ex post evaluation of objective 1 1994-1999 national ... · éligible pour l’objectif 1. il...

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Ex Post Evaluation of Objective 1

1994-1999

National Report - Belgium

Ex-Post Evaluation of Objective 1, 1994-1999, National Report - Belgium

ECOTEC Research and Consulting Ltd / IDEA Consult2

Table of Contents

1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ______________________________________________ 41.1 Summary (English)................................................................................................... 41.2 Résumé de l’évaluation............................................................................................. 5

2 INTRODUCTION _____________________________________________________ 83 METHODOLOGY _____________________________________________________ 9

3.1 Information reviewed................................................................................................ 93.2 Organisations or individuals interviewed ............................................................... 103.3 Case studies ............................................................................................................ 10

4 APPROPRIATENESS OF STRATEGY ADOPTED AND PURSUED 1994-99 __ 114.1 Key issues in 1994 and their evolution to 1999...................................................... 11

4.1.1 The economic activity..............................................................................................124.1.2 Attractiveness of the region.....................................................................................134.1.3 Infrastructure ..........................................................................................................134.1.4 Human resources ....................................................................................................13

4.2 Strategy................................................................................................................... 144.2.1 The four priorities ...................................................................................................144.2.2 Planned and actual expenditure..............................................................................164.2.3 Changes to the SPD ................................................................................................18

4.3 Assessment of geographical spread ........................................................................ 204.4 Conclusions on appropriateness ............................................................................. 20

5 EFFECTIVENESS ____________________________________________________ 225.1 Programme objectives ............................................................................................ 225.2 Programme effects .................................................................................................. 23

5.2.1 Programme contributions to overall social and economic changes........................235.2.2 Results by thematic priority.....................................................................................245.2.3 Key influences .........................................................................................................325.2.4 Success factors and obstacles to effectiveness ........................................................325.2.5 Horizontal issues .....................................................................................................345.2.6 Fund distribution and effectiveness.........................................................................35

5.3 Assessment of Community Added Value............................................................... 365.4 Changes to policy and practice ............................................................................... 385.5 Conclusions on effectiveness.................................................................................. 38

6 EFFICIENCY ________________________________________________________ 407 IMPACT ____________________________________________________________ 40

7.1 Evolution of the context.......................................................................................... 407.2 Contribution of SPD to achievement of targets ...................................................... 407.3 Impact on employment and multiplier effects ........................................................ 417.4 Impact on regional convergence ............................................................................. 437.5 Conclusions on impact............................................................................................ 44

8 MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION SYSTEMS ___________________ 458.1 Institutional Arrangements ..................................................................................... 45

8.1.1 Overview of the programme management structures..............................................458.1.2 Programme Monitoring Committee (PMC) ............................................................458.1.3 The Technical and Financial Committees...............................................................488.1.4 General co-ordination by the Walloon Government ...............................................488.1.5 The steering committee (comité de pilotage)...........................................................498.1.6 Vertical partnership approach ................................................................................49



8.1.7 Horizontal partnership............................................................................................508.1.8 Capacity ..................................................................................................................508.1.9 Changes to the programme management ................................................................51

8.2 Project selection process......................................................................................... 518.3 Financial systems.................................................................................................... 52

8.3.1 Implementation........................................................................................................528.3.2 Financial audits ......................................................................................................538.3.3 Contribution of the audits .......................................................................................55

8.4 Monitoring structures.............................................................................................. 558.4.1 Monitoring of ERDF actions...................................................................................558.4.2 Monitoring of ESF actions ......................................................................................568.4.3 Monitoring of EAGGF ............................................................................................568.4.4 Administrative Task Force ......................................................................................578.4.5 Quality of monitoring..............................................................................................57

8.5 Programme evaluation ............................................................................................ 588.5.1 How was the programme evaluated ........................................................................588.5.2 Changes to evaluation during the programming period .........................................598.5.3 Consequences of evaluation ....................................................................................59

8.6 Synergy effects ....................................................................................................... 598.6.1 Internal effects.........................................................................................................598.6.2 External effects........................................................................................................60

8.7 Equal opportunities and the environment ............................................................... 608.7.1 Equal Opportunities ................................................................................................608.7.2 Environmental priorities within the programmes ...................................................61

8.8 Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 619 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES, 1994-99 _____________________________ 63

9.1 Process Issues ......................................................................................................... 639.2 Achievements ......................................................................................................... 64

10 CONCLUSIONS______________________________________________________ 6510.1 Lessons from the 1994-99 period ........................................................................... 65

10.1.1 General conclusions................................................................................................6510.1.2 Fund-specific conclusions .......................................................................................66

10.2 Consequences for the 2000-2006 programming period.......................................... 6610.2.1 General....................................................................................................................6610.2.2 Fund-specific...........................................................................................................67

11 RECOMMENDATIONS _______________________________________________ 6811.1 Recommendations for the phasing out in Hainaut (2000-2006) ............................. 6811.2 General, long-term recommendations..................................................................... 69

Annex 1: Exchange rates used_______________________________________________ 70Annex 2: Measures in the SPD Objective 1 Hainaut_____________________________ 71



1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Summary (English)

On July 20th 1993 the Council of EU Ministers decided that in Belgium one region waseligible under Objective 1, in particular the province of Hainaut. In consequence of thisdecision, the government of the Walloon Region presented to the European Commission aplan for regional development for the province of Hainaut, and on June 14th 1994 the singleprogramming document for the period 1/1/1994-31/12/1999 was approved.The single programming document thus bears upon the whole province of Hainaut, contraryto the Objective 2 region (1989-1993) which covered only part of the province of Hainaut,namely the region of Charleroi and Centre.The province of Hainaut was selected because of its poor economic performance. Theproblem in Hainaut is that it is a region with a strong tradition in industries such as textile andsteel, which are now declining. Compared to other regions in Belgium, Hainaut employedless people in the services sector or in tourism. Because the services sector was notsufficiently developed, and due to the decline in traditional industries, the region wasconfronted with a large structural deficit of jobs. Hainaut showed high unemployment rates,and was responsible for 50% of total long-term unemployment in Wallonia.The strategy outlined in the SPD is a strive towards a higher GIP per inhabitant mainlythrough the creation of new economic activity in the region. Other axes from the programmeconsist of making the region more attractive for the inhabitants, the construction of missinginfrastructure links, and ameliorating the quality of human resources. This strategy isconsidered to be a good response to the socio-economic situation, and in the 2000-2006 thestrategy follows broadly the same lines. The difference between both programmes is that the1994-99 programme mainly tried to put in place the necessary foundations, while the phasingout goes a step further and tries to capitalise on those foundations.Concerning effectiveness, the programme rates well when it comes to creating jobs andreducing unemployment. One of the major contributions of the programme was the increasedinvestment in the region. However, according to the estimates obtained by the econometricmodel developed for measuring the effects of the programme, the creation of financial valueadded (sales minus cost of purchases) and a higher GIP per inhabitant have not (yet) beenrealised.The programme was found to have strong effects on supporting skills development and onassisting SME. The programme has also put in place the necessary infrastructure (poles ofexcellence) that can promote innovation and R&D in the future. In addition, the programmeencouraged rural diversification, developed the touristic potential of the region, andcompleted some missing infrastructure links, in line with the financial efforts put into it. Theprogramme contributed rather weakly to overcoming territorial imbalance, in improving theenvironment and to urban regeneration.Effectiveness was somewhat impaired by the dispersion of funds (both between measures andbetween regions) and by the priority to budgetary absorption over a consistent strategy forregional development. Also more synergies and partnerships between projects financed byERDF-EAGGF (as was realised for ESF) could have increased the effectiveness.The added value of Community intervention can’t be determined unambiguously. However,most of our interlocutors agreed that the structural funds certainly had a strong financialleverage effect, and that they made a considerable contribution to policy-making in Walloniathrough the methodology imposed. Before, there was no tradition in Wallonia of multi-annual programming, neither were the governments used to have their strategies and actionsevaluated. The new approach led to changes in policy, also outside the structural fundsprogrammes.



The global impact of the programme, i.e. its contribution to the amelioration of the socio-economic situation in the province of Hainaut, was positive when it comes to job creation, butGDP growth fell below expectations. Consequently, Hainaut did not succeed to convergetowards the European average.Until now, the most visible impact comes from the private capital investments. The impact ofthe more structural measures is not yet visible but is expected to become apparent from 2000onwards and to continue beyond 2005. It is important that these postponed effects indeed arerealised, especially since the impact from the private capital investments is only temporary.Strategic thinking and acting in the phasing out period will be essential for the valorisation ofthe building stones that have been created in the 1994-99 programming period.Besides the putting in place of the physical conditions (centres of excellence, infrastructure,training centres) the programme also generated a change in mentality and increaseddynamism among the local operators and stakeholders. Clearly the belief has emerged thatprosperity in the region can be realised through endogenous rather than exogenous growth.Finally, the way in which the programme was implemented was also assessed. Themanagement and co-ordination of the programme was subject to very large learning effects.In 1994, the people responsible for managing the programme were confronted with acompletely new task and a new way of working. By 1999 however, due to learning and theapplication of technical assistance funds, the implementation had significantly improved.A good element of the management system was also the broad horizontal partnership whichcreated a broad consensus on the programme, while weaknesses include the supply-drivenproject selection process and the operational difficulties of the ESF-cell due to the complexstructure caused by the division of authorities in BelgiumMost apparent weaknesses have been addressed for the phasing out period 2000-2006. Theselection of projects has become more demand-driven and more objective. The projects arenow no longer assessed in terms of financial progress, but also evaluated against some qualitycriteria. This was not the case in the 1994-99 period. Attention should still be paid tosufficiently select projects against strategic rather than political objectives. The monitoringsystem was put in place during the previous period and the lack of (quality of) indicatorsworked on. Nevertheless, the efforts to improve measuring the real results of the actions, inaddition to the financial follow-up, should be continued. The managing authority has stressedthe presence of synergies and partnerships in implementation of projects, but has to play itselfan adequate redirecting role to achieve this objective.

1.2 Résumé de l’évaluation

Le 20 juillet 1993, le Conseil des Ministres de l’UE a décidé qu’en Belgique une région étaitéligible pour l’Objectif 1. Il s’agissait plus particulièrement de la province du Hainaut. Suiteà cette décision, le gouvernement de la Région Wallonne a présenté à la Commission un plande développement de la province, et le 14 juillet 1994 le DOCUP pour la période 1/1/1994-31/12/1999 a été approuvé.Le DOCUP concerne donc l’entièreté de la province du Hainaut, contrairement à la régionObjectif 2 (1989-1993) qui ne s’étendait que sur une partie de la province, plusspécifiquement sur les régions de Charleroi et le Centre.La province du Hainaut a été considérée éligible pour support des Fonds Structurels sousl’Objectif 1 à cause de sa faible performance économique. Les problèmes du Hainaut peuventêtre attribués à sa forte tradition dans les secteurs industriels, surtout en textile et sidérurgie,qui sont en déclin. Comparé à d’autres régions en Belgique, le Hainaut offre moins d’emploidans les secteurs des services et du tourisme. Comme les industries traditionnelles étaient endéclin, et que les autres secteurs n’étaient pas suffisamment développés, la province souffraitd’un déficit structurel d’emplois. Le Hainaut avait des taux de chômage élevés et étaitresponsable de 50% du chômage de longue durée en Wallonie.



La stratégie exprimée dans le DOCUP vise une augmentation du PIB par habitant,principalement par le biais de la création de nouvelles activités économiques dans la région.Les autres axes du programme consistent en l’augmentation de l’attractivité de la région pourles habitants, la construction des liens manquants et l’amélioration de la qualité des ressourceshumaines. Globalement, cette stratégie a été considérée adaptée à la situation socio-économique du Hainaut, et le programme pour le phasing out suit les mêmes lignes. Ladifférence entre les deux programmes est que dans l’Objectif 1 (1994-99) l’accent était sur lamise en place des structures, tandis que dans la période 2000-2006, le but est de valoriser cesstructures.En ce qui concerne l’efficacité, le programme est jugé favorable pour la création d’emplois etla réduction du chômage. Une des plus grandes contributions du programme étaitl’augmentation de l’investissement dans la région. Par contre, selon le modèle économétriquequi a été développé pour mesurer les effets du programme, la création d’une valeur ajoutée etune augmentation du PIB par habitant n’ont pas (encore) été réalisées.Le programme a certainement stimulé le développement des compétences et soutenu ledéveloppement des PMEs. Le programme a mis en place l’infrastructure nécessaire (pôlesd’excellence) pour promouvoir l’innovation et la recherche et le développement dans le futur.En outre, le programme a eu des effets favorables sur la diversification rurale, sur lavalorisation du patrimoine touristique, et a complété certaines liaisons d’infrastructure. Parcontre, les contributions du programme étaient plutôt faibles en ce qui concerne ledéséquilibre territorial, les efforts environnementaux et la régénération urbaine.L’efficacité du programme a été diminuée par la dispersion des fonds (à la fois entre mesureset entre régions) et par la préoccupation pour l’absorption des crédits, qui prévalait sur lademande pour une stratégie de développement régional cohérente. En outre, plus desynergies et de partenariats entre (opérateurs de) projets cofinancés par FEDER-FEOGApourraient avoir contribué positivement à l’efficacité des projets.La valeur ajoutée de l’intervention communautaire ne peut pas être déterminée univoquement.Cependant, la plupart de nos interlocuteurs souscrivaient à la thèse selon laquelle les fondsstructurels ont eu un effet de levier significatif et qu’une value ajouté élevée a été créée par laméthodologie imposée. Auparavant, il n’y avait pas de tradition de programmationpluriannuelle et d’évaluation en Wallonie. Cette méthodologie a également engendré deschangements dans les autres politiques en dehors de la gestion des programmes européens.L’impact du programma, c’est-à-dire sa contribution à une amélioration de la situation socio-économique en Hainaut, a été positif en ce qui concerne la création d’emplois. Néanmoinsl’augmentation du PNB a resté loin des espérances. La province d’Hainaut n’a pas parvenu àconverger vers la moyenne européenne.Jusqu’à maintenant, l’impact le plus perceptible résulte des investissements en capital privé,tandis que l’impact des mesures plutôt structurelles ne se manifeste pas encore, mais estattendu à partir de 2000 et se poursuivra au-delà 2005. Il est important que ces effets retardésse produisent effectivement, surtout car l’impact des investissements en capital privé n’estque temporaire. Une réflexion stratégique dans le phasing out sera indispensable pour lavalorisation des fondations crées dans la période 1994-99.En dehors de poser les assises (centres d’excellence, infrastructure), le programme aégalement engendré un changement de mentalité et une dynamique nouvelle parmi lesopérateurs locaux. La conviction que le développement peut être réalisé par une croissanceinterne au sein de la région plutôt que par un apport exogène est apparue.L’implémentation du programme faisait également objet de cette évaluation. La gestion et lacoordination du programme ont démontré des effets d’apprentissage énormes. En 1994, lesfonctionnaires et les opérateurs des projets étaient confronté avec de nouvelles tâches, et unenouvelle façon de travailler. Néanmoins, vers 1999, l’implémentation s’était amélioréremarquablement, grâce à l’apprentissage et à l’usage des crédits de l’assistance technique.Ces crédits ont permis d’engager du personnel supplémentaire et d’établir une base dedonnées.



Un large partenariat horizontal a favorisé le consensus sur le programme. Parmi les faiblesses,on note la procédure de sélection des projets (inspirée par l’offre) et les difficultésopérationnelles de la cellule FSE qui peuvent être attribuées à la distribution des pouvoirs enWallonie, nécessitant une structure complexe pour la cellule.Le DOCUP du phasing out 2000-2006 et sa mise en œuvre ont tenu compte de plusieursfaiblesses de la période 1994-99. Parmi les changements les plus remarquables, on note lanouvelle procédure de sélection pour les projets, et une plus grande attention pour la qualitédes projets au cours de leur exécution. Néanmoins, il faut rester vigilant pour que la sélectiondes projets se fasse suffisamment dans un contexte stratégique plutôt que politique. Lesystème de monitoring a été développé et a remédié au manque d’indicateurs. Ces efforts, quivisent a gérer non seulement le suivi financier mais également le suivi en termes de résultatsréels, doivent impérativement être poursuivis dans la présente période de programmation. Lesgestionnaires du programme ont mis en évidence la nécessité de créer de plus amplessynergies entre projets et de stimuler les partenariats entre opérateurs locaux, mais doiventarticuler suffisamment leur rôle directeur pour atteindre cet objectif.



2 INTRODUCTION

On July 20th 1993 the Council of EU Ministers decided that Hainaut was eligible underObjective 1 and on November 10th 1993, the government of the Walloon Region presented tothe European Commission a plan for regional development for the province of Hainaut.After negotiations, this document was adapted, and became the single programmingdocument for the period 1/1/1994-31/12/1999 that was approved on June 14th 1994.In Belgium, during the period 1994-1999, there was only one Objective 1 region namely theprovince of Hainaut. The ex-post evaluation Objective 1 in Belgium is thus equivalent to theex-post evaluation of the programme of Hainaut.Contrary to the Objective 2 region (1989-1993) which covered only part of the province ofHainaut, namely the region of Charleroi and Centre, the Objective 1 programme for the period1994-99 relates to the whole province of Hainaut.This Member State report covers the ex post evaluation of the Objective 1 programme inHainaut. In the following chapter we first outline the methodology used for this evaluation.The fourth chapter then discusses the appropriateness of the strategy chosen for Hainaut.The second element against what the programme is assessed, is its effectiveness, which isdealt with in chapter 5.The efficiency of the programme is a third element of evaluation, but is not covered by thisMember State Report. We refer therefor to the cross-country analysis.After the analysis of the impact of the programme in chapter 7, we describe and evaluate themanagement and implementation systems in chapter 8.Next, some country-specific elements are highlighted, followed by the strengths andweaknesses that can be derived from the previous chapters.We conclude this Member State Report with some conclusions on the 1994-99 programmingperiod, and some recommendations for the next programming period and thereafter.



3 METHODOLOGY

This Member State Report was written on the basis of the available literature on the one hand,and using the outcome of several interviews on the other hand.

3.1 Information reviewed

The following documents were reviewed as part of the ex post evaluation of the Objective 1Programme for the province of Hainaut:

a) The first set of information is directly related to the programme and its implementation.In particular it concerns the following documents:- Single Programming Document (SPD) Objective 1, Hainaut, 1994-1999 (in French).- Decisions of the Commission relative to the modifications to the SPD Hainaut for the

1994-1999 period. (in French)- Annual reports: Report on the execution of the structural interventions: 1994-1995,

1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000. (in French)- Minutes of the meetings of the Programme Monitoring Committee, 1994-2001. (in

French)- Single Programming Document Phasing Out Hainaut objective 1, period 2000-2006.

