explaining citizen support for trade liberalization

Explaining Citizen Support for Trade LiberalizationAuthor(s): Karl C. Kaltenthaler, Ronald D. Gelleny and Stephen J. CeccoliSource: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec., 2004), pp. 829-851Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693537 .

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International Studies Quarterly (2004) 48, 829-851

Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization

KARL C. KALTENTHALER

Rhodes College

RONALD D. GELLENY

Rhodes College

STEPHENJ. CECCOLI

Rhodes College

This paper examines individual attitudes in six industrialized democracies to determine what factors condition citizens' support for trade liberalization. We argue that public support for trade liberalization is influenced by politically driven views and individual economic utilitarian considerations. To test our propositions, we develop and estimate a series of logistic regression models of public support for trade liberalization. That data are derived from The World Values Surveys (1995-1997). We find strong empirical support for the economic utilitarian factors-primarily education, but also gender and income-as the prin- cipal factors shaping individual attitudes toward trade liberalization. Conversely, while some empirical support is found for political factors such as one's geographic orientation and level of cognitive mobilization, we find that the political predictors of support are weaker overall than the economic interest predictors.

Trade liberalization remains an important and controversial component of the economic globalization process. The potential consequences of the liberalization of international economic markets have generated a contentious political debate. World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings continue to be met with large public demonstrations and strikes, as protestors of trade liberalization have taken to the streets in Seattle, Washington, DC, Prague, Quebec City, and Genoa.- Yet, many governments seemingly remain convinced that trade liberalization--the increased flow of international goods, services, and capital across countries-will yield pos-

Authors' note: An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. The authors would like to thank Christopher J. Anderson, William Hixon, the editors of and reviewers at ISQ, and the participants at the panel on which this was presented as a paper. The authors, of course, are responsible for any errors.

1 Opposition to trade liberalization is also apparent in EU countries. For example, in the fall of 2002, French workers conducted a series of strikes and protests against the continued opening of France's economic market to EU

competition.

? 2004 International Studies Association. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.



830 Explaining Citizen Support for Trade Liberalization

itive and long-term economic growth. To this end, the World Bank has estimated that "abolishing all trade barriers could increase global income by U.S.$2.8 trillion and lift 320 million people out of poverty by 2015" (WTO, 2001:2).

Given this considerable debate, it is readily apparent that public opinion is a critical factor in the trade liberalization process. It has been shown in the U.S. and other advanced industrialized democracies that public opinion is, at the least, a constraint, if not a determinant of foreign policy decisions (Page and Shapiro, 1983; Brooks, 1990; Risse-Kappen, 1991; Sobel and Holsti, 2001). For instance, if international trade flows and other aspects of trade liberalization are perceived by the public to impose significant economic and political costs, domestic governments will be pressured to implement protectionist trade policies. However, while much has been written about the effects of trade liberalization on economic growth (see An- drews, 1994; Garrett, 1995; Sachs and Warner, 1995; World Bank, 1997; Dollar, 2001; WTO, 2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2002) and the relationship between trade liberalization and domestic government policies (see Crotty, Epstein, and Kelly, 1996; Haggard and Maxfield, 1996; Eichengreen, 1997; Rodrik, 1998; Swank, 1998; Gelleny and McCoy, 2001; Richards, Gelleny and Sacko, 2001), relatively few studies have directly examined the relationship between public opinion and aspects of trade liberalization.2 This gap is particularly true in the case of cross-national studies exploring public attitudes toward trade and other aspects of foreign policy (see Holsti, 1996).

Early studies of public attitudes toward foreign policy issues argued that the public did not have well-formed opinions on such matters. Specifically, the seminal studies of Almond (1950) and Converse (1964) found that significant segments of the American public failed to exhibit any coherent and structured preferences regarding foreign policy matters. Other studies appeared to reinforce these findings (see Erskine, 1963; Free and Cantril, 1968; Simon, 1974). However, more recent research has revealed far more structured foreign policy attitudes than allowed for by Almond and Converse (see Maggiotto and Wittkopf, 1981; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Shapiro and Page, 1988; Wittkopf, 1990; Eichengreen and Dal- ton, 1993; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1993; Chittick, Bingley, and Travis, 1995). Hurwitz and Peffley (1987:1102), for example, find that citizens support specific policy positions based on general foreign policy inclinations and that "foreign-policy attitudes are more stable and organized" than previously assumed. Thus, foreign policy preferences are coherent and not as easily manipulated as previously thought (Page and Shapiro, 1983).

Trade liberalization has been identified as a leading element of increased economic integration throughout history (Cooper, 1968; Lindert and Williamson, 2001; Aninat, 2002). For example, between 1820 and 1913, often considered the first global century, global trade jumped drastically owing to decreased transport costs (Rodrik, 1997; Lindert and Williamson, 2001). Trade has continued to maintain a prominent role in the integration of the international economy (Gilpin, 2001). Furthermore, trade policy is extremely politically sensitive since it directly affects job security and wages-issues that are dear to the hearts of all citizens.

Building on previous public opinion and political economy research, this paper addresses the question "What factors influence public support regarding trade liberalization?" To answer this question, we examine individual-level data from respondents in six advanced industrialized countries--Australia, Germany, Nor- way, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. We think it is important to study attitudes about trade liberalization in industrialized countries because the trade liberalization process is much more advanced in these countries compared to other parts of the world. Moreover, public opinion is playing an increasingly prominent

2 Important exceptions include O'Rourke and Sinnott (2001) and Mayda and Rodrik (2002).



KARL C. KALTENTHALER, RONALD D. GELLENY, AND STEPHENJ. CECCOLI 831

role in trade policy circles. For example, it is commonly recognized that the Single European Act and the Treaty on European Union have relaunched the European Union's economic integration process through the opening of Europe's internal trade and capital markets. These treaties required public ratification before their implementation, thereby obliging European elites to convince their domestic con- stituents of the benefits of trade liberalization. In short, it is impossible to ignore the fact that public opinion has become a primary constraint on the European integration process (Eichengreen and Dalton, 1993). By examining the role of public support for trade liberalization, we are analyzing an essential, but poorly under- stood, component of the economic globalization process.

In this paper, we seek to fill several gaps in the literature. We argue that public support for trade liberalization is influenced by both politically driven views as well as individual economic utilitarian considerations. Thus, we seek to provide a fuller picture of how public opinion is shaped regarding trade liberalization policies. We begin our study by discussing the general outlines of the domestic politics of trade liberalization. Next, we develop a model of public support for trade liberalization. We analyze individual-level data derived from The World Values Surveys on six industrialized countries using a series of logistic regression models. We first estimate a pooled model to provide baseline parameter estimates and then estimate the model for each of the six countries. Lastly, we end the paper with a discussion of the results and suggest further paths of research.

