorders 1968). For example, during the1992 trial of the four officers accused in the Rod-ney King beating, the television news media con-tinually aired the videotape showing King beingbeaten by police officers while lying on theground, apparently helpless. This incited public


opinion of police brutality. Television images ofthe riots following the verdict further exacerbatedthe situation.

Live reports of police activity alerted disruptivegroups to the locations of unprotected areas wherethey engaged in looting and other criminal activi-ty, In some instances, persons not normally in-clined to such behavior were provoked by thesereports simply because the opportunity nowexisted.

Causes of civil unrest

Historically, civil unrest in the U.S. has beenundertaken for a variety of purposes: disputesover exploitation of workers, substandard livingconditions, lack of political representation, poorhealth care and education, lack of employmentopportunities, and racial issues, among others.These underlying causes have been widely docu-mented.

Brief descriptions of seven significant civildisorders of the 20th century are presented below.

East St. Louis, 1917. Labor disputes in the indus-trial slum of East St. Louis caused employers toimport black laborers in an effort to cut laborcosts and break strikes. Angry white workersretaliated by burning buildings and attackingblacks. On one occasion, a carload of whitesdrove through a black district, shooting intohomes-the residents retaliated. When policearrived to investigate, driving a car similar to theperpetrators’, neighborhood residents mistakenlyfired upon it and killed two police officers. Riot-ing began again the next day. Three hundredbuildings were destroyed and forty-eight peoplewere killed.

Chicago, 1919. Racial tensions ran extremely highin post-war Chicago during the summer of 1919.On July 27, a young black boy swimming in LakeMichigan accidentally crossed the imaginary lineseparating the “black beach” from the “whitebeach.” The boy was stoned and drowned. Policerefused to arrest the attackers but did arrest oneblack on a white’s complaint. In the seven days ofrioting, 38 persons were killed, 500 injured, and1,000 left homeless.

Harlem, 1935. The nature of race riots changedsignificantly in Depression-ravished Harlem of1935. Previous riots had pitted whites againstblacks. In the Harlem riot of 1935, black residentsdirected their hostility toward white-owned estab-lishments and the police, who they viewed as an“army of occupation” in their community.

A week before the March 19 riot started, ablack male was beaten by police and lost an eye inthe assault. The man was arrested and chargedwith felonious assault, but a grand jury refused toindict him. On March 19, a sixteen-year-old blackyouth was arrested for allegedly stealing a knifefrom an E. H. Kress store (a major holdoutagainst hiring blacks). The rumor of police brutali-ty spread and a riot erupted-over 200 stores wereransacked and looted-property damage was re-ported at $2 million. New York City Mayor La-Guardia appointed a commission to investigate thecauses of the riot. “Existing economic and socialforces created a state of emotional tension . . . Aslong as the economic and social forces which wereresponsible for that condition operate, a state oftension will exist in Harlem and recurrent out-bursts may occur. ”

Watts, 1965. Over a week of rioting was trig-gered in the Watts district of Los Angeles by thearrest of a black motorist in the area, leaving 34people dead and over 1,000 injured. Nearly 3,800people were arrested, and property damages wereput at $40 million. An official report criticized byblack leaders placed some of the blame for theriots on the growing civil rights movement. Twomore people were killed when disturbances flaredagain in Watts in early 1966.

Detroit, 1967. Forty-three people died after aweek of rioting devastated the nation’s fifth largestcity. Federal troops were deployed for the firsttime since 1943 to quell the unrest. A police raidon a “blind pig” (after-hours bar) on the largelyblack West Side triggered the trouble. Damagewas estimated at $200 million, arrests topped7,000, and over 2,000 people were injured. Thiswas one of the riots that prompted the creation ofthe National Advisory Commission on Civil Disor-ders (the Kerner Commission).

26

Miami, 1980. Three days of rioting in the LibertyCity section of Miami were touched off after anall-white jury acquitted four former Miami policeofficers of the fatal beating of a black insuranceexecutive. Eighteen people died, over 400 wereinjured, and 1,100 arrests were made. Damageswere estimated at $200 million.

Washington, D.C., 1991. The worst violence inthe nation’s capital since 1968 broke out in thelargely Hispanic Mount Pleasant section after theshooting of a Hispanic man by a female policeofficer.

What are the elements that set the stage for civildisorder? The Kerner Commission Report citespoverty and other social factors, as well as racialdiscrimination, as major causes. However, it isbecoming increasingly apparent that the key factorin actual riotous confrontation is the community’srelationship to law enforcement and other localofficials.

The belief in many inner cities is that policeharassment and intimidation are the norm and notthe exception. When a riot erupts, the police arethe immediate target. This view is easily and veryoften transferred to other uniformed personnel,including firefighters and EMS personnel enteringa riot zone, even though their purpose is to bringaid.

This report aims to address the need to developand institute measures to mitigate civil unrestsituations and to quickly and effectively quellthose disturbances which cannot be prevented. Thekey aspects to consider in bringing civil disturb-ances under control include:

n Mitigation

n Preparedness/Planning

n Response

n Recovery


3

MITIGATION

W. A. Bridges/Atlanta Journal Constitution

3

MITIGATIONMitigation basically implies efforts to prevent orminimize the damage which can result from civilunrest. These efforts can be developed using les-sons learned from previous civil disturbances inlarge, medium, and small cities, as cited in thecase studies above.

Mitigation can take place both during prepara-tion for a potential disaster and during recoveryfrom a crisis. The aim, at all times, is to reducerisk through anticipating actions. However, thelevel of intensity, catastrophe, and destructivenessof civil unrest occurrences are often difficult topredict. Thus, mitigation can only be accom-plished through instituting programs to cope withpotential disruption or destruction of physical andsocial networks between agencies and thecommunity.

PRIORITIZATION

It is essential that agencies jointly study previouscivil unrest situations to identify any commonpredictors of the probability of reoccurrence. Thiswill be useful to them in prioritizing their responseactions based on previous activity in a similarenvironment. Common predictors include such

scenarios as a prevalence of youth gangs with noplanned agendas and gangs with members whohave no involvement in community projects tooccupy their time. Other common predictors in-clude a lack of social services to meet the needs ofcommunity residents, a large presence of a minor-ity group without local services to help integratethem into the community, and a significant rise inunemployment in the community.

“It is essential that agencies jointlystudy previous unrest situations toidentify any common predictors ofthe probability of their reoccur-rence. ”

PLANNING

An incident command system (ICS) should be de-fined and implemented in both fire/EMS andpolice agencies. The agencies should develop theflexibility to adopt this mode immediately, withoutconfusion or conflict, and the unified police/fire

MITIGATION 31

command should extend to the policy level.Policies and procedures for joint ventures shouldbe developed, approved, and accepted by allagencies involved, in order to clearly establishresponsibilities and avoid discrepancies anddisagreements during the crisis. These policies andprocedures may take the form of standardoperating procedures (SOPS) and mutual aidagreements, which may incorporate otheragencies, such as hospitals, federal law enforce-ment agencies, the military, the district attorney’soffice, the mayor and other officials, and agenciesin other jurisdictions.

ADDRESSING TECHNICAL ANDPOLITICAL ISSUES

Field experience has demonstrated that there aretwo parallel aspects to emergency incidentmanagement-technical and political. Technicalaspects include the establishment of command andthe creation of operational sectors with identifiedand defined key roles. The political aspectsprimarily pertain to the interpersonal andorganizational dynamics of incident managementthat tend to be downplayed in many firedepartments and more emphasized in policeagencies. Traditionally, the administration andmanagement of governmental organizations are

“Field experience has demonstrated. .two parallel aspects to emergencyincident management-technical andpolitical.”

influenced by political considerations. Politicsalso influence the administration and managementof an ICS, with particular emphasis on organi-zational dynamics, conflict, compromise, andcommunications. Political considerations also playa part in the management of an emergency. Themost expedient time to address political issues isduring the planning stage, where the primaryconcerns usually are “Do we meet therequirements of the law?” and “Can our personnelperform the duties that we expect of them?”

Inter- and intra-agency problems are createdwhere there is lack of communication prior to anemergency-i.e., the key players and theiremergency response missions related to civildisturbances are not identified or known-andeveryone believes their specific agendas orinterests are the most important. The ability tomount a safe and effective response is directlyrelated to what is accomplished during theplanning stages.

“Agencies must share intelligence.”

BUILDING STRONG RELATIONSHIPSAMONG AGENCIES

No single agency can effectively manage a size-able disturbance. Planning for an emergencyrequires the resources and expertise of law en-forcement, EMS, the fire service, and other localpublic agencies. It also requires becoming familiarwith operational procedures carried out by keyplayers in these agencies.

Agencies must share intelligence. For example,if police know that rock concert attendees have thepropensity to commit arson, they should share thisinformation with the fire department. Criticalissues to be addressed through intelligence gather-ing include:n The probability of civil unrestn Capability assessments requiredn Legal ramifications to be determinedn Existing mutual aid agreements which may

need to be reviewed, fine-tuned, andrehearsed, as necessaryFloor plans of buildings and otherinformation which may help police deviseeffective tactical maneuvers, e.g.,-information relating to hazardous materials-identification of everything in the impactzone that could affect tactical plans

Emergency declaration policy guidelines shouldbe established (these can be fine-tuned duringpreparation for civil unrest), to define such mattersas alert phases for different levels of activity. A

32

policy group made up of political representatives,with agency personnel acting in advisory capaci-ties, can be established to formulate theseguidelines.

Planning activities should also include measuresfor relief, feeding, and medical attention.

Operational Plans

n Identify vendors who will provide emergencyequipment, food, and medical accoutrements.Special arrangements should be made toensure there are no shortages of these neces-sities.

n Clean up and reduce likely sources of fireloads (e.g., old cars, trash, and abandonedbuildings).

n Mandate sprinklers in all new construction.All agencies may want to solicit political helpto ensure this. Retrofit is encouraged in allolder buildings. (City of Los Angeles 1992)

COMMUNICATIONS

A strong communications infrastructure should beestablished among the fire department, the policedepartment, and the media. The Kerner Commis-sion made several recommendations regarding themedia’s involvement in civil unrest during the late1960s. A wide range of interviews with govern-ment officials, law enforcement authorities, mediapersonnel, and other citizens (including ghettoresidents), as well as a quantitative analysis of riotcoverage and a special conference with industryrepresentatives, led the commission members toconclude that:n “Despite instances of sensationalism, inaccu-

racy, and distortion, newspapers, radio, andtelevision tried, on the whole, to give a bal-anced, factual account of the 1967 disorders.

n “Elements of the news media failed to por-tray accurately the scale and character of theviolence that occurred last summer (1967).The overall effect was, we believe, an exag-geration of both mood and event.

n “Important segments of the media failed toreport adequately on the causes and conse-quences of civil disorders and on the under-lying problems of race relations. They have

not communicated to the majority of their audience -which is white-a sense of thedegradation, misery, and hopelessness of lifein the ghetto.”

In addition to more balanced coverage of “theNegro community, ” the Commission recom-mended that the media improve coordination withpolice through advance planning in reporting riotnews, cooperate with the police in the designationof police information officers, establish informa-tion centers, and develop mutually acceptableguidelines for riot reporting and conduct of mediapersonnel (National Advisory Commission onCivil Disorders 1968).

Since the publication of the Kerner CommissionReport over twenty-five years ago, the media hasadopted a new and less patronizing approach tocovering civil disorders. They have adopted amore balanced account of the causes and results ofcivil disturbances. The media and police and firedepartments have developed guidelines by whichto work cooperatively during civil disturbances.The creation of the post of Public InformationOfficer (PIO) is the key to improving relationsamong police and fire/EMS departments and themedia. The PIO must be well-informed, charis-matic, and experienced in public relations. Themessages conveyed by this individual are oftenvital to the mitigation of civil disturbances. ThePIO can work with the media to alleviate thepublic’s often hostile view of law enforcementofficers and to publicize the important andextensive work carried on by the police, fire, andEMS services.

COMMUNICATION BETWEEN POLICE ANDFIRE AGENCIES

Communication often proves to be the controllingelement in assessing whether a civil disturbancewill quickly dissipate or intensify. Each jurisdic-tion must decide whether its agencies should re-place their separate communication systems andbuild a single, more efficient one, or whether theirpresent systems are compatible and need only tobe updated or modified. A unified dispatch systemmust be in place and ready for operation on shortnotice, as needed. Ideally, this system would be

MITIGATION 33

located in the ICS headquarters.The Public Information Officer is invaluable to

ensuring good communications in the event of acivil disturbance. The PIO would participate in allmeetings and decisions regarding the civil unrestsituation and would act as official liaison to thepublic and media on behalf of each agency.

COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

One type of communications equipment whichcould prove to be invaluable during a civil disor-der is the cellular telephone. Agency executivesmay desire to enter into special arrangements withcellular telephone companies to provide this equip-ment to its personnel. Cellular phones could behelpful to firefighters working long shifts insecluded areas to keep them in touch with theirincident commanders and families, as it becomesnecessary.

Compatible radio communication frequenciesshould be carefully researched and tested for effec-tiveness, to ensure that agencies are able to com-municate with one another (e.g., portable radios).

TRAINING

Fire and law enforcement agencies should workclosely with local legislators and governmentofficials to maintain or increase funding for jointtraining programs. These programs, if carried outon a regular schedule, would enhance the effec-tiveness of firefighters and officers in all facets oftheir field work.

“Media personnel should be includedin certain aspects of training toensure that the public has an under-standing of how agencies operate toavoid civil disorder.”

A civil disturbance requires a police departmentto adopt a military model, which creates stressfulsituations within the organization and in its rela-tionships with other agencies. For example, duringriot situations, police officers are often faced witha conflict between their normal autonomous rolesand the requirement to follow precise unit

34

directives. Conflicts over authority frequently arisebetween fire departments and National Guardunits. Many problems experienced by policeduring disturbances stem from organizationalalterations.

