evolutionary theory in sociology: an examination of current thinking

Sociological Forum, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1990

Evolutionary Theory in Sociology: An Examination of Current Thinking

T h o m a s Die tz , ~ T o m R. Burns, 2 and Federick H . ButteP ,4

After long neglect, evolutionary thinking is receiving new emphasis in the social sciences. Although evolutionary theories in biology are complex, changing, and often controversial, the basic concepts o f variation, selection, and transmission potentially have powerful applications in sociology. In such uses, a crucial distinction must be made between developmental processes and evolutionary processes. Two main approaches characterize current evolutionary thinking in sociology: sociobiological explanations, and coevolutionary accounts o f the interaction o f genes and culture. Evolution through natural selection can occur with genes, cultural elements, and any other self- replicating codes. Although social learning is the cultural analogue o f genetic transmission, cultural evolution does not necessarily maximize genetic fitness. Newly emerging sociological theories o f evolution hold promise o f integrating micro- and macroprocesses, providing explanations o f complexity and diversity in social change, reconciling ideas of agency and structure, and linking sociology to biology without misleading reductionism.

KEY WORDS: evolutionary theory; sociobiology; coevolution; cultural transmission; altruism.

Evolution is history and explaining history is not easy . . . . Despite science's emphasis on the lawlike, history continues to demand explanation. (Taylor, 1987:1)

1Northern Virginia Survey Research Laboratory, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia 22030.

2Clarence J. Robinson Professor of Sociology, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia 22030, and Sociotogiska Institutionen, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.

3Department of Rural Sociology and Program on Science, Technology and Society, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853.

4To whom correspondence should be addressed.

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0884.8971/90/0600.0155506.00/0 © 1990 Plenum Publishing Corporation

156 Dietz, Burns, and Buttel

INTRODUCTION

Since the emergence of the neo-Darwinian synthesis-the intersection of the notions of natural selection and Mendelian genetics- in the early 20th century, evolutionary theory has provided the theoretical framework that unifies the life sciences. Attempts to unify the social sciences around a concept of evolution are even older, but they have never succeeded. Most sociologists learn that evolutionary thinking is an obscure backwater in the history of social theory, one that has little positive influence on the current of mainstream thinking. But concepts and even entire theories involving ecological analogies (e.g., the population ecology of organizations) remain common to this day, and notions of sociocultural evolution persist. During the 1980s there was a revitalization of evolutionary thinking in the social sciences. We believe a new framework is emerging that has great integrative and ana- lytic potential. But in building that framework, social scientists must rethink and clarify some existing approaches, and also develop innovative concepts and tools. The papers by Lopreato and van den Berghe are part of this process. Here we will examine them in the context of the emerging framework, and also touch on a few issues they have not discussed.

It is useful to stress at the outset that the meaning of evolutionary theory in biology has been a moving target historically, and there continue to be major disagreements within the subdiscipline. Thus, what should be taken as "evolutionary theory" in biology is by no means as unproblematic as many sociologists-both proponents and opponents of "biosociology"-typically assume. As an example, this paper's introductory quote, which many read- ers might mistakenly presume was written by a social scientist, is actually taken from the opening sentences of an article in a biology journal in which the author strongly criticizes the reductionist and ahistorical tendencies of the dominant tradition in neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology. The theoretical and methodological dilemmas of modern evolutionary biology- historical vs. lawlike models of causation, individuals of a species being essentially pas- sive vs. active- are strikingly parallel to those of modern sociology. Although limitations of space prevent a full elaboration of the point, we would stress that a sociology that wishes to take up certain insights from biology need not commit itself to any intrinsic reductionism, as there are emerging models in evolutionary biology that are consistent with comparative- historical sociology.