Differing Views of Trade Liberalization

Trade liberalization has become a popular phrase to describe many different aspects of the international economy. For the purposes of this paper, we define trade liberalization as the increased flow or liberalization of goods, services, and capital across countries (Tonelson, 1997; IMF, 2000; Dollar, 2001; Aninat, 2002). Propo- nents of trade liberalization argue that the integration of the world's economic markets encourages economic growth and efficiency. Opening domestic markets to trade and capital flows establishes powerful and direct ties between national economies and the international system (Andrews, 1994; Sachs and Warner, 1995). For one, increased capital flows, such as foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations (MNCs) provides host countries with additional jobs. Further- more, portfolio investment and the expansion of other capital instruments provide an infusion of capital which local firms can access (Hausler, 2002).4 More importantly, the liberalization of capital restrictions allows money to flow to the most productive investments, thereby enhancing economic growth and efficiency (Eic- hengreen, 1997; IMF, 1997; Dollar and Kraay, 2002). To maintain levels of capital investment (i.e., limit capital flight), governments must be willing to implement policies conducive to capital investment. These policies often include limiting domestic budget expenditures and providing lower taxes for business firms.

Trade liberalization also enhances economic competitiveness. In order to maintain high income and employment levels, domestic firms must be capable of com- peting efficiently against international competitors. Hence, governments must be willing to establish a business environment that helps the competitive position of domestic firms. Such policies may again include lower corporate taxes and the restructuring of employment regulations (Owens and Whitehouse, 1996; Owens, 1999).

3 Domestic competition from MNCs also encourages local firms to become more competitive to protect their market share.

4 FDI consists of building plants or acquiring a controlling interest (more than 10% of outstanding stock) in an overseas company. Portfolio investment is the purchase of stocks and bonds of less than 10% of the outstanding stock in foreign firms (Walther, 1997).




The end result is that trade liberalization encourages governments to limit their involvement in the economy. Markets, not politicians, government agencies, nor government bureaucrats, drive economic decisions. Consequently, economic decisions are more efficient and optimal economic results are achieved. This logic is reflected by Mexican President Vicente Fox, who stated that we "are convinced that trade liberalization is good and it's good when you do your homework ... keep your fundamentals in line on the economy, build up high levels of education, respect the rule of law.... When you do your part, we are convinced that you get the benefit" (Dollar and Kraay, 2002:130). Keeping economic fundamentals in line generally implies maintaining low levels of government spending, decreasing corporate tax rates, loosening regulation standards that apply to businesses, and re- specting the rule of law (see Crotty et al., 1996; Swank, 1998).

Opponents of trade liberalization fail to see the above process as a positive oc- currence in the international system. Instead, opponents steadfastly contend that the competitive environment created by trade liberalization encourages a "race to the bottom" regarding domestic social policies (Crotty et al., 1996). The trade liberalization process is seen as forcing governments to make economic concessions that benefit the capitalist elites, including multinational corporations and international investment firms (Economist, 9/25/2000; Bhagwati, 2002). For instance, while MNCs are increasingly excused from paying taxes, the ensuing tax burden is shifted to the less wealthy. Moreover, the loss of tax revenue from capitalist elites strains the ability of governments to maintain the social safety nets that many citizens have grown accustomed to having (Garrett, 1998; Rodrik, 1998).

The issue of income inequality is also of considerable concern to many since there is a perception that income inequality is highly correlated with increasing trade liberalization. For example, although many new jobs were created in the United States during the decade of the 1990s, many families saw the gap between themselves and the wealthy continue to rise (Bergsten, 1999; Cline, 1999; Galbraith, 2002). There has been significant concern in the U.S. that trade liberalization has come at the expense of American jobs (Sobel, 2001; Holsti, 2002). Unemployment rates in many European countries have remained high. Studies have shown that once European workers lose their jobs they have found it very difficult to find new employment opportunities." Trade liberalization exposes already anxious workers to greater economic competition from newly industrialized countries (NICs), thus heightening worker fear regarding income stability (Iverson and Wren, 1998; Bergsten, 1999; Mazur, 2000).

Thus, ultimately, trade liberalization is seen to exacerbate economic inequality (both within and between countries), threaten the domestic welfare state, pose a risk to the health of the world's environment, and enable unchecked capitalism to ex- tend its reach throughout the world.

Below, we briefly describe the various factors that we expect to influence the relationship between public opinion and trade liberalization. These individual-level factors are grouped into two distinct categories: political attitudes and economic utilitarian considerations.

Political Attitudes

Individual-level political attitudes are likely to be critical in the formation of public support for trade liberalization. Considering the general Right and Left attitudes toward economic liberalization, with the Right in more general support of neoliberal economic policies at the domestic level than those on the Left, some think that

5 Between the early 1970s and early 1990s, the EU member states were unable to produce a net increase in

private sector jobs (see OECD, 1994).




people who place themselves on the ideological Right would want more liberalized international trade (Dalton, 2001).

We have strong suspicions that the traditional Left-Right ideological continuum, by itself, is a relatively imprecise measure of an individual's ideological predisposition toward trade liberalization (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Kitschelt and Helle- mans, 1990). For instance, a person's declaration that s/he is on the political Left or Right may be a statement about how s/he thinks about culture, religion, or the role of the state in the economy. Alternatively, it is increasingly common to think about the Right-Left spectrum as a two-dimensional space, with one dimension concerned with materialist/economic issues and the other related to concerns about individual freedom and self-expression (Kitschelt, 1995). Just asking a person if s/ he is on the Right or Left does not tell if s/he thinks of herself on the materialist Right/Left or cultural Right/Left.

We agree that those who think of themselves as on the economic/materialist Right would be more supportive of trade liberalization than those who place themselves on the economic/materialist Left. The best way to determine where the individuals are on the economic/materialist Left-Right dimension is to ascertain how they think about the state's role in the distribution of income in the economy. There is a general consensus among scholars of public attitudes toward the economy that those who think of themselves on the materialist Left believe the government should take responsibility for creating a relatively equal distribution of incomes, whereas those on the materialist Right believe the market should be the primary determinant of the distribution of incomes. Thus one's attitudes toward the state's role in income distribution will identify where one sits on the materialist Right-Left spectrum. We also argue that it will predict how one thinks about trade liberalization.

A common grievance attributed to trade liberalization is that the process inten- sifies the gap between the rich and the poor (Cline, 1999; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Galbraith, 2002; Jesuit and Smeeding, 2002). As mentioned above, MNCs and international investment firms are seen by antitrade liberalization activist forces to be at the center of a system designed to exploit people abroad and labor locally (Bhagwati, 2002). MNCs, for example, are able to use the threat of exiting to a more "business friendly" environment to negotiate and extract favorable tax, labor and environmental standards from host governments. Furthermore, high profile cases of executives receiving large sums of money (often paying little corporate taxes) while their respective companies go bankrupt and workers discover that their pensions are valueless reinforces the insecurity of citizens.6 Consequently, trade liberalization can heighten the uneasiness of citizens regarding the equitable nature of the process. Past political experience has shown that the issue of income equality can fuel fierce political conflict within societies (Verba and Kelman, 1987).

