evid regala case

8/7/2019 Evid Regala case

1/64


2/64

Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines versus EduardoCojuangco, et al."i[1]

Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners TeodoroRegala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion,Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G.Hayudini, and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were thenpartners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and CruzLaw Offices (hereinafter referred to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRALaw Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included,among others, the organization and acquisition of business associationsand/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental services whereits members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders. More

specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of the lawfirm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client'sequity holdings, i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing theshares registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or

i t i id h I th f th i d li ith


3/64

Eduardo U. Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the AngaraConcepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law offices (ACCRA) plotted,

devised, schemed. conspired and confederated with each other in settingup, through the use of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporateframework and structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and more than twenty othercoconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of SanMiguel Corporation shares and its institutionalization throughpresidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidiousmeans and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned investmentarm, ACCRA Investments Corporation, became the holder ofapproximately fifteen million shares representing roughly 3.3% of thetotal outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. This ranks

ACCRA Investments Corporation number 44 among the top 100 biggeststockholders of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000 shareholders.On the other hand, corporate books show the name Edgardo J. Angara asholding approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984.v[5]


4/64

Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm,filed a separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint

implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.vii

[7]

Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their "COMMENTAND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991 with Counter-Motionthat respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to them(exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded private respondent Roco.viii

[8] The Counter-Motion for dropping petitioners from the complaint wasduly set for hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with therequirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following conditions

precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure ofthe identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents substantiating thelawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds ofassignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their

i [9]


5/64

x x x.

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identityof the client for whom they have acted, i.e. their principal, and that willbe their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations ofwhether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers existscannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excusethemselves from the consequences of their acts until they have begun toestablish the basis for recognizing the privilege; the existence andidentity of the client.

This is what appears to be the cause for which they have been impleadedby the PCGG as defendants herein.

5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has demonstrated hisagency and that Roco has apparently identified his principal, whichrevelation could show the lack of cause against him. This in turn has


6/64

ACCRA lawyers filed the petition forcertiorari, docketed as G.R. No.105938, invoking the following grounds:

I

The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in subjectingpetitioners ACCRA lawyers who undisputably acted as lawyers in

serving as nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of the law ofagency.

II

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in

not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarlysituated and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment.

1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had


7/64

2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not limited to theidentity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to

other privileged matters.

IV

The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion innot requiring that the dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must bebased on reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to theconstitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protectionof the law.

Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion for

reconsideration of the March 18, 1991 resolution which was denied byrespondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a separate petition forcertiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113, assailing respondentSandiganbayan's resolution on essentially the same grounds averred by


8/64

Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.

I

It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly,respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the bigger fish as they sayin street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGGs willingnessto cut a deal with petitioners -- the names of their clients in exchange forexclusion from the complaint. The statement of the Sandiganbayan in itsquestioned resolution dated March 18, 1992 is explicit:

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity

of the client for whom they have acted, i.e., their principal, and that willbe their choice. But until they do identify their clients, considerations ofwhether or not the privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers existscannot even begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse


9/64

Cojuangco. Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished allthe monies to these subscription payments of these corporations who are

now the petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers executed deedsof trust, some in the name of a particular person, some in blank. Now,these blank deeds are important to our claim that some of the shares areactually being held by the nominees for the late President Marcos.Fourth, they also executed deeds of assignment and some of theseassignments have also blank assignees. Again, this is important to our

claim that some of the shares are for Mr. Cojuangco and some are forMr. Marcos. Fifth, that most of these corporations are really just papercorporations. Why do we say that? One: There are no really fixed setsof officers, no fixed sets of directors at the time of incorporation andeven up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And not only that, they have

no permits from the municipal authorities in Makati. Next, actually alltheir addresses now are care of Villareal Law Office. They really haveno address on records. These are some of the principal things that wewould ask of these nominees stockholders, as they called themselves.xvi

[16]


10/64

In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney ismore than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers

of trust and confidence reposed on him by his client.xix

[19] A lawyer isalso as independent as the judge of the court, thus his powers are entirelydifferent from and superior to those of an ordinary agent.xx[20]Moreover, an attorney also occupies what may be considered as a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the Courtxxi[21] andexercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken

favorable to his client.

