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ART ICLE

Time for member stateled strategic

partnerships

Timothy Stafford

Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies 2014

Abstract Europe needs to revise its focus on partnerships in the wake of the

political turmoil in Ukraine and the end of combat operations in Afghanistan.

Doing so will require a root and branch review of existing approaches alongside

internal European debates. In particular, Europe needs to prepare itself for an era

in which its key partners will be non-European states. By renewing andstrengthening ties with long-standing, enthusiastic, necessary and unavoidable

partners, Europe can maintain peace and security within its theatre. However,

Europe will be most successful in this regard if it devolves responsibility for key

strategic partnerships to individual member states.

Keywords Europe Partnerships Defence Security European Union NATO

Introduction

In the two decades since the Cold War, Europe has proven remarkably active in

its pursuit of external partnerships. Association Agreements emerged as the

primary means by which to prepare Central and Eastern European countries for

EU membership. Likewise, NATO expanded to absorb the countries of the former

Eastern Bloc, as well as the Baltic states, themselves former Soviet republics.

Following such formal enlargement, Europe continued its efforts, establishing

The author writes in an individual capacity, and his comments should not be seen as reflecting the

institutional position of any organisation.

T. Stafford (&)

61 Whitehall, London SW1A 2ET, UK

e-mail: [email protected]

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DOI 10.1007/s12290-014-0332-4


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formal mechanisms to govern its ties with non-members in peripheral regions.

Through its Neighbourhood Policy, the Barcelona process and the Eastern

Partnership, the EU moved to foster a more favourable regional environment.

Such moves built upon NATOs initiation of the Partnership for Peace

programme, which established associate member status for non-NATO mem-bers. This move was of particular relevance after 2001, as it provided a structure

which enabled these states to participate in NATO operations in Afghanistan.

Collectively, these efforts were indicative of a buoyant self-confidence and of

evidence that policymakers were succeeding in their efforts to construct a

Europe, whole free and at peace (Washington Post 2012). Not only would the

Cold Warera divisions within Europe be eliminated, but so too would the threat

of external challenges, something which the Soviet Union had embodied before

the end of the Cold War.

From confidence to nervousness

Europe now finds itself at a very different juncture. Efforts to consolidate Central

and Eastern Europe into the broader European construct have proved largely

successful. Accordingly, the focal point of the EUs outreach efforts has shifted to

areas that are in many ways less Europeanwhere support for integration into

European political structures is partial, qualified and less intense. By definition,

the prospects for success in these regions are less promising. This has been seenmost vividly in Ukraine, where the EUs efforts to secure an Association

Agreement with the country not only prompted an aggressive reaction from

Russia, but vehement opposition from Ukrainians in the east of the country, who

consider alignment with Moscow to offer greater benefits than alignment with

Brussels. At the same time, the glue that has bound together many NATO

partnershipsnamely the 13-year mission to Afghanistanis drawing to a close.

As a result, many have begun to question the basis upon which future NATO-

partner relations will rest.

These developments demand root and branch reassessments of Europes

strategic partnerships. What are such partnerships for? Who should these

partners be? How should these partnerships be pursued? Does the EU need to

empower the Common Foreign and Security Policy through an expanded

External Action Service and the centralisation of foreign policy decision-making

in Brussels, similar to the manner in which it has acquired control of member

states fiscal policies? Or, given diminished support for centralisation, can the EU

as an institution do more with less, by establishing priorities that the member

states implement themselves?

These ought to be key questions for current officials. Unfortunately, the

Europe of today is ill-equipped to address these particular challenges. At an

individual level, incoming EU commissionersas well as incoming NATO

Secretary General Jens Stoltenbergwill spend their first few months in office

getting up to speed with their existing briefs. Accordingly, there is a danger that

the inertia this causes will result in a postponement of the kind of reassessment


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that is required. More importantly, Europe as a whole is beset by an array of

economic challenges that are draining attention away from a much-needed

focus on neighbourhood and partnership issues. The crisis in the eurozone has

divided prospering countries in northern Europe from their struggling southern

counterparts. Indeed, the gulf is so great that some have spoken openly of theirdesire for greater economic problems in Germany so as to restore unity on key

economic issues (Niblett 2014). For a continent that prides itself on harmoni-

sation the resolution of such divisions must be prioritised. As a result, the focus

on internal European problems is likely to crowd out any focus on how Europe

approaches its immediate neighbourhood, not to mention the wider world.

Allowing internal problems to become the focus for Europe would be a

tremendous mistake. Only by addressing risks and challenges beyond its borders

can Europe maintain the long-term peace and harmony it has sought to

cultivate. Underlying this reality is the unavoidable fact that Europe remains onthe frontline of most major global security challenges: lawlessness and

extremism in North Africa and the Sahel, geopolitical polarisation in Ukraine,

and terrorism emanating from the Middle East. Speaking off the record, one

American official recently noted that these security challenges are likely to hit

Europe first, the United States second, and Asia third. Europe, therefore, has no

choice but to look out as well as in. This, though, will require long-standing

habits to be set aside. For the last two decades, the focus of most European

nations foreign policies has been on resolving outstanding divisions within the

European theatre. Those days are now past. To succeed in the next two decades,Europe will need to shift its focus from regional issues to global ones.