ONTOGENY AND EVOLUTION

The concept of evolution through processes that generate, select among, and retain variability is at the heart of the neo-Darwinian synthesis in biolo-

Evolutionary Theory 157

gy. AS Lopreato demonstrates, the progenitors of modern sociology made some use of the natural selection concept in their work. Elements of the classical theorists' writings on evolution and social change touch on issues that still are salient in contemporary debates. But discussions of differentiation, integration, and social t ransformat ion dominate their work, and it is these concepts that have defined evolution in the writings of most social theorists. As a result, evolutionary theory in sociology has focused on development and t ransformat ion p r o c e s s e s - i n effect, on explicit (as in Durkheim or Spencer) or implicit (e.g., late Parsons) analogies to organismic development. The logical parallel in biology is with ontogenetic or developmental processes rather than with evolutionary processes (cf. Gould, 1977; Van Parijs, 1981). To clarify the discussion that follows, we will refer to the approach typical in sociology and the other social sciences as "developmental ," and to a Dar- winian approach as "evolutionary."

The difference between these two approaches is critical. A "developmental" theory focuses attention on one or several key institutions, processes, or variables, typically by assuming progression f rom a common starting point (e.g., traditional or primitive societies) to a common end point (e.g., mature, developed, industrial, or postindustrial societies). The analysis emphasizes changes in culture or social organization, and its image of social change often is essentially teleological. Microlevel phenomena usually are treated as derivative of macrolevel change or are given little consideration. Even when microlevel phenomena are seen as important elements of social change processes, little analytical power is expended on them. Institutions, culture, and other immanent social forces are center stage. Lopreato notes these tendencies in Comte, Marx, Spencer, Parsons, Lenski, White, and especially Durkheim. Such emphases are present also in Habermas (1979) and Luhmann (1982:255-271; see also Greenwood, 1984, for a further discussion of what he calls "pre-Darwinian" theories).

As Lopreato and van den Berghe note, evolutionary theory in biology focuses on microlevel processes. In particular, evolutionary theory is con- cerned with the generation o f genetic variability in populations, transmission o f information through genes, and the action of natural selection and other processes (drift, migration, mutation, etc.) on the distribution of genes in a population. Macro- or population-level phenomena and structures are of critical importance, but they are derivative f rom the microlevel processes and form part of the selective environment for these processes. 5 Van den Berghe

5This is not to say that evolutionary theory in biology is, or need be, reductionistic vis-fl-vis microlevel determination. Recent innovative statements of evolutionary theory place particular stress on the need for a synthesis of evolution with ecology and developmental biology; instead of treating ecology and development as "the given context," this new synthesis can make possible explanations "that can incorporate the active, often appropriate responses of organisms and the role of organisms in constituting their own environments" (Taylor, 1977:12).


offers interesting hypotheses as to why sociologists are uncomfortable with this approach to linking the micro with the macro. He sees it as a result of "trained incompetence." Lopreato sketches the historic loss of this type of evolutionary thinking in "the masters."

Sociological resistance to evolutionary thinking presents an interesting problem in the sociology of knowledge. But whatever the reasons for a lack of evolutionary thinking, it is clear that both evolutionary and developmental theories, and biological analogies of many types, exhibited a renaissance during the 1980s. We believe it is significant that the renaissance of evolutionary approaches comes at a time of ferment in sociological theory. The 1980s, for example, were a time of reconsideration of broad, encompassing ("grand") theories, but in ways that addressed the acknowledged limitations of grand theories of the 1950s and 1960s: the tendency to teleology and to structural determinism, the lack of falsifiability, excessive stress on either structure or agency, and so on. As we will suggest, evolutionary theory has the potential to be the foundation for more ambitious and comprehensive theories. And van den Berghe represents one theme in the resurgence-the use of a sociobiotogical approach to explain human behavior and social organization. Lopreato's position reflects some elements of the most interesting recent work on sociocultural evolut ion-a coevolutionary approach to the interplay between genes and culture.

