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Evolution, Co-operation and Rationality II
philosophical perspectives
Clifton Hill House, University of Bristol
27th-29th June 2011
Evolutionary account of normative orders: rationality and the
“homo economicus/homo sociologicus” debate.
Eliana M. Santanatoglia
PhD Candidate (ABD), Law School, University of Buenos Aires
Introduction
How can we explain the emergence, change, and stability of moral and
legal rules and moral or legal orders? Are they the result of deliberate
creations of rational individuals or the spontaneous outcomes of their
interactions?
From the evolutionary perspective, the present moral or legal systems
can be seen as the continuous outcome of an evolutionary cultural process of
emergence, stabilization and change of different kind of rules that compound
normative orders. Furthermore, in the case of Law, we propose not to see
them as made solely by legislation or judicial decisions -such as other theories
affirmed- but as complex systems formed also by other principles, habits, and
rules, unintentionally produced by the interaction of individuals.
This evolutionary account of normative orders is inspired by the
Scottish tradition -David Hume, Adam Smith, and Adam Ferguson-, which
are continued in the XX Century by Friedrich A. Hayek. We will call this
tradition “Classic Evolutionism” (CE) and claim the possible conceptual
connexions between it and a newer evolutionary account of social phenomena
such as the Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT). We believe this intersection of
theories could provide more precision to the explanation of the evolution of
normative orders.
As a result of this “theoretical blend” we will propose an evolutionary account
of normative orders, which, in our opinion, will provide the most accurate
explanation of the emergence, change and stability of rules and institutions,
allowing a deep understanding of the dynamics of normative systems.
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Moreover, we consider that this evolutionary approach is propounding
a vision of human decision-making process that is richer than that of
traditional rational choice visions. It allows to think about human conduct as
the result of adaptative tendencies – biological and cultural- translated into a
complex of inclinations and considerations. Individuals can be motivated by
several reasons: their own interest, sympathy with one another, learning
mechanisms that allow them to imitate or adopt other’s more successful
strategies, etc.
We also consider that the evolutionary vision of law and morals,
represents a good solution for the debate between “homo economicus” and
“homo sociologicus” visions. In fact, we consider that the evolutionary view can
provide a blend of these two notions. We consider individuals not only as self-
regarded but also as having necessary relations with other individuals, since
they acknowledge the mutual need to resolve coordination conflicts. As we
have said, there could be diverse motivations for human conduct. The
interactions between individuals involuntarily produce regularities, which are
often internalised as rules for they are more efficient or better adapted to the
changing desires and goals of individuals. By following these rules,
individuals also reinforce the expectations with regard to theirs’ and others’
actions. In conclusion, we consider that individuals are followers of rules
unintentionally created by their self-regarding behaviour.
Assumptions about Human Nature
For this vision of normative orders as evolutionary phenomena, we will
take into account a very “thin” but interesting notion of human nature, such as
the one proposed by David Hume (1978: 484) and other authors of the Scottish
Enlightenment, such as Adam Smith or Adam Ferguson. From this vision,
human nature presents one objective and two subjective aspects. The objective
feature is that human nature represents for men “numberless wants and
necessities” and “slender means” to cope with them, that is, scarcity. Hume
adds two subjective features referred to selfishness and limited generosity.
Selfishness, in Hume’s terms, is not a negative disposition or evil egotism; it
means individuals generally care more for themselves than for other human
beings, though there is a natural concern towards others close to them, like
family and friends. The second feature - limited generosity - is the tendency of
men to be more generous with the people nearest to them than with strangers.
Hume also introduces what are the main problems individuals would
have to face in a “natural state” or “pre-societal” community. Very generally,
individuals would have to face the limitation of the force, the impossibility to
attain perfection in any particular art and the lack of security. In Hume’s
opinion, these three difficulties could be solved by society. Society provides a
remedy to these three problems through first, the conjunction of forces, which
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allows the augmentation of the force; second, the division of labour that
permits the increase of abilities; and third, the mutual succour, that remedies
the lack of security. Moreover, the scarcity problem, in the opinion of the
Scottish authors, grounded not only markets and economic phenomena but
also other institutions such as Hume´s explanation of the origin of the three
fundamental laws of Justice: a) stability of possession, b) transference by
consent and c) performance of promises.