Joint training exercises among police, fire/EMS,and public works personnel are essential toalerting them to circumstances that could lead tocivil disorder and to measures that can be taken toprevent the development of an explosive situation.Media personnel should be included in certainaspects of training to ensure that the public has anunderstanding of how agencies operate to avoidcivil unrest. These exercises should be designed tocover:

Life safety prioritiesGeneral guidelines (SOPS) for dealing withcivil unrestCoordination of tactical activitiesDetailed explanation of police/fire goalsCoordination of a unified dispatch systemDelineated span of control of each agencyPolice control procedureOperation of the integrated command systemOperation of the integrated communicationsystemTask force approach to dealing with civilunrestMedia briefingCultural sensitivity trainingLegal issuesMutual aid systems

CULTURAL SENSITIVITY TRAINING

The Mesa, Arizona, Fire Department (MFD) isone example of a fire department in the forefrontof actively addressing the needs of cultural diver-sity in the community. With a diverse population,Mesa’s city staff, mirroring the make-up of itscitizens, chose to be proactive in diversity issues.

MFD is a high-profile agency-the public sees itworking fire and emergency medical calls as wellas teaching and helping in the community. Thecity’s affirmative action policy helped MFD quick-ly organize its multicultural awareness program.The goal of this long-established policy is toachieve “a representation in the city’s workforce

that mirrors the community.” MFD shares thatgoal and worked to rectify deficiencies, such asthe lack of minorities and females in mid- andupper-level management.

Workforce 2000, the Hudson Institute report,estimates that by the year 2000, 70 percent of theavailable workforce will be minorities and women(Johnston and Packer 1987). To tap this resource,MFD began a long-term effort which includesorientation, education, training, and active recruit-ing. MFD reached a consensus on these issuesafter facing earlier problems and recent courtdecisions on so-called “reverse discrimination.”MFD’s approach is to identify immediate problemareas. The three greatest obstacles faced by poten-tial recruits were Emergency Medical Technical(EMT) certification, lack of minority applications,and the testing process, including written, physicalagility, and oral boards.

Since the MFD requires applicants to be EMT-certified, the strategy was to enroll qualifiedminorities in college-level EMT classes. Commu-nity colleges agreed to offer more EMT classesand preparatory courses for employment and pro-motion. To remedy the lack of minority appli-cants, area high-school personnel pledged tosupport the effort. Handouts, aimed at junior highschool students, show cultural diversity on the joband include language that is nonsexist and notgender specific. By allowing students to see whatfirefighting entails, MFD feels the new focus andincentive may help some students succeed whonormally would not.

The fire-service testing process can be an obsta-cle for many. MFD is working to ensure that theprocess is not culturally biased. To assist appli-cants, the department’s orientation programexplains the entire testing procedure. MFD empha-sizes that all programs ensure equal opportunityfor all applicants, especially the physical agilitytest, which has been the biggest obstacle forfemale applicants.

The department began an exercise program tohelp applicants increase their physical fitness.Aimed primarily at women, any applicant mayparticipate in the program. Formerly, once thetesting process was completed, the applicants wereignored. Today, the Personnel Division, along

with the MFD, tracks the results, and specifictesting problems for minorities and females arenoted. To assist applicants who need guidance, thedepartment developed a “Fire Department EntryLevel Preparation” class which will be taught atlocal community colleges.

Joint fire/police venture

A recruiting team made up of personnel from allranks assisted in locating possible applicants forMFD and, thus, were able to communicate withmore people on a personal level. Mesa’s PoliceDepartment pioneered this concept, and today re-cruiting is a joint fire/police venture. The recruit-ing team studied the affirmative action plan and isfamiliar with all aspects of the MFD, the “do’sand don’ts” of recruiting, and applicant qualifica-tions.

Communicating with the community

Twelve percent of Mesa’s population is Hispanicand many do not speak English. Because MFDpersonnel could not effectively communicate withthem, especially in emergency situations, the cityinstituted a Spanish-proficiency certification pro-gram. Conversational Spanish classes offered tofirefighters include terminology that will be help-ful in emergency situations as well as sensitivity tocultural differences.

These programs would not work without inter-departmental cooperation, management guidance,organized labor participation, open communica-tions, inclusion of community colleges, and publicrelations. Through these combined efforts, MFD ischanging its workforce to promote not only com-pliance with the law, but effective, relevant ser-vice to the community (Knutson and Note 1992).

OPERATIONS ISSUES

Fire and law enforcement agencies can workcooperatively to prevent civil unrest throughoutthe nation. Specific plans to address the followingissues should be developed:n Sale of liquor during civil unrestn Sale of gasoline and explosive materialsn Removal of rubbish and all extraneous mate-

rials which could be used as weapons

MITIGATION 35

n Fine-tuning of joint exercises amongagencies

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

The primary aim of mitigation is to reduce riskthrough anticipating actions. Community relationsmay prove to be the most valuable mitigationeffort in the prevention of civil unrest. Communityactivities should include:

n Preparing land-use and development plans forhazardous areas

n Educating decision makers and communityrepresentatives about the risk of civil unrestand circumstances that can cause civil unrest

Public service announcements and campaignsare good maintenance tools to adopt to keep thecommunity involved in government and to remindpeople that these agencies exist to protect and helpthem.

Agencies need to support community leadersand to include them in regular and comprehensivebriefings on agency policies and activities. Theaccumulation of unresolved grievances by resi-dents, coupled with a minor police action such asa simple arrest, can easily be perceived as explo-sive enough to spark a riot situation. Local gangsusually include influential leaders who are accord-ed much respect and authority within their com-munities, Harnessing this leadership can help bringharmony to the community and enable local fireand police departments to interact with the gangsthrough innovative programs and social events thatwill make them an important and productive partof the community (see Part 6, Recovery).

Recent civil disturbances have demonstrated thatcommunity-oriented programs connect the publicwith fire and police. Increased public awarenesspromotes changes in attitude toward fire and po-lice personnel. Public support is essential whenagencies and their personnel become the target ofrioters, as was the case in Los Angeles.

Agencies can implement various programs de-signed to build trust and develop a partnershipwith the community through:n Dialogue/town meetingsn Networking with community leadersn Community relations assistants, who monitor

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the vital signs of the community and reportdirectly to the chief executivesHotlines, which are set up immediately be-fore, during, and after civil unrestDesignating “safe places” sponsored by thefire and/or police departments to carry oncommunity activities, such as food drives,clean-up programs, child-care services, andfund-raising drives for other services to re-spond to specific community needsEstablishing cultural sensitivity workshops foragency executives, officers, and other person-nel. When properly conducted, these pro-grams can enhance police/communityrelationsRecruiting culturally diverse personnelStrengthening media relationsEstablishing a public access system, possiblythrough the PIO (ideally, direct access tochief executives of both police and fireagencies)

SPRINKLER SYSTEMS

All local government agencies should cooperate inthe development of comprehensive plans for theinstallation of sprinkler systems, Operationalsprinkler systems have proven to be highly effec-tive in saving property and, thus, millions ofdollars in damage from arson and other fire-relat-ed actions. In its report on the Los Angeles riots,the Fire Sprinkler Advisory Board (FSAB) ofSouthern California reported on the effectivenessof automatic fire sprinkler systems. The FSABreports that more than 5,000 fires were reportedduring the riots.

“Operational sprinkler systems have

proven to be highly effective in sav-ing property and, thus, millions of

dollars in damage from arson andother fire-related actions.”

Because firefighters were often blocked fromreaching their destinations by angry mobs, theautomatic sprinkler systems were the only meansof controlling these blazes. Those buildings

lacking sprinklers sustained heavy losses (FSAB fold dollar loss above that of a sprinkler-protected1992). A five-year study by Factory Mutual building. A more recent study revealed similarSystems (1980-1984) concluded that the average data, with losses in a sprinklered buildingfire loss in a fully sprinklered building was averaging $147,429 versus $1,603,200 in a non-approximately $38,000, while a non-sprinklered sprinklered building (dollar values are indexed tobuilding of the same size showed an average loss the 1991 dollar value). (Fire Sprinkler Advisoryof approximately $315,000. This reflects an eight- Board 1992.)

MITIGATION 37

4

PREPAREDNESS

W. A. Bridges/Atlanta Journal Constitution

4

PREPAREDNESSHOW POLICE CHIEFS AND FIRE CHIEFSWORKED TOGETHER

During the course of their deliberations, the TaskForce on Civil Unrest developed the followinglists, prepared by each agency (fire and police),which outline a two-way flow of actions and data/information in response to a given situation. Thelists appear in order of priority.

Fire Personnel-support expected from thePolice Department

1.

2.

3.4.

5.

6.

7.

Protection of fire personnel, both en routeand on the sceneInformation regarding resource capabilities ofpolice personnelAccurate, up-to-date intelligence briefingsBetter communications/coordination withpolice, at all levelsKnowledge of police needs from fire person-nelJoint training on incident command, accord-ing to accepted and agreed upon standardsDelineation of each agency’s responsibilities(who is in charge of what)

8. Financial responsibilities of each department

Police Personnel-support expected from theFire Department

1.

2.

3.

4.5.

6.

7.

Protection of police personnel (by EMS/rescue)Realistic expectations, based on resourcesavailableImmediate liaison-sharing between fire/EMSand policeIntelligence liaisonsSharing of critical information-floor plans,elevators, etc.Joint training on incident command and otherissues (exercises)Mutual aid agreements between police andfire personnel, a.k.a. Emergency OperationPlan (EOP)

PRIORITIZATION

Police and fire agencies must maintain close liai-son with local agencies and private entities toprepare for civil unrest. These preparations in-clude mutual aid agreements with other agencies,

PREPAREDNESS 41

plans for easy access to utilities (electricity, gas,and water companies), and contracts for the serv-ices of food preparers and distributors.

The following guidelines to combat civil unrestare listed in order of suggested priority.

1.

2.

3.

4.

Study all reports on previous civil unrestdocumented by each agency to identify anycommon predictors of events that can triggerviolent reactions from residents,Adopt a policy approach, through consulta-tion with city administrators, the districtattorney’s office, and the mayor. This iscrucial to avoid any legal ramifications thatmay complicate joint action by law enforce-ment and fire personnel.Establish the extent of compatibility of thetwo agencies-careful documentation of acommon language and the design of an agree-able command structure to ensure that person-nel from both agencies can work togethereffectively, The agencies may have solidexecution plans before coming together toformulate a joint plan or both agencies maystart from ground zero to develop and estab-lish a solid plan for joint action. The defini-tion of professional terms is crucial at thispoint of preparing for civil unrest.Present the final plan to the city administra-tors for administrative and financial consider-ations, At this juncture, questions as to whowill finance the plan and where to procurethe hardware should be answered.

COMMUNICATIONS

Technology has progressed faster than any othertype of scientific advance in this century. Today,it is not unusual to hear about floating holograms,“head-up” displays that project images on nearbysurfaces, computers integrated into the dashboardsof vehicles, patrol cars carrying optical laser diskscapable of storing millions of pages of informa-tion, voice-activated systems and video monitorsthat allow callers to see the person on the otherend of the telephone.

The 911 operating system

In some states, the changeover to a 911 operating

system was mandated by legislation. However,some agencies have had to battle the telephonecompany for access to residential phone numbersand addresses. Others could not afford to maintainsuch a database and were happy to allow the tele-phone company to handle it. Some jurisdictionshave had to decide whether a public serviceanswering point (PSAP) would route calls or if thecalls would be sent directly to the agencyinvolved. Each telephone number in a 911 systemhas to be assigned to a particular law enforcementagency, fire department, or ambulance service.Funding has to be secured, hardware purchased,and consultants engaged, which could take fromtwo to five years, and there are still many citiesand counties that have not yet begun the process.

The 911 system is a simple concept, althoughimplementing it can be difficult, expensive, andcomplicated, It consists of a telephone systemhooked to a computer: when the phone rings, thecomputer checks its database to find the telephonenumber of the incoming caller and displays it on amonitor. The system is further enhanced when thecomputer gets smarter and automatically identifiesand displays the telephone number, address, and,in some cases, the name of the person who ownsthat number. In some cases, accompanying infor-mation includes the fire department and ambulanceservice responsible for handling emergencies inthe caller’s area. If the jurisdiction uses a PSAP,the call taker simply pushes a button on the con-sole to transfer the call to the appropriate police,fire, or ambulance dispatcher. The entire processtakes less than fifteen seconds.

Before a changeover to the 911 system, admin-istrators first must find an individual with bothcomputer expertise and emergency service experi-ence. They should observe systems already inoperation in other jurisdictions in order to assesstheir own needs, Detailed and specific needsshould be documented and a consultant retained toreview the specifications, design the system, andhelp procure the desired hardware. Administratorsshould not attempt to become experts in all thedifferent technologies involved. Several companiesoffer a variety of services associated with theimplementation of a 911 system. GTE offersclasses on 911 implementation and services and

42

products for creating a master street guide;computer-aided dispatch systems; and personnelwho will conduct a site survey, determine how bigthe system should be, and work with the local tele-phone company and other vendors to implementthe 911 system.

A highly tuned communications preparednessplan is invaluable to ensuring rapid and efficientresponse efforts. The Austin, Texas, Fire Depart-ment has averaged under five minutes citywideresponse time. The city is divided into five geo-graphic regions or battalions, with a battalion chiefin charge of all companies and alarms within theregion. Operations companies are assigned a spe-cific number of target sites within their districteach year. Plans were developed for each district,using standard information forms in combinationwith site and floor plans. Copies were distributedto all affected companies, and a copy of each planwithin a battalion chief’s district was carried inthat chief’s vehicle, As the city grew, the filesexpanded from one or two binders to a speciallydesigned field box which fit into the back of thebattalion chief’s car, a suburban-type vehicle. Thefile box could take up fully one-half of the spacein the back of the car. Because of the size of thefile box, the battalion chiefs carried only thoseplans relevant to their own district, which createdproblems when simultaneous incidents in a districtrequired the response of an alternate battalionchief who might not have on-hand the plans asso-ciated with the second incident. With a total of2,500 to 3,000 plans for the entire city (and moreto come), it was impractical for each chief to carryall the plans for a particular district.

