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Extended Floodline
Warnings Direct
Trial A report to summarise the findings of the EFWD trial
May 2012
FINAL REPORT
CONTENTS
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 3
Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 5
Background ................................................................................................................................... 6
Government Policy for Civil Alerting ............................................................................................ 6
Current Alerting Capabilities........................................................................................................ 6
The Alerting Capability Gap ........................................................................................................ 7
The FWD System .......................................................................................................................... 9
Project approach .........................................................................................................................10
Project Objectives ......................................................................................................................10
Project Delivery ..........................................................................................................................11
The Trial ........................................................................................................................................12
Location of the Trial ....................................................................................................................12
Establishing Existing Alerting Arrangements ..............................................................................13
Pilot Operating Principles ...........................................................................................................14
Trial Operating Procedures ........................................................................................................16
The Findings ................................................................................................................................17
The Public ..................................................................................................................................17
Message delivery ....................................................................................................................17
Local responders ........................................................................................................................23
Message delivery ....................................................................................................................23 Operational Feedback ............................................................................................................24
How Effective Could EDW be for Other Risks? .........................................................................27
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................30
Next Steps..................................................................................................................................32
Annex A - Message content of professional partner and public message .............................34
Annex B- Ipsos MORI public evaluation- Key findings ............................................................35
Annex C- Results of Local Responders’ Hot debrief sheets....................................................35
3
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
1. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA)1
places a statutory duty on category one
responders to: “maintain arrangements to
warn the public, and to provide
information and advice to the public, if an
emergency is likely to occur or has
occurred”. The level of capability to meet
this requirement across the United
Kingdom is variable. As such within the
2010 Strategic Defence and Security
Review the Government committed to
evaluating options for a Civil Alert System.
2. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)
in partnership with the Cheshire Local
Resilience Forum (LRF) and the
Environment Agency (EA) conducted a
trial to assess the viability of using the
„Extended Direct Warnings‟ (EDW)
component of the Floodline Warnings
Direct system to alert the public to the
onset of other types of emergencies.
3. The trial was held on 1st February 2012
and involved the transmission of audio
messages to 5,738 landlines in the
Ellesmere Port area in Cheshire.
Approximately 12% of these calls were
acknowledged and a further 56%
connected but were unacknowledged. In
total 349 people volunteered to participate
1 Civil Contingencies Act, Cabinet Office, 2004
in a follow-up survey to better understand
their thoughts and experiences.
4. Of these 349, 230 interviews were
completed yielding a 66% response rate
or 4% of the initial population. Findings
from the survey suggest that the message
was well received as participants found
the message helpful, trustworthy and
reassuring. The findings corroborated
previous research suggesting that the
Police and the Fire Service would be the
most trusted sources of information.
5. Slightly different messages were sent to
local emergency responders. These were
also received positively with comments
that this would have resulted in the
quicker notification of an incident to all
relevant responders and therefore the
improved activation of the wider response
arrangements. The trial identified other
issues that would present themselves
regardless of the alert method adopted –
primarily the command and control
arrangements for activating the system.
6. The performance of the trial was reviewed
against a number of criteria identified by
research for an effective alert system. The
service performed well against these,
except the limited nature to which it
notified all local residents and the value of
the delivery information produced.
7. Next steps will see the findings of this trial
shared with other LRFs, and their
devolved equivalents to understand to
what extent these might be validated and
4
to better understand the rationale for the
current levels of capability.
8. This trial has determined that use of EDW
as a warning capability for a risk other
than flooding, in this instance an incident
at a COMAH site, could be an effective
form of alerting. The system‟s ability to
issue alerts to a large, targeted population
in the time immediately after an
emergency is crucial to this. This is
important as it offers a solution to the
perceived gap nationally in current
alerting capabilities to do this. In addition,
the fact that the majority of UK homes
(85%) have a landline connection
(although it is unclear exactly how many
have phones connected) suggests there
would be wide coverage for such an
alerting system.
5
INTRODUCTION
9. On the 1st February 2012, a test alert
message was sent to 5,738 public
landlines in the area surrounding the
Innospec Speciality Chemicals site in
Ellesmere Port. This message was sent
as part of the Extended Floodline
Warnings Direct (EFWD) trial, with the
aim of assessing how appropriate the
system might be for alerting the public
about risks other than flooding
10. This report will look at the background to
the trial, considering current alerting
capabilities and the EDW component of
the Environment Agency FWD system as
it stands, before outlining how and why
the EFWD trial was conducted. Finally this
report will present the findings from the
trial and will make recommendations
regarding future expansion of EDW for
risks other than flooding.
11. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat would
like to take this opportunity to thank all
stakeholders involved in the project,
particularly the Cheshire Local Resilience
Forum and Innospec Speciality
Chemicals. Without the close cooperation
of all project stakeholders this trial would
not have been possible.
6
BACKGROUND
What is Civil Alerting?
12. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA)2
places a statutory duty on category one
responders to: “maintain arrangements to
warn the public, and to provide
information and advice to the public, if an
emergency is likely to occur or has
occurred”.
13. The Defence Science Technology
Laboratory (DSTL) classifies a civil alert
system as „the primary mechanism by
which the public receive warning of the
presence of an emergency or hazard in
their proximity.‟3 By alerting the public to
an emergency in a timely and effective
manner, responders can enable
individuals to take action and help
themselves, reducing the likelihood that
they or others may come to harm.
Effective alerting can also build public
trust and avoid unnecessary panic.
Government Policy for Civil
Alerting
14. The National Security Strategy4 and the
Strategic Defence and Security Review5
set out a series of National Security Tasks
2 Civil Contingencies Act, Cabinet Office, 2004
3 The Effectiveness of Civil Alert Systems: A Review of the
Literature, Defence Science Technology Laboratory, 2012 4 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, National Security
Strategy, HM Government, 2010. 5 Securing Britain in An Age of Uncertainty: Strategic Defence and
Security Review, HM Government, 2010.
– one of which is “providing resilience for
the UK by being prepared for all kinds of
emergencies, able to recover from shocks
and to maintain essential services.”
15. The Strategic Defence and Security
Review recognises the need for the UK to
assess its capability in this area: “[The
Government] will also develop
arrangements for warning and informing
members of the public: for this we will
evaluate options for an improved national
public alert system for use in major
emergencies.”
16. This project forms part of this option
analysis. Other components include
research to further understanding on alert
messages and public perceptions on the
issue. There is also an intention to
conduct a similar trial utilising mobile
devices as the primary alert channel.
Current Alerting Capabilities
17. There are a number of different ways to
warn people following the onset of an
emergency. Current capabilities include
mobile device based alerts, fixed landline
based alerts and loud hailers. More
traditional alerting capabilities such as the
use of sirens and door knocking are also
employed. Changing trends around the
use of technology have made it far easier
for people to get information on the move.
In turn, this has changed the way
emergency responders can communicate
with the public during the course of an
emergency and suggests that existing
ways of working may need adapting.
7
18. There has been a steady rise in mobile
phone ownership and internet access
since 2005 across all age ranges.6 The
soaring popularity of social networking
sites such as Facebook and micro
blogging services such as Twitter mean
that these forms of internet based
interactions can be employed to transmit
alert messages quickly to large numbers
of people. Conventional media alerts
using radio or television can have
significant reach although coverage will
vary at different times of the day and at
different times of the year. Research has
shown that they are better suited to
conveying further, more detailed
information later on in the emergency
cycle.
