National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

School of Economics and Political Sciences

Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration

Department of International and European Studies

The Europeanization of

Turkish Politics

The protection of minority rights

By Evangelos Marios Kemos

1342201000095

Thesis advisor: Assistant Professor Susannah Verney

Athens, February 2015

2

to my family that made me the person I am,

my friends that honoured me with their kindness and

embraced me with their positive thinking

and to everyone that believed in me…

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KEYWORDS

Turkey, European Union, Europeanization, conditionality, domestic reform, democracy, minori-

ties, minority rights.

ABSTRACT

Turkey’s EU candidacy initiated Turkey’s subjection to Europeanization’s rational- and con-

structivist-based mechanisms. Ever since, successive Turkish governments engaged in unprece-

dented reforms, aiming to conform Turkey to the Copenhagen political criteria including the re-

spect for and protection of minorities, located in great numbers, relics of the multi-ethnic and

multi-religious Ottoman Empire. However, the virtuous cycle slumped and gradually deviated to

a vicious cycle of EU-Turkey relations deterioration and reforms discontinuity after the official

negotiations initiation, reflecting among others, the decreasing credibility of the EU membership,

the public opinion’s fading support and the decomposition of the AKP-EU strategic alliance.

Nevertheless, as argued, factors other than Europeanization pressures contributed to the devel-

opments and are therefore analyzed in this thesis.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 8

1. Theorizing Europeanization ...........................................................................11

1.1. Theoretical evolution of EU integration......................................................................... 11

1.1.1. Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism ......................................................... 11

1.1.2. Rational choice and Constructivism approaches .................................................... 12

1.2. The emergence of the Europeanization concept ............................................................ 13

1.2.1. Europeanization and the EU member states ........................................................... 14

1.2.2. Europeanization and the EU accession candidate states ......................................... 15

1.2.2.1. Constructivist approach and the EU-led policy learning and socialization

mechanism ........................................................................................................................ 17

1.2.2.2. Rationalist mechanism, the case of conditionality .......................................... 18

2. Minorities in Turkey .......................................................................................20

2.1. Ethnic minorities ............................................................................................................ 21

2.1.1. Kurds ....................................................................................................................... 22

2.1.2. Roma ....................................................................................................................... 24

2.1.3. Caucasians............................................................................................................... 25

2.2. Religious minorities ....................................................................................................... 27

2.2.1. Alevis ...................................................................................................................... 28

2.2.2. Caferis ..................................................................................................................... 29

2.2.3. Armenians ............................................................................................................... 29

2.2.4. Jews ......................................................................................................................... 29

2.2.5. Assyrians ................................................................................................................. 29

2.2.6. Rum Greek Orthodox Christians ............................................................................ 30

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3. Turkey’s path to EU accession .......................................................................30

3.1. Post-Helsinki convergence ............................................................................................. 33

3.1.1. Ecevit coalition government’s reforms, 1999-2002................................................ 34

3.1.2. AKP’s first term reform period, 2002-2005 ........................................................... 35

3.2. The 2005 backlash and the post-2005 reforms discontinuity ......................................... 36

3.2.1. AKP’s second term reform shortcomings, 2007-2011 ........................................... 37

3.2.1.1. The ephemeral AKP ‘openings’ to minorities ................................................. 38

3.2.1.2. The ‘privileged partnership’ and the freeze of negotiations ............................ 39

3.2.2. AKP’s third term politics, 2011 until today ............................................................ 41

3.2.2.1. New agenda, relabeled approach and the loss of the EU momentum ............. 42

3.2.2.2. The state of the Turkish democracy and the EU membership perspective ..... 44

4. Europeanization and minority rights protection in Turkey .......................45

4.1. Europeanization factors in Turkey’s accession process ................................................. 46

4.1.1. The Copenhagen criteria ......................................................................................... 47

4.1.2. The conditionality mechanism and the external incentives model ......................... 48

4.1.2.1. Legal coercion and the acquis communautaire ............................................... 50

4.2. Domestic political expediencies ..................................................................................... 54

4.3. Civil society pressure ..................................................................................................... 55

4.4. International agents other than the European Union ...................................................... 57

Conclusion ...............................................................................................................58

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Map of Turkey ................................................................................................................ 26

Figure 2 Austrian, French and German public opinion towards Turkey’s EU membership ........ 32

Figure 3 Turkish public opinion towards EU membership, 2004-2014 ....................................... 37

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Turkish reforms regarding minority rights, 2000-2008 ................................................... 51

Table 2 Chapter 23 assessment process and current status ........................................................... 53

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AKP Justice and Development Party (Turkey) - Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi

ANAP Motherland Party (Turkey) - Anavatan Partisi

AP Accession Partnership

BDP Peace and Democracy Party (Turkey) – Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi

CDU Christian Democratic Union (Germany) - Christlich Demokratische Union

CEECs Central and Eastern European Countries

CHP Republican People’s Party (Turkey) - Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi

CoE Council of Europe

DSP Democratic Left Party (Turkey) - Demokratik Sol Parti

DTP Democratic Society Party (Turkey) - Partiya Civaka Demokratîk

ECHR European Convention of Human Rights

ECtHR European Court of Human Rights

EC European Commission

EEC European Economic Community

EP European Parliament

EU European Union

FDP Free Democratic Party (Germany) – Freie Demokratische Partei

FP Virtue Party (Turkey) - Fazilet Partisi

MHP Nationalist Movement Party (Turkey) - Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi

PKK Kurdistan Workers' Party - Partiya Karkerane Kurdistani

RP Welfare Party (Turkey) - Refah Partisi

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SPD Social Democratic Party (Germany) - Sozialdemokratische Partei

TNP Turkish National Programme

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UMP Union for a Popular Movement (France) - Union pour un mouvement populaire

US United States of America

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Introduction

Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, minorities1 have been perceived as a threat to

the “indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation” enshrined in article 14 of the

Turkish Constitution, perception that has had a grave impact on generations of minorities in ac-

cessing their fundamental rights in Turkey. Even though it has been argued that the Kemalist

establishment has been superficially western in form, it remained rigidly authoritarian and dog-

matic in substance continuing to stress republicanism over democracy, homogeneity over differ-

ence, the military over the civilian and the state over society as Hakan Havuz concludes (cited in

Kubicek, 2004, p. 112).

However, Turkey since its foundation and up to our days, nevertheless its adopted policies,

remains a land of vast ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity. It is home not only to Turks,

Kurds and Armenians, but also to Alevis and Assyrians followed in size by Laz, Caferis, Roma,

Rum Orthodox Christians, Caucasian and Jewish populations. This diversity assembles a centu-

ries-old mix of languages, cultures and traditions being practiced within its borders during the

multi-ethnic and multi-religious Ottoman Empire.

Starting from the Helsinki European Council in 1999 Turkey has been exposed to the cele-

bration of its ethno-cultural and religious identity, mainly due to the process of the Europeaniza-

tion of its politics. This process has been ongoing with certain difficulties testing the consolida-

tion of its democracy and the practical application of the Europeanization concept itself. Still, it

is of great interest that while Turkey’s capacities to implement domestic reforms is less limited

than in most of other European Union [EU] candidates case, its perspective as well as its own

enthusiasm for membership has been gradually fading.

This thesis, analysing the application of the concept of Europeanization in Turkish politics,

aims to explore the degree of its application to the case of the EU acceding, candidate states. It is

important in that sense to observe whether the transformation of domestic politics, inter alia and

of great importance, the protection of minority rights has been the result of Europeanization

pressures and of its factors or an aspect of a broader process based on deeper interests and politi-

1 Since there is no universally accepted definition of minorities, minorities in this thesis will refer to groups that are

ethnically, religiously, linguistically and culturally different from the majority of the population, difference that can

be recognized either by outsiders or by members of the minority group itself.

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cal expediencies. Although, it has already been concluded in the relevant literature that Europe-

anization is in fact observed in the case of EU candidate states, as argued, its importance and

exclusivity in domestic reforms, as well as the adjustment pressures that applies, greatly vary.

Therefore, it is critical to assess not only how external pressure contributes to domestic reform

but also in what extent. Moreover, in the case of Turkey and especially in the AKP governance

period, political expediencies, as argued in this thesis, are crucial in order for the political devel-

opments to be understood.

Additionally, this thesis attempts to disprove and possibly amend the hypothesis that in the

Turkish case, the minority rights protection amelioration has been exclusively driven by the

pressure applied in the framework of Turkey’s EU candidacy, based on the concept of Eu-

ropeanization and its conditionality mechanism. In order for this hypothesis to be examined,

useful information concerning the ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey, as well as the histor-

ical events that led to the current negotiations phase, are analyzed. This analysis aims to provide

an accurate understanding of recent political developments, especially during the AKP govern-

ance period. Moreover, the theoretical framework of the Europeanization concept is being related

with key events and procedures that occurred during the given period of time, consequently

elaborating on the adjustment load that the process involves.

For the topic’s as well as the working hypothesis’ elaboration, various sources were used.

They included but were not limited to primary sources, notably international treaties, together

with international organizations documents - EU Council and European Commission [EC] doc-

uments, presidency conclusions and progress reports as well as Council of Europe [CoE] docu-

ments. Other primary sources included newspaper articles written at time of the events that con-

tributed to the political developments’ evaluation. Moreover, the author’s traineeship at

RUMVADER, The Association for the Support of Greek Community Foundations provided use-

ful insight, concerning the recognized minorities’ status in Istanbul, Turkey’s largest city, that

contributed to the deeper interest and understanding of the topic. The primary sources have also

been supplemented by secondary sources and relevant literature, mainly in the form of books and

academic articles gathered from reputable journals. Furthermore, the use of studies analyzing

criticizing but also interpreting primary sources have been crucial in providing useful and accu-

rate understanding of the actual events and developments.

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Accordingly, the thesis is structured as follows. The first chapter develops the analytical

framework, the concept of Europeanization, its theoretical predecessors that contributed to its

emergence and its effect on current EU member states as well as the perspective member states.

An attempted synthesis of the constructivist approach with the rationalist mechanisms is being in

that sense selected as suitable to explain the pressures of Europeanization applied to the specific

case study of the Turkish EU candidacy. The second chapter presents the ethnic and religious

minorities residing in Turkey and provides useful insight to the issue of their traditional mis-

treatment and suppression by the dominant Turkish-Sunni-Muslim majority.

The third chapter focuses on Turkey’s path to EU accession, chronologically analyzing the

successive governments in power since the late 1990s up to our days and their contribution to the

promotion of the minority rights protection. Concurrently, the relevant developments taking

place in the EU- and EU member states level are being highlighted; hence they provide useful

information for the shifting general view of the EU toward the Turkish EU membership. The

fourth and last chapter elaborates on the factors that constitute adjustment pressure and have con-

tributed to the improvement of minority rights protection in Turkey in the past. Those are not

limited to Europeanization factors such as the conditionality mechanism and the acquis commu-

nautaire [acquis] adoption but extend to domestic political expediencies, the civic pressures de-

riving from the society as well as pressure applied by other external international agents in do-

mestic politics

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1. Theorizing Europeanization2

1.1. Theoretical evolution of EU integration

The beginning of the European unification project over time led to the emergence of a number of

theoretical explanations trying to amplify the European evolving integration process. As Pollack

(2005, p. 13) summarizes, the:

neofunctionalist models of integration through spill-over [were soon pitted] against inter-

governmentalist models emphasizing the continuing dominance of national governments;

later, this debate was largely supplanted by a second debate pitting rational-choice theo-

rists against constructivist analyses.

In this context, the emergence of the concept of Europeanization should be explained by the shift

of the European theory studies from the narrow explanation of the European integration with a

focus centred on the question of how to account for the emerging European polity adopting a

'bottom-up' perspective (Börzel & Risse, 2003, p. 57).

1.1.1. Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism

Using the words of Hix (Hix, 2005, p. 15) “the first and most enduring grand theory of European

integration is neofunctionalism”, first introduced by Ernst Haas and based on the argument that

European integration is a deterministic process, in which, as elaborated by Lindberg (as cited in

Hix, 2005, p. 15)

a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can

be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a

need for more, and so forth.

Vital to the theory is the mechanism of spill-over, the domestic pressure from social interest

groups for further policy integration in order for them to promote their narrow economic and

2 Alternative terms have been introduced by scholars of which of great relevance to the current thesis is Wallace’s

(2000) ‘EU-ization’. As summarized by Flockhart (2010, pp. 790-791) there is a conceptual distinction between

‘EU-ization’ and Europeanization: “The ‘EU-ization’ is in this case different from ‘Europeanization’ because of its

focus on the EU and because it is predominantly concerned with ‘political encounters’” that encapsulate transfer of

institutional and organizational practices and policies. Hence, EU-ization is understood as the specific effects of the

EU accession process in candidate countries, whereas Europeanization encapsulates the broader effects of European

ideas and governance in the European periphery both before and after the establishment of the EU. This thesis will

however, use Europeanization interchangeably with the term EU-ization.

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ideological interests, parallel to the delegation of more powers to supranational institutions,

namely the EC, in order to increase their influence over policy outcomes.

Neofunctionalism’s mainly opposing theory, intergovernmentalism, has been rather a result

of the theory’s failure to explain the slowdown of European integration in the 1960s, and the

subsequent strengthening of the intergovernmental elements of the EC. As Rosamond (2000, p.