On the other hand, they included in their analysis another aspect of
human nature: the natural tendency of human beings to sympathise or
empathise with their fellow men. The natural inclination to harmonise our
own feelings and sentiments with those of our friends, family members and
even neighbours, provide the foundation of our moral reasoning and judging
(such as Smith´s theory on moral sentiments). Regarding their vision of social
orders and institutions, they conceived them -using an Adam Ferguson’s
definition- as “the result of human action, but not of human design” (Hayek,
1973: 20).
In the 20th Century Friedrich Hayek´s continued the tradition of the
authors of the Scottish Enlightenment (that Hayek called the pre-Darwinian
Darwinist) and introduced some more “limitations” to their vision of human
nature, particularly, the limitations on human knowledge and rationality
(1949).
We can summarize his thought in four main points: a) Knowledge is
dispersed in society: there is not a complete and coherent core of knowledge
available for each person (Hayek, 1949: 77). Individuals have fragments of
knowledge allowing them to act and make decisions. This dissemination of
knowledge applies to scientific knowledge as well as to practical knowledge –
the “know-how” of some activities– and the interaction of individuals with
dissimilar knowledge is what defines the social order. b) The specific
knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place: In everyday life,
individuals make decisions based on pieces of knowledge and information
that depend on their specific situation. This specific and practical knowledge is
very important to the decision-making process but it is generally not
considered by social sciences when explaining the rationality behind human
interactions; c) The transmission of knowledge: Hayek also believes “practical
knowledge” is sometimes impossible to be transmitted from one person to
another and this feature represents an important difference from scientific
knowledge. There are certain social devices, such as the price system or some
abstract legal or moral rules that concentrate dispersed knowledge and
provide a guide to human actions and decisions. d) Consequently, human
rational capacity of knowledge is limited: no human mind can concentrate all
the knowledge that a social order can produce. Each individual makes
decisions considering fragments of such knowledge. Social order has
spontaneously produced a number of social devices that help individuals in
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their decisions, such as language, prices and abstract rules, but each person
makes decisions and construes the information provided by these social
devices in specific circumstances of time and space and based on subjective
values and abilities.
We can relate this vision of rationality with the notion of “bounded
rationality” proposed Herbert Simon in his analysis of decision-making
process and also introduced by Jason McKenzie Alexander (2007: 5) in his
“The Structural Evolution of Morality” when criticizing the “homo economicus”
assumption of perfect rationality. Simon, cited by Alexander (2007: 5) says:
“The capacity of human minds for formulating and solving complex problems
is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is
required for objectively rational behaviour in the real world –or even for a
reasonable approximation to such objective rationality”.
However, despite this limited knowledge and capacity, individuals
manage to resolve most of the every-day practical problems by following
certain heuristics. In this sense, we can see that both the CE and the EGT
refuse the assumption of a pure rational mind with complete knowledge as
the one taking decisions in these interdependent games, affecting any possible
“homo economicus” assumption for normative orders.
Normative Orders
Hayek called attention to the finding of the Scottish Enligtenment with
respect to the different conceptions of social orders. In this sense, he proposed
the notion of “spontaneous orders”, distinguishing them from those
exclusively natural or completely artificial. Language, markets, moral orders,
or law are not orders provided in a complete way by Nature, that is to say,
orders that can only be discovered, described and predicted by individuals,
because individuals intervene in those orders. Every individual action
contributes towards the emergence and particular configuration of a specific
social order. However, these orders are not, as wholes, the result of human
artificial or deliberate creation of an individual or group of individuals. They
are emergent orders (as we call them today) based on the interactions of
multiple elements in the social sphere such as individuals and organisations in
a specific framework of incentives. These spontaneous orders are – we have
already cited Adam Ferguson’s definition- “the result of human action, but not
of human design” (Hayek, 1973: 20).