The Alerting Capability Gap
6 UK adults’ Media Literacy Survey, Ofcom 2011
19. Despite the availability of these varied
capabilities, the latest available evidence
suggests that many of these methods are
not currently being used or even
considered by Category 1 responders for
the purposes of warning and informing.7
The graph below, taken from the 2010
National Capabilities Survey
demonstrates this. It shows that LRFs
have limited plans to improve or even
consider a number of alerting capabilities.
20. The reasons for this are unclear although
could include financial restrictions,
aversion to some of the perceived
drawbacks such as lack of coverage
(geographically or demographically), lack
of technical capability or simply lack of
desire or will to evaluate.
7 National Capabilities Survey, 2010
Source: 2010 National Capabilities Survey
8
21. Whilst these capabilities are useful in
notifying the public of an emergency, their
penetration can be limited and they are
often used after the first 60 minutes of an
incident. This identifies a clear gap in
alerting the public, quickly and effectively
in the immediate period following an
emergency. It is hoped that by examining
the effectiveness of EFWD in alerting the
public to emergencies other than flooding,
that a national system could be developed
to fill this gap. It is not intended that such
a system would replace existing alerting
methods, but rather enhance the current
warning and informing toolkit.
22. There are a number of „opt in‟ alerting
systems in operation at present, however
these can vary in success and are
dependent on public buy in. Birmingham
City Council have established a city wide
SMS, email and landline alerting system
which has been well received by the
public. Over 6,700 users have signed up
and positive feedback regarding the
scheme has been received via email and
social media. The system was used
during the public disorder in August 2011
to keep people up to date with events. An
internal report into the use of the system
during the disorder identified the majority
of those surveyed reported favourably on
the system. Notably feedback on the
speed of the alerts, message content,
accuracy and frequency was very good.
These findings highlight the potential
benefit to the public of an alerting system
capable of sending out messages in the
time immediately after or during an
emergency.
23. The challenge with such systems is
getting people to opt in, even if it will
benefit them. An alerting system set up
by Glasgow City Council which offers a
similar service, is contracted to run until
2013. Upon completion of the contract
there are no plans for renewal due to the
low number of opt ins. As of February
2012, 140 businesses and 167 residents
have signed up. As such, the council are
now exploring alternative alerting options.
24. These case studies demonstrate the
challenge of persuading members of the
public to opt in to an alerting service, even
if it is has been proven to work. This is
backed up by research indicating people
are not inclined to opt in to alerting
services, even if they are free, and of
clear benefit. Possible reasons for this
could be a „perceived lack of usefulness,
lack of clarity relating to the purpose of
the alerts and lack of control over what
alerts are received.‟8 This suggests that to
achieve maximum impact alerting
systems should automatically enrol the
public.
8 The Effectiveness of Civil Alert Systems: A Review of the
Literature, Defence Science Technology Laboratory, 2012
9
THE FWD
SYSTEM
25. The Environment Agency (EA) operates
the Floodline Warnings Direct (FWD)
service to notify households if they are at
imminent risk of flooding. In March 2010,
a new service - Extended Direct Warnings
(EDW) - was launched which provides a
„reverse-999‟ capability. This enables
automated calls to be made to all
landlines within pre-defined flood-risk
areas with the capacity to issue 60,000
alerts within one hour of activation. This
trial looks to test this capability of the
wider FWD system.
26. The areas prone to flooding are identified
through modelling and then through
agreements with the principal
telecommunications companies (BT,
Cable and Wireless and Kingston
Communications) an anonymised list of
landline numbers for these areas is
provided. This process is repeated weekly
to ensure the database is up to date.
27. Before March 2010, the service was an
„opt-in‟ service where members of the
public would register their contact details
to receive warning messages and
suffered low levels of uptake. The Pitt
review9 into the 2007 floods
recommended that “The EA should work
9 Recommendation 62; Learning the lessons form the 2007 Floods,
An independent review by Sir Michael Pitt; June 2008
urgently with telecommunications
companies to facilitate the roll-out of opt-
out telephone flood warning schemes to
all homes and businesses liable to
flooding, including those with ex-directory
numbers.”
28. As a result of this recommendation the
system was expanded and became, in
part, an opt-out service. Before March
2010, the number of FWD fully registered
properties was 464,260. After the £4.3
Million expansion project there was over a
100% increase in customers to more than
952,000. This number has continued to
rise; current figures show that there are
just under 1.4 million customers on the
system. Whilst these customers can opt
out of the warning should they wish to do
so, in practice this opt out rate is less than
0.1%. The original „opt in‟ part of the
service continues to operate, providing a
superior experience through utilising
additional contact methods such as
mobile numbers for SMS, email
addresses and fax. These details must be
provided and cannot currently be
uploaded automatically.
10
PROJECT
APPROACH
29. In 2010 CCS asked Local Resilience
Forums (LRFs) to identify risks from their
community risk registers where an
extended FWD system might benefit the
response. The conclusions of this
consultation identified that high-hazard
areas - such as major petrochemical or
civil nuclear installations and areas at risk
of reservoir inundation - would be likely
candidates.
30. The Control of Major Accident Hazards
(COMAH)10 and the Radiation Emergency
Preparedness and Public Information
Regulations (REPPIR)11 require Public
Information Zones (PIZ) and Emergency
Planning Zones (EPZ) to be maintained
around these sites. These zones are
defined as the areas where people are
liable to be affected by a major accident
should it occur at the site. The size of the
zone varies from site to site based on the
unique hazards presented at each site.
Operators of these sites are required to
pass information to local residents on the
types of potential major accidents and the
safety arrangements in place to mitigate
them. Whilst sites have a duty to warn
and inform the public the variety of
10
The Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations, 1999 11
The Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations, 2001
capabilities available are not fully
exploited.
31. As a result of this consultation the
Innospec Speciality Chemical site (a top
tier COMAH site) in Ellesmere Port, was
identified as an appropriate site for this
trial as it fit the risk profile identified in the
consultation. When approached the staff
at Innospec kindly agreed to assist CCS
with the project. Also the trial needed
support and cooperation from the Local
Resilience Forum; a strong partnership
between CCS and Cheshire LRF was
already in place which made this area a
good choice for the trial.
Project Objectives
32. Project objectives were defined at the
start of the project and recorded in the
Project Initiation Document. These were
to:
determine the appropriateness of
using the EFWD approach to areas
and risks beyond flooding;
identify the level of change needed to
the existing system used for flooding
purposes;
engage a sample of users through the
trial and deliver test alert messages to
them;
evaluate the overall approach so as to
be in a position to provide Ministers
with advice as to the likely benefit of
such a system; and
11
produce a consultation pack, on which
the views of other LRFs could be
established.
33. These objectives will be evaluated in the
conclusion of this report. The final project
objective refers to future work that will be
taken forward following the evaluation of
this trial.
Project Delivery
34. The EFWD project was conducted in line
with PRINCE2 project management
principles. All project documentation was
stored on the National Resilience Extranet
(NRE) for future reference by all members
of the project team.
35. The project team consisted of a project
manager and a project support officer,
who reported to the SRO (Senior
Responsible Owner). The SRO (Director
of Resilience Capabilities in CCS) sat as
the Chair of the project board. Members
of the project board included
representatives from the Suppliers
(Fujitsu and to some extent the EA) and
the Users Chair of NSCWIP (National
Steering Committee on Warning and
Informing the Public), Cheshire LRF and
the CCS Warning and Informing
Workstream Manager. The project board
was responsible for oversight of project
progress and sign off of key project
documentation.
36. As with all resilience initiatives successful
multiagency working was crucial. Officers
from the Cheshire LRF took the lead
chairing both a Tasking and Finishing
group and a local Communications group.