73) concludes, the alleged implausibility of empirical data pointing out the increasing relevance

of the nation-states as well as their continuing centrality in promoting and safeguarding certain

sorts of key values and freedoms has been contrary to neofunctionalist assumptions, thus putting

the theory under stress.

Intergovernmentalism, presents a European integration driven by the European nation-states

interests and actions. Thus, it elaborates on the basic aim of national governments, the protection

of their geopolitical interests, such as national security and sovereignty. In the words of Hoff-

mann (as cited in Hix, 2005, p. 15; Rosamond, 2000, p. 77), “intergovernmentalist ‘logic of di-

versity’ in areas of key importance to the national interest, certainty or self-controlled uncertainty

is preferred and promoted”. Furthermore, as per Rosamond (2000, p. 78) the new theory’s cri-

tique added up to the ambivalence of the idea of spillover and the implications of automaticity it

conveyed. However, the critical developments of the 1960’s and 1970’s saw the undertaking of a

series of theoretical refinements by neofunctionalists that led to the obsolescence of the ‘grand

theories’ as discussed (p. 97) that were subsequently replaced by middle-range3 explanations.

1.1.2. Rational choice and Constructivism approaches

Rational choice and constructivist approaches to politics, in contrast to neofunctionalist and in-

tergovernmentalist theory, did not originate in the field of EU study and should therefore be un-

derstood broadly and in a more general manner. As Pollack (2007) summarizes, over the past

two decades, rational choice theories have made rapid inroads into the study of EU politics, most

notably through the combination of rational choice and institutionalism4 to the study of EU deci-

sion-making. Rational choice institutionalism is based in that sense on the perception of “actors

as utility-maximizers operating according to a ‘logic of consequentiality’” (Pollack, 2005, p. 24)

3 Opposing to a grand theory seeking to explain phenomena at a societal level, a middle-range theory has a limited

scope, generally trying to explain a specific set of phenomena. 4 Applied as Rational Choice Institutionalism in the framework of new institutionalism.

13

striving to maximize the expected benefits in the framework of a fixed set of preferences. In ad-

dition to the above, more recently, an increasing number of studies started focusing apart from

the effects of the EU on domestic politics within the EU’s old and new member states, on its

effects within EU candidate states (See Chapter 1.2.2).

Constructivism on the other hand understands institutions broadly, including not only formal

rules but also formal norms, constituting actors who inter alia shape identities and preferences.

Using the wording of Pollack (2005, p. 24), in constructivism, “actor preferences are not exoge-

nously given and fixed as in rationalist models but endogenous to institutions and individuals’

identities are shaped and re-shaped by their social environment.” Indeed, in constructivism one

observes a shift towards the logic of ‘appropriateness’5 of an action in the basis of a socially con-

structed role or institutional rule.

In short, recent developments in EU study and in Europeanization and enlargement studies in

specific, have witnessed the adoption of a pragmatic ‘tool-kit’ use of mechanisms, that as con-

firmed by Pollack (2007, p. 42), derive from rational choice and constructivist approaches. These

approaches aim rather to shed light on issues currently in the spotlight than compete with the

grand theories mentioned in the previous Chapter. Moreover, Pollack complements that “external

incentives in the form of political conditionality have emerged as the best predictor of policy”,

therefore its analysis has become more crucial than ever.

1.2. The emergence of the Europeanization concept

Nevertheless, none of the grand theories has proven powerful enough to provide satisfactory ex-

planations for the EU enlargement mainly in the framework of the shift towards the analysis of

EU governance. As a result, a tendency to use middle-range theoretical notions to promote par-

tial explanations emerged. Europeanization being one of those middle-range concepts moves

steadily towards becoming a theory. Europeanization is generally understood as the domestic

impact of, and adaptation to, European governance in the EU’s member states.

However, the precise meaning and scope of the term remains unclear, while some scholars

disregard and rather contest its usefulness as an analytical tool. Even providing a broadly ac-

5 The concept of a ‘logic of appropriateness’ is introduced in the work of March and Olsen (as cited in Pollack,

2005, p.24).

14

ceptable definition has become a serious problem to overcome, with most scholars de facto fa-

vouring a definition of Europeanization as the domestic impact of the EU, increasingly differen-

tiated by either ‘uploading’ or ‘downloading’ stances to and from the EU as observed by Börzel

(2002), with great “emphasis on the process and extent to which member states and prospective

member states adopt EU rules and implement EU policy-making.” (Flockhart, 2010, p. 790)

Nevertheless, Claudio Radaelli has provided one of the most comprehensive but mostly EU cen-

tric definitions. In Claudio Radaelli’s words (2000, p. 4), Europeanization is the incorporation of:

formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’,

and shared beliefs and norms, which are first defined and consolidated in the making of

EU public policy and politics … in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political

structures, and public policies.

During the 1990s6, the study of Europeanization became a popular subject “with a growing

number of studies seeking to explain both the process of Europeanization and the significant var-

iation in outcomes observed across both member states and issue areas” (Pollack, 2005, p. 40),

namely political processes as indicated by Flockhart (2010, pp. 790-791). Thus, scholars have

used Europeanization as a “newly fashionable term to denote a variety of changes within Euro-

pean politics and international relations.” (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003, p. 3) Even today Eu-

ropeanization is rather seen as an “‘orchestration’ of existing concepts and theories, with major

theoretical import from comparative politics and theoretical policy analysis” as Featherstone and

Radaelli put it, than a theory by itself as already argued.

1.2.1. Europeanization and the EU member states

At this stage, Europeanization was best described as a process whereby EU institutions and poli-

cies influence national institutions and policies within the member states. In their 2001 work

Transforming Europe; Europeanization and Domestic Change, Cowles, Caporaso and Risse (as

cited in Pollack, 2005, p. 40) elaborating on the conditions of Europeanization, suggested that the

extent of Europeanization is:

6 As cited in Pollack (2005, p. 40), the study of Europeanization dates back to the 1970s, when a small number of

scholars examined how EU membership had influenced national political institutions and public policies.

15

a dual product of the adaptational pressures resulting from the varying ‘goodness to fit’

between the EU and national institutions and policies; and the domestic intervening vari-

ables, including the number of veto points and the organizations and political cultures

embedded in existing national institutions.

Additionally, the impact of Europeanization has been typically described as incremental, irregu-

lar, and uneven over time and between national and subnational levels. (Featherstone & Radaelli,

2003, p. 4)

Furthermore, important to stress, the concept of Europeanization has been a broadly extended

concept. It is being supposed to explain processes varying from cultural change, new identities

formation to policy change, administrative innovation, even modernization as Radaelli (2000, p.

4) confirms, covering the formation of European public policy and the effects of EU decisions on

national systems, and affecting member states but also the wider world. In this framework, there

is undoubtedly Europeanization of policy in countries applying for EU membership, as this thesis

elaborates. Nevertheless, it is also true that the response to the processes involved, as signified in

the Differential Responses to European Policies: a Comparison, 2001 work of Héritier and Knill

(as cited in Radelli, 2003), may not necessarily be of convergence. Convergence as a result of

EU participation is therefore far from being inevitable.

1.2.2. Europeanization and the EU accession candidate states

Grabbe (2003, p. 304) rejuvenated the concept of Europeanization by analysing its application in

Central and Eastern European countries [CEECs] at their EU accession process at the time7, with

the reasoning that these countries are already subjected to substantially the same pressures of

adaptation to EU policies as current member states. It is true that the Europeanization mecha-

nisms as identified in the relevant literature are likely to operate for the applicant countries, given

that the same policy structures and implementation procedures are used. In the light of the above,

contractual agreements signed between the EU and third countries have become one of the main

instruments of the EU for promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms in those countries

(Arikan, 2010, p. 20). Concurrently, as identified by Kubicek (2004, p. 4) further methods are

7 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that joined the EU in

2004.

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being used by international actors to shape processes of democratization and facilitate the path to

democratization in general and the Europeanization of the EU ascending states in specific, based

on a certain degree of control over state policy.

However, even in the above-mentioned framework, the case of the CEEC candidates slightly

differs from their Southeastern European counterparts, thus hindering further generalizations. As

Börzel and Soyaltin (2012, pp. 10-11) assert, the traditional mediating factors identified by the

early Europeanization literature are becoming less and less relevant8 or more ambivalent in their

impact9 in Southeast Europe. Newer conditions for EU-induced domestic institutional change

have emerged. Those conditions are according to many scholars cited in the work of Börzel,

Risse and Soyaltin (Börzel & Risse, 2012, pp. 10-14; Börzel & Soyaltin, 2012), mainly focusing

on power asymmetries, regime type10, domestic incentives for change, and degrees of state-

hood11.

Into detail, the early Europeanization literature did not deal with regime type at all, since the

member states before the 2004 enlargement were all consolidated democracies. Soon however

the level and quality of democracy came into the epicentre of the Europeanization debate and

culminated with the assessment of mostly democratizing countries, including Turkey, for EU

membership (Börzel & Soyaltin, 2012, p. 11). This is indeed the basis of the research question of

this thesis. Therefore, the Turkish case, especially in the period of the AKP government is a good

example of whether Europeanization was bound to meet and actually met greater resistance in

areas such as minority rights where democratic institutions were less consolidated and fragile.

Preliminary, one can only observe that the support of the EU played a vital role in the establish-

ment of the AKP in Turkish politics since as this thesis argues it was the alignment of interest

that made possible their strategic partnership. As a consequence, the Europeanization of Turkey

rather disproves the above argument.

8 Notably factors such as the existence of norm entrepreneurs and formal supporting institutions. 9 Namely, veto players and the existence of informal institutions. 10 Namely, democracy versus autocracy. 11 Notably the level of state consolidation. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004, p. 663) also conclude that there is

a variation in the impact of the conditions according to the political context of the country observed. While in the

context of democratic conditionality, domestic adoption costs severely limit the effectiveness of EU conditionality,

even when it was credible and rewards were sizeable, while at the same time, authoritarian governments turn down

the offer of membership rather than accept the political power costs of adopting liberal democratic rules. By con-

trast, in the context of acquis conditionality, variation in the size of domestic adoption costs only accounted for the

speed of rule transfer but did not matter systematically for its effectiveness.

17

Coming back to EU’s impact on the political governance of accession candidates sizeable

and credible incentives were offered by the EU in the form of a membership prospect. As sug-

gested by the Europeanisation literature and confirmed by Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier

(2004, p. 662), the EU incentives formed the basis of a strong conditionality policy. Indeed as

they continue:

the dominant logic underpinning EU conditionality is a bargaining strategy of reinforce-

ment by reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a target government

to comply with its conditions.

Those conditions included but were not limited to democratic reforms and the compliance with

core political values of the EU. However, the recent fatigue and the discontinuity of reforms in

Turkey, mostly observed after 2005 highlighted the fact that a big enough and tangible reward

able to compensate the incumbents for perceived losses of power or popularity after introducing

unpopular reforms was rather at the core of the conditionality mechanism (see Chapter 4.1.1;

Noutcheva & Aydin-Düzgit, 2012, p. 59).

Developments in alternative rationalist and constructivist hypotheses about the effect of EU

membership on the newer member states brought new conceptual evidence to light. As Börzel

and Risse (2000) pointed out, scholars made increasing notions of an EU-led policy learning and

socialization attributed to constructivism, nevertheless the timing of policy reforms in the newer

member states suggested that the greatest impact of the EU has resulted from explicit EU condi-

tionality attributed to rationalist mechanisms (Pollack, 2005). Soon those notions materialized

into a newer branch of the Europeanization literature (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004) that

concentrates on the modes of social learning, adaptation and lesson-drawing as the mechanisms

involved in the process of Europeanization. Therefore it is useful that Europeanization itself is

theorized in terms of those two distinct mechanisms.

1.2.2.1. Constructivist approach and the EU-led policy learning and

socialization mechanism

The social learning model follows core tenets of social constructivism, with its main assumptions

being the logic of appropriateness. According to this logic, actors rather than maximising their

egoistic self-interest, seek to meet social expectations in a given situation. Processes of socialisa-

tion often result in complex learning by which actors redefine their interests and identities

18

(Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 7). In addition, as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004, p. 675)

elaborate, among:

alternative courses of action, they choose the (most) appropriate or legitimate one. Corre-

spondingly, arguing about the legitimacy of rules and the appropriateness of behaviour

(rather than bargaining about conditions and rewards), persuasion (rather than coercion),

and ‘complex’ learning (rather than behavioural adaptation) characterizes the process of

rule transfer and rule adoption.

Furthermore, as pointed out at the same work, the lesson-drawing should be analysed as a re-

sponse to domestic dissatisfaction with the status quo. It is policy-making actors that evaluate the

transferability and adjustment prospects of rules and policies applied in other countries or issues,

namely the adoption of EU rules and the acquis, expecting the rules to solve effectively domestic

policy problems.

1.2.2.2. Rationalist mechanism, the case of conditionality

Conditionality and external incentives provide a stronger explanation of the states behaviour than

socialization. According to the empirical observation of Zürn and Checkel (as cited in Pollack,

2005, p. 25), socialization effects are rather weak and secondary to dynamics at the national lev-

el. Concurrently, as per Avcı (2011, p. 410) the rationalist institutionalist branch of the literature

suggests that, “candidate country governments adopt EU rules if the benefits of the EU rewards

exceed the domestic adoption costs.” In this framework and under the limitations imposed, the

EU’s conditionality mechanism offers rational incentives for domestic actors to undertake re-

forms in expectation of the credible perspective of EU membership.