(in French)- Programming Complement Phasing Out Hainaut objective 1, 2000-2006. (in French)In addition, we made also use of the database of the Walloon Region which was put intopractice for the administration of the different programmes with intervention from theStructural Funds. This database gathers information on financial and other indicators formeasures, axes, and programmes.

b) The evaluations of the programme constitute a second valuable source of information.The following documents were consulted:- Evaluation intermédiaire, période 1994-1997, Group SEMA- Evaluation du plan de développement régional et des programmes operationnels,

période 1994-1997, ULB.- Evaluation des mesures FSE, évaluation intermédiaire période 1998-2000, CEMAC

et OGM.- Evaluation des mesures FEDER/FEOGA/IFOP, évaluation intermédiaire période

1998-2000, ULB, FUCAM et CEMAC .- Evaluation de l’impact macro-économique du DOCUP, période 1998-2000, ULB.

c) Finally, we used some general literature related to Structural Funds interventions andEvaluation, and in particular:- Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, European Commission January

2001



3.2 Organisations or individuals interviewed

To complement the information gathered from the publications and reports mentioned above,several persons were interviewed. Their names and the institutions they represent aresummarised below.

President of the PMC and representative of the Walloon government- Mr. J-P. Robbeets, Cabinet du Ministre chargé des Relations internationales

Representative of the European Commission- Mr. M. Wolf, DG Regional Policy

Representatives of the general co-ordination- Mr. J. Janss, Direction Générale de l’Economie et de l’Emploi, Direction des

Programmes européens, Directeur- Mme C. Mathot, Direction Générale de l’Economie et de l’Emploi, Direction des

Programmes européens, Attachée,- Mr. D. Boreux, Direction Générale de l’Economie et de l’Emploi, Direction des

Programmes européens- Mr. D. Collet, Direction Générale de l’Economie et de l’Emploi, Direction de la

Politique Economique, Directeur- Mr. V. Lepage, Direction Générale de l’Economie et de l’Emploi, Direction de la

Politique Economique

Representatives of the day-to-day coordination and monitoring- Mr. J. Pjetri, Cellule Fonds Social Européen- Mme A. Dethy, Direction Générale de l’Agriculture

Representatives of the local and social partners- Mr. D. Paquot, UWE- Mr. M. Mathy, FGTB- Mr. P. Thiry, IDEA- Mr. P. Vandewattyne, IDETA.

External expert- Prof. H. Capron, Université Libre de Bruxelles – DULBEA – Centre d’Economie

Régionale et de la Technologie

3.3 Case studies

In Belgium, during the period 1994-1999, there was only one objective 1 region: Hainaut.Consequently all aspects of the evaluation for Belgium relate to that region and are illustratedand clarified with data from that case study.



4 APPROPRIATENESS OF STRATEGY ADOPTED AND PURSUED 1994-99

A first element of evaluation concerns the appropriateness of the strategy that was adoptedand pursued in the period 1994-99. In this chapter, we describe the situation in the province ofHainaut at the beginning of the 1990s, and then indicate what strategy was outlined in theSPD in order to respond to that situation.

4.1 Key issues in 1994 and their evolution to 1999

The province of Hainaut is a region with a strong tradition in industries such as textile andsteel. In the beginning of the 1990’s, the economic situation was declining, as shown by thefollowing indicators:- in 1992, GNP per inhabitant equalled 77,3% of the Community average;- the average growth rate amounted 2,2%, compared to a European average of 3,5% ;- the unemployment rate was 13,2% in 1992, 40% higher than the EU-average, with high

levels in Charleroi and Mons.Compared to other regions in Belgium, Hainaut employed less people in the services sector(9,6% compared to 14,1% for Belgium) or in tourism (2,9% compared to 3,6%). Because theservices sector was not sufficiently developed, and due to the decline in traditional industries,the region was confronted with a large structural deficit of jobs.Hainaut showed high unemployment rates, and was responsible for 50% of total long-termunemployment in Wallonia. Given the structural shortage of jobs, especially young peopleexperienced great difficulties in finding a job. Youth unemployment levels equalled 27%,compared to 17% in the EU-8. Also the low level of education –in 1994 52% of the activepopulation aged between 25 and 59 didn’t have a diploma of higher secondary education –was characteristic for the region. For Wallonia as a whole, the % of the active populationwithout higher secondary education equalled 46%, for Belgium 42%.The origin of economic decline in the region was to be found in the weak economic tissue.The province had a tradition of textile and steel but the crisis in these businesses caused ahuge structural imbalance in the market. Investments made by the declining traditionalindustries were mainly restructuring, not diversifying towards new activities. Innovation wasalso hampered by low R&D efforts, which were, in addition, concentrated in the traditionalsectors. As a result, the network of PME’s was also less developed in Hainaut, and thecompanies showed less dynamism and more conjuncture-driven movements than elsewhere inWallonia.The weak economic situation considerably raised the number of unemployed people in theprovince. Especially women, young people and people with lower education suffered fromunemployment. The reduction of jobs in industry lead to a shift towards the services sector,but the main employers there were the public sector and the non-tradable services (such ashealth care). The commercial services sector was less dynamic. The province not only hadproblems with the quantity but also with the quality of its human resources. For many people,their education had become insufficient, or was not adapted to the needs of local companies.Within the province, the situation differs between several regions. Unemployment was muchhigher in Charleroi than in Ath, the latter however realising very low value added.Nevertheless, all regions show important disparities compared to the Belgian average.Concerning the environment, Hainaut was confronted with three major problems, namely therehabilitation of industrial grounds, the quality of water and the administration of waterresources, and the treatment of waste. However, the problem of insufficient capacity forwater purification is not a problem for Hainaut only and since the necessary resources tofinance the additional water purification capacity by far exceed the budgets available throughObjective 1, this topic was not included into the SPD. The two other environmental matters(cleaning of industrial grounds and waste treatment) were dealt with in the SPD.



Since the initial indicators formulated in the SPD were not always very clear and sometimesambiguous, and because of changes in the way statistics were collected (revision of nationaland regional accounts), a new set of indicators was identified by the interim evaluator. Thefollowing section summarised the main findings of this evaluation, which was finished inApril 2001. The indicators are grouped in four broad categories that reflect the four prioritiesof the SPD, namely indicators relating to the economic activity, the attractiveness of theregion, infrastructure and human resources.

4.1.1 The economic activity

- Growth:GDP per inhabitant in Hainaut amounted 73.4% of the EU average in 1998. Between1993-97 the index (Hainaut/EU) systematically decreased, only in 1998 a positiveevolution could be noticed. Also growth rates of GDP show a similar evolution: theabsence of any improvement compared to the EU average until 1998.

- Composition of economic activityThe economic tissue in Hainaut is still for a large part formed by industry (24.7% ofemployment in 1999), with a focus on heavy industries. The tradable services - especiallythe services to companies (e.g. ICT services, auditing, publicity…) and tourism- are stillunderrepresented in Hainaut. Services to companies represented 6% of employment in1999, which is equivalent to 93.4% of the Walloon figure. Tourism employed 3.7% oftotal workforce in Hainaut, or 82.5% of the Walloon value.

- Economic dynamics and investmentThe creation of new companies averaged the Walloon figure over the period 1993-99.The evolution of independent workers show in Hainaut, fewer people start their ownbusiness. Industrial investments have risen over the period assessed but still fall under theWalloon average. Total investment however didn’t show a positive evolution, due to theabsence of increased investments in the services sector.

- Technological potentialStatistics on R&D and technology are hardly available at province level. Indicatorsavailable for 1993 show that industrial R&D intensity is higher in Hainaut than theWalloon average, but much lower than the Belgian or European values. For public R&D,Hainaut shows low values, compared to both Wallonia, Belgium and the EU.The only available statistics covering the whole period is the number of technologicalinnovations. This statistic shows an increase in 1994, but this evolution isn’t continued inthe following years. Only in 1997 another increase was noticed.

Indicator Unit 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999GDP/inhabitant Index (EU=100) 77.4 76.6 75.5 74.1 72.2 73.4Growth GDP – Hainaut % -1.5 1.2 1.6 -0.1 -0.3 3.9Growth GDP – B % -1.5 3.0 2.6 1.0 3.5 2.7Growth GDP - EU % -0.5 2.9 2.5 1.6 2.5 2.7Distribution of workforce by sector:- Agriculture % 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1- Industry % 27.9 27.2 26.4 25.7 24.8 25.1 24.7- Tradable services % 43.4 43.8 44.6 45.4 45.8 45.4 46.1

of which: serv to comp % 4.6 4.6 5.3 5.4 6.2 6.2 6.0of which: tourism % 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.7

- Non tradable services % 26.2 26.5 26.6 26.7 27.1 27.4 27.1Creation of new companies index (W = 100) 99.0 99.8 100.0 99.7 99.9 99.3 100.1% of independent workers index (W = 100) 86.1 86.6 86.7 85.2 85.3 85.2 85.4Industrial R&D intensity index (W = 100) 113.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.Industrial R&D / inhabitant index (W = 100) 103.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.Public R&D intensity index (W = 100) 26.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.Public R&D / inhabitant index (W = 100) 24.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.



4.1.2 Attractiveness of the region

- TourismBetween 1997 and 99, the number of overnight stays in the province of Hainautincreased. However, this was not translated into increased turnover or jobs.

- The environmentThe increase of the number of polluted industrial sites is not due to deterioration of thesituation, but because of the inventory work done. Nevertheless, efforts must becontinued to clean these industrial sites which seriously harm the image of the province.

Indicator Unit 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999Turnover in Tourism % Belgium 7.0 6.9 6.9 6.6 6.4 6.3 6.5Jobs in Tourism index (W=100) 107.9 104.9 107.7 105.7 105.5 104.6 104.7waste collected kg/hab/yr 318 318 n.a. n.a. //314 217 n.a.Purification capacity % Belgium 13.0 13.2 13.4 13.6 13.1 12.6 12.1Polluted industrial sites 1100 1130

4.1.3 Infrastructure

The transport and energy infrastructure is sufficiently developed in Hainaut, as can be readfrom the following table. Both road and rail density are much higher than the Walloonaverage. Air transport of goods also gradually increased.Indicator Unit 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999Electricity production

capacityMW/1000 inhab 0.8 0.8 0.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

Railway density km/100 km² 13.5 13.3 13.2 13.2 n.a. n.a. n.a.index to Wallonia 142.1 141.2 141.2 141.2

Road density km/100 km² 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.9index (to Wallonia) 138.1 138.1 138.1 138.1

Air transport – goods T/1000 inhab 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8

4.1.4 Human resources

In 1993, unemployment rate in Hainaut amounted 14% or 33% higher than the EU averageand 24% higher than the Walloon unemployment rate. Over the period 1993-99, theunemployment rate remained high. The unemployment in Hainaut is characterised by thefollowing: it is mainly long term unemployment, which mainly affects workers with a lowereducation level, in the traditional sectors, and younger than 25 years. There is also a highunemployment rate amongst women. Between 1993 and 1995 unemployment rose by 2.6points, but compared to Wallonia the situation does not deteriorate. In the following years theunemployment rate improved in Hainaut, but its position relative to Wallonia aggravated.The average education level was relatively low in Hainaut in 1993. The indicators showedlow values compared to Belgian or Walloon figures. Over the years 1993-99 the number ofpeople with a higher education increased.

Indicator Unit 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999Unemployment rate Index

(Wallonia = 100)123.9 119.2 123.3 122.5 123.2 124.4 124.8

Long termunemployment

Index(Wallonia = 100)

130.6 125.9 126.2 127.7 130.0 131.5

People with onlylower education

% n.a; 51.9 n.a. n.a. 45.0 n.a. n.a.



4.2 Strategy

The outcome of two studies by Prof. Quévit (Rider-UCL) and Prof. Capron (ULB) onrespectively the labour market and the macro-economic situation in the region lie at the basisof the strategy for the SPD Objective 1 for Hainaut. A task force with representatives of theWalloon Government and the agencies for regional development drafted a proposal forstrategy given the results of the studies. This draft document was subsequently diffused to abroad range of parties concerned, such as the municipalities and the social partners(employers’ association, labour unions) for consultation. During this phase, there was also aninformal call for projects, in order to have an idea of the possibilities in the region.The document that arose from this consultation round was then remitted to the Commissionfor remarks, and in October 1993, the plan for regional development was finalised. This planfor regional development took into account the comments from the EC

4.2.1 The four priorities

The strategy outlined in the SPD consists of a strive towards a higher GIP per inhabitantmainly through the creation of new economic activity in the region.1) The creation of new economic activity in the region constitutes the first, and most

important, axis of the SPD. The stimulation of new economic activity encompasses 4sub-programmes.� The emphasis lies hereby on investment aids. A very large part of the financial

resources was reserved for granting aids to investors (both endogenous andexogenous) for creating or expanding enterprises in the region.

� For the recovery of the economic activity, the programme envisaged also the creationof the basic conditions for performing research and development through the launchof centres of excellence.

� Thirdly, the SPD aims at making the region more attractive for economic investmentby paying extra attention to the environment of the economic activity. In particular,the actions of this sub-programme co-finance infrastructure works to business parks(e.g. electricity, telecommunications and drainage), and animate the building ofhosting offices for starting companies. Also the cleaning of industrial grounds(demolition of abandoned factory halls, replacement by greenery) and urban renewal,and enhancing the accessibility of industrial zones (creation of turning points) areactions within this sub-programme.

� The fourth sub-programme of the first axis tries to translate the economic recoveryinto supplementary and durable jobs. This sub-programme mainly touches upon thecontinued training of the workers especially in the field of information andtelecommunications technology. Other measures deal with the strengthening of linksbetween education, training and enterprises.

2) A second, smaller axis of the programme heads for a more attractive region for theinhabitants through the promotion of tourism in the region, rural development and by thetreatment of some environmental concerns. Actions in this field are e.g. the developmentof tourist accommodation in the region, the development of promotional activities andtools, the increase of greenery in the cities and the consciousness-raising of the publicwith respect to the protection of the natural patrimony. Also actions to reduce theextraction of water in the overexploited zone in the west of Hainaut and wastemanagement (creation of combustion units) fall under this axis.

3) A third axis of the SPD aims at constructing the missing infrastructure links. Someadaptations to the A8 highway (tunnels, bridges) the creation of a multimodal platform atCharleroi (road, rail, water) , the valorisation of the airport of Charleroi and therenovation of some train stations have been financed by the Structural Funds.



4) A fourth axis deals exclusively with projects related to human resources, especially witheducation and training. Action in this field aim at the improvement of educational andtraining systems (e.g. the purchase of ICT material by schools), the support of training forjob-seekers and the creation of tools for the professional insertion of young job-seekers(apprenticeships).

The first axis contains 24 measures, or 56% of all measures. Its budgetary importance ismuch higher though. The first axis represents 79% of the originally planned cost (82% of therevised cost), and 65% (69% revised) of the cost born by the public authorities (EC andnational administrations).

% of total planned cost % of public costAxis /Sub-programme % of measures planned revised planned revised

1.1 23% 60% 65% 37% 42%1.2 12% 8% 8% 12% 12%1.3 7% 7% 5% 11% 9%1.4 14% 4% 4% 6% 6%2 12% 8% 6% 12% 11%2b 2% 3% 2% 5% 4%3 30% 10% 10% 17% 17%Total (excltechn.assist.) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

In the following table, we give the repartition of planned and revised expenditure by priorityand by year.

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Totalplanned 259,00 278,97 300,58 321,73 351,41 383,92 1.895,61Axis 1 : Reanimation of

economic activity actual 18,69 111,49 278,32 216,39 579,71 302,96 264,78 1.772,34planned 24,42 26,37 28,51 30,69 33,89 37,32 0,00 181,20Axis 2 : Reinforcing

attractiveness actual 0,37 4,63 12,78 13,75 13,28 29,63 51,63 126,07planned 10,41 11,26 12,15 13,08 14,45 15,89 77,24Axis 2 Bis : Transport

infrastructure actual 0,15 7,41 8,67 13,52 9,93 6,23 14,01 59,92planned 35,51 38,94 40,77 42,95 45,02 46,85 250,04Axis 3 : Human resourcesactual 32,00 38,56 41,87 47,08 48,38 36,78 0,47 245,14planned 1,06 1,14 1,20 1,30 1,40 1,50 7,60Axis 4 : Technical

assistance actual 0,57 1,66 1,20 1,75 1,45 1,32 0,96 8,90Notes:Planned expenditure: expressed in millions ECU 1994 (as mentioned in the SPD)Actual expenditure: Realised expenditure converted from BEF to ECU by average exchange rate of the year concerned (see annex),and deflated to 1999 prices (expenditure of 2000 not deflated).

As can be read from the table, the planned expenditure assumed a more or less equaldistribution of expenditure between years. Actual expenditure however fell largely underplanned expenditure during the first two years. Only for the third axis, projects were startedimmediately, due to the fact that these projects were awarded to operators familiar with theESF methodology. All projects within this priority were channelled via these “traditional”operators.

There are also large differences between the size of the various measures. 14 measures, or33% of all measures, had an estimated cost of less than 10 million euro each. On the otherhand, 2 measures represented 50% of the total budgeted cost in 1994 (58% of the revisedbudget). These measures were ACE and AIDE.



measures planned costEstimated cost ofmeasure

(mio EUR94) # % mio EUR94 %

0-10 14 33% 66,57 3%10-50 18 42% 474,71 20%

50-100 9 21% 649,81 27%+100 2 5% 1213,00 50%

Total (excl.techn.assist.) 43 2404,09

4.2.2 Planned and actual expenditure

The maximum global allocation by the structural funds and the FIFG amounted 730 millionecu (1994 prices), distributed over the years and by the different funds as indicated in thefollowing table:



Table 4.1 – Overall expenditure (1994-99).

Community FinanceObjective 1Hainaut

Overallexpendi-ture Total

EC ERDF ESF FIFG EAGGF

Nationaladministration

Private

Planned 330.40 100.00 67.93 24.70 0.37 7.00 102.37 128.03Revised 52.64 23.82 0.66 15.78 0.37 7.00 26.95 1.88Committed 132.68 58.77 31.46 21.34 0.00 5.97 64.41 9.501994

Actual 51.78 23.27 1.03 17.26 0.00 4.97 27.26 1.25Planned 356.68 108.00 73.50 27.50 0.00 7.00 110.47 138.21Revised 201.59 53.94 29.49 20.48 0.77 3.21 56.95 90.70Committed 641.82 176.16 137.69 32.70 0.00 5.77 164.43 300.631995





Actual 376.92 104.60 69.32 27.72 0.06 7.50 109.43 162.89PlannedRevisedCommitted2000

Actual 331.86 84.50 80.52 0.00 0.00 3.99 98.34 149.02Planned 2411.69 730.00 515.92 166.70 0.37 47.01 747.15 934.54Revised 2899.77 760.64 536.62 174.52 1.62 47.87 803.16 1335.98Committed 2947.66 787.07 551.16 182.25 1.63 50.03 830.54 1332.05Total

Actual 2212.37 595.09 404.88 149.64 0.43 40.14 635.11 982.16Notes:Planned expenditure: expressed in millions ECU 1994 (as mentioned in the SPD)Revised expenditure: expressed in millions ECU (as mentioned in decision N° C(00) 887 – may 2000)Committed expenditure: “montants engagés” converted from BEF to ECU by average exchange rate of the year concerned (see annex), anddeflated to 1999 prices.Actual expenditure: Realised expenditure converted from BEF to ECU by average exchange rate of the year concerned (see annex), anddeflated to 1999 prices (expenditure of 2000 not deflated).