The Tasking and Finishing group
consisted of local responders and
emergency planners brought together to
assist development of specific products
and to discuss emerging project issues.
37. The Communications group was made up
of local communications officers, and
members of the Innospec site and was
responsible for the delivery of the pre-trial
public communications campaign. This
involved informing the public about the
trial via a letter, local websites and
through local press. Two public
awareness days, arranged by the
Cheshire Fire and Rescue Service, were
also held and provided the project team
with an opportunity to engage the public
in a local supermarket car park to inform
them about the trial. The Communications
group also took the lead in dealing with all
enquiries about the trial, directed through
the Cheshire West and Chester Council
contact centre.
12
THE TRIAL
Location of the Trial
38. The Ellesmere Port area has a
combination of industrial, commercial and
residential areas. The map below
highlights the defined Public Information
Zone, of Innospec Speciality Chemicals
which provided the basis for the trial
target area. There are two other COMAH
sites located in close proximity. All three
sites use sirens as the primary method of
alerting the public in an emergency.
39. The Health and Safety Laboratory were
commissioned by CCS to provide
population data of the PIZ, to enable
better understanding of who would
receive the alert message. The PIZ had a
day time residential population of 6,210
and a night time residential population of
more than double of 13,805. This
highlights the challenge of contacting
people during the day, who would be
away from their houses, at work or
elsewhere in the area.
40. HSL data also showed there were 73
people in one care home in the area and
1,026 people in six schools. The
challenge of contacting these potentially
vulnerable groups was another
consideration for the Communications
group who contacted school head
teachers separately to tell them about the
trial and fielded a number of calls from
vulnerable groups. It was recognised and
13
accepted at the outset that use of EDW
would not be an appropriate warning
method for all members of the public.
41. A complicating factor in the trial area was
the high proportion of short-lease rental
properties within the PIZ. Due to the high
turn over of residents in these dwellings,
current occupants may not understand
the risk posed by the site or what do to in
the event of a major accident.
42. Data was sent to the project team by the
Cheshire West and Chester Council on
the age profile of the trial area in order to
better understand the alert recipients. As
seen in the table below, the test area
population has a greater proportion of
younger people when compared to
Cheshire as a whole.
2010 Population estimates
Innospec test area
Cheshire (Cheshire W, Chester & Cheshire E)
0-4 1000 7.7% 38,900 5.6%
5-9 770 5.9% 37,200 5.4%
10-14 800 6.2% 40,600 5.9%
15-19 890 6.9% 42,300 6.1%
20-24 980 7.6% 38,800 5.6%
25-29 1010 7.8% 36,100 5.2%
30-34 820 6.3% 34,700 5.0%
35-39 870 6.7% 44,800 6.5%
40-44 1000 7.7% 53,000 7.7%
45-49 970 7.5% 54,900 7.9%
50-54 740 5.7% 47,000 6.8%
55-59 640 4.9% 44,000 6.4%
60-64 640 4.9% 48,100 7.0%
65-69 520 4.0% 37,900 5.5%
70-74 510 3.9% 31,600 4.6%
75-79 330 2.5% 25,000 3.6%
80-84 240 1.9% 18,800 2.7%
85+ 230 1.8% 17,400 2.5%
Total 12960 691,100
Establishing Existing
Alerting Arrangements
43. One of the project objectives was to
„identify the level of change needed to the
existing system used for flooding
purposes‟. In order to achieve this, a
workshop was set up in the early stages
of the project with local responders and
emergency planners. The aim was to
discuss existing command and control
arrangements in Cheshire and to find out
what changes would need to be made to
accommodate use of EDW, and what
impact this would have.
44. The current alert process as outlined by
attendees was that the site operator
would initiate the alarm following the
onset of an emergency by activating the
siren. This would be heard by those within
the PIZ. At the same time as the siren
was activated the site operator would
contact the Fire and Rescue Service via
999 who then notify the Police of the
incident. The Police then initiate an
information cascade to other emergency
services and professional bodies.
Anecdotal evidence from across the UK
has suggested that this process can take
up to 1 hour to complete.
45. Another issue was the „public information
gap‟ between the time the siren sounded
and the point at which additional
information was available. While those
living in the PIZ should be able to hear the
siren and be aware that it denotes an
incident, they may not be aware what to
do or which site it has come from.
14
46. Workshop participants recognised that the
capability gap of organisations to alert all
affected members of the public and other
responders and organisations in the time
immediately following the onset of an
emergency needed to be increased.
47. In identifying what changes would have to
be made to the existing alerting
arrangements in place to accommodate
use of EDW, some interesting issues
were raised. Attendees commented that
the main issue would be deciding who
has responsibility for activating the alert. It
was thought that the site operator should
be responsible as this would be the
quickest way of getting the message out
and crucially, in line with current
arrangements.
48. Training emergency responders and site
personnel to run the system, the
resources and cost of system
maintenance were flagged up as points
that would need further consideration.
49. Responders felt that if a new alerting
capability were to be introduced, there
would have to be clearly defined trigger
points for when messages would be sent
out. If the public were bombarded with
messages on a regular basis it is highly
likely that this would reduce the
effectiveness of the system in a real
emergency.
50. Overall, attendees felt that the key
advantages of introducing EDW for other
risks would be the speed at which the
initial message could be transmitted and
the ability to tailor messages for different
groups. There was a concern however
that this capability may be seen as a
„silver bullet‟, rather than complimentary to
existing methods. Additionally, careful
consideration about who would have
responsibility for issuing the alert and how
this would link with command and control
arrangements was important.
51. Once existing local alerting arrangements
had been established the project team
were in a position to move forward with
the trial. To ensure common
understanding of how the trial would be
conducted two short papers were
produced. These were the Pilot Operating
Principles (POPs) - a high level outline of
how the trial would work - and the Trial
Operating Procedures (TOPs) - a more
detailed plan for the day. These are
explained below.
Pilot Operating Principles
52. The aim of the POPs was to document
the key components of the trial. Decisions
on alert activation, recipients, format,
content and the timing were made and
recorded in here.
53. Following discussion and debate at the
Tasking and Finishing group, the
Communications group and the Project
Board the following decisions were made:
Alert activation
15
54. The site operator would activate the trial
from the control room of the Innospec site
to provide an element of realism to the
trial. As the site operator would be on
scene of the emergency the intention was
that the alert could be activated at the
same time as the siren. Security and
training were two risks with this
arrangement as the site operator would
need third party access to the alert
system, and would require the necessary
training to navigate it. For the purposes of
this trial, these issues were mitigated by
having representatives of Fujitsu and the
Environment Agency present to supervise
activation. The system was accessed on
behalf of the site operator and guidance
provided throughout the process as
necessary.
Alert Recipients
55. It was agreed that the alert message
would be sent to all residents, with a
landline living within the PIZ of the
Innospec site.
Alert Format
56. It was agreed that that two separate
messages would be sent as part of the
trial: one to the public and the second to a
group of local responders. The public
received a 70 second message to their
landline, with an optional play back
function at the end.
57. Local responders had the option to
receive a landline, SMS or email message
or any combination of the three. In order
to utilise these additional communication
channels the specific mobile numbers and
email addresses of recipients are required
in advance. Given the costs of collating
and inputting these for the public it was
agreed that this would have been an
inefficient use of limited resources.
Alert Content
58. The information requirements of the public
and of local responders were different and
were reflected in the messages they
received. The Communications group
took the lead in developing the alert
content for the public message. There
was a risk that the public would be unduly
alarmed by the message and as such
there was heavy emphasis that the
message was being sent as part of a trial.
