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EVALUATION REPORT EV668August 2006

EVALUATION OF DFIDCOUNTRY PROGRAMMES

COUNTRY STUDY: MOZAMBIQUE

Nick Chapman, Munhamo Chisvo,Esther Van Der Meer

Kemal Vaz, Muriel Visser

210 mm

Evaluation of DFID Country Programmes:

Country Study: Mozambique

August 2006

Nick Chapman, Munhamo Chisvo, Esther Van Der MeerKemal Vaz, Muriel Visser

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report has been prepared by an independent team from Information, Training andDevelopment (ITAD) Ltd and the Dutch Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) with Ecorysconsisting of Nick Chapman, Munhamo Chisvo, Esther Van Der Meer, Kemal Vaz andMuriel Visser. The team is very grateful to all those people who have provided support,information and comments.

The team was greatly assisted by the Head of Office and all the staff of DFIDMozambique. However, full responsibility for the text of this report rests with theauthors. In common with all evaluation reports commissioned by DFID’s EvaluationDepartment, the views contained in this report do not necessarily represent those ofDFID or of the people consulted.

Acknowledgements

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Front cover photograph by Cliff McCormick

PREFACE

This evaluation of DFID’s Mozambique’s country programme is one of a series ofregular Country Programme Evaluations (CPEs) commissioned by DFID’s EvaluationDepartment (EvD). The studies are intended to improve performance, contribute tolesson learning and inform the development of future strategy at country level.

The evaluation was carried out by a team of independent UK, Dutch and localconsultants led by Nick Chapman, ITAD Ltd. The process was managed by Shona Wynd, lain Murray and Lynn Quinn from EvD. The study is part of a wider,rolling programme of evaluations of DFID’s work at country and regional level.

The study period focused on DFID’s programme during the period 2000-2005 and the evaluation was carried out between January and March 2006. This included a one-week inception visit carried out by EvD and a two-week field visit carried out by the consultancy team. The field visit included interviews with DFID staff, localstakeholders and key partners.

In accordance with EvD policy, considerable emphasis was placed on involving thecountry staff during the process and on communicating the findings. Staff were invitedto discuss the outcomes at a workshop during the evaluation, and offered writtencomments on the draft reports.

Despite the legacy of protracted civil war and high vulnerability to natural disasters,Mozambique’s recent macroeconomic and social development progress has beenimpressive. During the last five years GDP growth averaged 9% while the reduction innational poverty, from 69% to 54% between 1996-97 and 2002-03, exceeded thegovernment target of 60% by 2005. However, despite poverty moving in the rightdirection, food insecurity shows little improvement, income inequality has worsenedand achievement of almost two thirds of the MDG targets by 2015 remains unlikely.

A critical factor affecting MDG achievement is soaring HIV and AIDS prevalence, whichhas doubled in six years to 16%. Governance, although improving in some areas likefiscal and financial management, lags behind in other areas like corruption control,political stability parliamentary scrutiny and justice. The absence of a demand functionoutside government for improvements in budget processes and outcomes limits theextent to which benefits from growth and rising aid flows can be re-distributed to thepoor.

DFID has been the sixth largest donor in Mozambique in the past five years with ashare of around 7% of aid. DFID deserves praise for helping Mozambique to reachHIPC completion point in 1998 and for leading the introduction of an ambitious, but sofar successful, model of Budget Support (BS). The study found that DFIDM’s strategieshave been closely aligned to corporate policies and the country programme is seen asa star performer in introducing the BS instrument and in strongly influencing otherpartners’ behaviour towards improved predictability, aid effectiveness and transparency.It is recognised as having played a key role in building donor alignment andharmonisation in a highly fragmented donor environment. But risks remain in prioritising

Preface

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BS in an environment where transparency and accountability are weak thoughimproving.

DFID’s specific contribution in Mozambique can be grouped into three areas: an abilityto interact with government and other major donors to bring about greaterharmonisation, a flexibility that has allowed DFID greater influence through strategicinterventions and technical assistance, and the competence and commitment of itsstaff. The study also highlights weaknesses in certain areas such as the failure tomanage the disengagement from certain sectors in the shift towards central reformsand BS, the limited effectiveness in crosscutting issues especially gender and HIV andAIDS and the need for more explicit linkages between processes and measurableoutcomes.

This has been an important lesson learning opportunity for DFID. The usefulness of the study findings has resulted from the efforts of many people. EvD would like toacknowledge the contribution made by the evaluation team itself and also thecooperation of DFID staff and development partners in Mozambique.

Nick York Head of Evaluation Department

Preface

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CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ix

1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. CONTEXT 3

3. STRATEGY, PROGRAMME CONTENT AND PROCESS 7

4. PROGRAMME EFFECTIVENESS 25

5. DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS 39

6. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS 43

ANNEXESAnnex A Terms of referenceAnnex B People consultedAnnex C Evaluation Matrix Annex D BibliographyAnnex E Mozambique and DFID TimelineAnnex F Programme expenditure

Contents

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

ART Anti-Retroviral TherapyARV Antiretroviral (drug)BOM Bank of MozambiqueBS Budget SupportCIDA Canadian International Dev. AgencyCF Clinton FoundationCFMP Mozambique’s MTEFCIMT Change Impact Monitoring TablesCIRESP Inter-Ministerial Committee for PSRCNE National Council for ElectionsCNCS National AIDS CouncilCRESCE Micro Finance Agency (Cresce means Grow in English)CSO Civil Society OrganisationCSP Country Strategy PaperDANIDA Danish Development AssistanceDBS Direct Budget SupportDCIM Development Cooperation Ireland, MozambiqueDER Department for Rural RoadsDFID UK Department for International DevelopmentDFIDM DFID Mozambique Country OfficeDNS National Directorate of Health ServicesDPC Directorate of Planning and CooperationDWG Donor Working GroupEISA Elections Institute of Southern AfricaESSP Education Sector Strategic PlanFAO UN Food & Agriculture OrganisationFASE Education Sector Common Fund FINNIDA Finnish International Dev. AgencyFRELIMO Governing Political PartyGAS Water and Sanitation Working GroupGBS General BSGDP Gross Domestic ProductGFATM Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, TB, & MalariaGNI Gross National IncomeGoM Government of MozambiqueGTZ German Agency for Technical Development Co-operationHIPC Heavily Indebted Poor CountriesHOO Head of Office, DFID MozambiqueIMF International Monetary FundIND National De-mining InstituteINGC National Institute for Disaster ManagementJA Joint AgreementJR Joint ReviewKCP Key Change ProcessMADER Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Dev.MAE Ministry of State AdministrationMAP Multi-sectoral AIDS Program (WB)

Acronyms

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MDBS Mozambique Direct Budget SupportMDGs Millennium Development GoalsMDP Ministry of Development & PlanningMF Ministry of FinanceMINEC Ministry of Education & CultureMISAU Ministry of HealthMoH Ministry of HealthMONASO Mozambique Network to fight HIV/AIDSMOPH Ministry of Public Works & HousingMoU Memorandum of UnderstandingMPF Ministry of Planning and FinanceMTEF Medium Term Expenditure FrameworkNAC National AIDS CouncilNGO Non-Government OrganisationNORAD Norwegian AidPAF Performance Assessment FrameworkPAP Programme Aid PartnerPARPA Mozambique’s Poverty Reduction StrategyPEN Strategic PlanPEN-Saude HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan for Health SectorPER Public Expenditure ReviewPES Economic and Social PlanPESS Health Sector Strategic PlanPFM Public Finance ManagementPLWHA People living with HIV/AIDSPO Poverty ObservatoryPROAGRI Agricultural Sector Public Expenditure ProgrammePROANI Swedish Niassa Development Programme PROSAUDE Health SWApPRSC Poverty Reduction Support Credit (WB)PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy PaperPSD Private Sector DevelopmentPSIA Poverty and Social Impact AssessmentPSR Public Sector ReformRENAMO Main Opposition Party SADC Southern African Development CommunitySBS Sector Budget SupportSDC Swiss Development CorporationSIDA Swedish International Development AgencySISTAFE Mozambique’s Financial Management SystemSTAE National Elections BodySWAP Sector Wide Approach for developmentTA Technical AssistanceUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUTRESP Technical Unit for Co-ordinating Public Sector ReformUSAID US Agency for International DevelopmentWB World BankWFP World Food Programme

Acronyms

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Executive Summary

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

S1 This report is an evaluation of DFID’s country programme in Mozambique. It isthe fifth in a round of five country programme evaluations (CPE) commissioned in2005/06. The evaluation asks two main questions: what was the quality of DFID’sprogramme and processes; and what has the programme achieved?

S2 Despite the legacy of a protracted civil war and high vulnerability to naturaldisasters, Mozambique’s recent macroeconomic and social development progress hasbeen impressive when compared to other African countries. During the last five years,GDP growth averaged 9%, while the reduction in national poverty, from 69% to 54%between 1996-7 and 2002-3, exceeded the Government of Mozambique (GoM) targetof 60% by 2005. Infant mortality fell by 19% and has been accompanied byimprovements in immunisation, maternal mortality and birth attendance. However, thecountry still ranks 168 out of 177 countries in terms of the Human Development Indexand despite poverty moving in the right direction, food insecurity shows littleimprovement, income inequality has worsened, and achievement of almost two thirdsof the MDG targets by 2015 remains unlikely.

S3 A critical factor affecting MDG achievements is soaring HIV and AIDSprevalence, which has doubled in 6 years to 16%. Governance, although improving insome areas like fiscal and financial management and public sector reform, lags behindin other key domains including corruption control, political stability, regulatory reform,parliamentary scrutiny and justice. The absence of a demand function outsidegovernment for improvements in budget processes and outcomes, in particular, limitsthe extent to which benefits from growth and rising aid flows can be re-distributed tothe poor.

Programme Content, Process and Effectiveness

S4 DFID has been the sixth largest donor to Mozambique in the past five years witha share of around 7% of aid. DFID deserves praise for helping Mozambique to reachHIPC completion point in 1998 and for leading the introduction of an ambitious, but sofar successful, model of Budget Support (BS). Mozambique, a country wheredevelopment assistance is so centralised that it forms up to one quarter of GDP, hasseen un-earmarked BS grow from almost zero in 2000 to 6% of GNI in 2005. Althoughthe poverty benefits of the BS instrument are yet to be fully quantified and the paceand singularity of approach has been questioned, its potential for upstream influencingand for strengthening existing government systems have been admired.

S5 DFIDM’s strategies closely reflect DFID’s corporate policies. From 2001,DFIDM’s sought to take leadership first in the area of BS, and then use that footprint tobuild influence in other areas. Excluding emergency relief, annual spending has almostdoubled over the review period, from £26 million in 2000/01 to £47 million in 2005/06.BS funding is the largest type of DFIDM expenditure in each year from 2001 onwards.SWAP/pooled funding in health and education account for a significant percentage, butproject funding has been usually higher. Technical co-operation though small in valuehas played a key role in supporting other instruments and in providing expertise toother Development Partners (DPs) and to GoM.

S6 DFIDM’s programme has been seen as a star performer within DFID in termsof pursuing budget support and building donor alignment and harmonisation in ahighly fragmented donor environment. Signature of the BS MoU by 15 ProgrammeAid Partners in 2004 was a watershed for DFIDM, and arguably for DFID globally,given the resultant increase in aid predictability, effectiveness and transparency. BShas improved domestic accountability simply by shifting responsibility for resourceallocation from donors to government.

S7 Through BS, DFIDM prioritised reform of central government systems asthe most effective means to address poverty alleviation in a sustainable manner.This was a risky strategy (albeit an acknowledged one) in an environment wheretransparency and accountability are still being built, where there has historically been acomplex and unharmonised pattern of donor engagement, and where sharp urban-ruralpoverty disparities persist. Nevertheless the risks were regarded as acceptable giventhe potential rewards foreseen.

S8 The thrust towards BS led to a disengagement from some sectors and lostopportunities for exploiting complementarities between on-going sectoral andup-coming central reforms. In order to manage the shift in strategic direction withlimited staff resources, choices had to be made to rationalise the portfolio. The speedand direction of this transition contributed to a reduced role in PROAGRI (theAgricultural Sector Public Expenditure Programme) and the education financialmanagement project. For the former, there were good grounds for remaining engaged,including the need to draw lessons from this first SWAP and the central role of the ruralsector in meeting certain MDGs.

S9 The rapid DFID/CHAD response to floods in 2000 and 2001 was vital insaving lives. DFIDM used the experience to influence an evolution of disastercontingency planning which has seen all sectors adopt the concept and allocateresources for it on an annual basis. In general DFIDM can be commended forconsciously linking reconstruction efforts (in roads) with employment creation inaffected communities, although the results were mixed and depended on unique labourmigration patterns.

S10 The change from the Country Strategy Papers (CSP) to Country Assistance Plan(CAP) brought with it a coherent three-cornered strategy that aimed to balancesupport for government reforms with enabling growth and strengthening civil society.However, the portfolio that emerged has been less well balanced with the growthportfolio engaging unevenly in a wide range of sectors, and with civil society movingmore slowly. The imbalance was not a question of funding (since potentials varied) butof unequal effort and sequencing. Civil society has received more resources fromDFIDM indirectly than directly, but these have tended to focus on service delivery andthus reinforced state structures as opposed to strengthening the challenge function ofcivil society.

S11 DFIDM is yet to proactively mainstream crosscutting issues, especially gender.For HIV/AIDS, mainstreaming has occurred in some areas particularly at project level,and often in an innovative manner, but only recently - with the 2005 HIV/AIDS strategydocument - has a more strategic selection of entry points for HIV/AIDS been achieved.

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S12 DFIDM has a well-respected and balanced staff complement, but faceschallenges due to headcount pressures. The pre-2004 team of UK-based staff inDFIDM served for longer and had good language skills. The current advisory teamhave a shorter median service period, and have to yet to build equivalent languageand contextual knowledge. Experienced and well-integrated locally-recruited staff havecontributed to continuity (institutional memory) and helped to ground programmes in anunderstanding of the local context.

S13 In terms of quantifying results from the portfolio, gaps in the PRISM databasemake systematic analysis of outcomes difficult. No ratings were available for the civilsociety corner of the CAP triangle as all projects were below the £1 million threshold.Overall, results show a weak trend during the period 2000-05, with the mostcommon score of 3 (purpose and outputs likely to be partially achieved).

S14 Recent evidence suggests though that the investment in budget support ishaving the desired effects on alignment of government budget with nationalpoverty goals, and on donor predictability, reduced transaction costs and to someextent on domestic accountability. The impact of BS on poverty goals is less clearat this stage, and a recent GBS study concluded that it has had a weak but positiveeffect on service delivery and service responsiveness. While DFIDM has beensuccessful in assisting in raising Customs and Tax revenues, critical reforms in publicfinancial management and public services are slow.

S15 Achievement against the Director’s Delivery Plan is good in terms ofmeeting the BS target, and for the related (though selective) indicators for governmentfinancial management and accountability. Key crosscutting reforms (for areas such aspublic services, staffing, planning and audit) are still underway so Mozambique cannotyet be said to be fully on track. Mozambique is also showing signs of improvementregarding the PSA indicators but the low base means that there is still some way togo to meet the absolute targets in education and health.

S16 Aid has contributed to the stability of the GoM’s political and macro-economicframework, and this in turn has encouraged investment and sustained economicgrowth. The extent to which Mozambique’s strong economic growth is pro-poorremains uncertain. Evidence currently suggests that inequality is increasing, and thatprovincial development is noticeably unbalanced as the south and key transportcorridors move ahead much faster than central and northern areas.

Lessons

S17 Key lessons arising from this evaluation include (i) that DFID can play a catalyticrole in leading a BS aid modality, provided it is prepared to invest the immense timeand energy in coordination work. (ii) Reforms take more time than foreseen, especiallythose that complement the BS instrument and target sensitive areas such as publicservices and financial management - even in a well-harmonised donor environmentand with a relatively compliant government partner. (iii) Implementing a major shift instrategic direction requires firm leadership, committed staff, sufficient resources andDFID-UK political backing. (iv) When contemplating such a shift, DFID’s country

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assistance strategy needs to consider the transition process and to provide a clearrationale for disengaging from a particular sector or thematic area. Trajectories andtargets for all MDGs need to be re-examined in the ‘with HIV/AIDS scenario’, ratherthan managing it as just one component of a poverty reduction strategy.

Recommendations

S18 Three sets of recommendations are made. In terms of improving relevance andquality of country strategy, DFID should build its next programme on the concept ofmutual accountability between aid partners and government extending further anddeepening the gains made through BS. In ensuring that government spends money inan accountable manner, the involvement of provinces is key. Strategies and targets fordecentralisation should be discussed in the context of the CAP.

S19 Gender, equity and HIV/AIDS need to move higher up DFID’s agenda inMozambique. Concrete strategies and targets need to be identified with explicit linksmade to the contribution that various interventions will make addressing these areas.Specific recommendations on HIV/AIDS are made in the report.

S20 To improve programme design and delivery, a twin track approach is requiredthat both strengthens long-term government capacity through support to the budgetand to central reforms, and also addresses - in the short-term - urgent poverty needs inkey under-performing areas, such as HIV/AIDS, water and sanitation and food security.

S21 Mechanisms for improving communication and thus the transparency both forthe poverty reduction strategy mechanisms and for DFIDM’s own programme areneeded. This should involve decentralised structures of government as well as bettermedia, publications and web-presence.

S22 On staffing, DFIDM needs to more systematically promote transfer ofinstitutional memory between old and new staff and to carefully balance staff timebetween policy and coordination within working groups, on the one hand, andimplementation and ground-truthing, on the other. Further, UK-based staff need greatersupport for language skills, and DFID’s recruitment procedures should emphasise thisability in the case of non-English language postings.

S23 Finally, to strengthen monitoring and evaluation of results, DFIDM needs toimprove its reporting by identifying intermediate outcomes expected for DFIDM arisingfrom the large number of activities in the annual country review. Monitoring andevaluation of budget support and public financial management also needs to bestrengthened (in the national poverty assessment framework or PAF) throughcoordinated donor support so that early signs of achievement can be better captured.

1. Introduction

1.1 Against a background of a substantial increase in resources1 and a focus onpoverty reduction and achievement of MDGs, DFID globally has adopted a policy ofdecentralisation in order to achieve greater relevance, responsiveness and impact forits aid resources. DFID country offices have been able to design and implementgrowing programmes of development assistance with increasing delegated authority,2

while at the same time efficiency drives have reduced staff resources and countryteams must deliver ‘more with less’. Given the opportunities and challenges that theseconditions place on DFID, there is considerable interest in assessing the effectivenessof the aid budget and learning lessons to improve delivery performance and impact inorder to assist countries to meet their respective millennium targets.

1.2 The Evaluation Department of DFID (EvD) has contracted ITAD and KIT3 toundertake a series of country programme evaluations (CPEs) with the aim of assessingthe relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of DFID assistance at country level.Mozambique is the fifth and last country in the series, and represents a significant casestudy given that it is one of DFID’s newest country offices (established in June 2001),and one of the most successful models for the introduction of Direct Budget Support(DBS).

1.3 Methodology: The CPE exercise, which is characterised as a ‘light evaluation’,was conducted in three stages (see TOR in Annex A). An initial one-week country visitwas made in January 2006 by a two-person team from EvD to work with the countryoffice on preparing the evaluation, collecting documentation and assessing the mostsalient issues for evaluation. For the second stage, a two-week field visit by a team offive independent consultants took place in February 2006.4 Given the scope of thestudy and the timeframe, the fieldwork did not involve project visits but concentrated ongathering evidence from documentation and a range of stakeholders, including DFIDcountry staff (past and present), government, donors, NGOs, and consultants. A list ofpersons consulted is given in Annex B. The exercise was guided by a matrix ofpertinent questions to be addressed (the pro-forma matrix is in Annex C). The thirdstage of the CPE was the drafting of the main report, followed by circulation forcomment and report finalisation.

1.4 Report Structure: the CPE report follows a standard structure that mirrors theevaluation matrix. Chapter 2 describes the pertinent country context in Mozambique,the level of development assistance and DFID’s own history of assistance since 2000.Chapter 3 then outlines the programme content and process, outlining: (i) the evolutionof the strategy, and assessing relevance and policy consistency; (ii) the nature of DFIDrelationships with key partners; and, (iii) describing and assessing the portfolio ofactivities. This leads to a review of the programme’s effectiveness in Chapter 4, wherethe results achieved by different projects and through different instruments areexamined. In so far as documented evidence is available or the views of informants

Introduction

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1 DFID resources increased from £3 to £4 billion between 2000 and 2005.2 Heads of Offices can approve projects up to £7.5 million3 ITAD: Information Training and Development, UK; KIT: Royal Tropical Institute, The Netherlands.4 The team consisted of a team leader (institutional and evaluation specialist) and specialists in economics, educationand health (especially HIV/AIDs), governance and rural livelihoods.

can be triangulated, the contribution of these different interventions on broader strategyobjectives, towards DFID’s public service agreement and key policy themes are thenaddressed. In Chapter 5, the results of DFID’s support are placed in the context ofMozambique’s overall development progress over the period under review. Then in thefinal chapter, conclusions are made on DFID’s added value and its strengths andweaknesses, and a set of lessons are presented that may guide future assistance inMozambique (especially within the context of the new Country Development Plancurrently under preparation) and more generally for DFID globally.