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethicalconduct and duties that breathe life into it, among those, the fiduciaryduty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidential

character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith,xxii

[22]that is required by reason of necessity and public interestxxiii[23] based onthe hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good causeis an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.xxiv[24]


11/64

Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. - Thefollowing persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in

the following cases:

x x x

An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as toany communication made by the client to him, or his advice giventhereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, canan attorneys secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without theconsent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact theknowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.xxix[29]

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:


12/64

of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does itdemand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or

chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.

Considerations favoring confidentiality in lawyer-client relationships aremany and serve several constitutional and policy concerns. In theconstitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to one of the mostsacrosanct rights available to the accused, the right to counsel. If a clientwere made to choose between legal representation without effectivecommunication and disclosure and legal representation with all hissecrets revealed then he might be compelled, in some instances, to eitheropt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose the right to counsel.If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it amounts to self

incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed therebyrendering the right practically nugatory. The threat this representsagainst another sacrosanct individual right, the right to be presumedinnocent is at once self-evident.


13/64

First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privilegedinformation is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.

Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-clientrelationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does notattach until there is a client.

Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matterof therelationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing partyshould, as a general rule, know his adversary. A party suing or sued isentitled to know who his opponent is.xxxii[32] He cannot be obliged to

grope in the dark against unknown forces.xxxiii[33]

Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is howeverqualified by some important exceptions.


14/64


15/64

In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered injury when the taxicabshe was riding, owned by respondent corporation, collided with a second

taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff brought action bothagainst defendant corporation and the owner of the second cab, identifiedin the information only as John Doe. It turned out that when the attorneyof defendant corporation appeared on preliminary examination, the factwas somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know the name of theowner of the second cab when a man, a client of the insurance company,

prior to the institution of legal action, came to him and reported that hewas involved in a car accident. It was apparent under the circumstancesthat the man was the owner of the second cab. The state supreme courtheld that the reports were clearly made to the lawyer in his professionalcapacity. The court said:

That his employment came about through the fact that the insurancecompany had hired him to defend its policyholders seems immaterial.The attorney in such cases is clearly the attorney for the policyholder

h th li h ld t hi t t t l ti


16/64

involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the question tothe State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyers refusal to divulge the

names of his clients the court held:

If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order appealedfrom, that he represented certain persons in the purchase or sale of thesemines, it has made progress in establishing by such evidence theirversion of the litigation. As already suggested, such testimony by the

witness would compel him to disclose not only that he was attorney forcertain people, but that, as the result of communications made to him inthe course of such employment as such attorney, he knew that they wereinterested in certain transactions. We feel sure that under suchconditions no case has ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney,

at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer, butthe nature of the transactions to which it related, when such informationcould be made the basis of a suit against his client.xli[41]


17/64

enforcement of the IRS summons. For Bairds repeated refusal to namehis clients he was found guilty of civil contempt. The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals held that, a lawyer could not be forced to reveal thenames of clients who employed him to pay sums of money to thegovernment voluntarily in settlement of undetermined income taxes,unsued on, and with no government audit or investigation into thatclients income tax liability pending. The court emphasized theexception that a clients name is privileged when so much has been

revealed concerning the legal services rendered that the disclosure of theclients identity exposes him to possible investigation and sanction bygovernment agencies. The Court held:

The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that exception to the

general rule. Here money was received by the government, paid bypersons who thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient amount inincome taxes some one or more years in the past. The names of theclients are useful to the government for but one purpose - to ascertain

hi h t thi k th d li t th t it h k th


18/64

itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would thenreveal client confidences.xlvi[46]

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case atbench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at leasttwo exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the alleged client'sname would lead to establish said client's connection with the very factin issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the

privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance(without which there would be no attorney-client relationship).

The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice orlegal service sought was duly established in the case at bar, by no less

than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific conditions laiddown by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:


19/64

Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client'sname would obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to

build its case, where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the words ofBaird, that would inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary toconvict the (client) of a... crime."xlvii[47]

An important distinction must be made between a case where a clienttakes on the services of an attorney for illicit purposes, seeking advice

about how to go around the law for the purpose of committing illegalactivities and a case where a client thinks he might have previouslycommitted something illegal and consults his attorney about it. The firstcase clearly does not fall within the privilege because the same cannot beinvoked for purposes illegal. The second case falls within the exception

because whether or not the act for which the advice turns out to beillegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads toevidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead topossible action against him.