Every individual following his/hers own plan and interacting with
other individuals and organisations, started to produce certain social
regularities that are not perceived by them and that slowly start to work as the
expected result of actions. Moreover, certain principles or rules that appear as
the solutions to certain particular problems or conflicts, are then imitated and
apply to new and different problems, allowing the emergence of general rules.
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In Hayek´s terms, we can describe an “order” as “a state of affairs in
which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so related to each other
that we may learn from our acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part
of the whole to form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least
expectations which have a good chance of proving correct.” (1973:36)
As we can see, Hayek is introducing a number of elements to
understand individual’s decision-making process in a social context:
a) Agents have limited knowledge of the whole: individuals decide how to
act considering a limited numbers of elements, namely, the knowledge of a
spatial or temporal part of the whole (1973:36),
b) The importance of the rules in social orders and the role of the
expectations: individuals decide to act considering a number of expected
results based on regularities perceived in their cultural environment, that is,
individuals follow certain principles or rules like heuristics that they expect
will lead them to the expected results. This is the way individuals adapt
themselves to diverse social context, trying to discover and follow the
particular rules of the order. He evens talks about the concurrent evolution of
mind and society. (1973: 17)
c) Hayek believed that those groups that allow certain specific kinds of
rules or institutions to emerge (such as the respect of promises) will prevail
over other groups.
Even if this last claim can be discussed, we believe that the Scottish
tradition of thought, together with Hayekian vision of normative orders as
spontaneous orders, allow us to have a dynamic and richer vision of law and
morals than the usually provided.
For example, if we try to think about how to explain the emergence and
continuity of legal rules, we can argue - with Hume- that legal rules and
principles are not the natural outcome of our virtues such as the sympathy we
feel towards others under certain circumstances. In fact, such elaborated legal
norms as the principle of “pacta sunt servanda” (the principle that establishes
the contracts and treatises must be honoured), or the sophisticated systems of
modern private property, cannot be seen simply as the product of natural
virtuous inclinations men feel towards their peers. Such rules are part of what
Hume calls “artificial virtues” (1978, Book III, part III, sec. i). The rules of
Justice are the example of how rules can appear gradually and acquire force
slowly. These rules do not only emerge from a mutual and general “sense of
common interest”, they evolve in accordance to the expectations of other
individuals’ behaviour. The repeated experience persuades men into the
inconveniences of not respecting the rules and reassures the sense of common
interest and the confidence in the future regularity of conducts. In this way,
Hume explains strangers can establish common rules.
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We can see here the connexion between Hume, Hayek and the EGT’s
account of social rules as the outcome of decisions taken as “interdependent
choice problems” (Alexander, 2007: 9). All these visions concur in the
importance of individuals’ expectations with respect to each other’s attitudes
and actions as grounds for the emergence of common rules.
But the evolutionary visions of normative orders offered by CE did not
provide much precision about the particular way in which rules change and
become stable (or not). This evolution is generally referred as a “trial and
error” process but without the specifications of what could be the learning
rules or the specific way in which imitation, adaptation, and change could
happen in a social context. In this sense, I think that the new evolutionary
approaches, such as EGT, allow us to find that precision in the study of the
emergence, change and stability of rules.
We will not discuss here every social model propounded by the new
evolutionary theories or even by the EGT, but we will try to show that most of
its assumptions are very close to the ones of CE. So, we will argue that the rule
emergence and evolution mechanisms suggested by Hume and Hayek could
be precised by the learning rules and mechanisms proposed by EGT.
Consequently, we will claim the theory and models thought to be applied to
the social or basic moral rules by EGT could also be applied to the study of the
legal rules of a society.
Change and Stability
But, agreeing with this account of the emergence of legal rules, how can
we explain change and stability of them? In other words, how does, after all
the process of interactions and expectations described, a group of individuals
find a rule and decide to change it afterwards? Or, how can we explain the
rapid change of some legal arrangements while other ones survive several
generations and even major context changes?