To resolve this problem, the departmentequipped its vehicles with cellular phones, pur-chased twelve portable fax machines, and updatedcommunications procedures. The department wasdetermined to find a more efficient way to storelarge amounts of data that could be recalled at amoment’s notice to provide specific informationfor an incident commander. This information, inturn, had to be transmitted via fax machines linkedto the cellular phones in the commanders’ cars, Tomeet this challenge, operations personnel providedthe latest site and floor plans. Other relevant siteinformation was entered into the database specifi-

cally developed for this task. As now designed,the system has the potential to include photographsof buildings, hazardous areas, fire-alarm controlpanels and other objects, and could be invaluableas intelligence information to be shared amongmutual aid partners during any crisis. The ultimategoal is efficiency-providing the greatest amountof information in the shortest amount of time tothose who need it quickly.

Radios

In some departments, radio dispatch is still thebest and most affordable system. Mobile andportable radios are not the behemoths of ten yearsago. Crystals have been replaced by micro-processors, and where once an 8-channel systemwas considered sophisticated, today’s equivalentmay carry as many as 300 channels. Modern unitsare considerably smaller and more durable andfeature numerous options, such as a message relaysystem and a scrambler that prevents eavesdrop-ping and offers high-quality recovered audio.Other units offer such features as emergencyaccess, priority queuing, and the ability to inter-face with other conventional channels, such asmutual aid frequencies.

Historically, emergency communication fre-quency assignments have been made so a firedepartment has its own unshared frequency forprimary operations communications, if possible. Asecond frequency for administrative communica-tions may be assigned. The same radio operatingenvironment operates in police, public works, andutilities agencies. Each of the many departmentsin a jurisdiction has been assigned a radio channelfor its almost exclusive use. Traditionally, radiochannels have been assigned to government usersbased on the specific types of services they pro-vide, such as fire, police, medical, or generallocal government. Orderly communications werethe principal reason for this approach; also, it wasimportant that public safety communications pathsbenefit from open communication lines wheneverthey were needed.

Decades ago, the telephone industry switchedfrom its conventional wire-line system to atrunking system to meet the escalating demandsfor advanced technology and service. The same

PREPAREDNESS 43

technology today is applied to radio communica-tion. The goal of a radio trunking system is toincrease the percentage of time a radio channel isused for communications, by allowing that channelto broadcast any type of service communicationsrather than being dedicated to a single service.The trunking system does have some drawbacks.The major shortcoming is that all of the field fleetsor base agencies sharing the system might transmitcommunications simultaneously, thus overloadingthe system.

Videotape systems

Videotape and photographic equipment used tofilm riot participants are helpful in assisting agen-cies to identify rioters for future reference, legalpurposes, and historical documentation. Extremecaution should be used by individuals video-tapingor photographing riot scenes, due to the probabili-ty of attack by the rioters.

Mobile data terminals

Mobile data terminals (MDTs), also known asmobile digital terminals or mobile computer termi-nals, extend to the officer in the field the capabili-ties available to the dispatcher. MDTs basicallyare dumb terminals (i.e., they can transmit andreceive data but cannot process information in thesame way as a personal computer). Accessing thestate and national computers for warrants, checks,and intelligence information is executed via theterminal in the working vehicle, a process thatbypasses the dispatcher and clears the air for otherimportant transmissions. In some cases, personnelhave access to calls which the CAD system holdsin a pending file and can query the database forvarious types of information. The installation ofMDTs assumes the department’s computer systemis capable of handling the extra workload. Trafficcan increase substantially and the system should bedesigned to handle the additional load.

combination with them. Laptops allow officers inthe field to complete incident reports and store theinformation or transmit it to the department’s maincomputer via a modem hooked into telephone orradio lines. If the computer system is designed forit, personnel can access the main database as wellas state and national computers in much the sameway as those using MDTs.

Cellular phones

Cellular phones are another example of communi-cations equipment that has grown in use and im-portance in the past several years, They allow theuser to handle details that may not require theirappearance at the scene. The disadvantage ofcellular phones is their high cost and lack of confi-dentiality.

Logging equipment

Logging equipment is vital to communicationsunits. Just as electronic technology has not re-placed the traditional radio dispatch system, it isstill necessary to record every call that comes intothe department. There has been much progress inthe development of high-tech equipment to addressthis need.

Hand-held computers

Although computers continue to shrink in size,they are still expected to perform bigger and morecomplex tasks. Hand-held computers epitomizesophisticated technology-small but powerful. Thislightweight computer can be used to prepare shortreports when an officer needs a paper copy, suchas field interviews and abandoned vehicle or tow-ing reports.

Regardless of the type of system procured, it isimportant to provide continuing support and main-tenance of the units. While agencies spend thou-sands of dollars to upgrade systems, they holdback on expending money to recruit, train, andcompensate those who operate and maintain them.Technology is indispensable in curtailing a danger-ous riot situation, but personnel are still incontrol, and they should be adequately trained touse these new advances, both efficiently andknowledgeably.

Laptop computers

Agencies should consider allowing their personnelto use laptop computers. These small, generallylightweight computers are usually less expensivethan MDTs and can be used in place of or in

44

Interacting with the media and their mutual aid partners. Two types of plan-

Fire department and law enforcement spokes- ning should be addressed:

persons are responsible for conveying a profes-sional image to the media and the public at alltimes. Each department should develop generalguidelines to assist its personnel who meet withthe public and the media. Common sense guide-lines should improve encounters with the mediaand the public, while, at the same time, projectinga positive image for the agency.

“Fire department and law enforce-ment spokespersons are responsiblefor conveying a professional image atall times.”

PLANNING

Planning is basically a management function forpreparing for civil unrest. The possibility of a civildisturbance is analyzed according to social indica-tions and historical references. Resources areinventoried and apprised as to their effectiveness,and the manner in which the resources necessaryto control the incident will be expended are deter-mined. Plans should be available for review andcritique by all agency personnel.

Agencies should establish a system that providesfor the updating of civil unrest response plans asneeded. Basic to an effective plan is a relationshipbetween one department and other municipaldepartments or agencies. Agency personnel, par-ticularly those involved directly in the planningprocess, should become acquainted with one an-other through social and professional interaction,such as attending roll calls and briefings on aweekly or monthly basis, depending on the organi-zation. Interdepartment/interagency agreementsshould include a process for exchanging informa-tion that alters plans and, consequently, emergencystrategies and operations.

Planning prior to a possible civil disturbanceshould reflect the prioritization procedures earlier.It involves identifying critical decisions that needto be made by fire and law enforcement agencies

Strategic planning-the administrative andpolicy details which need to be agreed upon.

Tactical planning-planned responses tospecific situations in the field.

Strategic planning. For fire and law enforcementagencies to work together, decisions have to bemade based on available resources. These includeequipment, staffing, transportation, food suppliers,facilities, and the support of local government,including the district attorney’s office. It is at thispoint that a joint planning committee must decidewhether existing resources are sufficient or wheth-er they need to be supplemented for the purposesof working together. The joint planning committeeshould include agency chiefs, communicationsspecialists, tactical experts, and at least one publicinformation officer.

It is recommended that each agency provide itspersonnel with transportation. This is viewed as aflexible deployment approach for security reasons.Police should only escort fire vehicles if there isconcrete evidence of life-threatening attacks onfirefighters. If the designated impact area is se-cure, then it is best to have separate transportationfor each agency’s personnel. This recommendationis applicable also where mutual aid partners are in-volved. In general, security measures can be madebased on historical and intelligence information.

Alternative base sites, such as those establishedduring the Los Angeles riots, should be planned.These sites need to be easily accessible, provideshelter, and be staffed with maintenance, commu-nications, feeding, and security personnel.

Both agencies need to plan how best to securethe impact zone as soon as it has been defined.The planning committee should decide also on aclear, common language and should detail how toset up joint/shared radio frequencies.

Tactical planning. The protests of the 1960s seemtame in comparison to recent civil unrest disturb-ances. Rather than peaceful demonstrations, policeand fire departments today are faced with urban-guerilla warfare tactics. The devastating aftermath

PREPAREDNESS 45

of the Los Angeles riot attests to the premise thatriots have become more warlike. This was evidentalso after the McDuffie trial in Miami in 1980 andin a major disturbance in the Mount Pleasantneighborhood of Washington, D. C., in 1991.

Today, bands of protesters, rioters, looters, andarsonists are well organized and mobile. Theymove quickly through an area and have easyaccess to weapons, which they use freely andfrequently (Pilant 1993).

Mobile field tactics present the biggest changefor police in controlling a riot situation, Knownalso as the mobile field-force concept, it is essen-tially a change in the way law enforcement re-sponds to civil disturbances. In general, the goal isto quickly and effectively disperse large crowds byremoving them from the scene or separating theminto small, manageable groups, These actionsrequire a different response tactic on the part oflaw enforcement and fire officials than employedtwenty to thirty years ago. Officers need specialtraining in dealing with current “trends” in riots.

Mobile field tactics have changed law enforce-ment’s response to civil disturbances in numerousways. In Los Angeles, for example, a skirmishline used to be made up of a squad of ten officers,with one sergeant in charge, and two officersacting as line backers, thereby reducing the num-ber on the front line to seven. Generally, theywere on foot, in the open, and had no other tacti-cal support, If they came under fire, there was noplace to take cover and no way to defend them-selves other than with their sidearms. Today, theprimary tactical component of the mobile force isstill the squad, but its number may be as many assixteen, Each vehicle carries four officers and thecars become a support tool for the officers. Thevehicles are driven behind the line and can be usedwith lights and sirens to intimidate and/or directcrowds, recover injured officers or members ofthe public, and pursue suspects. They also serve asan effective public address system and as a block-ing or maneuvering force,

Tactics employed by different jurisdictions vary.In Miami, for example, police draw a well-orderedline formation, They also apply a variety ofmobile tactics to riot situations in urban areas. InLos Angeles, an advancing line of officers is

followed by several vehicles. In Miami, only onecar follows a line-the rest are parked nearby,with an officer standing guard.

Firefighting tactics

In order to reach their objectives and lessen thedanger to personnel, firefighters should use hit-and-run tactics. The goal is to knock down the fireand quickly exit the impact area. Selective firedamage plans should be adopted to ensure thatunits are first dispatched to the most critical areas.The use of large diameter hoses and heavy streamappliances should be maximized, and sprinklersystems should be required, particularly in build-ings of over 5,000 square feet. The number ofburnable items should be reduced as much aspossible, for example, abandoned vehicles, trash,and debris. Abandoned buildings should be as-sessed for razing, since they are prime targets forcovert activity and arson during riot situations.

". . . to reach their objectives andlessen the danger to personnel, fire-fighters should use hit-and-run tac-tics.”

Fire departments should use engine companiesin the impact area. Trucks or aerial ladders shouldbe available in the area. All personnel with thepotential of entering the impact area should alwaysbe protected with body armor. There should be nointerior firefighting in impact areas, and a planshould be devised to control the spread of hazard-ous materials, such as pesticides, asbestos, andpetroleum parts, into the sewage systems. Depart-ments should ensure that there are enough bullet-proof vests to outfit all personnel who maypotentially operate in the impact area. Suppliersshould be identified (e.g., the military) in casethere is an unforeseen need for more body armorand other protective gear.

It is useful to have “bird-dog” personnel onstand-by to direct and assist mutual aid response,as outside firefighting units and the NationalGuard may not have proper directions to desig-nated impact areas.

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INSTITUTING A MISSION STATEMENT

As police and firefighters plan to work together, both agencies need to establish a mission statementdetailing staffing priorities. The Miami Police Department has established such a document, whichserves as a basic guideline for joint operations between the agencies. The Department’s guidelines inreference to Fire Department escorts are as follows:

Rationale

During a civil disturbance, Miami Fire Department units often come under attack from hostileelements, Fire units are an essential weapon in the suppressing of a civil disorder. The rescueelement, of course, also provides important emergency medical services to the community and to thePolice Department.

In order to accomplish this mission, the following procedures will go into effect upon a departmentalmobilization.

Mobilization Priority

A total of eight two-person units will be assigned to fire stations. All fire stations will receive onetwo-man unit first... if extra resources are available, other stations will get the units in [a specified]priority order. The following are the mission assignments for police officers assigned to fire units:

(Prior to perimeters being closed)

1. The first priority will be the escort of Fire Rescue Units to calls within the affected area. Fire andpolice units responding to requests for medical services will not use emergency equipment whengoing into and out of the affected areas.

2. If there is a second two-person unit assigned to a fire station, this second unit will escort firetrucks to fire scenes, In this case, the Fire Department will respond in what they call a TaskForce configuration. This is generally a task force commander’s vehicle and three fire trucks. Thepolice unit escorting should be immediately behind the task force commander’s vehicle,

3. Under no circumstance will police escort vehicles leave their fire units unprotected. You areexpected to remain with the rescue or task force at all times.

(When a perimeter is set)

In the event a perimeter is closed because of problems in an affected area, the following procedureswill be in effect:

1. The two-person unit will continue to escort rescue or fire units. They will, however, receiveclearance from the EOC or Fire Dispatcher before proceeding into the area.

2, If advised by the EOC or Fire Dispatcher, escort units will bring fire units to a specificintersection, where additional resources, such as field force element or SWAT may be assignedto assist.

3. A no lights or siren response will be the order of the day,4. Once again, police units will remain with their fire personnel at all times,

PREPAREDNESS 47

Mutual sharing

Mutual sharing is a critical element of theplanning process. In addition to the EMS, theresources commonly found within a municipalgovernment complex include personnel from thebuilding department (including engineers andarchitects), public works department (includingheavy equipment operators), water department,electric and gas utility companies, and the tele-phone company, among others. Almost every skilla jurisdiction utilizes on a daily basis may beneeded in an emergency. The fire service mustidentify these services and include them in theirresponse plans.

Potential mutual aid partners

State and federal agencies have expertise and re-sources that can be called on in civil disturbances.These may differ from state to state. The obviousagencies include the Federal Aviation Adminis-tration (FAA), the Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobaccoand Firearms (ATF), and the local water commis-sion. Other agencies may include the U.S. CoastGuard, the State Forest Service, the FBI, theArmed Forces, the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-neers, and the Department of Transportation.