20/64

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28655 August 6, 1928

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,vs.EUGENIO TOLEDO and SISENANDO HOLGADO, defendants.EUGENIO TOLEDO, appellant.

C. V. Sanchez for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.


21/64

querida of Filomeno Morales, who testified to the presence andparticipation of Eugenio Toledo. Her testimony was partially

corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave. On the other hand, thetheory for the defense was that Toledo was in another place when thefight between Morales and Holgado occurred and that his onlyparticipation was on meeting Holgado, who was his landlord or master,in helping him to a nearby house. To this effect is the testimony of theaccused and of Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando Holgado. The

defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1,which was identified by the municipal president of Pinamalayan.

Counsel de oficio in this court makes the following assignment of errors:

I. The lower court erred in not admitting in evidence Exhibit 1.

II. The lower court erred in not finding that accused-appellantEugenio Toledo did not take part in the fight between accused


22/64

this reason I decided to see Filomeno Moralesabout this matter and when I talked to him this

morning (Wednesday) at about nine o'clock, atthe hemp plantation of Victorio Saudan situatedin Calingag, he told me that if I should plantthere anything he would cut my neck, and to thisI answered that if he was going to cut my neckwe would fight and thereupon he stabbed me

with a penknife and then I slashed at him; afterthis we separated, and went to DalmacioManlisic's house. When we fought, there wasnobody present.

Question by president: When you went to thehouse of Dalmacio Manlisic, did you not meetanybody before reaching said house?

f k d


23/64

In the presence of:

(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLEHILARION NIEVA

Signed and sworn to before me, this Junefifteenth, 1927.

(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLEMunicipal President

The discussion of the case in court has revealed three different points ofview among the members participating, all leading to the same result ofacquittal. Under such circumstances, it is, course, difficult for the writerof the opinion to do entire justice to those theories which do not conform

HisSISENANDO HOLGADO

Mark


24/64

evidence as part of the res gestae, and that giving it effect, in relationwith the other evidence, the accused has not been proved guilty. What

has heretofore been said with reference to the state of the record need nothere be repeated. It only remains to be stated that Exhibit 1 was made bySisenando Holgado on the same morning that the fight occurred andwithout the interval of sufficient time for reflection. The declaration ofSisenando Holgado fulfilled the test of the facts talking through the partyand not the party talking about the facts. There was such a correlation

between the statement and the fact of which it forms part as stronglytends to negative the suggestion of fabrication or a suspicion ofafterthought. The nature and circumstances of the statement do notdisclose intrinsic evidence of premeditation as revealed in a long,coherent, closely connected story. The modern tendency is toward the

extension of the rule admitting spontaneous declarations to meet theneeds of justice when other evidence of the same fact cannot beprocured. (22 C. J., pp. 461 et seq.; U. S. vs. David [1903], 3 Phil., 128.)

III


25/64

Professor Wigmore, one of the greatest living authorities on the law ofevidence, has attempted to demonstrate the false premises on which the

arbitrary limitation to the hearsay rule rests. He shows that the limitationis inconsistent with the language originally employed in stating theprinciple and is unjustified on grounds of policy. Professor Wigmore inturn has been answered by no less a body than the Supreme Court ofMississippi in the case of Brown vs. State of Mississippi ([1910], 37 L.R. A., New Series, 345). The editor of the Mississippi case in L. R. A.,

however, comes to the support of Professor Wigmore saying theunanimity of the decisions "is as complete as the shock which they givethe general sense of justice." The question has likewise in recent yearsgained attention by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case ofDonnelly vs. United States ([1913], 228 U. S., 243). There it was held

that the court below properly excluded hearsay evidence relating to theconfession of a third party, then deceased, of guilt of the crime withwhich defendant was charged. Mr. Justice Pitney, delivering the opinionof the court, said: "In this country there is a great and practicallyunanimous weight of authority in the estate courts against admitting


26/64

In the Philippine jurisdiction, we have never felt bound to follow blindlythe principles of the common law. A reexamination of some of those

principles discloses anomalies.

