Meiji University

　

Title EUの軍備管理と武器禁輸-内部衝突と外部からの影響-

Author(s) 李,永?

Citation 政治学研究論集, 35: 83-103

URL http://hdl.handle.net/10291/17868

Rights

Issue Date 2012-02-29

Text version publisher

Type Departmental Bulletin Paper

DOI

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　https://m-repo.lib.meiji.ac.jp/

政治学研究論集

第35号 2012.2

EU's Arms Control and Arms Embargo

【Abstract】

一一-InternalConflicts and External Influences

EUの軍備管理と武器禁輸

ー一一内部衝突と外部からの影響

博士後期課程政治学専攻 2009年度入学

リ エイシュ

LI Yongshu

China policy has never been a problem to EU before China's rise: during the Cold War East vis-a-

vis West confrontation， attitudes of each camp were set by default. A typical case can be raised as

Tiananmen Incident. In response to the 1989 Tiananmen Incident， East camp showed great sup-

port to the action while West camp condemned it and installed comprehensive embargo against

China. However after the end of the Cold War and accompanied by the rise of China， there have

been increasingly divided opinions among the traditional Western allies on the arms embargo

against China. European Union (EU) has taken a far softer line than the United States (the US)，

and its friendly attitude towards China often unsett1es the US and its allies. Especially in 2004，

European Council suggested to the EU presidency of lifting the arms embargo on China despite the

inherited destabilizing danger in such an action. Although the lifting was not realized， it indicat巴d

the changed attitude of EU and the divergence in transatlantic relation. Oth巴rthan the US， China's

Asian neighbors have also been strongly concerned about the suggestion of lifting the embargo on

China， to whose worries EU did not display much consideration and interest. How and why EU

reached such a decision? What are the in丑uentialfactors to the arms embargo issue? These are the

questions to be examined in this paper.

The methodology of this paper will be first1y discussed， then through an examination to the histo-

ry of EU arms control policy and arms embargo on China，五nalarguments will be that unlike the

US， which changed its strategy towards China after the embargo， EU's China policy appears very

consistent; moreover， after the Cold War EU has no more urg巴tofollow the US foreign policy doc-

論文受付日 2011年10月3日 大学院研究論集委員会承認日 2011年11月9日

- 83-

trine and it enabled EU of pursuing its independent foreign po1icy. In other words， EU wou1d pay

most attention to the interest of its own， rather than others. As there are no interests' con宜ictsbut

mutual benefit between EU and China， EU decided to pursue a pro-China foreign policy. EU wi11

give in the US as well as others' interests as long as it does not provoke retaliation.

【KeyWords】 EU，China policy， arms control， arms embargo， the Code of Conduct

Introduction

As EU integration is under progress， EU foreign po1icy has increasingly attracted academic at-

tention. EU demonstrated differences from any other po1itical entities: it is a continuously expand-

ing collection of states; its organizational structure keeps changing and evolving; it is more consoli-

dated than a regional organization but looser than a supra-state; it owns foreign and security po1icy

and actively interacts with the world， yet each state owns great diplomatic freedom at their hands.

The complexity of EU makes it a challenging task to c1arify the working mechanism of EU foreign

policy.

Bearing the complexity of EU foreign po1icy in mind， it appears to be an interesting job to look

into the diplomatic interaction between EU and other countries. In this research， efforts are paid to

c1arify how EU navigated its arms control policy and arms embargo on China since 1989. Specifical-

ly speaking， this research explores the external and internal factors that shape EU arms control

policy and arms embargo po1icy on China. This exploration was originated from a case in 2004，

which is that despite the constantly confrontational situations between China and the US over

cross-strait issues， the European Council proposed to the EU presidency to lift its arms embargo

against China， which evidently indicated detachment from its traditional foreign policy coherence to

the US. In the face of the US severe criticism， EU justified its policy by giving the explanation that

EU's arms transfer to China 'should not be an increase of arms exports from EU Member States to

China'l after the embargo is lifted; and China ‘agreed not to buy arms from EU countries when the

embargo is lifted'2. The problem is， if this is the case， the symbolic meaning of lifting the embargo

will be much bigger than its practical meaning， though it still opens Pandora box of arms transfer; if

not， which is the worry of most concerned countries， it will significantly help China to challenge the

US dominance in Asia and may pose security threat to China's neighboring countries.

1 Council of the European Union， 16238/1/04 REV1， (1st February， 2005)

2“The European Arms Embargo on China: 20 Years Later"， theEuros， accessed 13th September， 2011， http://

www.theeuros.eu/The-European-Arms-Embargo-on-China，3545 .html?lang = fr

84

From containing China to engaging China， obvious changes have been witnessed in EU foreign

policy; however one may wonder first， how EU managed to reach such a decision internally and

second， how China as well as other states perceived the policy and casted impacts onto each of EU

institutions. These questions invite a scrutiny to the evolving process and the entangling relations

of EU's institutions and an evaluation to how EU is being influenced by international actors. Once

these questions are answered， this research wi11 contribute to a better understanding of EU's arms

control policy on China and help further researchers understand EU's decision making process on

China policy.、Inthe next section the research methodology and the research settings will be

presented.

Research Method

As stated in the introduction， there ar巴twomajor questions to be answered in this paper: how

EU institutions and countries influence each other and how EU is influenced by other regions. Con-

sequently th巴objectivesof this research are as follows:

1. To explore EU institutions and Member States' interaction and how the interaction forms

influence to EU's arms control policy and China policy.

2. To reveal how China and other political actors perceive EU's policies and how they impact

on EU's decision making process of arms control policy and arms embargo on China.

To achiev巴aboveobjectives， the research m巴thodologyshould be specially designed according to

the uniqueness of EU， as EU is a collection of states. EU itself can interact with other states and

regions， and EU Member States may also conduct diplomacy independently. It enables a foreign

country to influence EU by two major means: direct interaction with EU institutions， or indirectly

influence via EU Member Stat己s'governments. This uniqueness causes two problems to research-

ing the diplomacy of EU: it makes it very di血cultto de五neIndependent Variables (IV)， as IV s

often interact with each other as well as the Dependent Variables (DV); it also hides the thread of

巴vidences，because one countrγmay not indicate that its political choices within EU institutions

were the direct result of the infl.uence of another country.3 To overcome these problems， this

research will be designed with the following f巴atures:

1. As the traces of foreign infl.uence are often hidden， the existence and location of foreign

influence became the first priority in this paper; the strength of the foreign influence will be

left for further studies. Because the attitudes of most non-EU states on EU's arms control

3 For example， A country (non.EU Member State) infiuenced B country's (EU Mernber State) position on X

policy. When B country takes it to the EU， it may not direct1y relate its position on X policy as the result of A

country's in自uence;instead， it rnay use another reason to explain its political choices.