This common view of trade liberalization means that those who are upset by rising income inequality will have a less supportive attitude toward trade liberalization than those who are not very concerned about the issue of income inequality. Therefore, we hypothesize that those who want governments to make incomes more equal will be less supportive of trade liberalization than those who do not want governments to engage in such actions.

Second, another dimension of political attitudes that may affect how people think about trade liberalization is an individual's level of cognitive mobilization. Ingelhart (1970) and Inglehart and Rabier (1978), writing in reference to public support for European integration, have argued that the more people think of themselves as citizens of the world as opposed to their nation or locality, the more likely one is to accept the international integration process. Their cognitive mobilization hypothesis "argues that the rising educational levels of recent decades, coupled with the

6 Recent highly publicized cases include Enron and IBM's raiding of their labor forces pension funds.




growing availability of information about things happening in distant places, is conducive to an increasingly cosmopolitan outlook on the part of Western publics" (1978:86).

Inglehart and Rabier reason that one's level of cosmopolitanism is a function of one's level of education and degree of political sophistication. The more educated an individual is and the more informed that person is about politics, the more likely that person is to view the world from a cosmopolitan (as opposed to parochial) viewpoint. It is argued that those who are uneducated and parochial cannot grasp the world beyond their locality because they do not know about it or understand it. This process of becoming more cosmopolitan is a result of the "cognitive mobilization" individuals go through as they are educated (Inglehart and Rabier, 1978:86). They posited that the greater the individual's exposure to the cognitive mobilization process, the more supportive that person would be of the European integration process. This cognitive mobilization argument views one's cosmopolitan orientation as an intervening variable between the cognitive mobilization process and one's position on European integration. In other words, as one becomes more cognitively mobilized, one becomes more cosmopolitan oriented and thus more supportive of the integration process.

The same conclusions could be drawn about individual attitudes toward international trade. Specifically, a cognitive mobilization hypothesis would posit that the more educated and informed one is about politics, the more likely one is to accept trade liberalization. Those who have a higher degree of cognitive mobilization will not feel threatened by trade but will view it as an opportunity to try new products and interact with the broader world. As the parochial will not have an abiding interest in goods from other countries, they will not see trade as bringing them benefits. Increased trade could be viewed as threatening, in that it brings in goods that may challenge the local customs and norms.

Whereas Inglehart and Rabier view one's level of cognitive mobilization as a predictor of support for integration, it is also possible to utilize a person's self- identified attachment to a geographic entity (such as a city, a province, or a country) as an additional predictor of support for trade liberalization. Thus, we hypothesize that the more parochial a person is (i.e., the more local their sense of political attachment) the less likely that person is to support trade liberalization.

In summary, we seek to test the effects of three factors related to respondent political attitudes -attitudes toward income distribution, cognitive mobilization, and geographic orientation. We argue that these factors should help explain individual attitudes regarding trade liberalization. In contrast to the political arguments, the following section outlines several economic interest arguments.

Economic Interest Factors

Aside from one's political ideology, a person's perceived economic interests may determine how s/he evaluates the trade liberalization process. There are several aspects of one's place in society that could condition the level of support one ac- cords to the opening of the economy to imports. Many scholars have argued that individuals make rational decisions about what they themselves expect to gain in material terms from government decisions (Downs, 1957; Kiewiet, 1983; Page and Shapiro, 1992). In terms of individual economic interests, we explore the role of education, income, perceived social class, union membership, gender, and age as factors that could potentially affect how individuals evaluate their support for trade liberalization.

Scholars have argued that those individuals with higher levels of human capital (i.e., skill levels) will be more supportive of economic liberalization than those with lower levels. That is, the liberalization of the international economy provides opportunities for efficient enterprises to invest in the generation of new technologies




and skilled workers to exploit significant opportunities of research successes in a vast world market (Grossman and Helpman, 1990; Gilpin, 2001). Hence, economic liberalization stands to benefit those with the skills to compete efficiently in the international market place. Those with higher skill levels have an upper hand in market competition and should welcome enhanced market forces and reduced barriers to competition. As such, individuals with higher levels of human capital, such as education, will be more supportive of economic integration than those with lower levels of human capital because the liberalization of markets stands to benefit those with the skills to outperform and thus profit from those with lower skill levels (Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel, 1998; Scheve and Slaughter, 200 la, b). Thus we hypothesize that the higher one's level of education, the more one should support trade liberalization.

One's level of income could also affect how one thinks about trade liberalization. This logic has been demonstrated in similar empirical contexts. For example, Gabel (1998) has argued that the higher one's income is the more supportive one is of European integration. His logic is that higher income individuals stand to gain more from the liberalization of trade than those with lower incomes. Specifically, those with higher incomes have the resources to buy imports made available by liberalized trade, whereas those with relatively lower incomes do not. Also, higher income individuals have the resources to invest in the trade process and expect to make increasing gains, whereas those with lower incomes will not have such an opportunity. The poor will not perceive that they will make profits from trade liberalization nor will they relish the thought of having more access to imports.

We would agree with Gabel that those with higher incomes will be more supportive of trade liberalization than those with lower incomes, but we would base our argument on a slightly different logic. We posit that lower income individuals do not think about their inability to buy imports and thus support trade liberalization less than those with higher incomes, but rather lower income individuals think about their inability to prosper in an enhanced competitive environment. Lower income individuals would likely think that they have not done well in the present level of market competition, thus they stand to be made even worse off with more competition. Those with higher incomes, on the other hand, would probably look optimistically at trade liberalization as a way to maximize their wealth potential. This means we would expect that the higher one's relative income, the more supportive one would be of trade liberalization.

An individual's perceived social class may be another economic utilitarian factor affecting her attitude toward trade liberalization. The logic behind this assertion is very similar to that of the income hypothesis. Those who think of themselves as in the upper classes will think that more openness in trade will mean greater opportunity as consumers and as investors. Those who think of themselves in lower social strata will not perceive potential personal benefits from liberalized trade. In fact, they may very well think that more market competition will make the rich, upper classes richer and the working classes poorer. This leads to the hypothesis that the higher one's perceived social class status, the more supportive one will be of trade liberalization.

Fourth, the reaction of organized labor to the trade liberalization process should also be a key factor regarding public support for trade liberalization. Survival in the global economy requires firms to be cost efficient in the international market rather than simply competitive in the domestic market (Gilpin, 2001). This may require local firms to be given additional flexibility to hire or fire workers. Domestic laws that lower worker safety standards in order to enhance the economic competitiveness of domestic firms may also be implemented. Furthermore, the lowering of corporate taxes and the requirement of governments to maintain "good economic fundamentals" may necessitate the dismantlement or restructuring of the welfare system, thereby threatening the unspoken agreement between labor and capital that forged the postwar economy (Eichengreen, 1997).




