exploring isis in yemen
TRANSCRIPT
EXPLORING ISIS IN YEMENKatherine ZimmermanCritical Threats Project
American Enterprise Institute
July 24, 2015
EXPLORING THE RISE OF ISIS IN YEMEN
• Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) dominates the jihadist fight in Yemen and is the greatest direct threat to the U.S. from the al Qaeda network.
• The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) declared an Islamic Caliphate on June 29, 2014, under the leadership of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. ISIS called on all Muslims to pledge allegiance to Baghdadi.
• AQAP leadership reconfirmed allegiance to al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri, rejecting the legitimacy of the Islamic Caliphate in November 2014.
• The 2015 collapse of the central Yemeni state and subsequent localized fighting has created inroads in Yemen for both AQAP and ISIS.
• ISIS-linked cells now operate in at least eight Yemeni governorates.
UNDERSTANDING THE DATA
ISIS STATEMENT
ISIS ATTACK
ISIS INFLECTION POINT
U.S. STATEMENT
AQAP STATEMENT
ANTI-AL HOUTHI FORCES ATTACK
LEGENDThe data included is an open-source collection of reported ISIS-linked activity in Yemen, collected by research teams at AEI’s Critical Threats Project and the Institute for the Study of War.
Ntrepid’s Timestream application displays the data along a timeline, with visual cues to represent group affiliation and type of event.
Search terms are also highlighted in the dataset to further show trends.
EMERGENCE OF ISIS IN YEMEN
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Initial reactions to ISIS in Yemen were limited geographically and in scope. There were early pledges of allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, but no indications that these groups had developed capabilities inside Yemen.
ROLE OF AQAP JUDGE IN PROMOTING ISIS
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AQAP judge Mamoun bin Abdulhamid Hatem (highlighted) outwardly sympathized with ISIS and probably facilitated an Ibb-based recruiting network. A deleted tweet from Hatem’s account expressed support for the declaration of the Islamic Caliphate; AQAP leadership may have ordered its deletion. An airstrike killed Hatem in al Mukalla, Hadramawt, which was then under AQAP control, in May 2015.
ISIS-LINKED GROUPS ORGANIZE IN YEMEN
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The rumored ISIS-linked groups that emerged in fall 2014 began to organize into “wilayats,” provinces, following a global ISIS organizational structure. Claims for attacks served as an announcement for many of the wilayats, particularly Wilayat Sana’a’s March 20 attack. There are no indications that ISIS wilayats are undertaking governance activities in Yemen.
For more, see Joshua Koontz, “Desknote: The Growing Threat of ISIS in Yemen,”AEI’s Critical Threats Project, May 6, 2015
DECLARED ISIS WILAYAT IN YEMEN
MAR-APR MAY-PRESENT
AS OF FEB
ADEN
SHABWAH
SANA’ADHAMAR
HADRAMAWT
IBBLAHIJ
MA’RIBAL BAYDA
ISIS-LINKED ATTACKS IN YEMEN
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ISIS-linked activity is growing in Yemen, though wilayats do not appear to share capabilities. Many attacks are claimed as independent events. Interestingly, Wilayat Shabwah claimed participation in a local tribal offensive against the al Houthis at the end of May 2015.
current as of July 22, 2015
MAPPING ISIS ACTIVITY IN YEMEN
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ISIS EXECUTIONS IN YEMEN
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ISIS militants are publicizing their executions of al Houthis and al Houthi-aligned Yemeni soldiers, but the casualty rate pales in comparison to ISIS executions in Iraq and Syria. ISIS Wilayats Aden, al Bayda and Shabwah (Ataq) have participated in beheadings (highlighted), a tactic rarely seen in the Yemeni context.
ISIS’S FIRST SPECTACULAR ATTACK IN YEMEN
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ISIS Wilayat Sana’a claimed credit for coordinated suicide attacks in Sana’a and Sa’ada on March 20 that targeted mosques and was the deadliest terrorist attack in Yemen’s history. The suicide attack in Sa’ada was disrupted. AQAP immediately denied responsibility and cited orders from al Qaeda’s Ayman al Zawahiri not to attack mosques or market places.
For more, see Alexis Knutsen, “ISIS in Yemen: Fueling the Sectarian Fire,”AEI’s Critical Threats Project, March 20, 2015
ISIS’S USE OF SUICIDE ATTACKS
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ISIS does not appear to favor suicide bombers in Yemen (attacks highlighted). Suicide attacks have only occurred on March 20 in Sana’a and May 17 in al Bayda. ISIS may have a smaller pool of members and potential recruits to dedicate to suicide attacks.
SHIFT TO ISIS VBIED ATTACKS IN YEMEN
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The first ISIS-linked vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack occurred on June 17 in Sana’a, with the near-simultaneous detonation of four bombs. Wilayats Sana’a and Ibb are the only ISIS-linked groups in Yemen to deploy a VBIED (highlighted) to date.
ISIS WILAYAT SANA’A
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ISIS Wilayat Sana’a, operating in Yemen’s capital, has increased the frequency of its attacks (highlighted) since the beginning of Ramadan. A shift from suicide attacks to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and VBIEDs may indicate a limited capability to field suicide bombers.
ISIS WILAYAT SANA’A’S VBIED CAMPAIGN
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ISIS Wilayat Sana’a claimed VBIED attacks during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan as part of a campaign against the “dens” of the al Houthis. The reported ISIS VBIED attack on July 2 came through a pro-ISIS Twitter account, but has not been claimed by ISIS Wilayat Sana’a.
For more, see Alexis Knutsen, “Ramadan Bombings in Yemen: Part of ISIS’s Global Strategy?,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, June 17, 2015
EVALUATING ISIS’S THREAT IN YEMEN
• ISIS wilayats in Yemen are still establishing themselves and do not pursue governance activities.
• ISIS’s message in Yemen does not resonate with the population, shown by recruiting levels, and it is not as established as AQAP there.
• ISIS’s objectives in Yemen appear to be drive sectarian tensions in order to exploit the conflict.
• ISIS will seek to expand its foothold in Yemen as long as the conflict continues, but its impact remains limited to date.
The data behind this report is derived from the hard work of AEI’s Critical Threats Project Yemen Team, especially contributor Joshua Koontz who has worked tirelessly to
document ISIS and AQAP activity in Yemen, and the Institute for the Study of War. AEI’s Critical Threats Project also partners with Praescient Analytics, whose support helped to make this report possible, and uses Ntrepid Corporation’s Timestream, which served as
the analytical tool to derive the insights presented.
Download Timestream to view full case.Timestream: Exploring ISIS in Yemen.tsm [37.12 MB]
Katherine ZimmermanCritical Threats Project
American Enterprise Institute(202) 888-6576
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND CONTACT INFORMATION