The contribution of the EC as initially foreseen was distributed between the different funds asfollows: ERDF 70,67%, ESF 22,84%, EAGGF 6,44% and FIFG 0,05%1. After somerevisions, the distribution between funds was ERDF 70,55% / ESF 22,94% / EAGGF 6,29%and FIFG 0,21%.The distribution of the funds over time had to be rescheduled since there was a slow start ofprojects in 1994. There was a catch up movement in 1996/97.The reasons for the slow start were diverse:

1 A table with the planned and actual expenditure split by fund and by priority is included in Annex 3.



- First, several big infrastructure projects were slow to start because of long procedures toaward the contracts (public adjudication). For the A8 highway several services of theCommission needed to be consulted, because of the size of the project.

- Secondly, several projects in the SPD were new types of projects, with which the partiesconcerned had no experience. The projects that resembled actions from the past couldbenefit from a routine approach, and showed a quick launch, but the more innovativeprojects showed some delay.

- Finally, for the projects dealing with environmental matters (e.g. cleansing of industrialgrounds) the administrative burden had been largely underestimated. It was far moredifficult to obtain the necessary permits for expropriation, etc. than what had beenexpected. This also created some delays in the execution of the projects. The legislationof the Walloon Region itself was not adapted to handle this issue.

4.2.3 Changes to the SPD

Over the period 1994-99 some changes occurred to the SPD. These were approved by theCommission as indicated in the following table.

14/06/94, decision N° C(94) 1450, SPD approved24/06/96, decision N° C(96) 1343, converting of financial table from 1994 to 1995 prices18/12/97, decision N° C(97) 3516, converting of financial table from 1994 to 1997 prices16/12/98, decision N° C(98) 3578, converting of financial table from 1994 to 1999 prices

and review of the decisions relating to ESF10/12/99, decision N° C(99) 3913, changing the annual financing plan of the SPD31/05/00, decision N° C(00) 887, modifying the financing plan of the SPD

In the following paragraphs, we discuss the most significant budget changes. We hereby makea distinction by fund.

4.2.3.1 ERDF� Increased budgetsThe largest budget transfers were due to the success of the measure 1.1.2 (AIDE) whichprovided for grants for the expansion of companies in the Hainaut region. The initial budgetfor this measure was 225 ECU. In the course of 1996-97, the initial budget foreseen for thismeasure was already exhausted, and the Monitoring Committee decided it was preferred tocontinue the measure.Additional resources were sought, and this meant a transfer of budgets between measures.The revised budget of this measure was 884,82 ECU (1999 values). Or, where measure 1.1.2represented 9% of total budget in the 1994 plan, this percentage had risen to 31% of therevised financial plan. When we only consider the public funds, the share of measure 1.1.2rose from 4% to 16%.Other projects that had been approved but were not yet started were evaluated against AIDE.Some were abandoned, and the budget was transferred to the AIDE budget. This was forinstance the case for some projects dealing with the cleansing of industrial grounds (1.3.2).Also unused budgets of projects where the actual cost was less than what had beenanticipated, were transferred to measures that were running well from the beginning andwhose budgets were nearly consumed. This practice of shifting unused budgets betweenmeasures implies that especially the traditional measures benefited from additional resources.The more innovative projects were slower to start, and their budgets were less quicklyexhausted. Since even these additional budgets were not sufficient to cover the demand for



AIDE subsidies, the award criteria for AIDE also became more selective (in terms ofemployment and sectors of activity).

Also INVEST (measure 1.1.7) is a measure that benefited from some additional budgetallocations, as well as measure 1.2.2 (technological support to enterprises). INVEST shows aparallel history as AIDE: it was also from the beginning very successful, and availablebudgets were soon spent. Additional funds were sought, but since over the course of theprogramme, the decision-makers preferred endogenous investment to exogenous investment,the reallocation of funds towards INVEST was not as large as for AIDE. In the initialfinancial table, 30 mio ECU (1% of total budget) were reserved for INVEST. In the revisedtable, the budget for this measure equalled 46 mio ECU, or 2% of total.A fourth measure where budgets were significantly increased is 1.3.3 (access to industrialzones). The initially foreseen budget for measure 1.3.3 equalled 10,25 mio ECU, which waslater on revised to 25.63 ECU.

� Decreased budgetsSome measures financed by the ERDF also witnessed significant budget decreases. This wasinter alia the case for 1.1.10 (technological innovation of enterprises), 1.2.4 (internationalpartnerships), 1.3.2 (cleansing of industrial grounds), 2.1.4 (management of hydric resourcesand waste), 3.1.3 (innovation) and 3.2.7 (social economy) and 3.2.8 (health).

Measure Initial budget Revised budgetin ECU (1994) in % in ECU (1999) in %

1.1.10 14.96 1% 0.64 0%1.2.4 2.61 0% 1.40 0%1.3.2 82.40 3% 36.87 1%2.1.4 94.00 4% 77.52 3%3.1.3 2.12 0% 0.00 0%3.2.7 8.00 0% 4.61 0%3.2.8 5.00 0% 1.72 0%

The reasons for this decrease are multiple:- Firstly, some of the projects concerned, although approved, didn’t get started because of

long procedures and heavy administration for judicial and environmental plans forinstance. This was mainly the case for various measures dealing with environmentalaspects (1.3.2)

- The more innovative projects were difficult to implement (e.g. 3.1.3 and 1.1.10). Measure3.1.3 was even completely abandoned. These innovative projects could lead to problemsin the financial absorption capacity.

- There was also a transfer from ERDF financing to financing by the Walloon region forthe building of a purification station. The reason therefore was that the absence ofcommunity spending brought more flexibility for the execution of the project. This meantparticularly a decrease of ERDF funds for the measure, but was compensated by largerfunds by national administrations.

4.2.3.2 ESFLikewise there were also some changes in the allocation of funds from of ESF. As for ERDFmeasures, these transfers were not inspired from strategic reorientations, but from a concernto exhaust available credits.



4.3 Assessment of geographical spread

The SPD covered the whole province of Hainaut. There were projects in several zones withinthe province. Nevertheless, not all regions have benefited equally from each of the measures.This can be illustrated by the subsidies awarded under measures 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 (ACE andAIDE), which represent a very large part of the budget.

In the first years of the programme, most demands for subsidies came from the northwesternpart of the province (Mouscron, Tournai). This was the most dynamic zone, where one wasfaster in creating or extending companies. After some time also other zones in the provincesucceeded in their reorientation towards new activities. This was for instance the case in theCharleroi region.

Figure 1: Geographical distribution of job creation under (a) ACE, (b) AIDE - creation ofPME, (c) AIDE – company expansion

Charleroi and Mons benefited relatively more from the measures around R&D, poles ofexcellence and the cleaning of industrial sites and urban renewal. Charleroi benefited forinstance from the creation of a cell to stimulate the R&D transfer from the UCL universityand the companies, as well as from the creation of the Telecom centre Minerve. In Mons anorganisation was set up to act as an interface between university and business.

4.4 Conclusions on appropriateness

In global, the strategy outlined in the SPD can be considered a good response to the socio-economic situation. All of our interlocutors agreed that the different axis made up a goodstrategy to reduce the lagging behind of the province of Hainaut. After all, the main problemin Hainaut is the lack of economic diversification. The creation of new economic activity byattracting (exogeneous) investment, or by stimulating (endogenous) dynamics must thereforebe the focal point of the programme. This is reflected in the allocation of funds between



priorities. The first priority represents 82% of financial resources spent. The next two axes ofthe programme support this first priority: an attractive region has more chances of attractinginvestors and tourists (both generating economic activity in Hainaut), and a well developedenergy and transport infrastructure is a prerequisite as well.The decline of the traditional industries and the necessity to start up new types of economicactivity in the region also implies that a lot of people need new qualifications for work. Thefourth axe therefore focuses on training and education.The selection of these topics as the four priorities and the allocation of funds between therecan hence be considered very appropriate given the socio-economic situation in the provinceof Hainaut.However, when we look at the way in which these priorities have been translated to measures,and especially projects, some of the strengths of the formulated strategy get lost. One seriousweakness of the SPD is its fragmentary character, which is attributable to the way in whichprojects were selected (see further). The SPD seems more a bundling of separate projects,which all independently strive for more growth in the province, but without a strong,integrated vision behind them. Operators of one project are often not familiar with the contentof other projects, which means that potential synergies could insufficiently be realised. Anexample is the measures dealing with tourism. Several new infrastructures were built, circuitswere developed, but the SPD does not provide for promotional activities at province level. Ifthe new tourist facilities were promoted by a provincial organism, the valorisation resultswould have been much higher.The strategy itself didn’t really change over the course of the programme. There were somebudgetary transfers, inspired mainly from the concern to use all available credits, not becauseof a strategic reorientation of the SPD. This matches with the idea that the strategy itself wasconsidered appropriate, but that for the implementation, the programme-makers relied toomuch on the available supply of projects, rather than actively seeking and selecting projectsthat fit best given the priorities of the programme.Our conclusion regarding the appropriateness of the strategy is that the strategy itself was wellthought-out, but that this strategy could have generated better results if the translation of thestrategy into projects would have been more strategic and priority-driven.



5 EFFECTIVENESS

This chapter evaluates the effectiveness of the programme. The effectiveness is defined as thedegree by which the objectives have been reached. We describe the results and wider effectsof the programme and examine which factors have contributed to those. Also the added valueof Community intervention is assessed in this chapter.

5.1 Programme objectives

The objectives formulated in the SPD to measure progress were:- the recovery of the economic activity, measured by:

- annual growth that is 0.5 percentage points higher than European average- annual growth of private investments of 4.8% in order to reach the Community

average- creation of at least 5.000 jobs- significant raise of the number of SMEs- increase of R&D outlays of the companies relative to Belgium

- a more attractive region:- turnover for tourism increases by 10%- number of jobs in tourism increased by 5%- better capacity for waste treatment and water purification

- integration of young people and disadvantaged people in the labour market- reduction of the unemployment rate for young people- less long term unemployed in Hainaut and a reduction of the share of Hainaut in the

number of unemployed people in Wallonia

As can be seen, these objectives were not always quantified (e.g. better capacity for wastetreatment, significant raise of SMEs), and where they are quantified, this was not alwaysunambiguous. Moreover, since the writing of the SPD, there were some changes in the waystatistics are collected, e.g. there was the revision of national and regional accounts.

Because of this, the interim evaluator formulated a new set of indicators. The interimevaluator also made an estimate of the global effectiveness on the basis of an econometricmodel.The model indicates that programme was effective in creating jobs and reducingunemployment. We can also deduce from the table established per thematic priority that theobjective of creation of 5.000 jobs has largely been achieved. It is in fact from 1997 onwardsthat the evolution of unemployment levels was one of the most favourable in Walloniecompared to those of other provinces.The econometric model also indicates that creation of value added and the objective ofincreasing the GIP per inhabitant have not yet been realised. Indeed, the SPD defines thefollowing global aim of the Objective 1 programme:- the recovery of the gross interior product by 2 points compared to the Community

average in 6 years.The GIP/inhabitant amount to 77.3% of EC average in 1992. This ratio decreased andamounted to only 73.4% in 1998.



5.2 Programme effects

This section focuses on describing the various programme effects related to the overall social-economic situation.It is clear that the programme generated, thanks to different measures, accelerated investment,and also increased investment. Accelerated investment took place because investors couldtake advantage of interesting investment aid schemes during a limited period in time, whichwas a trigger for them to invest now rather than later. But also increased investment tookplace as the aid schemes decrease the investment risk. The financial contribution of theStructural Funds made the investment aid schemes attractive and created as such financialvalue added, but on top of that, each investment project requires a majority of funds from theprivate sector.Hainaut was confronted at the beginning of the period with the highest unemployment figuresin Wallonia. Despite these numbers, vacancies could not be filled due to mismatch betweenoffer and demand for labour. Most of that labour force was characterised by very low levelsof education. The programme has been able to educate and train already part of the hugenumbers of non-qualified labour force.The effects of the programme in terms of visibility for the public remained limited. Forexample aid to SMEs or extension of firms cannot readily be observed. Also in terms ofattractiveness of the region, the problem of numerous uncleaned industrial sites is stillpolluting view of the inhabitants. Some bigger public projects have been visible, for example,the poles of excellence (research centres) or the aeropole around Charleroi.Concern about absorption of resources has channelled some more resources to the measuresfor investment aid, such as e.g. AIDE. The Managers of the Programme monitored carefullythe progress in terms of financial resources used. The consequence of this is that the routineprojects rather than the more innovative projects received additional funding. Innovativeprojects are more difficult to start, whereas projects or actions pre-existing to the Objective1programme can more easily be implemented. Such approach is also compatible with the idea(shared by the Commission) that good working programs are programs that start quickly andare able to expend from the beginning. The N+2 rule in the new period is an expression of thiswish to realise execution as soon as possible after approval.

5.2.1 Programme contributions to overall social and economic changes

Based on qualitative assessments from interviews, this section describes social and economicchanges noted and provides reasons for such changes. The following table gives ourassessment of how effective the Objective 1 programme has been in tackling the variousissues enumerated.

Assessment Why is this?Supporting innovationand research anddevelopment

StrongInfrastructure is put in place (with public funding) andprovides fundaments for the economic development to berealised during this programming period.

Supporting skillsdevelopment Strong

Creation of employment, combined with education of theunemployed has lead to a very positive effects forjobseekers

Overcoming territorialimbalance Weak

Difference in dynamism between the sub-regions hasn’tbeen fully bridged yet. Despite different needs, there hasbeen a more or less equal support to each sub-region.Independent of this sub-regional distribution, in any case,bridging this difference in dynamism will take more than adecade to materialise.

Promoting ruraldiversification Adequate Financially the part of the programme devoted to rural

development was very limited. But given this limited



Assessment Why is this?budget, nice results were obtained in terms of initiating thechange in culture of farmers towards more value addedproduction or processing of products.

Promotinginfrastructuredevelopment

Adequate There were not that many deficiencies in the basicinfrastructure. A few missing links were completed.

Supporting SMEs StrongCreation of new infrastructures for entrepreneurship andsensibilisation toward entrepreneurial spirit within theregion itself rather than awaiting exogenous injections..

Improvingenvironmentalinfrastructure

Weak Very few measures and also unsuccessful measures relatedto environment

Improving energyinfrastructure

Notrelevant

Improving renewableenergy infrastructureand resource efficiency

Notrelevant

Contributing to urbanregeneration Weak There was not really a priority on urban regeneration in the

programme. Some city centres were renewedModernising thefishing sector

Notrelevant

Supportingtelecommunicationsinfrastructure anddeveloping anInformation Society

Adequate Creation of poles of excellence and creation of trainingstructures in the field of telecommunication

5.2.2 Results by thematic priority

The following table contains an overview of the main outputs and results of the programme.For all outputs and results the corresponding measure or group of measures (“sous-programme”) where these outputs were realised are mentioned. The main source ofinformation for these data is the Database for Management of the European Structural Fundscreated and maintained by the Walloon Region.A few remarks must be made:- The following thematic priorities are not relevant for Hainaut: energy infrastructure

networks, and fisheries. A theme that was not present in the table but was relevant forHainaut is “tourism”.

- Often in the table, the initial target is not given. This means that the indicator in questionwas not defined at the beginning of the period, but only added later. Consequently in allthese cases it is very difficult to assess to what extent “targets” have been achieved.

- Sometimes in the database a same indicator is once used as result and once as impactindicator, consequently we classified all outcomes as global results for the differentthematic priorities.

- After the table, the effectiveness per thematic priority is discussed in general way withoutaddressing all the actions separately. The latter was already extensively reported on in theinterim evaluation that was finished in April 2001.



Table 5.1: Results by thematic priority

Core Indicators Targets Results MeasureEmployment - Jobs created

- Jobs safeguarded

3.0001.8001.500/55/2.0709910/

3.2115.9171.8964271471185.1581271123

769

1.1.11.1.21.1.71.1.8SP1.02Axis2bisSP1.032.1.12.1.4SP3.02

1.1.8TransportInfrastructurenetworks

- Batiments relaisconstructed (number)

- Motorways constructed orupgraded (km)

- Other roads constructed orupgraded (km)

- Roundabouts

- Multimodal platforms- Commodity freight (t)- Passenger freight (number)- Cleaning industrial land

(ha)- Industrial zone (ha)

- Number of firms installed- Infrastructure public

transport- Art works

13

/27.814.7820111//

233.31

/554.78121567257

12

2027.567.6817812.319255.321

178.61

30700.76123614246

SP1.03

Axis2bisSP1.03Axis2bisSP1.03Axis2bisSP1.03Axis2bisAxis2bisAxis2bis

SP1.03

Axis2bisSP1.03Axis2bisSP1.03Axis2bisAxis2bisSP1.03

EnergyInfrastructurenetworks

Not relevant

Telecommunica-tions andInformationSociety

- Firms benefiting fromservices

- Telecom centre 1

75

1

1.2.5

1.2.5

Environment - Infrastructure wateradduction reinforced (km)

- Waste disposal treatmentfacilities

- Capacity created in wastedisposal and recyclingfacilities (ton/year)

- Creation of centre forinitiation to ecology(CRIE)

- Activities CRIE (#/year)- Visitors CRIE (#/year)

50

4

12.000

7

0

25

2

22.000

1

6189.300

2.1.4.

2.1.4

2.1.4.

2.1.1

2.1.12.1.1

R&DTI - Firms supported for RDTIprojects

- Private R&D projectssupported

- RDTI collaboration

799147

60

895147

74

1.1.10SP 1.02SP 1.02

SP 1.02



Core Indicators Targets Results Measureprojects

SMEs - SMEs supported:ConsultancyPunctual adviceFirms visitedProjects detectedBeneficiaries infrast.

- Number of new SMEscreated

- Number of SMEssafeguarded

- Number of SMEs enlarged

- Information actions:SeminarsMailingsPublicity actions

- Number of contactsestablished

- Number of follow-ups- Investment generated (in

BEF)

59542165/

/

32.527.668.00035.537.078.000

1999493109541006376768101

120

463263

177121214

4.2892.59026.064.119.96727.032.347.921

1.1.81.1.81.1.81.1.81.1.81.1.11.1.21.1.71.1.8

1.1.7.