85 -

po1icy and arms embargo on China are quite c1ear and most1y constant， such as China is

definit巴1yapro-lifting country and the US is definitely an anti-lifting country， the existence of

the foreign in:flu巴nceswill be 10cated in 1ine with respective countries.

2. The problem of interacting IVs will be tak巴ncare of by a mu1ti-layer research structure.

There will be too many IV s interacting with each other in this research if there is no group司

ing for them; IV s will be defined into three layers， and the who1e picture will be seen as

1ayers interacting with each other. The interaction between IV s will on1y be examined within

1ayers. The three 1ayers are: nationa11eve1， EU 1evel and internationa1 1evel. The EU 1evel

IV s can be seen as the IV s to the DV s， or it can a1so be seen as the medium IV s， which

transmit the in:fluence of nationa11eve1 IVs to the DVs. Internationa1leve1 IVs in:fluence both

nationa1 1evel IV s and EU 1eve1 IV s.

Seeing IV s as layers， the variab1es are defined as follows:

Nationa1leve1 variab1es:

1. IVl， Governments of EU Member States

2. IV2， Parliaments of EU Member States

At the nationa1 1evel of IVs， in most cases parliaments (IV2) cast great in宜uenceover the

government (IVl) as parliaments represent the voice of public. However regarding the arms

embargo and arms control issue， it is assumed that some parliament(s) only have very limited

in:fluence on it， as some sources already indicated.4 Governments can directly affect the decisions of

the European Council (IV5) and the Council of European Union (IV6). European Parliament

(IV3) and European Commission (IV4) are presumed to be immune to EU Member States'

governments.

EU level variables:

1. IV3， European Parliament

2. IV 4， European Commission

4 It can be assumed so， for tbe following evidence:‘In the recent debate Chancellor Schroder by persistently

promoting the line to lift the embargo， has positioned himself not only against his own Social Democratic Par-

ty (SPD) but also against Joschka Fischer， the German Foreign Minister and the leader of the junior coali-

tion partner， tbe Greens. Commenting upon a possible discussion on the arms export embargo in the Lower

House of the German Parliament (Bundestag)， Schroder insisted in an interview on March 315t to th巴Ger-

man weekly， Die Zeit， that irrespective of any voting in the Bundestag， the final authority of foreign policy

making lies with the federal government.'，“EU Arms Embargo on China: The German debate"， accessed

14th September， 2011， http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/EUArmsEmbargoonChina_AkMuk-

hopadhyay _020505;“Taiwan hails German parliament's support for China arms embargo"， accessed 14th

S巴ptember，2011， http://www.taiw呂nembassy.org/uk/ct.asp?xItem = 4153&ctNode = 932&mp = 132&now-

Page = 9&pagesize = 30

- 86-

3. IV5， European Council

4. IV6， the Council of European Union

At the EU level， the mutual infiuence between EU institutions is very complicated. European

Parliament (IV3) cannot cast direct impact to the lifting of arms embargo on China (DVl). It can

only infiuence the embargo by strengthening the arms control policy (DV2); nonetheless so far it

has failed to pass legislation on EU's Code of Conduct for Arms Exports. European Commission

(IV 4) is considered to be infiuential to the arms embargo issue. European Council (IV5) is clearly

significant and in support to the lifting of arms embargo issue. The Council of European Union

(IV6) is another heavyweight actor in arms embargo issue， which shares the same view with th巴

European Council.

Internationallevel variables:

1. IV7， China， the People's Republic

2. IV8， the US

3. IV9， others

Obviously China (IV7) and the US (IV8) have direct connections and infiuence to EU Member

States and EU itself directly; nevertheless it is hard to trace and locate the evidence of their

infiu巴nce，as once EU's foreign a:ffairs chief Catherine Ashton indicated in an interview with Sky

News network，

‘For us， it's about our [EUJ relations with countries across the world. And what America

does is what America does.'

And ‘For our part in the EU we have to make our decisions about what we do.玖Tehave to

determine our own relationships.'5

The claim shows that although EU and its Member States are being infiuenced by international

actors (such as direct criticism by concerned countries) ， they are not willing to admit the fact. Con-

sidering this difficulty， locating the foreign infiu巴ncebecame one of th巴tasksin this paper. Other

countries (IV9) are also taken into consideration， though it is even harder to track their in丑uence，

as they mostly utilize lobbying groups to infiuence EU and its Member States. A few examples of

these lobbying countries are Japan6， Taiwan7 and Australia8.

5 "EU refuses to intervene in China-US row"， Catherine Ashton in an interview， accessed 14出 September，

2011， http://www.theparliament.com/latest-news/artic1e/news呂rtic1e/eu-refuses.to-intervene-in-china-us-

row/

6“Japan concerned by call to lift China embargo-o伍cial"， accessed 14th Septemb巴r，2011， h仕p://www.ab.

cmoney.co.uk/news/272007172122.htm;‘Japan: Ashton was wrong on China arms ban'， accessed 14th Sep-

tember， 2011， http://euobserver.com/9/32360

87 -

Dependent variables:

1. DV1， the outcome of decision to lift/keep EU's arms embargo on China

2. DV2， the strength of EU's arms control policy

There are two DVs in this research. The outcome of EU's arms embargo on China (DV1) is

directly made by the decisions of European Commission (IV 4)， European Council (IV5) and the

Council of European Union (IV6). The strength of EU's arms control policy (DV2) is under the

infiuence of European Parliament (IV3) and the Council of European Union. The tricky point of

the DVs is that the strength of EU's arms control policy is also directly impacting on the outcome of

EU's arms embargo on China. If EU has a very strong arms control policy， such as a legalized

Code of Conduct of Arms Exports， then the impact of lifting arms embargo on China will be very

limited. If the arms control policy remains political， EU Member States will have fiexible control on

their arms export to China. Both of the DV s and their relationship are significant to concerned

countries， nevertheless in this research they will be viewed as different issues. The correlation

between DVl and DV2 will not be covered in this paper.