A brief consideration of the similarities and differences between these two positions will lead us to examine other promising evolutionary approaches. A first approximation in this overview will be to note that van den Berghe's sociobiology is akin to microsociology in that both focus primarily on microprocesses. Lopreato's coevolutionary approach straddles the micro-macro divide, although with more emphasis on micro than macro. The argument to be developed below is that evolutionary theory (in sociology), which heretofore has been primarily a microtheory, must necessarily have a complementary macrosociology and include theoretical reasoning at the level of the "micro-macro link" (see, however, Clark and Juma, 1987: chaps. 3-5, and Norgaard, 1985, for uses of the notion of coevolution in macro- oriented development economics).

U N I T A R Y I N H E R I T A N C E A N D D U A L I N H E R I T A N C E

According to sociobiological theory, natural selection acting on genes will produce behavior and social structures that optimize genetic reproductive fitness. Thus behaviors and elements of social structure can be explained by their function in enhancing the genetic fitness of the individual. Teleo- logic functional explanations based on "design" are replaced with teleonom-


ic functional explanations based on process (Ayala, 1970; Van Parijs, 1981). The social sciences, in this view, can be unified. E. O. Wilson (1975:5) sees sociobiology and neurobiology emerging as the two approaches that subsume all previous disciplines, while Gary Becker (1976) has argued that sociobiology and economics will suffice to explain behavior and social structure.

As van den Berghe makes clear, the sociobiological model has not been widely adopted within sociology. Indeed, criticisms of it are more common than attempts to use it. Neither Lopreato nor van den Berghe explicitly dis- cusses the critical assessments of the sociobiological program by biologists and social scientists (Fausto-Sterling, 1985:156-204; Gould, 1987:25-50; Kitcher, 1985; Lewontin et aL, 1984; Van Parijs, 1981). One important line of criticism argues that culture should be taken seriously as a mode of adaptation in humans- tha t it must be at the center of human sociology. The sociobiological model presumes that human behavior and social organization, while guided by culture, nonetheless reflect the imperatives of natural selection acting on genes to enhance individual reproductive fitness. The coevolutionary model attempts to understand the circumstances under which culture and genes would coevolve so as to optimize genetic fitness, and how culture and genes might evolve under other circumstances.

Lopreato advocates Lumsden and Wilson's (1980a, 1980b, 1981, 1983) approach to gene-cutture coevolution. In particular, he draws on conclusions from their core models (1981:192-304) that indicate culture will be heavily "channelized" by evolutionary processes to optimize genetic fitness. As his examples indicate, this view of the interaction between genes and culture leads to a position nearly identical to that of sociobiology. Human behavior and social structure can be explained in terms of adaptive strategies that maximize the genetic fitness of individuals. But he does not discuss the criticisms that have been offered of the Lumsden and Wilson approach (Boyd and Richerson, 1983a, 1983b, 1985:163-164; Gould, 1987:107-123; Maynard- Smith and Warren, 1982; Pultiam, 1982; Pulliam and Dunford, 1980). These criticisms suggest another approach to sociocultural evolution, one that is at the heart of emerging evolutionary theory.

CULTURAL TRANSMISSION AND EVOLUTION

Evolution through natural selection is a very general process. Donald Campbell (1960, 1965, 1975) has noted that a Darwinian approach can be applied to any self-replicating code, including culture. Following social rule systems theory, we can consider culture a system of rules that guides (not determines) human action (Burns and Flam, 1987). How do people acquire these rules? One mechanism is through trial and error, where an individual


invents a rule, tries it out, assesses the results, and retains, modifies, or re- jects that rule based on the outcome of one or several trials. Trial-and-error learning is an important source of cultural change, but it is too complex, costly, and time-consuming to be the source of all cultural rules (Boyd and Richerson, 1985:81-94; Pulliam and Dun ford, 1980). Most culture is acquired through observation and imitation of o t h e r s - t h a t is, social learning (Ban- dura, 1977). Social learning is the cultural analogue of the genetic transmission process. Processes of transmission, selection, migration, and mutation as well as random effects will lead to changes over time in the prevalence of rules in a culture. These changes are cultural evolution (cf. Burns and Dietz, forthcoming, for a more detailed account and for a demonstration that the same argument would apply if culture is conceptualized in terms of values, norms, preference functions, and so on).