1.1.2.1.1.8

1.1.81.1.81.1.8

1.1.81.1.81.1.11.1.2

Human ResourceDevelopment

- Number of beneficiaries- Number of trainees

- Hours of training

40.6303.00544.16866.5613.398.2601.255.005995.96628.653.525

34.2682.35037.02768.8801.718.868320.625374.62020.013.377

SP1.04SP2.02SP3.01SP3.02SP1.04SP2.02SP3.01SP3.02

Tourism - Candidates creation gite- Attractivity communes

- Attractivity parcs

- Subsidised touristicequipment

- Visitors/year- Valorisation natural sites- Attractivity public space

/8148239

1.125.000723

18011138229

705.999723

2.1.12.1.12.1.32.1.12.1.32.1.1

2.1.12.1.12.1.3

Fisheries Not relevantRuraldevelopment- Investment

inagriculturalholdings anddiversification ofactivities

- Level of investments infarm holdings

- Change in output/incomes- Jobs created

- Firms created

- Number assisted

- Number of requests for

100/

1050/

/

37010

23684

23.119

1.1.31.1.6

1.1.31.1.41.1.6

1.1.41.1.6



Core Indicators Targets Results Measure

- Lessfavouredareas

- Improvingprocessingproceduresandmarketing ofagriculturalproducts

- Sylviculture

information

- Pedagogic farms- Visitors pedagogic farms

(children/day/year)- gites- Visitors gites (nights/year)- Turnover of these (new)

activities (p.a.) (in BEF)- Pilot projects- Number of products- Number of varieties- Regrouping of land(ha)- Roads constructed or

upgraded (km)- Centre for quality control :

number of firms visited

- Number of hectaresrestored

- Number of trials

12/

7

60//2.940

11.79

94

/

78

1.310

3024.000

220.640

12.496.159666961751.570

12.29

214

880.46

78

1.1.6

2.1.22.1.2

2.1.22.1.2

1.1.61.1.61.1.61.1.62.1.2

2.1.2

1.1.6

1.1.5.

1.1.5

5.2.2.1 EmploymentThe bulk of the jobs created can be attributed to the first priority: Revival of economicactivity. In particular the following measures are responsible for these realisations.- aid for investment for creation of firms (1.1.1)- aid for investment for extension of firms (1.1.2)- investment fund (1.1.7)- group of measures around industrial environment (“sous-programme” 1.03)The initial targets were largely surpassed, but it must be noted that important budgetary shiftshave taken place over the course of the programme in favour of several of these measures (seesection 4.3).In the table we did not consider the employment created but related to the realisation of theprogramme. Such employment is considered temporary and not seen as a long-term impact ofthe programme.

➧ The success of this measure can be attributed to the fact that before the programme, aregime of aid to investment already existed. The central administration, responsible forthe administration of these projects, was thus used to administering the application forms,and handling the files of the companies.

5.2.2.2 Infrastructure and transport (axis 2B)The contribution to economic development of infrastructure investment depends on the typeof investment:



There were three types of infrastructure projects:- industrial infrastructure (development of zoning and cleaning of industrial land)- infrastructure for roads, airport and other “private” transport- infrastructure for public transport

The development of industrial zones stimulates industrial activity. With the realisation ofabout 700 ha of industrial zone, the objectives in terms of surface of zoning have beenreached and surpassed. This realisation has at the same time been an answer to increaseddemand due to the success of the economic measures (priority 1) of the programme itself.A very important problem that needs to be solved in Hainaut is the cleaning of obsoleteindustrial sites. Such measure also has an important psychological factor for the inhabitantsof the region and their feeling about the attractiveness of the region. Restoration of these siteshas an external impact for the attractiveness of the region and an internal impact on thementality of the inhabitants of Hainaut. Due to absence of the right legal framework inWallonia, achievement remained largely under the objectives. Such measure shouldimperatively be continued in the new period contingent upon the necessary changes inlegislation. Otherwise in 2006, the same conclusion of insufficient cleanings will have to bemade.Investment in basic infrastructure such as motorways and other roads are a necessarycondition for economic development. In terms of roadworks, there were a few missing linksin the road network completed, of which some will have a strong impact (e.g. some ringroadsaround cities, the A8). Another important element that needs to be mentioned is thedevelopment around the airport of Charleroi. Although largely trespassing the objective 1 intime and budget, clearly the development of the aeropole has a longer-term impact for theregion and that is in addition visible for the public.In terms of infrastructure for public transport, the few projects that were aimed for wererealised. These projects however were not inserted into a general vision around mobility forthe region, the budgets were divided over different relatively isolated projects.

➧ Conclusion: transport infrastructure projects were successful. The Walloon Region wasfamiliar with this type of projects, so that the costs of these projects could be estimatedrather accurately, and consequently all targets were met. Much more difficulties turnedup in the industrial infrastructure projects. There were difficulties related to theacquisition of the sites, the heavy administrative burden, the multitude of operatorsinvolved and the absence of a leader amongst them. The feasibility of the projects hadclearly been underestimated.

5.2.2.3 SMEsThe measures that most directly benefited the private sectors and the SMEs in particular are:- aid for investment for creation of firms (1.1.1)- aid for investment for extension of firms (1.1.2)- investment fund (1.1.7)- assistance to SMEs (1.1.8)Also in the group of measures around R&D (“sous-programme” 1.02), a measure such astechnological support to firms (1.2.2) benefited the private sector, but less the small andmedium enterprises. Aids for research benefited relatively more the larger companies: alsobecause SMEs are not always familiar with all the possibilities for obtaining grants andsubsidies



As already mentioned above, the main focus was on aid for investment. These measures werevery successful in terms of their:- attractiveness for the firms- budgetary absorption capacity- employment creation potentialThese measures represented an increase in the existing schemes of investment aid of theRégion Wallone. The result was an average investment aid for firms settling or expanding inthe region of about 25%.Such measures typically have an impact in the short and medium term as the action consistsof a subsidy to one firm at one moment in time. It must nevertheless be noted that about 70%of the foreign investors stayed after the fulfilment of contractual obligations, which is anindication for long term effects. For the enterprises that were already in the region, the impactcan be qualified as one of acceleration of investment. There have been few side effects interms of firms that de-localised, especially in the region of Tournai, but these effects werevery limited.To increase effectiveness of such measure in the longer term, such measures could beaccompanied with a strategic plan defining conditions, norms and selection criteria for thefirms to be settled. Given the success of the measures, the selectivity indeed increased overthe years, but more reflection on, for example, definition of sectors and types of firms that onewants to attract, definition of norms and conditions linked to the subsidy, would not harm.

The combination of the measures 1.1.7 (INVEST) and 1.1.8 (assistance to SMEs) was alsoeffective at supporting the SMEs. Lack of knowledge of aid systems and reluctance towardsthe heavy administrative burdens and requirements are two important bottlenecks forinvolvement of SMEs in the programme.➧ The regional development agencies have played an important role in raising the

awareness of possibilities offered to the SMEs by the Région Wallonne and in assistingthe SMEs to materialise these possibilities.

5.2.2.4 Research and Development and ICTThe group of measures focussing on R&D is the “sous-programme 1.2”, complemented withthe measure 1.1.10 technologic innovation of firms.These measures mostly benefited universities. What needs to be mentioned is the equaldistribution of funds between the three universities: Bruxelles ULB, Louvain UCL, andUniversity of Mons. One can ask the question whether this was a strategic or a politicalchoice.The spin-offs from universities have, during the period 1994-1999, been limited. Withadequate accompanying public policy one could expect these spin-offs to realise in the longerterm. Well-documented choice in terms of the research projects to match demand from theprivate sector and the supply can help to realise such transfers in the current phasing outprogramme.These measures also benefited to some extent the larger companies, but technology transfersto the private sector have been limited. Again, probably it is very difficult to realise andvalorise such transfer within the period of programmation. One should take a longer timehorizon to evaluate the effects. For SME’s fewer benefits can be observed. But SMEstypically do not have the financial capacity to support or participate in research projects.➧ Practice has shown, however, that a more dynamic approach, with local operators

(regional development agencies) taking the information initiative, can lead to increasedparticipation of firms in general and SMEs in particular. Participation of the private sectorand the realisation of synergies with the private sector require bridging the distance



between the Région Wallone and the private sector. It must also be noted that in the newprogramming period more partnerships between firms, research centres and universitiesare emerging.

5.2.2.5 Education and TrainingEducation and training are financed under the third priority, except for measures 3.2.7(insertion by social economy) and 3.2.8 (prevention of pathologies), and under the “sous-programme” 1.4. All these measures are financed by ESF.The third axis of the programme deals with the development of human resources by focussingon three topics:- the improvement of educational and training systems- the support of training for job-seekers- the creation of tools for the professional insertion of young job-seekersThe direct outputs of the actions supported by ESF can be found in the table above. But theESF measures also contributed to some realisations that go beyond the direct outputs.- In the 1994-99, the focus was put on trajectory assistance, which was a new way of

thinking. This required a restructuring of the whole field of education and training: theoperators don’t have to offer their courses independent of the other operators, but mustconsider their training as part of a broader career. Within the Objective 1 programme, thesystems have been put in place to create a link between the training operators. The co-ordination between the players must facilitate the transition of the trainee from oneoperator to another. The Objective 1 programme clearly contributed to a large mobilityof trainees between different suppliers of training.

- Secondly, the measures dealing with social economy (3.2) were a pilot. The Objective 1programme allowed for the exploration and stimulation of activities in that field, whichproved to be very important for the professional insertion of some groups of jobseekers.

- Thirdly, the Objective 1 programme contributed to a higher quality of the supply oftraining in the region, through the creation of new centres of competence.

- Finally, an enhanced openness of education and training towards the economy, thecompanies has been realised. By means of the pilots in the Objective 1 programme (e.g.the creation of mini-enterprises at school) a shift in culture, mentality has been achieved.

➧ The ESF-cell tried hereby to stimulate as much as possible the more active measures. Itwas a deliberate option not to use the available funds for the paying of unemploymentbenefits, but to use them to encourage active ways of dealing with unemployment andeducation.

Some of the projects financed by ESF showed some delay. The reasons thereof were twofold:➧ Some of the projects were dependent upon the finalisation of another part of the project

financed by ERDF, e.g. the building of a training centre. As long as the building wasn’tfinished, training courses could not get started.

➧ The projects of the traditional operators for training (FOREM e.g.) showed a quick start.The more innovative project often involved new operators, with whom the ESF-cell wasnot used working. This also caused some (minor) delays.

5.2.2.6 EnvironmentIssues around the environment are tackled in measures 1.3.2 (industrial grounds) and 2.1.4(water and waste treatment). In measure 2.1.1 there is an action around creation of a centre for



initiation to ecology, which is in fact an action for tourism, but aimed at raising awarenessaround environmental issues.The actions for cleansing of industrial grounds were discussed under infrastructure (seeabove). The actions for water treatment, initiated under objective 1, have been realised thanksto the financing of the Région Wallone as the budget for these actions was diminished overthe course of the programme. The actions for waste treatment have an innovative character.The target in terms of capacity created in waste disposal and recycling facilities has largelybeen surpassed.The environment was included as horizontal priority in the sense that each project descriptionhad to contain information about the impact on the environment. This was a requirementinitiated by the rules of Région Wallone.

5.2.2.7 Rural development and agricultureRural development is supported by the measures 1.1.3 to 1.1.6 and 1.1.9 and financed byEAGGF. Measures 1.1.3 to 1.1.5 are in fact aid schemes of which 1.1.3 and 1.1.4 successfulinvestment aid schemes. Rural development is also supported by the measures 2.1.2 and 2.1.3(both related to rural tourism), but only measure 2.1.2 is financed by EAGGF. The actionsunder 2.1.3 tackle more the attractiveness of rural communes and are financed under FEDER.Agriculture in Hainaut is relatively well developed compared to other regions in Wallonia.About one third of the Walloon farmers live in Hainaut. The agricultural issues or “problems”are not worse in Hainaut than in other regions. There are, for example, no particularly lessfavoured areas. Increasing competitiveness of agricultural products was also not really apriority for the programme, as the Région Wallone has very little impact on the prices set byEurope. The main priority of the rural development programme was to try to increase theproportion of products with higher value added. The processing industry is very little presentin Hainaut whereas the region produces a lot of base products. Prices and quantities of thesebase products are mainly determined on European scale and can hardly by influenced by theregion. In other words, the aim was thus to develop the processing industry.Assessing the effects of the programme for rural development is not easy given the differentexternal events that took place such as mad cow disease, dioxine crisis et al. Nevertheless themeasure 1.1.3 was, despite a slow start, very successful.Reasons for that success are (i) the relatively high rate of investment aid, thanks to thefinancial value added of EAGGF above the existing aid scheme, (ii) real value added could berealised in the potato market (less regulated by Europe). Towards the end of the programssome farmers initiated even additional investment for their new activities, which is at thesame time an indication of long-term effects.In terms of rural tourism, there should be more synergy between the ERDF and the EAGGFfund, but given the separate rules for governing the funds, this is very hard to realise.

5.2.2.8 TourismPriority 2 aimed at increasing the attractiveness of the region, under which mainly the “sous-programme” 2.1. Measure 2.2 resorts under ESF as a measure of education and training, butalso aimed at the sector of tourism.The target groups for these measures are the communes, the provinces, non-profit associationsand the regional development agencies. SMEs are not eligible under this programme fortouristic projects. The main intermediaries for tourism are nevertheless the regionaldevelopment agencies. The role taken by the RDA determines the success of the projects. Asthere are five different RDAs in the region, it is clear that the initiated projects are linked tothe offer and also partly reflecting their agenda. In addition the role assumed for managingtouristic project is also different from one RDA to another: Some are more dynamic thanothers in taking this responsibility, with consequently differing project results.



Improving attractiveness of the region remains an important priority for any strategicdevelopment plan of the region of Hainaut. Several good projects were conducted, but duringthe period 1994-1999, the different initiatives have mainly been taken relatively independentof one another. An integrated strategic plan for tourism development was not existing at thebeginning of the programming period. In the meanwhile, for some sub-regions such plan hasbeen designed.To increase the effectiveness of touristic projects for the phasing out programme, anintegrated vision for the sector of tourism in the whole region should be further articulated.Further attention should also be paid to an integrated approach in the managing of the projectsthemselves with attention for solutions for valorisation and exploitation after initiation of theprojects.

5.2.3 Key influences

5.2.3.1 AbsorptionConcern about absorption of resources had a serious effect on the practical implementation ofthe strategy. A first example is the translation of the strategy into measures and projects.Because the programme-makers feared that funds wouldn’t be fully used, there was aninformal consultation round when drafting up the development plan for Hainaut. The largerprojects were carefully chosen in function of the strategy, but to absorb available resources,additional projects were selected, and this selection was often more supply-based thanstrategy-driven.Also in the course of the programme, absorption concerns prevailed. Because of this, unusedresources were channelled to the measures that showed a quick start and could rapidly absorbmore resources. The consequence of this is that the routine projects rather than the moreinnovative projects received additional funding.

5.2.3.2 Leverage and co-financingThe financial leverage of the community financing was significant. When we look at theactual expenditure in the period 1994-2000, for each euro spent by the Structural Funds,regional and other public authorities made a contribution of 1.07 euro, while the private sectoradded 1.65 euro. This means that the private sector made a significant effort (44% of totalcost) and it is likely that without the Objective 1 programme, its contribution would have beenless high.The leverage effect differs across measures and funds. While on average the private sectorpaid 44% of all expenditure, large differences appear between funds. Measures that were co-financed under ERDF show the largest private participation (53%). The ESF-measures on theother hand are only paid for 5% by the private sector.The measures with the highest financial leverage effect are ACE and AIDE, the investmentaid schemes. The private sector bears 70-72% of the cost of these measures.An EAGGF measure with high private participation (55%) is measure 1.1.3 (adapting theagricultural value chain).Private participation in measures dealing with tourism and rural development was limited (3to 4%) and non-existing for transport infrastructure projects.

5.2.4 Success factors and obstacles to effectiveness

5.2.4.1 ProgrammingThere has been at the start reflection of the Région Wallone towards a well-defined strategy.Studies of Prof. Quévit (Rider-UCL) and Prof. Capron (ULB) on respectively the labourmarket and the macro-economic situation in the region lie at the basis of the strategy for theSPD Objective 1 for Hainaut.



The way the strategy was implemented has, however diminished its initial potentialeffectiveness. First of all there was probably too much dispersion of funds. This dispersiontook place in two ways: across measures (see discussion on concentration below) and acrossregions. One can say that the programme was characterised by sub-regional distributiondespite differing needs across regions. Of course, this is linked to the political fact that thereare five different regional development agencies in the province of Hainaut, compared to onein other provinces. Second, selection of projects was often too much driven towardsbudgetary absorption rather than regional development. As already explained above, this ispartly linked to the Commissions philosophy, but it does lead to more innovative projectsbeing set aside. Sometimes selection of projects was also influenced by (i) lobbying force ofregional development agencies and (ii) equal treatment of the different regions, rather thanfrom strategic choice.

5.2.4.2 PartnershipClearly, more synergies between projects and (more) partnerships between local operatorscould have increased effectiveness of the programme. The dynamism of all operators in thisrespect was very much different in 1999 than in 1994. In the new programming period, amuch heavier accent is placed upon partnership in general to increase effectiveness.Generally, partnership between projects was higher for ESF measures given that often thesame operators are involved.

5.2.4.3 Cross-border and transnational co-operation and networkingTransnational co-operation was not one of the priorities of the Obj 1 programme, contrary tothe Community Initiative Interreg. Some projects however have had an interregional orinternational impact. We mention for instance the project “Optical fibre network” whichcreated an optical fibre infrastructure that was not limited to province or even countryborders. The network was constructed along the highways in Hainaut, and is connected withnetworks in the other (Walloon and Flemish) provinces. Moreover, interconnections withnetworks in France (Lille), Germany and Luxembourg are planned. Towards Brussels,interconnection has been realised.

5.2.4.4 ConcentrationTwo measures for aid for investment (1.1.1 ACE and 1.1.2 AIDE) received very largebudgets. They cover 50% of planned budgetary outlays. On the other hand, 14 measuresreceived less than 10 million EUR, and 18 measures received between 10 and 50 millionEUR. Those measures (75% of all measures) only cover 23 % of total budget. For thosemeasures one can indeed speak of important dispersion of funds over measures, whichdiminishes possible impact of each of the measures and/or actions. This is especially so ifthere then in addition little synergies between projects.

5.2.4.5 ImplementationAt the beginning of the period, there was little support and guidance for projects. This is truefor the administrations as well as for the local operators. There were simply no strongorganisational structures in place.The Région Wallone was a relatively new administration (with regionalisation laws datingfrom the end of the eighties) and was suddenly confronted with a programme (although smallto EC norms) of that scope and budgetary size. The central co-ordinating administration wasonly put in place in 1999. Also the regional development agencies had very specialised tasks,compared to the roles they perform nowadays in terms of really developing the region. Theslower start of the programme is definitely also attributable to these deficiencies ininstitutional arrangements.Other reasons for the slower start of the programme are:



- necessity to carry out feasibility analyses for some projects caused delays (e.g. Parcd’Aventures Scientifiques, Transhennuyère)

- some projects were approved without thinking thoroughly beforehand on the practicalimplementation. The heavy administrative or judicial burden was underestimated (e.g. forthe cleaning of industrial grounds, e.g. for Eau d’Heure.