Below is a diagram to visualize the relationship between the IV s and DV s:

From the above descriptions and deductions， several hypotheses are proposed:

1. Unlike a usual pattern of parliament-government relation， in the EU arms embargo issues

national parliaments (IV2) own very little control on their governments (IV1) on arm

embargo issues.

2. On the contrary to most studies9 on EU's arms control policy and its arms embargo on China，

it is argued that European Parliament (IV3) also cast in血renceon the arms embargo on

China (DV1)， via the arms control policies (DV2).

7“EU should not lift the arms ban against Chinaぺaccessed14th September， 2011， http://www.gio.gov.tw/

taiwan-website/ 4-oa/20041120 /2004112001.html

8 It should be noticed that although Australia says it will not lobby for keeping the EU's arms embargo on Chi-

na， it has advised EU to‘do so in a way that has no impact on the power balance or the strategic structure of

the East Asian region.'“Australia won't lobby EU over China arms embargo"， accessed 14th September，

2011， http://www.abc.net.au/ cgi-bin/ common/ printfriendly.pl?http://www.abc.net.au/news/ newsitems/

200502/s1301480.htm.

9 'The European Parliament opposes lifting the arms embargo on human rights grounds also， but the Parlia-

ment has no role in the decision， which rests solely with the Member States.'， Kristin Archick， Richard Grim-

mett and Shirley Kan， "European Union's Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. Poli-

cy"， (CRS Report for Congress， April15th， 2005);‘Although it has acquired a signi宣cantrole in several areas

of the European Union (EU) over the years， the European Parliament still plays a rather marginal one with

respect to the EU's extemal relations.'， Flavia Zanon，“The European Parliament: An autonomous foreign

policy identity?"， in The Role 01 Parliaments in European Foreign Policy， ed. Esther Barbe and Anna Herranz，

(2005)

- 88

Diagram 1， the R巴lationshipbetween Independent Variables and Dependent Variables

National Level EU Level DV

合

(巴

=今

臼 合国

=今

3. External actors (IV7， IV8， and IV9) cast strong infiuence to every stag巴ofthe policy making

process of EU arms control policy， both at the national and EU levels.

4. Because national interests (IVl) have been translated into European interests through Euro-

pean Council (IV5) ， the Council of European Union (IV6) and European Commission (IV4) ，

the process enabled some European states of ignoring negative impacts of their policies

(DVs).

International LeveJ

『

aEEEEEJ

rEEEE--

圃

圃

園

田園

園

田

園

圃

圃

--JF』

FM司

，4、

The next section wi11 be a brief introduction to EU's arrns embargo on China， and how it evolved

into a transat1antic rift.

The Start of the Arms Embargo

As a respons巴tothe commonly known 1989 Tiananmen Incident， after a two-day meeting from

26th to 27th in Madrid， European Council adopted a joint dec1aration to address the issue. The Euro-

pean Council， dec1ared to 1) raise human rights issues in appropriate international forums; 2) inter-

rupt high level military cooperation and embargo China on arms trade; 3) suspend high level con-

tacts; 4) reduce all other activities to minimum and 5) prolong Visas of Chin巴sewho wish to stay in

Europe.lO

10 The European Council， Europe仰 Council:Madrid， 26 and 27 Ju眠 (1989)

- 89

Since the dec1aration of the embargo， the fragility has been shown. Cultural and technological

programs soon resumed to pre-Tiananmen level. Economic embargoes were soon lifted. As a

matter of commonly-known fact， EU is current1y the biggest trade partner to China and China is the

second biggest trade partner to EU.l1 The most critical two points， the human rights issues and

arms embargo， are almost equal to none too.

As European Council stated， it would try to raise human rights issues about China at appropriate

forum. However， it only did so in the early years of 1990s; EU Member States had cosponsored

resolutions on human rights issues in China annually in United Nations Commission on Human

Rights (UNCHR) until1996.12 In 1997， EU Member States， with France， Germany， ltaly， Greece

and Spain against making such resolutions (though other 10 were still in favor)， argued that co-

sponsoring a resolution against China was not an e:ffective way to infiuence China， and non-confron-

tational measures should be taken. Since the EU internal split over the issue， EU never raised

human rights issues against China at UNCHR. Rather than resolutions against China， EU decided

to continue to use its Human Rights Dialogue， which was started in 1995， to convey its idea about

human rights to China. The cease of cosponsored resolution on human rights issues in China has led

EU to a new approach to its China policy， which is their soft-liner policy in contrast to the US'

persistent denouncement to China's human rights status.

In 1998， EU Member States agreed that出eywould‘neither propose， nor endorse' any resolution

on criticizing China's human rights status; such position lasted until now.13 In the same year， EU

unveiled its strategic paper on China， which is ‘Building a Comprehensive Partnership with

China'.14 The most recent attitudes of EU countries towards human rights in China was recently

revealed in a leaked c1assified file of the US embassy in UK， and the most pro-China country in

Europe， France， indicated that human rights should not be a hindrance to the improvement of EU-

China relations:

‘National Positions: France versus Denmark

11“European Union and its main trading partners"， accessed 15th September， 2011， http://ec.europa.eu/trade/

creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/ statistics/

12 For more detailed information on the EU human rights policy towards China and UNCHR， a paper written by

an active participant is available， Philip Baker，“Human Rights， Europe and the People's Republic of China"，

The Chi叩 Quarteゆ， No. 169， (2002)， 45-63

13 Reuben Wong， "Towards a Common European Policy on China? Economic， Diplomatic and Human Rights

Trends sinc巴 1985"，(paper presented at the International Political Science Association Conference on ‘The

European Union and the World: Asia， Enlargement and Constitutional Change'， Beijing， China， 5th-6th May，

2005)

14 European Commission， Buildi-目ga Comprehensive Partnership with China， accessed 14th September， 2011，

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri = COM:1998:0181:FIN :EN:PDF

