examination of an ontological argument

CLEMENT DORE

E X A M I N A T I O N O F A N O N T O L O G I C A L A R G U M E N T

(Received 27 September, 1974)

The argument which I shall be examining in this paper goes as follows:

(1) (2)

Hence

(3)

So

(4)

Therefore

(5)

Hence

(6) (7)

So

(8)

Therefore

(9)

It is possible that there is a Divine Being ('a DB' for short). It is necessarily true that if anything is a DB, it exists necessarily and has those properties in virtue of which it is a DB necessarily (i.e., it is a DB necessarily).

it is possible that something exists which is such that it both exists necessarily and is a DB necessarily.

it is possible that there is something which both exists in all possible worlds 1 and is a DB in all possible worlds in which it exists.

it is possible that there is something which is a DB in all possible worlds.

it is possible that it is necessarily true that there is a DB. If a DB does not exist, it is possible that a DB does not exist.

if a I)B does not exist, it is necessarily possible that a DB does not exist.

if a DB does not exist, it is not possible that it is not possible that a DB does not exist.

Philosophical Studies 28 (1975) 345-356. Ail Rights Reserved Copyright �9 1975 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland

346 C L E M E N T D O R E

Hence

(10)

So

if a DB does not exist, it is not possible that it is necessarily true that there is a DB.

(11) a DB exists. (From (6) and (10) by modus tollens.)

In the final two sections of the paper I shall consider whether (1) is plausible, and I shall discuss (2) presently; but first I shall offer a brief defense of the thesis that (8) follows from (7). There is a familiar sense of 'possible' in which it is true, e.g., that it is possible that (as happens in science fiction stories) there is a spaceship which goes faster than the speed of light. I shall use 'possibles' to express this sense. (Not everything is possible1 ; e.g., square circles are not. Moreover there is another familiar sense of 'possible' - which I shall express by using 'possible z' - in which much of what is possible1 is not possible. That is the sense of 'possible' in which it is not possible that a spaceship goes faster than light, z It should be noted here that when I say that something possesses a property, P, necessarily, I mean that it is not possible1 for it to exist and fail to have p.a) Now consider the statement that it is possiblex that there is a spaceship whose velocity exceeds that of light. Those observations which pro- vide evidence that it is not possible 2 for anything to move faster than light are the best candidates for empirical disconfirmers of the former statement: yet they do not disconfirm it. There is, then, no conceivable observational disconfirmation of that statement. Hence, since the statement is true, it is necessarily true. 4 And so for all statements to the effect that something is possible~ : it follows from the fact that they are immune to empirical disconfirmation that, when true, they are necessarily true. But wherever 'possible' occurs in the argument consisting of (1) through (11) it should be construed as meaning 'possibles'. Hence (8) follows from (7).

I I

It is, as St. Anselm saw, plainly necessarily false that it is both the case that a DB exists and that it is nonetheless possible1 that he does n o t - possible1 that he will go out of existence next Wednesday, say. Hence it is necessarily true that if anything is a DB, he exists necessarily. And it

E X A M I N A T I O N OF AN O N T O L O G I C A L A R G U M E N T 347

may well look as though DB-making properties are also such that it is necesarily true that a DB would possess them necessarily (as though (2) is true). Surely it is necessarily false that it is both true that there is a DB and true that it is possible 1 that he is not or will not be preeminently powertul and knowledgeable- possibl%, for example, that he will be- come feeble and ill-informed in 1980.

Still it can be doubted that all DB-making properties, including the property of total abstention from wrongdoing, are such that a DB would possess them necessarily. For if a DB would necessarily abstain from wrongdoing, he would not do so freely; his abstention from wrongdoing would be like that of a stone rather than like that of a bona fide moral agent. And it may well be thought that a necessary condition of being a DB is being a free moral agent. It looks, then, as though the argument consisting of (1) through (11) establishes only that there is a being who has most of the properties of a DB but that it fails to establish that this being is never guilty of wrongdoing.