Neighboring fire and police departments can beparticularly valuable partners. Large and smalldepartments alike have limitations and no adjoin-ing department should be excluded automatically.

All planning decisions-strategic and tactical-should be formalized, followed by an officialmemorandum of understanding between agencies.This document, along with the planning decisions,provides the basis from which to conduct relevanttraining of personnel.

TRAINING

Joint training exercises and simulations can bevery helpful in educating and preparing fire andpolice personnel to work together effectively dur-ing civil unrest. By learning together, getting toknow one another, and establishing a commonmodus operandi, valuable time will be saved whenit becomes necessary to set up a joint ICS during acrisis. This is another lesson learned from the Los

Angeles riots. Although a special plan had beenagreed upon in advance between the fire andpolice departments, it fell apart because the agen-cies did not work together. Fire chiefs were angrybecause of the lack of police escorts. Fire person-nel could not reach fires because of threats to theirlives and personal safety.

Active training is as important in civil disturb-ance situations as in all other facets of firefightingand law enforcement, It should involve all person-nel in the department. Strategic goals must becommunicated all the way down to line personnel.Joint training exercises should be conducted on aregular basis between fire and law enforcementpersonnel, and these exercises should be practicedregularly, until they become routine procedures.Political and media components, particularly Pub-lic Information Officers, should be included in allfacets of training, including table-top exercises,simulations, and field exercises.

“Joint training exercises and simula-tions can be very helpful in educatingand preparing fire and police person-nel to work together effectively dur-ing civil unrest”

Both agencies should observe and understandeach other’s SOPS. Firefighters and police officersneed to be fully aware of their agency’s organiza-tional principles-those that form the underpin-nings of the department’s overall mission orphilosophy. Officers must be apprised of themissions and goals of individual operations. Oneoperation may call for mass arrests by police orfirefighters putting out an arson fire, while anothermay put personnel from both agencies under fireand require armed back-up from police or themilitary.

The command staff should be well trained, withone incident commander in charge of overall guid-ance and direction of the operation. Commandstaff and their personnel should attend other agen-cy roll calls on a regular basis and carry out regu-lar joint training activities to become accustomedto each other and better learn each other’s SOPS.

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Before actual training begins, administratorsshould conduct an exhaustive and detailed analysisof the organization and community. Is the organi-zation set up to handle a major disturbance? Howwill it go about it? What is the feeling of the com-munity relative to the handling of major disturb-ances? What resources can each department callupon when responding to critical incidents? An-swering these questions should give command staffa better idea of the type of training needed and thetype of equipment to be added to the department’sarsenal.

Command staff need to know what type oftraining is available locally, in the county and thestate, through universities and community colleg-es, private vendors, or other police and fire de-partments, and the military. Crucial areas to focuson include:

Risk analysis. Teaching personnel how tolook at what is happening in the communityand evaluate that against the potential forproblems.Operational planning. Understanding theprinciples of tactical operations and learninghow to put an operational plan together.Command structure. Setting up a workablecommand structure and learning how to com-municate the operation’s mission, goals, andthe tactical plans devised to accomplish them.Tactics. Adapting and using the mobile field-force and hit-and-run concepts, reviewingriot-control formations, the purpose and strat-egies for effective and appropriate use; under-standing psychological factors and undergoingcultural sensitivity training; reviewing tacticsfor dispersing the crowd, rescuing victims orfallen personnel; infiltrating a crowd andremoving its leaders; and utilizing ground andair support.

Other important areas to be covered includelegal ramifications, methods of preventing andpredicting civil disturbances, and strategies forimproving relationships with the community.

Training should include every member of anagency. All personnel must be thoroughly apprisedof the department’s overall mission and the

mission of their partner agency.

EQUIPMENT

Equipment is a critical consideration, especially attimes of civil unrest. Administrators should decideinitially on the philosophy, purpose, and opera-tional guidelines of the mobile force. These basicprinciples will help determine what type of equip-ment the department needs. Examples include:

Specialty vests. The standard issue vest is general-ly worn by most officers. Special weapons offi-cers, those charged with tactical support and whoexpect to be in high-risk situations, may opt for avest with a higher protection level than the stand-ard issue. It should provide upper torso protection,enough freedom for arm movement, neck protec-tion, and pockets for carrying special equipment.

“Specialty vests...should provideupper torso protection...freedom forarm movement... neck protection, andpockets for special equipment.”

Helmets. Helmets should cover the back of theneck (minimally) and the ears, block out noise,and, ideally, have enough room for a radio com-ponent or earpiece. For maximum efficiency,officers should be able to move the face shield upor out of the way and still get in and out of theirpatrol cars easily. Officers should be able to weara gas mask with the helmet, which does not needto be ballistic unless the department expectsofficers to come under fire. Civil unrest policehelmets are designed with a visor and a low centerof gravity for stability.

Chemical agents. Chemical agents have a numberof uses, including dispersing crowds, denyingaccess, or giving an outnumbered force theadvantage, as in the case of routing large groupsof looters from stores. Smoke can be used tocover officers’ movements, as well as to warncrowds that police will be using more seriousweapons such as CS gas. While smoke is generallyused as a warning or cover, it can also be used in

PREPAREDNESS 49

conjunction with CS gas to carry the chemicalagent further into the crowd.

Although distraction devices such as the 37 mmfoam rubber baton rounds, rubber pellet rounds,and bean bags fall in the category of chemicalmunitions, they may not be appropriate for useduring a civil disturbance. Generally, noise-flashdiversionary devices are used only by speciallytrained personnel in barricade situations.

Aircraft. Air support can be a vital component toboth agencies and their mutual aid partners forcrowd control. Rotary-wing aircraft can be used asspotters to provide intelligence information onviolent and potentially dangerous situations. Bygiving ground commanders an instant snapshot ofa wide area, motor-craft surveillance significantlyenhances command and control functions. Whenproperly equipped with sirens and a public addresssystem, they can be used for diversion or distrac-tion. They also can work in concert with a mobilefield force for rapid deployment of rescue effortsand can provide platforms for video coverage ofdisturbances.

Specialty vehicles. The new Cobra, a riot-controlvehicle, has been designed to disperse gatheringswith a minimum of discomfort while providingmaximum protection for the vehicle’s occupants.Features include a water tank capable of propel-ling dye or pepper gas and a remote-controlledwater turret with a 360 degree halogen lightingsystem.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The issue of who is the primary agency-in-chargeduring civil unrest is not to be determined on theemergency scene. However, even when resolvedduring the preparedness stage, command can be

“The issue of who is the primaryagency-in-charge during civil unrestis not to be determined on the emer-gency scene.”

usurped in situations where there is not a strongcommand presence with effective incident com-

manders at work. An incident commander’spresence must inspire people to perform on theemergency scene; it must set a standard for themanagement of the emergency.

During civil unrest, an incident commandermust be prepared to face a multitude of technical,managerial, and political issues. Incidents that areeffectively directed from technical and managerialperspectives can be perceived by the public andmutual aid partners as poorly managed becausepolitical issues associated with the incident are notadequately addressed.

ACCEPTING RISK

Incident commanders must be able to distinguishbetween assumptions and facts. They are responsi-ble for the entire operation and welfare ofeveryone involved. If command is unsure or un-comfortable with any part of the plan or informa-tion received, further action should be delayeduntil incident command is satisfied. The incidentcommander should be a risk evaluator, not a risktaker. While the final decision will always restwith the incident commander, it should be basedon input from the entire command staff.

Command officers must be cognizant of thelegal implications of their decision making. This isan issue that should be addressed during the pre-paredness stage.

THE ROLE OF THE PUBLICINFORMATION OFFICER

The Incident Command System is an effectivevehicle for ensuring that commanders address thetechnical and political issues of civil disorder. Akey officer in this regard is the public informationliaison or Public Information Officer (PIO). Thisindividual serves as the point of contact for allmutual aid representatives, allowing the incidentcommander and the command staff to focus onproblem resolution while ensuring that politicalsensitivities continue to be addressed. The PIO’sability to effectively coordinate, handle, and“stroke” individual agencies and their representa-tives and the press will impact on how the incidentis perceived from a political viewpoint.

Documentation speeds the reporting process. Itis important to document everything during the

50

incident, particularly relevant details which maybe lost in the confusion of the incident. Detailssuch as times, locations, and names will aid in re-constructing what actually happened.

OPERATIONS ISSUES

An organizational philosophy and managementgoal of each agency’s emergency response pro-gram for civil disturbance should be to developoperational procedures that will bring consistencyto executing the response. The components of thissystem include:

n Developing SOPSn Training all personnel in the scope, applica-

tion, and implementation of SOPSn Executing SOPS on the riot scenen Reviewing and critiquing the effectiveness of

operationsn Revising and updating SOPS during response

and at the recovery stage

Over time, this standard management cycleensures self-improvement.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Building a strong bond of understanding and coop-eration should be an ongoing process between fireand police agencies and their jurisdictions. Com-munity-oriented programs and constant feedbackshould be an integral part of the work of theseagencies. Agency representatives, along with thePIO, should work to develop these programs andrespond to the concerns expressed by members ofthe community.

The community outreach program adopted bythe Philadelphia Fire Department in 1989 hascontributed to the largest decrease in fatalities inPhiladelphia in over thirty years. Activities likethose listed below are always useful and have ahigh success rate in building a spirit of trust andcooperation between the community and fire andpolice agencies.n Attend police community workshops to dis-

cuss pertinent fire safety issuesn Establish programs at Get-Set preschools, day

care centers, and nursery schoolsn Publish fire prevention articles in neigh-

borhood newspapers, written in English andSpanish by members of local companiesDistribute fire prevention literature at areashopping centers on weekendsCoordinate fire education programs with areahospitals so that blood pressure and choles-terol screenings can be conducted by localfire personnelDisplay fire prevention/safety messages onoutdoor marquees or signs of businesses inthe districtPrint fire prevention/safety messages on thepay stubs, advertisements, and shopping bagsof participating local businessesPresent programs at all houses of worship inthe neighborhood“Adopt” elementary schools in respectivelocal districts and participate in their pro-grams-such as Career DayBecome involved with local hospitals-pay aChristmas visit, for exampleIdentify homes lacking smoke detectors, andpurchase and install them in conjunction withthe Fire Prevention DivisionFollow-up on a periodic basis to ensure thatsmoke detectors are operational. Replacementbatteries could be made available through thefire prevention division and donated by bat-tery manufacturers, community organizations,and businesses.

Public access media also are a valuable resourcefor developing community activities. Police andfire agencies could produce and/or sponsor in-formative programming on their “worlds”; or theycould sponsor entertainment programming gearedto both adults and children.

HOW AGENCIES CAN BUILD ARELATIONSHIP

It is imperative to build bonds of respect and trustbetween fire and police agencies, especially sincethey must work as one unit during crisis andunrest situations.

On the night of April 29, 1992, when the LosAngeles riots were escalating, the job of escortingfirefighters was given to Metro, the police depart-ment’s elite division that includes its SWAT teams

PREPAREDNESS 51

and other specialized units. Although this decisionmight be questionable, when protection ultimatelywas provided, firefighters praised the courage anddedication of their police escorts. Interagencycommunication was a major problem in this situa-tion. Firefighters use different radio channels fromthose assigned to the police and there was no wayto link them. The two agencies were unfamiliarwith each other’s equipment and methods of oper-ation, and this proved to be a major handicap inthe execution of their jobs during the emergency.

Each agency needs to fully understand how theother sees the world. They need to build relation-ships for the welfare of the community. Atlantafire and police chiefs, for example, meet for din-ner once a week. They share their experiences,compare notes, and get to know and understand

each other. The weekly dinners have helped tobuild and strengthen the strong cooperation andtrust that exists between police and fire personnelin the city.

Another successful program first developed bythe Miami Police Department in 1981 is theSWAT media program. Under this program,firefighters trained as paramedics attend the MiamiPolice Department SWAT school. After complet-ing this program, the firefighters are fully trainedin the defensive use of firearms and SWAT tac-tics. This training qualifies them to move intohostile areas to render urgent life-saving aid. Theprogram is very effective during a civil disorder,where police and/or fire personnel can be injured.It has positive benefits for both agencies andbuilds stronger, firmer ties between the two.

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5

RESPONSE

W. A. Bridged/Atlanta Journal Constitution

5

RESPONSEImplementing a response plan for civil unrest mustbe viewed with caution so as not to provoke orincrease riots. Department heads or the IncidentCommander (IC) must keep in mind that deployingresources in the form of strike teams or task forcesin a nonviolent area may increase tension. On theother hand, responding with inadequate resourcesmay endanger emergency response personnel,

During the second trial of the Los Angelespolice officers in the summer of 1993 and theensuing high tension in major cities across thenation, many cities evaluated their state of pre-paredness for civil unrest. City plans were put inplace for the possibility of riots, and many citygovernments were prepared for a “worst casescenario.” Although the violence never erupted,emergency services were faced with the questionof “How do we respond in high-tension areaswithout inciting violence?”

A department standard response to a call in ariot zone may be two engines, police units, a Bat-talion Chief and a medic unit. This may be in re-sponse to a car fire or other types of small fires.This show of strength may be seen as a demon-stration of force or a risk escalating the violence.

In some cases, while tension is building, the firedepartment may elect to treat calls in a potentiallyhot zone with a standard response call (one engineto a small dumpster fire). On the other hand, in anarea which has experienced violent attacks, thedepartment may increase the standard response toensure protection for emergency response person-nel. Incident Commanders must rely on intelli-gence from the field to match the proper responseto the situation in the riot zone. They must addressthe safety needs of the emergency response per-sonnel and the protection of the community.