- 90一

4. (S/NF) According to our UK contact， France staked out a “zero flexibility" position on

lifting the embargo， and is opposed to any talk of applying conditionality (i.e. by insisting on

further human rights progress by China and/or strengthening the Code of Conduct prior to lift-

ing the embargo). The Danes are reportedly stillleading the opposition， and have circulated to

EU partners a list of ten human rights conditions that they believe China should meet before

the embargo is lifted (we have not yet obtained a copy of this list). Other EU Member States

are lining up somewhere in between， although "all agree in principle" that the embargo should

be lifted if certain conditions are met. The debate from now on will focus on defining conditions

and timing. '15

As one can see， lifting arms embargo has already become a matter of timing rather than a ques-

tion; strengthening it no longer remains as an option. EU's stance on human rights in China， along

with its strategic partnership with China， indicated that EU has chosen to embrace China compre-

hensively first and then solve problem later (if problems are solvable) .

The above leaked file also extended to the second important point， which is arms embargo issue.

As a matter of fact， the rights to export or control arms lie in the national governments rather than

EU. Therefore on the whole picture， EU never stopped arms transfer to China. Stated above， the

arms embargo in the dec1aration is nothing but an‘Interruption by the Member States of the Com-

munity of military cooperation and an embargo on trade in arms with China¥16 Each countrγmay

apply its own interpretation of arms embargo， which renders the arms ban to almost none. For ex-

ample: to French， there is no definition further than ‘cooperation in the technical， technological and

infrastructure fields' which is ‘within the framework of our European and international

commitments'，17 The details of EU's arms transfer to China will be elaborated in later sections; the

point here is that lifting the arms embargo is only a matter of details. EU countries are delinking

human right to arms embargo， and contrasting it to the strategic relationship with China in order to

make a forceful pass of lifting embargo.18 In the next section， some conflicts within EU on the lift-

ing embargo will be specified.

15 "cable 04BRUSSELS1510， CHINA ARMS EMBARGO: APRIL 2 PSC DEBATE AND NEXT"， accessed

14出 September，2011， http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2004/04/04BRUSSELS1510.html

16 The European Council， Madrid， 26 and 27 June， (1989)

17 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)， "French statement on int巴rpretationof EU arms

embargo against China"， EU arms embargo on China， accessed 14出 September，2011， http://www.sipri.org/

research/ armaments/ transfers/ controlling/ arms_embargoes/ eu_arms_embargoes/ china/french

18 The process of delinking is: 1989-1996， resolution on human rights issues in China; 1995 to 2004， Human

Rights Dialogue with China; 2004-， working towards lifting the arms embargo without conditionality.

- 91-

The Stalemate of Lifting the Arms Embargo on China

Con:flict lies everywhere within EU institutions and countries， which caused stalemate in the

decision making process of lifting arms embargo at EU level. The govemments of most countries

are in support of lifting the embargo， while most of their parliaments object to do so. It is similar at

EU level， among which European Commission， European Council and Council of European Union

confront European Parliament on the issue. Below is a table to brie宜ydescribe the con丑ictingcoun-

tries and institutions:

Table 1 the Table of Positions of Countries and Institutions on Arms Embargo against China19

Regarding the Arms Embargo on Have Direct Power to Infiuence a Have No Direct Power to In-

China， Countries or Institutions Decision to lift the Arms Embargo fiuence a Decision to lift the Arms

which... Embargo

Are in Support to Lifting the Arms Governments of UK， Bulgaria， Parliament of Cyprus; China

Embargo on China Cyprus， France， Greece， Hungary，

ltaly， Spain， Ma1ta， Romania， Aus-

tria， Estonia， Finland; European

Council， Council of European Un-

ion， European Commission， J ose

Manu巴1Barroso， Catherine Ashton

Are in Objection to Lifting the Governments of Czech Republic， Parliament of Czech Republic，

Arms Embargo on China Poland， Denmark， Sweden Germany， Denmark， Netherland，

Sweden， France， ltaly， Ireland，

UK; European Parliament， the

US， Japan， Taiwan

Are Observing the Situations Government of Germany， Nether- Parliament of Poland， Greece，

(Wavering over the Issue， or not land， Portugal， Slovakia， Slovenia， Hungary， Ma1ta， Bulgaria， Por-

Interested in it) Belgium， Latvia， Lithuania， tugal， Romania， Slovakia， Slove-

Ireland， Luxembourg; Herman nia， Spain， Austria， Belgium， Esto-

Van Rompuy nia， Finland， Latvia， Lituania， Lux-

embourg; Australia

19 These data are found in the data set below， though there can be nuanced differences between current facts

and the data presented above; the data refiects the reality most for 2009 and 2010.“The EU and arms for・

China"， accessed 15th September， 2011， http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2010/02/eu_china_

arms_embargo;“EU to Keep China arms embargo despite massive investments"， accessed 15th September，

2011， http://euobserver.com/884/31592; David Shambaugh，“Lifting the EU Arms Embargo on China: An

American Perspective"， accessed 15th September， 2011， http: / / www.tfpd.org / pdf/ Shambaugh-

.ChinaPaper.Apr2005.pdf; John Fox and Francois Godement， A Power Audit 01 EU-China Relations， (2009)，

67-100

- 92-

First of all， it should be pointed out that in the table， the current meaning of‘support' and ‘objec-

tion' vary from their meaning before EU's suggestion of lifting the arms embargo in 2004. Before

2004， the difference between ‘support' and ‘objection' is to lift the embargo or not; after 2004 it has

been recognized that the embargo should be lifted， therefore the di民rencebetween 'support' and

‘objection' became first， whether lifting the embargo should be done now or later and secondly

whether conditionality of human rights should be attached to it or not.