However, this was countered by the need
for the message to be as realistic as
possible to gauge how effective it might
be at prompting action. As such the
instruction „go in, stay in, tune in‟ was
included in the message.
59. The content for the responder message
was based on the specific COMAH Off
site emergency plan.12 The responder
message contained more detail about the
hypothetical „emergency‟, including the
chemicals involved and wind speed. This
is reflective of the information that
12
Cheshire West And Chester Council, Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2005, Offsite Emergency Plans
16
responders would require in a real
emergency. Full scripts of both messages
can be found at Annex A.
Alert Timing
60. To coincide with the monthly test of the
site siren, it was decided to send the
public message out at 10:00 and then
attempt to resend the „unsuccessful calls‟
(those where the call did not connect) at
18:00. It was agreed that the responder
message would be sent once at 10:00.
61. A contingency date of the 8th February
was agreed as a fall back date, should the
trial on the 1st February be delayed for
any reason, including a system failure or if
there was a local emergency. This was
incorporated into planning and public
communication efforts.
Trial Operating Procedures
62. The aim of the TOPs was to provide a
detailed brief for the trial. It was sent to all
project members and local responders
and contained information on the trial
aims, message content, timetable, roles,
responsibilities and locations of the
project team as well as the feedback
process for local responders receiving the
message. The TOPs also contained
details of those who would receive the
responder message. This was included so
the relevant contact information could be
loaded onto the system prior to the trial.
63. The TOPs highlighted the estimated
delivery time. The finite number of
external lines connected to the system
dictates the alert transmission rate.
However, as the number of lines
increases the risk of call congestion at the
local exchange also increases. It was
estimated that delivery of the messages
would take between 10 and 30 minutes. It
is important to note that this trial only
utilised one third of the total lines that
would normally be available. Therefore
the message delivery in a real life
situation would be much quicker.
17
THE FINDINGS
64. This section of the report will look at the
findings of the trial, taking into account the
trial data supplied by Fujitsu, the public
evaluation – including the results of a
survey conducted by an external market
research company; the hot debrief sheets
completed by local responders as well as
anecdotal feedback since the trial date.
The Public
Message delivery
65. The results of the trial sent on by Fujitsu
allows for analysis of how the EFWD
system performed. The alerts sent out are
split into 3 categories:
a. Those which were acknowledged i.e.
where the recipient pressed 1 or 2 to
opt in or out of the public evaluation
survey; or another key such as * or #.
b. Those where the call is connected but
the recipient did not acknowledge the
call. This is defined as successful.
c. Finally, unsuccessful alerts where the
phone rang out despite multiple
system attempts to retry the number.
66. The table below summarises the system
performance data from the trial.
67. At 10:00 hours 5,738 landline messages
were sent out, 693 were acknowledged
and a further 3,212 were successful,
taking 32:14 minutes. The successful calls
in categories a) and b) were completed in
the first 15 minutes, the system then
retried the unsuccessful calls for the
remaining 17 minutes.
10:00 18:00
% of calls Average call
duration % of calls Average call
duration
TOTAL Calls 5,738
00:01:05 1,831
00:00:26
TOTAL successful calls (Acknowledged + connected) 3,905 68.1% 00:01:29 339 18.5% 00:01:28
Acknowledged Calls 693 12.1% 00:01:20 88 4.8% 00:01:25
Connected Calls 3,212 56.0% 00:01:31 251 13.7% 00:01:29
Unsuccessful Calls 1,833 31.9% 00:00:16 1,492 81.5% 00:00:12
18
68. At 18:00 hours, 1,831 numbers were re-
tried, 88 were acknowledged and a further
251 of the follow up calls were successful.
This process took just under 24 minutes.
During this time all acknowledged and
successful calls had been made within the
first 5 minutes, the system then retried the
unsuccessful calls for the remainder.
69. A key output of this stage of the project
was a sample of people who were content
to be interviewed to further understanding
of the public reaction to this message. A
total of 239 people opted into the survey
by pressing 1; a further 139 opted in at
the two public awareness days held
before the trial. Once duplicates had been
removed a sample of 349 had been
developed. A total of 463 people chose to
opt out of the survey by pressing 2.
Around 10 additional numbers were
included after receiving a follow up „thank
you‟ post card.
70. Based on data produced by the system
the average call duration for successful
calls at 10:00 was 1 minute 20 seconds,
with the vast majority being sent out within
the first 15 minutes at both 10:00 and
18:00. One important point to note
however is that of the 3,463 successful
calls, we can not be sure exactly how
many of these were listened to by a
human or recorded by an answer phone.
At 10:00 the average duration of calls
classed as successful but not
acknowledged is 01:31, 11 seconds
longer than those acknowledged
suggesting that some of these might have
been recorded as they were not hung up.
71. In light of this, it can be concluded that
781 people (693 + 88 acknowledged calls
at 10:00 and 18:00 respectively)
definitely heard the call and responded
by pressing one to opt in or two to opt out
of the survey as directed, or they pressed
another key. It cannot be confirmed that
the remaining 3,463 „successful‟ call
recipients heard and listened to the
message because they did not
acknowledge the call as asked. This could
be because they did not listen to the end,
they did not want to acknowledge the call,
or the message was being played to an
answer phone.
Headline Survey Results
72. To understand perceptions of the alert
message CCS commissioned Ipsos MORI
to collate public opinion on the trial. In
accordance with data protection
regulations, CCS sent Ipsos MORI the
contact numbers for members of the
public who opted in to the survey. These
members of the public were then
surveyed between 10th and 25th of
February 2012 to answer a number of
questions about the trial.
Respondent demographics
73. The age breakdown of participants in the
EFWD survey shows that of the 230
people interviewed:
19
12% (28) were between 18-34 years
old,
27% (62) were between 35-54 years
old; and
60% (139) were over 55.
74. Compared to the age breakdown provided
earlier on, this sample is skewed towards
over 55s who make up only 24% of the
Ellesmere Port trial population. As such
the findings of the survey must be treated
with caution and may not be
representative of the wider population.
75. The times chosen to send the alerts out
(at 10:00 and 18:00) may have
contributed to this situation. At 10:00 the
call will have been heard by those at
home during the day, potentially those out
of work, or retired. It is also possible that
18:00 may have been too early to send
the second alert message out as people
may not have arrived home from work at
this time.
76. Findings from the evaluation conducted
by Ipsos MORI were encouraging. A total
of 230 interviews were completed - 66%
of the sample given.
Message Tone and Penetration
77. In general the responses were positive:
When survey participants were
replayed the message they believed it
was „helpful‟ (95%), „trustworthy‟
(94%) and „reassuring‟ (92%). This is
compared with less than one in ten
rating it was „unfriendly‟ and 6% who
regarded it as „pointless‟. It should be
noted that 45% of people found it
„concerning‟. Whilst the message
should not panic the public it is
perhaps inevitable that an individual
will feel concerned about an
emergency in their area. This can be
seen as positive as feelings of concern
may prompt people into action.
69% of the sample recalled receiving
the message with a further 10%
saying that someone in their
household had heard it. There was
also evidence that those who heard
the message told others about it,
which is a positive finding. 61% of the
69% who received the message went
on to tell family, friends or people at
work about it. However the speed at
which this occurred is unclear.
Message Content and Recall
78. Specific message recall varied, 30%
remembered hearing that it was a test
message and a very small proportion
(2%) remembered that the message was
from the emergency services. It is
important to note however, that 30%
could not remember anything about the
message.
79. Six in ten (63%) of the sample
remembered that they were told to „stay
20
in‟ in the event of an emergency and 24%
recalled being told to listen to the radio.