Hume and Hayek do not provide any precise explanation of the rules’
change process. As we said, Hayek generally refers to a “try and error”
process to talk about the selection of rules within a society, without offering a
specific learning rule. Furthermore, Hayek considers the case of the
competition between different institutional arrangements or groups of rules
(whole legal orders). In this case, he propounds a kind of “cultural group
selection” by which the legal orders that prove better, -in terms of providing
the possibility for individuals to follow their life’s plans in a more complete
and free way-, will succeed (or survive) over those who do not. Thus, he
identifies some individual rules or institutions -such as the rule of law or the
private property- that have proven to be more successful that others in
allowing coordination between individual plans of action. He also believes
that these successful orders of rules will be imitated by other communities.
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Andreozzi (2005: 16) considers that Hayek’s ideas on the selection of
rules can be related and even better explained by some models of the EGT.
Despite the fact that Hayek presents the case of the rules that are open to free-
riding as a problem for the explanation of emergence and stabilization of
rules, Andreozzi believes that the mechanisms of EGT provide the way to
show how group beneficial rules can emerge and remain stable, while
sustained by punishment, within a single population.
We agree with Andreozzi that several mechanisms studied by EGT can
be useful to provide an account of the selection, change and stabilization of
new strategies within a normative order. As Alexander explains (2007: 25), an
evolutionary model provides, in principle, two things: a) A representation of
the state of the population and b) A specification of the dynamical law, that is,
how the state of the population changes over time.
One of the most discussed dynamical laws propounded by EGT is the
Replicator Dynamics such as we can see in the work of Skyrms (2005: 313). We
do not completely agree with this dynamical law since its assumptions are not
completely applicable to the normative orders. As D’Arms has noticed (2006:
624) and Alexander has confirmed (2007: 33), Replicator Dynamics assumes an
infinite population and random interaction between agents in a group. Both
these assumptions could not be a good starting point to study dynamics at
Morals or Law since the normative orders studied, despite being large, they
are formed by finite elements or agents and the relation between the agents in
such groups is not at all random. On the other hand, the relations between
agents are commonly repeated and some particular agents occupy important
roles in the social network (such as judges or legislators) that influence in
others’ strategies.
The agent-based models and the different heuristics propounded by
Alexander seem to be more appropriate for the study of the interrelations in
normative orders and their dynamic. Despite the agent-based models share
with the Replicator Dynamics some features –such as the notion of bounded
rational agents, and the fact that both are proposing cultural evolutionary
models-, its assumptions (Alexander: 34) and heuristics are different and able
to be applied to Law and Morals:
a) Small population, meaning that the size of the group could range from
small groups to the size of any real group;
b) Constrained interactions, that is, no randomness with respect to the
possible interaction between individuals;
c) Key agents defined as “one whose adoption of a different strategy sparks
a large-scale shift in the strategy frequencies found in the population. A key
agent occupies an Archimedean point, enabling her single action to alter
radically the future state of society.” (Alexander: 35). We consider that this
notion of the key agent is fundamental to understand the relations at, for
example, a legal network. Some agents will have an essential role in the
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configuration of a legal order since their decisions as judges, legislators or
administrators will not only influence others’ strategies but also would
establish, in a direct or indirect way, the payoff schemes for each strategy;
d) Nondeterminism: this means that an amount of mutation, this is to say,
that some agents will propose new strategies without being influenced by
others under regular basis; and
e) Heterogeneity of the agents involved in the dynamics. In contrast to the
Replicator Dynamics’ assumption of homogeneity between the agents (of
course, with the exception of the difference in strategy), the agent-based
models consider differences between individuals, such as differences in
learning rules or in interaction styles.
With respect to the heuristics propounded by agent-based models in EGT,
there are three based in imitation and one based on the “best response” but
tailored to bounded rationality (Alexander, 2007: 39):
a) Imitate the best neighbour: By this learning rule, every agent, at the end
of each generation, evaluate the scores of her neighbours and “adopts the
strategy of the one who “earned the highest score””. It is also assumed that the
agent will not switch strategies unless she has some incentive to do so.