5.2.4.6 Synergy effectsMost influence between Structural Fund programs and domestic (regional) policies andprogrammes is being channelled from the Objective 1 programme to the domestic ones. Animportant synergy effect arises from the evaluation methodology. Belgium did not have atradition of evaluation. Since evaluation was obliged under the Structural Funds framework,regional governments and sometimes even local operators have started to evaluate their ownpolicies and programmes.Internal synergy effects were rather weak. The Walloon Region had developed some supportschemes that provide financial grants to companies settling or expanding in the region, toagricultural holdings created or expanded, and set up a risk capital fund. These aids had tostimulate economic activity. All other measures were seen supportive to the economicrecovery in the region, but because of the fragmentation of budgets and because of the supply-driven project selection process, the other projects were carried out independently of eachother, and also often without knowing the strategic vision behind the programme. Moreinternal synergies between projects could have enhanced effectiveness of the programme.

5.2.4.7 OtherIncreasing in the learning curve for operating the programme is definitely one of the mainqualitative merits of the programme. The experience gained in operating and managing theprogramme, together with the different audits (Région Wallone and EC) performed and theevaluations conducted have led to important changes in the process-management. Tangibleresults of these changes are the electronic database developed. Aim was to harmonisereporting of the different functional administrations on the projects for not only financialperformance, but also physical performance of the projects.

5.2.5 Horizontal issues

5.2.5.1 Equal opportunitiesThe SPD mentions that the programme is coherent with the European policy on Equalopportunities. In practice, the contribution of the programme to the issue is minimal. The exante evaluation of the programme recommended that the programme would focus more on theentry of women in the labour market and on long term unemployment. Nevertheless, thesegroups were not specifically targeted in the programme.In the following table, the unemployment rates for men and women in Hainaut are given forthe period 1993-99. Over the whole period, the difference between both series approximates6-7 percentage points. Both rates show the same movements, except for 1998-99. In thisyear, female unemployment decreased, while the unemployment rate for men furtherincreased.

unemployment rate 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999women 18.3 18.9 19.6 19.5 18.8 20.8 19.4men 11.0 13.1 13.3 13.1 13.0 14.1 14.6



5.2.5.2 EnvironmentThere were actions in the programme dealing with environmental concerns, but these projectsrepresented only a limited percentage of the total budget. Moreover budgets were reviseddownwards because of implementation problems.Measures from the programme dealing with environment are for instance (see discussionabove):- Cleaning industrial grounds (measure 1.3.2)- Water and waste treatment (measure 2.1.4)The environment was included as horizontal priority in the sense that each project descriptionhad to contain information about the impact on the environment. This was a requirementinitiated by the rules of Région Wallone. For example, for some the infrastructure project A8,an environment-friendly itinerary was chosen.

5.2.6 Fund distribution and effectiveness

The fund effectiveness can immediately be read from table 5.1. as:- results of ESF financed measures are included under Human Resource Development;- results of EAGGF financed measures are included under Rural Development and

Sylviculture;- all remaining results are results of measures financed under ERDF.

5.2.6.1 ERDFThe bulk of ERDF resources were used for the economic diversification. The maininstruments were the development of several financial support schemes for firms generatingextra jobs, and the stimulation of R&D activity.Most of the jobs created can be attributed to the financial support schemes. Direct investmentaid schemes like ACE, AIDE, or the creation of a risk capital fund (INVEST) createdrespectively 3.211, 5.917 and 1.896 new jobs. These measures showed a rapid start. This isdue to the fact that the government had experience with handling similar aid schemes, andthat once the SPD was approved, the project could start immediately. No long procedureswere necessary before the actual start of the project, contrary to the construction-type ofprojects where after approval, several steps have to be taken before the actual start (eg. publicadjudication of works, expropriations…)The stimulation of new economic activity in the region is supported by other measures co-financed by ERDF that try to make the province more attractive for investors, tourists and theinhabitants. ERDF-financed measures realised e.g. some missing infrastructure links,provided for assistance to businesses, and especially PME, increased the capacity for wastetreatment and water purification, and raised the number of tourist facilities. These supportingmeasures can’t be expected to create a lot of jobs in the short term. They must be viewed asthe necessary building stones, which must be put in place to enable future development ofeconomic activity. Therefore, it is at this moment too early to tell their effectiveness.Nevertheless, what can be noticed is that synergies between these measures were insufficient.

5.2.6.2 EAGGFRural development and agriculture were not the main priorities in the SPD Objective 1Hainaut. The agricultural situation was not worse in Hainaut than in other regions. Conformthe aid schemes for industry and services, a support scheme was developed to provide grantsto farms that were created in the province, or that expanded their activity. Other activitiesfinanced by EAGG are rather small-scale and local projects, which clearly reflect the supply-driven selection process. Especially because agriculture was not a top priority for the SPD,



projects were chose based on available proposals by local actors, whereby synergy effectsbetween projects are ignored.

5.2.6.3 ESFESF funds were mainly used to give the people of Hainaut the necessary competences so thatthey are qualified for the new type of jobs that are being created in the province. The shiftfrom traditional industries to the services sector implies that the previous education level is nolonger sufficient ant that new skills and abilities must be learnt.The concept of trajectory assistance was the basic philosophy for improving training systems.The idea is that the competences needed for finding or doing a specific job are compared withthe ones already acquired by the jobseeker of worker. On the basis of this analysis, a path forskill development is then stipulated. The jobseeker or worker can then follow the relevanttraining course with any operator. The result is that the training courses more reflect thedemands by industry, rather than their own interests. Thanks to the ESF fund, more than 21million hours of training were given to more than 140.000 trainees.

As already explained above: Two measures for aid for investment (1.1.1 ACE and 1.1.2AIDE) received very large budgets. They cover 50% of planned budgetary outlays. On theother hand, 14 measures received less than 10 million EUR, and 18 measures receivedbetween 10 and 50 million EUR. Those measures (75% of all measures) only cover 23 % oftotal budget.For ESF, the focus for intervention was on active measures.

5.3 Assessment of Community Added Value

The table below lists what has been regarded the added value of the structural interventions inthe effectiveness of the activities supported. The evidence is derived from interviews with keystakeholders.

Yes No Evidence*COMMUNITY DIMENSIONContribution to economic and social cohesion

1. Additional growth2. Increase in the level of investment x Investment aid was a very important

focus of the program3. Productivity gains4. Greater economic integration

Community priorities5. Infrastructure provision, particularly- trans-European networks- effectiveness of infrastructure- accessibility- energy efficiency and diversific.- new information technologies- connections to drinking water and

waste recycling systems

± Limited: Hainaut already had good basicinfrastructure in place

What still is missing: sufficient waterpurification installations: but budget ofObjective 1 not sufficient for that

6. Regional competitiveness- public and private R&D expenditure- employment in R&D- potential for job creation through

local development initiatives

x Promotion of investment through grantsR&D: mixed: successful for creation ofcentres of excellence at universities, buttransfer of knowledge to companies waslimitedNew technologies: ICT and agro-alimentation



Yes No Evidence*7. Human resources- improved employability- reducing long-term employment- employment rate

x More jobs, less unemployment throughpromotion of investment (demand forlabour) and training (quality of supply oflabour)

8. Environment- Fund contributions to compliance

with environmental standards

± Less than anticipated: judicial problems

9. Equal opportunities- rate of employment among women- # women setting up a business

x not a target of the programme

Balanced and sustainable development10 Better distribution of economicactivities over the Union- regional convergence- degree of concentration of economic

activities- Quality of growth (sustainability

index)

x Sustainability: environment was not apriority in the previous SPD

Hainaut is now a less retarded region,although still opportunities foramelioration

FINANCIAL CRITERIA11. Additionalitychanges in structural expenditure ofnational origin (annual average)

x

12. Financial leverage effect- national public co-financing

mobilised under the SF- private sector expenditure

x Through the investment aid leverageeffects towards both national public co-financing mobilised and private sectorexpenditure

CRITERIA RELATED TO THE STRUCTURAL FUNDS METHOD13. Quality of multi-annualprogrammingdegree of integration between nationaland Community prioritiesdegree of coherence between nationaland Community programming

x The use of indicators, the approving ofprojects (with consequently implicationfor budgets) for a period of multiple yearswas new methodology

14. Enlarged partnershipextent of the partnershipdegree of efficiency

x Partnership developed over the course ofthe program

15. Control – Auditshare of projects audited

x More rigour and control

16. Development of monitoring systemsbased on quantified objectivesshare of measures covered by financialand physical monitoring information

x Lack of definition and quantification ofindicators at the start of the program:lesson for the new programmecreation of a database

17. Extension of evaluation work in thepublic administrationsexternal evaluationsbudget for evaluationsevaluation structuresquality of evaluations

x More evaluation of public actionsperformed.Quality of evaluation has improved:1994-99: only financial follow-up (to useall budgets)2000-06: also follow-up of quality of theprojects

CROSS-BORDER AND TRANSNATIONAL COOPERATION AND NETWORKING18. Added Value of cooperationactivitiesjoint cross-border of transnationalmanagement committeesjoint projects involving administrationsand/or firmscooperation projects with non-membercountries

x Limited: synergies between projects wereonly marginal (except for ESF).Operators of a project were often notfamiliar with the programme, and itsobjectives.2000-06: coherence with the programmeand synergies are explicitly incorporatedin the selection criteria



Yes No Evidence*19. Innovative actionsmultiplier effects in terms of volume ofinvestment mobilised and jobs created inthe regiondegree of transferability of actions(mainstreaming)

Limited: most funds were directedtowards traditional measures

20. Networking and exchange ofexperiencesinitiatives and seminars on exchanges ofexperiences on the Structural Funds

x There were some exchanges with othermember states. The feeling exists that theCommission could stimulate this more inorder to learn from each othersprogrammes (e.g. making programmes,evaluations other countries available)

Other, please specify

5.4 Changes to policy and practice

In the following table, we identify and summarise whether and to what extent the programmesled to changes in policy at regional level.

Policy change Programme influenceStrategy formulationand multi-annualplanning

Strategy of objective 1 had to be a global strategy for the whole province.Such approach was new compared to the sub-regional or local strategiesimplemented before and led to consciousness on realisation of synergies

The Objective 1 programme has also lead to changes in practice that were carried over toother activities.

Practice change Programme influenceCulture of evaluationof public policy

Acceptance that public has right to be informed about the actions ofgovernment and that sometimes public policies need to be adapted toincrease effectiveness

Audit and control More and more attention to judicious use of public funds and decrease inthe political clientelism

Use of indicators More and more attention to real physical results and impacts of policies

5.5 Conclusions on effectiveness

Concerning effectiveness, the programme rates well when it comes to creating jobs andreducing unemployment. One of the major contributions of the programme was the increasedinvestment in the region (cf. the success of the investment schemes ACE and AIDE).However, econometric modelling suggests that the creation of financial value added or ahigher PIB per inhabitant have not been realised. Strong effects were noted when it comes tosupporting skills development and assisting SMEs. The programme has also put in place thenecessary infrastructure that can promote innovation or R&D in the future. In addition, theprogramme encouraged rural diversification, developed the touristic potential of the region,and completed some missing infrastructure links, at least in line with the financial efforts putinto it. The programme contributed rather weakly to overcoming territorial imbalance, inimproving the environment and to urban regeneration.



Effectiveness was somewhat impaired by the dispersion of funds (both between measures andbetween regions) and by the priority to budgetary absorption over a consistent strategy forregional development. Also more synergies and partnerships between projects financed byERDF-EAGGF could have increased the effectiveness.The added value of Community intervention certainly follows from a strong financialleverage effect, but the programme also made a considerable contribution to policy-making inWallonia through the methodology imposed.



6 EFFICIENCY

The examination of efficiency was contractually not required for this Member State Report.The efficiency of the programme is elaborated on in the cross-country analysis.

7 IMPACT

7.1 Evolution of the context

The basic problem in the province of Hainaut was the industrial decline. This decline inindustrial production lead to the multitude of abandoned industrial land, to hugeunemployment figures and extremely limited mobility in the region. There is a consensus thatthese problems are not yet resolved as of today and that the same socio-economic problems ofthe region are still present.As was evident from the evolution of key indicators (see 4.1), for most indicators, theprovince evolved negatively compared to Walloon, Belgian and European averages.Especially the evolution of GDP in Hainaut was rather unfavourable. The GIP/inhabitant forinstance amounted to 77.3% of EC average in 1992. This ratio decreased and amounted toonly 73.4% in 1998. Between 1993-97 the index (Hainaut/EU) systematically decreased,only in 1998 a positive evolution could be noticed. Also growth rates of GDP show a similarevolution, namely the absence of any improvement compared to the EU average until 1998.In 1993, unemployment rate in Hainaut equalled 14% or 33% higher than the EU average and24% higher than the Walloon unemployment rate. Over the period 1993-99, theunemployment rate remained high. Between 1993 and 1995 unemployment rose by 2.6points, but compared to Wallonia the situation does not deteriorate. In the following years theunemployment rate improved in Hainaut, but its position relative to Wallonia aggravated.The average education level was relatively low in Hainaut in 1993. The indicators showedlow values compared to Belgian or Walloon figures. Over the years 1993-99 the number ofpeople with a higher education increased.

7.2 Contribution of SPD to achievement of targets

Although it is clear that the programme as whole has generated strong employment effects(number of jobs created largely surpassed the targets), the relative position of the regioncompared to Wallonia in terms of unemployment figures has not evolved much. The index oftotal unemployment in Hainaut relative to total unemployment in Wallonia evolved from123,9 in 1993 to 124,8 in 1999 (see interim evaluation ULB).Nevertheless, there is equally consensus that important progress has been made during thenineties and that the industrial decline has at least been stopped. In other words, one couldhypothetically say that the socio-economic problems would have worsened without theprogramme.The reason that the programme doesn’t have a large impact in the short term is because asignificant share of the measures/action are of a structural type, which don’t translate directlyin job creation. To measure the impact of different types of investment, he interim evaluatordistinguished between the following type of measures:1) physical capital investment

1a: private (e.g. the aid schemes ACE and AIDE)1b: agriculture1c: public1d: tourism



2) human capital investment3) intangible capital investment (knowledge)

From the analysis can be concluded that two types of investment yield important impacts,namely the investment in private capital and in human capital.This is not at least caused by the size of the budgets allocated to these measures. But anotherreason is that the private capital investments have also the most direct impact on economicactivity in the region, through the generated investment and the creation of jobs.Other types of measures are of a more structural nature. The impact of these measuresmanifests itself essentially from 2000 on and is expected to continue beyond 2005. Theimpact is hence not visible in the short term.

However, although the calculations indicate the significant impact of private capitalinvestments, the results also show that the impact on added value of this type of measures isonly temporary, and hence that in order to safeguard employment, additional measures (of amore structural nature) are necessary. The structural measures must be considered as buildingstones for the future. It is therefor essential that in the phasing out framework, the postponedeffects of these investments are realised through the valorisation of the investment that havebeen put in place in the 1994-99 period.

Interesting is also that investments in tourism mainly have an effect on added value at the endof the calculated period, illustrating the potential of this sector for added value creation andfuture development.

In addition to an impact on added value and employment, the programme also had a moreintangible impact. Most interlocutors agree that the foundations have been built to realisestructural change in the future. A significant change in mentality took place in the region:there is now greater belief that growth in the region should and can be generated fromendogenous growth within the region rather than from a deus ex machina such as a foreigninvestor. Enterpreneurial spirit and potential for growth appeared and are now present thanksto the different infrastructures/institutions put in place. An expression of this change inmentality and belief in growth is for example the increased dynamism of the local operatorsand stakeholders and their willingness to co-operate and to act as partners for the realisationof the development of Hainaut.

7.3 Impact on employment and multiplier effects

7.3.1 The HELM-model

An evaluation was made by ULB on the macro-economic impact of the SPD. Theeconometric HELM-model (Hainaut Economic Lead-in Model) generates an estimation offuture development of the province of Hainaut, taking into account the implementation of theSPD over the period 1994-2005. The macro-econometric model considered the effects ofendogenous growth linked to long-term productivity. The goal variables are value added,employment, investment, labour productivity and R&D. The model is based on the Kaldoriantheory according to which the manufacturing industry is the leading sector of economicgrowth. The dynamics of technical change in the manufacturing sector is a main factor of thedevelopment process because of productivity gains. Given that Hainaut is an old industrialregion, this approach fits well the economic situation. Because the province of Hainaut is asmall open economy, the productivity gains explain to a large extent its competitiveness sincethe trade balance of the region is mainly composed with manufacturing products. Therefore,



it is the increased competitiveness that determines the growth potential in the region thanks todirect or indirect impulse to other economic activities.The model distinguishes between 6 sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, energy, construction,tradable services, and non-market services. 50 variables are included in the model, which canbe grouped into 4 categories: total investment, employment, production and demand.

Figure 2: Simplified scheme of the HELM model

Non-tradable services

Demand

Investment

Employment

Tradable services

Investment

Demand

Employment

Training

Construction

Demand

Investment

Employment

Relativelyautonomous

Energie

Housing

Agriculture

Industry

Investment

Demand

Training

Employment

R&D

Productivity Export

7.3.2 Impact on employment

On the basis of this model, the authors conclude that the additional effect of the SPD on totalemployment is equal to 14.300 jobs in 1999 and 24.400 by 2005.The following table (source: ULB-FUCAM) summarises the main results. The first fourcolumns give the estimates for total and additional job creation (compared to the referencescenario) for two time horizons, 1999 and 2005. These estimates result from the econometricmodel. The final column indicates the actual job creation by the measures.



Measure type Total empl 99 Total empl 05 Add empl 99 Add empl 05 Actual emplPrivate capital investment 18,824 14,001 7,588 8,949 10,395Agric. capital investment 136 330 107 187 440Public capital investment 563 2,971 265 1,519 142Touristic capital investment 222 3,514 218 3,151 91Human capital 12,825 15,480 5,480 6,809 n.a.Private knowledge investm 449 17,632 233 2,085 69Public knowledge investm 0 282 19 849 1,342Synergy effects 3,365 11,736 406 886 n.a.Global impact 36,433 65,946 14,315 24,434 12,479

Consequently, the SPD implies significant postponed effects. The SPD is hence believed tocompensate for the expected reduction of 11.500 jobs in the manufacturing industry by 1999and the loss of 14.300 jobs by 2005.The model estimates that in the reference scenario (without SPD), employment in themanufacturing sector would decrease by 2.4% a year compared to a decrease of 0.5% a yearwhen the SPD is carried out.Moreover, the SPD would realise 8.100 jobs in the tradable services sector between 1994 and2005. This would raise the annual employment growth from 1.1% in the reference scenario to1.5% a year. Nevertheless, in 1999, the figures do not fully confirm this. The 1.500 jobs fallbelow the expectations.Given these expected evolutions in the manufacturing and services sector, the unemploymentrate is expected to decrease by 1.6 points in 1999 and by 4.3 points by 2005, to levels ofrespectively 18.2% and 12.9%.

What indirect employment effects concerns, it should be stressed that these are hardlyquantifiable on the basis of existing information. In order to quantify the indirect effects, amore systematic data collection would be necessary.Indirect effects mainly result from the measures increasing the attractiveness of the region.Also for the R&D measures the indirect effects on employment are probably important.Thirdly, the measures dealing with education and training are assumed to generate indirectemployment effects through the increased employability.

