even though the united states does not censor its internet

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With these three axes in mind, we can compare various countries to better understand their approaches to the Internet. Almost all countries use codes to censor child pornography and to track illegal behavior that may go against government interests (WikiLeaks, Edward Snowden). However, some countries are far more pervasive in their approach to surveillance and internet control. The OpenNet initiative found that Egypt, France, Germany, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States had no evidence of limiting netizens' internet freedom, while they found China to engage in pervasive filtering in all areas. North Korea stands alone with its isolated version of the internet. Along with China, countries like Iran, Myanmar, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan have been increasing their internet filtering(OpenNet). Thus we begin to witness how as each country can have a unique approach, the internet may not be the cosmopolitan safe haven we had dreamt about in its early days; it may instead be a new tool for surveillance and ideological propaganda(Fuchs; Mai; Chomsky and Hesse). Internet usage has been growing at an exponential rate. On any day in the last 5 years, there were on average 640,000 people online for the first time(Roser et al). Social media platforms are modifying standards of socialization as they inherently change our ways of interacting with each other. Platforms like Facebook have upwards of 2 billion monthly users(Roser et al), making social media a contentious battleground for political and social matters(Sechenova). With these staggering numbers in mind, it is easy to imagine the internet as a free cosmopolitan community where everyone has a voice, but this is far from the truth. Lawrence Lessig explained in his book "Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace" that every era has regulations set by governing powers, and the age of the internet is not devoid of these hegemonic influences; the regulators have become invisible(Lessig). Governments seem to regulate and censor our internet experiences through code, as algorithms gain increasing power in shaping our realities. The OpenNet Initiative set out to monitor and report internet censorship and surveillance around the world. They indicate that most countries use code to control the media circulated on the internet, with varying degrees of pervasiveness to netizens' cyber-privacy. They tracked the number of restrictions on political and social expression, as well as access to digital tools(Opennet). They found three areas which defined "Internet freedom": Infrastructural and economic barriers to access specific technologies or applications; legal control over internet access providers. Filtering and blocking of websites; manipulation of content; the diversity of online news media; control over social media activism Restriction of online activity; surveillance and limits on privacy; and repercussions for online activity, such as legal prosecution or imprisonment;

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Page 1: Even though the United States does not censor its internet

With these three axes in mind, we can compare variouscountries to better understand their approaches to theInternet. Almost all countries use codes to censor childpornography and to track illegal behavior that may goagainst government interests (WikiLeaks, Edward Snowden).However, some countries are far more pervasive in theirapproach to surveillance and internet control. The OpenNetinitiative found that Egypt, France, Germany, India, theUnited Kingdom, and the United States had no evidence oflimiting netizens' internet freedom, while they found Chinato engage in pervasive filtering in all areas. North Koreastands alone with its isolated version of the internet. Alongwith China, countries like Iran, Myanmar, Tajikistan, andAfghanistan have been increasing their internetfiltering(OpenNet). Thus we begin to witness how as eachcountry can have a unique approach, the internet may not bethe cosmopolitan safe haven we had dreamt about in itsearly days; it may instead be a new tool for surveillance andideological propaganda(Fuchs; Mai; Chomsky and Hesse).

Internet usage has been growing at an exponential rate. Onany day in the last 5 years, there were on average 640,000people online for the first time(Roser et al). Social mediaplatforms are modifying standards of socialization as theyinherently change our ways of interacting with each other.Platforms like Facebook have upwards of 2 billion monthlyusers(Roser et al), making social media a contentiousbattleground for political and social matters(Sechenova).

With these staggering numbers in mind, it is easy to imaginethe internet as a free cosmopolitan community whereeveryone has a voice, but this is far from the truth. LawrenceLessig explained in his book "Code and Other Laws ofCyberspace" that every era has regulations set by governingpowers, and the age of the internet is not devoid of thesehegemonic influences; the regulators have becomeinvisible(Lessig). Governments seem to regulate and censorour internet experiences through code, as algorithms gainincreasing power in shaping our realities.