Even though different studies point out that the effectiveness of EU conditionality differs

across countries and issues, there are certain factors that are generally crucial for the success of

conditionality. Most notably and according to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004), two fac-

tors that are singled out are the credibility of the membership perspective itself, offered as the

key reward by the EU, followed by domestic adjustment costs that are not excessively high for

governments and do not endanger their power base.

In general, studies have confirmed that EU conditionality has successfully spread by opening

windows of opportunity for policy reform to domestic actors by decreasing the political costs of

controversial reforms. (Avcı, 2011, p. 410). Featherstone and Radaelli (2003, p. 58) explain this

19

process of changes in the political opportunity structure as a domestic redistribution of power.

This depends in any case on the capacity of actors to exploit these opportunities and avoid the

constraints. They also observe two mediating factors with opposite effects influence these capac-

ities, the multiple veto points in a country's institutional structure and the formal institutions. The

first can effectively empower actors with diverse interests to resist adaptational pressures ema-

nating from Europeanization while the latter, might exist providing actors with material and idea-

tional resources to exploit new opportunities, leading to an increased likelihood of change.

However, as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) suggest, these dominant features of

conditionality might be superseded by other mechanisms that can also lead to rule transfer. The

existence of conditionality should not therefore undermine the possibility of independent adop-

tion of rules as part of application of best practices or as effective solutions to domestic policy

challenges in the EU accession framework. Moreover, it should also be taken into account that:

while the EU might provide incentives for the adoption of its rules, the mechanism

through which the CEECs adopt these rules might relate to processes of persuasion and

learning in which EU actors socialize CEEC actors rather than coerce them. (p. 662)

This latter idea combines the rational choice mechanism of conditionality, and the EU incentives

in specific, with the constructivist mechanism of social learning. Accordingly, the rule transfer

from the EU to the CEECs and the variation in its effectiveness are best explained in the basis of

the external incentives model but in particular with the credibility of EU conditionality and the

domestic costs of rule adoption, factors already mentioned in this Chapter.

In the Turkish case study, one can distinguish the rule adoption as a result both of the use of

conditionality as well as in the framework of the independent adoption of rules; application of

best practices as effective solutions to domestic policy challenges. The latter, elaborated in Chap-

ter 4 is also based on the exerted pressure in the direction of minority rights protection applied by

the EU but also by other international agents such as the CoE. Taking the above into account it

can be concluded that besides conditionality also external, EU incentives have played and con-

tinue to play a vital role as tools promoting reform at the domestic level. Therefore, the mainte-

nance of a stable and highly credible commitment by the EU towards the perspective member-

ship remains crucial.

20

2. Minorities in Turkey

The Turkish official position on minorities began to formulate soon after the promulgation of the

Republic on the 29th of October 1923. During the previous period, following the Ottoman defeat

in 1918, saw the rise of Turkish nationalism, linked to the “Sèvres Syndrome, the fear of territo-

rial and national disintegration inherited from World War I and the War of Independence during

which Christian (Rum Orthodox Christians, French and Armenian) minorities had collaborated

with foreign occupiers” and have been therefore associated with attempts to implement their

plans to dismember Anatolia (Türkmen & Öktem, 2013, pp. 463-464). During the same period,

nationalist Turks successfully appealed to Kurds to assist them in the name of the Muslim father-

land, a cause that had great appeal in view of the Armenian Christian threat in eastern Anatolia.

The agreed in the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 population exchange meant that almost all

Orthodox Christians in Turkey had to be transferred to Greece in exchange for Greece’s [non-

Albanian] Muslim populations. Only a small number escaped this transfer, notably the popula-

tions of Istanbul and the islands of Imvros and Tenedos12, nevertheless, the Ecumenical Patriar-

chate of Constantinople remained in the city. As Türkmen and Öktem note (2013, p. 466) “in

accordance with the Turkish government’s wish…, [the Lausanne Peace Treaty] excluded other

sectarian Muslim minorities, like Alevis, as well as various ethnic and linguistic groups such as

Kurds and Arab…. [However,] the Western powers accepted these limitations in order to protect

the remaining non-Muslim portion of the population considerably reduced after two wars, the

1915 events involving the Armenians”, and the population exchange stated above. The Lausanne

Peace Treaty, with its very specific and limited definition of minorities on the basis of religion,

was the Treaty that also outlined the country’s policy on minority rights for the years to come.

Generally, the Turkish domestic policy asserts that national minorities are those that are rec-

ognized by international treaties, implying the Lausanne Treaty which indeed provides safe-

guards for the non-Muslim inhabitants of Turkey and their rights13, consequently only Rum

12 Imvros and Tenedos are the names of Gökçeada and Bozcaada respectively, two neighbouring islands on the Ae-

gean Sea that belong to Turkey. 13 The articles 37-43, section III, Part I of the Treaty grant, the freedoms of living, religious beliefs and migration,

the rights of legal and political equality, the right of use of the mother tongue in the courts and a series of rights that

end from the holding of religious ceremonies to the right to open minority schools or similar institutions (Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, 1924).

21

Greek Orthodox Christians, Armenian Christians and Jews were being formally acknowledged as

minorities (Karimova & Deverell, 2001, p. 7) and are still recognized as those today. However,

since only a small fraction of the Turkey’s population is non-Muslim, “sizeable Muslim minori-

ties of sectarian as well as ethnic nature continue to exist…. such as the Kurds [ethnic] or …

such as the Alevis [religious] (Çarkoğlu & Çağın Bilgili, 2011, p. 351), which are “integrated

socio-economically but are treated politically as second-class citizens because they do not belong

to the dominant Turkish-Sunni-Muslim majority.” (Kaya & Harmanyeri, 2012, p. 13) Those

populations have been “banned from using their languages in schools and in media, and from

fully exercising their religious rights…. have been subjected to policies aimed at homogenizing

the population of Turkey and destroying minority language, culture and religion.” (Kurban,

2007, p.p. 3, 15-31)

Once more, as a result of Lausanne’s “restrictive definition of minorities on the basis of ‘reli-

gion’ instead of ‘religion, sect and denomination’, minorities within Islam are also excluded

from its protection.” (Kurban, 2007, p. 21) The size of all mentioned minority groups is un-

known and undetermined, since the state does not ask citizens to declare their ethnic, religious or

other origin in censuses14 (p. 11), thus the present thesis drawing its information from the work

of Kurban retains the original disclaimer clarifying that: “The quantitative estimates … should be

read with caution; they are mostly provided by the minorities themselves and are not supported

by academic research.”

2.1. Ethnic minorities

The Turkish state as formulated by the Turkish nationalist movement comprised itself by a part

of the Ottoman Empire, a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Empire. Turks were just one of the

ethnic groups of the Empire at the time, but through the Young Turks revolution and under Mus-

tafa Kemal’s leadership were to form the “Turkish Motherland and Nation” as later enshrined in

the preamble of the Constitution. Apart from Turks, the borders of the Turkish State enclosed a

series of ethnic minorities, notably Kurds, Roma and other populations of Caucasian origin as

well as the Laz. According minority rights to those minorities according to many Turks would,

14 The lack of minority censuses further hinders the analysis of other ethnic minorities that live in small and unde-

termined numbers around Turkey such as are Alevi, Sunni and Christian Arabs, Bulgarians, Bosnians, Pomacs and

Albanians, analysis which is not however in the interest of this thesis.

22

as per Kubicek (2004, p. 115), tempt dissolution, “while allowing religious intrusion into the

public sphere is seen as backsliding from modernity.”

2.1.1. Kurds

Kurds were first included and tolerated in the definition of the nation provided by the Ankara

Government, considered an integral part of the Turkish nation and they were never legally rec-

ognized as a minority group; since in their case civic nationalism15 has been firstly employed.

Nevertheless, Kurds were also the first ethnic minority to be affected by the consolidation of

nation-state authority under Mustafa Kemal trying to eliminate “imperial legacies such as the

binding role of religion in defining the nation and the autonomy of Kurdish tribal leaders after

1925” (Köksal, 2006, p. 506) 16 by promoting secularism, ethno-territorial nationalism and a cen-

tralized system. The above process ranging from tolerance and inclusion to pluralist policies17

and eventually to assimilation confirms the necessity for a “reformulation of the relations be-

tween states and minority groups… [especially taking into account that] government policy to-

wards minorities is defined under the influence of several factors18, and it may fluctuate until

state consolidation is completed” (p. 503) as it did in the Turkish case but also in the case of the

Turks in Bulgaria19.

However, Mustafa Kemal’s ambition led to, as noted by Gurses (2010, p. 341) “an aggressive

assimilationist policy toward the large Kurdish minority” located in the eastern part of the coun-

try. Indeed, as per Yildiz (2012, p. 152) “since the 1920s, the political and social attitudes of

Turkey’s successive governments towards Kurdish demands and interests have been marked by

15 Civic nationalism, as opposed to ethnic nationalism, is the form of nationalism where the state derives political

legitimacy from the active participation of its citizenry. States in which civic forms of nationalism predominate are

usually products of diverse ethnic group i.e. ex-settler colonies, in which ethnic nationalism is difficult to construct.

The civic nationalism notion adopting states are often characterized by adoption of the jus soli for granting citizen-

ship, deeming all persons born within the integral territory of the state citizens and members of the nation, regardless

of their parents' origin. 16 As per Yonca Köksal (2006, pp. 501, 506), “state policy became more assimilationist after the Sheikh Said rebel-

lion of 1925” itself a reaction to earlier efforts of state centralization. 17 Pluralist policies were applied in the early years of the Republic of Turkey for a short period of time and out of

necessity (Köksal, 2006, p. 518). 18 Such as the imperial legacy, ruling elite competition, responses of minority groups, legal definitions and interna-

tional pressure to name a few. 19 As analysed in the work of Köksal (2006, p. 516), the organizational capacity of Turks in Bulgaria and Kurds in

Turkey was indeed different. Before the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Turks in Bulgaria were the administra-

tion’s privileged community, since they represented a Muslim presence within a non-Muslim majority.

23

denial, intolerance and marginalization”, which according to Kirişci (2011, p. 336) failed to re-

consider the definition of national identity in a manner that would allow Kurds to express their

ethnic and cultural identity in public. This liberal idea has been generally opposed to the later

popular belief associating the Kurdish issue with terrorism, “aggravated by the economic and

social problems of underdevelopment in south-eastern Turkey and the support given to the PKK

by the international community”.

By the 1980s, Turkey had gone through significant changes notably “the transition to a mul-

tiparty democracy…, the rapid modernization [which] engendered a relatively freer political en-

vironment and gave rise to increases in income, literacy, and urbanization” followed by a series

of other factors, formed such a political environment that brought up the PKK (Gurses, 2010, p.

341), who launched its first attack and initiated an insurgency that lasted for 16 years and put

enormous human, economic, social, and political burdens on Turkey.

The capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 and the implicit Turkish army’s victory, the de-

clared unilateral ceasefire by PKK, also signified the abandon of the goal for the creation of an

independent Kurdish state and coincided with the Ecevit government’s aim “to develop a more

liberal democracy and improve Turkey’s human rights record” and determination to meet the

Copenhagen criteria (Kirişci, 2011, p. 337). However, the violence perpetrated by the PKK re-

sumed in 2004 and continued since 2012 when the current resolution process between Turkey

and the PKK was initiated. The demands have eventually “evolved from the goal of a completely

separate state into more viable goals such as institutionally protected autonomy”, promoting

smaller steps towards that goal such as the acknowledgement of the Kurdish identity thus bring-

ing it into the scope of legal and democratic protection of their “basic human rights fundamental

to the maintenance of ethnic identity, such as the freedom to educate Kurdish children in the Kurdish

language” (Gurses, 2010, pp. 341-342).

Up to our days, Kurds indisputably remain the largest ethnic and linguistic minority in Tur-

key, the estimate size of which claimed by various sources ranges from 10 to 23 per cent of the

total population of the country (as cited by Kurban, 2007, p. 11). Moreover according to Kurb-

ban (2007, p. 11), the Kurdish language is divided into Kurmanci, Zaza and other dialects and

the majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, with a significant number being Alevis. Historically

Kurdish populations concentrated in the eastern and south-eastern region of Turkey, where they

24

constitute the overwhelming majority, however large numbers have migrated to urban areas in

western Turkey (Kurban, 2007, p. 11).

2.1.2. Roma

After the Kurds, the second largest ethnic minority is considered the Roma, whose settlement

within today’s Turkey’s boarders has a long past. Although the Roma populations fell under the

category of the Muslim Millet during Ottoman times20, they were, similarly to other ethnic mi-

norities, not granted full rights and privileges, and discrimination against them occurred fre-

quently (Kolukirik & Toktaş, 2007, p. 762). It is true however that the previous experiences in

the Ottoman era continued in the Republican era when Turkish Roma as pointed out by Kolu-

kirik and Toktaş (2007, p. 762) “continue to face economic and social hardship…. [maintaining

a] low socio-economic status with low levels of income and education, and they furthermore face

disrespect from other people… [being] subject to pejorative and discriminatory practices in every

aspect of their lives.” Analogous to other ‘openings’ towards minorities21, the Justice and Devel-

opment Party [AKP] government officially acknowledged the discrimination against Turkish

Roma and declared that the necessary political, social and economic measures would be taken to

ward off this situation (Gençoğlu-Onbaşi, 2012, p. 599).

