exercise united shield 2008

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EXERCISE UNITED SHIELD 2008Mungo MelvinPublished online: 13 Jul 2009.

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THE RUSI JOURNAL

EXERCISE UNITEDSHIELD 2008

REVISITING MILITARY STRATEGY FOR THE

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Mungo Melvin

With the current focus on expedi onary opera ons, it may seem strangeto revisit old Cold War scenarios in staff rides. There is, of course, noan cipa on of a return to large-scale East–West confronta on or industrialwar. Nevertheless, United Shield derived a set of meless lessons andraised many intriguing ques ons about war figh ng and interna onal co-opera on in campaigns. Major General Melvin gives a first-hand accountof the issues and debates s rred up by the exercise.

© RUSI JOURNAL JUNE 2009 VOL. 154 NO. 3 pp. 36–43 DOI: 10.1080/03071840903097639

The Exercise Author, Major General Melvin, briefing near the old Inner German Border.

RUSI 154_3 Text June 2009.indd 36RUSI 154_3 Text June 2009.indd 36 25/06/2009 14:16:4125/06/2009 14:16:41

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Awar reporter recorded the sceneof combat: ‘Screening smokese les over the Elbe at Storkau

in Eastern Germany’s province of Sach-sen-Anhalt like a shroud. A T-72 of theNa onal Volksarmee of the GermanDemocra c Republic ra les over thepontoon bridge constructed by olivegreen amphibious vehicles, followed bya Russian BMP. The unearthly roar quick-ly becomes louder: two Tornados of theRoyal Air Force a ack. Bombs explodeand the bridge is broken under the deaf-ening din of an -aircra fire.’1 No, this isnot a snapshot from some long-forgot-ten Cold War scheme, but rather anepisode from a unique training event, aninterna onal staff ride led by Chief of theGeneral Staff (CGS), General Sir RichardDanna . This ar cle describes exerciseUnited Shield (22–26 September 2008)and the strategic debate it has triggeredfrom the perspec ve of the exerciseauthor, drawing on independent analysisconducted by the Defence Academy andoffering some personal conclusions.2

Since theendof theColdWar,most of theemphasis of the Bri sh armed forces hasbeen on peace support opera ons in theBalkans, and la erly in counter-insurgen-cy opera ons in Afghanistan and Iraq. Inline with na onal policy and interna on-al commitments, we have been rightlyfocused on achieving success in thesetheatres. This is, and must remain, our‘principal effort’.3 But history shows thatno armed force can afford to be fixedconceptually on today’s conflicts en rely.The Cold War was a me of rela ve stra-tegic clarity with poli cal ends and mili-tary ways and means broadly aligned: inother words, our military strategy wasin balance. Current opera ons, whichby their expedi onary nature have asuperficially greater degree of discre-on about them, neither enjoy neces-

sarily the same compelling sense ofna onal urgency nor a ract the appro-priate priority of resource.4 Any resultantdisparity between ends, ways andmeansrisks poten al strategic imbalance. In the

broader context, we can neither ignorethe lessons of the past nor overlook theemerging challenges of the future in find-ing new ways to rebalance our strategy.Further, it is our conten on that over thelast twenty years, collec ve understand-ing of military strategy and the opera-onal art that bridges this to tac cs,

including joint opera onal manoeuvre atlarge scales of effort, have diminished.5

The staff ride was designed to addressthis assessed deficit.

Our campaign of study was the ‘warthat neverwas’ duringwhichwedeterreda Soviet a ack across the former InnerGerman Border. We chose this in orderto elicit discussion of large-scale opera-ons and opera onal level manoeuvre.

So that there is no misunderstanding:we do not believe that there is any likeli-hood of a return to a Cold War, with anew Europe divided by a re-galvanisedIron Curtain transposed much furthertowards the East, for all the sabre-ra lingwe hear from Russia and its displays ofmilitary might in Moscow’s Red Square.However, not least because of the eventsof summer 2008, it is surely prudent toreview our obliga ons under Ar cles IVand V of the NATO Treaty in order to giveassurance and demonstrate solidarity tomember states (orprospec vemembers)throughout the Alliance. This la er pointwas not lost on the Ukrainian militarydelega on that a ended the staff ride,who gave us a most informa ve formerWarsaw Pact perspec ve and view fromthe ‘near abroad’ of Russia.