Introduction

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2. CONTEXT

Political, social and economic country context

2.1 Despite a history of civil war and high vulnerability to natural disasters,Mozambique’s achievements in macroeconomic management and social developmenthave been good compared with many African countries. During the last five years,GDP growth averaged 9%, while national poverty fell from 69% to 54% between 1996-7 and 2002-3, well below the 60% target for 2005 in the Government’s (GoM) povertyreduction strategy5. Infant mortality fell by 19% however life expectancy onlymarginally increased from 40.7 to 41.9 years.

Table 1: Key Social and Economic Indicators in Selected Countries

Source: 2004 UNDP Human Development Report. /1 The most recent estimates for Mozambique are 16.2% (MDGreport, 2005).

2.2 Mozambique is still ranked 168 out of 177 countries in terms of the HumanDevelopment Index. The assessment in the most recent MDG report finds a mixedlevel of achievement. While poverty reduction is moving in the right direction, foodinsecurity shows little improvement and inequality has worsened as marked regionaldifferences remain. School enrolment has improved but is unlikely to reach theabsolute target of all children completing primary school by 2015, and considerableregional and gender imbalances persist. Important areas of gender inequality alsocontinue, particularly in literacy and share of wage employment.

2.3 Given the low base after the civil war, relative measures of poverty reduction aregenerally on track (child mortality, immunisation, maternal mortality and birthattendance). A critical factor affecting all MDG achievements is HIV/AIDS (see Box 1).The prevalence rate of HIV has doubled in 6 years, and has reached 26% in high riskareas such as Sofala where transport corridors increase exposure levels. In contrast,MDG targets for malaria and other diseases Mozambique is expected to be achieved.

Country Context

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y Gross

National Income Per Capita($) (2003)

Average Inflation Rate

HIV preval-ence (2003)

GiniIndex

Access to ImprovedWaterSource(2002)

Net Primary School Enrolment Rate(2002/3)

Life Expectancyat Birth (2002)

Mozambique 230 13.4 12.2/1 39.6 42 45 41.9 Malawi 156 9.6 14.2 50.3 67 50 39.7 Tanzania 287 3.5 8.8 38.2 73 50 46 Zimbabwe … 24.6 56.8 83 86 36.9 South Africa 3489 5.9 21.5 57.8 87 88 48.4 Sub Saharan Africa 633 … 7.3 … 58 … 46.1

5 GoM and PAP (2005) Mid Year Joint Review.

2.4 Mozambique achieved HIPC completion status in 1998, and has since enjoyedsignificant debt relief amounting to $ 2.8 billion.6 Yet growth in the country is notparticularly poor-focused, being driven by mega-industrial projects, foreign investmentand large-scale agriculture that are highly mechanised as opposed to labour intensive.Job creation that is sufficient to soak up unemployment levels is not occurring. Nationalincome remains low, with per capita GDP at $311 in 2004. Though agriculturecontributes only one-fifth of GDP, it employs 80% of the economically active population.The vulnerability of the economy to shocks was demonstrated in 2000 when the severefloods cut GDP to 1.5% that year.

2.5 Although democracy is firmly entrenched, with three democratic elections in 15years, politics is a source of potential instability and uncertainty. The two leadingparties are deeply divided at national level, and their level of representation at locallevel is polarised and with little accountability to constituents. The recent third electionsin 2004 strengthened Frelimo’s power, as the party won with a strong majority althoughwith evidence of localised electoral malpractice.

2.6 Recent governance assessments show Mozambique to be a poor (thoughimproving) performer in key governance domains: political stability, regulatory reform,parliamentary scrutiny and justice. The anti-corruption unit, set up in 2002, has provedineffective, and although the new government has published a respected Anti-Corruption Study in 2005, the will for serious action to address this problem remainsuncertain. Excessive centralisation of decision-making authority continues to hinderaccountability, and although media and civil society capacity is growing it isnevertheless still too focused on Maputo and urban elites and remains hindered by lackof access to public information. Lack of judicial reform is for some commentators one ofthe most important issues. Apart from basic rights concerns, this also strongly affectsaccess to commercial justice and business remains hampered by an overlybureaucratic public service.

2.7 Some commentators argue that ‘ government works more to please the donorthan to solve real internal problems’ (Moyana, p.38). Nevertheless with considerabledonor support, Mozambique has progressed and the GoM is making steady progress inaddressing some governance issues, including improving fiscal and financial

Country Context

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6 Since 1996, Mozambique has gone through two rounds of HIPC debt relief, bringing its debt-to-exports ratio downfrom 709% in 1997 to 131% in 2001. The WB and IMF regard this level as sustainable.

Box 1. The impact of HIV/AIDS in Mozambique

In 2004, out of a population of 18.9 million, an estimated 1.4 million people wereinfected with HIV/AIDS. Without the impact of HIV/AIDS, the average lifeexpectancy would have been 46.4 years but, because of AIDS, it fell to 38 years.The same year, about 100,000 Mozambicans died of AIDS. It is estimated that by2010 about 10,000 teachers, 9,000 policeman and 6,000 health workers will dieof the disease. The high mortality resulting from HIV/AIDS has so far orphanedabout 270,000 children under the age of 17. (Source: Moyana 2004, p.37)

management, and public sector reform. Recent measures include buildingaccountability through a poverty observatory consisting of civil society representatives,and a much more consultative poverty reduction planning process under thegovernment’s second poverty reduction strategy (PARPA II) now being finalised.

Development assistance

2.8 Between 2000 and 2004, Mozambique received $6.3 billion in foreign aid, ofwhich $5.6 billion was in the form of grants, and the remaining $0.7 billion inconcessionary loans (Table 2). The share of foreign aid to the nation's total resourcerequirements has remained substantial. From 60% of GNI in the early nineties, netforeign financing fell to 25% in the second half of the 1990s, and has remained at thislevel since, with a surge in 2002 due to debt forgiveness. A significant feature is theincrease in general BS within aid flows, rising from 2.7% in 2000 to 18.6% of total ODAin 2004.

Table 2. Net ODA Flows to Mozambique

Source: OECD-DAC International Development Statistics on line: Database on annual aggregates.

Destination of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid - Disbursements (Table 2a)

DFID

2.9 DFID’s own aid to Mozambique over the review period has been relatively stableat around 5% of total aid to Africa, but with a sharp upturn in 2001/02 which relates to alarge (£20m) programme aid payment (Table 3). 2004/5 saw a marked growth in aidwith approval of a new BS agreement, the first tranche of which for £30 million. DFID isthe sixth largest donor over the past five years, but if debt relief is excluded, it would bethe fourth largest after IDA, EC and USAID.

Country Context

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qAmount ($ Million) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 % of Total

(2000-2004) Total 877.0 932.7 2202.7 1038.9 1228.4 100% IDA 93.6 53.0 297.2 159.1 194.2 13% United States 115.5 91.8 159.7 135.4 110.0 10% EC 78.8 73.6 137.8 90.2 151.1 8% Italy 13.1 13.1 446.5 15.1 27.0 8% France 16.1 15.3 431.6 16.6 14.6 8%United Kingdom 82.7 185.2 48.0 63.4 65.9

9% 20% 2% 6% 5% 7% Germany 47.8 40.7 156.9 37.9 38.7 7% Netherlands 61.6 86.6 52.0 47.3 54.7 7% Sweden 46.3 42.6 45.3 56.5 67.9 4% Denmark 46.9 48.3 51.9 66.4 67.4 4%

Table 3: DFID bilateral aid to Mozambique, Africa and Globally (£ million)

Source: DFID Departmental Report 2005. Annex 1, Table 4.

Country Context

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Summary of findings

� Mozambique has exhibited strong economic and social growth in thepast decade albeit from a very low base after the devastation of thecivil war.

� Nevertheless Mozambique is unlikely to achieve two thirds of itsMDG targets by 2015, especially in food security, gender andHIV/AIDS.

� Although recognised as a stable democracy, the Mozambiquegovernment has yet to address key governance issues particularlyin areas such as parliamentary scrutiny, justice reform andcorruption.

� Overall development assistance forms one quarter of GDP and BShas grown to 18% of GNI.

� Excluding debt relief, DFID is the largest bilateral donor toMozambique, with a share of around 7% of all aid.

(Annex E contains a timeline for Mozambique and for the work of DFID 2000-05).

q , y ( )Country/ Regional

ProgrammesMozambique Africa Africa % Global

TotalGlobal %

2000/01 29.9 583 5.13 1,096 2.73% 2001/02 38.6 497 7.77 1,141 3.38% 2002/03 30.6 663 4.62 1,341 2.28% 2003/04 36.6 639 5.73 1,623 2.26% 2004/05 45.7 833 5.49 1,761 2.6%

Total 2000-2005 181.4 3215 5.64 6,962 2.61%

3. STRATEGY, PROGRAMME CONTENT AND PROCESS

3.1 This chapter examines the quality of DFID’s programme in terms of strategy,relationships and the composition of the portfolio. It starts with an exploration of howstrategy developed and how that responded to the context described above. Next,relationships with GoM and development partners are examined followed by anassessment of the portfolio of programmes and projects.

Strategy

3.2 Over the period reviewed, two main phases of strategy evolution can bediscerned: (i) the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) that covered the period 1998-2002;and (ii) the Country Assistance Plan (CAP) from 2004-07.

The Country Strategy Paper

3.3 The CSP was prepared and implemented while the Mozambique programmewas managed under the DFID office in Harare, Zimbabwe. A small team of threeAdvisors were attached to the British High Commission in Maputo to provide localguidance, but they reported to the Head of Office in Harare.

3.4 The CSP recognised Mozambique’s intense poverty, but noted the country’seconomic potential, the government’s improving economic management record, and itsadherence to international norms and commitment to poverty reduction. Although DFIDdid not have a long legacy of involvement based on colonial linkages, prospects for along-term development partnership were seen as good. The CSP aimed to provide atransition from a series of relatively successful but piecemeal interventions in customsreform, language teaching, and a rural livelihoods programme in Zambezia Province; toa wider programme building on four ‘impact areas’: ‘improved economic and financialmanagement, a more effective and efficient public service, sustainable rural livelihoods,and improved .... education and health for poor people’ (CSP, p.1).

3.5 The CSP was closely aligned to the national Poverty Reduction Strategy thathad been elaborated during the structural adjustment processes overseen by the IMFand World Bank in the late nineties. Britain was seen as a middle-ranking donor withsound provincial and sectoral experience. DFID had contributed (through programmeaid and technical help) to Mozambique’s improved macro-economic management andin consequence to debt relief under HIPC, a step that has triggered significant resourcetransfers in the past five years. The CSP planned to double ‘programme aid’ to £20mto ensure the completion of HIPC, and also to move to a multi-year commitment toraise predictability.

The Country Assistance Plan

3.6 The CAP represented a dramatic shift to new thinking about DFID’s role inMozambique. There were five main factors that marked this change in emphasis. First,the setting up of a new Country Office in June 2001 brought new resources andcapacity into the country, with an immediate effect in terms of greater engagement withpartners, and the independence to develop a programme tailored to Mozambique’s

Programme Content and Process

7

needs. Second, the shift in DFID thinking globally towards more upstream, long-terminstruments for aid provided the context and political support for a new approach. Third,the lack of a long legacy of programmes and advisors, plus the adjustments neededfollowing the floods of 2000, gave greater freedom of action than might have beenavailable elsewhere. Fourth, the GoM’s poverty reduction strategy (PARPA) provided asound framework within which a new strategic direction could be embedded. Andfinally, a small group of other like-minded donors7 already existed and had begun usinga joint mechanism for programme or BS funding.

3.7 The process of preparing the CAP took over two years, from the arrival of theHead of Office (HOO) in mid 2001 to end of 2003 when the document was approved.There were various reasons for this delay. The challenge of setting up a new office andrecruiting staff was compounded by the events of the terrorist attack in September2001 which raised security concerns and led to the evacuation of the DFID team fromthe BHC compound. A period of ‘homelessness’ lasted for a year when staff worked indifferent locations. The HOO found this period useful in terms of providing space forreflection that allowed the DFID team to debate and agree on the shift in programmedirection. Strong divisions of opinion existed about the pace and singularity of approachunder the move to GBS, but by mid-2002 these had been resolved and although theCAP was not finally approved until later, the DFIDM team were already working inaccordance with the strategy.

3.8 The CAP considered that the CSP did not address the more fundamentalimpediments to overcoming poverty reduction, and proposed a shift towards tacklinggovernance reforms in a broader and more centralised manner. It argued for a lesssector-based focus and greater coherence of approach. In a country with ‘over twodozen donors’, it made sense to reduce GoM’s burden of donor coordination, improvepredictability of funding, and above all, to build government’s own systems of efficientresource management rather than weaken them with parallel donor-led approachesand systems.

3.9 The CAP was therefore organised around a ‘poverty reduction triangle’ of threekey areas of intervention. These addressed (i) capable government, (ii) effective civilsociety and (iii) an enabling environment for growth, private sector engagement andtrade. DFIDM’s specific actions were configured through a set of Change ImpactMonitoring Tables (CIMT) that provided justification for the foreseen spend and staffwork programme.

Strategy assessment

3.10 In broad terms, DFID’s strategy for Mozambique has been appropriate in termsof taking into account the current context and DFID’s own policy environment. Thestrategy has increasingly been aligned with a maturing national poverty framework andhas provided the basis for an increasing level of financial commitment to Mozambique.

3.11 The contrast between the CSP and the CAP reflects a sea change of emphasisand direction. The CSP became seen as a ‘recipe for silo-isation’ and did not addressthe fundamental issues affecting obstacles to poverty reduction. The CAP rightly


8

7 Initially the G4 group consisted of Switzerland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark.

identified the need to improve government’s effectiveness and transparency throughbuilding government systems, particularly in public financial management and services.The strategy of balancing accountability in government with supporting investments foran enabling environment for growth and for strengthening civil society provides acoherent strategy.

3.12 The CAP argues that engagement in sectors is seen as less critical thaninfluencing a ‘small number of key change processes’. Yet the document is not clear onwhat basis support to sectors or to different levels of government would be maintainedor withdrawn, and how gradual the shift from sector programmes to central fundingshould be. Equally the issue of decentralisation receives little attention despite itsimportance in improving governance and civil society involvement.

3.13 Reform of public financial management and administrative machinery is closelylinked and a vital element in making BS work and the CAP recognised this. It alsoargued for continuing support in four sectors (health, education, agriculture andinfrastructure) to support policy-making, management and delivery (para. 66). Theevidence, as will be shown later, indicates that these sectors were unevenly addressed.From a strategic point of view, the CAP did not provide sufficient guidance on how toprioritise between these key sectors, and so in part left the choice to be resolved onthe basis of negotiation between management and advisors. Greater emphasis couldalso have been given to identifying and analysing the roles of other donors and theconsequent opportunities for DFID’s involvement that might have emerged.

3.14 Within specific sectors or crosscutting areas, explicit strategies to define DFIDinvolvement in support of GoM’s own strategies were sometimes absent or haveevolved only recently. Reasons for this include the need to harmonise and thereforedevelop strategy within the broader donor context and within the PARPA: thus theapproach to feeder roads was led by the national feeder road programme. The mostconsistent basis for sector involvement was predicated on the need to have a sectorpresence in order to encourage institutional reform, ensure essential services andabove all to be better informed in policy debates at national level. A further factor wasthe degree of expertise of DFID staff, especially where staff were taking on two or moreportfolios and choices were made to focus on the sector where the individual couldmake the best contribution.

3.15 It is worth noting that no CSP review was undertaken to take stock of theachievements and draw lessons from the 1998-2001 period. The long gestation of theCAP is perhaps understandable given the major shift in approach, but no final versionwas published.8

Results Focus

3.16 The strategies are generally clear in terms of direction, and in alignment to theMDGs and to the national poverty reduction strategy (PARPA) and its accompanyingpoverty assessment framework (PAF). Both the CSP and CAP can be consideredambitious. The CSP was a broad platform aiming to provide ‘a blueprint to move into


9

8 There are two versions entitled interim (2002-7) and draft (2004-2007). The DFID Mozambique website refers to:CAP 2002-2007 (Interim).

Mozambique in a solid way’ (former DFIDM Human Development Advisor). It provideda framework for a range of interventions which in themselves were well focused andmonitorable (such as the CRESCE micro-finance and the Zambezia AgriculturalDevelopment Projects). As DFID begun to seek deeper changes, so the challenge ofdesigning easily measured interventions rose. Working at sector level, such as withPROAGRI in agriculture, and then with broader BS, using ‘programme aid’, meant thatresults had to be wider in scale, more systemic in nature and agreed with partners.

3.17 DFIDM’s medium and long-term results and outcomes are thereby definedwithin the first PARPA (from 2000) and then the Performance Assessment Framework(PAF) (from 2004). The CAP relied on a ‘logic model’, in line with the 2002 NationalAudit Office report on DFID’s programme performance management9. This was builtaround an elaborate poverty monitoring framework that drew links between DFID’sactivities in the three corners of the CAP triangle, and the desired wider outcomes. Thefocus is on shared achievement both with the other funding partners and thegovernment. DFIDM isolates its own results only at the activity level, in terms ofidentifying specific actions annually that it will take to contribute to the joint PAFoutcomes.

3.18 This approach is captured in the Change Impact Monitoring Tables (CIMT) firstintroduced in 2003, which are built around the three ‘Key Change Processes’ set out inthe CAP. These Tables represented an innovative approach for DFID at the time bydemonstrating a systematic logical linkage of DFID activities with the wider PAFoutcomes. At the national level, the mechanisms to capture all the needed resultsrequire considerable coordination, as can be seen from the extensive preparation workrequired for the six-monthly joint reviews10, as well as the use of a sometimes weakgovernment data machinery to assemble.

3.19 In terms of understanding DFID’s contribution, the CIMTs do not alwaysdistinguish well between different levels of indicators, and while providing considerabledetail, they do not yet give an effective summary of DFIDM’s own achievements withinthe country’s overall reform programme that can inform decision making. Greaterconsistency in the levels of indicators of DFID performance as well as more attention totheir sequencing from inputs, processes to results would be valuable. In the mostrecent CIMTs for 2004/5, one finds for example DFIDM’s objectives ranging from suchhigh level achievements as ‘PAF targets for 2005 ensure macroeconomic stability andrealism’ alongside input-oriented aims such as ‘DFID technical assistance becomespart of a coordinated package and absorbs less DFID administrative resources’ 11 (seealso 3.78).

Relevance to context and PRS

3.20 DFIDM’s CSP and CAP mirrored well the emerging Mozambican context as thecountry moved from a period of structural reform to one that builds increasedgovernment effectiveness based on a democratic system that would focus on povertyreduction. Hence the CSP and the CAP were aligned with the PRSP process, and tookaccount of growing trends in donor harmonisation. The CAP recognised the six


10

9 NAO (2002) DFID: Performance Management, Helping to Reduce World Poverty.10 The 2005 Mid Year Joint Review involved the G17 donor group, plus 5 observers, with the GoM.11 DFIDMozambique Annual Country Review, 2005 (draft) pp 6-8.

essentially sectoral ‘fundamental areas of action’ in the PARPA of: education, health,agricultural and rural development, basic infrastructure, good governance and macro-economic and financial management12. The CAP however concentrated on tacklingthree key ‘cross-cutting issues’ that would deliver the PARPA by improving weakgovernment systems, building civil society and supporting pro-poor growth. Closeinvolvement in the PARPA working groups, supporting the Poverty Observatory andfunding election processes have been key ways that DFIDM has played a relevant rolein the PARPA framework.

Consistency with DFID policies

3.21 The programme in Mozambique is a strong example of a country programmefollowing DFID corporate policy. The CSP was one of the first country strategies toarticulate the 1997 White Paper, and progressed DFID support towards a more pro-poor framework. The CAP likewise reflects DFID’s corporate concerns to buildinfluence, to strengthen harmonisation and to improve donor coordination andpredictability. The shift in approach towards building national ownership, a moreaccountable government, changing aid conditionality received firm political backingfrom HQ.

3.22 By and large at sector level, consistency with DFID policies may be consideredimplicit due to the absence of explicit written strategies. Special mention can be madeof three areas: education, HIV/AIDS and rural livelihoods.