Will cultural evolution act to maximize genetic fitness, as Lumsden and Wilson and Lopreato argue? Not necessarily, in our view. The cultural transmission process differs from the genetic transmission process. Culture is not obtained at birth, with half of the rules coming from mother and half from father. The greater complexity of the cultural transmission process means that the rules favored by cultural evolution will not necessarily be the rules that maximize genetic fitness. Buddha, Christ, and Lao-Tse had very low genetic fitness, but their ideas (rules) have persisted and spread, indicating high "cultural fitness." In many circumstances there wilt be a tendency for genetic fitness and cultural fitness to diverge. 6 Indeed, the relationship between the cultural inheritance system and the genetic inheritance system can be thought of as a conflict or game (Boyd and Richerson, 1976).

Lumsden and Wilson develop models in which the genotype of an individual influences the rules that an individual adopts. Genes bias culture so as to favor rules that enhance genetic fitness. They argue that such geneti- cally determined biases in the acquisition of culture are strong enough to fix cultural rules favoring genetic fitness in a particular environment in 50 generations (or about 1000 years for humans) (Lumsden and Wilson, 1981:289-300). If their assumptions are correct, then human behavior and social organization can be explained in terms of strategies to enhance genetic fitness, at least for populations that have lived in a stable environment for that long. But other students of gene-culture coevolution are highly critical of the assumptions underpinning this model (Boyd and Richerson, 1983a,

6Note that the term "fitness" has a precise meaning in discussions of evolution. Genetic fitness measures the relative ability of an organism to place genes in future generations. Cultural fitness is the relative ability of an individual to place rules in future generations. Genetic and cultural reproductive success are favored by natural selection. Reproductive success is often closely linked to material success and adaptation, but the link is neither perfect nor necessary.


1983b, 1985:163-164; Gould, 1987:107-123; Maynard-Smith and Warren, 1982; Pulliam, 1982; Pulliam and Dunford, 1980). The model requires very strong selection forces, no migration between groups, and a relatively un- complicated cultural transmission process.

Most other work on the coevolution of culture and genes leads to the conclusion that, in general, cultural evolution will not shape behavior and social organization in ways that maximize genetic fitness (Boyd and Richer- son, 1985; Cavatli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; Pulliam and Dunford, 1980). Of course, cultural rules that greatly reduce genetic fitness are subject to the force of natural selection acting on genes. But that force is seldom strong enough to yield cultural forms that would be predicted by a sociobiological model. This in itself is an important result of the work on coevolut ion-the relative importance of "nature" (genes) and "nurture" (culture) can be deduced from models of evolutionary processes. The environmental conditions and transmission processes that would lead to a dominant influence for nature or nurture can be specified. But research on the coevolution of genes and culture has also led to more systematic thinking about sociocultural change. Evolutionary models of culture provide interesting insights into a number of central problems in the social sciences. We will sketch one of these to il- lustrate the value of the evolutionary approach.

ALTRUISM AND CONFORMIST CULTURAL TRANSMISSION

The problem of altruism has been an important theme in the social sciences for decades. Discussions of free riders, Prisoner's Dilemma, and the tragedy of the commons center around the following questions: "When will an individual place the interests of the group ahead of self-interest?" "When will cooperative behavior emerge in social groups?" The standard approach to the problem is to find ways of explaining how behavior that seems altruistic is in fact self-interested. In sociobiology inclusive fitness models provide a "selfish" explanation for what seems to be altruism (Hamilton, 1964), while in the social sciences models of reciprocity have been influential (Axelrod, 1984).