A growing backlash to trade liberalization by labor organizations has become increasingly apparent. Unions and their allies have been largely successful in deadlocking U.S. trade policy in recent years (Bergsten, 1999; Dollar, 2001). Trade liberalization clearly has an impact on many issues that are of significant concern to unions. Labor unions adversely affected by trade liberalization have the ability to vigorously lobby politicians and the public to hold the line on issues such as job losses, wages, labor standards, and welfare provisions (Moon, 1996; Cline, 1997; Mazur, 2000). Additionally, unions in France and South Korea have struck over the introduction of policies designed to undermine the welfare system and making it easier to fire workers (Rodrik, 1997). Furthermore, labor organizations are starting to better coordinate activities on an international scale and have established themselves in the forefront in challenging the expansion of trade liberalization (ILO, 1997; Mazur, 2000). As a consequence, we hypothesize that union members should be less supportive of trade liberalization than non-union workers.

Gender is another individual-level attribute that may affect one's cost-benefit calculus concerning trade liberalization. Public opinion studies have shown that women think about the negative consequences of market operations differently than do men. Shapiro and Mahajan (1986) use longitudinal analysis to demonstrate that women are more supportive than men of the government protecting those who lose out from market competition. Women are particularly supportive of job and income guarantees and wealth equalization.

It has also been argued that women are generally the losers of the economic liberalization process (Finifter and Minkiewicz, 1992; Graham and Pettinato, 2000; Tickner, 2001). In fact, Ramachandra Reddy, a State President in India, told the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee of the UN's General Assembly that the "situation of the world's women is progressively deteriorating due to trade liberalization" (Sandrasagra, 2000). Critics of trade liberalization argue that women are let go more readily than men in times of economic downturn. In particular, women are often disproportionately employed in low-skill and low-paying jobs in comparison to men who possess a greater percentage of professional and management-level jobs (Ozler, 2000). In addition, those women displaced from their jobs when domestic firms fail due to international economic competition are not guaranteed to find a replacement job quickly nor a job that paid as much as the previous place of employment (Cardero, 2000). Consequently, women bear the negative costs imposed by trade liberalization. Thus, women would, generally, not be as welcoming of increased economic competition as men and would want the state to protect them from the market. Therefore, we would hypothesize that women would be less supportive of trade liberalization than men.

The final individual-level characteristic that could affect support for trade liberalization we wish to examine is age. As with the gender variable, age is about one's sense of vulnerability in the economy. Studies have shown that older individuals tend to be less supportive of economic liberalization processes because they fear that they will not be able to recover economically from being dismissed from their employment (Lipset and Schneider, 1983; Duch, 1993). Indeed, older persons have found themselves to be among those unemployed for more than one year (Kro- nauer, 1993; OECD, 1994). Thus, older individuals will think that they will have a harder time getting rehired and that they will have less time to recoup economic losses than younger persons. Because trade liberalization is exposing workers in general to more competition, it would make the most vulnerable to dismissal very wary. This logic would lead us to hypothesize that the older one is, the less supportive one will be of trade liberalization.

This section has outlined six economic interest factors that should influence how citizens feel about trade liberalization. The following section describes the measures used to test the hypotheses described above.




Research Design To determine the factors that influence public support for trade liberalization, this study uses a cross-sectional survey data set derived from World Values Surveys (1995- 1997). Individual-level data are examined for respondents in six advanced industrialized countries: Australia, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, the United States, and Western Germany.7 These countries are the only advanced industrialized countries with complete data for the 1995-1997 wave of the WVS (with respect to the variables included in this analysis).8 In addition to conducting an aggregate analysis of the six countries, the availability of individual-level respondent data provides an opportunity for a more in-depth analysis. As a result, we also seek to test our explanations of support for trade liberalization within each of the six countries as well.

Measuring Support for Trade Liberalization

To gauge public support for trade liberalization, we turned to a question in the World Values Surveys (1995-1997) that asks individuals what they think about freeing (or restricting) trade.9 Specifically, the question asked "Do you think it is better if: (1) Goods made in other countries can be imported and sold here if people want to buy them; OR that: (2) There should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here, to protect the jobs of people in this country."10

Table 1 provides a first glance at individual respondent attitudes toward trade liberalization both at the aggregate level (among the six nations) as well as within each of the six countries. In the aggregate, slightly more than one-third (35.2%) of individual respondents indicated a relatively supportive preference toward trade liberalization. This response indicates a rather underwhelming sense of support for trade liberalization, perhaps due to a number of factors including economic uncertainty brought about by the liberalization of product markets or even economic nationalist sentiments in response to international trade outcomes.

Alternatively, there is considerable variation at the national level. Specifically, support for trade liberalization was highest in Germany with 57.1% of respondents in support of trade liberalization. Norway and Switzerland follow Germany in terms of support levels with 47.9% and 42%, respectively. On the other hand, support for trade liberalization was lowest among the six states in Australia (23.7%), the United States (27%), and Spain (28.3%). This pattern of aggregate support seems to be linked to the extent to which the economy is linked to trade. Germany, Norway and Switzerland, the countries with the highest levels of support for trade liberalization, have the highest relative proportion of their gross economic product devoted to exports; 23%, 38%, and 36%, respectively."I The rest of the countries in the study have, on the average, lower exposures to trade, such as Australia with 20%, Spain with 24%, and the U.S. with 11% of its economy related to exporting, and consequently lower relative levels of support for trade liberalization. This cross- national variation provides the impetus to study the determinants of support for trade liberalization both at the aggregate level and national level across the six countries.

7 We excluded eastern Germany because it was treated as a different country in the World Values Survey and we would consider it a post-Communist transition economy, rather than a typical advanced industrialized democracy.

8 For example, the question we have operationalized as the dependent variable was not asked to respondents in the United Kingdom.

9 Appendix A provides a table of the questions we utilized from the World Values Surveys (1995-1997). 'oTo make interpretation of the results easier, we recoded the dependent variable as follows: "Do you think it is

better if: 1. Goods made in other countries can be imported and sold here if people want to buy them; OR that 0. There should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here, to protect the jobs of people in this country."

"The trade exposure data are for the year 1995 (World Bank, 1997).




TABLE 1. Support for Trade Liberalization in Six Industrialized Countries

Support (%) Oppose (%) n

Australia 23.7 76.3 1978

Norway 47.9 52.1 1103 W. Germany 57.1 42.9 967

Spain 28.3 71.7 1115 Switzerland 42.0 58.0 1051 United States 27.0 73.0 1464

Total 35.2 64.8 7678

Support = refers to response of "Goods made in other countries can be imported and sold here if people want to

buy them." Oppose = refers to response of "There should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here, to protect the jobs of

people in this country."

Factors Influencing Support for Trade Liberalization

We argued that public support (or lack of support) for trade liberalization can be explained by both respondent political attitudes and economic interest considerations. To measure individual concern regarding economic inequality issues, respondents placed themselves on a scale ranging from 1 (complete agreement that incomes should be made more equal) to 10 (complete agreement that we need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort). Based on the arguments outlined in the previous section, we expect individuals that favor greater income equalization efforts will be less supportive of the trade liberalization process.