How best to undertake this shift? While there is a natural temptation to

centralise in the face of any new challenge, the counter-intuitive approach is

more appropriate. Europe will enjoy the most success if it restricts itself to

identifying general continental objectives, whilst letting individual member

states take the lead in establishing partnerships that are of critical importance to

them. This approach would enable each country to utilise its comparative

advantage, whilst still working towards an overall goal that benefits Europe as a

whole. The best way to do this would be to conceptualise European partnerships

as falling within one of four categories: relations with long-standing partners,

relations with enthusiastic partners, relations with necessary partners and

relations with unavoidable partners.

Long-standing partners

Primarily, Europe must strive to consolidate and maintain ties with its long-

standing partners, above all, the US. This ought to be a straightforward task. The

US remains bound to Europepolitically, militarily, culturally and institutionally.

For all the nervous talk of the US pivot towards Asia that has swept through

European capitals in recent years, senior American officials have repeatedly

offered reassurances that Europe remains the partner of first resort (Bumiller

and Erlanger2012), and partner of choice for military operations and diplomacy

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around the world (Bumiller and Erlanger 2012). That is not to say that caution

must not be taken to preserve the health of the relationship. To maintain

harmonious ties, European nations must take into account the exasperation that

lies behind the USs repeated insistence that they spend more on defence

capabilities. Likewise, European states would be well advised to temperexcessive criticism of American intelligence gathering efforts (Gude et al.

2014), given the activities that European member states also undertake in this

area (Sharkov 2014). Nevertheless, this years developments in Ukraine have

brought the US and Europe even closer together, suggesting that the

fundamental commonalities that underpin the transatlantic partnership remain

strong.

How then, can relations best be maintained? Here, Europe can succeed by

devolving responsibilityalbeit informallyto a state that enjoys historically

close ties with the US. For instance, no other country in Europe enjoys the samereception, regard and trust in Washington that are afforded to the UK. A

common history, language and outlook bind the two nations together in a

special relationship in a way that no EU regulation or initiative could replicate.

Therefore, it makes sense to give primary responsibility for managing the EUs

relationship with the US to the UK. This might prove anathema in countries such

as France and Germany, which regard themselves as having comparable

international standing by virtue of their membership of the UN Security Council

and G8. However, there are tremendous benefits to empowering the UK with a

semi-formal role as the EUs primary liaison with Washington. First, it wouldstrengthen the EUs ability to introduce its priorities into the American discourse,

whether they be demands for more assertive action on climate change, greater

stabilisation of the American financial sector or better resourcing of US aid

commitments. The UK is well suited to acting as the EUs voice in this regard.

Second, recognising the UKs unique advantages would go some way to quelling

the sharp rise in Euroscepticism that has brought London to the brink of EU

withdrawal, with British Prime Minister David Cameron pledging a referendum

on membership should the Conservative Party win next years parliamentary

elections.

How would such an arrangement work in practice? Primarily members of the

External Action Service could be brought into the British embassy, providing a

strong European dimension to the UKs bilateral relationship. Equally, EU issues

and priorities would form part of the agenda at UKUS summits. Likewise, UK

personnel could be given the leadership role in all legal or political negotiations

between the EU and the US, be they over the provision of passenger data to

airlines, trade negotiations or agreeing joint positions ahead of G20 summit

meetings.

Enthusiastic partners

A difficult balance must be established with those countries thatwantto be part

of the broader European construct but remain partially locked within Russias


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sphere of influence. Here, the future of Ukraine poses the most vexing question.

That there is a greater desire within Ukraine for partnership with Europe than

with Russia is indisputable, and Europe should not permit Russia a veto over the

countrys future alignment. At the same time, Europe must not make the mistake

of believing that the future orientation of Ukraine can be decided upon amajoritarian basis, or that integrating states that Russia sees as falling within its

sphere of influence can be done without cost (Harding 2014).

In this instance, European governments have been overly simplistic in their

posture, assuming that the only criterion to be applied vis-a-vis partnerships is

whether the country in question seeks a closer relationship. A much broader

awareness, which takes into account the environment in which that state sits, is

desperately required. For this reason, in its dealings with Ukraineand other

countries along Russias bordersEuropean policymakers should heed Henry

Kissingers advice (2014), and never subordinate the strategic element in theirconsiderations.