7.4 Impact on regional convergence

In the first phase of the interim evaluation of the Objective 1 programme in Hainaut, theimpact of the on the positioning of Hainaut relative to other European regions (Nuts 2) wassimulated. According to the simulation, the growth difference between the province ofHainaut and the European average equals 1.4% for the programming period 1994-99, with aconfidence interval between 1 and 1.9%.By now, more recent figures have become available. New estimations indicate that thisgrowth differential has not been realised. Consequently, the simulation results have beenrevised downwards, and lead to an estimated growth rate of 2.5% for the period 1997-2002and a European growth rate of 2.7%. This means that the province shows a negative growthdifferential compared to the European average. In consequence, the SPD was not sufficient tomake the province of Hainaut converge to the European average.For the most recent years however, the situation is somewhat more favourable. Nevertheless,there is still a long way to go, whereby an increased attention towards the effectiveness ofactions could be a critical success factor. The selection and monitoring of projects from astrategic perspective rather than from a financial absorption perspective is essential fordurable growth in the province.



7.5 Conclusions on impact

A model developed by ULB estimated the macro-economic impact of the programme as awhole. The programme was found to generate additional jobs in both the manufacturing andservices sector.For the assessment of the impact of the SPD, the distinction between two types of measuresproved to be essential. Investment in private capital generated important impacts in theprogramming period, but these effects on economic growth were also found to be rathertemporary. Investment in R&D has a high long term effect on output, employment andphysical investment, but the simulation results of the HELM-model demonstrate that aboveall it is investment in human capital that is crucial for the recovery process of the region, sincethese investments are characterised by indirect important positive effects on physicalinvestment and employment.The impact of the more structural measures is however not yet visible, since these measurescreate the building stones, necessary for future economic development, leading to apostponement of the effects.The programme also had an impact on the mentality: it stimulated dynamism among the localoperators and stakeholders. The belief has emerged that prosperity in the region can berealised through endogenous, and not only through exogenous growth (foreign investors).The positive evolution of GDP however still remains to be realised. Until now, the Objective1 programme has not enabled the province to converge towards the European average growthrate. The HELM model concludes that it cannot be expected that the intervention will beenough to reverse the divergence trajectory of the province.



8 MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION SYSTEMS

The effectiveness of Structural Fund interventions is influenced by management andimplementation arrangements. The following assessment shows how management andimplementation arrangements evolved over the period 1994-99.

8.1 Institutional Arrangements

This section describes management and implementation systems in terms of institutionalarrangements, representational structure, types of partnerships and capacity.

8.1.1 Overview of the programme management structures

The programme management structures consist of1) Structures for the general co-ordination and management, in particular:

- The Programme Monitoring Committee (Comité de Suivi) ;- DG Economy and Employment of the Walloon Government- Technical and Financial Committees- A steering committee

2) Structures for the day-to-day co-ordination and monitoring, namely:- for actions dealing with “economy and attractiveness” (ERDF): DG Economy and

Employment & the various functional administrations- for actions in the field of “human resources” (ESF): ESF-Cell- for actions concerning “agriculture and forestry” (EAGGF): Direction générale de

l’Agriculture- an administrative task force

In this section we only describe the general management structures. The administrationsdealing with the day-to-day monitoring and co-ordination are described under 8.4 Monitoringstructures.

8.1.2 Programme Monitoring Committee (PMC)

The programme monitoring committee is entrusted with the monitoring of the implementationof the SPD and with the control of the execution of decided measures. In particular, the PMC:- assures the smooth development of the SPD in order to realise the objectives. The PMC

specifically watches:- the compliance with regulatory provisions, including the eligibility of actions and

projects- the conformity of actions and measures with the priorities and the objectives

formulated in the SPD- the respect of other community policies- the co-ordination between the subsidies of the funds and intervention by other

instruments- establishes the provisions necessary for an effective implementation of the measures. For

big projects, the PMC makes sure that the information required in art.5 of Regulation(CEE) n° 4254/88 (ERDF) is remitted to the Commission

- assures the organisation and follow-up of the mid-term evaluation- proposes any measure necessary for an accelerated execution of the SPD when the latter

is delayed



- prepares and reflects upon proposals for modifications to the SPD, when necessary- makes a proposal for the affectation of resources that become available from the yearly

indexing- co-ordinates the actions for promotion and publicity of the SPD- makes proposals for the actions of technical assistance to be implemented- judges the annual reports- periodically analyses the evolution of the situation in terms of disparities and retarded

development on the basis of the indicators specified in the SPD.At the suggestion of the Walloon authorities and in consideration of the partnership approach,the task of the PMC also includes the approval of actions and projects proposed by thetechnical and financial committees.

The PMC met 2 or 3 times a year. The initiative for a meeting can come from the MemberState (by the President of the PMC) or from the European Commission. The PMC meetingswere presided by a representative of the Minister responsible for international affairs. Themembers of the PMC included representatives of the European Commission (DG V(Employment), XVI (Regional Policy), VI (Agriculture), XII (Research), XIV (Fisheries)), aswell as representatives of the ministers of the Walloon government and of the FrenchCommunity, and in particular:- For the Walloon Region: representatives of the

- Minister of Economy, SME and Tourism- Minister of Technological Development and Research- Minister of Internal Affairs and budget- Minister of regional Planning, Patrimony and Transport- Minister of Public Works- Minister of Social Action, Accommodation and Health- Minister of Environment, Natural Resources and Agriculture

- For the French Community: representatives of the:- Minister-President- Minister of Higher education , Scientific Research, Youth, International Relations- Minister of Education- Minister of Budget, Sport and Culture

Also the various administrations, local actors (province of Hainaut, the 5 regionaldevelopment agencies) and socio-economic partners (Economic and Social Council,Employers’ association, labour unions) were represented in the PMC. In addition, someexternal experts attended the meetings. This broad partnership implied that in the period1994-99 on average 51 persons were present at the meeting of the PMC, and in June 1996,there were even 66 participants to the meeting of the PMC.The number of representatives at the PMC meeting by category of actor is given in thefollowing table.



Table 8.1: Members of the PMC

Category Number of members in PMCEuropean Commission 5 to 8 representativesWalloon Region +/- 15 representativesFrench Community 1 to 3 representativesAdministration: 5 to 8 representativesCoordination: 1 to 6 representativesLocal partners: 6 to 13 representativesTrade unions and employers: 2 to 5 representativesExternal experts: 0 to 5 experts

This large size of the PMC had the advantage that it created a lot of goodwill among allparties in the region, and that the programme was supported by all actors concerned.However, this broad partnership also created a lot of overhead, delays in transmittingdocuments, and sometimes inefficient meetings.Not all persons attending the PMC played an equally active role though. The reasons thereofare the following:First, several decisions were taken outside the PMC: besides the PMC meetings, there werealso Intercabinet meetings (e.g. in the steering group), and bilateral meetings between theWalloon government and the EC. For most members of the PMC, the PMC was clearlyregarded as a sort of forum, where all stakeholders could express their views. Nevertheless, aminority of them wondered what they were doing there, since several decisions were takenelsewhere. However, since the socio-economic partners are significantly involved in thepolicy-making in Belgium, and this at several levels, not too much importance should beattached to this remark. Moreover, the PMC as a decision-taking organism wouldn’t havebeen a practical solution given the size of the PMC. The informing and consultation role wasindeed the best workable solution for the PMC.Secondly, a large part of the discussion, certainly during the first years, was about theapproval of projects: The approval of projects was mainly a discussion between the EC andrepresentatives of the Walloon government, who had a decisive vote. The social partners andlocal actors only had a counselling vote. The EC played a very decisive role here. The vetoright of the EC Commissioners has been abandoned in the new programming period to createa larger judicial certainty for the projects.Other members of the PMC were often both judge of the projects and actor involved.Moreover, once a project for a specific region was approved, this inspired actors in anotherregion to formulate a similar project. The members of the PMC then felt they couldn’t butapprove the second project too, since it was similar to the one they already approved, eventhough the second region had different characteristics. Many members of the PMC felt theneed for a more objective selection of projects. That’s why in the new programming period,the process of selecting projects has been changed.

Nevertheless, by the second half of the programming period, the working of the PMCimproved. This was due to two elements.Firstly, in 1996 a steering committee was created to handle the topics that needed fasterdecisions. This was necessary since the PMC only met 2-3 times a year. Due to this, the PMCcould more concentrate on the long-term items.Secondly, by 1997, the number of projects to be approved decreased: most projects had beenstarted. The selection of the projects and the follow-up of financial credits available becameless important. This meant that there was more time available to discuss other matters. Thelater meetings often focussed on a specific topic, such as the results of the evaluation.



8.1.3 The Technical and Financial Committees

At the beginning of the 1994-99 programming period, there were also two Technical and twoFinancial committees, one of each dealing with economic development and attractiveness ofthe region (FEDER-EAGGF measures), the other dealing with human resources (ESF).These meetings were held 2 to 4 times a year, each time shortly before the PMC, since theirtask was to prepare the PMC, and to handle the more practical problems.The Technical and Financial Committee for ESF is presided by (a representative of) theMinister of the Walloon government who is responsible for Employment. The other Technicaland Financial Committee (ERDF-EAGGF) is presided by (a representative of) the Minister ofExternal Relations of the Walloon governmentThe Technical and Financial Committees are furthermore composed of representatives of theEuropean Commission, of other representatives of the Walloon Region or the FrenchCommunity and of the functional administrations dealing with the topic. The president of theTechnical and Financial Committee appoints the local actors and social partners as membersto the meetings. In total, the TFC counted 25 members, but since each (representative of a)Minister had the possibility to be accompanied by a representative of the functionaladministration concerned, there were on average some 30 members present at the meetings ofthe TFC.In particular, in the Technical and Financial Committees the available information wasanalysed, the members proposed a selection and a priority ranking for actions and projectsaccording to the selection criteria of the SPD and according to the progress thereof. Thesepropositions were then submitted to the PMC for approval.

However, the Technical and Financial Committees were soon found redundant. It was oftenthe case that the Committees prepared a position, but the members of these Committees werenot necessarily the same people that were member of the PMC. Hence, the same discussionwas held again in the PMC whereby the preparatory work of the Committees was neglected.As a result, the Technical and Financial Committees were abandoned in 1997.Moreover, by that time, most projects had started, were running, so that the PMC had todedicate less time to the projects themselves, and could reserve more time to discuss othermatters.Given that because of these reasons (different members in both organisms, and graduallymore time available in the PMC) the value added of the Technical and Financial Committeesbecame negligible, they were abolished in 1997.

8.1.4 General co-ordination by the Walloon Government

The Ministry of the Walloon government, and in particular DG Economy and Employment,Direction of Economic Policy thereof assured the general co-ordination of the programme. InJanuary 1999, the Direction of European Programmes was created within the DirectionEconomic Policy of the DG Economy and Employment. From then on, this direction hasbeen responsible for the secretariat of the Programme Monitoring Committee in associationwith the ESF cell, which is a joint construction of the French Community and the WalloonRegion.For the staffing of the Direction of European Programmes and of the ESF-cell, an appeal wasmade to the funds for technical assistance. The direction of Economic Policy enrolled 5technical assistants, of which 1 graduate, 1 secretary and 3 attachés, financed 50% by ERDFand 50% by regional authorities. The funds for technical assistance were also used for thestaffing of the ESF cell. However, since this cell is falling under the joint authority of theWalloon Region and the French Community, and is only created for the length of theprogramming period, the cell could not enrol people on an permanent basis, but had to offertemporary, short-term contracts to its staff. This complicated the management of its humanresources.



The unit within the DG Economy and Employment is in charge of the collection andtreatment of the data necessary for evaluation. The unit is also responsible for the update ofthe database and is the interface between the Programme Monitoring Committee and theexternal evaluator. In addition, the cell concerned assures the secretariat of the ProgrammeMonitoring Committee (jointly with the ESF cell) as well as the administration of theTechnical and Financial Committee dealing with economic development and theattractiveness of the region.This unit assures hence the day-to-day co-ordination, and is the central contact point foreverything relating to the programme.

8.1.5 The steering committee (comité de pilotage)

In 1996 a steering committee was installed. This was because the need was felt to have moreregular meetings with representatives from the different administrations and cabinets of thegovernments involved. The steering committee had very regular meetings (every two weeks)and was of a smaller size than the PMC (± 15 members). The steering committee offered theadvantage of faster decision taking.The tasks of the steering committee were:- to guarantee the regular follow-up of the execution of the programme- to identify the implementation difficulties- to formulate recommendations in order to find solutions for some general administrative

difficulties- to advise on solutions to be implemented by the various functional administrations- to assure a systematic link with the administrative task force- to inform the governments (Walloon Region and French Community) on a monthly basis

on its activitiesThe steering committee dealt with the follow-up of individual projects so that the ProgrammeMonitoring Committee could work at a more aggregated level (measures).The steering committee had regular meetings until October 1998. Because of a change inlegislature, the continuity of the meetings was interrupted at that time.The steering committee ensured regular meetings between the different administrationsdealing with the co-ordination of Objective 1 projects. Implementation difficulties met byone administration were often also present in other administrations, and by meeting on aregular basis, the administrations sought jointly for solutions, that were then implemented byall of them. The steering committee thus mainly created added value for the practicalimplementation of the co-ordination task.

8.1.6 Vertical partnership approach

In the PMC different governmental levels were involved. The EC played a very active roleand had also a decisive vote in the selection and approval of projects. Also the Walloonregion was very largely represented in the PMC. The different cabinets often met at theIntercabinet meetings, and there were regular bilateral contacts between the EC and theWalloon government.The third level, the province of Hainaut was also represented in the PMC, but was a lessdecisive actor in the Objective 1 programme. Contrary to the regional development agencieswho over the course of the programme evolved from administrators to pacesetters in theregion, the province remained predominantly an observer.Because of this vertical approach, there was both knowledge of the local situation and a moreglobal vision present.



8.1.7 Horizontal partnership

As the composition of the PMC shows, the programme wanted to create a broad horizontalpartnership, in order to have the necessary support for the programme.The social partners (employers’ associations and labour unions) appreciated the fact that theywere involved in the programme, but also pose some questions on their role therein.The situation in Hainaut was also typical in the sense that, contrary to other provinces, there isnot one, but five regional development agencies. These RDAs have over time evolvedsignificantly. They were member of the PMC, but also administrators of several projects, andbecause of this, there was a mentality change. Whereas in the beginning of the 1990s, themain role of the RDAs was to administer the industry zones in their region, at present, theRDA’s are convinced that economic development has to come from within the region, andthey have taken up their role as pacemakers for new initiatives in the region.The fact that they were at the same time operator and judge because of their membership ofthe PMC resulted in the demand for a more objective decision process. Together with thewish to reduce the size of the PMC, this lead to some changes in the composition of the PMCin the new programming period. Whereas in the period '94-'99, each regional developmentagency had its own representative in the Programme Monitoring Committee, in the currentprogramming period there is only one representative for all the regional development agenciesof the objective 1 region. This evolution is an indication of increased synergy between thedifferent actors and main stakeholders in the region.

8.1.8 Capacity

In 1994, all actors involved were confronted with a new set of tasks and had to learn to workaccording to a new methodology. Especially at the beginning, there were problems with lackof capacity, both in quantity and quality. Or, not only numbers of staff were insufficient tomanage and co-ordinate the programme, also the knowledge, the experience of handling sucha task was not present. After all, to European standards, the Objective 1 programme forHainaut was not a very large programme, but from a Walloon viewpoint, the programme wasvery substantial, especially compared to other programmes in the region such as Leader orInterreg.Over time, capacity problems diminished. Part of the budget from the technical assistanceaxis was used to recruit people for the general co-ordination (+7) and for the ESF cell (+4).There was the creation of separate unit within the administration, so that people within thiscell could fully concentrate on European programmes, and didn’t have to manage theprogramme on top of various other tasks. At least, this was true for the people dealing withthe general co-ordination. For the functional administrations, no enlargement of capacity wasforeseen.Also the quality of monitoring and co-ordination improved over time due to learning effects.People received additional training to get familiar with the new working methodology. Inaddition, technical assistance credits were used for the creation of a database.

Table 8.2: Capacity in 1994

Sufficient Only withdifficulty

Not sufficient Evidence base

Time xKnowledge xNumbers of staff x

Table 8.3: Improvements to capacity over the period 1994-99

In what manner?management recruitment of extra people (7 for ERDF, 4 for ESF), creation of a separate



unit dealing with European programmes, learning effects, creation of adatabase

implementation training, learning effects, databaseevaluation learning effects, database

8.1.9 Changes to the programme management

In the new programming period, the structures for programme management remain largelyunchanged. Most problems in the past occurred because of people being unfamiliar with theway of working required. Because of learning effects, the management of the programmeimproved significantly over time. No big changes were required for the new programmingperiod. The changes that were implemented for 2000-2006 are summarised in the tablebelow.

Table 8.4: Changes in the approach for programme management

Approach 1994-99 Approach 2000-06 Benefit gained Reason for changeeach regionaldevelopment agencyrepresented

only 1 representativefor all the RDAs

less administrativeburden, moreflexibility, moreobjective

too many members inPMCjudge and actor conflict

veto right for ECrepresentative

no veto right higher legal securityfor projects, moreobjective projectselection

The first big change refers to the representation of the regional development agencies. In the1994-99 period, each RDA had at least one representative in the PMC. For the 2000-2006period, one single person represents all RDAs. This not only offers the advantage of asmaller, and more workable, PMC, but also increased the objectivity of the representativewhen selecting or judging projects.The second change involves the role of the EC Commissioners in the PMC. Whereas in the1994-99 programming period, the EC Commissioner had a decisive vote when approvingprojects, this is no longer valid for the new programming period. The rationale for thischange was the creation of a larger judicial certainty for the projects in the programme.

8.2 Project selection process

At the time when the draft version of the development plan for Hainaut was diffused forconsultation, there was also an informal call for projects, in order to have an idea of thepossibilities in the region. Several bodies were consulted, inter alia the regional developmentagencies, municipalities, social partners…The programme was then finalised taking intoaccount the results of the consultation round on feasible options for the province.In order to assure that the projects with the largest impact on the development of the provinceare selected, specific selection-criteria were fixed for each measure.For measure 1.2.1 (the development of centres of excellence in RDT (Research,Development, Technology)) for instance, the following selection criteria were formulated:- The sustained actions have to concern industries identified as core industries

(telecommunication, aeronautic and spatial industry, biotech, environmental industry,agro-alimentation) and have to permit to remedy the massive concentration in only oneRDT sector, namely the electro-technical industry.

- The actions must try to follow as much as possible the partnership approach. Projects thatclearly define interface actions with companies, will be given preference to.