3.23 In education, the CSP stated that: “DFID should become a major partner in theeducation sector in recognition of its critical importance to the Government’s PovertyReduction Strategy.” (CSP, p.12). However, in practice the programme gave moreemphasis to health than to education up to 2004. Although the HOO viewed theprospects for co-operation to be greater in health at the time, an additional factor in thisshift was limited staff capacity and the sector manager’s stronger background in health.Funding for education continued but the change in strategy appears to have been notwell understood: “It was not clear what DFIDM wanted to do in the education sector,they left the sector but still carried on with projects” (comment by key donor ineducation sector). The move away from the sector may have been a rational choicegiven DFIDM’s limited human resources13, but was still inconsistent with the strongfocus on education in the PSA, DDA, and the White Papers. The renewed support foreducation as of 2004, and in particular for strengthening government systems throughSector Budget Support (SBS), shows greater consistency with these policydocuments.

3.24 In the area of HIV/AIDS, policy consistency is regarded as fair. DFIDM hasfocused primarily on two of the five priority areas of DFID’s corporate policy:14 onimproving the international response and on action to promote better nationalprogrammes. Other key areas such as promoting long-term solutions based onresearch, strengthening leadership, and providing support to People Living withHIV/AIDS, have been only very marginally addressed. Thus while in general the policyhas been consistent with DFIDs overall policy on HIV/AIDS, the response still needs to


11

12 Republic of Mozambique (2001), Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (2001-2005).13 Although DFIDM had an assistant education advisor (APO) from Oct. 2001 to Nov. 2002.14 DFID (2004), UK strategy for tackling HIV and AIDS in the developing world

become more comprehensive, especially given the growing seriousness of the diseasein Mozambique.

3.25 In rural livelihoods, under the CSP there was a strong adherence to sectorapproaches through the support of DFID’s Harare office to the first SWAP inMozambique in the agriculture sector. Direct support for PROAGRI, however, wasdiscontinued by DFIDM in the strategic move under the CAP to advance centralgovernment systems and to concentrate on BS. No doubt the decline of rurallivelihoods within DFID corporately in the early 2000s, accounted for some of the lossof faith in this area, as did the complexity of the sector compared to others, but themove to budget support raises important questions about how DFID can maintainsupport to critical sectors where its experience gives it a comparative advantage,where dialogue at sector level can complement budget support, and where continuedinvolvement can be advantageous in terms of reaching certain MDGs.15

3.26 In sum, DFIDM has worked to remain generally consistent with DFID’s policyenvironment and has been a pace setter in some areas, especially with BS. But atsector level, the record of consistency has been mixed.

Consultation

3.27 Consultation was weak in the earlier part of the evaluation period. The CSPwas prepared outside of Mozambique, and DFID’s Harare office had a low profilethough one that was seen as well coordinated with other players at the time,particularly the leading bilaterals, the EC and the World Bank. DFIDM’s consultativerole became far more catalytic from 2001, and the preparation of its CAP strategy wasbuilt around strong engagement with like-minded partners and as DFID’s own rolebecame increasingly subsumed within a broader joint donor strategy.

3.28 Consultation became increasingly structured within the PARPA process and itsassociated working groups. DFIDM played a lead role in the ‘Troika’: the group of threedevelopment partners who chair the Programme Aid Partner (PAP). DFIDM was acritical player in reshaping the way that the then G11 group of donors provided BSthrough key principles including that: “the PAF should focus on a limited range ofcritical measures for poverty reduction; that it should be proposed by government thennegotiated and agreed with donors; that it should, as far as possible, be identical to thepolicy matrix required by the PRSC which the World Bank had promised to deliver by2004; and that it should be increasingly coordinated with other planning instruments”.16


12

15 See the recommendations by Whiteside, M. and Ashley, S. (2002). Review of DFID’s contribution to PROAGRIand proposals for future support. “It is recommended that DFID continue to work within the wider agricultural sector,because of its central importance to achieving the PARPA objectives and DFID’s expertise and long-termcommitment to this sector. It is further recommended that much of this support should be through PROAGRI –however the actual amount and modality of support will depend on a number of factors, including the outcome of thePROAGRI evaluation and the resulting proposals and coverage for the second phase. Specifically DFID’s interestshould be in engaging actively with the process of PROAGRI in order to ensure that its concept and overall strategymaximise its contribution to the wider PARPA goals” p.4 Executive Summary.16 DFIDM (2004), Opportunities and Challenges in the PRS II agenda: DFID’s experience in Mozambique.

3.29 A particular problem was the ‘withdrawal from a proposal to finance a FinancialManagement Project which for the Ministry of Education was a crucial support for thepool fund of FASE to function effectively: “In stopping the project, DFID stoppedsomething that had been designed by us which was a process that was starting toproduce results, especially at provincial level.” (Director of Planning, MoE).17 AlthoughDFIDM made its decision on the basis of an independently commissioned assessment,and advised the Minister in writing of the grounds for its decision, there wasnevertheless considerable disappointment.

3.30 In most sectors, little evidence was found of consultation with the private sectoror with civil society. There are some exceptions such as with PODE, the private sectorproject, which had consultations with the private sector during the design process; andwith civil society through the Poverty Observatory, the Partners Forum on HIV/AIDS,and the various civil society projects (such as LINK and MONASO).

3.31 Communications Strategy: Although DFIDM has a Communications section anda strategy was prepared in 2004, less attention was given to this area in the earlier partof the evaluation period. This may have been due to the need for DFID to maintain alow profile during a period of growing harmonisation and country ownership. DFIDMhas worked in 2005 to improve G18 communications, and has supported a PARPA IIcommunication strategy. While DFIDM’s leadership and direction are well known by itsclosest partners, there is room to strengthen the wider public and partner under-standing of DFID’s work through, say, informative publications or a web-presence inPortuguese.

Relationships

Key Partners

3.32 DFIDM has changed from a donor working in sole-funded projects such asZambezia ADP to that of a highly integrated partner with strong and respected relationswith most other Development Partners (DPs) and with government. It has worked tobuild different forms of relationships: as lead funder, as joint funder and as a silentpartner working through others.

3.33 DFIDM’s key partners are members of the “group of the like-minded” who havesigned up to the MoU or who have participated in joint ‘pool’ funding of other sectoralprogrammes, or jointly financed separate civil society or private sector projects.

3.34 While DFIDM has formed closer relations with the PAP donor group and withkey central ministries, it has had less time to maintain links with some of its traditionalpartners in the UN and with certain bilaterals. UNDP felt that there was a ‘non-existentrelationship’ with DFID over the period 2002-2004 (UNDP Res. Rep.). Other UNpartners however have valued DFIDM’s role. DFIDM was “one of the strong partners,pushing for a long-term vision on food security and drought/disaster management.”(FAO Res. Rep.). UNICEF was also a particularly strong partner in water, education(including a staff secondment to UNICEF), in health (bednets) and other areas. In


13

17 In fact while waiting for the official approval procedures to be taken care of within DFIDM the MoE for severalmonths advanced funds for project activities from its own budget, and subsequently had great difficulty in replacingthose when DFIDM decided to withdraw.

recognition of the fact that DFID needs to engage UN more, the office is rethinking therole of the UN and this is expected to be clearer in its new country assistance plan,currently under formulation.

Harmonisation

3.35 Strong harmonisation of donor activity in Mozambique has been a hallmark ofDFIDM’s role since 2000. Indeed, DFID can take considerable credit for the growingharmonisation of donor approaches and strategies in Mozambique. The PRSP/ PARPAformulation process has been an arena where DFIDM has worked in closecollaboration with others, including the GoM, through the Troika and working groups.

3.36 DFIDM is also recognised for the central role it played in developing the MoUfor donor budgetary support and in setting the pace for others, for example inproposing longer periods of BS commitment, pressing for three years, and mostrecently for five years. In 2000, the common aid framework agreement between thethen G6 ran into trouble over varying donor interpretation of the conditions fordisbursement. This was highlighted when some donors reacted to the banking crisis of2001 by threatening to withhold BS in 2002. DFIDM took the opportunity to lead thebuilding of a new approach to conditionality that made the terms for disbursement moretransparent, more predictable, and tied to ‘underlying principles’,18 and the fact thatconcerns regarding violation of these principles will be addressed through consultationand dialogue. This approach anticipated and informed the evolution of DFID’scorporate thinking in this area19.

3.37 Signing the MoU in April 2004 was a watershed for DFID in Mozambique, andarguably for DFID globally:“It is particularly praiseworthy that such a large number of donors are signing up to amechanism in a country where there has been some dysfunctional behaviour in thepast (e.g. large off-budget allocations), and I applaud the explicit linkage to Montereyand Rome, and to an agreed performance assessment framework. This is a model ofthe new ‘political economy’ we are seeking to foster in the donor/recipient relationship”(Perm. Sec. DFID, 11/12/2003).

3.38 Although the group of PAP signatories to the MoU is large and still increasing,there remains significant variance regarding their perspectives on BS. It is also notedthat Japan and USAID are not members of the group.20

3.39 Harmonisation is also very strong due to co-financing arrangements for themajority of DFIDM’s projects. This is a growing trend in the portfolio, led by the BScontribution, the pooled funding arrangements in health, education, and HIV/AIDS andin a number of turnkey projects (PODE, SISTAFE, Public Sector Reform). Successfulinitiatives by DFIDM have in some case been later scaled-up by others. The evolutionof the Community Land Fund illustrates this, with multi-donor funding now contributing


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18 GoM commitment to good governance, the fight against poverty and sound macroeconomic policies. ProgrammeAid Partners (PAP) commitment to predictability, transparency and the use government systems.19 DFID (2005) Partnerships for poverty reduction: rethinking conditionality, London.20 See Annex F for current estimates of the level of BS provided by Development Partners (DPs), and theimportance of HQ / home constituency influence on DP strategy.

to an initiative that had been led by DFIDM based on early work in ZADP andsubsequent preparation studies.

3.40 In summary, harmonisation allows DFIDM to bring influence to bear on largerfunding partners. This is particularly the case with the EC and the World Bank whohave found DFID a valuable partner, as it has had the capacity to lead working groupswhere the EC and WB did not have staff. DFIDM have also built harmonisation byfunding TA posts in partner agencies (such as the HIV/AIDs specialist in the WB), byusing the partners to represent DFID in sectors where DFIDM is less active (such asusing Development Cooperation Ireland Mozambique (DCIM) for agriculture and theFinnish Embassy for the health programme).

Influencing Approach

3.41 While no explicit strategy exists for influencing, the approach to influencing inDFIDM is marked by the following characteristics:

• Building trust through a predictable, long-term relationship with GoM• Supporting the PRS processes and providing leadership in many working groups• Having flexible procedures and office autonomy to meet the needs of partners /

target groups• Working closely with DPs to develop strategy and co-fund interventions • Fielding a relatively large and professionally strong team of advisors• Using considerable funding resources

3.42 DFIDM’s approach since 2001 has been to take leadership first in the area ofGBS, and then to use that footprint to build influence in other areas including withinsectors. DFIDM exerted considerable pressure on other DPs to build theirunderstanding and then commitment to the alignment of support. DFIDM was not theinnovator of more aligned approaches, but brought tremendous persuasive energy,intellectual leadership and considerable financial muscle to the table.

3.43 What have been the results of these influencing methods in terms of strategy andpolicy? First and foremost, the role of DFIDM has been considerable in thePARPA/PAP process, where it has provided expertise, funding and analysis in severalthematic groups, especially private sector, health, disaster management, tax and publicfinance, and more recently in education. There is strong evidence of increasingalignment to BS approaches as the number of like-minded grows (from G6 to G18),and in particular the commitment of the World Bank and the EC to the process hasbeen a major signal of DFID’s successful influencing.

3.44 Evidence-based influencing is also a strength. DFID has sought wider influence bywidely disseminating findings of its drivers of change study21. The evolution of disastercontingency planning particularly under the SETSAN can be attributed to DFID/CHAD’smore strategic approach.

3.45 In health, the policy to develop a SWAP was driven by DFIDM’s influence, as wasgreater attention to development of an HIV/AIDS strategy and to the strengthening ofthe role of the national AIDS commission. In education, however DFID has been less ofa key player in the SWAP until recently.


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21 The ‘Political Economy of the Budget’ book was translated to Portuguese, and seminars funded around thecountry where authors presented their results.

Risks and Unintended Consequences

3.46 A careful evaluation of fiduciary risk against the benefits is required prior tocommitting to BS.22 This was achieved in terms of (i) an evaluation of the partnercountry’s public financial management systems based on the WB CFAA (countryfinancial accountability assessment), the IMF’s ROSC (review on standards andcodes), and the PER (public expenditure review), (ii) a credible programme to improvethe standards of these systems under the PAF; (iii) potential development benefitsjustifying the fiduciary risks: ‘the dangers from creating parallel systems (as throughnon-BS aid modalities) were judged to outweigh the risks to UK funds provided throughBS.23

3.47 While from a donor perspective, risks are reduced by being part of significantgrouping such as the G18/PAP, from the GoM perspective, there is the concern that amore aligned donor group will act in a unified manner to coerce or influencegovernment by threatening withdrawal of aid. This is something of concern when (in2004) budget aid accounted for 32% of external financing, 17% of the total budget, and28% of recurrent expenditures. So far the MoU has not been tested by actions thatmight breach it, but the point is recognised and moves to improve donor transparencyand adherence by their HQs to the MoU are being addressed.24

3.48 From the donor perspective, some donors feel alienated by the closerelationship of those in the PAP, and the emphasis placed on moving funds. There isalso the danger that the strength of the harmonised group will polarise others. The UNfamily have remained on the periphery of this direction, while other key players(USAID, Japan) remain outside the common approach. DFIDM’s ‘missionary-zeal’ asfar as GBS is concerned has been a concern to some partners, although this has tosome extent been mitigated by it now taking more of a backseat role in the PAP. At thesame time this softer role may eventually reduce DFID’s ability to steer the process incase of disagreements.25

Portfolio of activities

3.49 DFIDM has operated a portfolio of projects in a wide range of sectors over thereview period. The portfolio consists of 122 approved projects26 over the 2000-2005period with a total commitment of £321 million, and an estimated total expenditure toend February 2006 of £243 million. Under both the CSP and the CAP, Programme Aidor BS accounted for the largest share, some 50% of all commitments. Projects accountfor almost a fifth of spend, SWAPs just over 10% and relief just under 10% (Figure 1).Annex F provides further details of expenditure by sector and instrument.


16

22 DFID (2002), Managing fiduciary risk when providing direct Budget Support.Minutes of meeting E. Cassidy (Head of Office) and H. Benn (Sec of State), 25 June 2003.23 While DFIDM has done much to understand the political process in Malawi (e.g. the ‘Drivers of change’ and‘Budget as theatre’ studies), it has also tended to concentrate relationships around the Ministry of Finance and thehealth and education sectors (see section on DFID-Government relationships). 24 See for example DFIDM (2004), Opportunities and Challenges in the PRS II Agenda (op.cit).25 Although the resource intensive nature of the coordination work precludes an active role from minor partners(para 52, op.cit).26 38 of these were a series of CHAD delivered flood and drought relief projects in 2000-02. A number of others arestudies or smaller projects.

3.50 Excluding emergency relief, annual spending has almost doubled over thereview period, from £26 million in 2000/01 to £47 million in 2005/06. BS funding is thelargest type of expenditure in each year from 2001 onwards.27 SWAP/pooled funding inhealth and education account for a significant percentage, but project funding has beenusually higher. The majority of support is through government channels. Technical co-operation (5% of the portfolio by value) though small has played a key role insupporting other instruments and in providing expertise to other DPs and to GoM.

3.51 As Figure 2 shows, the balance of interventions by sector grouping haschanged significantly over the period (although trends are somewhat masked by thelarge quantum of budget support, where sectoral allocation can only be attributed as ashare of the national budget). Direct support to agriculture has declined from 7% to 0%of expenditures, health has been consistently important (between 10-20%), whileHIV/AIDs has increased in the past three years (from under 1% to 5%). Education hasbeen very low until last year. Public sector reform has shown a significant increase inthe CAP period. Infrastructure and water and sanitation have fallen from 24% to 11%.Direct funding of civil society initiatives has been minimal (1% of total expenditure)although other indirect funding occurs through various projects and SWAPs.

Figure 1. DFIDM Estimated Expenditure by Instrument for Fiscal Years 2000-05


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27 As of end February 2006.

Actual Expenditure by Instrument by YearDFID Mozambique

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

£m

ReliefTCSWAPProjectArea ProgBS

Figure 2. DFIDM Estimated Expenditure by Sector for Fiscal Years 2000-05(excluding relief)

Portfolio assessment

3.52 Justification and Relevance to Strategy: The portfolio in general reflects theCSP and CAP strategies. Certainly the dominance of BS funds has reflected theoverriding commitment to Mozambique’s poverty reduction strategies and the desire tostrengthen government systems using budget processes.

3.53 There is a pattern of moving as far as possible towards untied budgetarysupport, and prioritising supporting investments in critical areas of reform, such aspublic financial management. The portfolio still reflects the need to maintain sectorfunding, preferably in an on-budget manner, to maintain a role in policy dialogue, andto support accountability through greater space and strategic support to civil society.

3.54 The enabling environment for pro-poor growth corner of the CAP ‘triangle’is a mix of contrasting interventions: livelihoods, education, health, HIV/AIDS,infrastructure, private sector and disaster response, and also BS. Part 3 of the CAPincluded working through ZADP and PROAGRI to strengthen land, forestry andagricultural policy, yet these commitments were closed during this period. Usefulsupport to land reform and to drought mitigation were continued, however, and evolvedinto a community land fund and a drought mitigation action plan. Private sectorsupport is, in contrast, given limited attention and has weak strategic purpose, withPODE the main project but with few linkages built from this experience to wider privatesector engagement. In contrast, the BS commitments have been effectivelyimplemented, with full and predictable disbursements.


18

Expenditure by Sector by YearDFID Mozambique

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

£m

Demand Gov

Pub Sec Ref

HIVHealth

Education

Private SectorInfrastructure

Agric / NR

Budget Support

3.55 Improving government capacity has been an active area of the portfolio, withthe continuation of long-standing reform projects (such as Customs) and theintroduction of newer reforms (SISTAFE, Banking). Work in public financialmanagement has been fragmented, but as in other areas, DFIDM has sought ways tobuild common approaches and to develop pooled funds through joint GoM-donorworking group. Because of the IMF’s lead role in this sector, DFIDM has concentratedmore on technical functions than on strategy and the development of planning capacity.The focus of the customs, tax and SISTAFE projects concerns computerisation ofexisting systems rather than rethinking the systems themselves. This is due partly todesign (Tax, Customs) and partly to how the project evolved in practice (SISTAFE).The timescale of the project designs were in most cases, and especially with SISTAFE,highly optimistic.

3.56 Support to civil society has seen the smallest in terms of funding but hascontained an interesting and diverse range of interventions developed within a contextwhere civil society has been historically weak and the options limited. DFIDM hascorrectly identified multiple entry points (e.g., consolidation of democracy (support forElectoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) and the Carter Centre); civil societyparticipation in poverty programming and monitoring (support to the G20), CSO capacity building for service delivery and advocacy (common funding for LINK andMONASO). All of these entry points have been strategically selected and to some extent informed by results of drivers of change studies.

Staffing

3.57 The evaluation found a professional and committed cadre of staff in DFIDM,and the size and quality of the advisory team is widely respected amongst its partners.From a small team of advisors and programme staff reporting to Harare, the DFIDMoffice opened in mid-2001 and rapidly enlarged to a complement of fifteen. In 2003they were reorganised into three teams to reflect the three corners of the CAP triangle(see para. 3.9).

3.58 The staff record is positive in three ways. First the strong and open leadershipprovided by the HOO is widely recognised as having played a key role in the increasedprofile of DFID in Mozambique. This leadership has been effective both internally interms of building an effective team that understands and is committed to a strategy,and externally in terms of having a respected and extremely committed representativewho is able to convincingly present DFID’s approach and moreover persuade others tofollow. This leadership is especially effective as the HOO has substantial delegatedauthority compared to other DPs, which allows quick and substantial resourcecommitments to be made to back up policy positions.

3.59 Second, the strong team relations in the office, especially in the effectivepartnering between advisor and programme staff, have strengthened the integration ofthe overall programme. This is partly due to the management style of the HOOs, whichhave encouraged team working alongside a structured level of debate on strategy.Such an approach is reflected for example in the quarterly meetings, where one leadadvisor from a corner of the CAP programme triangle presents that portfolio, whilst alead advisor of one of the other corners plays a challenge function.


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3.60 Third, the staffing cover has been good in general, with few major gaps inadvisor presence. This is partly due to the attraction of working under a strong andwell-supported HOO, and also to the attractive challenge of working in Mozambique.There was a break in growth advisors in mid-2004 . The social development advisor incharge of the civil society corner of the CAP triangle also carried added responsibilityfor HIV/AIDS and this retarded the pace of programme formulation under the civilsociety corner.

3.61 There are three areas of concern with regard to staffing. These concern: (i) theinfluence of individuals over the strategy and portfolio direction; (ii) work patterns thattend to focus on donor coordination activities and less field contact and sector focus;and, (iii) the short posting duration of advisors and the associated lack of Portugueselanguage skills.