Roma according to information gathered by Kurban (2007, p. 12) live all across the country

and are not concentrated in any particular region. The Roma population as suggested by a re-

search conducted by the Bilgi University is estimated to be around 2 million (as cited in EU

Commission, 2006, p. 23), with its vast majority being Muslim, nearly half Sunni and half Alevi,

while there is a small number of Rum Greek Orthodox Christians (see Chapter 2.2).

20 Following the same logic, seeing the Roma as belonging to the dominant group as noted by Kolukirik and Toktaş

(2007, p. 762) Roma were included in the 1923 population exchange agreement between Greece and Turkey allow-

ing the Muslims of Greece, among them the Roma, to immigrate to Turkey. 21 The “Romani Opening” in Turkey followed the “Kurdish Opening”, “Alevi Opening” and an allegedly “Armenian

Opening”, all of which are projects initiated the AKP government with the allegedly aim of fighting against ethno-

religious discrimination (Gençoğlu-Onbaşi, 2012, p. 599).

25

2.1.3. Caucasians

Caucasians comprise a smaller ethnic minority which consists of various groups of peoples of

Caucasian origin22, each of which has its own language but Muslim religion and do unlike other

groups aspire to return to their historical homelands, where they had left behind a small minority.

As stated in the work of Kurban (2007, p. 11) “90 per cent of Caucasians in Turkey are Circassi-

an, while the majority of the remaining 10 per cent are Abkhaz”.

There is divergence on the estimates given by different sources regarding the significant Cir-

cassian population in Turkey, that may vary from 2 to 5 million people (Kurban, 2007, p. 11;

Zhemukhov, 2012, p. 505), whereas, according to Kurban (2007, p. 11) they live scattered in

numerous provinces in north-west, central and southern Turkey. Interestingly enough, during the

relatively more democratic political and legal structure of the 1990s, the Turkish state encour-

aged Circassians to establish associations mainly mobilized around the idea of an eventual return

to the homeland emphasizing that Circassian “ancestors had been expelled from their homeland

and had been tools in the political machinations of the Russian and Ottoman empires;… [con-

cluding] that a return to the homeland was inevitable” (as cited in Zhemukhov, 2012, pp. 232-

233).

According to Karimova and Deverell (2001, p. 16) Laz is a South Caucasian language related

to Georgian. The Laz population based on information gathered by Kurban (2007, pp. 11-12)

comprises of people of Caucasian origin which form two main groups inside Turkey, unified by

the Lazuri language that they do speak, the first of which having homeland the eastern half of the

Black Sea region, Rize and Artvin provinces (see Figure 1) and the second descending of immi-

grants who escaped the war between the Ottoman and Russian Empires in the late nineteenth

century and settled in Adapazarı, Sapanca, Yalova and Bursa, in western and eastern parts of the

Black Sea and Marmara regions (see Figure 1). Their number today according to the same source

is estimated to be between 750,000 and 1.5 million (Kurban, 2007, pp. 11-12).

22 Namely Abkhazians, Chechens, Circassians, Daghistanis, Ossetians and other various Turkic groups (Kurban,

2007, p. 11).

26

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27

2.2. Religious minorities

Mustafa Kemal’s conception of the Turkish nation avoids the distinction of any social segment

along with religion, ethnicity, and sectarianism (Kaya & Harmanyeri, 2012, p. 399) while in an

attempt to distance itself from the Ottoman legacy, “Kemalist discourse focused on ‘Turkish-

ness’ rather than Islam as the core of Republican identity…. [although] Islam is considered to be

an essential element of Turkish identity.” (Kose, 2013, p. 599) The essentiality and use of Islam

has been proven many times during the Republican era, when the content of the religion was

restructured and manipulated according to the needs of the Government, in recent years as well,

in the context of facilitating, monitoring and constraining certain religious activities sometimes

in contrast to the secular Kemalist principles. Taking the preceding into account and recognizing

that a genuinely secular state has no preferential links with any religion and neither promotes,

nor obstructs religious belief among its citizens, Turkey can be described as an ‘assertive secu-

larist’ state (Grigoriadis, 2009, p. 1196).

Moreover, as per Kaya and Harmanyeri (2012, p. 399) and on the discourse of the omission

of sectarian distinctions, “the republican Kemalist elite were difference-blind, and did not recog-

nize the ethno-cultural diversity of the Turkish nation”, making highly probable that the underes-

timation of ethno-cultural and religious diversity among the Muslim population of the Republic

was due to the preceding Ottoman Millet system23, which paradoxically influenced the success of

the Young Turks revolution as they note. Just as Bayar (2014, p. 115) also suggests, by situating

the definition of minorities along a Muslim versus non-Muslim divide, “the political elite was

bypassing the ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity of the nation … highlighting the presence of a

predominantly Muslim population” to whom the regime had to appeal to in order to legitimize its

rule. A similar appeal reappeared recently with the ongoing ‘Alevi Opening’ which started dur-

ing AKP second term in office following its victory in the 2007 general elections (see Chapter

4.2; Soner & Toktaş, 2011, p. 420).

Moreover, the recognition of religious other than the non-Muslim minorities during the for-

mation of the Republic would forego and undermine national unity by misleadingly simplifying

23 “The Millet system did not consider ethnic differences among Muslims. All Muslims, regardless of their other

differences, belonged to the one and the same ‘Muslim nation’.” (Kaya & Harmanyeri, 2012, p. 399)

28

a deeply divided Muslim community as a homogeneous entity24 (Bayar, 2014, pp. 114-115; Çar-

koğlu & Çağın Bilgili, 2011, p. 351). It is also true, that even though in line with the Lausanne

Treaty minorities are referred to as the ‘non-Muslim nationals’ living in Turkey, the Turkish

state interprets this definition to refer to the Rum Greek Orthodox Christian, Armenian and Jew-

ish citizens consequently, omitting other non-Muslims such as the Assyrians.

2.2.1. Alevis

Alevis are known to be the largest religious minority in Turkey and consequently the second

largest religious community in Turkey after Sunnis (Paul & Seyrek, 2014). Alevi is the term used

for a large number of heterodox Muslim Shi’a communities with different characteristics, which

do not form a homogeneous religious group, with many groups within Alevism itself, some more

influential than others. Their population is estimated to be between 10 and 40 per cent of the total

population (for estimate sources see Kurban, 2007, p.12), while Alevis are scattered throughout

Turkey. Linguistically, they consist of four groups: Azerbaijani Turkish, Arabic, Turkish and

Kurdish with the last two categories composing the largest Alevi groups (Kurban, 2007, p. 12).

According to Karimova and Deverell (2001, p. 9) 3 million of the Alevis are also Kurdish, thus

politically they face a dilemma whether should their primary loyalty be to their ethnic or to their

religious community25.

Alevis have not enjoyed any specific social, economic or political privileges in the past while

they have been subjects to ethnic homogenization and assimilation policies using religion as a tie

to connect ethnically diverse groups as part of the ethno-territorial Turkish identity during the

Turkish nation-building process. Alevi as pointed out by Karimova and Deverell (2001, p. 9)

experience both prejudice and discrimination in every aspect of their public lives, while not be-

ing able to manifest their belief openly in the Sunni-dominated society, consider their belief to be

misrepresented and misunderstood. In addition, contrary to Sunni religious leaders, there are no

government-salaried Alevi religious leaders and they are under-represented in the political

24 Hence an expansive definition of minorities was opposed by the Ankara Government during the Lausanne Con-

ference on that argumentative ground (Bayar, 2014, p. 115). 25 However, they also define themselves “primarily as a religious group belonging to the Shi’a denomination of

Islam.” (Kurban, 2007, p. 13) This preference, according to Erman and Göker (2000, p. 100) should also be exam-

ined under the effect of the Kurdish issue, the military confrontation between the PKK and the Turkish forces (see

Chapter 2.1.1) that turned Kurdish Alevis towards the religious elements of their ethnicity, stressing their Aleviness

in public discourse.

29

sphere. Alevi communities often lack the protection from harassment and other forms of abuse

by Sunni extremists, understandably since as Kose (2013, p. 603) concludes “the content and the

form of the religion was re-shaped according to an individualist and centrally organized [Sunni]

notion of official Islam.”

2.2.2. Caferis

Caferis are by majority ethnically Azerbaijani Turks who according to their own understanding

are presence in Turkey as “a result of the fact that their historical homeland in the province of

Iğdır (see Figure 1) was transferred from Russia to Turkey when the borders of the latter were

drawn” however, “they define themselves primarily as a religious group belonging to Shi’a Is-

lam.” (Kurban, 2007, p. 13) According to the information provided by a former official endorsed

by CAFERIDER, their national organization (as cited in Kurban, 2007, p. 13), the number of

Caferis is around 3 million, with the highest number of Caferis residing in Istanbul.

2.2.3. Armenians

Armenians are among the ancient people of Anatolia, with the majority of Armenians in Turkey

today belonging to the Orthodox Church, while there are also a few Catholic and Protestant Ar-

menians (Kurban, 2007, p. 12). While, according to Kurban (2007, p. 12), their number was

around 2 million during the Ottoman Empire era, today, slightly more than 60,000 remain,

50,000 of who live in Istanbul. Armenians run private schools providing primary and secondary

education in their mother tongue (Kurban, 2007, p. 12) and do generally actively participate in

the socio-economic life of Istanbul.

2.2.4. Jews

Another recognized minority is the Jewish community of Turkey. The majority of Jews in

Turkey are “descendants of Sephardic Jews expelled from Spain in 1492” while “their language

is Ladino, a variant of fifteenth century Spanish.” (Kurban, 2007, p. 12) Nowadays, around

23,000 Jews live in Turkey with the vast majority residing in Istanbul and Izmir.

2.2.5. Assyrians

Assyrians are a religious minority whose language and practices originated in early Christianity

and historically residing in their homeland, Turkey in the provinces of Mardin and Hakkari in the

30

south-east (see Figure 1). Although Assyrians are Christian, they cannot benefit from the rights

laid out in the Lausanne Treaty as the rest of the Christian minorities, thereafter it is forbidden to

found their own establishments, schools, or social institutions, while they remain banned from

public service (Karimova & Deverell, 2001, p. 12). As pointed out by Samur (2009, p. 328) due

to both external factors and differences in religious interpretation, the Assyrians split among

themselves and historically failed to establish their own state, while at times they were massa-

cred and exiled. The Assyrians residing in Turkey began to emigrate in the 1960s for economic

reasons, throughout the 1970s and especially the 1980s due to security concerns26. The majority

of the remaining Assyrians nowadays live in Istanbul (Kurban, 2007, p. 13).

2.2.6. Rum Greek Orthodox Christians

The Rum Greek Orthodox Christian community comprises of ethnic Rums27 as well as Arabic-

and Turkish- speaking Antakya Rum Orthodox Christians (Antiochians) who are not ethnically

Rum. According to Kurban (2007, p. 13) the comprised number of those two populations is esti-

mated to be around 16,000, while according to the Istanbul based RUMVADER, the central as-

sociation of the Rum community, the ethnically Rum residing in Istanbul are estimated to be

around 3500-4000 in number28.

3. Turkey’s path to EU accession

In July 1959, shortly after the creation of the EEC in 1958, Turkey made its first application to

join the community. The EEC's response to Turkey's application in 1959 was to suggest the es-

tablishment of an association until Turkey's circumstances permitted its accession. The negotia-

tions that followed resulted in the signature of the ‘Agreement Creating an Association between

26 One major reason for emigration of Assyrian was the intensified security problem in the region where they resid-

ed. In fact in many areas in south-eastern Anatolia, Kurds and Assyrians lived side by side therefore during the in-

creased acts of terrorism of PKK, villages populated only by the Assyrian community carried the same risk alike,

since they were situated near the areas of armed conflict. It is estimated that some 45,000 Assyrians migrated from

Turkey, mostly to western European countries, notably Germany and Sweden during this final wave of migration

(Karimova & Deverell, 2001, p. 12; Samur, 2009, p. 329). 27 According to Alexandris (1992, p. 17) “faithful to the belief that they descended directly from the citizens of Ro-

mano-Byzantine Constantinople, the Istanbul Greeks considered themselves as Romioi”. This fact has been

acknowledged by the Turks, who were addressing the Greek Orthodox community as Rum Milleti, thus “distin-

guishing a Greek of the Ottoman empire from one of the independent Greek state, whose citizens are known to the

Turks as Yunanlı.” 28 Data collected during the author’s traineeship term.

31

the Republic of Turkey and the EEC’29 on 12 September 1963. This first agreement, which en-

tered into force on 1 December 1964, aimed at securing Turkey's full membership in the EEC

through the establishment in three phases of a customs union, which would serve as an instru-

ment to bring about integration between the EEC and Turkey. At this point of the EU’s history,

no provisions towards the fulfilment of any political criteria in the framework of the accession

were in place. The declaration of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 and

the subsequent recognition of the illegal entity by Turkey led to a vigorous response by the Eu-

ropean Community that had a negative impact on the EU-Turkish relations.