PRIORITIZATION

The effective execution of activities in response tocivil disorder impinges heavily on thorough prepa-ration strategies such as those mentioned above. Inmost cases, preparedness and response go hand-in-hand. The ideal scenario is one in which policiesadopted in the joint fire/police preparedness stageanticipate all contingencies and are implementedso well that policy decisions do not have to bemade during the response period. However, nomatter how carefully plans are made, one cannever develop specific policies to deal with all of

RESPONSE 55

the variations in the types of incidents that maytrigger civil unrest. One can never anticipate allthe things that can go wrong or foresee all thedemands placed on fire and police organizationsand the community during the response period.

Effective response tactics may include the fol-lowing:

1. Unified command must be implemented im-mediately before and after declaring a civildisturbance. This is essential in order toeffectively avoid chaos and to coordinatetactical activities.

2. Frequent briefings and planning meetingshave to take place between police and fireexecutives during the civil unrest. Fire andpolice executives and field commanders haveto be informed constantly of the progress oftactical strategies and the status of firefightersand police officers in the field. Situations willchange quickly and may take a turn for thebetter or worse, depending on the environ-ment and the mood of civilians. Strategiesmust be changed and implemented on shortnotice.

“Unified command... is essential... toavoid chaos and coordinate tacticalactivities.”

3. Communications management is crucial in themidst of tactical response activities. Dissemi-nation of the wrong information by the mediaor by the PIO could incite destructive activityby troublemakers and make the emergencysituation practically uncontrollable. Themedia may either provide timely warnings orcreate mass panic.

4. Mutual aid agreements must be activated andall organizations must be alerted to respondon short notice to the needs of fire and policetask forces. The IC may request the servicesof EMS personnel, politicians, federalsources, public works departments, communi-ty leaders, and hospitals.

The joint IC must maintain control through

56

clearcut role definitions and lines of authority inorder to quickly curtail and subdue the dis-turbance.

COMMUNICATION

A strong communication network is crucial toquickly end civil disturbances.

General communication and SOPS shouldcome from the IC to ensure rapid and accu-rate flow and avoid duplication.The IC team should be well equipped tohandle a possible inundation of phone calls,such as occurred during the Los Angelesriots, where numerous personnel were com-mitted to coordinating and controlling andchanneling distress calls, recalls of reservepersonnel, and to process calls for help anddirection from fire, EMS, and police officers.PIOs of fire and police departments must bewell informed and ready to coordinate thedissemination of information. Effective com-munication involves providing and sharingintelligence and progress information withother organizations, including political enti-ties, the mayor’s office, community leaders,federal resources such as the National Guard,and the media.Early-incident decision making by officers inthe field should be encouraged. Task forcemembers should be directed to strike as nec-essary, with or without communication withthe IC.A PIO or liaison officer should be on duty atall times during the emergency.

Communications equipment

Computerized communications systems shouldbe maintained and monitored to ensure that theyare in proper working order and in adequate sup-ply.

To be effective in the joint command center,communications equipment should be in integratedmode. One method of integrating radio frequenciesis to trunk all mutual aid frequencies. An alterna-tive to voice radio is the Mobile Data Terminal(MDT). The San Diego Police Department suc-cessfully employed their network of MDTs to

transmit tactical information to field units and toeffectively deploy their forces to quell disturbanceswhich were sparked by the Rodney King verdicts.All vehicle dispatches and tactical informationwere relayed via the MDT system-voice commu-nication was not used except in emergencies.Other equipment, e.g., telephone lines and broad-cast equipment, should be compatible, and a com-mon language should be used by the task force.

PLANNING

Planning must be an ongoing function throughoutthe response period. Activities should include:

Constant evaluation and exchange of intelli-gence by joint command personnel, who arefocused on quelling the disturbance andavoiding riots, looting, violence, and arson-related activities, are important.Resource needs may change throughout thecivil unrest, and command personnel must beprepared to adjust their directives to addressthese needs in the impact zones.Operational guidelines may need to be modi-fied by command personnel in order to imple-ment strategies if there are unexpectederuptions of violence and excessive demandson resources, such as transportation.New mutual aid agreements may have to bereached to address unforeseen circumstances,such as terrorist activity. The civil unrest inLos Angeles required the rapid mobilizationof resources from the entire State of Cali-fornia. Fire agencies within California had awell-defined system due to the extensive useof the mutual aid system to combat wildfiresin the state, The use of mutual aid striketeams greatly contributed to the ability toconfine and extinguish fires and save manylives.Joint tactical initiatives have to be reco-ordinated, as necessary. Personnel may haveto undergo quick training to combat unfore-seen challenges.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The incident commander must continuously con-sult with staff and other involved agencies and

build tactical action plans, distribute such plans,and document all information.

Command personnel must quickly identifyimpact zones, secure dangerous areas, andcontrol movement on public thoroughfares.Guidelines must be direct and decisive on howresources must enter and operate in a specificimpact zone.Resource management is a crucial commandand control function. The joint command per-sonnel must authorize and supervise the dis-pensation of resources, such as body armor,food supplies for field personnel, transporta-tion, firearms, tools and other equipment,medical supplies, and the effective rotationand protection of personnel.

“Resource management is a crucialcommand and control function”

The experience and high visibility of com-mand personnel, both individually and as ateam, are important to effective decisionmaking. Good, effective commanders will bepersonally involved with their staff and fieldcommanders and will personally communicatewith other commanders, community leaders,and elected officials. They should make per-sonal appearances at news conferences andkeep informed on the latest intelligence. Theyshould be technically proficient and aggressivein obtaining and disseminating information.

OPERATIONS ISSUES

Declaration of a state of emergency is usually aprudent strategic move during civil unrest. Keyoperations issues include:

. Restricting the use or delivery of emergencyservices to civilians. For example, residentswill continue to expect emergency servicesduring disturbances, and plans should bemade to deal with the high number of calls. Ifpossible, the 911 line should be restricted fordistress needs only during the disturbance anddegraded criterion for resources should beimplemented.

RESPONSE 57

Curtailing all nonessential services in theimpact areas.Determining critical needs and warranted ac-tions for effective response. Immediate re-sponses suggested under an emergency planinclude:-Closing all gas stations in the communityand in the immediate surrounding areas

-Closing ammunition and firearms shops-Closing all liquor stores in the communityand in the immediate surrounding areas

Declaring a state of emergency to curtailpublic access to impact areas, a strategyproven effective under operations. It is im-portant to contain violent and destructiveactivity.

This action proved successful in the Wash-ington, D.C., Mount Pleasant disturbance, inMay 1991, The Mount Pleasant area is one ofthe most diverse international communities inthe District of Columbia. Many immigrants inthe community live in small apartments,under extremely crowded conditions. Most ofthem work a six-day week and Sunday isgenerally their only day for R & R. In thisinstance, a Salvadoran national was shot by apolice officer after resisting arrest for drunk-enness. This sparked a civil disturbance. Al-though no one was killed, the rioters wereparticularly violent and many seemed to beversed in guerilla tactics-a dangerous situa-tion for residents and other civilians in thearea. Deputy Chief Melvin High of the D.C.Metropolitan Police Department identified theimposition of a dusk-to-dawn curfew as thekey to bringing this riot situation undercontrol.Modifying SOPS according to the intensity ofthe disturbance. Firefighters in Los Angeleshad to adhere to the following emergencySOPs:-No firefighters working on roofs-No laddering of buildings-No ladder truck companies in impact zones-No overhauling of fires-No interior fire attacks

In addition to escorting fire companies dis-

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patched to an impact zone, police officers mayhave to deploy resources relative to the escalationof force, including the utilization of specialweapons and chemical agents,

“Modify SOPs according to theintensity of the disturbance.”

Mobilizing resources quickly is crucial to aneffective response to civil unrest. The com-munity’s mutual aid system should be imme-diately rendered operative. All neighboringfire and police departments should be alertedand briefed on the status of the disturbance.They should also be ready to share whateverintelligence they have that may be relevant tothe disturbance.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Keeping the community abreast of what its agen-cies are doing in response to civil unrest is the keyto executing an effective response strategy. Agen-cies need the community’s cooperation in order tomake their strategies effective. Frequent communi-cation through public liaison officers and the mediaare necessary in order to reassure the citizens thattheir interests and concerns are being addressed bypolice and fire agencies and other public officials.

Residents in the community are an invaluableresource for controlling disturbances. Com-munity leaders should be used as part of thepolice intelligence network.The community should be kept informed, asmuch as possible, through regular press re-leases and updates without endangering theeffectiveness of field operations.A calm yet commanding presence, and firm,forceful activity by police and fire agencieswill generally serve to quell the fears of com-munity residents. This approach will encour-age people’s cooperation in adhering tocurfews and in sharing valuable intelligence.The confident, joint presence of police andfirefighters will reassure the community that,with their support, a dangerous situation canbe controlled.

transmit tactical information to field units and toeffectively deploy their forces to quell disturbanceswhich were sparked by the Rodney King verdicts.All vehicle dispatches and tactical informationwere relayed via the MDT system-voice commu-nication was not used except in emergencies.Other equipment, e.g., telephone lines and broad-cast equipment, should be compatible, and a com-mon language should be used by the task force.

PLANNING

Planning must be an ongoing function throughoutthe response period. Activities should include:

n Constant evaluation and exchange of intelli-gence by joint command personnel, who arefocused on quelling the disturbance andavoiding riots, looting, violence, and arson-related activities, are important.

n Resource needs may change throughout thecivil unrest, and command personnel must beprepared to adjust their directives to addressthese needs in the impact zones.

n Operational guidelines may need to be modi-fied by command personnel in order to imple-ment strategies if there are unexpectederuptions of violence and excessive demandson resources, such as transportation.

n New mutual aid agreements may have to bereached to address unforeseen circumstances,such as terrorist activity. The civil unrest inLos Angeles required the rapid mobilizationof resources from the entire State of Cali-fornia. Fire agencies within California had awell-defined system due to the extensive useof the mutual aid system to combat wildfiresin the state, The use of mutual aid striketeams greatly contributed to the ability toconfine and extinguish fires and save manylives.

n Joint tactical initiatives have to be reco-ordinated, as necessary. Personnel may haveto undergo quick training to combat unfore-seen challenges.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The incident commander must continuously con-sult with staff and other involved agencies and

build tactical action plans, distribute such plans,and document all information.n Command personnel must quickly identify

impact zones, secure dangerous areas, andcontrol movement on public thoroughfares.Guidelines must be direct and decisive on howresources must enter and operate in a specificimpact zone.

n Resource management is a crucial commandand control function. The joint command per-sonnel must authorize and supervise the dis-pensation of resources, such as body armor,food supplies for field personnel, transporta-tion, firearms, tools and other equipment,medical supplies, and the effective rotationand protection of personnel.

“Resource management is a crucialcommand and control function”

n The experience and high visibility of com-mand personnel, both individually and as ateam, are important to effective decisionmaking. Good, effective commanders will bepersonally involved with their staff and fieldcommanders and will personally communicatewith other commanders, community leaders,and elected officials. They should make per-sonal appearances at news conferences andkeep informed on the latest intelligence. Theyshould be technically proficient and aggressivein obtaining and disseminating information.

OPERATIONS ISSUES

Declaration of a state of emergency is usually aprudent strategic move during civil unrest. Keyoperations issues include:

n Restricting the use or delivery of emergencyservices to civilians. For example, residentswill continue to expect emergency servicesduring disturbances, and plans should bemade to deal with the high number of calls. Ifpossible, the 911 line should be restricted fordistress needs only during the disturbance anddegraded criterion for resources should beimplemented.

RESPONSE 57

6

RECOVERY

6

RECOVERYTo address post-incident needs, the initial priori-ties should be to restore stability and provide aidto those injured and suffering loss from the riot.

Firefighting and police agencies should reac-quaint themselves with the community throughprograms that fit the make-up and the specialneeds of their specific jurisdictions. The agenciesshould then re-equip their departments with sys-tems and equipment to deal with future civilunrest.

TRAINING

Civil unrest requires police and fire departments toadopt a military model, which creates, in itself,stresses within the organization and in relationswith other agencies. Individual officers often arefaced with conflict between their normal autono-mous roles and the requirement to strictly followunit directives during riots.

Addressing stress-the Los Angeles experience

Research studies indicate that standard psycholog-ical and physical responses to stressful events areharmful to the body under certain conditions. Pro-longed exposure to stress frequently produces

psychological and physical damage. In response tothis concern, the LAFD’s Stress ManagementProgram provides several services to its employeesto combat this problem:

A five-year extensive on-site training withinthe department to educate members to recog-nize stress symptoms and reduce stressCritical incident debriefings by licensed psy-chologists experienced in the psychologicaleffects of critical incidents on public safetypersonnelShort-term counseling and a Peer SupportProgram (PSP)

Critical incidents such as civil unrest occurwhen public safety personnel are faced by emer-gency reactions, which can interfere with theirability to function either at or away from thescene. Supervisory fire personnel in the LAFD aretrained to recognize symptoms associated withprolonged stress. The department’s Critical Inci-dent and Stress Debriefing (CISD) Team providestimely consultation after a critical incident toreduce the impact of stress on department mem-bers. The Los Angeles CISD Team includes

RECOVERY 61

department personnel who have received special-ized training in stress identification and manage-ment, crisis intervention, listening and relatedskills. Some team members are also trained mentalhealth professionals. PSP members are volunteersfrom all ranks within the department, both swornand civilian, who are trained in listening andassessment skills, problem solving, crisis identifi-cation, substance abuse referrals, and other relatedskills. They work with employees and their fami-lies during crisis situations. The benefits of thisprogram are generated by less frequent use of sickleave, workers’ compensation, stress-related pen-sions, and employee turnover caused by job“burnout.” Recent statistics reveal that for each $1spent in stress management programs, over $2.50is saved in absenteeism and workers’ compensa-tion claims.

The videotape as a training tool

In response to a spate of litigation over the use ofdeadly force, an increasing number of state andlocal police agencies are buying the FirearmTraining System (FATS), a device that uses a life-size television screen and a laser-equipped weaponto help officers learn when to fire and who, ifanyone, should be fired upon, FATS includes arifle or handgun fitted with a laser that can fire abeam at realistic movie scenarios, such as lootersphotographed from the officer’s point of view.The machine grades judgment, accuracy, andreaction speed. “FATS is the most up-to-datetraining method,” says Gary Krantz, trainingmanager with the International Association ofChiefs of Police. Many federal agencies alreadyhave it, he notes, and “those state and local agen-cies blessed with foresight and good budgets arebeginning to implement it as well” (Persinos,1989).