3.62 The strengths and weaknesses of individuals in a relatively small team in theperiod 2000-2002 played an influential role in determining if not the strategy then thechoice of interventions to support that strategy. There was an intense debate duringthe formative period (2001-2) of the Mozambique programme within senior DFIDMstaff. Decisions to continue or withdraw support in a particular sector appear to haverested at least partly on the particular experience of advisors as on the intrinsic meritsof the case.

3.63 This point can be illustrated in two areas. First, the decision to remain involvedin the health sector rather than in the education sector, where the advisor at the timehad a background as a health specialist and it was difficult to split her time equallybetween two large sectors. Second, the case for reducing involvement in theagricultural sector though understandable given the slow progress of PROAGRI andthe decline in HQ support for livelihoods interventions, appears to reflect the widecoverage required of the pro-poor growth advisors and the consequent challenge ofaddressing all their sector responsibilities in depth.

3.64 The use of DFIDM staff time is not fully monitored, yet it is apparent that agreat deal of advisor time is spent on coordination work and policy discussions,particularly within the 23 working groups (WGs) under the PARPA and PAP. During thistransformation period, such efforts were critical, but in the past year, there is anincreasing sense that the WGs are becoming self-sustaining. The current HOO isconcerned over the value of staff involvement, and what added value they can continueto bring. However, in some WGs DFID involvement is perceived as crucial and muchappreciated (e.g. in the HIV/AIDS partners forum), especially given the relatively smallpresence of specialised staff in a large group of generalists. On the other hand, in ahighly centralised country where meetings in Maputo may bear little relation toprovincial issues and to the needs of the poor, DFID staff may need to reaffirm theirawareness of field issues.

3.65 Finally, DFIDM, like many country offices, suffers from frequent turnover ofadvisory staff. Up to 2004 the cadre of advisors served for an extended period andprovided good stability. But the median length of experience of the current cadre of UK-based advisory staff is 15 months , and only 3 out of the 8 UK-based advisory staffhave over 2 years service in country (see Annex F). This is to some extent offset by the


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experience of the SAIC programme staff, five of whom have been in post since theoffice opened in 2001. This is a valuable resource of institutional memory, although themeans by which this ‘knowledge’ is transmitted to advisors is informal, rather thanthrough more structured means such as in written form or perhaps through retreats.Associated with the service duration of UK staff is the weak Portuguese language skillsof the majority of non-Mozambican staff. This is being addressed locally through alanguage policy, but it raises issues for DFID’s recruitment and country orientationmethods.

Balance between Civil Society and Government

3.66 The balance has been predominantly on funding GoM with only limited support(3% in direct funding) to civil society or the private sector entities. What has been donein civil society nevertheless has been well chosen in terms of key entry points such aselection observation and flexible support to umbrella NGOs.

Government ownership

3.67 The increase in BS funding from a third of DFIDM’s total funding to over twothirds in five years has been the most significant mechanism for building governmentownership. DFIDM in addition has sought to build ownership with more central arms ofgovernment, so that whereas five years ago, line ministries and provincial governmentswere the main project partners (such as agriculture, roads and Zambezia Province)more recently DFIDM has focused on the Ministries of Finance, Planning and of StateAdministration with a raft of support to underpin budget aid, in public financemanagement, tax and customs reform, expenditure tracking and with public sectorreforms. These have directly built government ownership of their revenue generation,planning and budgeting cycles and processes.

Civil Society ownership

3.68 While direct funding to civil society has been limited, DFIDM has beenproviding greater support indirectly. During the CSP, DFID supported programmesmanaged through the provincial government of Zambezia, which in turn contracted Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to implement specific service functions on behalf ofgovernment. The same applies to the National AIDS Council (NAC) where DFID ischannelling support to a Common Fund the bulk of which is then disbursed to AIDSorganisations in civil society. Therefore although the DFIDM country portfolio isdominated by direct support to government, significant resources are also beingindirectly channelled to CSOs involved in service delivery.

3.69 Very limited resources, however, have so far been used in promoting thechallenge function of civil society. To this extent, the civil society corner of the CAPtriangle has received less attention than was expected, an understandable situationgiven the weak civil society base and the limited capacity within DFIDM.28 In terms ofthe private sector, DFID has found it hard to build ownership in a weak domestic


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28 The Social Development Advisor also had HIV/AIDS in her portfolio which took an unexpectedly large proportionof her time.

sector, where USAID is the dominant donor, and where government agencies and thebusiness community representation are still building effectiveness. An exception is inHIV/AIDS where since 2004 the private sector has been an active participant in thePartners Forum.

Crosscutting issues

3.70 Mainstreaming Gender: In general, DFIDM’s portfolio does little to addressgender concerns directly, and in fact gender aspects are not mentioned in the CAP.Isolated examples are found in the roads programme, where female labour wastargeted in the labour intensive construction work, in PROAGRI’s gender studies, andin de-mining where efforts were made to contract women. In HIV/AIDS, an explicit andsufficiently comprehensive gender dimension is absent in DFID’s approach. There hasbeen a focus within the health programme on maternal health, however, other aspectsof gender mainstreaming are not being addressed (such as making health servicesmore accessible to women, and a stronger focus on sexual and reproductive healthand rights). In education, DFIDM’s earlier support to open and distance learning andthe support to secondary education were explicitly designed to address equity issues ineducation, however, funding for this has been ‘folded into’ FASE and there is littleevidence that attention to gender mainstreaming has been prominent on the agendasince then.

3.71 Mainstreaming HIV/AIDS: The CSP makes tentative reference to HIV/AIDs,noting that the pandemic was not yet as serious as in neighbouring countries, that it isspreading rapidly and that DFID would ‘review the opportunities for involvement’.Under the CAP, HIV/AIDS is identified as a major threat to Mozambique’s ‘ability toachieve its PARPA objectives’ and as a major threat to economic and social growth.Apart from two specific interventions (in condom distribution and safe motherhood), themain effort to address HIV/AIDs has been through the National Aids Council, reflectingDFIDM’s interests in building harmonised, government-led approaches.

3.72 Mainstreaming has taken place only in a patchwork manner, and until thepreparation of an HIV/AIDS strategy in 2005, does not appear to have been based onsystematic analysis of strategic entry points. Thus, while DFIDM has supportedinnovative work on HIV/AIDS in the roads sector29 as well as workplace policies insmall and medium sized enterprises, there are other obvious sectors wheremainstreaming could play a very important role such as in education. This would ensuregirls gain access to upper primary and secondary education and provide adult, and especially female education, in nutrition and food security, and on the demand side by strengthen the involvement of people living with HIV/AIDS. There is also no mention of HIV/AIDS in the recently drafted civil society strategy.

3.73 Mainstreaming Poverty: By close adherence to the PARPA, DFIDM’s portfoliois directly aligned to the government’s poverty reduction strategy. To the extent that thegovernment’s budget effectively addresses priority poverty concerns, DFID’s strategy touse a BS modality broadly mainstreams poverty. The expectation is that by choosingto work through central government systems DFID is likely to reduce poverty more


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29 For example, national road contracts adopted social clauses about employment and HIV/AIDS, based on DFIDintroduced models.

sustainably than by funding improved service provision in key sectors. The advantagesof improved donor harmonisation and using government systems to prioritise publicspending are a better coordinated and resourced government-led response to povertyreduction. The close adherence of the budget to poverty reduction as measured by thePAF should mainstream poverty concerns at the heart of government spending.

3.74 This PARPA/PAF mechanism must encompass important dimensions ofpoverty such as the serious though reducing regional imbalances and the depth ofpoverty in rural areas, and the devastating consequences of HIV/AIDS on many of theMDGs. Use and access to essential services by the poor remains problematic - “ingeneral, the poor are more likely to report ill health and less likely to receivetreatment”30. Some statistics illustrate the point:

◆ Coverage rates for measles among the poorest 60% of the population is only 40%compared to the country average of 87% in 2003.

◆ Disease patterns are strongly related to poverty and malnutrition, in other wordsincidence of diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS is much higher among thosewho are poor.

3.75 Mainstreaming Environment: DFIDM’s portfolio in Mozambique mainstreamsenvironmental concerns in a modest way. Noteworthy efforts include the flood reliefmeasures in 2000-01 where DFID/CHAD support for prevention of the spread ofcholera mainstreamed environmental health issues into programme content. Support tothe Drought Mitigation Action Plan also contributed to environmental management.Specific recommendations were made on how to improve usage of vegetative materialand agro-forestry plantations31. In the roads programme, efforts were made torehabilitate borrow pits and to protect timber resources. Early work on forestry policyand the continuing land rights programme also contribute to environmental concerns,but against this must be noted the decision to reduce involvement in theagricultural/natural resources sector.

Monitoring and Evaluation

3.76 M&E instruments at portfolio level were generally absent under the CSP: in factone can find no reference to M&E in the CSP document. Also no CSP review wasundertaken to evaluate performance and draw lessons for the CAP. While M&E wasforgotten at country programme level, good examples of M&E work can be found atproject level: the drought roads, seed fairs, Zambezia ADP.

3.77 As the proportion of DFIDM’s portfolio rose in terms of un-earmarked BS underthe CAP, so the importance of a well-structured central performance system formonitoring and evaluating government’s budgetary and service delivery performanceincreased. DFIDM’s strong support to the PAF machinery contributed to this, includingits support to the Poverty Observatory as a non government actor in the assessmentsystem.


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30 B Martinez et al (2005) p.131 Evaluation of the Implementation of the Drought and Mitigation Action Plan for Maputo, Gaza and InhambaneProvinces – Final Report; p.3.

3.78 As noted in 3.18, DFIDM set out to link its annual activities with thePAF/PARPA through the CIMTs first produced in the CAP. This is a comprehensiveapproach, but in practice, the actual indicators, though varied, tend to be mainlyprocess-related. Thus, the annual assessment of DFID’s performance is judged by itsparticipation in working groups, engaging with partners, conducting studies, providingfunding. It would helpful for DFID’s added value to be measured more carefully throughidentifying intermediate outputs (where possible) that result from the processesidentified in the CIMTs.

3.79 At higher outcome levels, DFID’s overall contribution to poverty reductioncannot be explicitly measured, however, a carefully drawn up system of annual andmid-year reviews is established under the MoU that does allow all PAPs and GoM toexamine collective performance against agreed benchmarks set in the PAF, PES andother reports.


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Summary of findings

� The DFID strategy in Mozambique dramatically changed from the CSP to theCAP. The CAP heralded a shift to a more upstream engagement with andcommitment to government’s own systems and accountability by providing un-earmarked budget funding linked to the national poverty reduction strategy andpoverty assessment framework.

� harmonisation has increased with the CAP, as DFIDM has actively led theimprovement in donor alignment and coordination through the PAP structureand creation of the MOU in 2004.

� DFIDM’s strategies have been closely aligned to DFID’s corporate policies, andthe country programme is seen as a star performer within DFID in introducingthe BS instrument and in strongly influencing other partners’ behaviour towardsimproved predictability, aid effectiveness and transparency.

� DFIDM’s image has changed from one of minimal recognition to that of aleading, predictable and committed development partner. It is recognised ashaving played a key role in building donor alignment and harmonisation in ahighly fragmented donor environment.

� A number of risks characterise DFIDM’s strategic role. The most importantconcerns the decision to prioritise the BS instruments in an environment wheretransparency and accountability are weak though improving.

� While the thrust of increasing BS has been effectively delivered, theaccompanying and critical public sector reforms have taken longer thanexpected; while the changing nature of DFID’s engagement with certain sectors(agriculture, education) has been less well communicated or understood.

� DFIDM has a well respected team who face considerable challenges followingheadcount pressures. Experienced and well-integrated locally-recruited staffhave contributed to continuity/institutional memory and helped to groundprogrammes in an understanding of the local context. UK-based staff needgreater support for language skills, and their recruitment should emphasise thisability in the case of non-English language postings.

Programme Effectiveness

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4. PROGRAMME EFFECTIVENESS

4.1 This chapter concerns the effectiveness of programme implementation and theextent to which programmes and projects have delivered their objectives at output andpurpose level. It also considers the effectiveness of different aid instruments, includingBS, SWAPs, projects, emergency relief and technical assistance. The chapter thengoes on to discuss sustainability and progress towards the outcomes stated within theCAP’s Key Change Processes, the Directors Delivery Plan, and DFID’s Public ServiceAgreement.

Results

Results in relation to Achievement of Outputs and Purposes

4.2 A large proportion of the portfolio isnot rated, including the largest: £80 millionBS from 2003/4 to 2005/6. For the 32 ratedprojects, the available PRISM scores show,in general terms, a moderate to poorpicture for achievement of results at outputand purpose level. The most common scoreis 3 (purpose and outputs likely to bepartially achieved). Of projects with anexpenditure of over £1 million, 3 projectshave a score of 1 at purpose level (in TaxReform and Banking), but a total of 13 (or40 percent) are rated as good (likely to fullyor mainly achieved).

4.3 Budget Support is the most important element of DFIDM’s assistance in theperiod under review. An immediate effect of BS, as well as a key factor for GoMcapacity to fight poverty, is the total volume of resources available. As Table 2 showed,ODA has risen from $0.9 billion to $1.2 billion. Estimates vary, but the contribution fromgeneral or partner BS is believed to have risen from 3% to 19% of this ODA33.

4.4 At output level, the first programme aid grant (2000-03) was rated overall as 2(satisfactory), while no rating is yet available for the larger and more recent BS (2004-06). There are several relevant result indicators concerning transparency, domesticaccountability and efficiency of public spending. These are assessed in Table 4.

32 Score 1: likely to be completely achieved; Score 2: likely to be largely achieved; Score 3: likely to be partiallyachieved; Score 4: only likely to be achieved to a very limited extent.33 Based on the recent GBS Study on Mozambique : Batley, R., Bjornestad, L., Cumbi, A. (2006) Evaluation ofGeneral Budget Support – Mozambique Country Report, Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support, 1994–2004.

Score32 Outputs Purpose(frequency) (frequency)

1 1 3

2 12 10

3 16 19

4 2 1


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Table 4. Summary of output indicators assessment for 2003-05 MDBS

4.5 BS has improved the predictability and transparency of the flow of funds intoMozambique’s budget. Although there have been delays in disbursement by some ofthe donors, the G18 group as a whole is continuously improving. DFIDM’s BS trancheswere disbursed as planned. Through peer pressure, the MoU, to which DFIDcontributed substantially, significantly increased the predictability of total BS flows. Thisis evidenced by the fact that in 2005 the MoF needed to issue significantly lesstreasury bills than in previous years. DFID HQ twice wanted to postpone disbursementso as to bring it under the next UK fiscal year, but both times DFIDM won the case forrespecting the agreed timeframe on the basis of the commitment to predictability madein the PAP matrix. This shows that the PAP’s PAF matrix does indeed bring peerpressure and sanction in case of non-compliance, in the form of loss of credibility withGoM and other PAPs.

4.6 BS has also improved domestic accountability by shifting responsibility forresources allocation from donors to GoM. In Mozambique the shift ‘upstream’ is takingplace, with significant impulse from DFID. The shift in aid modalities is not only fromsector support to GBS, but also from common funds to sector support and from projectsupport to common funds. These moves towards harmonisation of instruments at alllevels have increased GoM oversight, control over allocation and planning capacity.Also DFID is making progress on bringing projects on-budget: for example, theSISTAFE project will be on-budget, through its common fund, for the first time in 2006.

4.7 In terms of improvement of public expenditure management, SISTAFE hasfocused on treasury and accounting components, through the implementation ofcomputerised accounting systems. Budgeting, audit and inventory/asset managementhave remained relatively untouched although the Planning and Budgeting Project(FoPoS) has begun to deliver improvements in GoM processes and procedures. Keyachievements include approval of the necessary legislation, the creation of a singletreasury account, and the piloting of the e-SISTAFE in the Ministries of Finance,Planning and Education. Effectiveness in terms of greater transparency in budgetexecution will be measurable when SISTAFE is fully rolled-out. Progress on widerreforms has been much slower than planned although this may be due to theunrealistic timescale of the project.

4.8 The joint BS initiative has achieved a reduction in transaction costs,particularly for the GoM, although there remains scope for further improvements suchas a reduction in the number of missions especially at critical stages of the budget

y pOutput Assessment (by CPE team)1. Predictable andtransparent aid flows

Good for DFID. Improving but still weak area for G18. (Source: May 2005 Joint Review).

2. Domestic accountabilitystrengthened

Mix of indicators, mixed performance,comprehensive analysis needed to formulatebalanced judgement. (See May 2005 Joint Reviewand PEFA assessment).

3. Efficiency of public spending raised

Weak. MTEF not effective, budget execution still weak, PSR stagnant, SISTAFE delayed.

4. Reduced GoMtransaction costs

Remains area of concern to GoM. Further progress to be made: less missions, quiet periods, etc.(Source: Joint Review and Perfect Partners Study)


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preparation cycle. On the inter-donor side, however, transaction costs have on thecontrary gone up. There are also ‘transaction benefits’ in the sense there is a capacitybuilding (or at least awareness raising) effect included in it, but the time invested indonor harmonisation is significant.

4.9 DFID support has also improved national revenue collection, through thereform of the customs and tax departments. These projects have generally achievedtheir outputs and purpose, with significant increases in revenues (taxes rising from$480m in the period 1999-2002 to $613m in 2003 and $756m in 2004). Over the sameperiod, customs revenue also grew by an annual average rate of 13.5% in US$ terms.

4.10 In banking, improvements in bank supervision and regulation havesuccessfully increased the quality of the banking system (scoring 1). This is animportant step for private sector growth, and it was especially relevant in the context ofthe banking scandals of 2001, where GoM bailed out private banks for non-performingloans made to the politically connected elite. In the private sector, the results of thePODE have been mixed, (scoring 2 and most recently a 3) with achievements intraining, linkages and labour conditions, but poor performance in the credit and in theintended wider enabling of the private sector.

4.11 In public sector reform, expenditure has been low in the three years ofexecution, and results have been slow to emerge. Rated a 3 so far, the main resultshave been in terms of studies and training, while the critical and more fundamentalobjectives of salary and staffing reform have moved slowly. Weak political commitmentand low buy-in from service ministries have been major constraints.

4.12 For livelihoods and agriculture, DFIDM’s achievements have been mixed.ZADP was finally rated a 3 largely because of delayed funding, complexity ofinterventions and difficulty of identifying achievements against the baseline or externalfactors. PROAGRI had a far smaller DFID stake financially although considerableadvisor time was invested. It was also rated a 3, for although progress was made oninstitutional reforms and conformity to SWAP principles, tangible benefits at farm levelwere limited.

4.13 Under infrastructure, the latest ratings are given as 2 for the feeder roads andpost flood road construction and the water projects. These helped to strengthen thecapacity of Provincial and National Roads Departments to plan and manage roads, andreportedly had impact at community level by strengthening social networks andmaterial asset base of the beneficiaries. The support for water supply and sanitationhas been successful in building a strategic engagement from a provincial base inZambezia, leading to the development of a Water Master Plan, more sustainable watersupply systems and better community hygiene.

4.14 The majority of emergency relief projects were not rated as they were toosmall, but records show that their objectives were largely achieved. The success washigher in 2001 because of increased DFID/CHAD staff presence in Mozambique. The“2001 flood emergency operation covered a larger geographic area but casualties(lives lost) were much less than in 2000” (INGC). This was attributable to a strong pushby DFID to encourage all agencies involved to start contingency planning for 2001


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floods. The related support to SETSAN, through the evaluation of the DroughtMitigation Action Plan has been effective. An informative document was produced andshared widely as a ‘lessons learned’ pamphlet. Recommendations made have beentaken on board by MADER. Seed fairs also proved a successful intervention, buildingmarket linkages while assisting disaster victims.

4.15 In education, ratings are available for only one project. The Open andDistance Learning Project has an average rating of 3 for output and 3.5 for purpose,indicating that a substantial number of the outputs and outcomes of the project will notbe achieved. The latest OPR indicates that lack of progress is among other issues dueto staffing gaps in the Ministry of Education. Poor capacity and weak commitment toimplementing this project were also identified as other constraints.

4.16 Support to FASE is not rated (it started in 2005), while the secondary educationpolicy work has no rating since the budget was under £1 million. Nevertheless, giventhat DFIDM has contributed to FASE since 2004 it can be inferred that some of thegains in the education sector are due to the DFIDM contribution. These gains include:improved predictability of funding and sector wide planning processes, although stillwith poor budgeting; steady distribution of school books in primary education;increased number of teachers and schools; and decentralisation of decision making forsupplies through the Direct Support to Schools Initiative.

4.17 For health, there are some preliminary indications that efforts in improvedsector planning and in developing the SWAP and more harmonised approaches tofunding are starting to produce results. Concrete indications of this are: improvement inthe quality health policy definition; sharp increase in quality of yearly health plans andbudgeting; integration of sector health financing in a well functioning SWAP and variouscommon funds.