But perhaps this defect can be rectified. Once again, statements to the effect that something, X, necessarily possesses a certain property, P, mean that it is not possible1 for X to exist and fail to possess P. Now whatever may be thought of the claim that it is necessarily true that it would be impossible~ for a DB to do wrong, this much seems plain: a DB would differ from human beings to the extent that it would be a kind of miracle were he to go morally astray. The point may be put by saying that if anything is a DB, it is impossible 2 that he does wrong. Moreover, we may add that like most DB-making properties, the property of being such that it is impossible 2 that he does wrong would be necessarily possessed by a DB. And since the proposition that a DB would possess this property necessarily is not empirically disconfirmable, we may infer that it is necessarily true that if anything is a DB he would possess necessarily the property of being such that it is impossible 2 that he does wrong. So we may conclude (after suitably modifying (2)) that there is a being who has at least most of the properties of a DB, including the property of being such that it is impossible 2 that he does wrong. Let us call such a being 'a near-DB'. (Being a DB entails being a near-DB but not vice versa.) Now it is plain that in believing that a near-DB has done wrong we would be believing that a miracle has occurred. And it is irrational to believe in miracles in the absence of very strong evidence for their occur-

348 C L E M E N T D O R E

rence. I shall not discuss here the question whether we have strong evidence (e.g., in the form of suffering) that if there is a near-DB, then he is wicked; instead, I shall simply remark that if we do not have such evidence, then we have reason to believe that there is a full-fledged DB (i.e., a near-DB who totally abstains from wrongdoing).

It should be added here that a DB would be able to go morally astray, even though it is impossible2 that he does. For if a DB's being able to do wrong were incompatible with its being impossible z that he does wrong, nothing would be gained by pointing out that a DB would be such that it is impossible2 rather than impossible~ that he does wrong; it would remain true that a DB would not be a free moral agent. The defense of the claim that if a DB exists, he is able to do wrong even though it is impossible2 that he does it as is follows. A DB-making property, which would be possessed necessarily by any DB, is the property of being able to do anything such that it is possibles that he does it. And even though it would be impossible 2 that a DB does wrong, it would be possible1 that he does. Hence a DB would be able to do wrong even though it is impossible2 that he does (and we may conclude that there is a near-

DB who is able to do wrong). I want to consider now two objections to what I have just said: (1) To

say that it is impossible2 for an individual, S, to have a property, P, is to say that there is a class, 0, such that S belongs to 0 and it is a true lawlike statement that if anything is a member of 0, then it does not have P. Now this being so, it is not possiblet both that someone brings it about that S has P and that it is impossible2 that S has P. For if someone causes S (a member of some class, 0) to have P, then eo ipso it is not the case that if anything is a member of 0 it does not have P ; and hence a necessary condition of the impossibility2 of S's being P is missing. It follows that it is not possible1 for anyone - even a DB - to do what is impossible2 : not even a being who is able to do everything such that it is possible1 that he does it could work miracles. (2) 'X is able to bring it about that S is P ' means the same as 'It is possible2 that X brings it about that S is P ' . It follows that 'X is able to bring it about that S is P even though it is not possible z for X to do so' reduces to a self-contradiction.

These objections are apparently formidable but in fact they can be met. Let us examine the first objection first. A DB-making property is being able to work miracles. Hence it is necessarily true that if anything is a DB


it is necessarily able to work miracles. So if miracles are not possible1, then it is not possible1 for there to be a DB. But reason to think that it is

possible1 for there to be a DB will be forthcoming in the next section. And since there is a reason to think that it is possible~ for there to be a DB and since it is necessarily true that a DB would be necessarily able to work miracles, there is reason to believe that it is possible~ to work miracles. If follows that an analysis of 'impossible z' from which it follows that miracles are not possible1 is in need of revision. The needed revision reads as follows: The statement that it is impossiblez for an individual, S, to have P is equilvalent to the statement that there is a class, 0, such that S is a member of 0 and either it is a true lawlike statement that if anything is a member of 0 it does not have P or this would be a true lawlike statement were il~ not for the intervention of a being who (a) is able to do everything such that it is possible1 that it does it, and (b) has brought it about that at least one member of 0 has P. Since a DB would be a being who is able to do everything such that it is possiblet that he does it, a DB's bringing it about that S has P is, on this analysis, perfectly compatible with its being impossible2 that S has P.

The reply to ttle second objection is implicit in what has already been said. The specific thesis with which we are concerned is that "S is able to do wrong' means the same as 'It is possiblea for S to do wrong' and hence that 'It is not pessible2 for S to do wrong' means the same as 'S is not able to do wrong'. Now in view of my reply to the first objection, it can be seen that 'It is not possible 2 for S to do wrong' is best construed as meaning that there is a class, 0, such that S belongs to 0 and either it is a true lawlike statement that if anything is a member of 0, it does not go morally astray 01: this would be a true lawlike statement were it not for a being who (a) is able to do everything such that it is possible1 that he does it and (b) has brought it about that a member of 0 (who ~s perhaps this very being himself) does wrong. Hence when S is a being who is able to do everything such that it is possible1 that he does it, its being impossible 2 that S does wrong is perfectly compatible with S's bringing it about that he does wrong (with S's doing wrong). And the statement that S bring it about that he does wrong entails the statement that S is able to bring it about that he does wrong. So when S is able to do everything such that it is possiblea that he does it, its being impossible z that S does wrong is comptaible with S's being able to do wrong. Hence it is

350 C L E M E N T DORE

false that 'It is not possibl% that S does wrong' means the same as 'S is not able to do wrong'.