A dying declaration is admitted of necessity in order, as the SupremeCourt of Mississippi states, "to reach those man slayers who perpetratetheir crimes when there are no other eyewitnesses." But the personaccused of a crime, under the same principle of necessity, is not

permitted to free himself by offering in evidence the admission ofanother under oath that this other committed the crime. Again admissionsare receivable against either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, but notagainst a penal interest. We fail to see why it can be believed that a manwill be presumed to tell the truth in the one instance but will not be

presumed to tell the truth in the other instance. Again the exhibit wouldhave been admitted against its maker at his trial, if he had not died. Butthe document is held inadmissible to exonerate another. Yet the truth ofthe exhibit is not different in the first case that in the second.


27/64

PAR. 1476. History of the Exception; Statement of Fact againstPenal Interest, excluded; Confessions of Crime by a Third

Person. It is today commonly said, and has been expresslylaid down by many judges, that the interest prejudiced by thefacts stated must be either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest,and not a penal interest. What ground in authority there is forthis limitation may be found by examining the history of theexecution at large.

The exception appears to have taken its rise chiefly in twoseparate rivulets of rulings, starting independently as a matter ofpractice, but afterwards united as parts of a general principle. . . .

These lines of precedent proceeded independently till about thebeginning of the 1800s, when a unity of principle for some ofthem came gradually to be perceived and argued for. This unitylay in the circumstance that all such statements, in that they

d j di i l h d l lf i


28/64

The same attitude has been taken by most American courts,excluding confessions of a crime, or other statements of factsagainst penal interest, made by third persons; although there isnot wanting authority in favor of admitting such statements.

PAR. 1477. Same: Policy of this Limitation. It is plain enoughthat this limitation, besides being a fairly modern novelty, isinconsistent with the broad language originally employed in

stating the reason and principle of the present exception (ante,pars. 1457, 1476) as well as with the settled principle uponwhich confessions are received (ante, par. 1475).

But, furthermore, it cannot be justified on grounds of policy. The

only plausible reason of policy that has ever been advanced forsuch a limitation is the possibility of procuring fabricatedtestimony to such a admission if oral. This is the ancient rustyweapon that has always been drawn to oppose any reform in the

l f id i h f d f b hi


29/64

prove the accused's non-commission of the offense by showingcommission by another person, not merely one casual piece ofevidence suffices but a "prima facie" case resting on severalconcurring pieces of evidence must be made out. Finally, most ofthe early rulings had in view, not the present exception to thehearsay rule, but the doctrine of admissions (ante, pars. 1076,1079) that the admissions of one who is not a co-conspiratorcannot affect others jointly charged.

It is therefore not too late to retrace our steps, and to discard thisbarbarous doctrine, which would refuse to let an innocentaccused vindicate himself even by producing to the tribunal aperfectly authenticated written confession, made on the very

gallows, by the rule culprit now beyond the reach of justice.Those who watched (in 1899) with self-righteous indignation thecourse of proceedings in Captain Dreyfus' trial should rememberthat, if that trial had occurred in our own courts, the spectacle

ld h b l h f l if f ll i


30/64

his innocence, and would be strong evidence to go before thejury in his favor. Any legitimate fact or circumstance whichwould meet or tend to meet the state's case and break the force ofcriminative facts introduced against the accused is alwaysadmissible. Appellant's contention was that he did not kill thedeceased, but that Cain did. The state's theory was the appellantshot the deceased, and Cain did not shoot him. Under the rules ofevidence this testimony was clearly inadmissible.

We would like finally to turn attention to what was said by the editor ofL. R. A. in his note in volume 37 hereinbefore referred to, viz:

The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for

the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statementof another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In otherwords, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, andthe inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors bel d h id l h f d l i


31/64

trained and experienced in the law display less discerning common sensethat the layman and allow precedent to overcome truth?

JUDGMENT

For three somewhat divergent reasons, we are all of the opinion that thedefendant-appellant Eugenio Toledo should be given the benefit of thereasonable doubt which prevails in our minds. Accordingly, the

judgment appealed from will be reversed and the defendant and appellantacquitted, and as it appears that he is now confined in Bilibid Prison, anorder will immediately issue directing his release, with costs de oficio.

Avancea, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real,

JJ., concur.


32/64

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119359 December 10, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.ROBERT CLOUD, accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:p


33/64

boy not more than three years old must havebeen hit by a truck (tsn, J. Aguilar, June 21, 1993,pp. 7-10, 14-15, 33).