In order to measure an individual's degree of cognitive mobilization, we considered interacting one's level of education with one's interest in politics (as per Inglehart and Rabier). Since interest in politics is measured by the frequency of the respondent's discussion of politics with friends, we hypothesize that those with higher levels of education and higher interest in politics will be more supportive of trade liberalization than all others. However, since the correlation between education and interest in politics is high (.73), we simply used the frequency of discussing politics as a proxy for cognitive mobilization and eschewed the interaction of the two variables. That is, we feel that those who discuss politics frequently are more likely to be supportive of trade liberalization than those who do not.

The alternative measure of cosmopolitanism that we employed was a self-iden- tification of one's geographic attachment. Respondents were asked to identify the geographic group s/he believed s/he belonged to first ranging from locality or town, state or region, the country, the continent, or the world. We expect that the broader the region the individual identifies with, the more supportive that person will be of trade liberalization.

Alternatively, we contended that a number of economic utility factors influence public support for trade liberalization. That is, individuals endowed with higher levels of human capital, such as education, will reap the benefits provided by an integrated international market and support the maintenance of such a system. Individuals were asked to identify the highest educational level that they have attained and we hypothesize that there should be a positive association between education and support for trade liberalization. We also include the amount of individual income and perceived social class in our model. To tap the role of income, respondents identified their income on a scale ranging from 1 (income falling into the lowest wage bracket) to 10 (the highest wage bracket). We expect that high levels of income should be positively related to support for trade liberalization. Respondents were also asked to identify their economic class ranging from 1 (lower class) to 5 (upper class). We argue that the lower the class individuals identify with, the less support that they have for the trade liberalization process.




To measure the impact of union membership on support for trade liberalization, respondents indicated whether they were active, inactive or non-union members. Individuals that are active union members should be less willing to embrace the trade liberalization movement. To measure the impact of gender (1 = male, 0 = female) and age we simply used questions asking respondents to identify their gender and age. We hypothesized that females should be less supportive of trade liberalization and age should be negatively associated with support of the liberalization. Finally, a series of individual country dummy variables are estimated to capture any country-specific effects.

Model and Results

We use a series of logistic regression models to test the hypotheses developed above. Specifically, we use maximum likelihood estimation to evaluate seven sep- arate logistic regression models using attitudes toward trade liberalization as the dependent variable. First, a single, pooled model encompassing the entire dataset is estimated to give a general orientation of how the explanatory variables affect support for trade liberalization across the six industrialized countries included in this sample. Second, we then reestimate the same model (minus the country dummy variables) separately for each of the six countries. Although the country- specific models are estimated to allow us to determine whether or not any country- specific effects are present among individual attitudes concerning trade liberalization, it is not our intention (and beyond the scope of this paper) to create deductive country-specific hypotheses about the effects of the explanatory variables. Table 2 presents the results of the pooled model. Appendix B presents the descriptive statistics of the independent variables and Appendix C provides the correlations between the various independent variables.

Pooled Model Results

The results of the pooled model are generally consistent with our intuitions. First, the goodness-of-fit measures indicate that the model performs fairly well, as 70% of the cases were predicted correctly and the model represents an 8.5% improvement over the modal prediction. The results showed that the coefficients of the explanatory variables are in the predicted direction and standard tests of statistical significance are used to provide an initial interpretation of the results.1'2 Since significance tests offer relatively little information about the substantive meaning of the coefficients (Pampel, 2000), we also report first differences.13

We test three variables related to one's political attitudes: income distribution, geographic orientation, and cognitive mobilization. First, the results of the pooled model provide support for each of these three factors. The measure for income distribution is positive and barely reaches a minimal level of statistical significance. Second, the results support our arguments about geographic orientation in that those who view themselves in more local and/or parochial terms have a lower propensity to favor trade liberalization. Third, higher levels of cognitive mobili-

'2To determine if there was any systematic bias in the distribution of missing cases, we also ran the models with median values in place of the missing cases. We found that the latter did not yield any significant differences in results.

'3The logit model produces maximum likelihood coefficients. Since the beta coefficients in the logit analysis cannot be interpreted directly, the first differences of the independent variables of theoretical interest and are

statistically different from zero are also estimated and reported. In each case, the first difference represents the

probability of change in the dependent variable (from 0 to 1) when the independent variable changes from one standard deviation below the coefficient to one standard deviation above the coefficient while all other variables are held at their means (King, 1990; Liao, 1994).




TABLE 2. Logistic Regression Estimates: Pooled, Baseline Model

Explanatory variables B SE First Difference

Dependent variable-support for trade liberalization Constant - 3.865*** .241 Income Distribution .019* .011 .017

Geographic Orientation .139*** .024 .060

Cognitive Mobilization .138*** .049 .030 Education .167*** .016 .127 Income .066*** .013 .061 Class .091" .038 .028 Union .120*** .046 .020 Gender .348*** .059 .059

Age - .004** .002 - .021 Australia - .086 .093

Germany 1.541*** .110

Norway 1.256*** .103

Spain .773*** .117 Switzerland 1.059*** .105 - 2 (log likelihood) 6946.16

Probability > X2 .000 % correctly predicted 70.0 N 6004

Note: Figures are unstandardized coefficients shown alongside standard errors. The United States is the reference category. The first difference represents the probability of change in the de-

pendent variable (from 0 to 1) when the independent variable changes from one standard deviation below the coefficient to one standard deviation above the coefficient while all other variables are held at their means. Coding of variables: Support (1) - "Goods made in other countries can be imported and sold here if people want to buy them." Oppose (0) = "There should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here, to protect the jobs of people in this country." Income Distribution (1-incomes should be made more equal, 10-larger income differences are

incentives). Geographic Orientation (1 -local, 5-global). Cognitive Mobilization (Frequency of Political Discussion where 3 = frequent, 1 = never). Education (1-low, 10-high) Income (1--low, 10-high). Class (1-lower, 5-upper). Union (1--Active Member, 2-Inactive Member, 3- Don't Belong). Gender (1I-male, 0-female). Age (18-92). *p<.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01.

zation also influence support for trade liberalization. This suggests that those who tend to discuss politics more frequently tend to favor trade liberalization.

The third column in Table 2 provides estimates of the impact of each variable when the other explanatory variables are set to their means. Using the predicted probabilities, our results demonstrate that among political attitudes cosmopolitanism and cognitive mobilization remain most important in predicting support for trade liberalization. For example, the predicted probability of support for trade liberalization increases by 6% as one's level of geographic orientation increases along the range of possible values. Increased levels of cognitive mobilization raise the predicted probability of support by 3%. Finally, the probability of support also increases, though less so, as respondents tend to favor larger income differences as incentives.