I l l

I shall preface my defense of (1) by saying what I shall mean by statements of the f o r m ' S experiences X ' - n a m e l y , that somebody, S, is aware or seemingly aware of something, X, in the special way that one is aware of an object which one is seeing or hearing or feeling or in the special way that one is seemingly aware of an object when one is suffering a visual or auditory or tactile hallucination. Seeing, hearing, feeling, and seeming to do these things involve what may be called sensuous experiences, but there are also non-sensuous experiences. For example, it apparently sometimes happens that a person in a dark room becomes aware of being in the presence of another person, even though the former does not feel, hear, smell, taste or see the other person and even though his awareness is not an inductively based belief. Now my argument in brief is (a) that we have evidence that experiences of a DB have occurred; (b) that it is not possible~ to experience what is not possibles ; and, hence (c) that we have reason to believe that it is possible s that there is a DB.

Let us look at (b) first. Suppose that someone reported that he had visually experienced a square circle. Then we could justifiably reject his report. Not only could we justifiably disbelieve that he had really seen a square circle; we could also justifiably disbelieve that he had seemed to see one, for we know that there are no such things as hallucinations in which people seem to see square circles. What I have just said about visual experiences of square circles applies to non-sensuous experiences as well. We might well be justified in believing a person who told as that he had experienced the presence of a stranger in a dark room, and that his experience was neither visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory nor olefactory. But if someone told us that he had experienced a square circle in a dark room, we could justifiably reject his claim even were he to add that his experience was a non-sensuous one.

Square circles are not unique in the envisaged respect. We know that no one can see or seem to see, e.g., an object which is both red and green all over and we know that no one can hear or seem to hear, e.g., the sound of one hand clapping. Now what all of the contemplated experiences have in common is that they would, if they occurred, be experiences of what is


not possible1. Hence it is likely that what prevents these experiences from being such that they can occur is precisely that they are experiences of what is not possible1. It is likely, that is to say, that it is not possible for there to be an experience of what is not possiblex. Now our knowledge that it is not possible to experience what is not possible1 is not based on empirical investigation; at any rate, those who are not specialists in psychology presumably know of no empirical support for the thesis that we cannot experience what is not possible1. At least in many instances, then, our knowledge that it is not possible to experience what is not possible1 is a priori. But it is surely unlikely that we have a priori knowledge of the contingent truth that it is not possible2 that anyone experiences what is impossible~. It is much more plausible that the a priori

knowledge under discussion is knowledge of the necessary truth that it is not possible~ to experience what is not possible1. 5 (However, it would, of course, suit my present purposes just as well if it were merely impossible2 that people experience what is impossible1.)

I do not wish ~Lo make the further claim that it is either impossiblex or impossible 2 to believe that something which is impossible~ exists or occurs or obtains. (E.g., mathematical errors are a counter-example to this claim.) And someone may wish to argue as follows: "Seeming to perceive X is the same as believing, or being inclined to believe, that one veridically perceives X. And it is possible for a person to believe, or to be inclined to believe, that he veridically perceives X even though the veridical perception of X is not possibles. Now the veridical perception of X is not possiblea when X is not possible1. So when X is not possibles, it is possible for a person to believe, or to be inclined to believe, that he veridically perceives it. I~: follows that it is possible to seem to perceive X even though Xis not possible 1.'' The objection is mistaken however. Seeming to perceive X cannot be adequately analyzed as believing that one veridically perceives X, for a person can suffer an hallucination which he knows full well to be an hallucination. Perhaps one cannot suffer an hallucination of X without being inclined to believe that one veridically perceives X, but nonetheless seeming to perceive X cannot be adequately analyzed as being inclined to believe that one veridically perceives X. For it might be true that I seem to see, e.g., a rat at place P while being inclined to believe that what I really see there is an old shoe instead; but I could not seem to see a rat at ptace P while seeming to see an old shoe there instead. 6

352 C L E ME N T D O R E

The defense of (a) is as follows: Many people have sincerely reported that they have had experiences of a DB (namely, God). Now a person's sincere report that he has had a certain experience constitues evidence that he has had such an experience. Of course this evidence may not be conclusive and, indeed, may be overridden by evidence to the contrary. Thus if it were directly evident that God, like square circles, is impossible, then we would have reason to reject reports to the effect that one has experienced God. Or again if it were directly evident that it is not possible to experience the necessary possession of DB-making properties - that it is either impossible1 or impossible2 to do so - then we should not accept the reports under discussion. But in fact it is not directly evident that God is impossible1. And as for the experience of the necessary possession of DB-making properties, the way to discover whether something can be experienced is to determine whether people have reported experiencing it; we cannot tell a priori that something, X, cannot be experienced unless we know that X is impossible~. 7