b) Imitate with probability proportional to success: The agent will compare
her scores with her neighbours’, modifying her strategy only when one
neighbour did strictly better. But in this case, “instead of ignoring those
players who did better that her but were not the best, this rule assigns to every
neighbour who did better a nonzero probability that she will adopt their
strategy” (Alexander, 2007: 39)
c) Imitate best average payoff: The agents select the strategy with the
highest average payoff in their neighbourhood, selecting randomly in case of
being more than one that tie. (Alexander, 2007: 39)
d) Best response: “Agents adopt the strategy that will confer the highest
payoff in the next generation, under the assumption that none of their
neighbours change strategies. In these is more than one such strategy, players
select a strategy to adopt at random”. The role of expectations is central since
it does not consider the past success of a strategy but the expected success in
the future. Moreover, it considers the assumption of bounded rationality
“since agents do not engage in strategic calculations to figure out what
strategies their neighbours will use at future times; instead, they blithely
proceed on the assumption that the people around them will continue to do
what they have done in the past.” (Alexander, 2007: 41)
This last learning rule seems particularly germane for the study of the
evolution, change and stability of legal rules. Since its assumptions agree with
how agents commonly act in the moral and legal realm, that is, by considering
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future expected payoffs under the assumption that the conditions will not
change. And, of course, there is always the possibility of the appearance of a
new strategy adopted by an individual without precedent, in other words, the
possibility of “mutation”.
Morals and Law are multiplayers games. So, we would take into account
the results of the models applied to this kind of games. It is suggested that the
evolution of moral rules such as cooperation, trust and fairness can be studied
by the EGT models. In general, the models show that the emergence of such
rules is not easy under all kind of circumstances and that:
a) The payoff scheme is very important with respect to the appearance,
change and stability of strategies. So, the role of incentives could determine in
a way the appearance and stabilization of some strategies. As in the case of
cooperation, if the “attractiveness of Defect” were too high, the mechanisms of
coordination would have difficulties to emerge.
b) It seems that the state of the first time considered highly influences
the final result. Therefore, if in the original population there is a big number
of trusting behaviour, then it is more probable that this behaviour
disseminates.
c) The role of the referees or the “key person” in a game could change
the result of the game. We can see in the case of fairness, that the game
changes in the cases where the role of the referee appears, changing the
assumption of a symmetric relation. This example is relevant to the study of
Law, since Law is a game that includes agents that occupy roles of judges or
referees who determine, in important ways, the range of possible strategies,
and the cost/benefits of following one or another strategy.
We can say that the heterogeneous rules that compound Morals and Law
emerge from the interdependent interaction of individuals. These interactions
are conditioned by the number of individuals of that specific social order, the
structure of relations between them, the special ‘roles’ performed by some
agents, and the individuals’ own characteristics. When certain strategies prove
to be successful (for example, allowing the coordination of different individual
plans and avoiding conflict), they will be imitated or adopted by those willing
to improve their performance. Moreover, at a “meta-level”, that is, at the level
of whole institutional arrangements or groups of rules, some groups imitate
others by similar means.
This evolving process will result in that particular strategies (and the rules
that emerge from them) show to be more stable than others as, for example,
the case of the principle of “pacta sunt servanda” already allowed. We refer, in
this case, to a “dynamic stability” that differs from the notion of stability
related to the Nash Equilibria, used by several scholars, such as Ken Binmore
(2005). The notion of “dynamic stability” refers to situations when more that
two people interact (Alexander, 2007: 280) and that “requires that when all
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strategies are perturbed at the same time, there is a long-run tendency for the
players’ choice to return to the equilibrium” (Gintis, 2006: 6)
The resolution of the dichotomy between Homo Economicus and Homo
Sociologicus views
We consider that this evolutionary vision of the emergence, change and
stability of rules permits us to resolve one dichotomy between two almost
antagonistic conceptions about human action and its social context that can
influence in our vision of normative orders.
On one hand, the “homo economicus” vision provides an account of the
decision-making process of rational individuals trying to maximize utility.
This vision seems to highlight selfishness or self-centredness as the most
important feature of human nature and considers maximisation of utility as
the only way in which this feature expresses itself rationally. First applied to
the field of the market transactions, then this vision was applied to explain
actions in non-market contexts. From this perspective, these features seem to
explain human action in a “complete” way as an action oriented to satisfy own
desires or goals.