It is noticeable that among all of th巴 infiuentialparticipants in the arms embargo issue， lots of

countries are in favor of lifting the arms embargo， with quite a few countries wavering over it (or

comply with a collective decision of EU); only few countries are critical to lifting it. It is on the

contraηT side of the extemal image of EU， of which human rights and public opinion are extremely

valued. Some countries just do not care乱boutthe embargo at all，2o while some leader public1y indi-

cated that parliament votes could not change his position towards the issue.21 Assumedly， the

embargo could have long been lifted if EU takes a majority vote on the issue， because wavering

states would overwh巴lπIInglylean to the mainstream opinion of lifting the embargo. Just like what

has been expounded in a European Council on Foreign Relations' interview with Lithuanian 0伍cial，

some of them does not have a position on arms embargo against China; their priority is to‘let China

know that we exist'.22 The only reason why arms embargo is still in its place is that EU passed the

embargo on a universal consensus base; therefore a unanimous is required to lift it. It is c1ear that

the stalemate of lifting arms embargo on China is caused by the disagreement of the very few coun-

tries. It is unknown that how long those countries can hold onto their position， as imaginably they

will be under severe lobbying of the robust pro-lifting countries such as France.

Above the nationallevel， European Parliament simply has no right or measure to stop the lifting.

The only thing it has ever done was a condemnation to the suggestion of lifting.23 The power of the

European Parliament lies in its legislation power of passing a strengthened legislated resolution of

EU's Code of Conduct for Arms Export; however it is seriously doubted that how far European

Parliament can go， as so far it still fails

20 'Poland: little public or media interest in China';‘Malta: adheres to the EU position';‘Portugal: Portugal

takes a zero-risk approach';‘Romania: no time for human rights';‘Slovakia: China not considered a priority';

官stonia:China rarely mentioned';‘Lithuania: let China know that we exist'， in Fox and Godement， A Power

Audit， (2009)，70，87-90，95，98

21“EU Arms Embargo on China: The German debate"

22 Fox and Godement， A p，ωer Audit， (2009)，98

23 Council of the European Union，“Removal of the EU embargo on arms sales to China， C91E/679"， Official

Journal 01 the European (J，托ion，(2004)

24 European Parliament， "European Code of Conduct on Arms EXPOlts， C66E/ 48"， Official Journal 01 the Euro-

pean Union， (2009)

- 93-

Parliament， it does not mark a success of the European Council and the rest， as the High Represen-

tative Catherine Ashton suggested to lift the embargo and failed to gain support from EU countries;

the timing did not seem right.25 On the international stage， the dilemma of EU is clear: China

argues that the arms embargo is outdated， discriminative and destructive to friendship; on the

contrary the US argues that the embargo should be strengthened rather than lifted， and lifting it

would draw serious retaliation from the US.26 A more detailed evaluation to出einfiuence of the

embargo will be conducted in later sections; in the next section， discussions on the establishment

and the infiuence of EU's Code of Conduct for Arms Export will be done in reference to European

Parliament.

The Establishment of the Code of Conduct and its lmpasse

EU's Code of Conduct on Arms Exports will be examined in this section， for two critical reasons:

first of all， when European Council suggested lifting the arms embargo on China， it was also trying

to comfort concerned parties by saying that EU has Code of Conduct for Arms Exports as a better

replacement for arms control. It was argued that‘the result of any decision should not be an

increase of arms export from EU Member States to China' and exports should conform to Code of

Conduct on Arms Exports which emphasis the importance of‘criteria regarding human rights，

stability and security in the region and the national security of friendly and allied coun仕ies'.27

Secondly， in contrast to its inability to cast impact on the decision of lifting the arms embargo on

China， the European Parliament is utterly infiuential on the Code of Conduct， which serves as a

post-embargo arms control measure. Its in包uencecan be directly re宜ectedin its involvement in the

decision-making process of the Code of Conduct， and its positive effort may shatter any EU

Member States' will for arms trade with China to pieces， even after the lifting. Consequently a

scrutiny to the Code of Conduct became necessary to foresee EU's arms trade with China in the

25 "EU Refuses to Lift China Arms Embargo"， accessed 16th September， 2011， http://www.securitydefen-

ceagenda.org/ Contentnavigation/Library /Libraryoverview /tabid/ 1299 / artic1eType/ Artic1e View / artic1eld/

1409 /EU -refuses-to-lift-China -arms-embargo.aspx

26 "China urges EU to remove discriminatory arms embargo policy"， accessed 16th September， 2011， http://

www.gov.cn/misc/2006-12/19/contenC473324.htm;“China calls on EU to remove political obstac1es in

bilateral relations"， accessed 16th September， 2011， http://www.gov.cn/misc/2011-05/13/contenC

1863434.htm; S.HRG.109-94， The Lifting of the EU Arms Embargo on China， (hearing before the Commit-

tee on Foreign Relations United States Senate， 16th March， 2005)， accessed 18th September， 2011， http://

frwebgate.access.gpo.gov / cgi-bin/ getdoc.cgi?dbname = 109_senate_hearings&docid = f:22886.pdf;“EU Said

to Keep Embargo on Arms to China"， accessed 16th September， 2011， http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/22

/politics/22diplo.html.

27 Council of the Europ巴anU nion， Brussels European Council 16/17 December 2004 Presidenり Conclusions，

16238/1/04， (2004)

94 -

post-embargo age and to understand European Parliament's in丑uenceamong EU institutions.

The initiative of Code of Conduct was allegedly to be a protective measure to internal repression，

international aggression and regional instability.28 There is no public linkage between the initiation

of Code of Conduct and the Tiananmen Incident， however one cannot help to wonder about the

connection between them， because the European Council published its arms embargo on China

during 26th-27th June， 1989; then in the same year 27th September the Parliamentary Assembly

published the Resolution 928， calling for arms control for human rights protection. As stated in the

resolution:

'5. Beli巴ving，too， that many arms exports may be used for the violation of human rights over

which the exporting country has no control， except to refuse to export arms which could be

used for domestic repression.'

‘c. to establish common criteria and definitions for arms sales， inc1uding modernisation and

maintenance of equipment already supplied， to draw attention to the risk of armed conflict in

the regions of recipient states， and to pay particular regard to international obligations in the

field of human rights;'29

If one tries to match Tiananmen Incid巴ntto the resolution， we can see that 'violation of human

rights' was referring to the Tiananmen Incident，‘refuse to export arms' was EU's dec1aration of

arms embargo， and the initiative is to‘establish common criteria and definitions for arms sales' as

there was no definition at all at the time.