However, 21% could not remember what
they were told to do. This suggests that
people are more likely to remember
directive action about what to do in an
emergency, as opposed to other
information in the alert message. It is
important to note that message recall, two
weeks after an emergency in a real life
situation would not necessarily be
important, as long as the person took
immediate action when they actually
heard the alert.
80. One of the questions in the survey probed
participants‟ understanding of the alert
message. 92% of people agreed that they
understood what the message meant for
them and their community. Of this, 65% of
participants strongly agreed that they
understood what the message meant for
them and their household while 62%
strongly agreed that they understood what
the message meant for their community.
Further information preferences
81. In recognition of the ability to convey a
limited amount of information in the
message, 80% said they would want more
information in the event of an emergency.
This is where the message content,
particularly the sign post for further
information becomes important. In this
trial the message directed people to the
Cheshire Resilience website, and to a call
centre for further information. The main
aim of this capability is to provide the
initial alert following the onset of an
emergency, not necessarily to provide
regular updated information in the hours
or days that follow. This can be achieved
via other forms of communication from
local responders in slower time.
82. When asked where they would go for
further information in an emergency, 53%
said „radio‟ and 28% „TV‟. Only 5% said
internet which could indicate that it would
be better to give people the local radio
station frequency rather than the local
resilience website address in the
message. This is further supported by the
different preferences in sources of further
information between age groups. Those
over 55 for example, are less likely to
have access to, or use the internet, which
may influence choices to publish further
information.
Pre-trial communications
83. The fact that 88% of people had heard
about the trial shows how effective the pre
trial communications campaign was in
engaging the community. 97% of people
who received the letter rated it as „good‟ in
terms of giving all the information they
needed with 77% saying it was „very
good.‟ One caveat here is that this was a
self-selected sample and so the people
interviewed may have had a greater
emotive response to the trial.
21
84. One issue with the success for the pre-
trial campaign is that the people
interviewed were expecting an alert
message whereas in real life they would
receive it without prior warning. Of course,
test alerts could not have been ethically
sent out without prior warning as they may
have caused panic. Had the sample been
larger, the answers of the 10% of
participants who had not heard about the
trial prior to hearing the alert could have
been analysed. This may have shed light
on whether views on the message would
have differed if they had not expected to
receive it. Unfortunately this 10%
comprised 24 people and is too small a
sample to draw any meaningful
conclusions.
Levels of Personal Emergency
Preparedness
85. In a linked piece of work Ipsos MORI were
commissioned to conduct a UK survey of
1,000 people regarding their perceptions
of risks facing the country and on their
own feelings of emergency preparedness.
The aim of this work was to compare how
an informed population living in close
vicinity of a COMAH site would rate their
emergency preparedness compared to
the general population.
86. The survey results suggest that the wider
UK population (47% of respondents very
or fairly well prepared for an emergency)
are more prepared for an emergency than
the trial participants (36%). This is
surprising as it was expected that those
living in close proximity to a COMAH site
would feel more prepared for an
emergency than the general population
due to the information regularly sent to
them by the site.
87. One explanation for this could be that
Ellesmere Port participants have a greater
sense of the risk in their local area and so
feel more vulnerable and thus less
prepared. This is despite the fact that
Ellesmere Port participants were more
likely than UK participants to have
undertaken a number of possible
preparations for an emergency. For
example 85% of Ellesmere Port
participants could tune into their local
radio station compared to 36% of UK
survey participants. Ellesmere Port
participants were also more likely to have
a torch, tinned food, spare batteries, first
aid kit and bottled water in the house.
Alert channels and sources
88. The surveys also looked at how feelings
of emergency preparedness affected an
individual‟s preferred medium of being
alerted in an emergency. Almost nine in
ten (87%) of Ellesmere Port participants
said „voice message to landline‟. This
compared to 10% of the general UK
population. Whilst this endorsement of the
use of the EDW system in this way is
encouraging this answer could be skewed
by the fact that Ellesmere Port
participants will have participated in the
22
trial and therefore understand what the
capability can offer, whereas the UK
participants are unlikely to have received
one.
89. The most popular method to receive
information was „announcements on TV‟
for both the UK survey and the EFWD
survey with 62% and 88% respectively,
citing it as their first preference. One draw
back to this method is that it would not
wake people up during the night; it would
only be a useful way to receive
information once people were aware of
the emergency and had turned the TV on.
One interesting finding was that 81% of
EFWD participants said sirens would be a
good method, compared to just 13% of
the UK survey. Again, this might be a
result of the use of sirens in Ellesmere
Port.
90. Both sets of participants were also asked
why they wanted to receive information in
this way. Regardless of the method
chosen, speed was the principle factor.
Of the trial sample:
75% of respondents said receiving
the message „quickly/directly‟ was
very important to them,
34% who preferred a particular
alerting method because they „can
get it anywhere‟; and
10% who said they would „trust the
message‟.
91. In terms of receiving information in
advance of an emergency both trial
participants (78%) and UK survey
participants (51%) preferred „letters or
leaflets‟ in the post. 16% of EFWD
participants said „voice message on a
landline‟ compared to 5% from the UK
survey. This finding is backed up by
research from the EA which has shown
that people like to have information in
hard format so they can keep it and refer
back to it if needed.
92. The message received by trial participants
in Ellesmere Port stated it was being sent
by the emergency services. As the
findings above identify, trust in the source
of the message is important to the public.
Participants in both surveys said they
would most trust a message from the
Police, followed by the Fire and Rescue
Service brigade and then the local
council. The need for this to come through
formal channels is suggested by the fact
that „friends/family‟ scored low with only
5% of trial participants and 11% of UK
survey participants picking this option.
Risk Perception
93. Both surveys considered participants‟
perception of risks in their local area.
Unsurprisingly, half the Ellesmere Port
participants cited „Major Industrial
accidents‟ compared to just 4% of those
asked in the UK survey. This could be due
to the fact that they live in close proximity
to such a site and receive information
23
about the risks, and that they were primed
by questions asked about the trial and so
recognised it as more of a risk.
94. In contrast, UK survey participants ranked
„severe weather‟ as the most likely to
happen with 39% selecting this option.
This was the second most popular answer
among Ellesmere Port participants with
26% giving this response. One possible
explanation for this is that during the time
of the survey there was heavy snow fall
throughout the UK which may have
impacted on views.
95. For the key findings section of the EFWD
trial public evaluation report from Ipsos
MORI see Annex B.
Anecdotal Feedback
96. As well as the formal evaluation, public
perception of the trial was also obtained
anecdotally. A total of 27 calls were made
about the trial to the Cheshire West and
Chester Council call centre. These were
split into three main groups; praise for the
trial and the alert message, queries about
why the alert had or had not been sent to
a particular number, and concerns raised
about the alert format. All queries were
referred to members of the project team.
97. One emerging issue raised by at least
three different callers was that EFWD
would not be appropriate for the deaf as
they would not be able to hear the alert
message. This feedback was valuable as
it shows that if this kind of civil alerting
capability were to be rolled out nationally
changes would need to be made to the
system, if it were to reach all members of
the community. Alternatively if users were
signed up to the system they could opt to
receive alert messages via SMS or email
instead. This currently forms part of the
FWD service.