The vast majority of today’s real,as opposed to hypothe cal, dooms-day conflicts are intra-state. If we areto believe Rupert Smith’s thesis of ‘waramongst the people’ and ‘not on theba lefield’, in which ‘industrial armies’are obsolete, then we can surely affordto reduce our conven onal capabili esfor interven on opera ons. As that writ-er observed, ‘...without an enemy it isnot possible to form a strategy, and with-out a strategy it is not possible to makeanything but the broadest decisions onweapons and equipment. As a resultforces in Europe have shrunk, but retainthe form and equipment of another ageintended for other ba les.’6

Yet much as we would want to wishit away, inter-state warfare is not neces-

sarily dead. It may have mutated merelyin a manner which exhibits less obviousmanifesta ons than hitherto (for exam-ple, ‘cyber’ warfare). Thuswe s ll requirea viable military strategy in response. AsColin Gray has remarked: 7

It is neither feasible nor par cularlyhelpful to try to predict par cular warsbetween states. But it is essen al toremain alert to the possibility of suchevents. The inten onhere is not to try tospot tomorrow’s wars, rather it is simplyto register resoundingly the claim thatregular warfare between states will longremain a feature of world poli cs.

So rather than either returning to ‘pure’conven onal warfare or conduc ngfurther ‘tradi onal’ peace support oper-a ons and ‘modern’ counter-insurgen-cies, we are faced today with a complexand persistent mix of both asymmetricand symmetric methods of figh ng in so-called ‘hybrid wars’, in which both stabi-lisa on and major combat opera ons(MCO) are messily intertwined.

An authorita ve American study hasconcluded that such wars incorporate‘a range of different modes of warfare,including conven onal capabili es, irreg-ular tac cs and forma ons, terrorist actsincluding indiscriminate violence andcoercion, and criminal disorder’.8 Whilethere remains an extensive academicand military debate about the evolvingdynamics and character of conflict, andhow in prac cal terms we should adaptour opera onal techniques, training andstructures to combat it, it is important tonote that both states andnon-state actorscan engage us now, and in the future. Thisrealitymust informourdefencepolicyandmilitary strategy that cannot be focusedfully on the la er at the en re expense ofthe former. Likewise, a policy without aneffec ve strategy is like a knight withouteither shield or sword.

The Cold War wasa me of rela vestrategic clarity

We can neither ignorethe lessons of thepast nor overlook theemerging challenges ofthe future

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Furthermore, we need to beprepared to meet the unexpected.According to many observers, we arenow facing a revolu on in economicand poli cal affairs across the world,driven by globalisa on, in which increas-ing inequali es of wealth and expecta-ons may fuel future conflicts. With

this in mind, Cold War specialists andnow respected futurologists urge us toremain aware of the ‘perils of predic on’and warn that ‘all things are possible butnot equally probable: the further we lookinto the future, the less precise becomesour analysis’. Nonetheless, ‘the be erwe an cipate the future, the lesser therisk’. If there is ‘no longer a clear dis nc-on between peace and war’, then we

need to understand be er that we havegone from Cold War to ‘hot peace’, inwhich internal and external threats toour security are very closely related.9

Hence all armed forces need to adapt tomeet current and an cipated require-ments in an unstable and unpredictableworld, recognising that the future isinherently uncertain. As the CGS stressedlast year in the RUSI Journal, ‘...we mustcon nue to op mise for the most likely,which is Interven on and Stabilisa onOpera ons whilst maintaining our abil-ity to dual role and meet the demands ofMCO’.10 Therefore considera on of theGeneral Defence Plan (GDP) of 1988 wasbut a driver of debate in exercise UnitedShield, not an end in itself. Important as‘looking back’ remains, our purpose wasfar more on ‘thinking forward’.

In sum, while the grand strategic contextover the last twenty years has changedremarkably since the end of the ColdWar, as has technology, including thewidespread employment of new surveil-lance and precision a ack capabili es,much of military strategy and opera-onal art – the higher level business of

intelligence, manoeuvre, logis cs andcommand – has an enduring nature.While we no longer envisage preparingfor war – let alone figh ng one – on theNorth German Plain ever again, the staffride provided much food for thought– from strategy to tac cs and from Cold

War to ‘hot peace’ – about the changingcharacter of conflict in the hybrid wars ofthe twenty-first century.

Approach and Prepara onWhilehybridwarfaremaynot takeatradi-onal, easily recognisable form, future

security requirements may s ll requirethe prepara on, assembly, movementand employment of significant groundmanoeuvre forces – supported by air andmari me power – in a manner we nolonger typically consider, let alone prac-se regularly. Simply put, if we neglect

to train, we may lose capability. The CGStook the decision in early 2007 to reviveopera onal understanding of MCO with-in the Bri sh Army. His method was toemploy the tried and trusted methodof the staff ride, a high-level ba lefieldstudy designed to educate a senior mili-tary audience. It was the first ever eventof this type run by the CGS, becomingvery much a joint and combined affair,with strong representa on from theRoyal Air Force and from the armies ofthe United States, Germany and otherNATO and Partnership for Peace na ons.