In terms of the economic utilitarian indicators, the sign and statistical significance of each coefficient for the six variables in the pooled model support the theoretical predictions made above. In relative terms, the effects of education are the greatest as an increase in the range of education increases the probability of supporting trade liberalization by nearly 13%. This seems to lend credence to the notion that the more educated look forward to the economic opportunities afforded to them by trade liberalization, while the less educated fear the increased economic competition occasioned by trade liberalization. Those who do not think they have the skills to compete, regardless of their political predisposition on liberalized trade do not welcome the specter of increased economic competition.




To a lesser extent, increases in income (6.1%) and being male (5.9%) also increase the probability of support for trade liberalization. The higher one's income, we find, the more supportive one is of the trade liberalization process. This seems to indicate that those with higher incomes tend to view trade liberalization as an opportunity to improve their lot-whether through consumption opportunities or wealth maximization--while those with lower incomes do not foresee such opportunities afforded by trade liberalization. The results for gender indicate that women are, in fact, less supportive of trade liberalization than men. This seems both in- tuitive and consistent with previous empirical studies of public attitudes toward economic liberalization.

To a much lesser extent, though still significantly different from zero, increases in social class (2.8%) increase the probability of support, while increases in age and union membership decrease the probability of support by approximately 2%. The social class variable supports our theoretical predictions that the higher one's perceived social class level, the more supportive one would be of trade liberalization. Thus, it seems that the upper classes think of trade liberalization as an opportunity to maximize their wealth and consumption and not as a threat. Being part of a union clearly shapes how one thinks about the trade liberalization process. Union members are clearly less supportive of trade liberalization than non-unionized workers. This would seem to indicate that the antitrade liberalization message of the union leadership is being internalized by the membership or that union members are concentrated in sectors of the economy that are not likely to do well in a more globalized economy. Additionally, since older respondents are more likely to be concerned about one's ability to recover from a market-induced layoff than younger respondents, this result supports our prediction that the older one is, the less supportive one would be of trade liberalization.

Finally, using the United States as the reference category, four of the five country dummy variables produced positive signs on the coefficient and were statistically significant. The positive sign on the coefficients points to the general support for trade liberalization outside of the U.S. and also suggests that country-specific factors are at work in terms of explaining respondent preferences for trade liberalization. Consequently, the next section discusses the results from each of the six country- specific logistic regression models.

The Country-Specific Models

The results of the country-specific models provide an interesting set of findings. First, the goodness-of-fit measures indicate that the model performs fairly well in each of the six cases. At least 63% of the observations were predicted correctly in each of the models and there were improvements over the model prediction. The model performed best in Australia (77.3%) and the United States (73.6%). In each of the six cases, we find general support for our theoretical predictions, although there is a fair degree of variation in both the level of statistical significance and the marginal effects of the explanatory variables across each of the six countries. Table 3 shows the logistic regression results and first differences from the six country specific models.

We now discuss the country-specific results in alphabetical order. The model results for Australia were not entirely consistent with the findings in the pooled model. In the case of Australia, none of the three measures of respondent political attitudes were significant predictors. On the other hand, four of the six economic interest variables-education, income, union membership, and gender--were important predictors in the Australian context. In relative terms, the marginal effect of gender is by far the greatest, followed by education, then income and union membership. In Australia, the probability of support for trade liberalization increases greatly for males (13%). Conversely, increases in education and income heighten




TABLE 3. Logistic Regression Estimates: Country-Specific Models

First First First

Explanatory Variables Australia Difference W Germany Difference Norway Difference

Dependent variable-support for trade liberalization Constant - 4.080*** - 3.326*** - 3.842**

(.473) (.675) (.535) Income Distribution .009 .061"* .069 .038

(.025) (.037) (.033) Geographic orientation .062 .153** .095 .054

(.052) (.068) (.070) Cognitive Mobilization .123 .387** .108 .318** .093

(.102) (.152) (.127) Education .161.** .096 .268*** .299 .226*** .246

(.041) (.043) (.036) Income .072*** .068 .053 .085*** .121

(.026) (.040) (.027) Class .123 .026 .196"** .092

(.081) (.123) (.087) Union .193* .043 .049 .222** .082

(.091) (.146) (.101) Gender .787*** .129 .608*** .146 .291** .072

(.128) (.174) (.142) Age - .007 - .003 - .005

(.004) (.006) (.005) - 2 (log likelihood) 1601.62 856.04 1169.86

N 1605 715 940

Probability > X2 .000 .000 .000 % correctly predicted 77.3 68.4 65.9

First First United First

Explanatory Variables Spain Difference Switzerland Difference States Difference

Constant - 2.796*** - 2.180** - 3.285** (.739) (.611) (.511)

Income Distribution .004 .017 .020 (.029) (.025) (.026)

Geographic Orientation .211.** .104 .288*** .192 .096* .048 (.066) (.059) (.050)

Cognitive Mobilization .126 - .032 .226** .053 (.126) (.125) (.114)

Education .078* .082 .0814* .070 .224** .183

(.041) (.049) (.037) Income .044 .08*** .123 .018

(.051) (.031) (.034) Class - .068 .137 .087

(.110) (.105) (.087) Union .239 - .037 .024

(.191) (.137) (.102) Gender - .086 .121 .283** .052

(.165) (.160) (.140) Age .006 - .002 - .013*** - .085

(.005) (.005) (.004) - 2 (log likelihood) 905.97 1009.52 1291.71

N 770 784 1190

Probability > X2 .000 .000 .000 % correctly predicted 70.5 62.8 73.6

Note: Figures are unstandardized coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses below. Coding of variables: Income Distribution (1 -incomes should be made more equal, 10-larger income differences are incentives). Geographic Orientation (I--local, 5-global). Cognitive Mobilization (Frequency of Political Discussion where 3 = frequent, 1 = never). Education (1-low, 10-high), Income (1-low, 10-high), Class (I-lower, 5-upper) Union (1-Active Member, 2-Inactive Member, 3-Don't Belong). Gender (1-male, 0-female). Age (18-92). *p < .1;**p <.05;***p < .01.




the probability of support by 9.6% and 6.8%, respectively, while an increase in the union membership category decreases probability of support by 4.3%. The significance of these four economic interest variables, particularly gender and education, suggests that economic utilitarian considerations play a pivotal role in explaining support for trade liberalization in the Australian context, while the influence of political attitudes in the Australian context are less important.

In the case of Germany, as was the case in the pooled model, all three measures of respondent political attitudes--income distribution, geographic orientation, and cognitive mobilization--were statistically significant. These three factors also have considerable marginal effects. An increase in cognitive mobilization increases the probability of supporting trade liberalization by 11% whereas increases in cosmopolitanism (geographic orientation) and income distribution increase the probability of support by 9.5% and 6.9%, respectively. In terms of the economic utilitarian variables, both education and gender were positively related to support for trade liberalization, consistent with our expectations. The results show a substantial relationship between education and support for trade liberalization in Germany as increases in education lead to a much greater probability of supporting trade liberalization (30%). Gender also has a considerable impact, as being male increases the probability of support for liberalization by over 14%.