However, from 1987 when Ankara applied for full membership to December 1999 when its

candidacy was formally approved by the Helsinki European Council30, certain reforms with a

view to democratize the entire political system have been undertaken by various governments,

nevertheless, characterized as “superficial and ad hoc…. [not representing] a fully-fledged and

committed programme of democratic transformation” (Tocci, 2005, p. 74). As suggested they

fell short in terms of human and minority rights protection, thus not meeting the political criteria,

set out by the Copenhagen European Council of June 199331. As affirmed by the CoE’s Parlia-

mentary Assembly (1999), the Turkish Government’s leverage at the time, the imminent threat

of terrorism perpetrated by the PKK, has been a hindering factor towards the full respect of the

rights of minorities, particularly of the Kurds. Nevertheless in the same document it is yet

stressed that only such temporary and imperative factors as terrorism can justify divergence with

respect to human and minority rights. In addition, as the CoE concluded, the long-standing Turk-

ish arguments advocating the non-implementation of cultural rights for ethnic groups should be

abandoned since those do not harm the territorial integrity of the Turkish state.

Additionally, it is true that the EU’s policies towards Turkey’s membership have been quite

ambiguous; limiting the EU’s influence on Turkey and therefore confirming the hypotheses that

the situation faced is a result of a vicious circle. As pointed out by Vardan (2009, p. 52) the tur-

29 The document is known as the ‘Ankara Agreement’. 30 Turkey and the EU formed a customs union in 1995, earlier than the grant of the official candidacy status. 31 In short, the Copenhagen criteria, set the following requirements for membership: a. the stability of institutions

guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; b. the existence

of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the

Union; c. the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, econom-

ic and monetary union and the administrative capacity to effectively apply and implement the acquis (see Chapter

4.1.1; EU European Council, 1993).

32

co-scepticism in Europe peaked during the first years of the century with a number of influential

European leaders32 openly opposing Turkey’s EU membership reflecting the public opinion

views towards Turkey’s EU membership in their respective countries (see Figure 2), while Tur-

key in the post 2005 period has been more and more reluctant to proceed to further reforms and

adjustments.

Figure 2 Austrian, French and German public opinion towards Turkey’s EU membership

Spring 2005

Note: Author’s compilation based on Eurobarometer spring 2005 wave data.

Concurrently, two interdependent developments were of great importance to the stance of

concern that EU formed towards Turkish politics in general and political parties in specific. First,

the Constitutional Court ruling of 1998 for the closure of the Welfare Party [ RP], an Islamist

party, on the grounds that it was violating the principle of secularism and the latter 2001 decision

of the Court that ruled to close the Virtue Party [FP], the successor to the Welfare Party. These

two party closures produced a series of political developments that were crucial in the formation

of the AKP and its first term politics as well as its strategic allegiance with the EU. Second, the

32 Including but not limited to the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, the Prime Minister [PM] of Austria, Wolf-

gang Schüssel, the leader of the Christian Social Union [CSU] in Germany, Edmund Stoiber, and the President of

France, Nicholas Sarkozy.

10,00%

21,00% 21,00%

80,00%

70,00%74,00%

10,00% 9,00% 5,00%0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Austria France Germany

In favour

Not in favour

Don't know

33

known as post-modern Turkish coup, initiated by the 1997 military memorandum that precipitat-

ed the resignation of Islamist PM Necmettin Erbakan and the end of his coalition government

has also produced serious concerns for the state of democracy in the country.

3.1. Post-Helsinki convergence

Coming back to Turkey’s path to EU accession and having the previous framework in mind,

the great leap forward came after 1999, under the incitement of the EU and in the context of the

official candidacy, which placed the country within “the stream of ‘conditionality compliance’

principles.” (Ulusoy, 2007, p. 472) Having Turkey on an equal footing with other candidate

countries marked the beginning of a series of reforms in the scheme of a pre-accession strategy,

which included enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the

political criteria for accession and particularly the issues of human rights (EU European Council,

1999), consequently the minority rights. As Font (2006, pp. 199-200), summarizes:

The Helsinki agreement opened a divergent institutional course of action and generated

new institutional dynamics with a series of self-reinforcing effects. First, it generated new

expectations and incentives on the applicant’s side to make progress in fulfilling the Co-

penhagen conditions. … Second, it replaced the EU traditional containment strategy with

a more proactive and cooperative one. … Third, it contributed to creating a climate of

opinion that viewed Turkey’s accession as being a plausible option in the long run.

Fourth, it reduced the range of possible EU options to those having a treaty-based legiti-

macy and framed them within the post-Helsinki institutional dynamic.

Indeed, Turkey in the framework of its EU accession prospect engaged in far-reaching constitu-

tional, legislative and policy reforms in order to meet the political criteria, while at the same time

the EU adjusted to the new realities. In particular, the EU offered Turkey an Accession Partner-

ship [AP] based on enhanced political dialogue and financial assistance tools. Especially, the AP

has been extensively used as a tool, promoting the enlargement processes, clarifying a road map

for the candidate countries with short- and medium-term measures, emphasising the immediate

priorities drawn by the political and economic aspects of the Copenhagen criteria and the im-

portance of concerned candidate country’s capacity to adopt the acquis (Ulusoy, 2007, p. 474).

The AP set out in a single framework the priority areas for further work identified in the EC’s

regular reports on the progress made by Turkey towards its EU accession, the financial means

34

available to help Turkey implement these priorities and the conditions, which will apply to that

assistance.

During the same period, the negotiated draft of an EU Constitution was affecting the charac-

ter of the EU itself. The controversy surrounding the question of whether the EU Constitution,

rejected by French and Dutch voters in May and June 2005, ought to have included some

acknowledgement of Europe’s Christian heritage in its Preamble was indicative of the complexi-

ty of the intensely debated issue. Nevertheless, the developments showed that the EU had aban-

doned the idea “of elevating a Christian culture to the status of membership condition” (Font,

2006, p. 200), and promoted secularism in general instead. As Michael O’Neill (2008, p. 244)

argues:

if the idea … was to use this cultural referent as an excuse to exclude Turkey from the

EU, that cause was already undermined by the fact that 15 million Muslims are already

residing there, some of them EU citizens.

The final text of the constitutional treaty, avoided making any explicit reference to cultural or

ethnic exclusivity, settling for the common European values in an otherwise culturally heteroge-

neous continent (2008, p. 245).

3.1.1. Ecevit coalition government’s reforms, 1999-2002

The Ecevit coalition government33 in response to the developments34, issued in March 2001 the

TNP35, “regarded for the most part as an unconvincing document.” (Ulusoy, 2007, p. 474), fol-

lowed however by the October 2001 first reform package of 34 constitutional amendments36,

33 A coalition government composed of the Democratic Left Party [DSP], the Motherland Party [ANAP], and the

Nationalist Movement Party [MHP]. 34 As Müftüler Baç (2005, p. 23) argues “the coalition government of DSP, ANAP and MHP could not act more

decisively earlier, partly because they were a coalition government and had different preferences, and partly because

the economic crisis became a more pressing problem.” Furthermore, the Turkish National Programme [TNP] itself

has been published in the framework of the EU demands set in the document concerning ‘the principles, priorities,

intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey’. Ac-

cording to the document (2001, p. 13), Turkey should prepare a national programme for the adoption of the acquis,

setting out a timetable for achieving the priorities and intermediate objectives established in the AP. 35 The TNP has been revised in July 2003 and December 2008 by the successive AKP government. 36 Τhe Constitution of 1982, most of which is still in force, has been ratified by popular referendum during the mili-

tary junta of 1980-1983. The 1982 Constitution re-asserted the powers of the State against inter alia democratic

values and human rights. Nevertheless, it has been modified many times since its ratification, with its last amend-

ment being the one in 2010.

35

succeeded by a second package of legislative reforms in February 2002 that affirmed the gov-

ernment’s reform commitment.

The elections of November 2002 that followed, completely changed the political landscape

wiping out the ANAP, DSP and MHP parties of the coalition government, giving rise to the new-

ly established AKP party and the CHP [Republican People’s Party] which became the major par-

ties of the Turkish Parliament. This dramatic political change should not be seen disconnected

from the reforms that the government put forward concerning the minority rights and the tradi-

tional cleavage in Turkish society between “the Turkish nationalists who perceive any kind of

diversity as a threat to the Turkish nation and the state, and the supporters of the recognition of

diversity in the Turkish society.” (Müftüler Baç, 2005, p. 23) As Müftüler Bac highlights (2005,

pp. 23-24), the granting of cultural rights to minorities, notably to the Kurdish groups has been

regarded as concessions to terrorism, while the abolition of the death penalty as serving conven-

iently PKK’s Abdullah Öcalan, comparing the reform packages’ clauses on increased freedom of

expression and cultural rights to giving in to the terrorists.

3.1.2. AKP’s first term reform period, 2002-2005

Between 2002 and 2005 the consolidated AKP government with a more reformist stance ap-

peared to be more forthcoming to the EU’s demands for domestic change, having as a conse-

quence a virtuous circle period as Kaya and Harmanyeri (2012, p. 410) note. At the same time

and until 2004 as per Saatçioğlu and Yılmaz: “the EU accession created pressure for the adapta-

tion for deep-seated reforms…when the credibility of EU conditionality37 towards Turkey was

still high” (as cited in Börzel & Soyaltin, 2012, p. 13). Political reforms have introduced changes

ranging from improved civil liberties and human rights to enhanced civilian control of the mili-

tary while the civil society has grown stronger (EU Commission, 2004, p. 15).

Concurrently, the AKP government gained additional support by backing the UN-proposed

Cypriot conflict-resolution Annan plan. The separate simultaneous referenda held in Cyprus on

24 April 2004 resulted in the majority Greek Cypriot population voting down the Annan plan,

whereas the minority Turkish Cypriot population voted for the Plan. The developments con-

37 The effects of EU conditionality on the Turkish EU accession are of great significance and therefore discussed

separately in Chapter 4.1.2.

36

firmed Erdoğan’s will to make progress on the issue of EU membership, by supporting a viable

Cyprus solution at the time.

3.2. The 2005 backlash and the post-2005 reforms discontinuity

The actual start of the accession negotiations in October 2005 has been however “a turning

point towards Eurosceptisism” (Kaya & Harmanyeri, 2012, p. 411). As Börzel and Soyaltin

(2012, p. 14) point out, since the AKP gained electoral support, consolidated its power and the

membership perspective became less credible in the post-2005 period, “the EU lost relevance for

domestic institutional change”, while the fading support for EU membership in the Turkish pub-

lic has “further undermined the potential for using EU accession as a legitimization device.” The

developments led to a vicious circle of deterioration of Turkish EU membership prospects.

The pursuit of EU membership, which served in the pre-2005 period as a way of shying away

from conflict, staying in power and carrying out the party’s declared political programme lost its

significance once the AKP consolidated its domestic power, topic thoroughly analysed in Chap-

ter 4.2. At the same time, the rising Eurosceptisism in Turkish public opinion38 (see Figure 3),

understandably because of the higher perceived costs of the EU accession against the uncertain

membership prospects, applied additional pressure adding to the opposing to the AKP politics

motives of the CHP, the main opposition party in the Turkish Parliament. The CHP’s uncoopera-

tive stance can therefore partly explain the discontinuity of the reforms, motivated in the previ-

ous period by Turkey’s EU accession prospect. Over time, the favourable conditions already

discussed (see Chapter 3.1.2) weakened further and eventually, after the AKP’s second election

victory in 2007, the CHP was joined in the Turkish Parliament by the ultranationalist MHP in

opposing further constitutional changes.

The negotiations led to an impasse also due to issues related to Cyprus’ EU accession as a

divided island, and the continuous scepticism of EU Member States, notably Austria, France,

Germany and the Netherlands with regard to Turkey’s EU accession39. In December 2006, nego-

38 According to Aydın and Keyman (as cited in Saatçioğlu, 2014, p. 97), the support for EU membership rose sys-

tematically since the receipt of EU candidacy and stabilized around 70 per cent between 2002 and 2004 to subse-

quently reach levels below 50 per cent in fall 2007 and eventually 41 per cent in 2011. 39 Hale (2011, pp. 326-327) elaborates on the factors and events that led to this scepticism starting in the winter of

2004, when early signs of the more negative tone from Europe emerged. At the Brussels European Council of De-

cember 2004 the EU heads of state and government stated that, “although the ‘shared objective of the negotiations is

37

tiations on eight Chapters was blocked40, as a consequence of the Turkish government’s refusal

to extend its customs union with the EU to the ten states that had joined the EU in May 2004,

most notably the Republic of Cyprus.

Figure 3 Turkish public opinion towards EU membership, 2004-2014

Note: Author’s compilation based on available Eurobarometer data.

3.2.1. AKP’s second term reform shortcomings, 2007-2011

The AKP won its second term in the July 2007 elections, expanding its electoral support

base41 and emerging as a stronger and genuine mass party in the Turkish political scene. Given

its enlarged power base and secured position in the secular political context, as noted by

Saatçioğlu (2014, p. 90) “due mostly to liberalizing EU reforms … the AKP started to rule ‘with

an exaggerated sense of its own power’.” becoming less dependent on the EU and its democrati-

zation agenda and more reluctant on implementing any reforms in the field of human and minori-

ty rights. It is true that AKP’s strategic alliance with the EU during its power consolidation peri-

accession’, the negotiations ‘are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand’,

and that the process, taking into account ‘the absorption capacity of the Union’.” 40 Following a unilateral blockage of negotiations on five chapters of the acquis communautaire imposed by Sar-

kozy’s newly elected Union for a Popular Movement [UMP] government in France. 41 Analysis of the 2002 and 2007 election results in the work of Yılmaz (2009, p. 61).