In 1992， the basis of the Code of Conduct was completed. It involves 8 common criteria to control

arms export， which is a great progress to the vaguely expressed 1989 arms embargo on China and

the Resolution 928. After the establishment of common criteria， it took EU another six years of

refinement to finally agree on an 0缶cialversion of Code of Conduct for Arms Exports in 1998.30

As it can be observed that during the decade from 1989 to 1998， the Code of Conduct had be巴n

progressively evolving into a mature and specified arms control regime. If the tide continued， EU

could have achieved an even more speci五edand legally-binding Code. However since 1998， Europe-

an Parliament has never made any progress on the Code of Conduct again. The failure to make any

28 Council of the European Union， EurolりeanUnion Code 01 Conduct on Arms Exports， 8675/2/98REV2， (1998)

29 Parliamentary Assembly， Council of Europe，“Resolution 928 (1989) on arms sales and human rights"， ac-

cessed 16th September， 2011， http://assembly.coe.int//Main.asp?link =http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/

AdoptedText/ta89 / eres928.htm非1.

30 For much more specific details on the initiatives， drafting process， contents of the 1998 version of Code of

Conduct， it is available at Parliamentary Assembly， Doc.8188 Drawing up a European code of Conduct on

arms sales， accessed 16th September， 2011， http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link= /Documents/Workin-

gDocs/Doc98/EDOC8188.htm

- 95

progr巴sscould be attributed to some other events happened in the same year， as stated in previous

sections: In 1998， EU Member States agreed that they would ‘neither propose， nor endorse' any

resolution on criticizing China's human rights status; in the same year， EU unveiled its strategic

paper on China， which is ‘Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China'，31 EU's general

strategy of pro-EU-China relation in foreign policy required coherence from European Parliament，

which resulted that even within the Parliament sector the Parliament cannot push for the legaliza-

tion of the Code. And the general strategy is not the only thing hinders the Code; as another

material came in in 2009，‘the Council has since 2005 failed to adopt this Common Position at the

politicallevel'， as ‘the reasons for this have never been officially explained but are evident1y linked

to the wish of some Member States to lift the current EU embargo on arms exports to the People's

Republic of China'.32 The nationallevel objections and EU level considerations together influenced

the outcome of the legitimation of the Code.

So far it has been argued that the Code of Conduct has been tampered for the priority of arms sell

to China; the influence of individual countries and other EU institutions have been great enough to

change the legislative outcome at the Parliament. In the next section， analysis will be dedicated to

EU's arms export to China in order to demonstrate why EU lifting the embargo can hardly be a

surpnse.

EU's Arms Transfer to China

It is critical to understand that EU's arms embargo on China is first， political and non-legally-

binding and second， unspecified. Such features lead to two outcomes: one is that EU Member

States can interpret the arms embargo by their own understandings and the other is that they can

export arms as long as they can justify the arms sales by their interpretations of the embargo.

Based on this understanding， this section willlook into the data of arms sales to China， and demon-

strate first1y why the arms'embargo is ineffective， then why EU wants to export arms to China and

finally why China is likely to import arms from EU after lifting the embargo. The answers to these

questions will further prove why EU's arms embargo is more likely to be lifted than not and why

the Code of Conduct will remain non-legally-binding for the purpose of arms sales.

EU and the US installed their arms embargo on China in 1989; the first question is how the

embargoes changed the arms transfer to China. From 1950 to 1989， eight countries had exported

arms to China， which inc1uded Albania， France， Germany， Italy， ]apan， UK， the US， the Union of

31 Wong，“Towards a Common European Policy on China?"， (2005); European Commission， Building a Com-

prehensive PartnershiP with China

32 European Par1iament，‘'Code of Conduct， C66E/48"， (2009)

- 96-

Soviet Socialist Republics (the USSR). 33 Among these countries， the USSR should be responsible

for the absolute majority of exports from 1950 to 1968， which laid the foundation of the USSR-

based Chinese military system.34 The Sino-USSR split at the end of 1960s led to a decrease of arms

export from the USSR to China， which totally ended in 1969 until1990; meanwhile， there has been

evidenced an increase of arms export from the West to China since 1966， from France， Germany，

ltaly and UK.35 By 1988， arms export from EU regions to China occupied 83% of the total arms

export to China; the rest 17% was the US.36 In 1989 and 1990， which were the year of arms

embargo installation and the year after， the arms exports to China did not even make a decrease:

EU Member States increased arms export; the US stopped exporting arms to China and its place

was filled by Japan.37 For a more visually direct data view， the table below may shed some light in

how the arms embargo changed the arms transfer to China:

Table 2 Arms Transfer to China， from 1988 to 1992， [Unit: million US dollarJ38

Country 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 Total

France 38 80 59 68 46 290

Germany 12 12 12 12 12 60

Israel 28 28 28 83

ltaly 9 9 5 5 28

Japan 15 30 45

Russia 1150 1150

UK 10 10 20

Ukraine 18 18

USA 14 14

USSR 81 133 214

Total 83 126 215 245 1253 1922

As it can be acquired from the table， the arms export from EU Member States to China did not

stop， but even increased after the embargo. The embargo has been an almost ineffective tool of con-

trolling arms transport; as a result， the attitude of EU towards embargo can be described as arms

33 Data available at SIPRI， SIPRI Arms TranザケDatabase，accessed 17出 September，2011， http://www.sipri.

org / databases/ armstransfers/ armstransfers

34 From 1950 to 1965， the USSR was the sole arms exporter to China. SIPRl， SIPRl Arms Tra托ミferDatabase

35 SIPRI， SIPRI Arms Tra担sferDatabase

36 France: 38m; Germany: 12m; ltaly: 9m; UK: 10m; m=million US dollar. SIPRI， SIPRI Arms Transfer Data-

base

37 SIPRI， SIPRl Arms Transfer Database

38 SIPRI Arms Transfer Database

- 97-

transport is much more important that human rights， if human rights matters at all.