But the words of the old woman the lola of thelittle boy, showed the cause of the injury to beotherwise for she was repeatedly saying in apotpourri of cries and tears: "Pinatay siya ng

sariling ama!" The old woman told the people insidethe Emergency Room that the boy'sfather Robert Cloud wouldn't allow JohnAlbert to come with her and when the boy started tocry and wouldn't stop crying his father began to

beat the boy hard, tied his hands, and made "tusok,tusok" in his body. The father continued beating theboy even when excrements were already comingout from the boy's anus (tsn, J. Aguilar, June 21,1993 12 13 22)


34/64

City[;] the boy's body was brought to Rey FuneralHomes[;] Dr. E. Cacas certified that the cause ofdeath of John Albert Cloud is broncho pneumoniawith heart complications (Exh. D-48) [;] and that theautopsy on the cadaver was waived by NatividadCalpito Cloud who claimed to be the boy's motherper her "Affidavit" dated August 3, 1988 (Exh. "D-47"). Atty. Balbin thereafter contacted the NBI and

requested for the exhumation of the boy's cadaver(tsn, J. Aguilar, June 21, 1994, pp. 17-21, 32, 35-37, 42; R. Balbin, March 8, 1994, pp. 6, 17-21, 23,25-27, 29-30, 36, 50, 54-55).

The exhumation was done on November 8, 1988 by the NBI at theManila South Cemetery. The exhumation report stated thefollowing findings:

U i i i ht i i


35/64

Other visceral organs, congested.

Stomach, empty (Exhibits "E" and "E-l")

Although the crime was supposedly committed on August 2, 1988,for reasons hereinafter explained the information dated May 10,1990 was filed on June 5, 1990. The decision of the trial courtstates that the accused was arrested only on April 15, 1993. That

is why, with the proceedings that then had to be undertaken andthe trial which had to be conducted, it was only in a decision datedNovember 11, 1994 that judgment was ultimately handed down,decreeing as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby renderedfinding herein accused ROBERT CLOUD GUILTYbeyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crimeof PARRICIDE for the violent death of his son


36/64

Atty. Balbin conducted an investigative research which enabledher to coordinate with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).Her efforts led to the discovery of the following facts:(1) RobertCloud and his family left their house at No. 69 San Isidro Street,Barangay Sto. Nio, Quezon City immediately after the death ofJohn Albert; 4 (2) John Albert's body was brought from the hospitalto the Rey Funeral Homes; 5 (3) a certain Dr. E. Gacas certifiedthat the cause of the death of John Albert was broncho

pneumonia with heart complications;6

and (4) the autopsy of thecadaver was waived by a certain Natividad Calpito Cloud whofalsely claimed to be the mother of John Albert. 7 Incidentally,despite her active participation in various aspects of this case, shewas never called upon by appellant to testify and corroborate hisassertions therein.

Atty. Balbin thereafter requested for the exhumation of the body ofthe little boy for purposes of autopsy. The exhumation was made

N b 8 1988 l t th th ft th b i l f


37/64

Q Madam witness, do you recallwhere were you on August 2, 1988at around 11:00 in the morning,madam witness?

A I was in the emergency room ofSt. Luke's Hospital in Quezon City,sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q While you were there after acouple of minutes, what happened?

Do you recall any unusual incident,madam witness?

A An old woman came with a boy full


38/64

Q Did you come to know the oldwoman, madam witness?

A No, sir.

Q How about the boy, did you cometo know the name of the boy whodied, madam witness?

A Albert Cloud, sir.

Q What happened after the boydied, madam witness?

A The lola started shouting tellingeverybody there how it happened, tothe nurses and to the doctors.


39/64

FISCAL PONFERRADA:

Q Did you have any occasion to seewhether there are marks in thehands or the body of the boy,madam witness?

A At that time the boy was full of

dried blood, sir.

Q After that?

A I see (interrupted)

Q What did you see, madamwitness?


40/64

Q So at that time in the hospital youdid not see the boy, madamwitness?

A Only dried blood, sir. 8

The defense, on the other hand, argues that at the time of thecommission of the alleged crime, appellant was not in his house

and that the boy, John Albert, must have fallen from the stairsleading to the second floor of the house. The defense presentedappellant and he testified that he left the house on the day inquestion and only learned upon his return that his son was alreadydead, thus:

Q Do you know how your son died,Mr. Witness?


41/64

Q Now, your son, where was he atthe time you left the house, Mr.Witness?