As we wanted to expose thecomplexity of MCO to the Army’s futuresenior leaders, while genera ng discus-sion and debate on conflict in the round,the staff ride was conceived primarily tobenefit today’s genera on of colonelsand brigadiers. Although this group hasanunparalleled level of opera onal expo-sure as forma on and unit commandersin peacekeeping and counter-insurgencyopera ons, there has been li le scopefor them to study the requirements offuture war against enemies who mayagain resort to symmetric opera ons,and those at a larger scale than currentlyundertaken. Thus we derived the follow-ing exercise aim: ‘To study combined andjoint opera onal manoeuvre in order toprepare commanders for their role inMCO at large scales of na onal effort.’

From incep on, therefore, the staffride was designed to encourage crea vethinking with applica on to moderncircumstance rather than revisit anuncontested GDP for old me’s sake.

Par cipants on a staff ride consid-er typically an historical campaign andspecific episodes from it, such as majoropera ons or ba les, with a view to

deriving lessons for contemporary opera-ons.11On exercise United Shield, unusu-

ally, we looked at the ‘war that neverwas’ between NATO and the WarsawPact, taking 1988 as our benchmark forconsidering the strategic and opera onalplanning on both sides. There were noveterans on hand to describe ‘tales ofderring-do’ in ba les, hard-fought, wonor lost. We were well-mentored, howev-er, by a notable cast of former NATOand na onal commanders led by FieldMarshal the Lord Inge, supported by astrong team of military academics andsenior serving officers.12

The core of United Shield was the train-ing audience of eighty-eight officers,with ranks ranging from major generalto lieutenant colonel. Led by a two-starofficer, including a major general fromUnited States Army Europe (USAREUR),each of the eight syndicates was jointand mul na onal in composi on. Apartfrom its syndicate leader, a typical syndi-cate consisted of six Bri sh Army colonelsor brigadiers, a member of HeadquartersARRC drawn from their mul na onalcon ngent, an officer each from theBundeswehr and USAEUR, and an RAFwing commander or group captain. Inaddi on, each syndicate was supportedby a dedicated lieutenant colonel ‘facili-tator’, drawn frommy headquarters.13 Tofocus the ac vi es of the training audi-ence, four three-star group leaders wereappointed, each responsible for provid-ing direc on and guidance to two syndi-cates.14

The detailed exercise programmewas developed over many months inclose conjunc on with the civilian andmilitary authori es of the host na on.15

The Bundeswehr gladly put units andfacili es at our disposal, not least itsmagnificent military police (Feldjäger)that cleared the path for our convoy offour large buses. I would contend thatthere has probably not been such superband friendly co-opera on between Brit-ish and German forces since the endof the Cold War. That was significant initself, and we are immensely grateful.The challenge now is to replicate these

Inter-state warfare isnot necessarily dead

We s ll require a viablemilitary strategy

exercise united shield 2008

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bonds in opera onal theatres such asAfghanistan.

Discussion on a Mobile SeminarThe exercise programme ran over fiveworking days. We started with a Mondayevening scene-se ng recep on, heldat the Allied Museum in Berlin. FormerCommander-in-ChiefAlliedForcesCentreGeneral Hans-Henning von Sandrart gaveus a fascina ng descrip on of Cold Warmilitary planning within the clear poli -cal constraints of forward defence andflexible response. He stressed that ‘therevival of opera onal art [in the 1980s]represented the closing of a gap that haddeveloped over the years’. He and others,notably General Sir Nigel Bagnall, weredetermined to make NATO ‘mentally andphysically capable at this level’, with thesimple aim of making ‘deterrence safer’in the central region.16 Looking to thefuture, he concluded his talk by sta ng‘no-one can predict precisely where andwhat new threats may emerge, so youare well advised to keep forces capableof conduc ng combined and joint opera-ons at the opera onal level’.

The next morning (Tuesday), theCGS observed that the staff ride wouldprove ‘historical, memorable and prof-itable’. More specifically, he remindedhis Bri sh audience that the army mustdevelop if it is to remain relevant. ‘Itneeds the appropriate capacity to fightMCO and stability opera ons sequen-ally and simultaneously; the capability

to endure on a wide range of opera on-al tasks; and the ability to orchestratemanoeuvre – in its widest sense – atthe two- and three-star level.’ Further-more, ‘the Army must remain relevantto our Allies and to our own governmentin pursuit of Alliance and na onal poli-cies’. Turning to all par cipants, he urgedeveryone: ‘to make the history relevant;contribute; keep an open mind; and beprepared to learn!’