It must be admitted that our evidence that some people have experienced a DB is not conclusive. For apparently some perople have reported having had experiences in which reality is directly revealed to them as containing no distinctions between individuals- as a single monolithic whole - and as being essentially non-personal. Now if it is possible for there to be a DB, then, as we have seen, a near-DB exists. And it is necessarily true that if a near-DB exists, he exists necessarily and has most DB-making properties necessarily. Hence if it is possible for there to be a DB, it is not possible for there to fail to be a near-DB. And a near-DB would be a person. Hence if it is possible for there to be a DB, it is not possible for persons to be mere illusions. So if it is possible for there to be a DB, then it is not possible for the monistic experiences mentioned above to occur. It follows that if those monistic experiences (call them 'M- experiences') do occur, it is not possible for there to be a DB and hence reports that one has experienced God are false. Now just as sincere reports to have experienced God are evidence that God-experiences have occurred, sincere reports to have had M-experiences are evidence that M- experiences have occurred - and, hence, that God-experiences have not. But of course the latter reports are not conclusive evidence that God- experiences have not occurred. Reports of God-experiences discredit reports of M-experiences to at least as great an extent as reports of M-

EXAMIINATION OF AN O N T O L O G I C A L A R G U M E N T 353

experiences cast doubt on reports of God-experiences. And indeed it may well be thought that reports of God-experiences are on their face more credible than reports to the effect that one has experienced the whole of reality and, what is more, experienced it in such a way as to have had revealed to one that all distinctions are illusory. The upshot is that sincere reports of God-experiences, though not a conclusive reason for believing that God-experiences have occurred, count as evidence that they have. The present proof of a DB yields only likelihood and not certainty, then, but of course it would have been astounding if it had been otherwise.

Implicit in the foregoing is a reply to a familiar sort of criticism of arguments of the sort propounded in Section I. The criticism can be formulated as follows: "let 'eternitron '8 mean the same as 'electron which exists necessarily and has electron-making properties necessarily'. Then it is necessarily true that if anything is an eternitron it exists necessarily and has electron-making properties necessarily. Hence if we add that it is possible that there is an eternitron, we can construct a proof of an eternitron which exactly parallels the Section I proof of a DB. And of course we can in the same way establish the existence of unicorns who exist necessarily and possess their unicorn-making properties necessarily ('eterniunicorns') and so on indefinitely. But no sober philosopher will countenance the envisaged proofs; everyone concerned to avoid ontological profligacy will reject the claim that it is possible that there is an eternitron and an eterniunicorn. 9 And it would be irrationally arbitrary for someone to reject these possibility claims while he continued to affirm (1)."

The reply to this criticism is now readily available. There is some evidence (in the form of religious experience) for (1) and no evidence for the possibility of eternitrons and eterniunicorns: it is presumably true that no one has ever sincerely claimed to have experienced the latter.

IV

Another argument against ~1) is as follows: "Everyone would reject the claim that one and only one unicorn is possible 1. But the claim that one and only one DB is possible1 is just as preposterous: if a DB is possible 1, then different DB's are possible~ - s a y , a DB who loves us steadily to degree D1 (a DB1), a DB who loves us steadily to degree D 2 (a DB2), and so on indefinitely~ It follows that if we accept (1), then we must agree (a)

354 C L E M E N T DORE

that it is possible that there is a DB 1 and hence that a DB1 exists, (b) that it is possible that there is a DB2 and hence that a DB2 exists, and so on up to a DB, where 'n' is as large a number as anyone may care to specify. So it is after all true that the affirmation of (1) is the first step on a wild ontological spree."