98. The number of calls received from the
public who wanted to lend their support to
the trial was very encouraging. Several
comments were received from the public
endorsing the trial. One lady who rang the
centre said she thought the message was
„excellent‟ and a „great way to reach
people.‟
Local responders
Message delivery
99. A total of 61 local responders and
members of the project team were sent
the test alert message at 10:00 on the trial
day. The table below breaks down how
this was achieved. All of the messages
were successfully sent or acknowledged
aside from two landline calls. Of these
two, one had no connection, and one was
not answered. One point of interest is that
without being asked to in the message,
one of the responders acknowledged it by
pressing one. This form of positive
acknowledgment could be very useful
when sending out messages in order to
confirm exactly who has heard the alert.
24
Landlines SMS Email
Alerts sent 58 41 52
Successfully sent
NA 41 52
Unsuccessful 2 n/a n/a
Unacknowledged alerts
55 n/a n/a
Acknowledged 1 n/a n/a
100. Due to a peculiarity of the way in
which message recipients‟ details were
input to the system the trial messages to
local responders were not sent until
10:15. This was due to the system
working through each recipient in turn. As
local responder details were loaded in
second, the system processed all the
public calls first followed by the responder
numbers. This would need to be reviewed
in the future.
Operational Feedback
101. In order to capture the views of those
who had been sent the message, all
recipients were asked to complete a hot
debrief sheet. These asked questions
about the format and content of the alert
message, as well as views on how helpful
it was. These questions were broken
down by medium of alert to enable
comparison between the different alert
message types received i.e. SMS versus
landline.
102. 27 of the hot debrief sheets issued
were returned to CCS. The overwhelming
response was that the trial had been
positively received. For SMS, Email and
the landline message, all respondents
either agreed or strongly agreed that it
was a useful way to receive an alert for
this type of emergency. Please see
Annex C for graphs providing a
breakdown of responses.
103. Of the comments collated in the free
text box, the majority were positive
remarks about the message being clear or
useful. Several themes emerged:
Playback - the most common
comment was that there should have
been a play back option at the end of
the telephone message. Whilst this
capability was present this was not
highlighted in communications.
SMS – the 160 character limit of an
SMS message hampered its
effectiveness with recipients stating
that the message should contain
further information.
Missing text – Some bits of the audio
message were missed due to the
speed at which the message started
once the call was connected. There
was also a desire for the „directive
action‟ the recipient needed to take.
Strategic Feedback
25
104. In order to discuss these comments in
further detail and to get some more
feedback on the trial a debrief workshop
was held one week after the live trial date.
Over 25 local responders and members of
the project attended, including
representatives from the blue lights
services, Cheshire and Cheshire west
Council, Cheshire LRF and the site
operator.
105. The debrief day provided a useful
opportunity for CCS to update the group
on the trial and to gauge further views.
The first of two discussion sessions
focussed on understanding how the trial
went, highlighting any issues or concerns.
Attendees commented that they thought
this system provided a really effective first
hit for alerting a high proportion of the
public quickly. It was also felt that this
system would be a useful addition to the
warning & informing toolkit but should not
replace existing arrangements.
106. Whilst it was believed that the system
would be useful for those living in
Ellesmere Port, attendees commented
that visitors to the area or those passing
through would not be contacted. As such
other alert tools would still need to be
employed.
107. The need to pre-configure messages
was also raised as it was felt responders
would not have time during an emergency
to populate a message, as the site
operator did for this trial. It was identified
that template messages would need to be
agreed during the set up of any future
system.
108. The second session focussed on
perceived benefits from the trial, the
challenges going forward and what next
steps the group would like to see.
Attendees reiterated that the main benefit
would be alerting the public and key
agencies quickly following an emergency.
109. It was felt that while this system would
be appropriate for a site with a PIZ of this
size; its value would diminish if population
sizes were significantly lower. There are
25 COMAH sites across Cheshire, all very
different in terms of infrastructure, staff,
profiles, size, production of chemicals and
size of surrounding populations. A site
with a PIZ of two households would not
want to take on such a system while
smaller COMAH sites may not be able to
afford to take on the system.
110. In terms of any potential future roll out
of the scheme, attendees felt that Central
Government should stipulate strict
thresholds for activation of the system to
ensure consistency, but allow local areas
to tailor it to suit their needs.
111. There was also recognition that there
would be a resource implication for LRFs
to enable set up and maintenance of the
system. This would include operational
factors such as agreement of message
sets, the maintenance of alert zones,
26
updating responder contact details and
promote its usage. There will also be
other procedural and familiarity factors
such as regular training and exercising of
procedures and arrangements to maintain
operational readiness.
112. One benefit of the trial, relayed back to
the project team, was that it prompted
local responders to consider their current
command and control arrangements and
to look at ways in which existing
communications between agencies during
an emergency could be improved further.
Additionally the site operator commented
that the workshops had been useful in
instigating conversations about alerting
arrangements between different agencies.
The Site Operator
113. The project worked in close
cooperation not just with the LRF but also
the operator of the hazardous site.
Innospec Speciality chemicals had a
unique perspective on the trial given their
role as activator of the trial and recipient
of the message. Staff from the site
supplied hot debrief sheets and also
attended the debrief workshop to offer
their feedback on the trial.
114. Staff commented that this system
would have several benefits to them,
notably the ability to warn the public
quickly and with less effort and „ringing
round‟ than current arrangements
necessitate. Staff also commented that if
this system were employed by
neighbouring COMAH sites it would be a
useful way to find out about incidents at
other sites.
115. One important piece of feedback from
the site operator was that it would not
have been practical, in a real emergency
situation for them to activate the alert.
This was because they felt they would not
have the time to input the required
information and send the message out.
Innospec always have a full shift on site,
however depending on the time of the
emergency this may only be one officer.
Given this extremely limited resource
there would be other specialised
demands on his or her time and the
actions of the officer would have to be
prioritised. As such it was felt that
activation of the system should fall to the
Emergency Services. The site operator
did recognise the benefit of the system
and felt it would be a good way to
cascade information in the event of an
emergency.
27
HOW EFFECTIVE
COULD EDW BE
FOR OTHER
RISKS?
116. The Defence Science Technology
Laboratory (DSTL) was commissioned by
CCS to produce a literature review into
the effectiveness of civil alert systems.
This identified a series of characteristics
that an effective civil alert system would
exhibit.13
117. This section of the report evaluates
the EDW component of FWD against
these characteristics to understand its
effectiveness, as it performed in this trial.
It is important to note that this trial did not
use the full FWD system for alerting the
public, just the landline method for
sending alerts.
118. A full explanation for each criterion,
along with the extent to which EDW can
be evaluated against it is provided below:
Speed - the rate at which the warning
is delivered to the intended audience.
In this trial 90% of messages were
sent to the 5,738 public landlines
13
The Effectiveness of Civil Alert Systems: A Review of the Literature, Defence Science Technology Laboratory, 2012
within 15 minutes. This is in line with
current estimated system
requirements.
The trial findings have shown that the
EDW capability allows professional
bodies to be contacted quicker than
the current notification process.
Locality - the extent to which the alert
message is geographically targeted to
those who are affected by the
emergency. EDW meets this criterion
as it provides a way of targeting
specific numbers or email addresses
within a designated area. EDW could
be used to target particular sectors of
the PIZ or the whole area if necessary.
Targeting – once the locality is
identified this is the extent to which the
right people are notified of an alert and
that those who did not need to know
about it were not communicated with.
EDW has the potential to meet this
criterion through the definition of
multiple warning zones. The objective
here is to minimise the likelihood that
alerts are issued to those it is not
relevant to thus reducing their interest
in the scheme.
Spontaneity - the extent to which an
individual has to complete an action to
receive an alert for example, opting-in
or subscribing to a service. The
service tested the automated
subscription process and as such no
28
action is required on the part of the
public to receive messages. Instead a
series of actions are incumbent on the
system and emergency responders in
defining target areas. If individuals
wanted to receive messages in other
formats there would be a need for
them to subscribe.