Subsequent stands that day – eacha specific training event – were carriedout at a former Soviet barracks in Elstalto the west of Berlin; at the German JointOpera onal Headquarters near Pots-dam; and at a crossing site on the riverElbe, north of Magdeburg. Together withthe first stand of the Wednesday at theGerman Altmark Training Centre on the

Colbitz-Letzlinger Heide, the overall aimof this preliminary period was to pres-ent the strategic and opera onal levelperspec ve of the former Warsaw Pact,using a number of historical planningassump ons. Further, in order to drivean opera onal level decision-makingproblem towards the end of the staffride, I had asked Charles Dick, a formerhead of the Soviet (la erly, Conflict)Studies Research Centre to write a pure-ly fic onal Soviet scheme of a ack basedon doctrinal norms.17

One of the undoubted highlights of thestaff ride proved the Bundeswehr’s veryprofessional river crossing demonstra-on on the Elbe, subjected to simu-

lated air a ack, which set the scene fora vigorous debate on the air-land inter-face, then and now.18 The demands,fric ons and synergies of co-opera onbetween air and land forces became arecurrent topic of discussion throughoutthe week. Whatever the specific tech-nical and tac cal challenges, a consen-sus view emerged during the staff ride.Good communica ons between compo-nents, close integra on of staffs wher-ever possible and, above all, a commonunderstanding and applica on of thehigher, joint, intent represent vital ingre-dients of success. Interes ngly, one ofthe lessons of the Second World Warapplied during the Cold War was the co-loca on of air and land headquarters toensure the best possible co-opera on.19

For various reasons, these structureswere broken up in the early 1990s.

During the bulk of the subsequentdays (WednesdayandThursday),weanal-ysed opera ons from the NATO perspec-ve at a variety of viewpoints to the west

of the former Inner German Border. Thearea nested by Braunschweig; Wolfen-bü el; Salzgi er; Hildesheim; Hannover;the Mi ellandkanal and north to Cellewas familiar to all the former command-ers and most of the senior serving offi-cers. Here we reviewed delaying, defen-sive and counter-offensive schemes of

manoeuvre in order to drawoutwhat haschanged today in terms of capabili es atbrigade, divisional and corps levels. Thebiggest difference iden fied over thelast twenty years is the integra on ofall source intelligence means and ‘jointfires’ ar llery, avia on and air power ata much lower level. On contemporaryopera ons, companies and ba le groupsrou nely employ unmanned aerial vehi-cles, a ack helicopters and long rangerocket systems that were largely theprovince of corps opera ons in ‘GDP’.Together with vastly improved informa-on and communica ons technologies

and night-figh ng equipment, thesemodern weapon systems allow one tofight a tac cal ba le quite differently.This being the case, there is now scopefor greater innova on in the construct ofshaping, decisive and sustaining opera-ons, and in overall campaign design.

The exchange of views betweenexperts in former GDP planning andtoday’s prac oners provoked somelively and robust debates. Althoughquite different strategic circumstanc-es apply, many serving commanders– with ‘wars amongst the people’ freshin mind and sand on their boots – ques-oned whether some of the assump-ons generally accepted during the Cold

War would have applied, come the test.Would the Warsaw Pact have a acked inthe manner we had so carefully script-ed? Was it reasonable, for example, toexpect that the German popula on (onboth sides of the IGB) would have stayedput in the event of war?Would not muchof the figh ng have taken place in theurban areas that we tended to avoid ontraining rather than in the rural areas wefound easier to exercise on and defend?Would we have reached our deploymentareas on me in any case, given the high-er readiness of our former opponentsin comparison with the slower tempoof poli cal decision-making in the Westand likely traffic chaos? Of course, it isnot possible to answer the hypothe -cal with counter-factual, but such chal-lenges to previously accepted wisdomprovided exactly the right sort of profes-sional exchange in a staff ride.

The ‘modernists’, if one can describethe current cohort of commanders, didnot have it all their own way. If there is

A policy without aneffec ve strategy is likea knight without eithershield or sword

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an intellectual flame to preserve, thereis surely one of opera onal level design,res ng on synchronised manoeuvre,mutual support and inter-operabilitybetween the tac cal elements of na on-al armed forces. In GDP, facing a commonand recognised threat, NATO corps, divi-sions and brigades used to rou nelyprac se the subordina on of flankingforma ons to other superior head-quarters and opera onal moves acrossna onal forma on boundaries. Likewise,liaison teams were well prac sed in theirroles and communica onswere regularlytested. NATO and na onal commandersgot to know their counterparts very well,both professionally and socially. Oneof the unstated reasons for (and greatsuccesses of) exercise United Shield wasto familiarise commanders with theircompatriots from other na ons.