4.18 At the service level, the Essential Medicines project is rated a 2 and isconsidered to consistently ensure availability of vital drugs nationally. While there havebeen improvements in overall service coverage the impact on the poor is not assessedso far. Selected gains include: (i) improvement in immunisation rates for BCG, DTP3and measles by between 6 and 13% to an average of around 75%, and (ii) someimprovement in contraceptive use and family planning but still well below regionalaverages.

4.19 With respect to malaria prevention and increasing access to insecticide treatedbed-nets, the projects were rated 2 and 3, due to lower than expected nationalcoverage. However sales of 152,000 nets through retail outlets and 57,000 netsthrough community councils and health centres were attained and distribution of46,000 re-treatment kits.

4.20 For HIV/AIDS, ratings are provided for two projects: the social marketing ofcondoms has achieved most of its objectives and was rated 2. The HSAM projectreceived a rating of 3. This lower rating reflects a complex design involving a largenumber of separate implementing agencies, unclear strategies for capacity building in asector where this is critical, as well as the absence of exit/transition strategies for theseinitiatives.

4.21 With respect to the funds contributed to NAC, there is a question as to theextent to which the sum of many small projects adds up to a coherent response. Animpact study that should be finalised in March 2006 will provide first insight intoconcrete results. The results achieved for HIV/AIDS in general are not easy toaggregate but include: increased, though still weak, capacity to manage grants,improved NAC leadership, improved demand for and capacity to deliver STIconsultations, 1,000 health workers at 260 clinics trained to collect and analyse STIdata, improved but still insufficient supply of essential medicines and ARVs.

4.22 For the civil society portfolio, no ratings are available (as all projects werebelow the 1 million), however, documented evidence shows that by and large projectlevel objectives are being met at output and purpose level. Specific reference in thisregard can be made to three projects: (i) Electoral Observation Assistance(EISA/Carter Centre 2003-4); (ii) Consolidating Democracy (EISA); and (iii) Support toLINK. The purpose of the first two projects was conflict management during the 2004General Election. According to the Final Report of EISA (May 2005), ‘the activities weregenerally conducted successfully”; and the aim of providing technical assistance andequipping those involved in election administration and supervision was achieved’. Thekey outcome was an election result that was ‘credible enough not to be contestedviolently by the opposition RENAMO party’ (Director, EISA).

4.23 DFIDM’s push for more sustainable funding mechanisms for umbrella NGOs(starting with LINK in 2002, then G20, EISA and MONASO) is generally viewedpositively and has earned it a reputation of a partner that brings in stable resourcesand “big ideas”. DFID is assisting these organisations to implement strategic plansoriginating from the partners, not DFID. However, the 2005 evaluation of LINK’s workhas been criticised for its quality, and the general weakness of M&E aspects limitsknowledge about wider results.

4.24 DFIDM’s micro-finance project, CRESCE, was rated a 3 due to low profitabilityin all but one of the bank branches. Achievement of the purpose (which was totransform CRESCE into a sustainable organisation serving poor people) was partiallyachieved. BOM estimates that it will take three years for the entire branch network toachieve profits consistently.

Results of Influencing

4.25 The most important area of influencing is through DFIDM’s support to theformulation work of the PARPA I and II and the PAP. DFIDM has established itself as acredible driver and valuable member of several Working Groups or Partners’ Fora, andhas had a decisive influence in convincing various stakeholders about the need forbetter coordination and harmonisation. This has come about both from DFIDM’s ownbehaviour in adhering to the PAP PAF matrix, and to its overt objective of persuadingother donors to align with the process.

4.26 The results in terms of greater levels of multi-donor BS have been describedearlier. As far as DFIDM’s own record is concerned, it has been described as the bestperforming donor in terms of ‘aid effectiveness’ in 2004.34 This was assessed on thebasis of a range of criteria including predictability, proportion of aid given as BS,


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34 Killick, T. et al (2005), Perfect Partners? The Performance of Programme Aid Partners in Mozambique in 2004

timeliness of disbursement, alignment to GoM procedures, capacity building efforts anddelegated cooperation35.

4.27 In other areas, DFIDM has had significant influence particularly in improvingthe strategic thinking of others. For example, DFIDM influenced the Swiss to commitresources to long-term support for consolidating democracy. Donors have nowchanged the approach from ad-hoc support to the Elections Observatory to moreconsistent and longer-term investment that recognises that building democracy is not aonce off event but a process.

4.28 In health, the SWAP mechanism has strengthened through DIFDM’scontribution to coordination work and the amount of vertical funding to the health sectorhas decreased from 81% in 2001 to 57% in 2004. However not all donors have comeon board: “Degrees of commitment to the code of conduct set down by the Ministry ofHealth vary greatly among external partners, some of whom sit on the GT-SWAPmeetings but continue to deliver their financial or technical assistance in a verticalmanner”.36

4.29 The evaluation of the Drought Mitigation Action Plan produced a number ofrecommendations that apply not only to agriculture but to other sectors. According toSETSAN, both the health and water sectors have adopted the Medium Term ActionPlan concept in their programming. This is an example where DFID used a low-spendproject to produce high-multiplier effects in Mozambique.

4.30 At project level there are several examples of the results of DFIDM’sinfluencing work. The success of the seed fairs approach has influenced government toallocate a budget line to them. The continued emphasis on land issues over the reviewperiod, has culminated in a newly agreed multi-donor financed land rights fund project.

Effectiveness of different instruments

4.31 DFIDM’s work is dominated by the BS modality, an instrument that by itsnature is hard to assess in terms of effectiveness. Numerous studies and reviews havebeen undertaken in the past three years to explore the performance of BS inMozambique, with extensive discussion on issues around mutual accountability,administrative burden and conditionality. The current situation is one with a range oflevels of donor commitment to the instrument, and the greatest hindrance is arguablythe level of non-general budget as well as off-BS that is provided and which to somedegree undermine the effectiveness of general BS. Although there is official support forGBS, as expressed in the PARPA-II, there is also lack of GoM buy-in in some arms ofgovernment, which creates fertile ground for other donors to continue ‘business asusual’.

4.32 DFIDM’s own assessment37 of the challenges faced in its future use of BSraised critical issues such as the ownership and capacity of GoM to manage the


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35 The mission found that some other donors reflected that the study was rather biased to measures favourable toDFIDM’s profile, and that there could be other criteria for aid effectiveness that might present a different conclusion.36 Martinez, J., et al (2005). Review of Health Progress in Mozambique 2000-2004.37 DFID (2004) Opportunities and Challenges in the PRS II agenda, (op.cit.)

instrument, especially in an aid context that is so donor-dominated. This can beextended to concerns over the wider ownership of the PARPA beyond the politicalleadership, and therefore the accountability of GoM in the use of resources in itsdelivery of services. That is why so much effort has been spent in policy dialogue(influencing) by DFIDM staff and why a range of public reform projects have beenimplemented alongside the payment of BS tranches. BS is a double-edged sword thatprovides government with un-earmarked resources, but also brings a considerableaccountability and prescriptive machinery (PAFs, joint reviews, studies and missions)that has burdened the government - although some view this burden as one that isnow shifting increasingly onto the donors than onto the government38.

4.33 These comments reach the heart of this evaluation as well as the debate onmeasuring effectiveness of BS. How long a view can donors (and their evaluators) takein assessing improvements in poverty reduction arising from aid with low conditionality?These issues are examined further in Chapters 5 and 6.

4.34 The record on effectiveness of projects is mixed in terms of recorded ratingsand delivered benefits. The group of projects addressing cross-cutting reforms ingovernment systems (public service reform, financial management, planning andbudgeting) have been over-ambitious and as a result delivered modest improvements.Long-term investments in customs and tax have been more effective through sustainedand in the case of customs major investment and technical assistance. Some havebeen critical in securing needed services (essential medicines, condom distribution,bed-nets), although details of benefits are not always available.

4.35 The use of technical assistance (TA) has proved influential in two ways. Firstthe funding of posts in partner agencies has brought useful recognition of DFID’s roleas a flexible and resourced partner. Second, TA has enabled reforms to be achievedover the longer term, with the Customs project and the LATH program in health(although discontinued) as good examples. In Customs, in a difficult reformenvironment, a long-term and initially very large commitment has been successful, andTA support has reduced (from 72 posts to 5 currently) as capacity has grown in theCustoms Dept.

4.36 TA has also been soundly used to produce a small number of important studiesof which the ‘Political Economy of the Budget’39 is the leading example, but in additionthere are useful studies into land rights, poverty analysis and drought mitigation.

4.37 In terms of emergency relief, DFIDM/CHAD can claim a good record ofassistance, particularly in introducing contingency planning and a more coordinatedresponse, and in linking reconstruction efforts (in roads) with employment creation inaffected communities.

4.38 The use of SWAPs as an instrument has been with mixed success. This ispartly because of the deliberate move towards general BS which then placed pressureon continuing SWAP funding. The first SWAP, PROAGRI, was in a complex sectorwhere there were some valuable achievements particularly in public sector reform,natural resources and food security, but with the exception of the latter, these were not


31

38 See Christian Aid and Trocaire, (2005) Donor Coordination and Aid Effectiveness in Mozambique, Ch.5.5.39 Hodges and Tibana (2004) Political Economy of the Budget, DFID

built on and insufficient links were made to the wider reforms embarked on under theCAP (e.g. SISTAFE). The health SWAP was more effective as it was used both toimprove sector coordination but also as a vehicle for DFID to put across its position onBS. Both education and health pooled funding arrangements (with different levels ofDFID involvement at different times) have increased resources flowing to the sectorand according to on budget priorities.

Sustainability

4.39 The level of sustainability is difficult to assess given the limited evidence andtime needed for benefits to endure, arising as they do from interventions that havebeen introduced since 2000. The move to BS is based on the expected greatersustainability of such instruments - even if this would be at the expense of rapidresults.

4.40 The question of fragility of results is a pertinent one, especially in a contextwhere two-thirds of DFID’s support is directly funding the budget, on the basis ofbuilding greater accountability and more efficient, transparent government systems.The reality of Mozambique’s political economy is a key question, given that parliamentis weak, civil society broadly ineffective and the private sector nascent. Somecommentators raise concerns over the close relationship between the politicalleadership and its government executive and the donors, and the ‘almost completeabsence of a demand function outside government for improvements in budget processand budget outcomes’.40

4.41 Sustainability is also an issue from the point of view of the aid-dependency ofMozambique. The country’s aid/GDP ratio is about twice as high as the average forSub-Saharan Africa, which is itself the world’s most aid-dependent region. Even withcontinuing strong economic growth, it will be many years before Mozambique is able toreduce this dependency. The risks of a sudden withdrawal of funds to governmentrelying on continued multi-donor BS is a concern, however most would accept this ispreferable to the traditional project-based forms of assistance of the past wheregovernment has limited ability to prioritise around its policy framework.

Outcomes

4.42 DFIDM’s achievements at outcome level are measured against the threeframeworks: the country strategy (in this case the 1998 CSP and the 2003 CAP), theDirectors Delivery Plan (2003-06) and the Public Service Agreement (2003-06).Progress towards CAP main objectives

4.43 The CAP’s main objective is ‘to make a significant contribution to the sustainedreduction of poverty by supporting the evolution, implementation and monitoring of thePARPA’ (CAP para. 54). This was to be achieved through three ‘key change processes’against which a number of DFIDM activities were identified for the first year ofexecution, 2003-4. In the subsequent annual reviews,41 attempts were made to defineDFIDM activities against the PARPA and PAF outcomes. As noted earlier (3.19), there


32

40 Hodges and Tibana (2004) p.102.41 For the years 2003/4 and 2004/5. No review was available for 2002/3 or earlier years.

is inconsistency in definition as some activities are process related (holding meetings,gaining agreements at working group meetings) while others are more output related.

4.44 Given the close alignment conceptually between the CAP and the PARPA, andthe fact that two thirds of DFIDM’s aid goes direct to government to implement thePARPA, the success of the latter is a direct measure of the former. Yet while thePARPA has six clear priority areas of action, DFIDM chose ‘to engage on a dynamicand opportunistic influencing of a small number of KCPs [Key Change Processes]which will drive progress of poverty’ (CAP, para. 57). In fact DFIDM undertook quite alarge number of KCP activities : 76 ‘objectives’ are listed in the draft CAP review for2004/5 (KCP1 - 21, KCP2 - 33 and KCP3 - 23). This wide-ranging choice of‘opportunistic’ actions, together with an absence of justification for which sectors wouldbe prioritised (see para 3.11), does inhibit the assessment of DFIDM’s contributiontowards the PARPA.

4.45 The emphasis on influencing led the first annual CAP review in 2003 to placeupfront the achievements of ‘donor practice and harmonisation’ - ahead of the threeKCPs - even though this is an implicit process rather than an outcome. DFIDM canclaim strong achievements in this area, and our findings would support their view thatDFID has led the way in development of the PAF and the MoU, stressing governmentownership, integration with government systems, using a single framework and mutualaccountability. In chairing or being a key player on many of the donor groups, DFIDMhas had influence on key sectors, especially in health, public service reform and publicfinancial management. Thus DFIDM has been instrumental in the evolution,implementation and monitoring of the PARPA.

4.46 Key Change Process One deals with enabling growth: besides strongoutcomes in BS area, private sector progress has been around improving the workinggroup, but there is limited evidence of success in outcomes in terms of positivechanges in business climate and ease of doing business. Ties with the British HighCommission have strengthened understanding and linkages with private sectorexpertise/contacts, but the working group has also been strongly led by USAID and thishas made donor harmonisation challenging. Nonetheless DFID have made goodcontributions to improvements to banking and micro finance and to land rights, roadsand water.

4.47 With such a diverse set of interventions the overall achievement in this keychange area is difficult to assemble. Overall, water and sanitation progress is noted tobe poor in the last joint review, with coverage worsening especially in urban areas,while roads have shown better progress but are constrained by capacity in the GoMdepartment (ANE) responsible. In disaster mitigation, significant progress has beenmade towards achieving the CAP objective. Contingency planning has been embracedby all agencies involved - government, the donor community and civil society. TheMinistry of Agriculture’s Medium Term Action Plan to Mitigate the Impact of Drought isnow under implementation, has been incorporated into regular planning cycle and hassignificant resource input from GoM and DPs.

4.48 Key Change Process Two aimed to ‘build greater opportunities for civil societyengagement in planning and monitoring, combined with increased capacity ofParliament. This includes making the Poverty Observatory process a more effective,


33

year-round forum for accountability, institutionalising civil society participation andimproving the accountability of civil society to citizens” (CAP, para 62). This has beenonly partially achieved. The Poverty Observatory is now an operational year-roundforum, and the preparation of PARPA II illustrates the growing dialogue betweengovernment and civil society. However, the G20 group42 of NGOs needs additionalresources to improve analytical capacity so that they can bring policy proposals thatare backed by solid evidence. Given the weak capacity of civil society, DPs will need tocontinue to be engaged with government on behalf of civil society for some yearsahead. While the support to the 2004 elections was successful, the need to addressparliamentary reform remains a key stumbling block to governance and accountability.

4.49 Key Change Process Three aims for a capable government working with civilsociety and private sector to improve pro-poor policies and service delivery. In health,there has been substantial progress with a better quality strategic plan being developedand better harmonisation and alignment (although still with some weaknesses andsome dissent among donors).

4.50 For HIV/AIDS, there has been improvement in the coordination betweengovernment, civil society and private sector partners over the past two years. However,there has only been a marginal improvement in the level and quality of prevention andmitigation activities on the ground. The response by different stakeholders is still veryweak and not growing in proportion to the increasing threat of HIV/AIDS. Theevaluation report of the HSAM programme notes that: ‘with respect to HIV/AIDS theprogress is not clear ... there has been a slow but steady increase in ART, PMTCT andHBC during the evaluation period, but this pace has slowed down’.43

4.51 In education, enrolment to primary education has improved but there is lessprogress at secondary school level. Some progress has been made in increasing theproportion of donor funding to education. The targeted 80% disbursal was achieved in2005 but the quality of what could effectively be done with these contributions wasseriously affected by bad timing as most donors only disbursed at the end of the year.This situation led a DFIDM advisor to remark that: ‘FASE is working in spite of thedonors.’ Consensus on the need for reform of FASE has led to a new MoU due forsignature in March 2006.

4.52 In the PFM area, the common framework for assessing progress at output/outcome level is the PEFA methodology. A draft report from December 2005 assessesMozambique’s progress as broadly satisfactory. Strong points include a crediblebudget, a budget calendar, steady improvements in revenue collection, startingimprovements in coherence PES, CFMT and PARPA, and improvements in systems ofaccounting and reporting, albeit from a low base. Major weaknesses include internalcontrol systems (payroll, expenditure commitments and procurement), the limitedcoverage of external audit, and the high levels of off-budget spending. These areexpected to be addressed in SISTAFE II.

Director’s Delivery Plan

4.53 Mozambique, is one of 16 priority countries in Africa where DFID aims to play aleading role in promoting the PRS process and in sector wide networking. The following


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42 A loose affiliation of 20 NGOs that has now grown to 100+ members.43 HIV/AIDS and Maternal Health Project evaluation, OPR December 2005, p.9

i-belshaw

Underline

section assesses the achievements with regard to the specific objectives in the AfricaDirector’s Delivery Plan.

4.54 Mozambique has met the DDP target of providing two-thirds of aid through BS.Specific targets (set in the DDP in Annex 7 in 2002) with regard to the establishment ofa poverty observatory, collection of household survey data and agreeing the MoU formulti-donor support have all been met. The implementation of SISTAFE is also still ontrack though not at the speed or scope anticipated. Impact of SISTAFE at prioritysector level, such as in education, are not yet evident. Retrenchment of staff andmaking senior management appointments in Customs have proved difficult, due to thelack of progress on public service reform but this indicator is arguably no longerrelevant given the merging of the Customs and Tax Departments into a RevenueAuthority. Also there are better indicators of public sector performance in this area, forexample, growth in tax revenues, increase in fraud detection, and speed of customsclearances.

4.55 ‘The aim of general BS will be to assist governments to implement cross-cutting reforms, to improve the effectiveness of government processes and servicedelivery’ (DDP, para. 21). Progress in this area has been modest as compared toexpectations, although the GBS Study for Mozambique considers BS has had apositive effect in terms of strengthening budgeting and building wider commitment ofservice delivery targets. There are major challenges involved given the socialist-derived, antiquated government systems and weak capacity. Reforms in public financialmanagement, staffing and conditions, planning and budgeting have moved slowly sofar and are noted as an issue of concern in the latest Joint Review. The Review alsonoted that ‘spending in priority area reached 66.9% of total expenditure, of which 54%in Health and Education’. Indicators in these sectors show continuing improvement,though with continuing gaps in gender, equity and in national coverage.

4.56 The DDP “prioritises a renewed emphasis on quality of education sector plans,with particular attention to improving girls’ participation and achievement” (DDP, p. 14).This is reiterated in the PSA which focuses on equitable access to primary education.Progress has been made both on access and on girls’ participation and achievementbut only at primary level. Gains in terms of quality are still unclear (Avaliação Formativada Educação Basica, 2005) and a lot remains to be done at secondary level.

4.57 Tackling HIV/AIDS is a top priority in the DDP. The programme in Mozambiquehas followed the priorities set out in both the PSA and DDP, and the support tostrengthening the NAC is producing some results, although it remains questionable towhat extent the NAC will be able to drive a response that will make a real impact onHIV/AIDS. Social marketing has produced a steady supply of condoms but condom useis still very low, indicating the need for more complex interventions. There has beenlittle progress on the DDP goals of mainstreaming and delivering an effective responsethrough civil society.

Contribution to DFID’s Public Service Agreement

4.58 The PSA has four areas of focus for 16 African countries, covering education,health, governance issues and private sector development. Table 5 below presents theCPE’s observations in these areas. Mozambique starts from a lower base than many


35

other target countries because of the very poor conditions after the civil war. Althoughtherefore the actual PSA targets may not actually be reached, the trend is generallygood.

Table 5. An Assessment of DFID Mozambique’s contribution to the PSA Targets


36

q g

PSA OBJECTIVE II: Reduce Poverty in

Africa. 2003-2006

PSA Target 2: Progress towards the MDGs in 4 key countries.

CPE comments

IV DFID will provide increased support tocontribute to:

a) The development and implementation of more effective government-led education programmes within a PRS, underpinned bya MTEF, focusing on primary education (58-72% enrolment) and including explicit objectives on equitable access for girls and boys (ratio from 89% to 96%) in at least 50% of PSA countries.

Partially Achieved. Primary enrolment inMozambique is close to the 72% target, beingreported at 69% by 2003. The gender gaps remainsbelow the target level of 96%, estimated at 83%,though this is an improving trend (71% in 1997)

b) The development and implementation of more effective government-led health

programmes within a PRS, underpinned bya MTEF, tackling communicable diseases

and HIV/AIDS, and reducing child and maternal mortality in at least 50% of PSA countries. Targets: A reduction in under-5 mortality rates for girls and boys from 158 per 1000 live birthsto 139 per 1000.