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

A good thing A bad thing Neither good or bad Don't know

38

od was rather crucial42 given the AKP’s Islamist roots (see Chapter 4.2). Those particular Islam-

ist roots provoked scrutiny by the members of the secular state establishment in the Turkish mili-

tary and high judiciary. These two particular institutions were in the core of previous either Is-

lamist party closure cases or coups d'état. They firmly accused the party of harbouring a hidden

‘Islamist agenda’ (Saatçioğlu, 2014, p. 91), while the party faced the threat of being banned by

the Constitutional Court two times, one before the November 2002 elections and one in 200843.

In spite of the recent developments elaborated in the chapter’s introduction, the government’s

political expediencies and its growing control over the secular state establishment, the extent of

the reform discontinuity should not be exaggerated. Reforms have not been entirely abandoned

by Turkey after 2005.

While the decreasing public support for EU accession affected the overall post-2005 reform

and AKP government’s Europeanization slowdown, according to some scholars (Saatçioğlu,

2014, p. 97), it cannot fully but only partly explain the reform reversing developments. Indeed

as elaborated by Eurobarometer (see Figure 3), the percentage of citizens who find the EU mem-

bership to ‘be a good thing’ had already fallen to around 50% before 2007, even reaching 44% in

spring 2006, without those low levels having as a result a reversal of reforms, that were reinitiat-

ed after 2007 (Saatçioğlu, 2014, p. 97).

3.2.1.1. The ephemeral AKP ‘openings’ to minorities

New conditions started emerging during the autumn of 2009. This period saw the reappear-

ance of a traditional extra-European influence actor in Turkish politics that in recent years and

during the post-Helsinki convergence period has been marginalized. The United States [US],

wishing to insure that the US withdrawal from Iraq will not produce a dangerous collision be-

tween Turkey and Iraqi Kurds encouraged and promoted a successful cooperation between them,

supporting Turkey in making effective moves to solve its own internal Kurdish problem. The US

geostrategic demands, coinciding with the AKP government’s narrow political interests and ex-

pediencies endorsed the AKP policy options, dictating the need to reduce the risk of terrorist

42 As Saatçioğlu (2014, p. 91) points out, “the liberalizing democratic reforms needed for membership promised to

make the rigid Kemalist model of secularism ‘less repressive and more inclusive’ and neutralize the secular state

bureaucracy.” 43 The closure was most recently prevented by a split decision by the Constitutional Court in March 2009.

39

attacks by the PKK and strengthen the AKP’s electoral position in the southeast by overcoming

primarily, the alienation of the Kurdish minority from the Turkish state (Hale, 2011, p. 328).

These processes launched in September 2009 what is referred to as the ‘Kurdish opening’, which

ended unsuccessfully after the propaganda victory promotion made by Democratic Society Party

[DTP] and its sudden ban by the Constitutional Court on December 11, 2009 on the basis of its

close association with the PKK. As Hale (2011, p. 329) noted, the events seemed to have put the

‘Opening’ in the freezer.

The AKP government during the following years made analogous ‘opening’ to either reli-

gious or ethnic minorities. Before the Kurdish, there have been initiatives towards the Alevi mi-

nority, starting from the summer of 2007 (Kose, 2010, p. 143) around the same time with the

2007 national elections. The AKP leaderships realizing the gains of such initiatives engaged it-

self in a series of similar ‘openings’ with both ethnic and religious minorities of the country. In

the late 2009 PM Tayyip Erdoğan inaugurated the latter known as ‘Romani opening’, while more

recently some commentators (Shlykov, 2015) made notions for an ‘Armenian opening’ based on

a series of recent actions taken by Davutoğlu’s government.

3.2.1.2. The ‘privileged partnership’ and the freeze of negotiations

Developments also took place at the EU level. The changing political landscape in the EU

member states raised doubts concerning the prospective admission of Turkey. Relevant discus-

sions in Germany and France were a key issue during the election campaign before the German

national elections in September 2005 and the French presidential elections of May 2007.

In Germany, as described by Hale (2011, p. 326), the proposed by Christian Democratic Par-

ty (CDU) ‘privileged partnership’ instead of a full Turkish membership gained ground, once the

CDU became the dominant partner in a coalition with the Social Democratic Party of Germany

[SPD] in the elections. The initial idea came from Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, representative of

the CDU in the Bundestag at the time. According to Guttenberg (zu) (2004) in the Turkish case

“a privileged partnership instead of an underprivileged membership is the better — and more

honest — option for both sides [EU and Turkey]” highlighting the EU objectives and proposing

a consistent strategy. Angela Merkel adhered to the ‘privileged partnership’ line, even after

forming her second coalition, this time with the Free Democratic Party [FDP] in October 2009,

mainly seeking to find ways “to fit German public concerns to Turkish expectations” (Pope,

40

2009). As further analysed by Pope (2009), the vague content of the ‘privileged partnership’,

ostensibly offers no new privileges to Turkey, which is in many ways closer to the EU than any

other non-member, confirmed by the fact that Turkey has already signed a Customs Union

agreement with the EU in 1995, the only major non-EU member state having signed such. Nei-

ther does the partnership offer a real and substantially new partnership, “since the main goal ap-

pears to be either to control Turkey or to exclude it from the decision-making that would make it

a true partner.” (Pope, 2009)

In France, the UMP also supported the stance, although Jacque Chirac himself joined other

European leaders in endorsing full Turkish membership as the eventual aim”, as Hale (2011, p.

326) notes. However, the presidential elections that brought Nikolas Sarkozy to the French pres-

idency have been an even more serious setback; during his presidency, the ‘privileged partner-

ship’ for Turkey became an official part of French government’s policy. Soon the French gov-

ernment unilaterally blocked negotiations on five chapters of the acquis that following the freeze

of negotiations on another eight chapters44.

Even before the French actions, the political processes in the member states had already

fueled the debate in the EU level. Indeed the EU elaborated on the Franco-German motions by

changing its stance towards Turkey to a more negative tone emerging from the wording of the

EC’s Negotiating Framework for Turkey subsequently accepted by the EU heads of state and

government, according to which (2005, p. 1):

The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-

ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While having full

regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Tur-

key is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be en-

sured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest pos-

sible bond.

44 Since Turkey has not complied with the requirements of the additional protocol of June 2005 extending the 1963

Ankara Agreement to the new EU members including Republic of Cyprus, the eight Chapters related to the Customs

Union did not open. These Chapters are: free movement of goods (Chapter 3), right of establishment and freedom to

provide service (Chapter 9), financial services (Chapter 11), agriculture and rural development (Chapter 13), fisher-

ies (Chapter 14), transport policy (Chapter 29), customs union and external relations (Chapter 30).

41

The Negotiating Framework document even though it implicitly state that the objective of the

negotiations is accession, clearly alternates the character of the negotiating basis as conceived by

the Turkish side. By describing the negotiations as an ‘open-ended’ process, it endorses the

‘privileged partnership’ as proposed by the Franco-Germans, while by including the vague

phrasing concerning the ‘absorption capacity of the Union’ weakens the negotiating safeguards

for Turkey furthermore and according to some scholars risks the credibility of the EU (Hale,

2011).

3.2.2. AKP’s third term politics, 2011 until today

In the 2011 Turkish national elections, AKP established its predominance in Turkey by increas-

ing its share of the vote for three elections in a row45, therefore giving rise to the academic dis-

cussion of whether we are confronted with the emergence of a predominant-party system in Tur-

key46 (Gumuscu, 2013; Müftüler-Baç & Keyman, 2012; Çarkoğlu, 2011). Clearly, as suggested

by Gumuscu, (2013, p. 224) the AKP “conforms to the trend of predominant parties in more

advanced democracies and follows a complex strategy that sustains the party’s political

dominance.” Precisely, this political domincance has as a consequence the dominance of AKP in

the agenda and policy setting process raising serious questions regarding the nature and quality

of Turkish democracy. Besides, the AKP’s ability to claim the record share of the 50 percent of

the total vote in the elections created huge confidence on the part of the Erdoğan’s leadership47.

The steady consolidation of the AKP’s power, initiated before the 2002 elections, led to a

progressive move of Erdoğan’s leadership from the periphery to the centre of the Turkish

political system (Öniş, 2014, p. 5). This was bolstered by the marginalization or at some point

even the elimination of forces of oposing and contesting its power and hegemony. The most

recent local and presidential elections of March 2014 and August 2014 respectedly, confirmed

45 As Giovanni Sartori in his 1976 work under the title ‘Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis’ (as

cited in Çarkoğlu, 2011, p. 44) argues: “three consecutive election wins are the criteria for a system to qualify as a

dominant party system”. 46 Dominant parties in competitive parliamentary systems are distinguished by three characteristics, (1) the vote or

seat shares in representative assemblies obtained by the parties in the system. (2) the nature of the opposition against

such parties and (3) the time-span over which these parties acquire a certain majority of the votes and seats

(Çarkoğlu, 2011, p. 44). 47 Given the fact that the rest of the remaining parties maintain very different identity being naturally unable to pre-

sent a unified front.

42

the AKP’s political domination; hence they ended both succesful for the AKP. The presidential

election brought to power the incumbent PM Erdoğan, who was elected President of the Turkish

Republic outright by a simple majority of the vote in the first round.

3.2.2.1. New agenda, relabeled approach and the loss of the EU

momentum

In this environment, Turkey’s democratic, let alone the minority rights record over the last

years has been mixed but mostly declining. As pointed out by Özbudun (2014, pp. 160-161) on

the positive side, the most important development was the ceasefire with the PKK, since March

2013, that allegedly was the event that led to the introduction of certain modest reforms relating

to the Kurdish issue through direct talks with the imprisoned Öcalan. In spite however, of the

ceasefire and the termination of the armed conflict in southern Turkey in the short-term, as noted

by Öniş (2014, p. 8), it remains to be seen “whether this process will be firmly institutionalized,

leading to a durable peace in the long-term.” It is too early to tell, whether the democratic

demands of the Kurds, especially on the issue of selfautonomy within a federal structure, will be

accommodated through the new Constitution, since commentators suggest that the kurdish

involvement has been simply a tactical move on the part of Erdoğan and the AKP, in terms of

changing the Constitution towards a presidential system and counting support of the Kurds in the

process (Öniş, 2014, p. 8).

Other reforms involved the return of certain properties to non-Muslim, namely Greek and

Armenian minorities charitable foundations, unlawfully taken away from them in earlier dec-

ades, while at the same time, the developments led to the announcement of the ‘democratization

package’ by Erdoğan on 30th September 201348. Even so, the Europeanization impetus of the

third AKP government further diminished and even fully halted during the second semester of

the 2012. From the July 1st 2012 to December 31st 2012, Turkey froze relations with the EU for

the duration of the Republic of Cyprus’ rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, despite the

48 The modest Democratization Package among others and relevant to the minority rights protection, promised to

allow the conduct of political activity and education in private schools in languages and dialects other than Turkish,

to apply a three year imprisonment punishment for hate crimes committed on a racial, ethnical, sexual, religious, or

other basis and for the prevention of religious worship by using threat or coercion (Albayrak, 2013; Özbudun, 2014,

p. 161)

43

actions taken by the EC, which in May 2012 launched what was termed as the ‘positive agenda’

with Turkey and described as intended to bring fresh dynamics into EU-Turkey relations its ac-

complishments are rather unclear. What some have categorized as dynamic changes that have

taken place in Turkey, driven in part by its EU aspirations, Turkey’s EU accession process con-

tinues at a relatively slow pace (Morelli, 2013, p. 15).

Even though Turkey remains part of the Western security structures, with its NATO mem-

bership and strategic bilateral ties with the US continuing being of critical importance and its

economic ties to the EU still remaining vital, as argued by scholars “it is no longer the country

that was firmly Western oriented and committed to the EU” (Öniş, 2014, p. 3). Indeed in many

occasions in the past PM Erdoğan opened the debate on Turkey’s membership to other interna-

tional organizations other than the EU. Most recently, in 2013 PM Erdoğan opted-out for mem-

bership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO]49; hence making an ‘opening’ towards

Russia and China (Blank, 2014; Keck, 2013). However, it is unclear whether the then PM’s and

current President’s increasing rhetoric about such possible memberships is not purely symbolic

or it represents a real change of mind-set. It is true that in order for Turkey’s EU membership

candidacy to move forward a virtuous dynamic between the country and the EU should be ignit-

ed; hence overcoming the notable vicious circle of relations deterioration. The limited progress

observed by Tocci (2013) in:

François Hollande’s lifting of the veto over one accession negotiation chapter50, Germa-

ny’s appreciation of the need to re-dynamise EU–Turkey ties, the prospects for a re-

launched Cyprus peace process after Nicos Anastasiadis’ election in Cyprus, the Cyprus

bail-out, and the potential dynamics brought about by Eastern Mediterranean gas could

all converge to unblock the paralysis in Turkey’s accession talks.