In our discussions we iden fied a certainirony during the course of the staff ride.Thanks to the efforts of Generals VonSandrart and Bagnall, and not least Cros-bie Saint from the United States Army,by the middle to late 1980s there wasan unparalleled degree of co-opera onbetween services andarmies inGermany,and also an intellectual s mulus betweenthem.20 A renaissance in joint, opera-onal level thinking had broken down

many of the hitherto rigid barriers andboundaries between na ons. Against acommon threat, there was unity of effortand purpose. Rules of Engagement (ROE)were uniform and all na ons shared theopera onal risks and burdens to a lesseror greater extent. A er the Cold War, asevidenced on peacekeeping opera onsin the Balkans andmore recently in coun-ter-insurgency opera ons in Afghanistan,there has been a resurgence of purelyna onal thinking and the ‘cantonisa-on’ of opera onal theatres into almost

sovereign sectors. Inevitably, this hasled to primarily local or regional tac calsolu ons being applied to opera onaland strategic problems that require acommon, integrated mul na onal andmul -agency approach at the campaign

or theatre level. If it is to remain relevantand usable, NATO must surely addressthis issue.

Logis cs, o en the Cinderella subject ofstaff rides, was given due prominence ina number of stands, notably at a formerGerman depot where a local Bundeswe-hr unit put on an impressive and highlyatmospheric demonstra on of Cold Wartechniques. More importantly, Germanand Bri sh specialists then presentedtoday’s different logis c requirementsand solu ons, backed up with a displayof modern equipments. In discussion,the need for improved co-opera onand inter-operability between na onalcon ngents was highlighted, as wasthe need to build ‘campaign’ logis csinstalla ons for enduring opera ons. Allmembers of the staff ride found the mehere – as on other similarly designedstands – to speak to the Bri sh andGerman soldiers manning the variousequipment. This was a valuable oppor-tunity for all concerned, underlining thepoint that policy and military theory canonly be put into prac ce by well-trainedand mo vated troops, supported by thebest available equipment.

One of the skills well developed bythe end of the Cold War was the rapides mate and decision-making processrequired at the higher tac cal andopera onal levels. Although the ini al,set-piece deployment for GDP couldbe planned in great detail, ‘subsequentmoves’ such as counter a acks at divi-sion, corps or army group level wereall very much situa on dependent.A empts to template them even underthe benign condi ons of exercise usuallyended in spectacular failure. Intelligencewas never – andnever canbe – complete;commanders and staffs needed plenty ofprac ce in deriving pragma c solu onsunder extreme me pressure. Mindfulthat this sort of problem was far fromthe recent experience of the vast major-ity of the training audience, CGS decidedto introduce a ‘decision-making in ba le’challenge for the Thursday a ernoon atthe final terrain stand. Syndicates were

given a limited amount of me to consid-er a developed ‘Dickov’ scenario – thatconfirmed all their worst fears – and tocome to an outline decision with suit-able jus fica on. Notwithstanding theevident ar ficiali es of this li le test, thevaria on in response and approach wassignificant.

Although views differ on whethersuch planning has direct relevance fortoday, the major opera onal problemheld in the environs of Schloss Schaum-burg overlooking the river Weser didreveal a lack of consistency in the meth-odology used in preparing and present-ing solu ons. While some syndicates setabout purposefully in producing an origi-nal solu on, taking into account ‘clas-sic’ factors such as compara ve forcera os, me and space and the need togenerate surprise, other syndicates weredistracted by trying to fight the problemwith requests for addi onal informa on.When me for decision is at a premium,the perfect solu on is the enemy of the‘good enough’. That aside, it was strik-ing how quickly two members of theUkrainian delega on (a re red lieuten-ant general and a serving major gener-al) came to producing a clearly drawngraphical scheme of manoeuvre fromthe ‘enemy’ viewpoint. Thus the keypoint at issue here is not the ‘rightness’of any one solu on but the requirementfor rigour in its deriva on and presenta-on. So there is some per nent material

here in the development of commandand staff courses if we are to preserve all-round competency in MCO at the opera-onal level. In the mean me, Headquar-

ters ARRC should con nue to provide thefocus for such thinking and training.

Throughout the staff ride we hadsome memorable contribu ons fromour senior mentors and historians, whoreminded us that the final decade of theCold War was not the period of stasis ofpopular military cliché. As we heard onseveral occasions, a great deal of intel-lectual energy was being expended inseeking novel opera onal solu ons toold strategic problems. In addi on, newtechnologies such as stealth aircra andmuch improved precision muni onswere being introduced that only cameinto the public domain during the FirstGulf War.

We need to beprepared to meet theunexpected

The future is inherentlyuncertain

exercise United Shield 2008



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ConclusionsThe first and most obvious point to makeis that a ba lefield study of such ambi-on and complexity should not be under-

taken lightly. That said, the considerabledemands on research, resource, prepa-ra on, administra on and staff supportwere tes ng but manageable. The exer-cise appeared to pay off well, and proveda valuable experience all round. The feed-back from the vast majority of the train-ing audience was extremely posi ve: notonly did United Shield run very smoothlybut, more importantly, it had given muchfood for thought. As staff rides havelong demonstrated, there is great valuein bringing soldiers, sailors and airmenof different backgrounds, experienceand na onali es together. Alliances andfriendships forged in training translateinto shared success on opera ons.