An increase in the proportion of birthsassisted by skilled birth attendants from49% to 67%;

A reduction in the proportion of 15-24 year old pregnant women with HIV from 16%

Not achieved though trend is positive. Under fivemortality has fallen from 219 to 178 by 2003, whileinfant mortality decreased from 147 to 124.

Not achieved though trend is positive. The proportion of births attended by skilled professionalshas risen from 44% in 1997 to 48% in 2003

Not achieved and incidence rising. The rate forpregnant 15-24 years old was 12.9% in 2003, andprevalence is on the rise rather than reducing.

c) Better economic and political governance

in 50% of PSA countries by 2006 asdemonstrated by: (i) an improvement in public financial

management and accountability systems and

(ii) a deepening of democracy and improvement in the rights of the sociallyexcluded.

Positive though slow progress in some areas. Improvements in financial management andaccountability are in progress, though the next twoyears will be ‘critical as key steps in budget,procurement, audit are rolled out’ (Joint Review, Sept. 2005).

Deepening democracy is a challenge. Positive signsinclude successful elections, a broad-based PARPA II consultation process, policy shifts towardsdecentralisation and the anti-corruption survey. Butconcerns lie around important areas such as accessto justice, ineffective parliament and opposition,weak media and civil society. ‘The analysis hasshown that there is no internal pressure, from withinMozambican society, that significantly affects thegovernment’s behaviour’. (Political Economy of theBudget, 2004, p.101)


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d) d) Sustained improvements in the climate for foreign investment, local private sectordevelopment and market access for thepoor.

Positive trend. Growth prospects are good

Positive trend though poverty focus uncertain. Business related public services are improvingslowly with better customs and tax procedures, andimproved awareness of corruption. However, business registration, legal claims, labour laws, VAT are all areas still to improve. Large scaleinvestments based on foreign direct investments inand around Maputo still account for the maingrowth, while local small-scale private sector activitylags behind. Market access has improved with roads, increased private transport, and cell phonecoverage, but the extent of access by the poor is asyet not well established. Tertiary roads (which reallymatter for the poor) are not yet an immediate priorityfor government and most rural areas are sparselypopulated making it difficult to justify suchinvestments from an efficiency point of view.

Summary of findings

� BS has been the increasingly dominant aid instrument, now accountingfor approximately 70% of DFIDM’s aid. Sector wide pool funding hasdeclined from 28% to 6% of expenditure. Projects have consistentlyaccounted for around one-fifth of expenditure.

� A systematic analysis of results is difficult because of gaps in thePRISM database, but overall, results show a weak trend during theperiod 2000-05, with the most common score of 3 (purpose andoutputs likely to be partially achieved).

� Scores of 2 were recorded for the first BS grant (2000-03). Moremodest success has been achieved in the areas of public sectorreform.

� Results of DFIDM’s influencing have been generally good, with verypositive results in the PARPA process and in donor alignment.

� At outcome level, it is difficult to synthesise results and measureDFID’s achievement due to a lack of suitable indicators.

� Achievements against the Country Assistance Plan appear to havebeen good in many areas, though judgement is hampered by an overemphasis on process rather than result monitoring.

� Success against the Director’s Delivery Plan is good in terms ofmeeting the BS target, and for the related (though rather selective)indicators for government financial management and accountability.Key cross-cutting reforms (for areas such as public services, staffing,planning and audit) are still underway so Mozambique cannot yet besaid to be fully on track.

� Mozambique is showing signs of improvement regarding the PSAindicators but the low base means that there is still some way to go tomeet the absolute targets in education and health.

5. DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS

Development Progress

5.1 This Section provides an overview of Mozambique’s social and economicperformance. As regards the most recent progress towards MDGs (August 2005), theresults are shown in Box 2. Mozambique has a mixed record in terms of MDGprogress. Six of the main targets are unlikely to be met while four are on track. Whileextreme poverty levels may be halved, food insecurity as measured by childmalnutrition is not falling fast enough (26% prevalence in 2001, down to 23.7% in2003) to meet the 2015 target of 17%. For some MDGs the situation is worsening(HIV/AIDs) or static (girls school completion rates or secondary school attendance).

Box 2: Summary of MDG progress

Extreme Poverty and Hunger Halve the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015 PotentiallyHalve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger by 2015 Unlikely

Universal Primary EducationEnsure that all boys and girls are able to complete a full course of Unlikelyprimary schooling by 2015

Gender EqualityEliminate gender disparities in primary and secondary education by Unlikely2005, and in all levels of education by 2015

Child Mortality Reduce by two-thirds the under 5 mortality rate by 2015 Potentially

Maternal HealthReduce by three-quarters the under maternal mortality rate by 2015 Potentially

HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseasesHave halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS UnlikelyHave halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria Potentiallyand other major diseases

Environmental SustainabilityIntegrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies Unlikelyand programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resourcesHalve by 2015 the proportion of people without access to safe drinking Unlikelywater and sanitation

Source: Republic of Mozambique (2005) Report on MDGs.

5.2 Much of the improvement in MDG status has occurred on the back of thestrong period of economic recovery in the late nineties, so that the real challenge isnow to keep momentum moving. The PARPA II target is to reduce poverty to 44% by2015. While recent analysis by the IMF indicates GDP growth will continue at around7% per annum, there still persists strong regional variations and inequality. The Ginicoefficient has risen from 0.4 to 0.42 between 1997 and 2003, and the consumption ofthe poor grew slower, in percentage terms, than that of the rich.


39

5.3 Above all if, ‘Mozambique is to attain the MDGs, it requires an urgent halt andreversal of HIV/AIDs, improvements in the efficiency of service delivery to the poor,employment creation, increases in state revenue, reductions in foreign aiddependency, and effective preparedness for natural disasters’ (MDG Report 2005).

5.4 This evaluation has been struck by the critical nature of the HIV/AIDSpandemic on Mozambique’s poverty reduction prospects, and by the apparent failure ofthe PARPA and of DFIDM to take into account the effects of this critical factor inassessing growth and MDG progress. This is not to say that DFID has not made acontribution to HIV and AIDS, especially in harmonising, in improving donorcoordination, and in supporting the National Aids Council. DFIDM also played a majorrole in convincing the Global Fund and the Clinton Foundation to put their funds onbudget, a significant achievement. By prioritising NAC leadership, DFID was consistentin its intent to build government ownership, and DFID’s resources in this area havesteadily grown (see Figure 2).

5.5 However, DFIDM itself recognises that “Our approach to the HIV and AIDSwork has developed in an incremental way with no explicit strategy ... there has beenlimited engagement in the HIV and AIDS work beyond the Human Development andSocial Development Teams”.44 This evolutionary strategy was appropriate to thecontext at the time within the office (limited staff time), within DFID corporately (as itsglobal HIV/AIDs strategy was published in 2004), and outside (lack of clarity on whowas doing what and how the process was going to move forward). 5.6 While HIV/AIDS is recognised as major challenge in its own right, the effects of thedisease on many other MDGs and on other key targets is not analysed sufficiently inthe PARPA II or in DFIDM’s analysis leading up to its next CAP. Yet there is solidevidence of the widespread negative effects from international studies and from work inMozambique.

5.7 Already the IMF reduces Mozambique’s annual growth by 1.4% due toHIV/AIDS, which recognises the crosscutting impact that is anticipated. Modelling workon Mozambique has estimated that the economy will be 14-20% smaller by 2010.45 Butmore work is needed on analysing and adjusting Mozambique’s poverty reductiontargets taking into account the disease.

‘Although we are in the third decade of the epidemic, the international developmentcommunity has not taken AIDS on board. There is little appreciation of what HIV/AIDSmeans for development targets. Indicators do not pick up on the impact of the diseasebecause they are based on historical data and take no account of current or futureimpact. Even with existing data it is not clear what is and is not included; and thosewho prepare data do not compare with and without AIDS scenarios. This is a long-wave event. The impacts are complex and possibly self-reinforcing’.46

5.8 Many MDGs will be affected in a country where prevalence is 16%: the effectson infant and child mortality, on school attendance and completion, on gender targets


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44 DFID (2005) DFID Mozambique HIV and AIDS strategic framework 45 Arndt, C. (2003)HIV/AIDS, Human Capital and Economic Growth Prospects for Mozambique, WB.46 Barnett, T and Whiteside, A, (2002) AIDS in the Twenty-first Century. Palgrave Macmillan, p.285.

where females age 15-24 have the highest levels of infection, on primary health carewhere HIV/AIDS patients will put pressure on clinical and treatment services and onfood security and hunger when rural adult populations are debilitated and unable tocultivate.

5.9 Conversely the extent of the HIV/AIDS problem justifies a major increase inprevention expenditure (2.5% of GDP) and in education (5% of GDP) such is thebenefit to the economy and the pay-off that would occur.47

5.10 There are some signs however that the wider impacts of HIV/AIDS are beingincorporated into national planning: “The National Assembly approved Mozambique’sHIV program for 2005-2009, which includes information taken from the HIV prevalenceestimates and impact projections produced by the policy-supported MultisectoralTechnical Group (MTG). The final 2005-09 Strategic Plan for HIV/AIDS also includesprevalence estimates and impact projections taken directly from various MTG products.This is the first time that such information has been included in high-level policydocuments”.48 Also recently (2005) a working group on HIV/AIDS at parliamentary levelhas been created.

Aid effectiveness

5.11 The large share that aid represents in the overall economy indicates that itscontribution in the country’s development performance is important. The adoption of apoverty reduction strategy has signalled Mozambique’s willingness to address pro-poorgrowth, and the preparation of the second PARPA in 2005 has indicated the willingnessof government to consult widely and include the views of a wider range ofstakeholders.

5.12 DFIDM has delivered significant influencing and funding in many critical areasidentified in the PARPA and has moved towards stronger effectiveness in terms ofmore predictable support to government budget systems. By virtue of the size of itssupport in Mozambique it will have made some valuable contributions to achieving theMDGs. Nevertheless, it is not easy to attribute changes in development performanceto a single donor, especially in a context where BS is provided by a group of 18 donorscurrently, and where all other significant investments in projects or SWAPs use a co-funding modality.

5.13 The recently published GBS study on Mozambique49 in this respectacknowledges that for BS, positive effects were traceable at the early results stages(inputs and immediate effects) but less evident at outcome and impact stages.

“There were broadly positive effects on macroeconomic performance. Sector supportand project aid have been the main external supports to improved service delivery, butPartnership GBS has helped by adding collective donor support for service targets aswell as funding and is helping to build the systems that should improve the reliabilityand quality of service funding in the future. GBS may have had a small positive effect


41

47 Arndt, C (op.cit). GoM expenditure has remained unchanged for HIV/AIDS through NAC over the evaluation period.48 http://www.policyproject.com/countries.cfm?country=Mozambique 49 Batley, R., et al. op. cit.

on service use, income-poverty reduction and the empowerment of poor people.However, its medium-term effects can be expected to be greater, given that it supportsunderlying positive processes ( para D1.6).

Also: “GBS’s contribution to the improvement of service delivery has not been to inventnew policies nor to create previously unasserted targets, but to maintain support forpolicies and targets already agreed at sector level. We assess it as having had a weakbut positive effect on service delivery and service responsiveness” (S40 - 41)

5.14 BS and Aid in general has contributed to the stability of the GoM’s political andmacro-economic framework, and that in turn has encouraged investment and sustainedeconomic growth. The extent to which Mozambique’s strong economic growth is pro-poor remains uncertain. Evidence currently suggests that inequality is increasing, andthat provincial development is noticeably unbalanced as the south and key transportcorridors move ahead much faster than other central and northern areas.


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6. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS

DFID contribution and value added

6.1 DFIDM’s specific contribution to Mozambique’s development effort in the pastfive years can be grouped into three areas: first; an ability to interact with governmentand other major donors to bring about greater harmonisation; second, a flexibility thathas allowed DFID greater influence through strategic interventions and technicalassistance, and third, the competence and commitment of its staff.

6.2 DFIDM has brought considerable influence to bear on aid coordinationparticularly through the PARPA process and in the Programme Aid Partners fora.Though there are still major challenges ahead, the progress so far in terms of povertyreduction and government accountability and efficiency are positive. DFIDM’s role as aplaymaker and leading proponent of placing confidence in government systems andproviding a substantial share of its resources through government is a model ofachievement worth noting by DFID country programmes elsewhere. It has also beenground-breaking in introducing a new approach to aid conditionality, that has led to amore stable and transparent resource delivery system and a mutually-assessedperformance framework.

6.3 DFID’s flexibility and pro-active stance has allowed it to provide rapid supportwhere needed (in disaster response for example) or to provide technical assistance atshort notice (in providing monitoring or specialist expertise to partner agencies). It hasalso been willing to trust its partners, whether government, other donors or NGOs, andallow them to manage funds in a flexible way without overdue interference.

6.4 DFIDM’s staff commitment and technical expertise is a widely respectedstrength that has allowed it to have greater influence than would otherwise beexpected. This influence has been supported by the fact that DFID is one ofMozambique’s top five aid providers, but there are several examples where the level offunding was less important than staff expertise and energy.

Strengths and weaknesses of DFID’s programme

6.5 There are five areas to highlight in terms of the DFIDM’s programme strengths:(i) The country strategy has been broad in coverage and addressing both governmentand civil society needs; and linked explicitly to the government’s poverty reductionstrategy. (ii) DFIDM’s programme has been consistently well-harmonised with a highlevel of co-funding arrangements. (iii) DFID has attempted to maintain a balancebetween long-term strengthening of central government systems with the more urgentprovision of support to key sectors, in particular in health. (iv) The portfolio contains anumber of innovative projects and studies that have been influential and led the way forother partners to bring support (land rights, drought mitigation, bednets). (v) There aregood examples of well chosen entry points, based on sound strategic thinking (such asin public sector reforms, support to civil society).

6.6 Weaknesses can be grouped into four areas: (i) a failure to managedisengagement from certain sectors in the shift towards central reforms and BS; (ii)

Conclusions and Recommendations

43

issues around staff effectiveness; (iii) more explicit linkages between DFID processesand measurable outcomes; and (iv) limited effectiveness in crosscutting issuesespecially gender and HIV/AIDS.

6.7 DFIDM’s changing engagement with agriculture and education in the period duringthe transition from CSP to CAP was not managed in a way that took account of thevalue of maintaining commitments in these key sectors, and that respected GoMinitiatives in for example developing government financial management systems50.DFID had to make hard choices as it shifted direction dramatically. But the rationale forreducing engagement in key poverty-related sectors was not always clear given thestated CAP commitments, and the process was not always well managed. The growthadvisor at the time noted that the DFIDM’s involvement in the sector represented, “Amissed opportunity for linking central and sectoral reforms - and - ‘to learn and applylessons to central reform processes - particularly from PROAGRI which wasMozambique’s first SWAP and which itself made major efforts to engage with centralprocesses”.51

6.8 The effectiveness of DFDM staff suffers from: (i) high staff turnover; (ii) thetendency to focus on high level policy debate and internal discussions, and less fieldengagement and contact with projects.

6.9 The link between the DFID activities, ‘KCP’ outputs and CAP objectives can befurther improved. Annual reporting essentially highlights process indicators (and, atleast in 2003, PSA / DDP targets). While there is a recognition of the innovativeapproach taken in identifying key change processes, links from these activities to atleast intermediate outcomes (the direct consequences of DFID’s actions where theycan be recognised or at least partially attributed) could be better specified.

6.10 So far gender has not been highlighted in DFIDM’s work in Mozambique. It is notmentioned in the CAP strategy or in specific strategies dealing with civil society.Support is limited to maternal health, aspects of roads, and equity in education iscovered in broad terms. In HIV/AIDS, even though women are disproportionatelyaffected, gender does not occupy a sufficiently strong place either in the work done byNAC or in its support to NGOs and even less in mainstreaming in other sectors.DFIDM recognises HIV/AIDS as a serious issue and has addressed it in number ofways, but given the tremendous potential of the disease to reduce the success ofpoverty reducing interventions, HIV/AIDS is not high enough on the agenda. It is anexceptional situation (as recognised two years ago in DFID’s corporate policy) wheregreater resources, results and accountability need to be demanded.

Explanatory factors

6.11 DFIDM’s strengths arise firstly because it has enjoyed an increasing level ofresources from DFID-UK as a priority country in Africa. In addition its independentbilateral stance gives it the freedom to act as a counterweight to the larger IFIs and tobe a mediator. This is complemented by the exceptional level of delegated authority


44

50 ‘…PROAGRI has produced real improvements in planning, prioritisation, transparency and financialaccountability that do at last seem to be delivering more capacity at the local level’, Whiteside & Ashley, ExecSummary,p3.51 Communication from former DFID Growth Advisor, Mozambique.

given to the country office, and to the management approach of the office Head thathas encouraged team building and delegated responsibility to advisors and programmestaff.

6.12 DFIDM has been seen as a clear thinking and predictable partner, and this islargely due to a consistent office leadership throughout most of the review period.Though not all partners agree with the direction of DFIDM’s programme, all understandtheir position. It is however questionable whether outside of the donor fora and higherlevels of government that DFIDM’s position is so well understood, especially givenDFIDM’s limited involvement in decentralisation, the private sector and ruraldevelopment.

6.13 The deliberate shift to a greater emphasis on BS, policy dialogue and centralgovernment reforms under the CAP meant that the DFIDM team had to focus its effortsand disengage from what were viewed as more difficult or less relevant projects orsectors. This led to ‘wildly varying workloads’ and changing prioritisation of particularsectors as opportunities arose or fell away. Staff meanwhile have, “a tail of olderprojects from non-priority sectors to deal with - which then become much less effectiveprojects as there is inadequate time to sort out problems, link them to top-level policy,or learn lessons”.52 Prioritisation is important but it should be accompanied bysustained periods of engagement rather than too frequent shifts into and out of sectors.

6.14 The lack of success in measuring DFID’s intermediate outcomes is due tovarious factors. The portfolio is wide and contains many different types of interventionsand instruments. It is also moving towards harder to measure interventions such asgovernance reforms and BS where traditional OPR methods may be less applicable.Most interventions are joint-donor activities, where DFID may be a minor partner andits contribution cannot be isolated. It is also the case that less staff effort has gone intobuilding M&E approaches than on the influencing and policy work.

6.15 The failure to explicitly incorporate and mainstream gender and HIV/AIDS intoDFIDM’s programme may be attributed to various factors. The slow emergence of thecivil society corner of the CAP strategy has restricted the ability to build capacity inthese areas. The lack of a dedicated gender or HIV/AIDS specialist in the DFIDM teamhas also meant reduced prominence.

Lessons

6.16 The findings of the Mozambique CPE suggest a number of lessons:

6.17 Budget Support though a potentially high-return investment requires anextensive consultation process and considerable investments in time and energy by itsproponents. Nevertheless in the right circumstances and with sufficient support fromHQ, DFID can play a catalytic role in introducing and supporting this instrument. At thesame time, experience in other countries (Ethiopia, Uganda) increases the need tojustify the logic of the approach, and to explain the complementarity between BS andother forms of aid to home constituencies. It also underlines the need to establish


45

52 former DFID Growth Advisor (ibid).

agreed intermediate indicators of success that would allow DFID to be sure theprocess is on track.

6.18 DFIDM’s risk, as the leading provider of general BS, has been mitigated by itsefforts to align other donors into the PAP system, which has resulted in a growingnumber of donors that are involved and the increasingly sound and transparent mutualaccountability mechanisms.

6.19 The impact of BS on service delivery has been assessed as important not interms of speeding up service delivery improvements but in its ability to strengthenexisting systems and to: ‘reinforce commitments by making them a matter of collectivedonor and government agreement, exposing them to transparent monitoring, andworking to improve the link between plans, budget allocations and execution’53. Yetcapacity constraints in the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPF) (compounded by itsrecent separation into two separate ministries) and the slow pace of public sector reform, underline the need to provide complementary and sustained support in critical sectorsthat address key MDGs such as education, environment, water and sanitation and malnutrition.

6.20 The PROAGRI SWAP example shows that it takes time to establishmechanisms that permit accountability and attain reform objectives, and that astrong advisory input (with some but not necessarily a major funding commitment) issufficient for DFID to be seen as a central and respected player in sector reform work.The experience in achieving central reforms is that addressing fundamental changestakes much longer than anticipated even in a well-harmonised donor environment andwith a relatively compliant government partner.

6.21 The wide sector coverage under the pro-poor growth area together with anoften limited advisory capacity means that it is difficult to devote sufficient time to eachsector. While there is sometimes an advantage to maintaining a balanced portfolio (forexample, so that efforts may be shifted to maximise results where one sector is movingmore rapidly than others), the trade-off between wide and necessarily limited coverageand deep and more sustained engagement must be managed carefully.