The system has proven its worth in court cases.FATS creates a detailed record of each officer’sperformance, thus it can be used in the defense ofa department that has been sued because of ashooting incident. It is a preventive, legal measureas well as a training system.

Recently, the Jacksonville, Florida, sheriff’sdepartment used the evidence provided by FATStraining to convince the court that an officer had

been well trained and had acted reasonably whenhe shot and killed a suspect who appeared to bearmed.

Videotape can also be a cost-efficient trainingtool. The nine members of the Belding, Michigan,Police Department produce their own training andpublic relations tapes. When officers return from atraining seminar, they share their new knowledgewith their fellow officers, using the department’svideotaping facilities. Spearheading production ofa training tape has three benefits:

1. It reinforces what the officer learned2. It provides for low cost training of others3. It boosts morale and self-confidence

The Belding Police Department also purchasedvideotape training modules, which limits the needto send their officers to training academies. Thevideo programs enable the department to train itsofficers for only $500. Tapes are viewed while theofficers are on-duty or during roll call, thus elimi-nating overtime and lodging costs of off-sitetraining (International City Management Associa-tion 1987).

The Human Rights Resource Center Program

One of the more innovative approaches to trainingis that of the Human Rights Resource Center inSan Rafael, California. This is a communityawareness training program that helps police offi-cers better deal with diverse groups and avoidcultural misunderstandings. The Human RightsResource Center’s program provides informationabout cultural and ethnic diversity that police andfire agencies need in order to avoid cultural mis-understandings. The program develops communi-cation and conflict resolution skills for officersthat can help them avoid unnecessary conflict withcitizens and complaints about their actions. Theprogram also provides effective policies and tech-niques to foster positive community relations andenhance communication skills and safety in work-ing with diverse groups within the community.

Upon completion, the Community AwarenessTraining Program will allow personnel to:

Communicate effectively with diverse groupsPromote and strengthen ties with the com-munity

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Utilize appropriate intervention skillsMinimize the escalation of violence due tocultural differencesEnhance team-building skills with other offi-cers

This training is designed to address the specificneeds of police departments. Under the program,the Human Rights Resource staff will:

Meet with the department chiefWork with a department liaison to assist withcoordinating the trainingMeet with line staff to develop and receiveinput on trainingMeet with representatives of community-based organizations to receive input andmaterials from the constituencies they repre-sentDevelop a community assessment question-naire and interview citizens from the commu-nities representedSelect a training site conducive to trainingDevelop critical scenario scripts and selectlocal actors from diverse groups with theassistance of department and communityrepresentativesSelect panel members who are representativesof diverse groups in the communityReview the program content and course mate-rials with the chief and/or liaison and agreeon delivery schedule

Training for fire and law enforcement personnelshould address the importance of understandingand developing the skills necessary for them toconverse with the public in on-the-street contacts.Words or phrases expressed inappropriately or inan offensive tone can frequently result in negativeconsequences. Personnel need to understand howto express themselves without generating antago-nism or hostility.

The above are all innovative forms of trainingwhich may be considered by fire and law enforce-ment agencies during the recovery period after adetailed review and analysis of a civil disturbance.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

The concerns and needs of the community after a

riot situation must be addressed immediately so asto mitigate similar situations in the future, Fireand law enforcement personnel must build abridge of mutual understanding and respect be-tween themselves and their community.

A study on policing with community coopera-tion

Those who know Dave Dobrotka, deputy chief ofthe Minneapolis Police Department, could nothave been too surprised in May 1992 when herankled many of his fellow officers by enlistingblack activists and gang leaders to help quell adisturbance on the city’s north side. The stereotyp-ical police officer is conservative, decisive, anddisciplined to the point of rigidity. Dobrotka isnone of the above. That was obvious a quarter-century ago when, as Dobrotka, now 44, admits,“I still haven’t decided what I want to do when Igrow up.”

But in the wake of the Los Angeles riots, withongoing tensions between police officers andpredominantly poor and young urban residents,Dobrotka has a clear sense of what he wants todo. “I am a police officer but I am also a peaceofficer,” he says. “I believe I have as much of anobligation to be an instrument to enforce the law.”

Dobrotka was able to be both on the night ofMay 7. He and Minneapolis Police Chief JohnLaux and a dozen other officers were with 102junior high students at a camp retreat in NewBrighton when word came that there had been ashooting in north Minneapolis. An anonymousflyer claiming incorrectly that a black youth hadbeen shot by a police officer brought an angrycrowd of about 800 people to the street. At onepoint, a KMSP-TV news crew was attacked andbeaten, On the way in, Dobrotka heard the ser-geant-in-charge withdraw police from the sceneafter concluding that they were escalating tensions.He stopped by the offices of The City, Inc., apredominantly black community organization oftencritical of the police, to request assistance. Agroup of about fifteen black leaders joined policeat the scene, and the incident ended without fur-ther injury. Dobrotka effusively praised SpikeMoss, City Inc.‘s director of at-risk-youth serv-ices, and other community members.

RECOVERY 63

The trust between Dobrotka and communityactivists has evolved slowly and often painfully.“For the first eighteen years of my career, I hadheard about the Spike Mosses and the Clyde Belle-courts, who were never portrayed in a positivelight by my colleagues,” Dobrotka says. “When Igot the opportunity to meet with them in a one-on-one situation, I saw in just about every one ofthem, a totally different side. After we are throughshouting at each other, there has always been awillingness to come back and discuss the prob-lems. ”

“People are realizing that the city can’t operatewithout an effective police department, and policeofficers are recognizing that 826 cops can’t police366,000 citizens without a fair number of themwanting us to,” Dobrotka says, in defense ofcommunity policing,

At the same time, Dobrotka knows that manypeople, inside and outside the department, resenthis chumminess with past critics of the police. “Ibelieve there are a certain few in the departmentwho believe in what happened (in May) whole-heartedly and support what we did,” he says.“There are a few who think it was the absolutewrong message to send and a bad thing to do. Butmy gut feeling tells me that a majority of thedepartment is sitting back and waiting to see whathappens next. They are thinking, ‘It worked onetime, but we still have several summer months togo”’ (Robson 1992).

Responding to a diverse community-thecommunications gap

The city of Aurora, Colorado, is a suburb east ofDenver. It covers more than 150 square miles witha population of 250,000. The end of the VietnamWar brought a significant influx of Asians, andAurora had its first major increase in limited-English-speaking residents since the mid- 1950s.Aurora became a veritable melting pot of Korean,Vietnamese, and Hispanic immigrants, all seekingthe American dream of freedom, citizenship, andownership. The initial reaction of many communi-ty members was that the Asian people would haveto “fit into society” by learning to speak Englishand that community locals should not try to com-municate in the languages of these immigrants.

The emergency response community began toreceive calls for help from members of the Asiancommunities, who would dial 911 and try to relatea problem, using a nearby translator or their own

“Ethnic tradition often play(s)... arole in the communications gap.”

limited English skills. The communications gapdelayed the fire department’s ability to dispatchemergency services, causing further complications.Some of the new immigrants were from countrieswhere the government and military-controlledpolice wielded fear and manipulation as weapons.As a result, there was an understandable distrust ofanyone wearing a uniform-firefighters included.

Ethnic tradition often played a role in the com-munications gap. Many times the Asian traditionof “coin rubbing” to fight off illness was mistakenby police and firefighters as a sign of child abuse.Another example was the kneeling position re-quired by police to safely “pat down” a suspect.For Asians, this brought back memories of theirpeople being executed in a kneeling position.

As these situations grew in frequency, thepolice and fire departments decided to meet withleaders from the various Asian and other ethniccommunities to address these problems. This ledto the formation of classes focusing on ethnic andcultural traditions, a first step toward understand-ing cultural differences and gaining the initial trustand respect of the Asian communities. However,this trust did not completely eradicate the commu-nication barrier between Asians and emergencyservice personnel.

Understanding the ethnic traditions of groups ina community can prevent misinterpretation of vitalcommunication which may be key to saving a life.Consider the following scenario:

The fire department has been designated tocoordinate a task force on a new radio system.When the group meets, one member, a Vietnam-ese programmer, remains silent. Later, othermembers conversing at lunch suggest that theprogrammer is not interested and not part of theteam. This is not necessarily true. Many Asians

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prefer not to express opinions unless they arethoroughly knowledgeable with the subject. Somewill express opinions only on direct invitation todo so. In general, Asians focus more on listeningand observing and less on expressing opinions.

This may be related to what is perceived as alack of crisis humor in Asians. Americans tend tojoke in the face of a crisis or stressful situation.Many Asians ‘interpret this behavior as a lack ofappreciation of the problem.

The potential for misunderstanding exists on asimpler level. The Aurora Fire Department recog-nized the potential for disaster if an incident wereto occur at a multi-unit apartment largely occupiedby Asians. The fire department began a communi-ty outreach campaign directed at the ethnic com-munities.

Bilingual volunteers who spoke English and anAsian language served as translators for emergen-cy services. Although this worked well in normalsituations, problems remained when immediatemedical attention or information relating to acrime was required. To resolve this, a book ofbasic questions (answerable with a nod or point-ing) in five different languages was compiled.Questions asked by the fire department included:

n Do you know where the fire started?n Can you point to where the fire started?n Did someone start the fire?n Which of these things was involved in the

fire?

tion as the International Cross Cultural Network ofAmerica (ICCNA). The ICCNA now has morethan sixty volunteers who speak more than twenty-six languages. It has branched out to providetranslators and interpreters for emergency andnonemergency situations, speakers on culturalissues for educational purposes, and promotion ofthe city’s related functions and projects.

Cross-cultural communication has become abuzzword. In Aurora, a bridge of mutual under-standing and respect was created through thewillingness of community-oriented employees(LaRusso 1993).

The above illustrations are but a few examples ofsuccessful community outreach programs adoptedby law enforcement and fire agencies across thecountry.

The importance of mutual aid teams

During the 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest, policeand firefighters made extensive use of their mutualaid system. For the duration of the disturbance,180 different fire agencies from throughout thestate of California participated. These agenciesmobilized eighty-five strike teams, which repre-sented approximately 2,000 firefighters from thesix regions in California. Mutual aid was verywell developed, defined, and easy to mobilize, dueto the extensive use of the system to combat wild-land fires in the state.

n Can you point to where the suspect ran?n Can you point out in this book the colors of

the clothing the suspect was wearing?

This book proved invaluable as an immediatemeasure for emergency services personnel and hashelped frustrated, limited-English-speaking citizensprovide information in emergency situations.

“The use of mutual aid strike teamsgreatly contributed to the confine-ment and extinguishment of fires.”

The Los Angeles City Fire Department receivedhelp from seventeen strike teams from Region 1and one strike team from Area A. A total of forty-eight different agencies contributed to the creationof the strike teams that entered the Los Angelescity limits.

Another element of the project was to recruitpersons interested in becoming translators and totrain them in basic police and fire procedures. Thecommunity response was remarkable-volunteertranslators were willing to be on call twenty-fourhours a day. They attended training sessions toassist their countrymen to become members of thecommunity. The network of volunteers was offi-cially recognized in 1990 by a city council resolu-

The use of mutual aid strike teams greatlycontributed to the confinement and extinguishmentof fires. Without their assistance, the loss of prop-erty would have been significantly higher. The

RECOVERY 65

mutual aid system functioned as planned, and thissingle incident of civil unrest validated the needfor its existence. The fact that the mutual aidsystem was frequently implemented to combatwildland fires and that mutual aid resources used acommon ICE terminology contributed to theireffectiveness. Mutual aid strike teams were able towork well together within the established ICEorganization.

State agencies working together

One example of state agencies working togethersuccessfully under a mutual aid agreement is theCommonwealth of Virginia’s Offensive Mobiliza-tion Against Narcotic Distribution (COMAND).

Created by executive order, COMAND includesthe Department of State Police, the Department ofAlcoholic Beverage Control, the Department ofGame and Inland Fisheries, the Department ofForestry, the Department of Aviation, the VirginiaMarine Resources Commission, and the VirginiaPort Authority. This consortium provides addition-al and much needed manpower to the state policein its efforts to fight Virginia’s drug problem. At atime when the state workforce is being reduced,additional manpower is allotted to the interdictionof illegal drugs and associated crimes with noadded expense to the taxpayer. The program alsoallows state agencies whose primary missions arenot drug enforcement (such as fire agencies) tomake a contribution to reduce a major problemfacing the citizens they serve.

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7

SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONS

7

SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONSResearchers now believe that riots develop in threedistinct phases. Phase One occurs when an incen-diary incident or action sets off a disturbanceamong a small group within a well-confined areaof a city. In Phase Two, ordinary citizens, alertedby media coverage but often not overly concernedwith the precipitating problem, join the crowd forthe purpose of looting, and the disturbance beginsto spread to other sections of the city. Phase Threeis set off when organized youth gangs join in theriot with planned activities directed against targetsof opportunity, such as gun stores. This report hasattempted to outline possible steps which can betaken by fire/EMS personnel and police to preparefor, respond to, and recover from this build-up ofevents.

The solutions for successful joint operations be-tween fire/EMS and police agencies have been de-tailed under the categories of Mitigation, Pre-paredness, Response, and Recovery. Under eachcategory, the issues of Prioritization, Communica-tion, Planning, Training, Command and Control,Operations, and Community Relations have beenaddressed and are summarized below.