Prepara on of the exercise revealedsignificant gaps in the record keepingof the Bri sh armed forces during, andmore par cularly a er, the end of theCold War. We could not trace certainkey historical documents, and foundthat there was limited na onal dataand expert research effort available toassist us in our analysis. Therefore wehad to rely on SHAPE, USAREUR andBundeswehr historical offices for muchof our informa on and support. Thisdeficit has highlighted limita ons in therole and capacity of the United KingdomMinistry of Defence’s ‘Corporate Memo-ry’ organisa on. My personal view isthat we should develop this and otherexis ng na onal organisa ons such asthe Joint Lessons Cell to set up a JointArmed Forces Historical Research Officeto collate, analyse and publish opera-onal narra ves and lessons, including

classified material for internal consump-on and unclassified documenta on

for public informa on and subsequentresearch and teaching effort.

In terms of doctrinal and conceptu-al development, we need to invest more

in understanding the nature of ‘hybridwars’, and in improving joint, mul na-onal and mul -agency co-opera on in

this process. As the Defence Academyproposes: 21

Planning and conduc ng opera ons inan era of hybrid conflict creates oppor-tuni es, challenges and vulnerabili esin all the lines of opera on and not justthe military line. The requirement fora shared declara on of strategic intentand a shared, comprehensive andagreed narra ve and plan of ac on isessen al to underpin coali on cohesionand avoid leaving exploitable chinksexposed. The planmust straddle and co-ordinate the poli cal, military, econom-ic, social, informa on and infrastructurelines of opera on and incorporate thedeployment and employment of themilitary instrument alongside that ofOGDs, na onal governments, NGOs,civil capability and, wherever applica-ble, the host na on.

Discussion during the staff ride high-lighted that we should adapt our militaryorganisa on and thinking – in the face ofan ever-quickening pace of change – inorder to best meet our current and mostlikely challenges in the short-term (suchas counter-insurgency opera ons) whileremaining flexible enough to turn to the

unexpected, both in scale and character.In this respect, effec ve force structuresrequire a balanced mix of both combatand ‘influence’ capabili es. The abilityto blend these seamlessly and providereconstruc on effort where it is neededin a mely manner is impera ve if we areever to affect posi vely, let alone, win‘hearts and minds’ and thereby achievelas ng campaign success.

With these requirements in mind, wemust get away from fixed no ons ofMCO and stabilisa on opera ons, orsymmetric and asymmetric warfare forthatma er, and recognise that ambiguityand risk – as with change and uncertain-ty – remain enduring opera ng factors.Furthermore, the no on of linking inten-sity of opera on to specific types ofconflict is not useful as the dis nc onsbetween them are increasingly blurred.Rou nely, ‘warfigh ng capabili es’ areemployed today at the tac cal level incounter-insurgency opera ons, whichduring our retreat from Empire wetermed quaintly ‘low-intensity opera-ons’. At the patrol, platoon, company

or even ba le group level, the fire-fightsinvolved nowadays and the close air anda ack avia on support being employed

1st German Panzer Division’s crossing site on the River Elbe under (simulated) air a ack.

Important as ‘lookingback’ remains, ourpurpose was far moreon ‘thinking forward’

If we neglect to train,we may lose capability

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is ‘high intensity’, but the campaign as awhole is certainly not. The exercise vali-da on study observed:22

The ability to fight at high tempo andintensity, employing many of the capa-bili es that characterise ‘conven onal’war, is therefore a core capability thatunderpins the effec ve conduct ofhybridwarfare to ‘establish condi ons inwhich the final outcome may be decid-ed by a combina on of other means’.Flexibility, adaptability, versa lity andagility rela ve to an adversary will becrucial to both sides for seizing theini a ve. The broader capabili es ofairpowermay be the crucial asymmetriccapability that conven onal forces canbring to bear.

In other words, the main effort – thatwhich gives substance to decisive,campaign-winning ac vity – typically willbe not be military in a tradi onal sense,but we cannot afford to lose either thewill or the capability to fight, and be ableto plan and conduct MCO should theneed arise ever again.

The categorisa on of futurewarfareis not the cri cal issue: what ma ersfar more is the effec veness of ourresponse, na onally and together withthat of our allies. While rightly priori s-ing for the most likely, confron ng this

reality by preparing for a wider range ofconflict than we might wish may comeat a price in organisa onal and procure-ment terms, but it is surely one worthpaying for guaranteeing our na on’ssecurity. New thinking in this direc onhas already started: events such as thestaff ride help fashion and inform it.