Positive developments should therefore be capitalized, since they provide the basis of renewed

interest from both sides.

49 The SCO’s members include Russia, China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. 50 Chapter 22 includes maters of Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments and is one of the five

Chapters frozen back in 2007 by the UMP Sarkozy government.

44

3.2.2.2. The state of the Turkish democracy and the EU member-

ship perspective

At the same time, one must notice that negative developments have somewhat weakened the

image of Turkey in the EU. The developments were mainly, the recent Gezi park protests, the

AKP executives’ corruption cases, as well as the ban of twitter and YouTube. In early June 2013,

public protests in Turkey over the future of Gezi park and the government’s tough reaction pre-

cipitated, as summarized in the work of Morelli (2013), a harsh response from the EC and the

European Parliament [EP] expressing concerns for the disproportionate and excessive use of

force by the Turkish police and the government’s handling in general. In general, the events un-

derline a manifestation of a growing confrontation that is refuelled by the government’s politics

and the Erdoğan’s lifestyle. Notable examples include the recently inaugurated Presidential Pal-

ace as well as another hefty acquisition of a Presidential jet plane. In his third term of office,

Erdoğan, as argued by Kirişci (2014a), became “increasingly linked to a majoritarian understand-

ing of democracy and scant respect for criticisms and dissent.”

Although apparently unlinked to one another, the Gezi protests were followed in December

2013 by the opening of a series of corruption investigations by the police and the legal estab-

lishments, both of which have long been suspected of being influenced by the Gülen movement51

(Çarkoğlu, 2014, p. 4). The scandal involved close relatives of high-ranking government- and

state- officials that were in the possession of currency allegedly used in bribery, fraud, money

laundering and smuggling of gold. The result has been a cabinet reshuffle ousting the accused of

corruption AKP ministers.

One of the indirect developments of the Gezi park protest and the corruption cases52 has been

the ban of popular social media platform twitter, following a Turkish court’s decision. The deci-

sion came on March 20 2014 as the country prepared to go to the ballot box for the local elec-

51 Fethullah Gülen is the influential founder a preacher and former imam, that started a moderately Islamist group

known as the hizmet or ‘the service’. According to many claims, the group has considerable influence over several

state institutions, particularly the judiciary, the police, and the national intelligence agency. The Gülen was a critical

ally in the AKP’s efforts during its early years in power, the collaboration between PM Erdoğan’s government and

the movement has increasingly turned sour (Çarkoğlu, 2014, p. 1). 52 As reported by Kirişci (2014a), during the Gezi Park protests, Erdoğan not only accused social media of becoming

a channel for ‘spreading lies’ but his dislike of the media was exacerbated after twitter “was widely used to spread

corruption allegations against him, his son and members of his government.”

45

tions, essentially an indirect confirmation of the government’s legitimation, triggering both do-

mestic and international reaction. On April 3, the site was unblocked; 24 hours after the Consti-

tutional Court ruled that the ban was a violation of free speech. During this process, YouTube

was also banned in Turkey on March 27, this time, after a leak of an alleged top-secret Turkish

government meeting on Syria. The Constitutional Court unblocked YouTube on May 29, 2014,

citing freedom of expression.

Moreover, Erdoğan has been rather silent with respect to EU-Turkey relations, while the EU

and its member state officials have publicly expressed their discomfort with the AKP govern-

ment’s authoritarian ways (Kirişci, 2014b). Nevertheless as Tocci (2014, pp. 3-4) concludes, the

EU itself is in a profound state of transformation since the eruption of the Eurozone crisis, which

has side-effectively brought the integration project to a brink. Instead, what is clear, as elaborat-

ed, is that:

if the EU successfully concludes its banking union, proceeds towards a fiscal union,

bolsters its democratic legitimacy, and tackles crucial policy challenges spanning

across defence, energy, migration, and infrastructure matters, it will be a profoundly

different union from the one we know today.

Taking into account that further integration makes enlargement more complicated and requires

deeper adjustments from the candidate states, the new conditions will make less probable a suc-

cessful Turkish EU accession.

4. Europeanization and minority rights protection in Turkey

The Europeanization of Turkish politics provided a new question to the enlargement process

academic discussion, presented and analysed in Chapter 1; hence, whether the example of the

Turkish membership is stretching the concept of Europeanization itself to its Limits (Börzel &

Soyaltin, 2012). Moreover, concerning the specific case study of minority rights, it indisputably

involved a series of different factors and agents other than the EU that nevertheless contributed

to Europeanization in a more general sense.

The bid to join the EU has brought Turkey under closer scrutiny from the EU. The EU from

the beginning identified areas in which Turkey needed to undertake policy reform in order to

make its standards converge with those of the EU. This would materialize mainly by the adop-

tion of a legal framework on anti-discrimination and the harmonization of Turkey’s national le-

46

gal framework with the EU acquis, inter alia concerning minority rights, to “avoid breaches of

human rights” and with special attention towards a viable resolution of the Kurdish issue (Ari-

kan, 2010, pp. 22-23; Kurban, 2007, p. 9).

Moreover, the direct involvement of the EU became critical with respect to the resolution of

the Kurdish issue, for at least three reasons best synopsized in the work of Kirişci (2011, p. 337).

Firstly, by granting “a powerful incentive based on conditionality as well as a relatively clear

blueprint for reform expressed in the AP”. Secondly, by providing, according to Tocci (2005; as

also cited in Kirişci, 2011, p. 337), “a ‘push’ or ‘trigger’ for growing domestic demands and ef-

forts to reform”, based on a promise to start accession negotiations if the Copenhagen political

criteria were met. Finally, by tipping the balance in Turkey in the favour of the liberal approach

against coalitions resisting reform efforts.

Subsequently, the EU’s promise of membership talks contingent on further democratization

emerged as a triggering factor for the reform measures that were adopted until 2005. However,

the pace of reforms slowed down after 2005 when negotiations opened. Critical developments on

the EU’s and its member state’s side contributed to this outcome and were therefore already ana-

lysed (see Chapter 3). In general, the EU stance reflected the member state governments’ strive

to focus more on the absorption capacity of the EU as a factor shaping the terms of Turkey’s

membership negotiations by including ‘special arrangements’ (Saatçioğlu, 2014, p. 96) while

considering the eventual Turkish accession (see Chapter 3.2.1.2).

4.1. Europeanization factors in Turkey’s accession process

The concept of Europeanization as already analysed in Chapter 1, involves a series of different

processes, agents and factors that contribute to domestic adjustment and reforms. In short, as

summarized by Böhler, Pelkmans and Selcuki (2012, p. 1) “adopting the full acquis in earnest,

fulfilling the political and economic Copenhagen criteria, demonstrating the required administra-

tive capacity”, generally displaying a readiness to address other outstanding issues in a spirit of

cooperation and eagerness to join the EU are vital parts of a successful pre-accession process.

Accordingly, because of the central role of the acquis adoption and the Copenhagen criteria sat-

isfaction, as well as the demonstration of the required administrative capacity in order for re-

forms to be successfully introduced those individual aspects should be analysed into more detail.

47

4.1.1. The Copenhagen criteria

The European Council of Copenhagen in June 1993 laid down the criteria and rules that define

whether a country is eligible to join the EU that have already applied to the consecutive 1995,

2004 and 2007 enlargement waves. Moreover, the criteria find application to EU accession can-

didate countries, among others to Turkey. It is important to stress that the criteria can be divided

into three categories of both explicit and implicit nature, namely into political and economic,

explicitly deriving from the document’s wording as well as legislative, deriving from the acquis’

adoption practice. The criteria generally request that a state has the institutions to preserve dem-

ocratic governance and human rights, a functioning market economy, and accepts the obligations

and intent of the EU. In fact, according to the Copenhagen European Council Presidency Con-

clusions (1993, p. 13):

Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions

guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of

minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope

with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes

the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to

the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

Again, the Copenhagen criteria make specific reference to the respect for and protection of

minorities, confirming that ethnic, linguistic and religious rights are enshrined in European

standards. Since 1993, the content of the criteria is being reflected in the successive EU legisla-

tion and the framework for negotiations with particular candidate states. In other words, the ful-

filment and complete satisfaction of the political criterion is crucial for the European Council

decision to open negotiations. However, the post-Copenhagen EC practice as argued in the work

of Emerson (2004, p. 2) showed a shift from an ‘absolutist position’ to the acknowledgement of

‘sufficient progress’ towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria as sufficient condition for the

opening of negotiations53. If the EU strictly followed its prior doctrine, the conclusion would

53 Emerson (2004, p. 2) drawing his examples from the CEEC candidates observes the adoption of four categories

(1) Yes (2) Yes, but (3) On the way (4) No, revealing the spectrum of possible assessments that may or not lead to

the opening of EU negotiations for the candidate states. As he further notes, for Turkey the present (2004) assess-

ment of the EU seemed to be neither ‘Yes’ nor ‘No’.

48

have been that Turkey did not yet fulfil the Copenhagen criteria back in 2004, in spite of the no-

table legislative reform progress (see Chapter 4.1.2.1). In this framework, the Brussels European

Council of December 2004 in conclusion:

welcomed the adoption of the six pieces of legislation identified … [and] decided that …

Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotia-

tions provided that it brings into force … specific pieces of legislation.

4.1.2. The conditionality mechanism and the external incentives model

The EU’s main tool for inducing national domestic political change is its conditionality mecha-

nism. In principle, conditionality is invoked to explain the role of the EU in inducing not only

member states but also candidate countries to adopt reforms and harmonize their laws and poli-

cies with those of the EU (Kirişci, 2011). In the post-Helsinki era, Turkish politics have been

highly exposed to conditionality, in the framework of Turkey’s need to comply with the Copen-

hagen Criteria that triggered an unprecedented reform programme, which considerably improved

minority rights (Grigoriadis, 2008, p. 35).

Furthermore, the external incentives model has also been assumed able to enlighten Turkey’s

adjustment and reform process. As elaborated by Cengiz and Hoffmann (2013, p. 417), crucially,

supporters of the external incentives model have argued that credible EU commitment to future

membership constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratic reforms in candi-

date countries, whereas low adoption costs and weak veto players constitute necessary and suffi-

cient conditions. However, Cengiz and Hoffmann’s analysis based on empirical data, most re-

cently confirmed the connection and interaction of the presence of a strong and credible com-

mitment by the EU to Turkish accession and the Turkish government’s adoption of initial re-

forms.

This credible commitment showed weakening signs during the critical juncture of the year

2005 that materialized in the wording of the latter EC’s Negotiating Framework for Turkey. The

initial reforms proceeded in spite of high domestic adoption costs and strong veto players that the

government faced at the time. As already analysed, even the public opinion towards the EU

memberships has been steadily decreasing (see Figure 3). Yet, as stressed by the researchers

(Cengiz & Hoffmann, 2013, p. 417) and argued in this thesis:

49

once the EU’s credible commitment declined with the stagnation in accession talks, the

reform process also slowed considerably despite a continuous decrease in adoption costs

as well as a weakening of veto players. Thus, in this specific case we have found that

credible EU commitment constituted a necessary and sufficient condition, whereas weak

veto players and low adoption costs constituted neither necessary nor sufficient condi-

tions.

Additionally, in the same work, a dynamic relationship between adoption costs and EU con-

ditionality can only marginally be observed. As Cengiz and Hoffmann (2013, p. 417) argue, Tur-

key’s AP has required removal of the political powers of non-majoritarian institutions, most no-

tably the military. Since those institutions constituted strong veto players, adoption costs have

decreased considerably and continuously as the EU-induced democratic reforms were adopted.

The above assumption is confirmed by the AKP reforms continuation up to a certain point after

which, it is not clear whether the shift has essentially been provoked by the weakening of the

credibility of the EU commitment, or because of pressure applied by strategic veto players, in

combination with the high reform adoption costs.

As suggested by this thesis, the shift in the EU’s stance toward the Turkish membership per-

spective, reflecting the shift in power in its member states confirmed the EU commitment dis-

continuity. At the same time and especially after 2005, as noted by Börzel and Soyaltin (2012, p.

13), “the EU certainly has provided not only new opportunities, but also legitimacy for the AKP

government to overcome the resistance of veto players in the state structure”. Those include not

only the military but also large parts of the judiciary and bureaucracy. More recently, the gov-

ernment achieved a further weakening of the judiciary and bureaucracy as well as of media not

related to the government, allegedly adjacent to the Gülen movement54. Nevertheless, the devel-

opments mirror rather narrower political expediencies, namely the Erdoğan-Gülen collaboration

backlash, than pressures of Europeanization.

54 In the framework of the Turkish government’s accusation of the Gülen movement allegedly having infiltrated the

police and judiciary, on 14 December 2014, the Turkish police arrested senior journalists and media executives on

charges of forming, leading and being a member of an armed terrorist organization.

50

4.1.2.1. Legal coercion and the acquis communautaire

A fundamental part of EU candidacy has always been apart from the conditions, the timing of the

candidate's adoption, implementation and enforcement of all current EU rules, known as the ac-

quis. The acquis is divided into 35 different policy fields, chapters inter alia such as transport,

energy, environment each of which is negotiated separately. However, for the purpose of this

thesis, it is Chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, which is of importance 55.