M I T I G A T I O N

The following are mitigation efforts which areapplicable to a civil unrest incident. When a dis-turbance is imminent, fire personnel must:

Pick up refuse/trash/debrisReduce the amount of “burnable” itemsPrioritize and clear vacant buildingsRemove abandoned automobilesEducate the public, including owners of high-risk occupancies, about the situationInstall metal roll-up doors and windows onbuildingsInstitute community participation, forexample:-neighborhood activities-safe-place programs at the firehouse orpolice station

-establish youth leagues to work on com-munity improvement projects

-hold public education forums-improve the racial balance of firefightersand police officers

-recruit workers from the inner city

SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONS 69

-establish effective cultural diversity trainingprograms

-identify and work with the real powersources in the community

Many hours should be investedin meeting with neighborhoodgroups. ”

Agencies should know their community andshould encourage organized social interactionswith the community at large. A strong sense ofcommunity and cooperation is key to preventing adangerous civil unrest situation.

Many hours should be invested in meeting withneighborhood groups. These groups are usuallyable to identify a simmering problem long beforeauthorities can, and later they may provide help tocool down the situation before it erupts.

PREPAREDNESS

Fire and police agencies should carry out exten-sive planning and training to encompass all entitiesconcerned with the public good. These includeadministrative and government agencies; politicalinterests, including the mayor, the governor, local

“A well-defined incident commandsystem should be planned and estab-l ished. . .”

politicians, and other public servants; supportservices, such as water and sewage agencies,electrical power companies, public works depart-ments, transit authorities, hospitals, communica-tion agencies, media agencies, and communityorganizations; and federal agencies such as theNational Guard. A comprehensive “battle plan”starts with formal agreements among these agen-cies. Special riot training is imperative to dealeffectively with today’s riot situations. Most offi-cers today average about seven years on the policeforce and are unlikely to have experienced theriots that engulfed many cities in the 1960s. Ex-

tensive updating is needed for joint training in allaspects of riot control. This includes training inthe possible causes of riots, the use of equipmentmost efficient in riot control, and how to workwith mutual aid agencies, both locally and fromother jurisdictions.

Public information officers and staff should bean integral part of the operations of police and fireagencies. They should be exposed to the trainingreceived by all other personnel so they can be-come familiar with all aspects of riot control and,as such, be able to communicate the agency’sactivities to the media and the community.

A well-defined incident command system shouldbe planned and established at a mutually agreedupon headquarters to monitor and manage inci-dents during riots.

RESPONSESuccessful riot control depends on a quick anddecisive show of force, built on a foundation ofcareful and thorough preparation, Successful re-sponse depends on a quick and decisive show offorce and authority. This can only be effective by

“Successful riot control depends on aquick and decisive show of force,built on a foundation of careful andthorough preparation.”

putting into operation a sophisticated ICS-well-equipped, efficiently staffed, and appropriatelytrained professionals-with clearly defined jobtasks. This includes the important task of histori-an to accurately document events for futurereference.

Once things are out of control on the streets, itis essential that authorities be able to operate froma fully equipped command post that must serve astheir eyes and ears. This includes televisions,radios, telephones, computers, fax machines, anddetailed maps.

In a fast-moving riot situation, field com-manders closest to the action should have theauthority to make decisions about resource deploy-ments. However, they should not have control

70

over strategic decision making, such as the deploy-ment of additional resources, as they do not havethe big picture view. Carefully planned and exe-cuted lines of command and control between thefield and the EOC eliminate the need for a bureau-cratic chain of command. What is needed duringthese crucial times is a highly disciplined, orga-nized machinery to execute rapid response andcontainment.

Officers can contain activity effectively throughcurfew, the closing of liquor stores, gun stores,gas stations, and sporting goods stores. By estab-lishing checkpoints, negative outside forces maybe discouraged from aggravating the situation.

RECOVERY

When it is all over, healing (by rebuilding rela-tionships in the community) and cleaning up

“Fire and police personnel shouldmeet...”

should be the first priority. This process will havean important psychological effect, limiting thechances of renewed flare-ups.

Fire and police personnel should meet to discusstheir activities and identify areas for improvement.They should share their findings with the commu-nity and encourage feedback.

SUMMARY OF SOLUTIONS 71

APPENDIX 1THE ROLE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES

IN CIVIL UNREST

APPENDIX 1

THE ROLE OF FEDERAL AGENCIESIN CIVIL UNREST

Initial riot control responsibility in the U.S. fallson local civil law enforcement and is based on thenecessary minimum force concept. The primarybackup to civil police forces is the NationalGuard, trained and equipped by the U.S. Armyand under command of the state governor. If extrareinforcements are needed, the guard is federalizedand placed under command of the regular ArmedForces. This is what happened in Los Angeles inApril and May 1992.

The regular army has historically been reluctantto being called in at the onset of major rioting. Itprefers that the more politically palatable citizen-soldiers of the National Guard be used, initially,in any major civil unrest operation.

In 1932, in the midst of the Great Depression, anational movement, largely made up of a ragtagarmy of 22,000 jobless and desperate World War Iveterans, formed what the press called the “BonusArmy.” They encamped in Washington, D. C.,where unsuccessful pleas were made to Congressfor prepayment of a veterans’ bonus scheduled for1945. Government demands that the “Bonus”marchers disperse were resisted. Fearing incipientrevolution, President Hoover ordered Army Chief

of Staff Douglas MacArthur to clear the capital.This was done using cavalry, tanks, and infantry.There were numerous casualties and one child waskilled by tear gas. Consequently, the army re-ceived adverse publicity and there were politicalrepercussions in Congress, on which the militarywas dependent for future appropriations. Thisincident has been a continuing, contributing factorto the low priority given military riot-controltraining, guidelines, research, and funding fornonlethal weapons procurement. In turn, the Na-tional Guard’s ability to more effectively back-upcivil law enforcement in major domestic distur-bances is directly affected. Recent incidents (i.e.,the Los Angeles riots) point to the need for adomestic force that is properly trained andequipped.

THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD INTHE LOS ANGELES RIOTS

The National Guard battalion in Inglewood wasmobilized to help quell the Los Angeles riots. Thebattalion tactical operations center, which includedthe S2 section, was operational within thirty min-utes of the mobilization order. Officers immediate-

APPENDIX 1 75

ly began to gather information, using radio andtelevision reports. Early in the riots, telephonelines were often unavailable because of the heavyvolume of calls throughout the area. Even cellularand pager circuits, later a primary means of com-munication, were too congested for use. FM com-munication was almost useless in this urban envi-ronment. Finally, an armed liaison party was sentto the Inglewood police headquarters to get whatlocal information was available. During the earlystages, it was impossible to prepare a modifiedcombined obstacles overlay because all of LosAngeles was a “go” area for gangs and rioters.Because of the nature of the operations and thetactical situation, it was not possible to prepareevent templates, doctrinal templates, or decisionsupport templates, nor a synchronization matrix.However, a situation overlay and collection planwere completed.

The situation overlay allowed the battalion toplot the location of hundreds of fires, lootings, andshootings as they occurred. As the operationdeveloped and more information came in, theoverlay showed curfew areas, appropriate policejurisdictional boundaries, and roads and freewaysclosed or declared danger areas. The battalionfocused on company areas of operations and shoot-ing incidents, especially those involving the guard.

Patterns of activity

It was difficult to predict the next trouble spot.However, as patterns of activity developed, the S2section combined information about the locationsof the most dangerous gangs with estimates ofcurrent primary targets of opportunity-including7-Eleven convenience stores and auto supply, elec-tronics, sporting goods, and shoe stores. Thisassessment aided field commanders in deployingassets to likely “hot spots” in the areas of opera-tions as missions were assigned.

The battalion was on target in placing local assets at critical gang targets. The Lynwood Police

Department’s watch commander expressed grati-tude to the battalion for its help.

Suggestions for changes in operations

How could tactical intelligence at a battalion levelbe more effective? Lt. Col. William V. Wenger

(Commander, 3d Battalion, 160th Infantry Divi-sion, California Army National Guard) and 1st Lt.Fredric W. Young (3d Battalion S2) suggest thefollowing improvements (Wenger and Young1992):

Order of battle. If possible, operational andintelligence staffs of the respective military andlaw enforcement units should anticipate use ofmilitary force early and maintain frequent liaison.They should develop workbooks documentinglocal gang characteristics-organization and struc-ture, territories, tactics, and weapons by type andfrequency used.

High value targets. Integrate multiple intelligencesources to identify a systematic documentation foranticipated operations or trouble spots. High valuetargets may include:

n Potential targets, such as the Foothill Divi-sion Police Station where Rodney King wasarrested, or the Korean-owned Empire LiquorMarket Deli where fifteen-year-old LatashaHarlins was fatally shot.

n High visibility targets, including such areasas the Martin Luther King/Drew MedicalCenter and the Kenneth Hahn Shopping Cen-ter, which the National Guard InglewoodBattalion protected on the first nights of theriots. These are in the designated areas ofoperations,

n Likely targets of opportunity, such as gunshops, sporting goods stores, auto partsstores, and electronic sales outlets.

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Thisprocess was difficult and required skills and tech-niques unusual to common battlefield tacticalintelligence. During the first week of the riot, theprocess was hampered by a lack of satisfactoryand standardized maps and extremely large areasof operations. These should be specified in theContingency Operation Plan for Civil Disturb-ances. A unit should be assigned to a specific areaof operation. It could then make a careful study ofits area of operations before mobilizing. It couldidentify facilities for operation staging areas,command posts, and temporary police headquar-ters, high-value targets, and indigenous gangs.

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Battalion and higher-level headquarters shoulddevelop and maintain situational overlays. Themilitary liaison officer should compare these withlocal police intelligence to develop possible pat-terns of future action by gang and counteractionby military forces.

Reconnaissance and surveillance. Military unitsmust coordinate activities with local law enforce-ment agencies in their designated areas of opera-tions. They could jointly or independently planand execute reconnaissance and surveillance to fillin critical intelligence gaps for future operations,

Focus. Unit commanders should make more judi-cious use of their critical, but limited, intelligenceassets. In civil disturbances, it is too easy for abattalion S2 to become simply a historian. While abit of such information is distributed to field com-manders and individual soldiers via intelligencesummaries (INTSUM), it should not become theintelligence staff’s focus and function. Proactivityand projection of possible enemy activity shouldalways be the focus and intent of the S2 section,

Training

In recent years, there has been some recognitionthat U.S. military riot control tactics mustchange-to meet the reality of dealing with ourown citizenry in domestic civil disturbances. Withthe exception of tear gas agents and projectors, thebasic weapon used by troops in direct contact withrioters is the rifle and bayonet. No less lethalweapon has been issued to fill the gap betweenanti-riot gases and deadly force.

The current level and type of riot-control train-ing the army advocates for the National Guarddoes not meet our national need for handlingfuture domestic disturbances. Army Field Manual29-25 (1985) should be updated. The Los Angelesriots illustrate that National Guard troops will haveto be trained in military police operations and in acombination of riot control and urban combattactics to be effective in future civil disturbances.

Interventions

The FBI report on the “Prevention and Control ofCivil Disturbance” describes three levels of inter-vention in controlling civil disturbances: local,

state, and federal (FBI 1992).

Local intervention. The local jurisdiction shouldbe the first responder, since it is familiar with thearea, people, and environment. Agencies would bemost effective acting alone, since personnel aretrained in laws and ordinances applying to arrestand other administrative procedures. If a situationis beyond the capabilities of the local jurisdiction,it should implement its mutual aid agreement withcooperating jurisdictions. Generally, the officer incharge at the requesting agency would be theofficer in charge of the incident.

State intervention. There are several alternativesavailable to local jurisdictions if they are unable tocontrol a situation, even with the implementationof the mutual aid agreement. In most states, thehighway patrol (state police) may be called on if apublic danger exists (as defined by state law orordinance). The highway patrol would supplement,not replace, local authorities. The mayor, citymanager, chief of police, chief executive of thelocal government, or sheriff must request this aid.

The governor can authorize the State NationalGuard to assist in situations where there is immi-nent danger that is beyond the control of localauthorities operating at capacity. The State Nation-al Guard, which has the authority to enforce statelaws, would supplement, not replace, the localauthorities.

Federal intervention. The U.S. Armed Forcesalso may assist to quell a civil unrest, if the situa-tion is beyond the capabilities of local and stateagencies. Each state has criteria for requesting thisassistance, and the local jurisdiction should bewell informed of these regulations.

Federal law prohibits the U.S. Armed Forcesfrom performing law enforcement functions withinthe U.S. When the State National Guard and theU.S. Armed Forces do operate in the same area, itis possible to federalize the National Guard,placing both forces under one command. This isnecessary to ensure effective management andcoordination, however, there may be drawbacks tothis action, as was evident in Los Angeles.

Federalizing the National Guard abolishes itspower to enforce state laws, as happened in Los

APPENDIX 1 77

Angeles, where the local police lost the services ofthe guard in enforcement actions such as securityand looting patrol.

Use of force. Federal law requires that officersmaking an arrest or other seizure of person usewhatever force is reasonably necessary to appre-hend the person or affect the arrest. “The privi-lege to use force is not limited to that amount offorce necessary to protect themselves, but extendsto that amount reasonably necessary to enable theofficers to perform their duties-i.e., to accom-plish the seizure.”

The use of deadly force is permissible under theU.S. Constitution, when necessary to protect anofficer or others from immediate threats of seriousphysical injury or to prevent the escape of danger-ous persons (i.e., those who threaten officers withweapons or who are believed to have committedoffenses in which serious physical injury waseither inflicted or threatened). While the consti-tutional standard provides a boundary withinwhich all law enforcement officers must operate, itis possible that state law may impose a stricterstandard on local law enforcement within thatjurisdiction. Accordingly, local officers must befamiliar with both the constitutional standarddefined by the Supreme Court in Graham v.Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), and Tennessee v.Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), as well as any specificstandards that govern the use of force in their ownjurisdictions.

Federalizing the California National GuardOn May 1, 1992, President George Bush issued aproclamation calling for all persons engaged inacts of violence and disorder in Los Angeles tocease and desist therefrom and to disperse andretire peaceably. President Bush signed the Execu-tive Order providing for the restoration of law andorder to the City and County of Los Angeles. TheOrder expressly addressed the applicable juris-dictional questions and provided all federal agen-cies with authority to act in a law enforcementcapacity during the civil unrest. It authorized theSecretary of Defense and the Attorney General todelegate to subordinate officials of their respectivedepartments the authority conferred to them by theOrder.