Establishing a stronger partnership with Ukraine will require more than

ratification of the Association Agreement signed with Kiev. The leading failure of

European states in recent years has not been their inability to present an

attractive vision to Kiev, but their inability to persuade Moscow that including

Ukraine within Europes political family poses no direct threat to Russia. The

successful management of Ukraines place within Europe will therefore require

an enormous effort to reassure interlocutors. Such an effort cannot simply come

in the form of affirmations of goodwill, but rather from tangible moves, such asthe removal of the sanctions applied this summer. It is therefore disappointing

that European states are reducing their level of engagement at a time when an

increase is needed. Europe must also take steps to ensure that enthusiasm for

integration does not get out of hand. There can be no doubting that Kievs

heavy-handed approach to militants in its eastern territory has damaged

Europes relations with Russia more than was necessary (USA Today2014). Thus

the essence of strategic partnerships requires that more should be done to avert

actions that are likely to destabilise EastWest ties.

How can this be achieved in practice? Again, the EU should move to work

through its member states, rather than seek to manage the outstanding issues

from Brussels. For instance, Finland has a wealth of experience of managing

relations with Russia from its time as a neighbour of the former Soviet Union.

Likewise, Norway has made great progress towards establishing better relations

with Russia, due both to its shared border and to common interest in

cooperating in the Arctic Ocean. Both countries should be invited to lead talks

on behalf of the high representativeinvolving Ukraine and Russia, so that

some progress can be made towards defusing tensions through the provision of

best practice. Such talks should also receive regular input from the Baltic States,

Poland and other former Eastern Bloc states. Devolving responsibility for Eastern

Partnership states to those states that have the greatest tradition of engaging in

diplomacy with Russia would make Europes involvement in its eastern

neighbourhood less cumbersome, whilst minimising any loss of expertise.

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Necessary partners

Perhaps the most important of all in the long term will be Europes relations with

necessary partners. This criteria should be seen to encompass those states with

whom Europe does not necessarily share values or geography, but whoseinterests overlap. The states of North Africa fit into this dynamic. None hold any

hope of becoming EU or NATO members. However, all have an essential role to

play if Europes security is to be preserved. As noted, tensions and volatility

along the coast of the Mediterranean will only exacerbate large-scale immigra-

tion, leaving France, Italy and other European nations open to significant

political pressures (Traynor and Hooper2011). The damage such developments

could cause is significant, especially if such states feel that their priorities are not

being adequately considered in Brussels. Thus it is vital that more be done to

strengthen efforts to bring state-building expertise and prosperity to NorthAfrica, under the guise of the Union for the Mediterranean. Here, primary

responsibility should be given to states that have the biggest stake in the

prosperity and success of North Africa. For instance, EU-wide decisions about

investment and aid should be devolved to Italy, France and other southern

European nations that have close relations with the governments and peoples of

North Africa. These states have consistently warned that Europe has failed to

focus its attention on Mediterranean issues. Devolving responsibility to them to

take the lead on Europes behalf would give them a chance to show what can be

achieved.In addition, Europe should seek out partners which could contribute to its

security in particular ways. For instance, Israel has emerged as a world leader in

science and technology, and, specifically, mechanisms to resolve cyber insecu-

rities. Greater cooperation on these issues would be well warranted. As a

developed region which lacks the degree of coordination that could be brought

to bear by a single country, it is essential that Europe remains ahead of the

curve in its acquisition of cyber defences. Countries with particular knowledge in

this area, such as Estonia, should be employed to lead the outreach.

Unavoidable partners

Lastly, Europe must engage those states with which partnership, even of the

informal kind, is unavoidable. Here, China will pose the biggest challenge to

Europe in the coming decades. Not only does the health of the Chinese

economy now in part underpin the prosperity of the Western world, but Chinas

place within the world must be carefully managed in order to ensure that its rise

is accommodated without an aggressive attempt to revise the rules of the

game. Here Europes role is somewhat limited, for direct EUChina relations aresignificantly underdeveloped. However, it should be noted that Germany is

ideally placed to lead the EUs efforts to engage China. Both are economic giants

at the heart of their regions. Both are nations that rely heavily on exporting to

ensure their continued growth. Above all, both are nations that are rising


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relative to the states they surround, both in terms of political influence and

economic prosperity. They are therefore natural partners to think through the

challenges of managing turbulent regional relations and international trade

imbalances. Accordingly, Berlin should be given responsibility for leading the

EUs efforts to forge closer and more meaningful ties with China.

Conclusion

By splitting the EUs relations with the world into separate parts, and devolving

responsibility to the states that enjoy a comparative advantage, Europe would

make use of the various advantages afforded it by its extensive membership.

Such a measure might result in a substantial weakening of the office of the high

representative, which would need to be downgraded in status to a coordinatingrole. However, such a move would be best in the long run, as it would empower

the states that are best placed to lead its engagement with the wider world.

Europe has come a long way in the last 20 years, and most of the goals it set for

itself at the end of the Cold War have been achieved. However, it would be a

tremendous mistake to conclude that the policies that have served Europe well

will continue to serve it well in the future.

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Timothy Stafford is a Research Analyst with the Royal United ServicesInstitute, a foreign and defence think tank based in London.
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