Our approach is different. We are not convinced that all behavior must be explained on the basis of self-interest. People may hold decision rules that call for altruistic behavior toward certain classes of other individuals even when there is no hidden selfish advantage to such rules. Clearly, most individuals hold such rules for people classified as close kin; many hold them for members of their local community, religion, ethnic group, or nation state; some hold them for all of humanity; and a few individuals seem to hold them for other species. If we assume that such altruistic ideas initially occur through


invention, under what conditions would they persist and spread, and under what conditions would the disadvantages of interacting cooperatively with noncooperators select against them?

The theory of kin selection in biology was a response to Wynne- Edwards' (1962) argument that altruistic behavior was the result of natural selection acting on groups or local populations. The group selection argument holds that natural selection can act on entire groups as well as on individuals. If the forces of group selection are stronger than those of individual-level natural selection, then genetic evolution could produce functional integration of the group and altruistic behavior that benefited the group despite the cost of that behavior to the individual. Group selection arguments were carefully developed by the neofunctionalist school in ecological anthropology (Vayda and Rappaport, 1968; Rappaport, 1968; but see Vayda, 1988, for his current views). In both biology and the social sciences, the theory of group selection acting on genes to produce altruistic behavior has fallen out of favor. In most circumstances, natural selection acting on individuals to maximize individual reproductive genetic fitness will overwhelm the effects of group selection acting to promote altruism (Richerson, 1977; Wil- son, 1980, 1983). Group selection will prevail only when group extinction rates are high, within-group genetic homogeneity is high, between-group heterogeneity is also high, and migration rates are low. These conditions are not met by most human populations, nor by most animal populations. Thus it does not seem that group selection can provide a genetic basis for altruism.

Because the dynamics of cultural evolution differ from those of genetic evolution, group selection acting on rules may provide a cultural explanation for altruism even though the genetic explanation seems implausible. Parallel conditions would have to apply. Groups would have to be internal- ly homogeneous with regard to the rules in question, and quite distinct from other groups. In addition, group cultural extinction must be high, and the migration of rules across groups low.

These conditions could easily develop if individuals acquire rules through conformist transmission (Boyd and Richerson, 1982, 1985:204-240). In conformist transmission, individuals assess the prevalence of rules in the group and pick the rules that are most common--"when in Rome, do as the Romans do." This mechanism increases the prevalence of modal rules very rapidly, and promotes within-group homogeneity. The amount of differences that develops between groups will depend on the variation in the environment from group to group and the flow of information between groups. A heterogeneous environment will lead to different rules being optimal for different groups and promote between-group cultural heterogeneity. The flow of information across groups, whether through the migration of individuals or through communication, will not have much effect on the prevalence of


rules within groups. This is because rules acquired from outside will be of low frequency and therefore not be favored by the conformist transmission mechanism. The rate of extinction depends on the environment, but extinction in this case is the loss of a rule from the culture, not the death of the individual carrying that rule. Very high extinction rates can exist with very little human mortality because people change their minds and their behavior.

When would conformist transmission develop? Conformist transmission is a useful way of acquiring rules when the environment is heterogeneous, with different groups occupying different local environments. By conforming, individuals can quickly find rules that are matched to their local situation. Environmental variability can be based on social as well as material differences. Members of different castes, classes, or ethnic groups may face very different environments even though they occupy the same physical space. Boyd and Richerson (1988; see also Levine and Campbell, 1972) have argued that conformist transmission may be very important in the development and maintenance of social boundaries.

If group selection on culture occurs, then altruism can evolve within the group. Indeed, the group selection mechanism can lead not only to altruistic behavior by individuals, but also to functional integration of the group and its culture. Under strong group selection the population behaves as if it were a single organism-just as in the history of biological evolution, group selection acting on populations of cells led to the evolution of metazoans (Wilson, 1975). The logic of cultural evolution recasts debates between func- tionalist and reductionist positions on social organization. Cultures may be functionally integrated, but a functional explanation must be preceded by evidence that historical processes of group selection have produced such integration. In the absence of such evidence, explanation by function is not justified (Jensen and Harre, 1981:161-209; Van Parijs, 1981).