A He was upstairs, sir.

Q Do you know what he was doingat the time you left, Mr. Witness?

A He was sleeping, sir.

Q Also, evidence already adduced inthis case indicates that your son was

brought to the St. Lukes Hospital,Quezon City by an old woman with amale companion on or about 12:00o'clock noon on August 1, 1988 and


42/64

Q Who is this auntie, what is hername, Mr. Witness?

A Teresita Alconyes.

Q Was that the old woman togetherwith the male person (who) broughtyour son to the hospital, Mr.

Witness?

A No, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Where did this aunt of yours Ms.Alconyes tell you that your son died,Mr. Witness?


43/64

Q When you learned that your sondied from your aunt, what did youdo?

A I went home immediately, sir.

Q Did you see any person in yourhouse or did you reach your house?

A Yes, sir.

Q Whom did you meet in your houseupon your return?

A None, sir.

Q So what did you do, Mr. Witness?


44/64


45/64

The defense also alleged that John Albert was a sickly child frombirth and was often hospitalized due to difficulty in breathing, asshown by some medical records. 10 Further presented was the

death certificate of John Albert Cloud issued by one Dr. Gacasand dated August 6, 1988, stating that the cause of death wasbroncho pneumonia with heart complications, 11 and the reportmade by Patrolman Ulep showing that he investigated the deathof the child, John Albert Cloud. 12

On this aspect, Dr. Alberto M. Reyes, the medical specialist at theNBI who examined the exhumed body of the little boy, waspresented as a prosecution witness. His report 13 indicated"hemorrhage, intracranial, severe, traumatic" as the cause ofdeath. He testified that "the upper incisor, right, was missing,contusions on the face, right side, buttocks, knees and on thehead. And the said injuries could have been caused by a hardblunt object, hitting by a fist or a piece of wood." He did give ah th ti l i "th t it l ibl th t it th


46/64

Q Both buttocks sustained injuriesaccording to your findings?

A Yes, right and left side.

Q If baby boy like this boy fall on thehigh building would sustain injury onthe buttocks, the injury on the

buttocks as well as the knees?

A The contusion on the buttocks arevery extensive. They are 20 by 20centimeters. So if the buttocks first

(sic) is very different, if he falls it isvery difficult for him and also on hisknees. And the knees are anteriorportion it is highly improbable.


47/64

(a) the accused was told that his son died from afall and he did not even bother to go to the hospitalwhere his son lay dead;

(b) he did not bother to see the medical records orthe medical certificate when he knew already thathis son did not die of an ordinary, natural cause.And corollarily, said certificate is false and even the

alleged doctor who made (it) is a false or non-existent doctor;

(c) the accused took his entire household to Paco,Manila away from Quezon City for years. Theremust have been some other reason than hisalleged sorrow over John Albert's death. For, if itwere just his sadness over it, then the Quezon Cityhouse could have been rented out or a caretakerl ft th t A it i H i i A t l ft d


48/64

own son by beating him to death. The said grandmother, RufinaAlconyes, was not presented in court, since at the time of the trialshe was already dead.

The Solicitor General posits the view that the outbursts of thatgrandmother constituted exceptions to the hearsay rule since theywere part of the res gestae. Those inculpatory and spontaneousstatements were: (1) "Pinatay siya ng kanyang ama" (he was

killed by his own father); (2) Putang ina ang ama niya . . . walangawa sa anak niya . . . hayop siya" (His father is a son of a bitch . . .without pity for his son . . . he is an animal); and (3) Appellant didnot allow his son, John Albert, to accompany her and when theboy started to cry and would not stop, appellant beat his son veryhard, tied his hands, and continued beating him until excreta cameout of his anus. 17

The trial court was of the opinion that what Ms. Aguilar heard ord t l tit t i d d tl l t


49/64

These are the pertinent parts of his representations in the trialcourt:

Q Mr. Acosta, where were you onAugust 2, 1988?

A I was at home, sir.

Q Where was your home then?

A At Santol but don't know specificaddress.

Q Do you know whose house wasthat?

A Mr. Robert Cloud the accused.


50/64

xxx xxx xxx

A Myself, Natividad and Abet and

Lola the old woman.

Q What is the full name of Naty?

A Natividad, the wife of Robert

Cloud.

COURT:

Q Who is this Abet?