Non-intrusiveness – whilst in „normal‟
mode the alert medium should not
interfere with the recipients‟ usual
activity. In this example, the use of
EDW in this way does not impede the
potential alert recipient from using
their telephone in the usual manner. It
is expected that when activated, the
alert system is likely to intrude on
normal activities which is seen as
appropriate.
Automated Operation – the potential
for the alert system to switch from
normal mode to alert mode without the
need for manual intervention, for
example through the use of sensors.
This element was not tested as part of
this trial but the existing FWD system
does include some river level sensors
which can trigger alerts to be sent if
they exceed defined thresholds.
Ubiquity – is the extent to which the
alert method excludes people from
receiving a message. The aim here
being that 100% of the population in
an impacted area receive an alert.
This capability, as tested does not
achieve 100% in this regard as it is
only capable of targeting those with a
landline connection (estimated 85% of
the population). Of the 6,210 daytime
residents it can be said that only 693
definitely received the message with a
further 3463 hearing the message
either at the time or when they picked
up their voice messages. Individuals
and groups representing those hard of
hearing expressed specific concerns
about them not being able to hear the
audio message. Alternative methods
such as SMS, email and others would
help to increase the ubiquity of the
system. This is countered by
individuals who may opt out of
receiving messages. People visiting or
passing through the area would not be
alerted if FWD were used in isolation.
Support for second languages – the
potential for the alert message to be
sent in additional languages. This trial
did not explore use of second
languages in messaging although the
EA use English and Welsh messages
for FWD messages. No complaints
were received regarding this decision.
Content – the variety of formats
employed to present the information of
an alert message. This trial only
utilised the audio message option for
the public. The full system as referred
previously does offer other alternative
messaging formats. These may be
29
constrained by the system or other
external factors.
One important piece of feedback from
the trial was that you would not want
to send a landline message longer
than 70 seconds in length in order to
keep the public engaged. A balance
must be struck in message content
between not alarming the public and
issuing clear directive advice. Having
a further point of contact is also key as
the purpose of the message is to send
an initial alert, not to provide regular
updates. Another issue is capacity;
the longer a message is, the longer
time needed for delivery.
Presentation – the ease at which the
message is interpreted by the
recipient. The message once received
must be understood in the right
manner. Results from the survey
suggest that a high proportion of
people understood what the message
meant for them. This is likely to be
linked to the frequency of pre-event
communications. The language, sound
and diction of the alert message for
the trial were revised several times to
ensure it was appropriate for the trial.
The digitised voice was surprisingly
well received with 95% of survey
respondents stating they found the
voice trustworthy. This does contradict
research by the EA which suggests
that a recorded human voice is
preferred and was anecdotally
reported by the contact centre.
Receipting – ascertaining whether the
message reached the intended
recipients. Whether or not EWD meets
this criterion, as tested in this trial, is
mixed. The system does and – indeed
did - show which calls were
categorised as successful or
unsuccessful. Unless a person
acknowledges the call by pressing
one, for example, it is not certain
whether or not they have actually
heard the message. This is
complicated by the fact that it is
difficult for the system to detect when
the call is picked up by an answer
machine. There is an algorithm within
the system which assesses if the
message was received by a human or
answer phone although the accuracy
of this is variable. An educational
campaign would be needed in order
for it to become engrained in
recipient‟s minds that they need to
acknowledge the alert message when
they receive it.
Security & Performance – the extent
to which the system could be
inappropriately accessed and is
available for use. As FWD is currently
successfully used by the EA during
emergencies; we can be confident that
data is protected and cannot be easily
spoofed, and that the system is
resilient. These would of course be
30
important considerations should the
system be expanded and used for
other risks.
119. The service performs well against
almost all criteria. The areas where it
does not perform so well are ubiquity and
receipting. In terms of receipting, this is
due more to human factors rather than the
system itself; other forms of alert sent via
SMS, or email would still require some
form of response to be sure that the
person had actually read the message.
CONCLUSION
120. In terms of the project objectives, we
can conclude that the trial successfully
engaged a sample of users and delivered
test alert messages to them.
121. This trial has determined that use of
EDW as a warning capability for a risk
other than flooding, in this instance an
incident at a COMAH site, could be an
effective form of alerting. The system‟s
ability to issue alerts to a large, targeted
population in the fifteen minutes following
an emergency is crucial to this. This is
important as it offers a solution to the
perceived gap nationally in current
alerting capabilities to do this. In addition,
the fact that the majority of UK homes
(85%) have a landline connection
(although it is unclear exactly how many
have phones connected) suggests there
would be wide coverage for such an
alerting system.
122. The system information obtained on
the trial day is helpful in showing how
many people received the message and
for how long on average they listened to
it. It was felt however, that if the trial were
to be conducted again, that the message
should be sent to all PIZ landlines at
10:00 and at 18:00 rather than sending
them out once at 10:00 with the follow ups
at 18:00. It was felt that this would have
allowed for a better comparison of how
the alert was received at different times of
the day. Also the more recent “tech
refresh” version of FWD would allow more
clarity around whether it was a person
who had received the call, or an answer
phone.
123. This trial has identified a number of
issues that still need to be resolved,
before EDW could be considered for
national roll out. Whilst not experienced
as part of the trial, call congestion at the
local exchange is a distinct possibility
which would have the impact of
significantly extending the time needed to
transmit the alert messages. The
likelihood of this could be reduced by
sending messages out in pulses rather
than all at once. This is currently being
investigated by the EA.
124. The scope of the system would need
to be carefully defined in terms of the
31
possible risks that it could cover and how
this would affect existing alerting
arrangements. There are a number of
scenarios set out in the National Risk
Register that could potentially benefit from
such a system. While we can conclude
that this system worked well in the trial
area for warning the public about a
potential emergency at a COMAH site,
more needs to be done to see if it would
work well in other areas and for other
risks.
125. The optimal frequency of test
messages to transmit would need to be
defined. Research has indicated that
repeated false alarms or overuse can
result in increased complacency and
diminished responses14. Conversely, if
messages are sent infrequently the public
will be unaccustomed to them and less
likely to treat them seriously. It is
important therefore to have suitable clear
guidelines on the trigger points for
sending out alerts. This was raised by
local responders at the first project
workshop.
126. The impact on Local Resilience
Forums will also need further
consideration. Particularly, who would
hold responsibility for set up, maintenance
and running of the system. Maintaining
security of the system will also require
consideration to minimise risk of an
attack.
14
The Effectiveness of Civil Alert Systems: A Review of the Literature, Defence Science Technology Laboratory, 2012
127. Increasing public awareness about
emergency preparedness is crucial if
improvements to civil alerting are to be
made. In this trial just under 800 of the
4,244 successful calls were
acknowledged as directed. Further to this,
of the 230 people who participated in the
follow up survey, 30% could not
remember anything that the alert had
said. Knowledge of the core „go in, stay
in, tune in‟ message which has been
pushed since a nationwide
communications campaign by the
Government in 1999 is low. If this
capability were to be rolled out a
communications campaign would be
needed to inform the public about the
system, particularly around the
importance of acknowledging messages
as directed, and about message content.
This could potentially improve receipting
of messages and understanding of
directive action
128. Case studies have shown that opt in
rates to alerting systems are low. Despite
the potential benefits people are reluctant
to subscribe to these systems. Evidence
therefore suggests that any system
should automatically enrol the public to
maximise likelihood of messages being
received. Findings from the surveys
conducted during the trial show the high
levels of support for this concept with 90%
of trial respondents and 76% of UK
respondents agreeing with this position.