The due outcome and reward of exerciseUnited Shield 2008, therefore, will lie inthat special s mulus of ‘looking backin order to think forward’. The DefenceAcademy concluded:23

[The exercise] achieved to a largemeasure the aim of observing the warthat never was and drawing some rele-vant deduc ons. It allowed broad brushanalysis and discussion of the relevanceand applicability of those conclu-sions for the wars at hand and for thewars that might be. That introspec onspawned some cri cal assessments asto how an Army op mised for the mostlikely Stabilisa on Opera ons can s llretain the capability, ability and capacityto conduct MCO at readiness and scale.That debate has not concluded.

Finally, the vital role of a key guidingfigure in effec ng transforma on withinthe armed forces should not be underes-mated. Field Marshal Inge stressed on a

coupleofoccasionsthecrucial importanceof the Bagnall ‘legacy’. As the outstandingthinker of his genera on, Bagnall intro-duced the opera onal level of war andMission Command into the Bri sh Army;he then set up the Higher Command andStaff Course to ensure that this body ofthought was ins lled into our ins tu onsand ethos. In response, it crossed severalminds that we need a ‘Bagnall moment’today in order to introduce greater inno-va on in strategic thinking and opera on-al prac ce across defence. A championfor hybrid conflict and the new strategy itdemands is now required as the pace ofchange and the warlike peace it encom-passes get ever ho er. ■

Major General Melvin assumedhis current post of General OfficerCommanding United Kingdom SupportCommand, in Germany, in August 2006.Previously (2004–06) he was DirectorOpera onal Capability in the Ministry ofDefence, responsible for the colla on ofjoint lessons and the strategic analysisof current opera ons.

Notes

1 Adapted from Helmut Michelis, ‘Whata Third World War would have meant’,Rheinische Post, 26 February 2009.

2 In the spring of 2007, General Dannatasked the author, as the GeneralOfficer Commanding of the UnitedKingdom Support Command (Germany),and Director General of the Bri shForces Liaison Organisa on (Germany)(BFLO(G)), to ini ate planning theevent for the early autumn of 2008and write the exercise on his behalf.Subsequent to the staff ride, theDefence Academy completed a FinalAssessment Review based on itsobserva ons during the exercise. I amvery grateful to Lieutenant GeneralAndrew Graham for providing me with

his dra summary report, which I havereferred to in compiling this ar cle. Iwould stress that neither his reportnor my own conclusions cons tute anofficially endorsed Ministry of Defenceposi on.

3 In accordance with United KingdomDefence Board direc on.

4 Adapted from the Defence AcademyFinal Assessment Review (dra ).

5 One prominent excep on tothis generalisa on is the role ofHeadquarters Allied Rapid Reac onCorps (HQ ARRC) in maintaining anddeveloping thinking at corps andland component levels in its training,

including its ‘Arrcade Fusion’ series ofcommand post exercises.

6 Rupert Smith, U lity of Force: The Artof War in the Modern World (London:Knopf, 2007), pp. 267–268.

7 Colin S Gray, Another Bloody Century(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005)p. 179.

8 Frank G Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st

Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars(Arlington, VA: Potomac Ins tute forPolicy Studies, December 2007), p. 14.

9 Contribu ons by Chris Donnelly and EricMorris on exercise United Shield 2008,24 September 2008.

The staff ride wasdesigned to encouragecrea ve thinking

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10 General Sir Richard Danna , ‘The LandEnvironment – Moving Towards 2018’,RUSI Journal (Vol. 153, No. 4, August2008), pp. 60-61.

11 The Bri sh Army dis nguishes betweentwo types of ba lefield study: ba lefieldtours and staff rides. In comparison witha ba lefield tour that could equally wellbe a civilian-run event for interest, a staffride is designed for professional militaryeduca on and training. Its origins liein the senior commanders’ rides ofthe German General Staff. It can bedefined as follows: ‘A staff ride consistsof a systema c preliminary study of aselected campaign, an extensive visitto the actual sites associated with thatcampaign and opportunity to integratethe lessons from each. It envisionsmaximum student involvement beforearrival at the site to guarantee thought,analysis and discussion. A staff ride thuslinks historical event, preliminary studyand terrain to produce ba le analysisin three dimensions. It consists of threedis nct phases: preliminary study, fieldstudy and integra on in an a er ac onreview.’ Quoted by R A M S Melvin,‘Contemporary Ba lefield Tours and StaffRides: A Military Prac oner’s View’ in:David Hall (ed.), The Relevance and Roleof the Ba lefield Tour and the Staff Ridefor Armed Forces in the 21st Century,Strategic and Combat Studies Ins tuteOccasional Paper No. 48, (Shrivenham2005), p. 56.

