export controls on cybersecurity feb. 2016 export controls on cybersecurity feb. 2016 eli greenbaum

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EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY TECHNOLOGY @OWASP Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum [email protected]

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Export Controls can: – Prevent the spread of WMD or military goods, which could harm global security and stability – Prevent the spread of dangerous technology to enemies – Preserve economic and military advantages – Promote trade between allied states Benefits of Export Controls

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Page 1: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY TECHNOLOGY

@OWASP Feb. 2016

Eli [email protected]

Page 2: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

• Laws that regulate the export and sharing of sensitive:– Technology– Equipment– Software– Know-how– Data

• Not related to “purpose” or “intentions”• Prohibitions vs. Licenses

Export Controls

Page 3: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

• Export Controls can:– Prevent the spread of WMD or military goods,

which could harm global security and stability– Prevent the spread of dangerous technology to

enemies– Preserve economic and military advantages– Promote trade between allied states

Benefits of Export Controls

Page 4: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

• Export Controls can:– Prevent potentially lucrative trade opportunities– Deter foreign investment– Hurt competitiveness of domestic firms– Anger domestic audiences– Have diplomatic costs

Costs of Export Controls

Page 5: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

• Need a license to: market, export, be an agent for controlled technology

• Restricts transfers to foreigners• Maximum fine: 3 years prison, 6.7 million NIS,

could be higher in aggravating circumstances• Company managers can have personal liability as

well.• Exceptions for public domain and academic

research

חוק הפיקוח על הייצוא הביטחוני - 2007

Page 6: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

• Nuclear Suppliers Group• Missile Control Technology Regime (MCTR)• Australian Group• Wassenaar Arrangement

International Export Control

Page 7: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

• 2013 amendments to Wassenaar Arrangements• French and British propose adding cybersecurity

controls• Implemented in many countries without problems• May 2015: United States regulations• Jan 2016: Israel Regulations

Cybersecurity Controls

Page 8: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

• Wassenaar:“Intrusion Software”“IP Surveillance Systems

• Israel adds:Forensic EquipmentVulnerabilitiesAutomatic Export Generation

Cybersecurity Controls

Page 9: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

Software specially designed or modified to avoid detection by 'monitoring tools', or to defeat 'protective countermeasures', of a computer or network capable device, and performing any of the following:

a. The extraction of data or information, from a computer or network capable device, or the modification of system or user data; or

b. The modification of the standard execution path of a program or process in order to allow the execution of externally provided instructions.

Not including:

c. Debuggers or Software Reverse Engineering tools;

d. Digital Rights Management (DRM) software ; or

e. Software designed to be installed by owners for asset tracking

Intrusion Software

Page 10: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

Software specially designed or modified to avoid detection by 'monitoring tools', or to defeat 'protective countermeasures', of a computer or network capable device, and performing any of the following:

a. The extraction of data or information, from a computer or network capable device, or the modification of system or user data; or

b. The modification of the standard execution path of a program or process in order to allow the execution of externally provided instructions.

Not including:

c. Debuggers or Software Reverse Engineering tools;

d. Digital Rights Management (DRM) software ; or

e. Software designed to be installed by owners for asset tracking

Intrusion Software

By Who?

• Users?

• Network owner?

• Owner of the software?

Page 11: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

Software specially designed or modified to avoid detection by 'monitoring tools', or to defeat 'protective countermeasures', of a computer or network capable device, and performing any of the following:

a. The extraction of data or information, from a computer or network capable device, or the modification of system or user data; or

b. The modification of the standard execution path of a program or process in order to allow the execution of externally provided instructions.

Not including:

c. Debuggers or Software Reverse Engineering tools;

d. Digital Rights Management (DRM) software ; or

e. Software designed to be installed by owners for asset tracking

Intrusion Software

Tracking software?

Page 12: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

Software specially designed or modified to avoid detection by 'monitoring tools', or to defeat 'protective countermeasures', of a computer or network capable device, and performing any of the following:

a. The extraction of data or information, from a computer or network capable device, or the modification of system or user data; or

b. The modification of the standard execution path of a program or process in order to allow the execution of externally provided instructions.

Not including:

c. Debuggers or Software Reverse Engineering tools;

d. Digital Rights Management (DRM) software ; or

e. Software designed to be installed by owners for asset tracking

Intrusion Software

• Auto-updaters?

• Products that stop employee communication?

• All third party developers?

• Antivirus software?

Page 13: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

Software specially designed or modified to avoid detection by 'monitoring tools', or to defeat 'protective countermeasures', of a computer or network capable device, and performing any of the following:

a. The extraction of data or information, from a computer or network capable device, or the modification of system or user data; or

b. The modification of the standard execution path of a program or process in order to allow the execution of externally provided instructions.

Not including:

c. Debuggers or Software Reverse Engineering tools;

d. Digital Rights Management (DRM) software ; or

e. Software designed to be installed by owners for asset tracking

Intrusion Software

• Packers?

• Obfuscators?

Page 14: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

חולשה, למעט אחת מאלה:

א. חולשות הנמסרות באופן בלעדי למי שפיתח את הקוד א הפרוטוקול, או למי מטעמו,

ב. חולשות המוצאות לנחלת הכלל,

בחברה המיוצרים בלבד, הגנה במוצרי לשימוש המיועדות חולשות ג. המחזיקה בחולשה או בחברה.

Vulnerabilities

Page 15: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

חולשה, למעט אחת מאלה:

למי או הפרוטוקול, א הקוד את שפיתח למי בלעדי באופן הנמסרות חולשות א. מטעמו,

ב. חולשות המוצאות לנחלת הכלל,

המחזיקה בחברה המיוצרים בלבד, הגנה במוצרי לשימוש המיועדות חולשות ג. בחולשה או בחברה.

What about:

• To customers/suppliers?

• Open source?

• Vulnerabilities that require multi-stakeholder cooperation?

• Academic/Security Research?

Vulnerabilities

Page 16: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

במיוחד • הותאמה או שתוכננה תוכנה או מערכות בהן שימוש ביצוע לשם אוטומטי, חולשות לאיתור

בתוכנת חדירה כנגד אחר.

טכנולוגיה וידע לפיתוח של תוכנת חדירה.•

Vulnerabilities

Page 17: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

במיוחד • הותאמה או שתוכננה תוכנה או מערכות בהן שימוש ביצוע לשם אוטומטי, חולשות לאיתור

בתוכנת חדירה כנגד אחר.

טכנולוגיה וידע לפיתוח של תוכנת חדירה.•

Vulnerabilities

What about:

• All software on on the planet?

What about:

• Pen Testing?

• Automated Exploit Generation (Metasploit)?

Page 18: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

• Foreign availability outside participating states.

• The ability to control effectively the export of the goods.

• The ability to make a clear and objective specification of the item

Wassenaar Criteria

Page 19: EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 EXPORT CONTROLS ON CYBERSECURITY Feb. 2016 Eli Greenbaum

THANK YOU

Eli [email protected]