6.22 Implementing a major shift in strategic direction requires firm leadership,committed staff, sufficient resources and DFID-UK political backing. It also needsto be balanced by clear exit or transition tactics that allow disengagement from lowpriority areas to take place without undue consequences. Adjusting a programmeportfolio takes time and will always lag behind new developments, but this may bepreferable to abrupt closure/disengagement from key initiatives and partners.

6.23 When contemplating a major shift in programme direction, DFID’s countryassistance strategy needs to consider the transition process and to provide a clearrationale for exiting or disengaging from a particular sector or thematic area.Investment choices should rely less on the experience, skills and persuasiveness ofindividuals and more on the underlying merits of those sectors in terms of theircontribution to specific programme goals.


46

53 GBS Study on Mozambique, p135, op cit.

6.24 The lesson from Mozambique is that by strengthening the national povertyassessment framework, programme partners can reach a mutual assessment ofprogress on poverty reduction. For DFID though, more focused and measurable earlyor intermediate outcomes would help to capture the contribution of its own activitiesbetter in its CIMTs. By concentrating in its own reporting on process indicators, it ishard to achieve the link to ‘PARPA deliverables’ such as improvements in services interms of outreach and targeting, or key public sector reforms.

6.25 DFID is as complicit as other donors in not addressing the overarchingimplications of the growing HIV/AIDS crisis in Mozambique. While innovative projectsand supporting government approaches were valuable, the scale of the response andits strategic direction have not been appropriate. Trajectories and targets for all MDGsneed to be re-examined in the ‘with HIV/AIDS scenario’, rather than managing it as aseparate MDG goal or as just one component of a poverty reduction strategy.

6.26 Programme design must be sufficiently informed by the specific regionalcontext. For example: employment creation interventions (such as with roadconstruction) need to take into account unique labour migration patterns between thecountry in question and its neighbours; HIV/AIDS approaches need to consider similartransport corridors.

6.27 The experience of Mozambique supports current DFID thinking on how toengage with fragile states: i.e. the importance of strengthening rather thanundermining institutions, and of harmonisation and where possible alignment. However,there is the need to address wider accountability concerns in terms of parliament,justice, media, and civil society, if results from a strong donor-government partnershipare not to flounder.

6.28 Projects can play a key role when addressing a specific question or policyissue and can be essential to filling short-term gaps or raising an issue’s profile in thenational context (e.g. Land Rights, Social Marketing of Condoms). Their justification aswell as their exit strategies should be clearly outlined.

Recommendations

6.29 A number of recommendations are set out here, some of which may informthinking for the new CAP that is currently under preparation in Mozambique.

Recommendations for improving relevance and quality of country strategy

1. With greater awareness in government and development partners emerging, DFIDshould build its next programme on the concept of mutual accountability. Thiswould extend the existing CAP framework to build a more comprehensiveapproach to development strategy. Weaving it through the entire programme wouldboth clarify and strengthen the BS intervention logic.

2. Although focused on BS, the importance of donor influencing must also berecognised and exploited in non-BS forms of aid such as SWAPs, common funds,projects, and technical assistance.


47

3. Gender, equity and HIV/AIDS need to move higher up DFID’s agenda inMozambique. Concrete strategies and targets need to be identified with explicitlinks made to the contribution that various interventions will make addressing theseareas. (See Box 3 below).

4. Involvement of provinces and districts is absolutely key to ensuring thatgovernment spends money in an accountable manner. Strategies and targets fordecentralisation should be discussed in the context of the CAP.

Recommendations for improving programme design and delivery

5. Build further the twin track approach that both strengthens government capacitythrough strong support to the budget and to central reforms, and also addressesurgent poverty needs in key under-performing areas, such as HIV/AIDS, water andsanitation and food security.


48

Box 3. Improving DFIDM’s response to HIV/AIDS

1. To meet the challenge of addressing HIV a realistic assessment ofhuman resources needs in the DFIDM office is essential.

2. Build skills particularly in the other key sectors to address HIV/AIDS. Thisis essential to ensuring that the other socio-economic drivers of thepandemic such as poverty, illiteracy and unemployment - in particularamong young women - are addressed.

3. This implies that within the DFID programme it should be the office as awhole and not just the HIV/AIDS sector that is held accountable onprogress towards preventing and mitigating HIV/AIDS.

4. OPRs and PCRs of all projects and initiatives should include specificspace for addressing progress related to HIV/AIDS.

5. HIV/AIDS needs to be brought to the forefront of the discussions in SBSand GBS. Equity indicators and progress on gender and poverty need tobecome more central to DFIDM and to the development partnersdialogue with Government.

6. DFID should support further research into the wider socio-economiceffects of HIV, and in particular into modelling the results of the diseasein all relevant MDG targets and timelines.

7. Identify entry points for strengthening government and civil societyleadership on HIV/AIDS in a transectoral manner. This includes placingfunding where it is needed but also a much broader and in-depthcommitment to finding creative ways of strengthening systems to addressthe challenges of HIV/AIDS.

6. DFID country offices need to communicate their own strategy, achievementsand priority areas as well as underscore the links with the poverty reductionstrategy and available poverty analysis. The strategy needs to be communicated todecentralised structures of government as well. Better media, publications andweb-presence would help. At the same time more could be done to buildcommunications, and thus the transparency, of the poverty fora and working groupactivities. (Mozambique might model their efforts here on the Local ConsultativeGroup example from Bangladesh).

7. Donor influencing needs to take place beyond BS, and should include non-BSforms of aid such as SWAPs, common funds, project and technical assistance.Progress has been made in harmonising approaches in some areas, but asubstantial agenda remains. DFIDM needs to maintain a focus onharmonisation at all levels.

8. Advisor time and management support should be allocated more evenlybetween policy work, implementation and M&E. Time should be more balancedbetween on the one hand, internal meetings and programme development workand on the other, great field exposure and interaction with locally influential bodiesat regional as well as national level.

9. Senior staff should be expected to have good language skills where, as inMozambique, these are necessary for doing effective business. Staff should alsoremain in country for at least three years, with appropriate career developmentsupport during this period.

10. National expertise and experience should be used in a more structured wayto build greater institutional memory and local knowledge in the currentteam. For DFIDM, local staff play a valuable role in this area, which should be fullyused through creative interaction (retreats, thematic working sessions, joint fieldvisits).

Recommendations for Strengthening Monitoring and Evaluation of Results

11. Develop further the CIMT framework by identifying the measurableintermediate outcomes arising from 70+ programme / Key Change Processescurrently captured in the annual reporting. During the next CAP preparationperiod, DFIDM could examine more closely how their planned annual activities andprocesses can be linked in a more sequenced way to achievable and measurableintermediate outcomes over the life of the CAP period in order, in turn, to deliver onthe PARPA II and millennium development goals.

12. Monitoring and evaluation of BS and public financial management needs to bestrengthened so that early achievements or signs of success can be captured. Auseful framework for further thought on intervention logic of aid, designed originallyfor BS but adaptable to include other modalities, is the causality map included inthe GBS evaluation (see Figure A1.1 in this study).


49

Annex A

51

Annex A

52

Annex A

53

Annex A

54

Annex A

55

Annex A

56

Annex A

57

Annex A

58

Annex B: People Consulted

DFIDRachel Turner HeadSam Bickersteth Deputy HeadEduarda Gray SPO CoordinatorPaul Wafer Education Adviser Marie Castelo-Branco SPOElizabeth Jones Growth Adviser Simon Vandenbroeke Economics Adviser Maria Teresa Mendes SPOJane Rintoul Governance Adviser Teresa Mendes SPOAlicia Herbert Social Development Adviser Paulo Gentil SPOAndrew Preston Governance AdvisorPhil Brown Programme AdvisorEmidio Oliveira SPO GrowthLouise de Sousa Deputy High Commissioner, British High Commission

Former DFIDM StaffEamon Cassidy Former Head Julian Compton Growth AdvisorCaroline Rickatson Governance AdvisorAlison Beattie Human Development AdvisorMelanie Speight Former Senior Programme Officer

GovernmentFernando Songane PROAGRI Coordinator, Ministry of AgricultureDanilo Nalá Deputy General, Customs Commissioner, CustomsMarcela Libombo National Coordinator, SETSAN, Ministry of AgricultureDiogo Milagre Deputy Executive Secretary/Project Director, National Aids

CouncilDr Domingos Lambo Ministry of Finance, National Director of BudgetDr Adriano Ubisse Ministry of Planning, Deputy National DirectorDr Aboobacar Changa Ministry of Finance, President of the Fiscal ReformCommissionDr Carlos Jessen Director of UTRAFEAntonio Mambo Director, Civil Engineering, National Roads AdministrationIrene Langa National Roads AdministrationGumercindo Langa Deputy Director, INGC

Development PartnersMarylene Spezzati Resident Representative, UNDP

Annex B

59

Karin Andersson Economist, Swedish EmbassySandra DieselSocio-Economic Advisor, Swedish EmbassyMichael Baxter Country Director, World BankHumberto Cossa World BankAntero Pina Water Project, UNICEFChristine de Voest Rural Incomes Team Leader, USAIDDonna Stauffer Deputy Director, USAIDTimothy Born Trade & Investment Program Team Leader, USAIDRamón Ynaraja Officer Private Sector & Trade, ECFrançoise Millecam Head of Food Security and Agriculture Section, EUOlle Sotamaa Counsellor, Embassy of FinlandNeils Richter Counsellor, Embassy of DenmarkFrançoise Desmazières Director, Groupe Agence Française de DeveloppementAdrian Hadorn Ambassador, SwitzerlandHeather Cameron Counsellor, High Commission of CanadaNora de Laet 1st Secretary, Belgian EmbassyPeter Vandor Country Representative, FAOJulie Riviere Education Advisor, GTZCaroline Faulkin Irish EmbassyMarcia Cohen CIDATelma Loforte Swiss Cooperation Office Mozambique, Economist Jolke Opperwal Royal Dutch Embassy, EconomistPatrick Empey DCI IrelandPeter Vandor FAO Representative in Mozambique and SwazilandAngela Van Rynbach WFP Representative in MozambiqueKarin Manente Deputy Country Director, WFP

OthersRodney Reviere Program Coordinator, Rural Development Program, GTZ Peter Lamb Consultant, Crown Agents, Customs ProjectDieter Orlovsky FOPOS project adviser (Support to budgeting and planning)Jacinto Muchine SISTAFE adviserSøren Langhoff SISTAFE adviserMaya De-Vibe UTRESP Consultant (ex-DFID APOS)Bert Shroeder Co-ordinator OXFAM AustraliaGunnila Wingqvist Program Co-ordinator, SIDASigvard Bjorck Engineering Advisor, EUCarmen Ramos Verde Azul, consultant DCI Ev TeamPalmira Vicente Agriculture Specialist, DCILuis de Brito Resident Director, EISAJose Piquitai Coordinator, LINK NGO Forum

Annex B

60

Annex C

61

AN

NEX

C: M

ozam

biqu

e C

ount

ry P

rogr

amm

e Ev

alua

tion

Mat

rix

CR

ITER

IAM

AIN

QU

ESTI

ON

SSU

B Q

UES

TIO

NS

/ TA

SKS

1. C

ON

TEXT

:wha

t wer

e th

e si

gnifi

cant

feat

ures

of t

he c

onte

xt in

whi

ch th

e pr

ogra

mm

ew

asde

sign

ed a

ndim

plem

ente

d?1.

1 M

ozam

biqu

e20

00-2

004

Driv

ers

for c

hang

e ov

erth

is p

erio

d •

Tim

elin

e an

d si

gnifi

cant

feat

ures

.

1.2

DFI

D 2

000-

2004

M

ajor

cha

nges

& e

vent

sw

ithin

DFI

D•

Tim

elin

e an

d si

gnifi

cant

feat

ures

1.3

Don

or s

cene

200

0- 2

004

Maj

or c

hang

esin

don

or c

omm

unity

and

appr

oach

•Ti

mel

ine

and

sign

ifica

ntfe

atur

es

2. P

RO

GR

AMM

EQ

UAL

ITY:

wha

t was

the

qual

ity o

fDFI

D’s

prog

ram

me

and

proc

ess?

•Su

mm

aris

e ev

olut

ion

& c

onte

nt•

Appr

opria

tely

harm

onis

ed w

ith a

nd c

omm

unic

ated

to, o

ther

don

ors?

•

Cle

ar,r

esul

ts-fo

cuse

dan

dm

onito

rabl

e?•

Rel

evan

t,ap

prop

riate

and

alig

ned

toco

ntex

t/PR

S pr

oces

s ?

•C

onsi

sten

twith

DFI

D p

olic

y?re

flect

ing

DBS

pat

h, P

RS

led,

harm

oniz

atio

n, u

pstre

am s

hift,

glob

aliz

atio

n, P

SA

agen

da

2.1.

Stra

tegy

•W

as D

FID

s st

rate

gy(s

) in

Moz

ambi

que

appr

opria

te?

•Ad

equa

teco

nsul

tatio

n w

ith a

nd c

omm

unic

atio

nto

gov

t, C

S a

ndPr

ivat

e se

ctor

?•

Iden

tific

atio

nof

key

partn

ers

and

chan

ge o

ver t

ime

•G

ener

al a

ppro

ach

to in

fluen

cing

•D

FID

– g

over

nmen

t•

DFI

D –

civ

ilso

ciet

y•

DFI

D -

bila

tera

ls•

DFI

D- m

ultil

ater

als

•D

FID

– F

CO

2.2

Rel

atio

nshi

ps•

How

was

DFI

D v

iew

ed b

y ot

her

deve

lopm

ent p

artn

ers?

•H

owef

fect

ivel

y di

d D

FID

pur

sue

the

‘influ

enci

ng’ o

bjec

tives

rega

rdin

g st

rate

gy a

nd p

olic

y?•

Wha

t wer

e th

e ris

ksan

d un

inte

nded

cons

eque

nces

?

•

2.3

Act

iviti

es•

wha

t por

tfolio

of a

ctiv

ities

and

•Fi

nanc

ial a

nd s

taff

inpu

tsby

CP

out

com

ean

d in

stru

men

t

Annex C

62

CR

ITER

IAM

AIN

QU

ESTI

ON

SSU

B Q

UES

TIO

NS

/ TA

SKS

•Ju

stifi

catio

n fo

r act

iviti

es a

nd in

stru

men

tsby

out

com

e•

Mai

nstre

am g

ende

r?•

Mai

nstre

am e

nviro

nmen

t?

•

Mai

nstre

ampo

verty

?•

Mai

nstre

am H

IV/A

IDS

•H

arm

onis

ed w

ith o

ther

dono

rs?

•

Cro

ss-c

uttin

g rig

hts-

base

d ap

proa

ch?

•

Gov

ernm

ento

wne

rshi

p?

•C

ivil

soci

ety

owne

rshi

p?•

Bala

nce

betw

een

govt

.and

CS?

inst

rum

ents

did

DFI

D im

plem

ent?

•

How

did

DFI

D a

ppro

pria

tely

bal

ance

its

supp

ort f

orgo

vern

men

t and

civ

ilso

ciet

y?•

How

did

it im

plem

entt

he c

ross

-cut

ting

issu

es o

f gen

der,

pove

rty, H

IV/A

IDS

and

envi

ronm

ent?

•M

& E

ofi

nitia

tives

and

inst

rum

ents

? 3

. PR

OG

RA

MM

E EF

FEC

TIVE

NES

S: w

hat h

as th

e pr

ogra

mm

e ac

hiev

ed?• • • • • • •

3.1

Res

ults

•To

wha

t ext

enth

ave

proj

ect l

evel

obje

ctiv

es b

een

achi

eved

/ are

ontra

ck a

t pro

ject

outp

utan

d pu

rpos

e le

vel?

•W

hat i

nflu

ence

has

been

achi

eved

? •

Has

DFI

D a

dvan

ced

harm

onis

atio

n?

•H

owef

fect

ive

have

diff

eren

taid

in

stru

men

tsbe

en a

s de

velo

pmen

tin

stru

men

ts?

•Ar

e th

ese

resu

lts s

usta

inab

le?

•

Equi

ty

• • • • • • • •

3.2

CP

outc

omes

:•

Wha

tpro

gres

s ha

s be

en m

ade

tow

ards

eac

h (C

P)st

rate

gic

outc

ome?

•Is

this

pro

gres

s su

stai

nabl

e?•

Wha

t has

been

DFI

Ds

cont

ribut

ion?

•

3.3

CP

purp

ose

and

goal

•W

hatp

rogr

ess

has

been

mad

e•

Supp

ort i

mpl

emen

tatio

nof

PR

S

Annex C

63

CR

ITER

IAM

AIN

QU

ESTI

ON

SSU

B Q

UES

TIO

NS

/ TA

SKS

•St

ate

and

soci

ety

wor

kto

geth

erto

achi

eve

sust

aina

ble

pove

rtyre

duct

ion

tow

ards

the

CP

pur

pose

and

goa

l?

•Tr

ansf

orm

atio

n w

ithin

pub

lic s

ervi

ce

•C

ontri

butio

n to

PSA,

SD

A a

nd D

DP

(gen

eral

) 3.

4 D

FID

corp

orat

e ob

ject

ives

•W

hatc

ontri

butio

n ha

s th

e pr

ogra

mm

em

ade

toth

e P

SA

and

DD

P?

•

4.

DEV

ELO

PMEN

T PR

OG

RES

S: w

hatd

evel

opm

ent p

rogr

ess

has

been

ach

ieve

d in

Moz

ambi

que?

•Ec

onom

ic a

nd d

evel

opm

entp

rogr

ess

4.1

Dev

elop

men

t pro

gres

s20

00 –

200

4 •

Wha

tove

rall

prog

ress

has

been

mad

eto

war

ds th

e M

DG

’s e

tc.?

•

Wha

t has

been

the

cont

ribut

ion

ofth

e de

velo

pmen

t ass

ista

nce?

•

Con

tribu

tion

ofde

velo

pmen

t ass

ista

nce?

5. C

ON

CLU

SIO

NS,

LES

SON

S A

ND

ISSU

ES5.

1 D

FID

cont

ribut

ion

and

valu

e ad

ded

•W

hat h

asbe

en D

FID

s ov

eral

l val

ue a

dded

/con

tribu

tion?

5.2

Stre

ngth

s an

dw

eakn

esse

sof

DFI

Dpr

ogra

mm

e•

Wha

t hav

e be

en th

e st

reng

ths

ofth

e D

FID

prog

ram

me?

•W

hat h

ave

been

its

wea

knes

ses?

5.3

Exp

lana

tory

fact

ors

•W

hat e

xpla

ins

DFI

Ds

cont

ribut

ion

and

the

stre

ngth

s/w

eakn

esse

sof

the

prog

ram

me?

5.4

Issu

esan

dle

sson

s•

Wha

t les

sons

can

bele

arne

d fo

rthe

Reg

iona

l Pro

gram

me

(Stra

tegy

?),D

FID

and

don

ors?

•W

hat i

ssue

s of

wid

er in

tere

st(P

RS

&BS

) are

rais

ed b

y th

e M

ozam

biqu

e ex

perie

nce?

Annex D Bibliography

Arndt,C. (2003) HIV/AIDS, Human Capital and Economic Growth Prospects for.Mozambique,Africa Region Working Paper Series 48, World Bank

Appraisal of the Potential for a Community Land Registration, Negotiation and PlanningSupport Programme in Mozambique. CTC Consulting August 2003. DFID

Austral Consultoria e Projectctos, Lda (2005) Evaluation Study of the Implementation of theDrought and Mitigation Action Plan for Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane Provinces, January 2005,Maputo: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development National Directorate of Agriculture,Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition.

Barnett, T and Whiteside, A, (2002) AIDS in the Twenty-first Century, Palgrave Macmillan.

British High Commission Maputo (2001) Information on Floods 2000 Execution, 9 May 2001.

Conlay Tom, Lockwood Harold, Orglvie Martin (2001) Mozambique Flooding Emergency 2001,Report of a review Mission : 16 to 26 May 2001.

Costa, J. Bergstrom, S., Hamalainen, R., Hellstrom, P. (2006). Provincial study to evaluate theapproaches to supporting health sector development at provincial level. Mozambique 2001-2005. Maputo: Stakes.

CSSM (2006) for Economic and political governance in Mozambique Background paper foradvisory Board The Nature and Scope of Governance Activities to be Supported 27 Feb 2006.