- Therefore, the needs and potential of PMEs, as revealed by the RDAs (see othermeasures) have to be taken into account



In addition, there were also some general selection-criteria to guarantee that the projects fitwithin the general philosophy of the programme and with the regional policy of theCommunity. In particular, the projects had to demonstrate:- that the intervention of the structural funds will realise additional value for the province

of Hainaut- the need for financing from the structural funds- the best cost/effect ratioThe selection criteria were defined in the SPD and communicated to all operators. Theprojects were then analysed by various instances (the Intercabinets, the steering committee,the Technical and Financial Committee) and the ultimate decision on approval of the projectswas taken in the PMC. Since the PMC met on average 2 times a year, the average duration ofthe selection process was equal to 6 months.However, although formal selection criteria were specified, many found the selection processsub-optimal. Projects were too much selected on the basis of available supply, not from thedemand side. Moreover, not only objective criteria were used.To respond to these concerns, the project selection process has changed in the newprogramming period. According to the new procedure, projects are first subject to an opinionof a Task Force, composed of two “captains of industry”, three university professors, anexternal consultant and the co-ordinating administrations. The Task Force advises the PMCon the feasibility and the suitability of the projects.

For ESF, another point must be added. The ESF cell prefers to work with the existingoperators in the field. Projects by individual companies are not accepted, but the companiesare encouraged to let one of the active operators make a proposal for the project.

8.3 Financial systems

This section will review the financial systems and mechanisms used for implementation, theirevolution, their linkage with the monitoring systems and audits.

8.3.1 Implementation

In 1994-99, the financial system required several flows of information: see picture. Theoperational management of projects part-financed by the Structural Funds requires a numberof additional tasks facilitating transparency of financial flows. Notable among these is thecreation of a database permitting on-line access by the various partners to the physical andfinancial progress of the projects.



Final Beneficiaries

Division Budget AndFinance

Information

Demands forpayment

Information

Direction of Eur.Programmes

Database

Gua

rant

eeD

ecla

ratio

n

Independent Audit

ExpenditureCommission

Administrationand Monitoring

FunctionalAdministrations

The operator of the project declares his expenses to the functional administration. Thisadministration has to perform a control on this declaration within a delay of 3 months. Within6 weeks after the control, the part financed by ERDF and Walloon Region is paid. Somefunctional administrations provide a system a prefinancing for the next three months. TheWalloon government pays the ERDF part to the operator, even if the government hasn’t yetreceived the contribution from the ERDF fund yet.For ESF-measures there is in principle no prefinancing, but for some projects an exceptionwas made. This was decided on a case-by-case basis.In theory, every operator receives his payment within a reasonable time period.In practice however, the parties concerned sometimes suffered from serious delays inpayment. This was due to:- delays with the different administrations involved (with large differences between the

various administrations, especially ESF cell suffered from delays)- delays with the Commission- operators not providing the required information (payment was subject to the fulfilment

of certain conditions, for which the operator must provide the necessary proofs).These delays are considered inevitable. Consequently, no changes are introduced for thephasing out period, relating to the financial system.

8.3.2 Financial audits

In the previous programming period, there was no link between the financial system and themonitoring of output. Payment was made after proof of costs.Over the programming period, some financial audits were carried out, both externally (by theAudit cell of the Inspection of Finance), and internally. These two types of audits are alsocalled first level audits (audits by the administrations) and second level audits (by theInspection of finance). In addition, there were also some controls by European institutions.



8.3.2.1 Internal audits (First level)The first level of audits is carried out by the functional administrations responsible for thepayments of the Community intervention. These audits cover ALL projects that are co-financed and represent a significant portion of eligible expenditure. The internal audits consistmainly of checking if all necessary conditions are fulfilled for making the payments. Alljustification pieces of expenditure and reports written by operators are subject to control.Most controls are performed on the basis of the proofs provided, but many controls are alsoperformed on place.For ESF measures, each year a sample of projects covering one third of the operators, wassubject to inspection. It were people from the ESF cell who acted as an inspector for theprojects that were administered by their colleagues. So each person was responsible for thefollow-up of his own projects, and was inspector for some other projects. In the 2000-2006period, the structure within the ESF cell has changed. A completely independent inspectionunit has been created within the ESF cell.

8.3.2.2 External audits (Second level)The Audit cell of the Inspection of Finance is responsible for the controls as described inArt.3 and 4 of Reg. 2064/97 of the Commission. The Inspection of Finance (IF) isindependent of the administration authorities of the Walloon Region and of the FrenchCommunity. The Audit Cell of the IF is composed of one Inspector, three auditors and onesecretary.These controls encompass both project audits (audits of individual projects) and system audits(verification of the quality of the administration and monitoring system put in place by theMember State).To perform these audits, the Inspection of Finance received methodological assistance from aconsultant specialised in financial audits.

- Project auditsThe Audit cell carried out some audits on project, whose combined value is at least 5% oftotal expenditure. The Audit cell started its activities in October 1998. The first auditcampaign was launched in the second half of 1999.The number of project audits is given in the following table:

Fund Number of audits Number of measuresERDF 21 9ESF 26 10

EAGGF 8 5FIFG 1 1

TOTAL 56 25

The methodology followed by the Audit cell was principally based on the Financial controlaudit manual of the European Commission.

- System auditsThe system audit for Objective 1 – ERDF showed the following course:

beginning of 1999: elaboration of procedure2001 audit of the central co-ordination administration and two

functional administrationsfirst half of 2002: reporting



The Audit cell started its activities with a description and a first evaluation of the strengthsand weaknesses of the main administrations dealing with the administration of theCommunity interventions.

8.3.2.3 Controls by European institutionsThe controls carried out by European institutions are summarised in the following table:Programme Subject Date InstitutionCommunity Framework for Obj 2

(1989-93), SPD Obj 1 Hainaut(1994-99) and Communityinitiatives

Community interventions withregional purpose in favour ofPME in Hainaut

Oct 95 EuropeanCourt ofAuditors(ECA)

SPD Obj 1 Haunaut (1994-99) Measure 1.1.1 May 96 ECASPD Obj 1 Haunaut (1994-99) Guarantee declarations for the year

1996Apr 96 ECA

SPD Obj 1 Haunaut (1994-99) Intermediary evaluation Dec 97 ECASPD Obj 1 Haunaut (1994-99) Impact on employment of ERDF

support to companiesMay 99 ECA

SPD Obj 1 Haunaut (1994-99) ERDF Control 28 sept - 1 oct 99

DG Financ.Control

SPD Obj 1 Hainaut (1994-99) andSPD Obj 2 Liège (1994-96)

Control of implementation of Mid-Term Review for StructuralFunds, and notably ERDF

Oct 98 ECA

8.3.3 Contribution of the audits

The audits described above contributed to an increased effectiveness of the programme in thefollowing way:An Audit Committee was created composed of high-level civil servants of theAdministrations responsible for the co-financed projects. This Audit Committee diffused theconclusions of the project and system audits to the various Administrations. This spread ofinformation contributed to the implementation of good practices.Good practices include the higher attention that went towards:- the need to have documented procedures- the necessity to analyse functions and the separation of tasks- …

8.4 Monitoring structures

As mentioned before, there are different administrations dealing with the monitoring of theprogramme according to the fund. The various functional administrations of the Walloongovernment were responsible for the follow-up of ERDF projects, the ESF cell monitoredESF actions, while the DG of Agriculture handled everything dealing with agriculture (andfisheries). The Administrative Task Force took care of the co-ordination between all theseadministrations.

8.4.1 Monitoring of ERDF actions

The day-to-day administration and the monitoring of the ERDF projects is performed by thefunctional administrations from the Ministry of the Walloon Region, the Ministry ofEquipment and Transport, and the Ministry of the French Community.These functional administrations include:- Direction générale des Technologies, de la Recherche et de l’Energie (Walloon Region)



- Direction générale de l’aménagement du Territoire, du Logement et du Patrimoine(Walloon Region)

- Direction générale des Autoroutes et des Route (Ministry of Equipment and Transport)- Direction générale de l’Agriculture (Walloon Region)- Direction générale des Ressources Naturelles et de l’Environnement- Direction générale de l’Action Sociale et de la Santé- Direction générale de l’Economie et de l’EmploiIn these functional administrations no extra capacity was foreseen for the execution of thetasks brought about by the Objective 1 programme.The general co-ordination of the ERDF actions was originally performed by the Direction ofEconomic Policy. Later on, the Direction of European Programmes was created. This co-ordination is carried out according to an administration scheme, harmonised for the whole ofERDF programmes, and applied since the ministerial circular letter approved by the Walloongovernment on December 21st 1995.

8.4.2 Monitoring of ESF actions

The ESF cell performs the co-ordination and monitoring of the actions dealing with humanresources (the ESF part). The difficulty with these measures is that regional policy andEuropean programmes fall under the responsibility of the Walloon Region, whileEmployment is a power of the French Community. This division of authorities implied that astructure was created jointly by the French Community and the Walloon Region: the ESF cell.The ESF cell has the following tasks:- the introduction of demands for support from the ESF fund into the Oracle system of the

EC as well as the internal treatment of information covering the different steps ofadministration of records, and the financial follow-up of the projects.

- the control of paper documents (means, content, beneficiaries)- the control of information communicated according to the same criteria (means, content,

beneficiaries) by the external inspection service upon which the ESF cell can call.- the secretariat of the PMC (jointly with the DG Economy and Employment)- the secretariat of the Technical and Financial Committee dealing with ESF measures- information and publicity- the placing of agents of the sub-regional committees of employment and training, whose

task it is to stimulate the European issues at sub-regional level

For the realisation of its tasks, the cell was staffed with 4 full time equivalents. The workingcosts were financed for 50% by ESF, the remainder by the public authorities.This complex structure has some inherent difficulties though. Since the Cell falls under thetutelage of both the Walloon Region and the French Community, the structure is regarded as atemporary one, and people cannot be enrolled on a permanent basis. This created significantproblems for the human resource management of the cell itself.

8.4.3 Monitoring of EAGGF

The co-ordination and monitoring of EAGGF is performed by the Direction General ofAgriculture of the Walloon Government. More specifically, the Direction General ofAgriculture is in charge of:- the link with the Commission (DG Agriculture) for the agricultural actions- the follow-up of agricultural projects



- the execution of demands for modifications to the programme (terms of payment, shiftsbetween measures …)

- the creation of financial tables for the Commission, the Intercabinet FST, the Technicaland Financial Committees, and the Programme Monitoring Committee

- the remittance of demands for engagement and for payment of the EAGGF contributionwith the Commission

- the contribution to redaction of the annual reports where it concerns agricultural actions- the participation to evaluation tasks

8.4.4 Administrative Task Force

Because the day-to-day monitoring was split over so many administrations, semestrialmeetings between these administrations were foreseen through the creation of anadministrative task force. The task of this Task Force was to facilitate the communication andexchange of information between the Direction of Economic Policy and the functionaladministrations.The members of this Task Force were the representatives of the different administrativeservices (ERDF measures), while the associate members came from the cells dealing with theco-ordination and administration of ESF (ESF cell) and EAGGF (DG Agriculture).The initiative for a meeting went out from the Direction of Economic Policy.

8.4.5 Quality of monitoring

The Objective 1 programme provoked huge changes in the way the administrations had tomonitor. Because none of them were used to defining and monitoring indicators, the processof monitoring had a very difficult start. The difficulties for instance arose with the differenttransfers of data (first from the operators to the functional administrations, then from thefunctional administrations to the general co-ordination, and next from the general co-ordination to the PMC and EC – see figure). The inexperience was also evident from theindicators, which were not formulated clear and unambiguous.



Figure 3: Flows of information

Commission

Dir. Pol. Econ.Evaluation

Independent Audit

Dir. Eur. Progr.

Database

FunctionalAdministrations

Admin. AndMonitoring

Final Beneficiaries

COORDINATION ADMINISTRATIONMONITORING

Nevertheless, over the years, monitoring benefited from learning effects. The regularity andtimeliness of reporting improved. Also the quality of the data improved through theformulation of better indicators. Reporting became more and more a routine, and wasfacilitated through the installation of a database.Only the ESF administration suffered from continued problems with timely and accuratereporting, for instance when deliveries were required for the annual report. This was mainlydue to its internal problems with human resources (see above).

8.5 Programme evaluation

This section describes programme evaluation activities undertaken in terms of frequency,capacity, quality and added value with regard to the effectiveness of Objective 1 programmes.

8.5.1 How was the programme evaluated

The programme was evaluated both externally and internally.Over the programming period, there were two big evaluation moments by external experts.The first one dealt with the period 1994-97, and was performed by SEMA ULB. The secondinterim evaluation covered the period 1998-2000, and was split in two parts. The first part, theESF-part, was carried out by CEMAC-OGM while ULB-FUCAM-CEMAC was chosen forthe rest of the programme. In that same period, another evaluation made an assessment of themacro-economic impact of the SPD (ULB).

Besides these external evaluations, the Walloon region also had its own evaluations of theprogramme. These evaluations were of another nature though. These internal evaluationswere mainly a follow-up of financial resources used. Their major goal was to transfer unused



budgets towards other measures. These internal evaluations could not be consideredevaluations of the quality or the effectiveness of the projects.

8.5.2 Changes to evaluation during the programming period

During the programming period, no major changes occurred in the frequency and amount of(internal) evaluation work. There was only reduced evaluation activity at the very beginningof the programme and at the end. At the beginning, most projects still had to be started. Thefollow up of financial resources used was still limited. At the end of the programme (after1999), budgets were frozen and no transfers were possible after a certain date. This alsocaused a drop in internal evaluation exercise.Also the capacity for evaluation and the quality of evaluation remained largely unchangedover the whole programming period.In the 2000-2006 programming period, evaluation is no longer restricted to a financial follow-up of the projects. Projects are now also evaluated against some quality criteria, reflectinge.g. their contribution to the overall objectives of the programme.

8.5.3 Consequences of evaluation

The external evaluation did not lead to major changes for the 1994-99 programming period.There was no reorientation of the programme as a response to the results of the evaluationexercise. The reason is that the (second) mid-term evaluation was only finished in 2000. Atthat time, budgets were already frozen, and the projects were being finished.Also the internal evaluation didn’t allow for major changes to the SPD, given that they werebasically a means of detecting unused budgets. Several budgetary transfers did occur, butthese don’t reflect a change in strategic orientation. The concern to use all budgets impliedthat especially the traditional measures benefited most from budget transfers, while innovativemeasures were put at a disadvantage due to the fear for lack of financial absorption capacity.

8.6 Synergy effects

This section presents internal and external synergy effects, and provides specific examples ofthe latter.

8.6.1 Internal effects

The internal synergy effects between projects financed by ERDF-EAGGF can be consideredlimited, because of the way projects were selected. The selection of projects was rathersupply-based driven, and not the result of an active selection process. In the beginning, theWalloon government saw the Objective 1 programme mainly as an additional source ofresources. The government did not seize the opportunity to make its vision for thedevelopment of the province apparent in the way projects were chosen. Larger synergy effectscould have been resulted when one would have been more selective in choosing the projects,and reflecting more thoroughly on their contribution to the objectives of the programme.The lack of integration or synergies between measures, projects and actors adversely affectedeffectiveness. R&D measures for instance were inserted into the SPD without preliminaryreflection on the most suitable circuits for their effective use, and without an integratedstrategy on the matter.For ESF projects, internal synergy was higher. Through the stimulation of trajectoryguidance, co-operation between the various operators was encouraged.



8.6.2 External effects

The external synergy effects are going one-way: the Objective 1 programme did not benefitfrom spillovers from other programmes. But since the Objective 1 programme (althoughsmall in European terms) was the first big programme to be handled by the Walloon Region,it had a huge learning effect on the way such a programme was administered.

yes no Please provide examplesStructural Fund x methodology, databaseOther national x introduction of evaluation practiceOther regional x introduction of evaluation practice

This learning proved to be extremely useful for the management of other programmes(Objective 5b, Objective 2) and the Community initiatives in Hainaut, and elsewhere inWallonia. Community initiatives in the province of Hainaut include:- Retex, Resider and Rechar: dealing with the reconversion of respectively the textile

industry, the steel industry and the carbon industry- Urban: in the cities of Mons and Charleroi- PME- Leader- Urban- Interreg- ADAPT

These learning effects arise for instance from the database that was created for the Objective 1programme, and is now used for all other programmes too. Also the fact that theadministration now has learnt how to manage such a programme, how to use indicators, etcetera constitute important synergy effects.

Again, for ESF measures, synergy effects were stronger. The operators of projects from theObjective 1 programme and from ADAPT or other programmes (Objective 3 ….) werelargely the same. In addition, they are also involved in the implementation of regionalemployment and education policies.

8.7 Equal opportunities and the environment

This section identifies the role of the horizontal priorities equal opportunities and theenvironment. Although these were not strong priorities in 1994, it is valid to consider howObjective 1 programmes have influenced these themes, but not to judge the programmesagainst these criteria.

8.7.1 Equal Opportunities

Equal opportunities were not a clear priority in the Objective 1 programme 1994-99. In theex ante evaluation, the suggestion was made to focus more on the entry of women on thelabour market, but this focus got lost in the final programme.

Role effectivenessSelection criteria NoSpecial working group No



Specific projects NoInformal understanding NoOther (please state) No

8.7.2 Environmental priorities within the programmes

The environment was certainly an issue in the 1994-99 programming period. Three majorenvironmental problems were detected in the analysis of the situation. The most apparentenvironmental issue was the insufficient capacity for water purification in Hainaut (andelsewhere in Belgium). However, this problem was not eligible to be taken care of in theOjbective 1 programme. The resources necessary to solve this issue far outweigh the fundsavailable under Objective 1. Moreover, the issue not only relates to Hainaut, but must betackled on a larger regional scale.

Two other environmental issues in Hainaut are the pollution of various industrial sites and thetreatment of waste. Both issues were included in the SPD. Measure 1.3.2 envisaged thecleaning of industrial sites while measure 2.1.4 bundled several waste treatment projects.

Role effectivenessSelection criteria NoSpecial working group NoSpecific projects Yes limited: projects difficult to implementInformal understanding NoOther (please state) No

The success of these measures was however limited. Several industrial sites were severelypolluted. The owners of the sites had declared themselves insolvent so that they wouldn’thave to bear the cost of the cleaning of the site, but since they remained the owner of thegrounds, it was extremely difficult to obtain the necessary permits for the works. Theadministrative burden had clearly been underestimated.

Besides these measures dealing explicitly with the environment, the environment was alsoconsidered indirectly in other measures. For the construction of the A8 highway for instance,an environment-friendly itinerary was chosen.

8.8 Conclusions

In this section, we reviewed the management and implementation systems. In terms ofprogramme effectiveness and lessons learned, we can formulate the following conclusions.Good elements of the management system are:- The broad horizontal partnership: this created a broad consensus on the SPD, because of

most stakeholders being involved.

Weak elements on the other hand are:- The lack of an integrated vision with the ERDF-EAGGF projects, which can be attributed

to the supply-driven selection of projects. A more demand driven (or strategy-driven)selection of projects would have resulted in a more effective programme.

- The difficult construction for the ESF-cell, with its human resource problems resulting.



- The unfamiliarity with the methodology, difficulties in transferring information,reporting, collection of data.