The next questions to be answer are why EU wants to export arms to China， and why China is

likely to import arms from EU Member States. First of all， two sets of data shall be introduced; first

set is the military expenditures of relevant countries:

Table 3 Military Expenditure of China and Arms Exporters to China， [Unit: million US dollarJ39

Country 1992 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

France 66221 62724 63059 63272 62642 66869 61285

Germany 62402 45460 44411 44454 45730 47453 46848

Russia 57716 38669 42317 45908 50937 53330 52586

Switzerland 6370 4138 3939 3964 4060 4057 4392

UK 55828 52579 52475 53122 55291 57907 57424

Ukraine N/A 2826 3170 3853 3770 3347 3442

China 21900 62100 72900 84100 92700 110100 114300

As we can see from this above， until 2010， most of the arms exporters to China suffered from

shrinkage of mi1itary expenditure， or at most maintained their expenditure at a fi.xed 1evel. The

shrinking budgets have impacted the governmenta1 purchase to the local military industries， and

the chain effect wou1d be that the military industries have to 100k for otherwise availab1e buyers for

their products in order to maintain their survival. China is the only country made a five-time enlar-

gement of military budget; it will be difficult for EU military industries to revoke their desire to

export arms and relevant technologies to China.40 The second set of data is the arms sales to China

in recent years:

Table 4 Arms Transfer to China， from 2005 to 2010， [Unit: million US dollarJ41

Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Tota!

France 98 73 75 113 62 78 499

Germany 19 14 6 6 6 6 58

Russia 3233 2550 1444 1331 782 410 9748

Switzer!and 65 65 65 65 65 15 340

UK 40 40 50 50 50 50 280

Ukraine 82 118 54 54 28 335

Tota! 3536 2860 1693 1618 993 559 11259

39 SIPRI， the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database， accessed 17th September， 2011， http://milexdata.sipri.org/

40 Eugene Kogan， The European日uω1Defe却ceIndustry and the Appeal of the Chinιse Market， (2005)， 11

41 SIPRI， SIPRI Arms Tn側約rDatabase

- 98-

EU Member States basically maintained their arms exports to China， however as to Russia， it is

c1ear that China sharply reduced its import from Russia. The reduction of imports from Russia was

caused by that China no longer needs Russian exports that much， as Russia's major exports are

hardware. China currently does not need lethal hardware but state-of-the-art coordinating hardware

and software; as many sources indicated that China has been building up and showed interest in

purchasing， the capabilities of command， control， communications， computers， intelligence， surveil-

lance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) which is EU's strength and what Russia cannot offi巴r.42

As a conc1usion to this section， China wants and needs arms (especially C4ISR) which EU major

arms exporters are wi11ing to export. With a huge number of EU Member States swinging on the

arms embargo issue， the embargo can hardly be effective and the Code of Conduct wi11 be thusly

rendered. In the next section， an evaluation to the external infl.uence of lifting the arms embargo

wi11 be presented.

EU， the US and China's Neighbors

In this section assessment to how EU's arms embargo policy on China is being infl.uenced and

evaluated by the US and other concerned parties. EU's Code of Conduct for Arms Exports wil1 not

be covered as there has not been any revealed relevance to it yet.

There have been two rounds of calls for lifting the arms embargo on China. The first round was

during 2004 to 2005. As 0伍ciallystated in the Presidency Conc1usion of EU， European Council

proposed to lift the arms embargo in consideration to the significant development in all aspects of

EU-China relations， and it especially looked forward to China's agenda on ratification of the Inter-

national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.43 However such information was not appreciated in

the same way by the US， as President Bush said ‘there is deep concern in our country that a trans-

fer of weapons would be a transfer of technology to China'， and the US congress even threat to

retaliate on the lifting.44 By the time EU gave up its plan of lifting the embargo in 2005， EU 0伍cials

admitted that EU yielded to pressure from Bush and retaliation from Congress， and lifting the

42 Peter Brookes， the Lifti:η:g 01 the EU Arms Embargo on China: An American Perspective， (Iecture given at Rus-

sels， Belgium at the European Security Forum， 2nd March， 2005); Kogan， The European Union Delence In-

dust:η， (2005)， 32; Michael Swaine， America 's Challenge: Engaging a Rising China 仇 theTwenty-First Centu-

η， (2011)， 177

43 Council of the European Union， 16238/1/04 REV1， (1st February， 2005)

44“Chirac de:fies Bush on China arms"， accessed 18th September， 2011， http://news.bbc.co.出 /2/hi!europe/4288067.stm;“EU may put off decision on China arms embargo"， accessed 18th September， 2011， http://eu-

observer.com/13/18719;“US， EU on Collision Course Over China"， accessed 18th Septemb巴r，2011， http://

www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0.1564.1507278.00.html

- 99-

embargo during Bush administration would be impossible.45 As it can be seen by that time the US

could strongly infiuence EU's decision-making progress on the arms embargo against China.

The second round came during 2010 to 2011. In the second round EU still failed to lift the

embargo on China; nonetheless it should be mentioned that there are several differences between

these two rounds of calling for ending the embargo: 1) in 2005 EU has 25 Member States and since

2007 it has 27 Member States， adding Romania and Bulgaria; 2) EU's Common Foreign and

Security Policy us巴dto be a pillar of EU in 2005， but it became a consolidated part of EU in 2009;

3) as the role of foreign minister， the post High Representative has been install巴din 2009; 4) the

US changed from Bush administration to Obama administration in 2008. All of these differences

have subtly infiuenced EU's policy on its arms embargo on China.

The calls for lifting the arms embargo came in January of 2010. It was started by the Spanish

ambassador， telling the Chinese official media that‘We hope to deepen discussions on lifting the

ban'.46 Then the Spanish foreign minister soon backed it up at foreign ministers' meeting at Brus-

sels， saying his government was 'weighing the pros and cons' of lifting the ban.47 However it did

not fully represent the official opinion of EU at that moment; as it was the first year that EU

presidency cooperated with the High Representative， and the High Representative should be the

one speaking on behalf of EU. Therefore commentators were expecting the High Representative

Catherine Ashton to assume her power and to tell Spain to back Off.48 A surprise is that， Catherine

Ashton did not take the opposite position to Spain， but gave a justification that 'The Americans

hav巴hadobligations towards Taiwan which is where this all comes from' and ‘for us， it is about our

relations with countries across the world.唱 Atthe end of 2010， the fact was proved to be that

