exploring the capabilities and economics of cybercrime

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Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime Recent Trends and Highlights JIM WALTER SENIOR RESEARCH SCIENTIST| CYLANCE

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Page 1: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

Recent Trends and Highlights

JIM WALTERSENIOR RESEARCH SCIENTIST| CYLANCE

Page 2: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

INTRODUCTIONS

JIM WALTER Sr. Research Scientist w/ Cylance

Previously ran Threat Intelligence and Advanced Threat Research efforts at McAfee / Intel Security (1998-2015)

Page 3: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

OVERVIEW

Current Attacker Community / Climate

Current Campaign and TTP Highlights

Mechanics

Mitigations & Countermeasures

Conclusions

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StatisticsCybercrime

Average Annualized Cost = 9.5 Million

21% Increase in total cost over 2015

Global cost of Cybercrime in FY2016 = ~ 460 Billion

“Malware” dominates attack ‘types’ in 2016

Information loss/theft is now the most costly consequence of cybercrime

Page 5: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

StatisticsCybercrime

CryptoWall Alone - ~325 Million

6 Trillion by 2021??*

Cybercrime has become the 2nd most reported economic crime**

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Statistics

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Statistics

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Statistics

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Current Community / ClimateSurface Level / Skiddies / unskilled

Mid-level order-followers / unskilled / compensated by higher-ups to install and manage infrastructure and infected nodes (ex: Nigerian Pony Loader networks)

Skilled –to-highly-skilled

Exclusive for-hire operations (ex: Sality & Gazavat)

Nation States / Gov-backed

Long-term and ultra-stealth

Page 10: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

Current Community / ClimateRansomware & For-Hire Offerings

Turn-key systems / All Inclusive

Page 11: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

Current Community / ClimateRansomware & For-Hire Offerings

Page 12: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

Current Community / ClimateRansomware & For-Hire Offerings

Page 13: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

Current Community / ClimateRansomware & For-Hire Offerings

Page 14: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

Current Community / ClimateRansomware & For-Hire Offerings

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Current Community / ClimateRansomware & For-Hire Offerings

Page 16: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

Current Community / Climate

Page 17: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

Current Community / Climate

Page 18: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

Current Community / ClimateRansomware & For-Hire Offerings

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Current Community / ClimateFull Service Carding

Page 20: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

Campaigns and TTP HighlightsNigerian BEC ‘gangs’

PassCV Group

CozyBear / APT29 (PowerDuke, etc.)

Page 21: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

MechanicsNigerian BEC ‘gangs’

Spearphishing, BEC, Pony Loader, Hawkeye, Citadel, iSpy Premium

PassCV Group

Digitally Signed malware

Targets gaming companies

ZxShell, Gh0st RAT, Netwire (COTS)

CozyBear / APT29 (PowerDuke, etc.)

Page 22: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

Mechanics CozyBear / APT29 (PowerDuke, etc.)

PowerShell-based malware tools

Phish / SpearPhish

Malicious Macros in Office documents

Spikerush malware encrypted in PNG image files

Page 23: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

Mitigations and Countermeasures Take Note . .

A majority of malware is single-use or target/host specific.

A majority of malware does not end up in-the-wild or on VT or similar sharing sites/services.

Page 24: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

Mitigations and Countermeasures In 60% Of Cases, Attackers Are Able To Compromise An Organization Within Minutes.

99.9% Of The Exploited Vulnerabilities Were Compromised More Than A Year After The CVE Was Published

95% Of Malware Types Showed Up For Less Than A Month, And Four Out Of Five Didn’t Last Beyond A Week.

70–90% Of Malware Samples Are Unique To An Organization.

Page 25: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

Mitigations and CountermeasuresJust under 1500 ‘malware-related’ breaches in 2016 (opposed to physical theft, miscellaneous hacking, social engineering and more)

“Analysis of one of our larger datasets showed that 99% of malware hashes are seen for only 58 seconds or less. In fact, most malware was seen only once. This reflects how quickly hackers are modifying their code to avoid detection.”

Page 26: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

Mitigations and CountermeasuresWhat to do?

Signatures and traditional methods will never keep up.

Learn from the past and smarten your countermeasures.

AI /or Machine Learning lead to true prevention and application of updated methodology to endpoint protection.

Page 27: Exploring the Capabilities and Economics of Cybercrime

QUESTIONSAND

ANSWERS

[email protected]

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Supporting

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SAMSA RANSOMWARE TARGETING HOSPITALS / MEDICAL FACILITIES

Payload = Samsa / Samsam Ransomware

‘Pay up to restore functionality’

Targeting Java-based webservers (JBOSS)

Jexboss (python-based JBOSS exploit toolkit)

reGeorg – tunnel RDP via HTTP

csvde, psexec, sdelete – legit tools used to move and function internally

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SAMSA RANSOMWARE

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SAMSA RANSOMWARE

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SAMSA RANSOMWARE

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SAMSA RANSOMWARE

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SAMSA RANSOMWARE

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SAMSA RANSOMWARE