BEYOND MICROEVOLUTION

We noted earlier that the resurgence of evolutionary models in sociology bears a relationship to several of the dilemmas and discontents of modern social theory. Briefly put, there has been a renewed search for encompassing ("grand") theories that can elaborate micro-macro linkages, avoid teleology, and treat both "structure" and "agency." Evolutionary approaches have several strengths relative to traditional theories that can help push this agenda forward. Several valuable evolutionary approaches to those problems have been identified by van den Berghe and Lopreato. Others, of a more macrosociological nature, which have kinship with recent critiques of mechanistic models of traditional neo-Darwinian natural-selective accounts, might be con- structed along the following lines.


The dominant thrust of the classical t radit ion-at least insofar as it has been interpreted and elaborated in Western sociology-has been to theorize that societies and the global order have become, and are becoming, increasingly homogeneous. The classics have identified various logics and processes that undergird this homogenization outcome: the imperative of division of labor, individualism, and organic solidarity (Durkheim); the competitive imperative of capital accumulation; the tendencies to the equalization of the rate of profit, to uniformity of the conditions of production, and to the ex- pansionism of capitalism (Marx); the imperatives of large-scale organization and the inevitability of rationalization and disenchantment (Weber); and so on. We would argue, by contrast, that it is not at all clear whether the empirical reality of large-scale social change over the past decades and centu- ries is one of homogenization. Indeed, it is now widely recognized that there has been a crisis in sociological theories of economic development and change because the reality of increased global and societal-level heterogeneity flies in the face of traditional-modern, core-periphery, and precapitalist-capitalist dualisms (Booth, 1985; Vandergeest and Buttel, 1988).

Macroevolutionary theory can potentially provide the building blocks for better analysis of the striking heterogeneity and complexity of the post- World War II period. It can do so for three reasons. First, contrary to the "developmental" models that have dominated both classical and much recent theory, evolutionary theory is explicitly nonteleological. Evolutionary theory postulates no particular beginning and end points in social change, nor any "necessity" of transitions in between. Second, evolutionary theory emphasizes the generation of variability within and between populations as a result of invention, migration, and chance effects in transmission of culture. Selection and retention forces act on this variability, sometimes increas- ing it (diversifying and balancing selection), sometimes decreasing it (directional and stabilizing selection). Thus evolutionary theory provides a nonteleological system for understanding how and why differences in social forms emerge and persist.

Third, evolutionary theory, by drawing upon parallels in evolutionary biology, can provide a nonfunctionalist logic for understanding the natural- material bases of human existence. Much as environmental changes or genetic changes in a species may lead to extinction, an evolutionary perspective on societal-environmental relations can transcend "adaptationism" (e.g., of much sociological human ecology and of Talcott Parsons' later evolutionary work). Instead of postulating that social change is at least, in large part, a process of adaptation to the natural environment, evolutionary theory sees adaptation as problematic and contingent on a population's culture and history. This allows evolutionary theory to incorporate generalizations about large- scale social change on the one hand, while taking account of historical speci-


ficity and the diverse patterns of world-historical change on the other. Although not written explicitly from an evolutionary perspective, Jones's (1987) The European Miracle, Wilkinson's (1973) Poverty and Progress, and the work of the Annales School (Bloch, 1973; Braudel, 1973; Le Roy Ladurie, 1971) are useful exemplars of such an approach.

Macroevolutionary theories reconceptualize large-scale social change by emphasizing processes that generate and select among variability in rules systems within and between groups. Social forms such as the "new interna- tional division of labor" (the tendency to relocate traditional manufacturing industries in low-wage countries such as the Asian newly industrializing count r i es -e .g . , Sanderson, 1985), the "informal economy," and "new social movements" are examples of emergent variability resulting from social and environmental forces. Each of these global forms and the rule systems that accompany them are subject to forces of selection that are shaped by geopolitics, differential patterns of state authority relations, the relative power of classes and their relationship to the state, changing political cultures, and so on. These selective forces change over time, involve both social and environmental constraints and possibilities, are historically contingent, and influence both micro- and macrolevel processes.