On the other hand, there is the “homo sociologicus” view, which tries to
introduce us in the study of the human action in a social context. In this case,
human action seems to be informed by the social norms or rules of a specific
society -that act as motivations or constrains- or by the characteristics or
demands of the social role performed by the individual at a specific moment, -
which establish the range of “valid” actions and decisions that can be
considered-. As follows, human nature could be defined as the capacity to
follow rules or to perform a role in a social structure.
Pettit (1995) summaries the economists’ view of agents’ minds in this
way: “…economists present human agents as relatively self-regarding
creatures who act with a view to doing as well as possible by their
predominantly self-regarding desires. These desires are usually assumed to be
desires for what is loosely described as economic advantage or gain…” But
then he adds that self-interested desires can be extended to other dimensions
such as non-tradable goods that consist in being well loved or well regarded
(Pettit, 1995: 314). This vision of agents appears in legal theory, for example,
through the school of Law & Economics. It assumes agents acting as “homo
economicus”, calculating costs and benefits of following or breaching rules,
evaluating the efficiency of certain institutional arrangements and finding the
solution of legal conflicts through economic analysis.
Pettit observes as well that the “homo economicus” conception of agent’s
mind can collide to the vision generally adopted by every-day vision of
human action. This common-sense vision includes many concerns not
incorporated in the narrow vision of “homo economicus”, such as rules, others’
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expectations, merits, friendship, common past, etc. This situation represents a
challenge to the “homo economicus” view.
On the other hand, the “homo sociologicus” vision describes human
beings as “rule followers”. Here, the concept of “social norms” is central, since
these norms are not only constitutive of a particular society, but also of the
individual actions of the human beings living in it. The social norms indicate
the range of permissible actions and the punishment for the non-followers.
As it is well known, Weber’s (1978: 28) account of human social action
proposes four “ideal types” of action: a) The rational action seen as employing
means to a given end, b) The rational action as an attempt to realise some
absolute value, c) The affectively or emotionally determined action and d) The
traditional behaviour, expression of a settled custom. Hollis (1994: 151) on
Weber’s ideal types suggests that not only the homo economicus -the action
guided by instrumental rationality-, but also that the homo sociologicus, -
represented typically in the role of the burocrat- could represent the “rational”
type. That is, in his words: “whereas for homo economicus to be rational is to
calculate, for homo sociologicus to be rational is to follow a rule”. So, the idea of
rationality in this interpretation of Weber’s ideal types is wider and includes
both explanations, not letting out the sociological explanation as irrational.
Furthermore, Hollis, referring to Hume’s on the origin of justice and
property (1994: 192), claims for a more complex moral psychology to
understand the emergence of rules and promises between strangers. He thinks
that certain relations or negotiations between individuals (such as the
Centipede game) can be better explained by the “homo sociologicus” point of
view than from the “homo economicus” one. In fact, Hollis criticizes that
Rational Choice Theory (1994: 186) works with ideal-types lacking in a
particular psychology, treats preferences as given, makes the origin of
preferences irrelevant and only focuses on how these preferences produce
certain choices.
In fact, we think that the contradiction of both visions of human action
depends upon the idea that these are exclusive visions. For “homo
economicus” vision, individuals are goal oriented all the time, taking into
account his own desires and not considering his context and other human
being. For “homo sociologicus” account, individuals are blind rule followers,
without own criterion, that do not take into account their own desires and
goals but the established rules of the society where they live.
We agree with Hollis in that decisions can be reasoned without being
instrumental (1994: 195) and in that in most cases, both points of view are
necessary to understand human behaviour, since rules sometimes
“underdetermine rational choices”, leaving “options which depend on the
utility which the agent attaches to fulfilling them” (Hollis, 1994: 185). Our
evolutionary view of rules offers a notion of human psychology that includes
these normative considerations, distant from the pure rational maximizing
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agent view and closer to Hollis’ “intelligent” rule follower. As Pettit offers an
account able to conciliate these two visions (his Virtual-Actual model), we
think that the evolutionary account we are proposing permits us to blend both
visions.