The California National Guard was federalizedand placed under the direction of the U.S. mili-tary. In this instance, there seemed to have been ageneral misunderstanding between the U.S. mili-tary and the National Guard as to what role themilitary could fulfill in quelling a civil disturb-ance. The City in Crisis report states that eachmistakenly assumed the federal troops and thefederalized National Guard could not undertakemissions requiring them to perform as peace offi-cers. By the time the guard was federalized, theArmed Forces had set up a Joint Task Force thatconcluded the military would take on non-confron-tational functions, allowing the law enforcementofficers to take on the more common law enforce-ment-type operations.

By issuing the proclamation ordering insurgentsto disperse, the President met the requirementsunder federal statute to exercise presidential powerto use federal troops to quell domestic violence.

Drawbacks to federalization

After federalization, it is estimated that only 20percent of troop requests were fulfilled by theNational Guard. In considering mission requestsfor the guard, the military commanders wouldconsider whether the request was for a “law en-forcement” or “military” function, If the requestwas for a law enforcement function, it was uni-formly denied, for example, a request for NationalGuard troops to transport prisoners arrested duringthe disturbance. This is a function the guard wouldhave performed before federalization. It wasdenied because it was believed that performingsuch a mission could be a potential violation of thePosse Comitatus Act, which prohibits the direct,active participation of army or air force personnelin the execution of civil laws, unless expresslyauthorized by the U.S. Constitution or by statute.This act applies with equal force to the NationalGuard only when it is federalized or placed in theservice of the United States.

A new level of bureaucracy is introduced withfederalization that can thwart deployment oftroops. Under this modus operandi, whenever theNational Guard liaison receives the initial assign-ment for the LAPD or the LA County Sheriff’sDepartment, the liaison contacts the U.S. Army

78

liaison officer. The army liaison officer then refersthe request to the U.S. Military’s Joint TaskForce. Frequently, the Joint Task Force will re-quest more information regarding specifics of themission. It then will decide whether the federal-ized troops should become involved, wanting toavoid a potential violation of the Posse ComitatusAct.

Federalization obviously changed the relation-ship between the National Guard and the LAPD.Before federalization, guard troops were complete-ly supportive of the LAPD and other law enforce-ment agencies’ efforts to deal with the disturbance.Several times, guard troops were asked to assist inmaking arrests or transporting prisoners; they alsoaccompanied LAPD officers in squad cars. After

federalization, the number of missions or tasksgiven to the guard was significantly reduced. Theguard was kept at full strength for the next severaldays but had few actual assignments to perform,creating morale problems within the ranks.

ConclusionCalling up the National Guard and other federalagencies has an important psychological effect onhow quickly order is restored in a civil unrestsituation. However, without proper planning andcoordination in riot control tactics, and without anupdate in administrative and tactical procedures,federal agencies will be underutilized in civilunrest emergencies.

APPENDIX 1 79

APPENDIX 2MODEL OPERATIONS PLANS

COPIES OF MODEL OPERATIONS PLANS ARE AVAILABLEFROM THE FIRE AND POLICE AGENCIES LISTED BELOW

Atlanta, GeorgiaDenver, Colorado

Long Beach, CaliforniaLos Angeles, California

Miami, FloridaMilwaukee, Wisconsin

New Orleans, LouisianaPortland, Oregon

St. Louis, MissouriSan Diego, California

Tampa, FloridaThe Greater Metropolitan Washington, D.C. Area

APPENDIX 2 81

MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT

MISSION STATEMENT AND STAFFING PRIORITIESFIRE DEPARTMENT ESCORTS

Rationale: During a civil disturbance, Miami Fire Department Units often come under attack fromhostile elements. Fire Units are an essential weapon in the suppressing of a civil disorder. The rescueelement, of course, also provides important emergency medical services to the Community and thePolice Department.

In order to accomplish this mission, the following procedures will go into effect upon a departmentalmobilization.

Mobilization Priority

A total of eight two-person units will be assigned to fire stations as follows:

No. 2 1901 N. Miami Avenue 2-two man unitsNo. 5 1200 N. W. 20 Street l-two man unitNo. 6 701 N.W. 36 Street l-two man unitNo. 8 2975 Oak Avenue l-two man unitNo. 9 69 N.E. 62 Street 2-two man unitsNo. 12 1455 N.W. 46 Street l-two man unit

All fire stations will receive one two-man unit first. Stations No. 2 and No. 9 will then get anadditional unit. Finally, if extra resources are available, other stations will get the units in this priorityorder: 1-Station No. 8; 2-Station No. 6; 3-Station No. 5.

The following are the mission assignments for police officers assigned to fire units,

Prior to a Perimeter Being Closed

1. The first priority will be the escort of Fire Rescue Units to calls within the affected area.Fire and Police Units responding to requests for medical services will not useemergency equipment when going into and out of the affected areas.

2. If there is a second two-person unit assigned to a fire station, this second unit will escortfire trucks to fire scenes. In this case, the Fire Department will respond in a Task Forceconfiguration. This is generally a task force commander’s vehicle and three fire trucks.The escorting police unit should be immediately behind the task force commander’svehicle.

3. Under no circumstance will police escort vehicles leave their fire units unprotected.They are expected to remain with the rescue or task force at all times.

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When a Perimeter Is Set

In the event a perimeter is closed because of problems in an affected area, the following procedureswill be in effect:

1. The two-person unit will continue to escort rescue or fire units. They will, however,receive clearance from the EOC or Fire Dispatcher before proceeding into the area.

2. If advised by the EOC or Fire Dispatcher, escort units will bring fire units to a specificintersection, where additional resources, such as field force element or SWAT, may beassigned to assist.

3. A no lights or siren response will be the order of the day.

4. Once again, police units will remain with their fire personnel at all times.

APPENDIX 2 83

APPENDIX 3GLOSSARY

Answering Point A central location from which to process and disseminate information tothe public.

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

CAO City Administrative Officer (Los Angeles).

CISD Critical Incident and Stress Debriefing. Time-sensitive consultation doneby trained department personnel after a critical incident to reduce theimpact of stress on fire department members.

COMAND Commonwealth of Virginia’s Offensive Mobilization Against NarcoticDistribution. Created by executive order, the organization includes theState Police, the Department of Alcohol Beverage Control, the Depart-ment of Game & Inland Fisheries, the Department of Forestry, theDepartment of Aviation, the Virginia Marine Resources Commission, andthe Virginia Port Authority.

EMS

EMT

EOB

EOC

EOO

FATS

Emergency Medical Services.

Emergency Medical Technical certification.

Emergency Operations Board (Los Angeles)

Emergency Operations Center. Facility for the centralized direction andcontrol of the jurisdictions’ emergency operations coordinators. It com-municates with all departments in the jurisdiction, and in selected outsideagencies.

Emergency Operations Organization (Los Angeles). Nerve center fordeploying agencies and personnel, and coordinating activities duringcivil unrest.

Firearm Training System. A device that uses a life-size television screenand a laser-equipped weapon to help officers learn when to fire and who,if anyone, should be fired upon.

APPENDIX 3 85

FEMA

Field Commander

IC

ICCNA

ICS

INTSUM

LAFD

LAPD

Line Command

MDT

MFD

Mutual Aid

OES

Parker Center

Posse Comitatus Act

PIO

ROVER

Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Officer who has line command over a given tactical area of responsibil-ity.

Incident Commander (Department Commander).

International Cross Cultural Network of America. A network of over 60volunteers in Aurora, Colorado.

Incident Command System. Nerve center for coordinating response toincidents received through communication systems, such as 911. Thiscenter is under the direction of joint agency chiefs.

Intelligence Summaries Briefings. Distributed to National Guard fieldcommanders.

Los Angeles Fire Department.

Los Angeles Police Department.

The exercise of the authority of command delegated by the Chief ofPolice to immediate subordinates, and by them to their subordinates,down to the lowest level of authority.

Mobile Digital Terminal. A computer terminal located in patrol vehiclesthat receives automatic dispatches and allows officers in the field directaccess to information from the Emergency Command Control Communi-cations System (ECCS). MDTs allow officers to send and receivemessages to other personnel in the field, as well as to other bureaus.

Mesa Fire Department, Mesa, Arizona. Their successful cultural diversityprogram is described in Part 3.

The support and assistance rendered by agencies from one jurisdiction toanother.

Office of Emergency Services (Los Angeles).

Headquarters of the Los Angeles Police Department.

A statute, codified at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1885, that prohibits involvement ofthe U.S. Military in traditional law enforcement functions, with certainexceptions.

Public Information Office(r).

Mobile hand-held radio.

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RTD

SOP

Staging Area

SWAT Teams

Tactical Alert

USFA

Rapid Transit District. The southern California Rapid Transit District.

Standard Operating Procedure(s)

A location approved by the joint command team for the collection,storage, maintenance, disbursement, and accounting of personnel, vehi-cles, supplies, and equipment used or held in reserve. May be used forthe temporary storage of booked property and impounded vehicles.

Special Weapons and Tactics Teams. A special unit of law enforcementagencies trained to deal with riots, violence, terrorism, etc.

Announcement of the anticipated redistribution of on-duty officer tocontrol an emergency.

United States Fire Administration.

APPENDIX 3 87

APPENDIX 4REFERENCES

ARTICLES

Applegate, Rex. “Riot Control, Army and National Guard Unprepared to Rule the Mob,” Soldier ofFortune, December 1992, pp. 43-46.

Associated Press. “U.S. Offers Advice to Curb Tampa Tensions,” Miami Herald, March 4, 1987,p. 2-B.

DeJong, Major Dean. “Civil Disorder-Preparing for the Worst,” The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,November 1993. In print. This article addressed many of the issues of planning, training, andpreparation associated with civil unrest. Major Dean DeJong is Commander of the Support ServicesSection, City of Miami Police Department.

Knutson, Linda and Joe Noce. “Cultural Diversity Is a Hot Program at Fire Department,” American City& County, September 1992, p. 48.

LaRusso, Martin. “Cross-Cultural Communication: Responding to the Needs of a Diverse Community,”Fire Engineering, January 1993, pp. 79-81.

Lin, Sam Chu. “In the Vortex of Violence: Firefighting Response to the L.A. Riots,” Fire Engineering,October 1992, pp. 42-45.

Kalman, Bruce J. “Applying Technology to Prefire Planning,” Fire Engineering, January 1993, pp. 46-49.

Noll, Gregory G. “The Politics of Incident Management,” Fire Engineering, March 1993.

Persinos, John F. “Video System Trains Police to Look First, Then Shoot,” Governing, May 1989.

Pilant, Lois. “Equipping for Riot Control,” The Police Chief, March 1993, pp. 37-47.

Pilant, Lois. “Modernizing Your Communications Unit,” The Police Chief, June 1992, pp. 39-49.

Pilant, Lois. “A Guide to Effective Interaction with the New Media,” The Police Chief, April 1992,pp. 45-48.

Robson, Britt. “Deputy Chief Wins Points, Barbs for His Brand of Riot Control,” MPLS. St. Paul,July 1992, p. 12.

APPENDIX 4 89

Sobba, Robert L. “Public Services Consolidation, The Answer to Your Community’s Needs,” FBI LawEnforcement Bulletin, February 1991, pp. 6-9.

Spahn, Ed. “Trunking Radio Communications Systems,” Fire Engineering, January 1992, pp. 61-65.

Thompson, Morris S. “At Tampa’s Core, ‘Life Gets Worse’; City Reexamines Progress in Wake ofRace Disturbance,” The Washington Post, March 9, 1987, p. 101.

U.S. News and World Report, “Ready for the Worst,” April 19, 1993, pp. 24-27.

Wenger, Lt. Col. William V. (USAR) and 1st Lt. Fredric W. Young (USAR). “The Los Angeles Riots andTactical Intelligence,” Intelligence, October-December, 1992, pp. 30-31,

BOOKS

Boesel, David, and Peter H. Rossi, eds. Cities Under Siege: An Anatomy of the Ghetto Riots, 1964-1968.New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971.

Chikota, Richard A., and Michael C. Moran, eds. Riots In the Cities: An Analytical Symposium on theCauses & Effects. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1970.

Hofstadter, Richard, and Michael Wallace, eds. American Violence: A Documentary History. New York:Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1970.

International City Management Association. Innovations: Ideas for Local Government. Washington, D. C. :1987.

REPORTS

City of Los Angeles. Civil Disturbance. A Report on the Buildings Protected by Automatic FireSprinkler Systems and Their Performance Record. Final Report, August 1992.

Governor’s Commission on the Los Angeles Riots. Violence in the Cities-An End or Beginning?December 1965. (The McCone Commission Report.)

Hodgkinson, Harold L. A Demographic Look at Tomorrow. Center for Demographic Policy, Institute forEducational Leadership, Inc. June 1992.

Los Angeles City Fire Department. Historical Accounts of the Los Angeles Civil Disturbance. 1992.

National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Report of the National Advisory Commission onCivil Disorders. March 1968. (The Kerner Commission Report.)

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U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Prevention and Control of Civil Disturbance:Time for Review. October 1992.

Webster, William H. and Hubert Williams. The City in Crisis. A Report by the Special Advisor to theBoard of Police Commissioners on the Civil Disorder in Los Angeles, October 21, 1992.

Webster, William H. Letter to Chief Donald O. Manning, City of Los Angeles Department of Fire,August 20, 1993.

TRANSCRIPTS

ABC News Nightline. A Conversation with Daryl Gates. Show No. 2874, May 28, 1992.

Koppel, Ted. A Moment of Crisis: Anatomy of a Riot in Los Angeles. ABC News, TranscriptNo. ABC-35, May 28, 1992.

LOGIN (Local Government Information Network) Data Retrieval System. Montgomery County Libraries,Rockville, Maryland.

DICTIONARIES

Black’s Law Dictionary. Henry Campbell Black. Joseph R. Nolan and Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley,co-authors, 6th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1990.

*U.S. Government Printing Office: 1994--517-433/80711

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