Now this much can be said for the criticism just given: if someone maintains that one but only one thing of a kind is possible, then we are warranted in rejecting his claim unless he can explain why it should be true. However, in the case of (1) this burden can be shouldered; for it can be proved that if one DB is possible, then no other DB is possible. Being, e.g., preeminently powerful is a property such that if anything is a DB, he possesses this property necessarily. Hence if anything is a DB, he is preeminently powerful in every possible world in which he exists. But if anything is a DB, he exists necessarily, and hence in every possible world; so a DB would, if he existed, he preeminently powerful in every possible world. But there is no possible world in which there is more than one preeminently powerful thing. And, as we have seen, if a DB exists in a possible world, then a DB or a near-DB exists. So if a DB exists in a possible world, he is preeminently powerful in every possible world. Hence if any individual is a DB in a given possible world, then there is no possible world in which there is a distinct individual who is also a DB. This amounts to the claim that if it is possible that there is an individual who is a DB, then it is not possible that there is a distinct individual who is also a DB. (Nor is it possible that there is a distinct individual who is a near-DB. For a near-DB, if possible, is preeminently powerful in every possible world. And, as has been said, no possible world contains more than one preeminently powerful individual. It is, as we have seen, possible~ for a DB to go morally astray. Hence it is true that if a DB occupies a possible world, Wt, then there is at least one possible world, W2, in which there is a wicked near-DB. But the near-DB of W z is not distinct from the DB or W~. Otherwise there would be two preeminently powerful beings in W2 and in Wl.)

But what about things (call them 'quasi-DB's') which, though they are like DB's, differ from them just in that there is no property such that they possess it to a preeminent degree? Quasi-Db's, thus characterized, are evidently such that we cannot construct a proof that if a DB is possible, then no quasi-DB's are possible or that if one quasi-DB is possible, then

EXAMINATION OF AN ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 355

no others are possible. Moreover , given the possibility of quasi -DB's , their existence can be established by an a rgument very like the a rgument consisting of (1) th rough (I 1). Hence, we should be loathe to embrace the thesis that quasi.-DB's are possible. But now isn ' t it clear tha t it would be

just as prepos terous to affirm the possibility o f a DB and deny the possibility of quas i -DB's as to affirm the possibility o f one and only one

centaur? One answer is s imply tha t it is not clear that the concept o f quas i -DB's is sufficiently similar to the concept of a DB so tha t the possibility of a DB entails the possibility of quasi-DB's . But a more convincing answer can be given. I t is a necessary t ruth tha t a DB and a near -DB who

differs f rom a DB only in tha t he is guilty of wrongdoing would, if they existed, be necessarily radically unique. N o w if there is a possible world in which a DB exists then there is a DB or a near-DB. Hence if there is a

possible world in which a DB exists then (since a DB would be necessarily existent) it exists in every possible world (in some as a wicked near-DB) and is radically unique in every possible world. So if a DB is possible, then

barr ing only a wicked near-DB, there is no possible world in which anything very like it exists. In plainer English, if a DB is possible, then,

barr ing only a wicked near-DB, nothing else which is very like a DB is possible. I t follows that either quas i -DB's are not possible or at least they are not sufficiently like a DB so that it can justifiably be claimed tha t

affirming the possibility of a DB while denying tha t quas i -DB's are possible is like affirming that a thing of one kind is possible while denying tha t things o f a very similar kind are possible.

Vanderbilt University

NOTES

1 To say that something, X, exists necessarily is not to ascribe to X the trivial property of existing in every possible world in which it exists. Otherwise everything is necessarily existent. X's being necessarily existent should be construeed as there being no possible world in which X fails to exist.

The distinction between what is possible1 and what is possibles does not, of course, originate with me. It corresponds roughly to the familiar distinction between what is logically possible and what is physically possible. Needless to say, the existence and nature of this distinction is the subject of much philosophical controversy - controversy into which I cannot enter in this paper. 3 To say that something exists necessarily is simply to say that it is not possible1 for it to fail to exist. See note 1. 4 Alvin Plantinga has pointed out that it is not always the case that when there is no

356 CLEMENT DORE

conceivable observational discontirmation of a statement, that statement, if true, is necessarily true. Exceptions are statements to the effect that there are observations and that there are observable objects. 5 Just as it is the case that if something is possible, it is necessarily possible, so, too, if something is not possible, it is necessarily true that it is not. 6 For more extensive comments on seeming to perceive, see my article, 'Seeming to See', American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965), 312-318. 7 Addressing himself to a similar thesis, George Mavrodes writes as follows: "From the fact that we... have experienced the characteristic of movement, we conclude that it is one that can be experienced. A question about the possibility of experiencing the contingency and dependence of natural objects can be decided in the some way. I f people do, in fact, experience this dependency of natural objects and events, then it is a characteristic that is accessible to experience..." Belief in God, Random House, New York, 1970, p. 72. s The word was originally coined by George Mavrodes: 'Some Recent Philosophical Theology', Review of Metaphysics XXIV (1970), 101. My definition of the term is a bit different from that of Mavrodes. 9 An alternative is to reject the thesis that if something is possible1 then it is necessarily possible1. But see my earlier argument on behalf of that thesis.

examination of an ontological argument

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