Initially, the conception of the human nature we have been assuming,
seems to agree, in general terms, with the “homo economicus” view since our
evolutionary approach also states self-centred individuals, guided by desires
and goals. However, there are some important differences:
a) In the first place, human “selfishness” includes concerns to others, such as
family and relatives, so others are considered in the evaluation of the act. This
inclination and the natural sympathy towards others, implies the capacity to
generate groups and small societies. In this sense, our human nature
assumption seems to be broader that the one of “homo economicus”, accepting
more factors as possible motivation for action. Moreover, the structure of
social relations and the role of certain individuals (such as leaders or referees)
influence the individual decision making processes.
b) Our idea of “self-centeredness” does not necessarily include a conscious
utility calculus as the “homo economicus” vision seems to imply. A vision of
individual with sympathetic inclinations towards others, limited knowledge
and bounded rationality, replaces the agent propounded by the “homo
economicus” view, making more difficult to affirm that individuals act in a
“pure rational” way with complete information.
These considerations imply two different points in relation to
rationality. On one hand, it is assuming a vision of rationality that is more
limited than that assumed by classical rational choice theories (such as
Simon´s bounded rationality notion also included in Jason Alexander´s vision
of morality). We also consider that this vision is an heir of the limited
cognitive capacity analysis propounded by the previous evolutionary
tradition, such as that initiated by the Scottish School of the XVIII Century and
Hayek in the XX Century. On the other hand, it allows to re-think the
definition of a rational action, providing a wider range of conducts that could
be consider rational without fulfilling all the required conditions established
by rational choice theory. For example, to follow a rule is a rational action
even if it does not seem to respond to a direct benefit for the individual? I
think that the evolutionary account of normative orders can provide of a good
explanation about why actions motivated by the respect of a rule could be
compatible with the idea of self-interested individuals (even if they do not
have the cognitive capacity to calculate the utility maximisation for every
action).
Finally, we can see that our evolutionary view blends the “homo
economicus” and the “homo sociologicus” visions. On one hand, and responding
to Holli´s demand, this view offers a notion of the human nature that allows
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us to create expectations on the possible behaviour and rules individuals
might follow in a social order. For example, we could expect that human
beings would be more concern about the well-being of family and friends than
of total strangers, and follow rules accordingly with this criterion. Moreover,
the idea of spontaneous orders and the social dynamics studied by EGT entail
a view where individuals are not conscious of the whole consequences of their
actions. They may be “creating” or changing rules without even noticing it.
The social and legal orders are games played by individuals that do not know
they are “players” of such games.
In second place, our evolutionary point of view would disagree with
Pettit´s idea that self-regarding concerns could only explain the resilience of
social norms and institutions, but not their emergence. The broader conception
of “self-interest” propounded comprises the idea that, -since individuals have
discovered the benefits of living in society-, they can pursuit common interest
with strangers, beyond the limits of the nearest social circle. As we have seen,
the emergence of legal and moral rules and institutions can be explained as the
result, not always deliberated, of self-centred human behaviour, considering
that individuals’ concerns are wider that the one included by the economic
vision.
Furthermore, the evolutionary vision of normative orders permits the
explanation of the dynamics of strategies and norms. Since it conceives
individuals with changing beliefs, expectations and social frameworks, the
“rational” responses can be very different in each context.
Finally, our evolutionary vision of law differentiates itself from the
“homo economicus” view by considering, that “man is as much a rule-following
animal as a purpose-seeking one” (Hayek, 1973: 11) introducing us to the
problem of “homo sociologicus” view.
In conclusion, from this “blending” evolutionary account of normative
orders see individuals are self-regarded, but that does not mean that they do
not have necessary relations with other individuals, since they acknowledge
the mutual need to resolve coordination conflicts. They can be motivated by
several reasons: their own interest, sympathy with one another, learning
mechanisms that allow them to imitate or adopt other’s more successful
strategies, etc. Their actions involuntarily produce regularities, which are often
internalised as rules since they are more efficient or better adapted to the
changing desires and goals of individuals. By following these rules,
individuals also reinforce the expectations with regard to theirs’ and others’
actions. In conclusion, individuals are followers of rules unintentionally
created by their self-regarding behaviour.
14
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