The German model results support our predictions for the income distribution, geographic orientation, cognitive mobilization, education, and gender variables and thus fit the general pattern. Would we have reason to expect that Germany would produce these specific results? To a degree it is not surprising that union membership and age failed to achieve statistical significance in the analysis. German unions are noted for their cooperative relationship with German corporate leadership. German corporatism has fostered a degree of harmony in industrial relations that has largely supplanted an "us versus them" mentality in labor relations. Thus German workers would be less likely than workers in many other industrialized democracies to look at trade liberalization as a capitalist ploy to exploit workers. Also, considering the very generous pensions that retired Germans re- ceive, it is logical that they would not be as concerned about the increased exposure to the market brought on by trade liberalization. The German state protects the retired from the market.

In the case of the Norwegian data, of the variables measuring one's political attitudes, only the cognitive mobilization variable was statistically significant. The marginal effects of an increase in cognitive mobilization are relatively sizable, though, as an increase in cognitive mobilization increases the probability of support by nearly 10%. In terms of the economic utilitarian measures, education, income, social class, union membership, and gender were all in the expected direction and statistically significant. Of these five factors, education once again has the greatest marginal effect (25%), followed by income (12%) and to a lesser extent, social class (9.2%), union membership (8.2%), and gender (7.2%).

The results of the Spanish model yielded only two significant predictors of support for trade liberalization-geographic orientation and education. An increase in the level of cosmopolitanism (geographic orientation) raises the probability of support for trade liberalization by just over 10%. This suggests that local and regional influences remain predominant among Spanish respondents. Perhaps this result stems from the long running debate in Spanish society over regional autonomy versus national unity dating back to the Franco era. Increases in education among Spanish respondents raise the probability of support by 8%. Also, unlike the other three country-specific cases discussed thus far, the impact of gender was not a significant predictor in the Spanish case.

The results of the model for Switzerland demonstrate that very little seems to divide the Swiss over the issue of trade liberalization. The results from Swiss respondents seem to most clearly parallel the Spanish case in that very few predictors




were statistically significant. Geographic orientation was once again an important predictor and, as was the case in Spain, the impact of geographic orientation on support for trade liberalization should probably not be surprising. The Swiss con- federation dates back to the 13th century, and local and regional influences throughout the 26 Swiss cantons continue to heavily influence the thinking of Swiss respondents about trade liberalization. In addition to geographic orientation, education and income were also statistically significant predictors in the Swiss case. It is also worth pointing out here, that as was the case with Spain, the impact of gender is also not statistically significant among Swiss respondents. In both cases, it seems as if geographic orientation provides much more of a predominant influence (a 19.2% increase in the probability of support) than any other political factor and far more than economic interest considerations (12% and 7% for increases in income and education, respectively).

Finally, the model for the United States produced results that support both the political attitudes explanation as well as the economic interest explanation. In terms of the variables measuring respondent political attitudes, the geographic orientation and cognitive mobilization variables are statistically significant predictors of support for trade liberalization. However, the marginal effects of increases in geographic orientation (4.8%) and cognitive mobilization (5.3%) are relatively minor. In terms of the economic interest explanation, three independent variables-education, gender, and age-were all in the predicted direction and statistically significant. We find that the less educated, females, and older Americans are less supportive of trade liberalization than the higher educated, men, and younger Americans. In relative terms, the marginal effects of education (18.3%) remain considerably higher than gender and age. Overall, one might expect that those with lower levels of human capital are unable to fully reap the rewards brought about by trade liberalization. Because women often tend to be the losers of increasing market forces in an economy, we were not surprised that women view trade liberalization in a more negative light than do men.

The notable difference in the American model relative to the other countries, however, is the emergence of the age variable as an important predictor. Only in the United States does age seem to matter as something that divides people over the issue of trade liberalization. One could surmise that this could have to do with the relatively meager public pensions provided in the United States, which could en- gender some insecurity among older Americans.

If one looks at the general patterns across all of the country specific models what emerges is that political attitudes about economic distribution provide little to no explanatory power. The lack of consistent statistical significance in our income distribution variable (with the exception of Germany) indicates a lack of any dis- cernible pattern among the data for this explanation. Perhaps ones' political predisposition is a much less important predictor of one's attitude toward trade liberalization than other factors. Although we often are exposed to anecdotal evidence about political opposition to trade liberalization emanating from large and regular protests in cities like Seattle or Genoa, it is clear that factors other than political ideology are at work in shaping attitudes about international trade. For instance, the measure for geographic orientation was statistically significant in four of the six countries and the cognitive mobilization variable was significant in three of the six cases.

Another noteworthy pattern is that in terms of economic interest variables, education is clearly the strongest predictor of support for trade liberalization across the six countries examined in this study. Education is a significant factor in all six countries and produces the greatest marginal effects, particularly in Germany, Norway, and the United States. Gender and income are also particularly powerful predictors. Together, as expected, those with higher levels of human capital tend to be more supportive of trade liberalization. In particular, of those who may perceive




that they have much to lose from trade liberalization-particularly the lesser educated, those with lower incomes, and women-tend to be far less supportive of trade liberalization.

Conclusion

This paper examines factors that condition individual-level attitudes toward trade liberalization. A series of political and economic utilitarian hypotheses related to individual-level support for trade liberalization were developed and tested. Overall, we find strong empirical support for several economic utilitarian considerations as consistent predictors of variations in support for trade liberalization. Education remains the strongest of such predictors in terms of its prevalence in the pooled model and the six country-specific models, as well as its considerable marginal effects. We also find gender and income to be strong predictors of support for trade liberalization in both the pooled model and in several national contexts. On the other hand, the political explanations were much weaker overall than the economic interest variables. While some empirical support is found for the geographic orientation and cognitive mobilization explanations, the income distribution explanation for variation in support for trade liberalization tested in this paper was much weaker than anticipated.

Perhaps most surprisingly, among the variables in the political explanation, the income distribution variable was generally not a useful predictor of attitudes toward trade liberalization. Several potential explanations for this finding come to mind. We may be seeing that citizens recognize that while trade liberalization may increase income inequality, it also raises the income of all groups. Instead, citizens may be holding their governments responsible for redistributing wealth. Alternatively, perhaps our results may be confirming the acceptance by most citizens of the virtues of the neoliberal economic model. That is, individuals may generally embrace the benefits of trade globalization. Consequently, governments advancing the virtues of free trade are not likely to face wide opposition based on inequality fears.

Among the variables included in the political explanation, one's geographic orientation and level of cognitive mobilization played significant roles in shaping attitudes toward trade liberalization in several national contexts. Thus, the less parochial and the more politically sophisticated one is, the more supportive the individual is of trade liberalization. Trade liberalization in many people's minds seems to be about whether they want to embrace the broader world or keep themselves isolated in their communities. We can well imagine that for many people, the outside world is a threatening place because it is unfamiliar and different. Therefore, the prospect of trading with individuals from outside of one's limits of community means accepting an interaction with those who are outside of one's comfort zone. If so, this is a largely psychological, and intangible, calculation.