A particularly promising methodological posture for a macroevolutionary theory may found in Max Weber's comparative historical studies of religion and capitalism, the agrarian sociology of ancient civilizations, and the origins of capitalism in the West. As West (1985) has argued, Weber's theory of large-scale social change is essentially Darwinian in its logic, and is based on notions of "se lec t ion"- according to factors such as the strength and role of militaries, states, mercantile and market systems; the power ca- pacities of classes and other groups; and natural-environmental f ea tu re s - and of a "precarious balance of forces." Weber's theories of "class, status, party" and orientations to action can be seen as a counterpart to the "generation of variability" component of ecological theory, while his ideal types of legitimation and domination have clear implications for the "selection" component. West's reexamination of Weber's method as neo-Darwinian comparative macrosociology is among the more fruitful paths for elaborating an evolutionary macrosociology. 7 Given the fact that evolutionary theory seems especially well suited to understanding world-historical phenomena from a neo-Weberian comparative methodological posture, the parallels

7It is also useful to note that Weber (1922/t968:32-33) developed the concept of "selection" in Chapter 1 of Economy and Society, and apparently used the notion in an essentially Dar- winian fashion. Among the more important recent attempts to apply the selection concept to large-scale social change is Adams's (1988) notion of the "natural selection of self-organizing energy forms."


among West's insight, Collin's (1986) rendering of Weber as a "world-systems theorist," and recent advances in comparative historical methodology (Ra- gin, 1987; Skocpol and Somers, 1980) are a particularly promising point of departure for developing a macroevolutionary comparative sociology.

THE STATUS A N D PROSPECTS OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

We hope our brief discussions of altruism, functional integration, and more speculative notions of macrosociological counterparts to evolutionary biology suggest the character of the emerging evolutionary framework. It differs from traditional uses of evolution in sociology in many key respects.

First, in evolutionary biology individuals and their interactions are building blocks of cultures and societies, rather than consequences or epiphenome- na of macrolevel processes and structures. As a result, the framework can incorporate many insights from microsociology and may generate new insights useful in microsociological research. Second, by emphasizing processes that influence the prevalence of rules and other cultural phenomena within a population, the framework moves away from a strictly adaptationist approach to explaining behavior and social organization. Under certain conditions, cultural evolution processes can produce an elaboration of symbolic traits that are adaptively neutral or even maladaptive (Boyd and Richerson, 1985:241-279; Richerson and Boyd, forthcoming). The conflict between explanations based on "culture" and those based on "practical reason" can be reconciled. Some conditions will favor rules that are essentially "symbolic" rather than "practical." Other conditions will increase the prevalence of in- strumental rules. Third, while most use of evolutionary theory in sociology has presumed slow change, the emerging framework can accommodate either rapid or slow change. In evolutionary biology, a heated debate is taking place between "gradualists" and proponents of "punctuated equilibrium" models (Eldredge, 1985; Eldredge and Gould, 1972; Gould and Eldredge, 1977; Charlesworth et aL, 1982). Whatever the outcome of this debate, it demonstrates that evolutionary models can accommodate revolutionary changes. Indeed, the punctuated equilibrium school has been labeled "Marxian paleon- tology" (Lumsden and Wilson, 1981:355). Under the emerging evolutionary framework, the pace of social change is a question for theoretical and empirical investigation, rather than a presumption. Further, there exists a via- ble evolutionary framework that views culture as relatively autonomous of genetic control, and thus not necessarily shaped to maximize genetic fitness. Here we differ with both van den Berghe and Lopreato, who offer explanations based on genetic fitness maximization. The difference in our positions is not based on presumptions, but on differing assessments of specific models


of gene-culture coevolution. Better models and better evidence can help resolve these differences.