The OpenNet Initiative set out to monitor and reportinternet censorship and surveillance around the world. Theyindicate that most countries use code to control the mediacirculated on the internet, with varying degrees ofpervasiveness to netizens' cyber-privacy. They tracked thenumber of restrictions on political and social expression, aswell as access to digital tools(Opennet). They found threeareas which defined "Internet freedom":

Infrastructural and economic barriers to access specifictechnologies or applications; legal control over internetaccess providers.

Filtering and blocking of websites; manipulation of content;the diversity of online news media; control over social mediaactivism

Restriction of online activity; surveillance and limits onprivacy; and repercussions for online activity, such as legalprosecution or imprisonment;

Page 2: Even though the United States does not censor its internet

China's internet filtering system uses a code that permitskeyword filtering, allowing the government to block anycontent with keywords that mark it as "illegal". This systemis said to be one of the most robust algorithms in theworld(Stockman and Gallagher). However these intenserestrictive lists at once slow down the internet, can becircumvented by proxy websites, and often block both legaland illegal sources. Keywords that are blocked include"Tianamen Square", "Falun Gong" , "taiwanese independence"(Etc.)(Lee and Liu)... The idea of legality also rides closelywith the concept of Chinese values (Perris).

After having outlined the more visible elements of Chinesecensorship, it must be noted that there are other lesstransparent ways of controling its population. The Anhuiprovince started a unit of their police department addressedto limiting illegal cyber behavior, this unit has since spreadto provinces all around China. These forces are said toexhort a "tight control" over what residents can access onthe internet. The are also responsible to limiting the spreadof "negative news", information that may be critical of thegovernment. This police force has made a blacklist ofjournalist who promulgated "Unapproved news". They alsopursued soe journalists in justice who had leaked somegovernment information to western news outlets.

Another controversial example of the Chinese approach toweb censorship is the establishment of a group of workerstasked with posting positively about the Chinese governmenton social media. They received their name because it wassaid that each post they publish was remunerated by about50 cents. It is thought that around 280,000 citizens are apart of this group, with a purpose of spreading positivepropaganda on the social networks dominated by theChinese people.

Alongside these previously mentioned examples, it is widelyaccepted that government officials have strong influenceswithin the news and entertainment media industries throughactions conducted by the State Administration of Press,Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPREF)(Aho andDuffield). Chinese cyber-censorship has become moreintensive in the last couple of years, since Xi Jinping hassworn to better China's control over the internet. For thisreason, the government has banned many western websitesand social media. Though some researchers claim this is forcultural preservation, my senior project research argued thatthe youth is not disillusioned by this government control,and increasingly uses Virtual Private Networks (VPN) toaccess the wider Internet (Sechenova).

China is renowned for its isolationist political stance, and forits reliance on political propaganda and censorship inquelling dissent and controlling its population(Sechenova).With the arrival of the Internet, China has beenexperimenting with different ways to regulate the internet.These sets of code based regulatory policies are recognizedas the great Chinese firewall and operate through thefollowing agents:

The Chinese government is known to wield its legal powernot only on its citizens, but also the corporations providinginternet. These Internet Service Providers (ISP) are thenmandated to enact the larger restricitions in fear of losingthe Chinese market(Sechenova).

Page 3: Even though the United States does not censor its internet

Even though the United States does not censor its internetas assiduously as China, it still predominantly controlscontents such as pornography, gambling and informationthat would even remotely promote anti- government speechand actions. Some might argue that the lack of contentrestriction has allowed for a spread of misinformation totake place on social media(Harsh and Taneja). This highlightsthe contentions behind the concept of free speech, as itpushes us to question what defines hate speech. A largeamount of power is thus being wielded by coders andpolicymakers in shaping the future of this cosmopolitanplatform.

Article 19 Universal declaration of Human Rights sets outthat "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion andexpression; this right includes freedom to hold opinionswithout interference and to seek, receive and impartinformation and ideas through any media and regardless offrontiers"(United Nations), thus we must consider the risksand benefits presented by internet and wide spread socialmedia usage, as it becomes increasingly prevalent aroundthe world. There are a variety of ways to approach theinternet, but with the increasing acknowledgment of thepower and scope of this platform, it is time to install somewider international policies to establish the future of ourinternet use and to preserve our freedom.

Page 4: Even though the United States does not censor its internet

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