On the other hand, and perhaps more importantly, we find in this study that one's level of human or tangible capital is a very significant factor when people decide whether to support or oppose trade liberalization. It seems evident that citizens are rational actors who calculate their expected personal benefits from trade liberalization. Thus, trade liberalization is not an issue that seems to elicit irrational passions that preclude interest-based judgments of trade liberalization. People seem to ask of the process: What's in it for me?

To this end, both education and gender were interest-based factors that produced not only the predicted results, but also considerably strong marginal effects. Those with higher levels of education, across all of the models, were more supportive of trade liberalization than those with lower levels. Thus, it is clear from our results, that those with higher levels of education feel less threatened by trade liberalization than less-educated individuals. Our interest-based explanation would tell us that this is because the more educated have the skills to compete in a more




globalized economy characterized by free trade. It is also possible that the education effect is picking up the difference between people who are educated and, therefore, more outward looking and those who are less educated and perhaps less comfortable with different people and cultures. These human capital and open-mindedness explanations are not mutually exclusive but could in fact have mutually reinforcing influences on the same individuals. In other words, education can make one both more secure in her/his ability to succeed in a global marketplace and also feel more comfortable with people and products that are a part of such a market.

The education result also raises the very interesting possibility of a profound divide in societies over trade liberalization. As a potential alternative explanation, some may argue that the significant effects of education might actually reflect the elite consensus in each country, which is overall pro-liberalization. This type of explanation would be consistent with arguments suggesting that opinion elites play a vital role in shaping public opinion toward important political issues (McClosky and Zaller, 1984; Ginsberg, 1986). However, on an issue such as trade liberalization which has direct and tangible effects on one's economic livelihood, we would agree with Page and Shapiro (1992:170), who suggest that actual public opinion on such policy matters is "highly resistant" to elite manipulation. When it comes to issues that have a direct impact on people's lives, people are more likely to take the time to form firm opinions and therefore will not be as easily persuaded by policy elites as they would on issues that have little, direct personal impact.

In addition, women, who have been shown to be less supportive of other important aspects of economic liberalization, are also less supportive than men of trade liberalization. This is consistent with other public opinion studies that have shown that women tend to favor government protection of those who could suffer from market competition. As economic liberalization and trade liberalization increase, could it be that this will heighten the saliency of a gender-based cleavage in politics?

One of the most important points we can draw from this study is that society divides in predictable ways over the issue of trade liberalization. For instance, our findings suggest that the social nucleus of the antiglobalization protest will be composed of segments of society that are generally the most vulnerable to the challenges of trade liberalization, including union members, older workers, lower wage earners, and the less educated. Consequently, protests against international trade agreements are likely to become more polarized and difficult to attain since the most vulnerable are likely to view such negotiations as zero-sum games. As the trade liberalization process continues and deepens, these divisions over trade liberalization could become more salient and conflicting. Trade liberalization could produce the next great cleavage in industrialized democracies.

Appendix A: Operationalization of Variables'14

Dependent Variable

Support for Trade Liberalization Do you think it is better if: 1. Goods made in other countries can be imported and sold here if people want to buy them; OR that: 0. There should be stricter limits on selling foreign goods here, to protect the jobs of people in this country.

Independent Variables

Income Distribution: How would you place yourself on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely

14All measures taken from the World Values Surveys (Inglehart et al., 2000).




with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.

Incomes should be made more equal (1) We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort (10) Cognitive Mobilization: Measured in response to the following question: When

you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently (3), occasionally (2), or never (1).

Geographic Orientation: To which of these geographical groups would you say you belong to: 1. Locality or town, 2. state or region, 3. country as a whole, 4. continent, 5. the world as a whole.

Education: What is the highest educational level that you have attained? (1-9 scale)

No formal education (1), University-level education, with degree (9) Union Membership: Could you tell me whether you are an active member (1), an

inactive member (2) or not a member of that type [labor union] of organization (3). Level of Income: Here is a scale of incomes. We would like to know in what

group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group (1-10 scale) your household falls into, before taxes and other deductions.

Social Class: People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the: 5. Upper class 4. Upper middle class 3. Lower middle class 2. Working class 1. Lower class

Gender: Sex of respondent: Male (1), Female (0) Age: You are *** years old.

Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

Income Geographic Cognitive Nation Distribution Orientation Mobilization Education Income Class Union Gender Age

Australia 5.60 2.43 1.87 6.15 5.26 2.85 2.65 .49 44.64 2.56 1.23 .661 1.81 2.85 .87 .68 .50 17.38 2025 2027 2047 2016 1817 1952 2046 2048 1971

W. Germany 5.38 2.22 2.15 5.61 5.77 3.21 2.74 .46 41.64 2.34 1.28 .581 2.37 2.33 .81 .565 .49 16.16 1008 1001 1012 1011 827 920 1009 1017 1016

Norway 5.27 1.78 2.07 5.89 5.50 2.90 2.37 .49 43.26 2.26 1.04 .588 2.22 2.87 .94 .74 .50 16.18 1122 1121 1126 1121 1040 1017 1126 1127 1127

Switzerland 4.84 2.56 1.93 5.21 5.74 3.22 2.77 .50 45.04 3.07 1.36 .637 1.75 2.98 .86 .54 .50 17.25 1177 1188 1210 1208 967 1152 1196 1212 1204

Spain 5.56 1.97 1.66 4.19 3.91 2.46 2.85 .48 45.10 2.80 1.21 .685 2.58 1.85 .84 .44 .50 18.35 1183 1199 1196 1206 882 1165 1211 1211 1210

USA 5.44 2.59 1.89 6.27 6.50 2.96 2.67 .50 48.31 2.69 1.36 .646 2.24 2.49 .93 .65 .50 17.94 1495 1509 1515 1537 1379 1475 1525 1542 1518

Total 5.38 2.29 1.91 5.64 5.50 2.92 2.68 .49 44.89 2.65 1.29 .655 2.25 2.74 .91 .63 .50 17.41 8010 8045 8106 8099 6912 7681 8113 8157 8046

First row = mean. Second row = std. deviation. Third row = N.




Appendix C: Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix*

Income Geographic Cognitive Distribution Orientation Mobilization Education Income Class Union Gender Age

Income dist.

Geographic .004 orientation

Cognitive .056 .084 mobilization

Education .102 .128 .254 Income .136 .083 .209 .376 Class .115 .075 .176 .367 .424 Union .036 .025 - .128 - .102 - .169 .006 Gender .055 .061 .117 .054 .082 - .017 - .085

Age -.019 -.058 .008 -.255 -.192 -.042 .051 -.007 Trade .046 .084 .140 .188 .160 .152 .000 .092 - .108

liberalization

*Correlation matrices for independent variables across individual countries are available from author.

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explaining citizen support for trade liberalization

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