Most work on the new evolutionary framework has focused on the relationship between genes and culture. We feel microevolutionary theory must transcend some of its traditional gene-cukure foci. For example, the problem of altruism, while of greater concern in other disciplines, is arguably of limited importance to sociological inquiry. Also, the ideas and models developed around the coevolutionary problem can yield important insights about the dynamics of cultural and social change. The emerging framework draws attention to the dynamics of the social learning process and demonstrates that the mechanisms by which culture is acquired impart dynamics to the content of the culture. This is in itself an important insight. But the framework offers more than that.

First, it provides a method for linking sociology and biology without unjustified reductionism. Human biology obviously influences behavior and social organization. But it is just as obvious that culture and social life influence human biology. A coevolutionary approach to the links between the biological and the social promotes studies that enhance understanding of those links. We agree with van den Berghe that sociology cannot progress without paying more attention to human biology, but we feel the development of "biosociology" involves more than the use of the biological variables to explain social facts. There are a number of empirical studies that take both the biological and the social seriously (Cloninger et aL, 1979; Mazur et aL, 1980; Rosa, 1979; Rosa and Mazur, 1979). We believe the new framework provides a foundation for further work along these lines.

Second, explicit modeling of cultural evolution provides a means for clarifying and refining theories of social change. In sociology, formal models have never achieved the popularity and influence they enjoy in economics. This may be because most formal modeling has been of phenomena distant from the theoretical core of sociology, e.g., demographic processes, ration- al choice. In addition, many models rest on assumptions that sociologists find implausible. In contrast, models of cultural transmission and evolution address problems central to sociology: persistance and change in ideology; emergence and maintenance of boundaries among genders, races, classes, and ethnic groups; role formation and differentiation; and so on. The models are driven by assumptions about how people acquire the information they use to shape their lives. While modeling of cultural change within the evolutionary framework is novel at present, we believe it will become a standard tool for sociologists in the near future.

Further, an evolutionary framework requires, and can readily accommodate, consideration of both the material and the ideal. Human action is influenced by the rules that constitute a culture. But the rules that are in-


vented, transmitted, and persist are not arbitrary. Social and physical reali- ties provide powerful feedback about rules, and both conscious reflection by members of the culture and the dynamics of selective retention will tend to favor rules that are in line with reality. For decades, American sociology tend- ed to ignore technology and the naturat environment. Contemporary sociology's innocence of the biophysical and environmental substratum of social relations is especially ironic given the long history of the use of ecological analogies and metaphors as sociological concepts (Lenski et al., 1986). But while it is now increasingly apparent that technological and environmental problems are of critical importance in shaping the future, most social theories provide little insight into these problems. An evolutionary framework can move technology and the environment to the center of our concerns, while still acknowledging the importance of culture and social structure.

Finally, the promising, but already well-trodden microapproaches to evolutionary theory must be supplemented with a nonreductionist, nonteleological, historically informed macroevolutionary perspective-that is, a perspective that can analyze macrolevels of social reality without reification or reductionism. In fact, macrosociology, which is most subject to the ills of teleology and overgeneralization, probably stands in greater need of an evolutionary perspective than does microsociology.

These are exciting times for sociological theory. The conceptual divi- sions most of us learned in graduate school are falling before new efforts at integration. Evolutionary theory is attracting broad interest precisely because of its synthetic potential. The framework is only beginning to take shape, and sociologists must be cautious not to confine evolutionary reasoning to "vocabulary games" - that is, limiting inquiry only to a mere relabeling of existing knowledge. It must generate its own agenda, and generate insights that are beyond the scope of existing theories. But already the first sketches of it are proving provocative and insightful, raising new questions and new approaches while drawing together seemingly irreconcilable ideas.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work was supported by the Northern Virginia Survey Research Laboratory of George Mason University and by the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences. The junior a~athor acknowledges the helpful discussions with Paul McLaughlin and Peter Taylor that helped to stimulate a number of the ideas presented herein.


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