A The one who fell in the stairs.

xxx xxx xxx


51/64

Q What about Mr. Cloud theaccused here Robert Cloud, was hethere when the child fell from the

stairs?

A He was not there also.

Q What about the Lola? Was she

there when the boy fell?

A Yes, sir.

Q What do you mean there, when

the boy fell the Lola was alreadythere?

A No, sir.


52/64

xxx xxx xxx

Q What time were you at the

groundfloor?

A Morning when I heard something"kalabog" that I went there.

Q What were doing there?

A I was preparing food and water forJonald, the old brother.

xxx xxx xxx

Q While you were doing this work,do you know what happened.


53/64

A The Lola first the one who left thenNaty then Robert Cloud.

Q Now when you said that (they) leftand you heard the "Kalabog" did youknow what kalabog is that?

A Yes, sir, I went to the stairway.

Q And what did you find out?

A I saw Abet.

Q So what did you do?

A I held him, I don't know how he felland I don't expect that he fall in the


54/64

Q Was there any remark made byan old woman while you wereholding the boy?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please tell us as far as you canremember?

A She was angry with the fatherbecause according to her"pinabayaan daw ang bata."

Q Can you represent all as you canthe statement of the lola?

A She was already angry and she


55/64

Q Do you know what happened inthe hospital?

A I don't know I just left there.

Q I am calling your attention to thetestimony of one Ms. Aguilar,according to her while she was

attending to her child for treatmentinside the hospital she saw JohnAlbert Cloud and the old woman andaccording to her the old woman(was) hysterical and she was statingaloud the following words orexpression "Pinatay siya ng sarilingama, pinatay siya ng sariling ama,"did you hear that?


56/64

A I went home to Santol.

Q Whom did you see there?

A Mr. Robert Cloud.

Q Did you notice what he was doingat that time?

A He was already crying.

Q Did you ask him why he wascrying?

A No, sir.

Q Did he talk to you?


57/64

therefrom. In fact, as the trial court elicited from appellant, thestairs from which the boy allegedly fell had only nine steps. It didnot even go straight down but went four steps to the first landing

then turned right where another five steps led to the ground floor.20Evidently, if one merely fell down such stairs, that fall would be

broken at the landing where the stairs turned at a right angle, andeven if he still continued rolling in that new direction, themomentum would have been greatly reduced. That would be true

even if that person did not merely slip or fall, but was pushed orthrown, down the stairs.

And this brings us to the irrefutable physical evidence which, asmedico-legal experts say, belies the adage that dead men tell notales. Indeed, to the trained eye, the inanimate remains of the

dead give testimony of their own and, in the present case, that istrue even of the young victim who in life could not have been asarticulate. We refer to the report of the NBI after the exhumation

d t hi h h t k i t l t l t t


58/64

medical staff whom he knew he could not delude, and yet he hasthe effrontery to do so before this Court.

The circumstances which the court below considered as reactionsbetraying a sense and knowledge of guilt on the part of appellantand his cohorts have already been catalogued. One of them is thefact that immediately after the death of the victim in the hospital,appellant took his entire household to Paco, Manila, abandoned

their house in Quezon City and never came back until severalyears later. This is admitted by appellant 21 and Acosta. 22 In fact,appellant admitted that, while investigations into the death of hisson were going on, he left for Japan in 1990 and returned in 1993,23 only to be arrested since the investigation had by then zeroed inon his culpability. This circumstance was even sought by the trial

court to be clarified by Acosta, but this is what transpired:

Q Do you know or did you come tok h ft th d th f thi b


59/64

with a passion for justice to seek redress for his untimely death.On this consoling thought, we write finis to this case.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the court a quo inCriminal Case No. Q-90-12660 convicting accused-appellantRobert Cloud of parricide is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costsin both instances.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.


60/64

i

ii

iii

iv

v

vi

vii

viii

ix

x

xi

ii


61/64

xii

xiii

xiv

xv

xvi

xvii

xviii

xix

xx

xxi

xxii

iii


62/64

xxiii

xxiv

xxv

xxvi

xxvii

xxviii

xxix

xxx

xxxi

xxxii

xxxiii

xxxiv


63/64

xxxiv

xxxv

xxxvi

xxxvii

xxxviii

xxxix

xl

xli

xlii

xliii

xliv

xlv


64/64

xlv

xlvi

xlvii

xlviii

xlix

evid regala case

Documents