12 Field Marshal the Lord Inge, formerCommander Northern Army Group(NORTHAG) and Chief of Defence Staff(CDS); General Hans-Henning vonSandrart, Commander Allied ForcesCentral Europe (CINCENT); GeneralSir Jeremy Mackenzie, Commander 1st

(Bri sh) Corps and Deputy SACEUR andLieutenant General Sir John Kiszely, abrigade commander during the ColdWar. Richard Holmes and Chris Donnellyled the historical team that includedother experts of the period such asEric Morris and Charles Dick. Formercommanders and historians providedthe historical context for the staff rideand helped to s mulate discussion,primed by a comprehensive set ofdocumenta on (Reader, Pocket Guideand Supplementary Handouts) puttogether by the exercise author andwri ng team. This preparatory effort,which included many months of researchand reconnaissance involving three

study days and a rehearsal exercise, wassupported by Air Marshals Stuart Peachand David Walker, Charles Dick andGeneral Helge Hansen. Unfortunatelythe la er, a former CINCENT andcurrently a senior mentor to NATO, couldnot par cipate on the staff ride due toan unavoidable clash of commitments.Nonetheless his authorita ve voice washeard in a pre-recorded set of orders tothe training audience. In his CommandGroup, CGS was supported by seniorserving officers, including General SirDavid Richards, Commander in ChiefLand Forces; Air Marshal Sir StuartPeach, then Chief Defence Intelligenceand now Chief Joint Opera ons; AirMarshal David Walker, Deputy AirComponent Commander Ramstein; andLieutenant General Andrew Graham,Director of the Defence Academy, wholed the joint valida on cell. Roundingout the Command Group was theUkrainian delega on of nine servingofficers and civilians, led by General ofthe Army Vitalii Radetskiy, Director ofthe Ukrainian Defence Academy andColonel General Ivan Svida, Commanderof the Ground Forces of Ukraine. GeneralRadetskiy turned out to be one of thestars of the staff ride, making a numberof lively presenta ons and per nentobserva ons.

13 The hub of the exercise control staffwas a highly effec ve control cellrun by my chief of staff, Colonel BillWarren, together with two dedicatedstand support teams, bus escorts,media support and film crew, and amedical team. The vital administra veunderpinning was provided by mylogis cs staff and by a most efficientechelon from the ARRC SupportBa alion.

14 From the Bri sh Army came LieutenantGeneral Sir Graeme Lamb, CommanderField Army; Lieutenant General NickParker, Commander Regional Forces;and Lieutenant General Richard Shirreff,Commander Allied Rapid Reac on Corps(ARRC). We were especially privilegedto add Lieutenant General KennethHunzeker, Commanding General V (US)Corps to this high-powered team.

15 In addi on to my own staff of theBri sh Forces Liaison Organisa on(Germany), we were assisted throughoutby Brigadier General Carsten Jacobson,Commander Rear Support, Headquarters

ARRC, and Colonel Bernd Giebner, ChiefHost Na on Support. It is fair to saywithout their enthusias c and focusedsupport we would not have receivedclearance to reconnoitre and plan theExercise, let alone conduct it.

16 When Inspekteur (equivalent to Chief ofthe General Staff) of the German Army,in 1986 General von Sandrart issuedhis Opera ve Richtlinien [Opera onalGuidelines].

17 This was soon christened the ‘MarshalDickov Plan’ and led to an amusingincident. En rely unbeknown to us,there had indeed existed in the USSR’sGeneral Staff Plans Department a veryRussian Colonel General Dickov. OurUkrainian friends not only wantedto know how we had got hold of aheavily classified document from sucha respected figure, but then went on tocri cise construc vely some of its granddesign!

18 The bulk of the excellent demonstra onwas performed by the Bundeswehr’sHeavy Engineer Ba alion 130, equippedwith the amphibious M3 bridging andferrying equipment. The Tornado aircracame from RAF Marham.

19 For example, Headquarters NorthernArmy Group (NORTHAG) andHeadquarters Second Allied Tac cal AirForce (2 ATAF) were collocated in theJoint Headquarters at Mönchengladbach(Rheindahlen) in western Germany.

20 See, for example, General Sir NigelBagnall, ‘Concepts of Land/AirOpera ons in the Central Region I’ andAir Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, ‘Conceptsof Land/Air Opera ons in the CentralRegion II’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 129,No. 3, 1984), pp. 59–62 and 63–66respec vely; General Sir Mar nFarndale, ‘The Counter-Stroke’,RUSI Journal (Vol. 130, No. 3, 1985),pp. 6–9; General Crosbie E Saint,‘A CinC’s View of Opera onal Art’,Military Review (Vol. LXX, No. 9, 1990),pp. 65–78.

21 Defence Academy Final AssessmentReview (dra ).

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

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exercise united shield 2008

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