32
129. While CCS recognises the value of the
EDW system for warning the public about
risks other than flooding, it is proposed
that the system forms part of a wider
approach to alerting, and is not seen as a
„silver bullet‟. While there is a wide range
of alerting capabilities in place, each has
their own advantages and disadvantages-
none are „catch all.‟ This trial has again
reinforced the importance of having a
diversity of alerting methods; while EDW
is good at sending audio messages to
targeted members of the population – as
evidenced by this trial - it is not an
appropriate way of contacting everyone.
In this trial those away from their home
when the alert was sent, or deaf members
of the community would not have received
it.
130. Research has indicated that
messages sent via multiple methods are
likely to be more effective than single
source. The trial has highlighted that
following receipt of an alert message the
recipient will look for further information to
either confirm or deny what they have
been told. This further suggests that an
audio alert message would be best used
as part of a wider approach to warning
and informing. A combination of alerting
capabilities also provides more resilience;
if one system falls down, there are others
to back it up.
Next Steps
131. In light of the findings from this project a
series of next steps are proposed below
to enhance the UK‟s capability to alert the
public during an emergency:
A consultation process with other
LRFs and their devolved equivalents
in the UK will be conducted to gather
more information on their approaches
to alerting and to understand the
rationale for this position. This will
also present the key findings from
this report to validate them across a
greater proportion of the resilience
community.
Work will also be conducted with the
EA and system suppliers to explore
how access to the FWD capability
might be increased and what the
resource and cost implications would
be for this.
CCS will work in partnership with
LRFs to draft template alert
messages that could be sent out to
the public in the event of an
emergency. The generic content of
these will be informed by research
and will include information on: the
incident, its location, directive action,
time of occurrence and who is
sending the message. Consultation
with relevant government
departments, press offices and local
responders will play an important part
in the acceptance of this work.
CCS will engage other Government
departments for their views on how
33
alerting the public to the (imminent)
onset of an emergency might best be
achieved. A policy paper will then be
produced which will outline in detail,
the Government‟s approach to
improving civil alerting. This will
include the findings in this report and
results of the consultation with LRF‟s.
34
Annex A - Message content of professional partner and
public message
Public- alert message content
Telephone
This test message is from the emergency
services.
There is no need to be concerned or take any
action.
This test message will help us understand
how useful this type of alert might be.
There is no real emergency at the current
time.
If there was, you would be advised to, go in,
stay in, tune in.
You would be told to go indoors and stay
inside, until told otherwise by the emergency
services.
Further updates would be given via your local
B B C Radio station. There is no real
emergency at the current time.
If you have any enquiries about this test
message you can call 08459 881188 or go
online at w w w; dot Cheshire resilience; dot
org; dot UK.
We want to know what you think about this
message. To take part in a future survey
about this message please press one, or to
opt out press two.
To repeat this message please press star.
Thank you for your time.
Local Responders- alert
message content
Telephone, Email and SMS
The telephone and email messages were
based on the „Major Accident Message‟
template and included information on the
incident, location and rendezvous point.
The SMS message, bound by the number of
characters was a more succinct message
stating the incident and location only.
All message formats reiterated that the
message was a test.
35
Annex B- Ipsos MORI public evaluation- Key findings
Evaluating the test message
132. When examining the results of the
Ellesmere Port survey it is always
important to bear in mind that it is based
on a sample of people that, following the
test message, agreed to be contacted for
this survey. This is not a representative
sample of all those residents who would
have received the message.
133. The findings of the Ellesmere Port
survey are on the whole positive on the
effectiveness of the recorded message.
An important facet of such messages is
how they get spread to the wider
population and even though this message
was just a test, six in ten respondents told
someone about it.
134. The most recalled part of the message
was “stay in”. While only 3% could
spontaneously remember the key theme
“Go in. Stay in. Tune in.” it is positive that
a third (33%) recalled being told to “stay
in” and a further 16% remembered the
message saying to “listen to the radio”.
However, three in ten people could not
remember anything about the message.
135. Respondents in Ellesmere Port
reacted positively to being replayed the
message. Over nine in ten said it was
helpful, trustworthy and genuine, while
87% said it was reassuring. Just 14% said
it was fake and 9% said it was unfriendly.
136. Levels of understanding of the
message were also high. Around nine in
ten respondents said they understood
what it meant for them and their
household as well as their local
community. A similarly high proportion of
respondents (87%) said they would know
what to do in a real emergency if they
received such a message. There was a
contradiction in terms of the level of
information provided, while 82% agreed
that the message contained all the
information they needed, 89% said they
would want more information if they
received the message in a real
emergency. This potentially reflects the
difference between a test situation and a
real life emergency, and the requirement
for follow-up information in the case of the
latter.
137. There is also positive news for the
effectiveness of the publicity around the
message before it took place. Two-thirds
of respondents recalled receiving a letter
about it in the post, while a quarter heard
it about it elsewhere. Just one in ten
respondents did not hear about it before
hand.
Emergency preparedness
138. It is encouraging for the effectiveness
of the test message, that among
Ellesmere Port respondents, a voice
message to landlines was amongst the
36
most preferred methods of receiving
information about emergencies. Around
nine in ten stated voice messages to
landlines, around the same as said they
would want announcements on TV.
'Messages on TV' was the most preferred
method among the general public. Sirens
also rated highly among Ellesmere Port
respondents (81%) while just 13% of the
general public stated a preference for
sirens – this is likely to be because
Ellesmere Port respondents are more
familiar with sirens being used in their
local area.
139. The respondents in Ellesmere Port felt
more informed about what to do in case of
an emergency than the wider general
public. Just three in ten British adults felt
informed about what to do in case of a
large-scale emergency compared to half
of Ellesmere Port respondents.
140. However, Ellesmere Port respondents
were less likely to say they felt prepared
for an emergency than the British public.
Just over one in three in Ellesmere Port
(36%) said they were well prepared
compared to just under half of the British
public (47%). One explanation for this
trend might be that there is a greater
sense of risk in Ellesmere Port, which
leaves people feeling more vulnerable (or
less prepared) despite their generally
having a greater awareness of what they
are meant to do if an emergency
happens.
141. Receiving information seems to make
British adults feel more prepared, with
three quarters of those who have received
information about being prepared for
emergencies saying they do feel prepared
compared to less than half (45%) of those
who did not receive information.
142. Many British adults have done little to
specifically prepare for an emergency, for
instance, 16% have prepared a list of
useful contacts, 11% have discussed
emergency procedures, and just 7% have
prepared an emergency grab bag.
However, most people routinely keep a
number of items that would be useful in
an emergency including:
- Torch: 78% - Candles: 73% - Tinned food: 70% - Spare batteries: 63% - First aid kit: 66% - Spare medication: 52%
143. Despite this, only one in three say they
routinely keep bottled water (34%) and
one in four a battery powered or wind up
radio (24%).
144. While respondents in Ellesmere Port
felt better informed than the British public,
there was also a greater thirst for more
knowledge about potential emergencies,
particularly amongst those who felt less
informed. Two thirds of Ellesmere Port
respondents said they wanted more
information (67%) compared to under a
half (45%) of British adults. One in ten
(10%) British adults said they do no need
to know about preparing for an
37
emergency while 15% say they know
enough already.
145. Leaflets and letters from the local
council and emergency services were by
far the most common way in which
respondents had received information on
preparing for emergencies. The Police,
Fire and Rescue Service and local council
were the most trusted organisations to be
giving out information about how to
prepare for emergencies.