Catherine Ashton herself was a supporter to lifting the arms embargo on China.50 At the beginning

of 2011 Catherine Ashton's effort was rendered in vain as UK and several other countries did not

agree to support the lifting of embargo.51

45“EU postpones lifting of China arms embargo/Pressure from Rice， int巴malpolitics cited as reasons"， ac-

cessed 18出 September，2011， http://artic1es.sfgate.com/2005-03-22 / news/ 17365191_1_ european-union-em-

bargo・chinese-action

46 "Spain could ask EU to lift arms ban on China"， accessed http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-01/21/

content 9352902.htm

47 "EU presidency reconsidering China arms embargo"， accessed 18th Septemb巴r，2010， http://euobserver.com

/884/29343

48 'Come on Catherine Ashton， slap th巴 Spanishdown'，“The EU and arms for China"， accessed 18th Septem-

ber， 2010， http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2010/02/eu_china_arms_embargo

49“EU refuses to intervene in China-US row"

50“EU Could End China Arms Embargo 1n Early 2011"， accessed 18th September， 2010， http://www.defen-

senews.com/story.php?i = 5342402

51“EU to keep China arms embargo despite massive investments"

-100一

As described above， although many actors in EU failed to lift the embargo in both 2004-2005 and

2010-2011， the failures were different in these two situations: in the former case， the lifting of

embargo was suggested from bottom to top by the rotating presidency， and EU failed for the US

pressure; in the latter case， the lifting was suggested in the top-down manner by the High

Representative who is going to stay in the post until 2014， and she failed for the disagreement

inside EU not because of the US pressure. Th巴 Obamaadministration appeared to be veηT quiet

during the issue， on the contrary to Bush's active response. All the facts suggest that there will be a

very consist巴ntwill to lift the embargo of EU， and the Obama might be much more tolerate than

Bush to it. As McNamara criticized that Washington k巴ptpraising the importance of Lisbon Treaty

and failed to‘realize that strategic divergences have opened between it and Brussels'， which

resulted in Catherine Ashton pushing to lift the arms embargo on China.52

As to other regions， J apan and Taiwan feels the pain most. Taiwan， as the target of‘Anti-cession

Law'， needless to say is anti-lifting and has been lobbying in EU. As Sino-Japanese tensions grow-

ing in recent years， Japan has taken every opportunity to stop EU from lifting the embargo， such as

lobbying groups in EU， and picking up the topic at everγpossible occasions. As the Japanese

defense chief seeing the issue，‘we should spare no effort to deliver our thought or concerns'.53

Ambassador Norio Maruyama also recognized， the High Representative ‘never dropped the idea to

lift the embargo'.54 As it can be seen that EU did not give up the idea of lifting the embargo， the

effect of Japan and Taiwan's persuasion can be limited. Australia is somehow not quite concerned

for the embargo. Australia itself lifted its embargo in 1992， and its foreign affair minister Alexander

Downer pointed out that‘We could hardly say you mustn't lift your arms embargo but we have

lifted our arms embargo so it' s alright for us but it' s not alright for you'.55

Conclusion

In this paper the histories of EU's Code of Conduct and its effort on lifting arms embargo on

China have been reviewed. EU has been proved to be a largely pro-EU-China-relation entity， with

little concerns to arms control but great interests in arms sales， and the further improvement of

economic tie. EU's Code of Conduct has be巴ntamper巴dfor the purpose of arms sales since EU's

1998 declaration to develop comprehensive partnership with China.

52 SaIly McNamara， How President Obama's EU Policy Undercuts U.S. Interests， accessed 18th September，

2010， http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/02/How-President-Obamas-EU-Policy-Undercuts-

US-Interests

53“Japan concemed by caIl to lift China embargo-official"

54 'Japan: Ashton was wrong on China arms ban'

55“Australia won't lobby EU over China arms embargo"

-101一

The first hypothesis on the relationship between EU Member States governments (IV1) and

their parliament (IV2) works as shown in the table 1， most EU Member States' governments have

con宜ictingviews with their parliaments， and thusly pushed two rounds of debate on lifting the arms

embargo on China.

The second hypothesis on the European Parliament (IV3) so far has been working theoretically;

the European Parliaments should have the ability to strengthen its Code of Conduct for Arms

Export (DV2) ， but th巴rehas been no improvement on the Code since 1998. It indicates that some

other stronger in:fiuence has won over the European Parliament， which are international actors

(IV7， IV8) and national interest of individual EU Member countries (IV1).

The third hypothesis on the external in:fiuence to EU is true， as on the nationallevel， China (IV7)

casts great in:fiuence to individual countries in EU (IVl) ， and pushed them to support arms sales

(DVl). However the US (IV8) has been proved to have greater in:fiuence than China on general

and particularly great in:fiuence on EU level (IV 4 and/or IV5 and/or IV6) ， because EU 0伍cials

admitted that the pressure from the US made them drop the idea of lifting the embargo during the

period of Bush administration.

The fourth hypothesis is true， as documents indicated that the Code of Conduct (DV2) has been

failing to be improved as there is c1ear link to some countries' wil1 to sell arms to China (IV1).

Finally to the two r巴searchquestions， how EU is being in:fiuenced by other regions， and how EU

institution and countries in:fiuence each other. At the nationallevel， a large part of EU Member

States are supportive on lifting the arms embargo， as they are either looking forward to selling

arms to China (such as France and UK) or they simple share strong tie with China (Such as Cyprus

and Romania). There are a lot of swing states being in:fiuenced by the majority opinion， such as

Bulgaria and Lithuania. The anti-lifting countries played key role in keeping the arms embargo in

its place， however because they have surrendered to other states' will once in 2004-2005 debate，

and they have agreed in principle that the arms embargo on China should be lifted， it remains

unknown that how long th巴ycould keep the arms embargo in the future. The example for a typical

anti-lifting country can be Denmark. On the EU level， Catherine Ashton， Jose Manuel Barroso，

European Commission， European Council and the

-102-

US was able to suppress EU's will to lift the embargo， by threatening the pro司liftingcountries and

EU on general. The US casts greater infiuence than China on EU level; nevertheless the infiuence

ofth巴UShas to be reviewed in the recent future， as the current Obama administration possessed

totally different views from Bush on EU integration and foreign policy. The US may have another

attitude toward EU and EU's embargo on China， if Obama is to be succeeded by some others in

2012.