DFID (1998) Mozambique: Country Strategy Paper 1998, London: DFID, October

DFID (2002) Managing fiduciary risk when providing direct budget support, London:

DFID (2002) DFID Service Delivery Agreement 2003–2006, London: DFID

DFID (2003 ) Department for internal Development Project Memorandum: Labour IntensiveRoad Programme to Mitigate the Impact of Drought, Mozambique January 2003

DFID (2003) Africa ADP Review, London: DFID

DFID, (2003) CAP evaluation Matrix (2002-2006) Maputo

DFID (2004) Memorandum of Understanding between DFID and the Netherlands Minister forDevelopment Co-operation concerning the Support to the Electoral Observatory, Maputo:DFIDM

DFID (2004) Mozambique Country Assistance Plan 2003/04 – 2005/06, London:

DFID (2004) Poverty Reduction Budget Support, a DFID policy paper, London:

DFID (2004) Managing fiduciary risk when providing PRBS, Briefing of 22 September 2004,London: DFID

Annex D

65

DFID (2004) Evaluation Framework for General Budget Support, February 2004, London:

DFID (2004) Partnerships for poverty reduction: changing aid ‘conditionality’, a draft policypaper for comment, September 2004, London:

DFID (2004) Political economy of the budget in Mozambique, December 2004, Maputo

DFID (2005) Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support, Mozambique Final Country Report,(Draft), January 2005.

DFID (2005) Summary of UK Development Program – 2004 to 2007

DFID (2005) Partnerships for poverty reduction: rethinking conditionality, a UK policy paper,London:

DFID (2005) DFID Mozambique HIV and AIDS strategic framework (internaldocument),Maputo:

DFID (2005) PROJECT MEMORANDUM Establishment of a Community Land Use Fund(Fundo de Terra para Uso Comunitário) in Mozambique, Final.

DFID (2006) DFID Support to Civil Society, Maputo: DFIDM, March

DFID (2006) Design of a Civil Society Support Mechanism for Economic and PoliticalGovernance in Mozambique, Vision, Objectives and Basics of the Operational Arrangements:Background Paper for the Advisory Board, Maputo: DFIDM, March

DNR, ADE, BAASTEL, ECO, and NCG (2004) Mozambique Country Study: Joint Evaluation ofEffectiveness and Impact of the Enabling Development Policy of the World Food Programme(WFP), Volume 1, December

Emeralda, M., Marino, Sc, Martel, P., (2004) Evaluation of the Integrated SupplementaryFeeding Programme Mozambique: Unicef/World Food Programme in collaboration with theMinistry of Health, June

EISA (2005) Consolidating Democracy through Enhancing through Capacity of andPartnerships between Key Stakeholders in Mozambique, EISA Mozambique Activity Report:Final Report, July 2004-March 2005

EISA (2006) Programme to Consolidate Democracy by Enhancing the Capacity of andPartnerships between Key Mozambique Stakeholders, Mission Report, 13 and 15, February.

European Commission (2005) Assessment of Public Financial Management in Mozambique2004/05, draft final report, December 2005, Maputo: EC

Evaluating Co-ordination and Complementarity of Country Strategy Papers with NationalDevelopment Priorities. Mozambique Desk Study. Final Draft October 2005.

Examining access to natural resources and linkages to sustainable livelihoods A case study ofMozambique. Simon Norfolk 2004. FAO

Annex D

66

FAO (2003) Rehabilitation of Family Agriculture in the Districts Affected by Floods in TheCentral Provinces of Manica and Sofala Final Report ,Mozambique, JulyFoster, M (2004) Linking budget support to progress towards education MDGs and EFA goals,draft report October 2004

GTZ (2005) PRSPs in Africa: Parliaments and Economic Policy Performance, Eschborn: GTZ

G20 (2004) Fighting the Causes of Poverty, Annual Poverty Report 2004

G20 (2005) Programme and Budget for the Secretariat of the Group of Mozambican civilSociety Organisation May 2005

IMF 2003 Mozambique - Joint Staff Assessment of PRSP – Progress Report, Washington

IMF (2004) Mozambique – Joint Staff Assessment of PRSP – Progress Report, Washington

IMF (2005) Mozambique – Joint Staff Assessment of PRSP – Progress Report, Washington

Compton, J. (2006) Storylines (1999-2004) – Mozambique CPE, March, London: DFID

Langa, I., (2004) ANE Drought Mitigation in Rural Areas of Mozambique, Study visit to Malawifinanced by DFID, 14-20 March 2004

Martinez, J., Pearson, M., Rossetti, C. (2005). Review of Health Progress in Mozambique2000-2004. Maputo: DFIDM and Finnida

McGee, R. and Taimo, N. (2001) Civil Society participation in the PARPA process, Consultancyfor DFID/CA: Mozambique, 23-30 October 2001, Briefing NoteMONASO(2005) Support to Monaso’s Five Year Strategic Plan 12 May 2005

Moyana Salomao (2005) Political Analysis of Mozambique Final Report 5 October 2005

Rakner, L et al. (2004) The budget as theatre – The forma land informal institutional makingsof the budget process in Malawi, Lilongwe : DFID Malawi Office

Republica de Moçambique (2006) Iniciativa Presidencial de Combate ao HIV/SIDA – Encontro com as Associações Femininas: Maputo, 16 de Fevereiro de 2006

Republica de Moçambique (2006) Iniciativa Presidencial de Combate ao HIV/SIDA - Encontrocom Empresarios: Maputo, 16 de Fevereiro de 2006

Republica de Moçambique (2006) Iniciativa Presidencial de Combate ao HIV/SIDA - Encontrocom Lideres Comunitarios: Maputo, 16 de Fevereiro de 2006

Republica de Moçambique (2006) Iniciativa Presidencial de Combate ao HIV/SIDA - Encontrocom Entidades Religiosas: Maputo, 16 de Fevereiro de 2006

Republica de Moçambique (2006) Iniciativa Presidencial de Combate ao HIV/SIDA - Encontrocom Juventude: Maputo, 16 de Fevereiro de 2006

Republic of Mozambique (2004) Agenda 2025. Prepared with technical assistance from UNDP

Annex D

67

Republic of Mozambique (April 2001), Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (2001-2005), (PARPA), (Strategy Document for the Reduction of Poverty and Promotion of EconomicGrowth), Final Version Approved by the Council of Ministers.

Review of the Mine Action Project in Zambezia Province, Mozambique. Nov 1993 – March2003. DFID

Review of DFID’s Contribution to PROAGRI and proposals for future Support. Whiteside, Mand Steve Asley (2002).

Republic of Mozambique (2005) Report on the Millennium Development Goals, August

The Carter Centre (2004) Mozambique Elections 2003-2004: Narrative Report: Maputo, 31January

Tom Kelly (2003) Hunger and Vulnerability in Southern Africa: A Regional Strategy Paper,DFID: Southern Africa, 25 August

UNDP (2000) International Reconstruction Conference, Rome, 3-4 May

WFP (2001) Emergency Food Assistance to Flood Victims in Southern and CentralMozambique: 2001 Standardised Project Report. Mozambique

UNDP (2000) Mozambique Common Country Assessment 2000

WFP (2001) Air Deliveries and Support to Flood Victims: 2001 Standardised Project Report.Mozambique

WFP (2001) Food Assistance to Flood Victims in Mozambique: 2001 Standardised ProjectReport

WFP (2006) Update on Food Security Assistance, 1 March, Mozambique

World Bank Maputo (2004) Support to HIV/AIDS ADVISER, Maputo 10 June 2004

World Bank (2003) Mozambique Country Assistance Strategy, Washington :

Annex D

68

Annex E

69

Ann

ex E

: Moz

ambi

que

and

DFI

D T

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& b

efor

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1998

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7.5%

1998

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rate

(15-

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8.

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plet

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Annex E

70

1 999

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Annex F

71

Annex F: Programme expenditure

The following results were informally collected from a Meeting of Heads ofCooperation. Thursday 23rd Feb. by the CPE team.

Table 1: Estimation of Current Aid Contribution by Instrument (%)

Development Partner

GBS SBS Area Based Programmes

Projects TA PS CS

1. UK 65 15 0 01/ 10 5 5

2. Denmark 20-25 70 (50)1/ 7-8 5 10

3. Ireland 20 42 5 25 0 3 5

4. Swiss 30 20 20 10 10

5. Canada 5 40-50 3 40 2

6. Germany 33 45 (40-50) 1/ 33 1-2 8

7. Belgium 50 33 17

8. Finland 25 50 15 10

9. France 25 10 5 45 10

10. Sweden 25 18 46 3 8

11. World Bank 40 No data provided

GBS= General Budget Support; SBS= Sector Budget Support; TA=Technical Assistance; PS=PrivateSector; CS= Civil Society/NGOs1/ Part of SBS

At the same meeting, DPs were assed to assess the relative importance ofdifferent sources of influence on their country programme

Table 2: Estimation of Relative Influence of Certain Factors on Country Programme (Rank)

Development Partner HQ Public Opinion Country

Office Host Govt Other

Donors

1. UK 3 4 2 1 5

2. Ireland 1 3 2 4= 4=

3. Swiss 2 - 3 1 5

4. Canada1/ 1= 1= 4 3 5

5. Germany 1= 5 1= 1= 4

6. Belgium 1 2 4 4 3

7. Finland 1 5 2 3 4

8. France 1 4 5 2 3

9. Sweden 3 4 1 2= 2=

10. World Bank 2= 2= 3 1 4 1/ Canada usefully added ‘international aid trends (DAC/MDGs) and ranked this 2nd.

Annex F

72

DFID Portfolio Tables: Analysis by Sector Grouping and Year

Table 1 Commitment in £ '000s by Theme

Theme 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 ? Grand TotalAgric / NR 7753 3000 50 179 424 261 2095 600 14362Budget Support 40550 325 8000 80300 30020 159195Demand Gov 237 416 300 120 1235 890 3198Education 80 1958 618 3433 6089Flood & Emerg 18414 1843 85 20342Health 1433 27945 400 8580 38358HIV 2000 250 24095 2133 28478Infrastructure 9845 100 975 450 11370Pub Sec Ref 1858 220 2362 14220 3560 22220Water 250 1639 2139 4028Private Sector 2077 4500 1110 7687Drought/Food Sec 1656 235 1891Planning 335 335Post Conflict 3908 3908

Grand Total 3908 7753 8747 104108 30530 5503 26845 86081 47386 600 321461

Table 2 Percentage of Commitment by ThemeTheme 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Grand Total

Agric / NR 100% 34% 0% 3% 2% 0% 4% 4%Budget Support 39% 1% 30% 93% 63% 50%Demand Gov 3% 0% 1% 2% 5% 2% 1%Education 0% 6% 11% 7% 2%Flood & Emerg 18% 6% 2% 6%Health 16% 27% 0% 18% 12%HIV 23% 0% 79% 5% 9%Infrastructure 9% 0% 4% 1% 4%Pub Sec Ref 2% 1% 43% 53% 4% 7%Water 0% 5% 39% 1%Private Sector 24% 4% 1% 2%Drought/Food Sec 6% 0% 1%Planning 1% 0%Post Conflict 100% 1%Grand Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Table 3 Risk Status by ThemeTheme High Medium Low Not Stated Grand Total

Agric / NR 33% 22% 33% 100%Budget Support 20% 40% 40% 100%Demand Gov 31% 38% 31% 100%Education 17% 33% 50% 100%Flood & Emerg 5% 95% 100%Health 71% 29% 100%HIV 43% 29% 14% 100%Infrastructure 29% 43% 29% 100%Pub Sec Ref 29% 43% 14% 14% 100%Water 67% 33% 100%Private Sector 100% 100%Drought/Food Sec 75% 25% 100%

Grand Total 8% 24% 19% 46% 100%

Year

Annex F

73

Table 4 Percentage of Committed funds by Sector and Instrument

InstrumentTheme ABP BS Project Study SWAp TC Grand Total

Agric / NR 53% 25% 21% 100%Budget Support 100% 0% 0% 100%Demand Gov 72% 2% 17% 100%Education 19% 56% 23% 100%Flood & Emerg 99% 1% 100%Health 32% 64% 4% 100%HIV 53% 47% 100%Infrastructure 92% 7% 100%Pub Sec Ref 91% 9% 100%Water 100% 100%Private Sector 100% 100%Drought/Food Sec 100% 100%Planning 100% 100%Post Conflict 100% 100%Poverty Analysis 68% 32% 100%Grand Total 2% 49% 32% 0% 10% 6% 100%

Table 5 Percentage of Committed funds by Year and InstrumentYear

Instrument 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Grand TotalABP 100% 2%BS 39% 30% 93% 63% 49%Project 100% 47% 37% 49% 67% 68% 6% 29% 32%Study 0% 2% 0%SWAp 34% 24% 7% 10%TC 19% 1% 51% 26% 1% 1% 0% 6%(blank) 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 0%Grand Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

Table 6 Count of Projects by ThemeYear

Theme 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 ? Grand TotalAgric / NR 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 9Budget Support 3 2 1 2 2 10Demand Gov 1 2 2 1 4 3 13Education 1 3 1 1 6Flood & Emerg 33 4 1 38Health 1 4 1 1 7HIV 1 1 2 3 7Infrastructure 3 1 2 1 7Pub Sec Ref 3 1 2 3 5 14Water 1 1 1 3Private Sector 1 1 1 3Drought/Food Sec 3 1 4Planning 1 1Post Conflict 1 1Grand Total 1 1 6 52 17 7 15 11 12 1 123

Table 7 Count of Projects by Stage of CompletionTheme Complete Operational Planned Grand Total

Agric / NR 6 3 9Budget Support 6 4 10Demand Gov 6 6 1 13Education 4 2 6Flood & Emerg 36 2 38Health 3 4 7HIV 2 5 7Infrastructure 5 2 7Pub Sec Ref 9 5 14Water 1 2 3Private Sector 3 3Drought/Food Sec 1 3 4Planning 1 1Post Conflict 1Grand Total 79 42 1 123

Annex F

74

Table 8 Amount of DFIDM Commitment by Year by Sector and Project(note these figures are not the actual expenditures, which may be quite different) DFID office opened

Year (£ '000) July 2001Theme Project Title 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 ? Grand TotalAgric / NR Agricultural sector public expenditure programme (PROAGRi) 1900 1900

Community Action on Rights 179 179Community Land Use Fund 2095 2095Improving the Lives of Poor Small Farmers CSCF 264 261 261Mocuba Agricultural Training School (MATS) 600 600ORAM/CA Advocacy and Land Rights Project 50 50Smallholder Rights Development in Maputo Province CSCF 243 424 424Support the Agricultural Sector Public Expend Prog (PROAGRI) 1100 1100Zambezia Agricultural Development Project (ZADP) Phase II 7753 7753

Agric / NR Total 7753 3000 50 179 424 261 2095 600 14362Budget Support 100 % Debt Relief Policy 8000 8000

2000/03 Programme Aid - Grant 40000 400002000/03 Programme Aid- TC Grant 300 30098/99 Programme Aid 300 300Budget Support 80000 80000Budget Support 2003/4 - 2005/6 300 300Expenditure Tracking Surveys 25 25Multilateral Debt Relief 30000 30000Poverty Reduction Older People 250 250Support to Communication Post in the PARPA Secretariat 20 20

Budget Support Total 40550 325 8000 80300 30020 159195Demand Gov 1999 Elections Observations 237 237

Agenda 2025 55 55Civil Society for Governance 250 250Civil Society Participation in the Poverty Reduction Paper 50 50Community Participation CSCF43 170 170Consolidating Democracy 450 450Electoral Observation Assistance 750 750Institutional Strengthening Project 250 250Poverty and Social Impact Analysis pilot study 120 120Pro-poor political changes in Mozambique 100 100Support to G20 190 190Support to LINK 330 330Sustainable Development Programme Niassa province CSCF 55 246 246

Demand Gov Total 237 416 300 120 1235 890 3198Education Education Sector Common Fund 3433 3433

Mined Financial Management 80 80Mozambique Open and Distance Learning - FA 158 158Mozambique Open and Distance Learning - TC 1400 1400Support to Secondary Education 400 400The Secondary Education by Distance Education - 618 618

Education Total 80 1958 618 3433 6089Flood & Emerg Agricultural water supply - Floods (R1393) 100 100

Assessment Mission 170 170Control of Cholera Outbreak 33 33Emergency Response Team Contingency Planning Mozambique 245 245Floods (R1393) 15366 15366Floods (R1393) water & sanitation 50 50Food Chrisis Consultancy 85 85Gaza assistance - Floods (R1393) 350 350IFRCS Appeal for Mozambique 250 250Local Govt Admin - Floods (R1393) 2000 2000Mozambique Floods: Food for the Hungry Appeal 160 160Support to WFP Operations: Floods 1288 1288UN Inter-Agency Appeal: Floods 145 145Water Rehailitation - Floods (R1393) 100 100

Flood & Emerg Total 18414 1843 85 20342Health Essential Medicines 25000 25000

Insecticide Treated Nets (ITN) Roll Out 8580 8580Malaria Bridging Project 400 400Malaria Prevention and Treatment in Zambezia Province 2545 2545National Health Plan - FA 400 400National Health Plan - TC 1433 1433

Health Total 1433 27945 400 8580 38358HIV HIV/AIDS and Maternal Health Programe - FA 10750 10750

HIV/AIDS and Maternal Health Programme - TC 13345 13345Monaso's Strategic Plan 1650 1650National AIDS Council 250 250Social Marketing of Condoms (PSI) 2000 2000Support to UNAIDS 320 320

Infrastructure ANE-DER (tc) 30 30Decentralisation of Roads Maintenance 100 100Enabling Env for the mngmnt of regional roads ANE-DER (fa) 945 945National Roads Programme: Mozambique Floods 2500 2500Post floods Reconstruction of Roads Links (EN1) - FA 7000 7000Post-floods Reconstruction of Roads Links (ENT) - TC 345 345Transport Specialist 450 450

Infrastructure Total 9845 100 975 450 11370Pub Sec Ref Decentralised Planning CSCF 54 250 250

Direct Tax Reform FA 936 936Direct Tax Reform TC 1426 1426Integ of Reformed Dir Tax Dpt 1230 1230Integ of Reformed Direct Tax Dpt 1680 1680Integration of Reformed Customs 300 300Integration of Reformed Customs into Revenue Authority 2220 2220Public Sector Reform 6000 6000Reform Process OF National Directorate of Taxes and Audit 50 50Strengthening Planning and Budgeting Project (DNPO) - FA 1518 1518Strengthening Planning and Budgeting Project (DNPO) - TC 90 90Support to Reforms (FA) 6000 6000Support to Reforms (TC) 300 300Support to the development of Public Service Reform UTRESP 220 220

Pub Sec Ref Total 1858 220 2362 14220 3560 22220Water Rural Water Supply & Sanitation Programme (RWSSP) - FA 2139 2139

Rural Water Supply & Sanitation Programme (RWSSP) - TC 1639 1639Water & Sanitation CSCF 7 250 250

Water Total 250 1639 2139 4028Private Sector CRESCE Mozambique 2077 2077

Mozambique (PoDE) 4500 4500Mozambique Banking System 1110 1110

Private Sector Total 2077 4500 1110 7687Drought/Food Sec Droughts Road Programme 1053 1053

Mozambique drought: Seed Fair 603 603Seed Fairs 2005-06 235 235

Drought/Food Sec Total 1656 235 1891Planning Poverty Analysis & Training 335 335Planning Total 335 335Post Conflict Demining in Mozambique: HALO Trust 3908 3908Post Conflict Total 3908 3908Grand Total 3908 7753 8747 104108 30530 5503 26845 86081 47386 600 321461

Prin

ted

& S

uppl

ied

by J

ohn

McC

orm

ick

& C

o. L

td.

Tel:

0141

-429

422

2 R

ef: 6

2911

DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

DFID, the Department for International Development: leading the Britishgovernment’s fight against world poverty.

One in five people in the world today, over 1 billion people, live in poverty onless than one dollar a day. In an increasingly interdependent world, manyproblems – like conflict, crime, pollution and diseases such as HIV and AIDS –are caused or made worse by poverty.

DFID supports long-term programmes to help tackle the underlying causes ofpoverty. DFID also responds to emergencies, both natural and man-made.

DFID’s work forms part of a global promise to

• halve the number of people living in extreme poverty and hunger• ensure that all children receive primary education• promote sexual equality and give women a stronger voice• reduce child death rates• improve the health of mothers• combat HIV and AIDS, malaria and other diseases• make sure the environment is protected• build a global partnership for those working in development.

Together, these form the United Nations’ eight ‘Millennium DevelopmentGoals’, with a 2015 deadline. Each of these Goals has its own, measurable,targets.

DFID works in partnership with governments, civil society, the private sectorand others. It also works with multilateral institutions, including the WorldBank, United Nations agencies and the European Commission.

DFID works directly in over 150 countries worldwide, with a budget of some£4.6 billion in 2005. Its headquarters are in London and East Kilbride, nearGlasgow.

DFID1 Palace Street London SW1E 5HE

and at:

DFID Abercrombie HouseEaglesham RoadEast KilbrideGlasgow G75 8EA

Switchboard: 020 7023 0000 Fax: 020 7023 0016Website: www.dfid.gov.ukEmail: [email protected] Enquiry Point: 0845 300 4100From overseas: + 44 1355 84 3132ISBN: 1 86192 825 4

evaluation of dfid country programmes - country … · evaluation of dfid country programmes...

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