Some of the weaknesses were overcome through learning effects over the 1994-99 period.



9 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES, 1994-99

This section examines what the strengths and weaknesses were in the planning and/orimplementation of the Objective 1 programme. Reasons for these highlighted strengths andweaknesses are set out. A distinction is made between process issues and achievements.

9.1 Process Issues

Strengths WeaknessesProgramming good response to the socio-

economic situationmulti-annual planning,formulation of a strategy

supply-driven selection ofprojectsunclear indicators

Partnership broad involvement of socio-economic partners (elaborationof the SPD, members of thePMC)

weak synergies betweenmeasures and projectsweak role of the province ofHainaut

Implementation Huge learning effectsCreation of a database

slow start (new period: N+2)underestimate of administrativeburden, judicial steps to betaken for certain projectsunfamiliar with themethodologyESF cell: difficult structureDatabase not running optimally

Monitoring/evaluation Timely recovery of unusedbudgets for other measures

monitoring was too financiallydriven, not orientated towardsquality which harmed the moreinnovative projects

When we look at the strengths and weaknesses of the implementation process, we notice thatover the programming period, the implementation evolved drastically. Very large learningeffects were realised for process issues. In the second half of programming period, everythingwas working much better. The problems at the beginning of the programming period weredue to the fact that in 1994 people had to learn a completely new way of working ,a newmethodology. Also new structures were created, …Some weaknesses still remained at the end, and these are – were possible – dealt with in thenew programming period.- The selection of projects has become more demand-driven. The coherence with the

programme and synergies with other projects are now being taken into account.- The monitoring of projects is no longer limited to a control of financial progress, but has

been enlarged to include also quality aspects.- Clear indicators have now been formulated from the start- The government has also learnt from the environment-debacle in the 1994-99 period, and

formulated more realistic objectives. Moreover, the judicial framework has been changed,so that some necessary measures can be taken more easily.

Other changes for the new programming period, arise from a new EC guideline that limits thetransfer of funds between years. Because of the “N+2-rule” budgets of year N that are unspentat the end of year N+2 are lost, and cannot be recovered.



9.2 Achievements

The chapter on effectiveness indicated that most achievements were realised in creating extrajobs, and reducing unemployment through the attraction of additional investments. This wasto a large extent generated by the investment aids.The achievements in tourism, rural development are of a smaller scale, but in line with thefinancial efforts put into them.The achievements in the field of R&D can be considered a partly success. The creation ofpools of excellence at the universities was a success. The financial grants for R&D mostlybenefited large companies. Smaller companies however often ignored the existence of theR&D subsidy. Also projects dealing with the technology transfer between companies or fromresearch centres to the companies did not show the anticipated results.

Strengths WeaknessesEmployment good resultsTransport

RoadRail

not a major problemrail: fragmentation

SMEsAid schemesBusiness servicesBusiness infrastructureFinancial engineeringTraining schemes

good results Insufficient selectivity in choiceof projects, certainly at thebeginning of the programmingperiod

Research and Development benefits for universities, largecompanies

unknown to SMEstransfer of knowledge towardscompanies was limited

Education and Training good results ESF-cell: difficult functioning,in terms of human resources andits relative independence blurstransparency of its activities

Rural Development Results in line with financialefforts

Fisheries Not relevant Not relevantOther: Tourism Some nice projects Lack of integrated strategic planEnvironment specific measures foreseen

dealing with the environmentpractical problems for executionof the measures



10 CONCLUSIONS

10.1 Lessons from the 1994-99 period

10.1.1 General conclusions

� Appropriateness:- The four axes of the programme make up a strategy that is considered a good

response to the socio-economic situation. Over the programming period, it becameclear that the region doesn’t have to wait for exogenous investment, but that it canalso stimulate endogenous investment, that is that the mentality of the people mustchange.

- In spite of the clear strategy, the operationalisation in the form of projects showedless strategic vision. A dispersion of funds, a supply-driven selection of projects andtoo much concern about the absorption of funds restrained a coherent and integratedentirety of projects.

� Effectiveness and impact:- The initial targets where insufficient and unclear. This implied that at present it is

difficult to evaluate to what extent targets have been reached. However, it is clearthat the programme was effective in creating jobs. Programme effects were strongwhen it comes to supporting R&D, development of competences and the animation ofSMEs. The programme only contributed weakly to a greater territorial balance, animproved environmental infrastructure or urban regeneration.

- Effectiveness would have been higher if some projects would have been preparedbetter (especially environmental projects) so that the feasibility would have beenassessed correctly.

- The granting of funds to a limited number of operators with whom the government isused working enhances transparency (similar indicators and information collecting)and warrants a quick launch of projects (operators know the methodology). At thesame time however, this also puts a restriction to new, innovative ideas from newoperators.

� Additionality- The added value of Community intervention is clearly evident from the financial

leverage effect it created for public and private investment.- Significant added value also resulted from the adoption of the structural fund

methodology characterised by multi-annual planning and the philosophy of controland evaluation.

- Evolution from a culture of more state control, conducting public policy in ahierarchical way towards public policy as an effective tool aiming to reach clearlydefined objectives has clearly been initiated.

� Implementation- The implementation witnessed some difficulties and delays at the start of the

programming period. But the management and co-ordination of the programmebenefited from serious learning effects over the programming period, while fundsfrom technical assistance were used for the recruitment of extra people and thecreation of a database.

- Important conclusions can be drawn regarding the project selection process. Theselection of projects was not always based on objective criteria, and the monitoring ofprojects was mainly a financial follow-up. This means that projects were not



sufficiently assessed in terms of their contribution to the overall objectives, both atthe selection moment and at the evaluation moments.

- The broad horizontal and vertical partnership approach ensured the necessarycommitment of all actors, but also aggravated the decision process.

10.1.2 Fund-specific conclusions

� ESF:- The distribution of authorities in Belgium implies that several governments are

concerned when dealing with education and training matters. The creation of a joint,structure by the French Community and the Walloon Region is the result (ESF Cell).The fact that this cell doesn’t belong to one administration creates some humanresources problems.

- The ESF projects differ from the other projects in terms of the operators. The ESFCell encourages all interested parties to insert projects into the programme by passingthrough the existing channels. This means that the operators of the ESF projects areused to handle projects financed by the structural funds and are familiar with themethodological requirements (e.g. formulation and follow-up of indicators…). Sincethey are also involved in the national or regional action plans and strategyformulation when employment or training is involved, their actions are generally inline with the policy outlined in the region.

� ERDF- The monitoring of projects co-financed by ERDF is performed by various functional

administrations. Large differences exist in the speed of handling administrativematters and payments, as well as in the possibilities for pre-financing.

10.2 Consequences for the 2000-2006 programming period

Below, conclusions are formulated regarding the extent to which strengths and weaknesseshave been built upon or addressed in 2000-2006 programming, starting by general points andfollowed by fund specific sections.

10.2.1 General

- Selection processAn attempt has been made to have a more objective selection of projects. First of allthere has been a much larger and opener call for projects than in the previous period.Second, the Walloon Region still takes the ultimate decision on approval of a project, butonly after having heard the opinion of a group of independent experts (the Task Force).

- The composition of the PMCThe composition of the Programme Monitoring Committee has changed in the newprogramming period. The broad representation in this committee had proved to be tooheavy for efficient decision-making. The number of members in the PMC has thereforebeen reduced in the new programming period. Nevertheless, the PMC still counts morethan 40 members. Consequently, even in the new programming period, the PMC mustrather be regarded as a forum, offering the opportunity for exchanging opinions, while theactual decisions are still taken in the Intercabinet meetings.

- The monitoring processAlso the monitoring of projects was subject to some changes. The administrationsinvolved now also monitor the quality of the projects, and their contribution to the overalltargets, besides the financial follow-up to what monitoring in the past was limited.



- The definition of indicatorsThe lack of quality of the indicators in the previous programme complicated theassessment of the effectiveness of projects. In the new programming period, efforts havebeen made to define clear and unambiguous indicators at the beginning of theprogramming period.

10.2.2 Fund-specific

� ERDF- The objectives were under more scrutiny with respect to their feasibility, especially

when it concerns projects where permits must be obtained (e.g. for expropriation).� ESF:

- In the 2000-06 programming period, the sectoral funds can no longer be the directbeneficiaries. This was introduced to promote transparency in the gathering anddiffusion of information and indicators.

- A separate inspection unit has been created within the ESF Cell to guarantee a moreindependent inspection of projects.

- In the new programming period, the approach has become more strategic, wherebythe structural funds are less regarded as a form of contribution to projects. There hasbeen a shift from target groups to systems: from projects dealing with target groupstowards the support of systems such as lifelong learning, support to alternation.



11 RECOMMENDATIONS

11.1 Recommendations for the phasing out in Hainaut (2000-2006)

- A more strategic selection of projectsFor the new programming period, some efforts could be made to increase strategic visionduring the project selection processes. Selection of projects more focused on strategicobjectives of the program rather than on sub-regional distribution, will increase theeffectiveness of the program. Acceptance that some sub-regions might be more in needfor financial assistance than others is a pre-requisite to improving the territorial imbalancein the region.Likewise, exploiting all possible synergies between projects and promoting partnershipsbetween local operators and stakeholders will increase the potential of the program totackle the problems in the region. The managing authorities clearly have set this accent onsynergies and partnerships in the program, but attention must be paid to really put thisrequirement into practice and fulfil a more directing role in this respect.

- An improved monitoring systemThe efforts put into the development of the monitoring system during the past periodshould be continued undiminishedly. A clear evolution towards following up theachievement of the projects, in addition to the financial control, took place. However,although a system of indicators is now in place, the dispersity in indicators used over thedifferent measures is an expression of the lack of co-ordination between differentmeasures and projects. Further growth along the initiated learning curve, should bepromoted. The managing authorities might want to play a more explicit co-ordinating roletowards better harmonisation of indicators across projects, and across measures: not onlyin terms of the choice of the indicators, but also in terms of uniformity in definition overindicators. Such exercise is easier if one moves slowly from output indicators towardsresult and impact indicators.Indeed, more orientation toward impact indicators would equally be an improvement: thisdefinitely is already the case for employment (e.g. number of jobs created), but could alsobe implemented for all entrepreneurial measures where one could specify revenuegenerated or increase in turnover for the firms etc.

- Increased visibility of the programmeThe question should be asked whether the Walloon Region would like to increase thepublic visibility of the programme in the new programming period. A way to achievepublic visibility is to augment efforts to increase attractiveness of the region or the imagethereof. Hainaut has several valuable patrimonial and natural sites that areunderestimated or unknown to the public.

- No automatic continuation of projectsFinally, the best way to increase the chance of obtaining tangible impacts of the phasingout programme in the region is to build further on the achievements of the past period.Exploitation of past results however, does not imply blindly refinancing all unfinishedprojects from the 1994-1999 period. Responsible governance demands for the evaluationof some projects. Several projects should be subject to a thorough cost-benefit analysisbefore deciding on their continuation.



11.2 General, long-term recommendations

- InnovationOne should question the promotion of possible more innovative projects. There is acontradiction in the sense that the N+2 rule stimulates traditional measures, but moreinnovative projects might stimulate new dynamics.



ANNEX 1: EXCHANGE RATES USED

Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999BEF/ECU 39.5574 38.1114 38.7785 40.4108 40.6964 40.3399



ANNEX 2: MEASURES IN THE SPD OBJECTIVE 1 HAINAUT

1 Axe 1 : Relance de l'activité économique1 1 Sous-programme 1.01 : Modernisation du tissu économique et développement

endogène1 1 1 Mesure 1.01.01 : A.C.E. : Aides à l'investissement en faveur des créations d'entreprises1 1 2 Mesure 1.01.02 : A.I.D.E. : Aides à l'investissement en faveur des extensions d'entreprises

et créations de petites entreprises1 1 3 Mesure 1.01.03 : Soutien des investissements agricole et sylvicoles1 1 4 Mesure 1.01.04 : Adaptation des structures de production des exploitations agricoles et

assistance encadrement des sociétés de production agricole1 1 5 Mesure 1.01.05 : Sylviculture1 1 6 Mesure 1.01.06 : Recherche de produits agricoles nouveaux et valorisation des produits

existants et nouveaux1 1 7 Mesure 1.01.07 : I.N.V.E.S.T. : Fonds de capital à risque1 1 8 Mesure 1.01.08 : Animation économique, assistance PME; promotion zone1 1 9 Mesure 1.01.09 : Filière aquacole1 1 10 Mesure 1.01.10 : Innovation technologique des entreprises1 2 Sous-programme 1.02 : Recherche et développement1 2 1 Mesure 1.02.01 : Développement des pôles d'excellence en RDT1 2 2 Mesure 1.02.02 : Soutien technologique des entreprises1 2 3 Mesure 1.02.03 : Diffusion de la culture scientifique et technique1 2 4 Mesure 1.02.04 : Partenariat international1 2 5 Mesure 1.02.05 : Pôle de télécommunications1 3 Sous-programme 1.03 : Environnement industriel1 3 1 Mesure 1.03.01 : Développement d'infrastructures d'accueil1 3 2 Mesure 1.03.02 : Assainissement de friches industrielles et urbaines1 3 3 Mesure 1.03.03 : Accès aux zones industrielles et équipements structurants1 4 Sous-programme 1.04 : Transformer la croissance en emploi1 4 1 Mesure 1.04.01 : Soutien à la croissance et à la stabilité de l'emploi1 4 2 Mesure 1.04.02 : Services de conseil, orientation et accompagnement1 4 3 Mesure 1.04.03 : Meilleure adaptation des travailleurs aux mutations industrielles et aux

changements des systèmes de production1 4 4 Mesure 1.04.04 : Dispositif de formation dans le domaine des télécommunications1 4 5 Mesure 1.04.05 : Encouragement des liaisons entre centres de formations, d'enseignement

et les entreprises1 4 6 Mesure 1.04.06 : Renforcer le potentiel humain en RDT1 4 7 Mesure 1.04.07 : Création d'emplois durables

2 Axe 2 : Renforcer l'attractivité2 1 Sous-programme 2.01 : Tourisme - Environnement - Développement rural2 1 1 Mesure 2.01.01 : Valorisation du patrimoine touristique2 1 2 Mesure 2.01.02 : Développement rural 1 : Tourisme agricole, développement équestre et

espace rural2 1 3 Mesure 2.01.03 : Développement rural 2 : Valorisation des ressources rurales2 1 4 Mesure 2.01.04 : Gestion des ressources hydriques et des déchets2 2 Sous-programme 2.02 : Formation et soutien à l'emploi2 2 1 Mesure 2.02.01 : Mesures de formation pour le développement du tourisme et en matière

d'environnement2Bis Axe 2 Bis : Infrastructures de transports2Bis A Sous-programme 2 Bis.A : Autoroutes et routes (DG1)2Bis B Sous-programme 2 Bis.B : Plate-forme multimodale (DG2)2Bis C Sous-programme 2 Bis.C : Aéroport de Charleroi (DG3)2Bis D Sous-programme 2 Bis.D : Transport en commun (DG3)2Bis D1 Mesure 2 Bis.D.01 : Gares de correspondance2Bis D2 Mesure 2 Bis.D.02 : Amélioration des axes routiers en faveur des transports en commun



3 Axe 3 : Donner sa chance à chacun3 1 Sous-programme 3.01 : Améliorer le système d'éducation3 1 1 Mesure 3.01.01 : Recyclage des enseignants et des formateurs3 1 2 Mesure 3.01.02 : Développement de la formation relevant du système d'enseignement

secondaire et supérieur3 1 3 Mesure 3.01.03 : Eveil à l'innovation3 2 Sous-programme 3.02 : Favoriser l'insertion socio-professionnelle3 2 1 Mesure 3.02.01 : Développement de l'insertion socio-professionnelle des jeunes à la

recherche d'un emploi, notamment par la formation en entreprise3 2 2 Mesure 3.02.02 : Développement de la formation et de l'enseignement en alternance3 2 3 Mesure 3.02.03 : Soutien à la réinsertion professionnelle chômeurs exposés au chômage

de longue durée3 2 4 Mesure 3.02.04 : Amélioration de l'intégration des personnes souffrant d'handicaps

physiques et mentaux3 2 5 Mesure 3.02.05 : Amélioration de l'intégration des personnes exclues du marché du travail

par un chômage de longue durée et/ou des handicaps sociaux3 2 6 Mesure 3.02.06 : Service de conseil, accompagnement et placement3 2 7 Mesure 3.02.07 : Insertion par l'économie sociale3 2 8 Mesure 3.02.08 : Prévention des pathologies3 2 9 Mesure 3.02.09 : Services de garderie3 3 Sous-programme 3.03 : Adapter la formation continue3 3 1 Mesure 3.03.01 : Structure pour adapter la formation aux besoins

A Axe 4 : Assistance techniqueA 1 Sous-programme 4.01 : Assistance technique FEDERA 2 Sous-programme 4.02 : Assistance technique FSE



ANNEX 3: OVERALL EXPENDITURE (1994-99) (IN ECU 1994)

Plannedexpenditure

Total Public EC ERDF FSE FIFG EAGGF Public(national)

WalloonRegion

Other public Private

Axis 1 1.895,61 962,07 480,15 388,93 45,54 0,37 45,31 481,92 424,31 57,61 933,54Axis 2 181,20 181,12 90,61 85,93 2,98 0,00 1,70 90,51 73,62 16,89 0,08Axis 2B 77,24 77,24 30,90 30,90 0,00 0,00 0,00 46,34 46,34 0,00 0,00Axis 3 250,04 249,12 124,54 7,56 116,98 0,00 0,00 124,58 80,22 44,36 0,92Techn Ass 7,60 7,60 3,80 2,60 1,20 0,00 0,00 3,80 3,50 0,30 0,00

Total 2.411,69 1.477,15 730,00 515,92 166,70 0,37 47,01 747,15 627,99 119,16 934,54

Actualexpenditure

Total Public EC ERDF FSE FIFG EAGGF Public(national)

WalloonRegion

Other public Private

Axis 1 1.626,45 738,17 364,86 300,51 28,65 0,39 35,32 373,31 336,29 37,02 888,28Axis 2 115,69 112,34 47,95 44,86 1,57 0,00 1,52 64,39 59,58 4,81 3,34Axis 2B 54,99 54,99 21,66 21,66 0,00 0,00 0,00 33,33 19,80 13,53 0,00Axis 3 224,96 216,20 108,01 2,54 105,47 0,00 0,00 108,19 107,43 0,76 8,75Techn Ass 8,17 7,23 3,62 2,25 1,36 0,00 0,00 3,62 3,62 0,00 0,94

Total 2.030,25 1.128,94 546,10 371,83 137,05 0,39 36,83 582,83 526,72 56,12 901,32Note:Planned expenditure: expressed in millions ECU 1994 (as mentioned in the SPD)Actual expenditure: Realised expenditure converted from BEF to ECU by average exchange rate of the year concerned (see annex), and deflated to 1994 prices

ex post evaluation of objective 1 1994-1999 national ... · éligible pour l’objectif 1. il...

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