EU policies in the area of judiciary and fundamental rights aim to maintain and further de-

velop the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice. This is achieved by promoting the es-

tablishment of an independent and efficient judiciary, by fighting corruption representing a threat

to the stability of democratic institutions and the rule of law and by ensuring the respect for fun-

damental rights and EU citizens’ rights.

With this in mind one must notice that initially, during the Ecevit coalition government, se-

verely criticised articles of the Turkish Penal Code and of the Law for the Struggle against Ter-

rorism [Anti-Terror Law]56 used by the courts to restrict human cultural and political rights, inter

alia, the freedom of expression and association, were amended (see Table 2; Tocci, 2005, p. 73;

Ulusoy, 2007, p. 474). As Ulusoy (2007, p. 474) further points out the “reforms of August 2002

… [brought about the] extension of rights over religious property of the non-Muslim minorities

[recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne], and rights of broadcasting [and receiving education] in

languages other than Turkish – particularly referring to regional dialects and the Kurdish lan-

guage.”

The succeeding AKP government maintained the reforms pace; hence in the framework of

the constitutional amendments passed in July 2003 the freedom of speech and of association

were extended and a series of cultural, religious and linguistic rights were safeguarded. The new

Law on Associations introduced in July 2004 brought a new and more transparent framework in

the organization and operation of the associations. Moreover, during the first AKP government

various covenants of the UN were adopted, covenants that Turkey had traditionally held reserva-

55 Chapter 23 covers the independence, impartiality, integrity and efficiency of the judiciary, the fight against cor-

ruption, and respect for fundamental rights and EU citizens’ rights, as guaranteed by the acquis and by the EU Char-

ter of Fundamental Rights. 56 Articles 159 and 312 of the Turkish Penal Code and Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law (No. 3713)

51

tions about. The Turkish Parliament proceeded to the ratification of the ‘International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights’57 and the ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultur-

al Rights’.

Table 1 Turkish reforms regarding minority rights, 2000-2008

Date Type Changes

October 2001 Constitutional Package 34 amendments to the 1982 Constitution

February/March

2002

Constitutional Package Constitutional amendments inter alia concerning the freedom

of expression and association

August 2002 Constitutional Package and

Anti-Terror Law Revision

Abolish of the death penalty; allowance of broadcasting in

languages other than Turkish

December 2002 Constitutional Package Operationalization of previous reforms; expansion of the

freedom of the press and of association

May/July 2003 Constitutional Package and

Anti-Terror Law Revision

Repeal Article 8 of Anti-Terror Law58; extent of freedom of

speech and association, cultural, religious and linguistic rights

May 2004 8Harmonization Package 10 amendments to the Constitution, inter alia on the freedom

of press and the supremacy of supranational treaties over

domestic law.

July 2004 New Law on Associations

September 2004 New Penal Code

February 2008 New Law on Associations

April 2008 Amendment of Penal Code Amendment of Article 30159 strengthening the safeguards for

freedom of expression.

Note: Author’s compilation, based on the work of Müftüler Bac (2005, p. 22), Tocci (2005, pp. 73-74), Hale (2011,

p. 327)

Furthermore, the AKP government showed signs of appreciating the need to ensure the effective

implementation of the new laws (Tocci, 2005, p. 74), thus the EU quickly recognized the gov-

ernment’s “great determination in accelerating the pace of reforms, which have brought far-

reaching changes to the political and legal system.” (EU Commission, 2004, p. 11) In its 2004

57 Its article 27 states that “in those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging

to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their

own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.” 58 This article had been used in the previous decade for the imprisonment of a number of journalists and publishers

for crimes against the ‘indivisible unity of the Turkish Republic’. 59 According to which, insulting the ‘Turkish identity’ and state institutions a punishable offence.

52

progress report on Turkey, the EC (EU Commission, 2004) recognized the accomplishment of

the Turkish Parliament which according to the report “between October 2003 and July 2004,

adopted a total of 261 new laws”.

Several articles of the Constitution and laws were amended to meet the new requirements. As

Grigoriadis (2007, pp. 424-425) summarizes, the amendments involve constitutional reforms

which undeniably reached unprecedented levels by lifting limitations, expanding fundamental

rights and freedoms and allowing the use of minority languages aiming at bringing about con-

vergence of the Constitution with the Copenhagen criteria but also in the content of other various

legislation. Soon, a new more liberal Law on Associations was introduced in February 2008 (see

Table 2), significantly improving “the property rights of religious foundations established by the

small non-Muslim minorities in Turkey60” (Hale, 2011, p. 327). In April 2008, an amendment of

Penal Code’s Article 301 has been ratified by the Turkish Parliament (see Table 2), further

strengthening the safeguards for freedom of expression. Regardless of those reforms, a large

unachievable agenda pointed out by the successive EC progress reports (2008, pp. 23-27; 2009,

pp. 18-29) remained61.

The negotiations stalled further following the EU Council meeting of December 2009,

where the Greek Cypriot Administration unilaterally stated that it would block the opening of

further six chapters, among others of Chapter 23. Chapter 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights)

and Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) remain politically blocked by the Republic of

Cyprus, despite the EC’s and EP’s call for them to be opened. The EC, eventually, in May 2012,

after some years of not opening negotiating chapters, tried to reinvigorate the process with a so-

called ‘Positive Agenda’. In the last two months of 2013 the ‘Positive Agenda’ resulted in “the

opening of negotiations on Chapter 22 on regional policy, the signing of a readmission agree-

ment and the adoption of a visa liberalisation roadmap.” however, this “did little to address the

root causes of the lethargy in relations.” (Blockmans, 2014, p. 4)

60 Notably the Armenian, Jewish and Rum Orthodox Christian minorities. 61 Summarized by Hale (2011, p. 327), the Turkish government failed to further extend the cultural and other rights

of the Kurdish minority. Indeed the EC’s concerns included the continued restrictions of freedom of speech and

communication, the continuation of compulsory classes in religious culture and ethics in primary and secondary

schools that ignored the interests of the Alevi minority, and restrictions on the Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriar-

chate, in particular, the closure of its seminary, the Halki Theological School on the Marmara island of Heybeli.

53

In general, the distance covered with successive legislation confirms both the usefulness

of conditionality as a reform enhancing mechanism as well as the constructivism-based lesson-

drawing mechanism. The latter could successfully explain the continuation of reforms after the

AKP consolidated its power and by the time, the EU perspective provided fewer benefits and

became less popular in the Turkish public opinion (see Figure 3). As assumed in Chapter 1, the

policy-making actors adopt rules, successfully applied in other countries or issues expecting an

effective domestic policy problem solution.

4.1.2.1.1. Normative shortcomings

Nevertheless, the government-adopted measures, laws and constitutional amendments; they have

been rather harshly criticized by subsequent EC’s Turkey progress reports as being half-

measures and legal framework improvements short of EU standards. For example, the status of

the assessment process of Chapter 23, which, for example, has been open for negotiations until

December 2009 and for a limited time, confirms the efforts further needed (see Table 2). Unde-

niably, the EU remains an important anchor for Turkey’s economic and political reforms, while

as elaborated in the EC’s 2014 progress report (p. 1) “it is in the interest of both Turkey and the

EU that the opening benchmarks for Chapter 23 … [lead] to opening of negotiations”. This is

important in the light of the Turkish government’s response following allegations of corruption

in December 2013 that gave rise to serious concerns regarding the independence of the judiciary

and separation of powers in Turkey.

Table 2 Chapter 23 assessment process and current status

Chapter

EC’s

assessment

at

start

Screening

completed

2007 EC

report

2008 EC

report

2009 EC

report

Chapter

froze

Current

status

23. Judiciary

& Fundamen-

tal Rights

Considerable

efforts

needed

13

October

2006

Limited

progress

Some

legislative

progress

Some

progress

08

December

2009

Further

efforts

needed

Note: Author’s compilation.

Concerning the protection of minority rights, it should be stressed that Turkey has not yet

signed the CoE Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and does not

54

recognise minorities other than those defined by the Lausanne Treaty. (EU Commission, 2000, p.

19). Moreover, even in areas that have been tackled with recent legislation in the framework of

the Europeanization pressures, more actions should be taken. It is true that none of the

Europeanization reforms suggested in the relevant literature have been successfully introduced.

The provision of safeguards to the legislated freedom of expression and association as well as to

the property rights and the lift of limitations to the education of the clergy of the non-Muslim

minorities should be further promoted and be recognized to the highest level. Furthermore, as

Emerson argued back in 2004 (pp. 3-4), the Kurds should especially receive important benefits

regarding the freedom of expression which has been mostly tackled by the successive reforming

legislation ever since.

In the framework of the ‘democratization package’, some minority-protection-oriented re-

forms have been included. On hate crimes according to an article of Turkey Agenda (2014), the

package stipulates that hate speech or acts related inter alia, to language, race, nationality, col-

our, religion or sectarian differences will be punished by up to three years in prison. Moreover,

according to the same source, Assyrian confiscated property in Mardin (see Figure 1) has to be

returned by law. Additionally, the package also announced the establishment of a Roma lan-

guage and cultural institute. Other reforms were the abolishment of restrictions on collecting

charitable donations and measures of deterrence by legal punishment from any action preventing

the practice of religious beliefs. The announcements also included reforms related to the Kurdish

issue; it does not however cover key steps essential for a viable resolution to the long-lasting

Kurdish issue62 (Cengiz O. , 2013).

4.2. Domestic political expediencies

Overall, as Börzel and Soyaltin (2012, p. 16) argue, domestic change in Turkey has been less

and less “driven by the EU and its fading conditionality, but by the political agenda of the Turk-

ish ruling elites and their preference for consolidating their political power”. At the same time,

the decision of the same elites to focus on failed restrictive policies in minority rights of previous

62 As per Cengiz (2013) “the wide-ranging definitions of ‘terror’ and ‘organization membership’ that are the cause

of the detentions of many Kurdish politicians and activists would remain” in place. At the same time, legal provi-

sions that enable mass detentions would stay unchanged. Concluding, the package limits mother tongue education

only to private schools not including public schools.

55

governments was perceived and called forth in order to please their constituencies and increase

their voting shares. As further elaborated by Grigoriadis (2009, p. 1199), the AKP leadership

realized that the EU could be of critical help in its effort to gain political legitimacy and promote

the sensitive, religion-related aspects of its political agenda. In this framework, the AKP’s first

and partly second term in office, until 2008 (see Table 1), demonstrates the use of Europeaniza-

tion reforms as an instrument of domestic political empowerment (Saatçioğlu, 2014, p. 90).

Interestingly enough, as summarized by Börzel and Soyaltin (2012, p. 14), the sum of Tur-

key’s Europeanization itself appears to be often ‘bottom-up’ or ‘indirect’. In the epicentre of this

hypothesis is the assumption that domestic actors are “not merely downloading EU policies nor

do they simply ignore them”. It must therefore be stressed that the politics of AKP simply

demonstrate the “(ab)use [of] the EU as a ‘legitimization device’” in order for narrower political

interests to be promoted and introduced.

It provides no surprise that reforms in aspects of cultural rights, the improvement of the rule

of law and of fundamental freedoms63, altogether, reforms in the legal system, analysed in previ-

ous chapters, liberalized the Turkish political environment, thus enhancing AKP’s power and

survival prospects with respect to long-standing secular ‘rivals’ in the military and high judiciary

(Saatçioğlu, 2014, pp. 92-93). Those institutions had monitored and scrutinized religion-based

parties for years, a fact that has been in the core of AKP’s reform stance and EU dedication since

the AKP-advocated new version of secularism sought to transform Turkish politics (Grigoriadis,

2009, p. 1196). The degree of transformation is somewhat controversial with many scholars sug-

gesting that AKP essentially saw “the EU as the path to ‘de-Kemalization’ and hence greater

religious freedom” (Kubicek, 2004, pp. 124-125) in order to fulfil the goal of a political Islam,

established in Turkey.

4.3. Civil society pressure

The increasing split over the EU and the Turkish membership perspective (see Figure 3) are also

reflected in civil society, where there are both pro-EU and Eurosceptic NGOs with diverging

views, although according to Smith (2004, p. 124) “all the leading Turkish labour unions and

63 The nature of the pressure that led to the promotion of human rights in the Turkish case in the frist place, namely

the political expediencies, as per Plagemann (as cited in Hale, 2011, p. 324) understandably show a tendency to

promote human rights on a particularist rather than universalist basis.

56

business organizations favour membership.” It is also observed that the pro-EU organizations in

particular have close allies in Europe. Given the importance of such transnational alliances, as

hypothesized in Chapter 1, Turkey would appear to be a good target for democracy promotion by

the EU.

Moreover, the role of the growing and active civil society in Turkey has been of critical im-

portance during the recent Gezi park protest in Istanbul and related protests across Turkey. Its

activities during the incidents reflected the actual emergence of vibrant, active citizenry as also

observed by the EC (2013, p. 11). Earlier, an equally important element of the 1999 to 2004

Turkish reforms, aiming to meet the political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria, was the pres-

sure coming from various civil society groups in Turkey that wanted the accession negotiations

with the EU to begin. As observed by Müftüler Baç (2005, p. 20) the general prospect of mem-

bership increased the visibility of pro-democracy and pro-European groups in the country. Fur-

thermore, the decrease of military’s political involvement and the power-consolidation-based

AKP governments’ strategic alliance with the EU affected the action of governmental bodies that

in the post 1997 democratic coup era started to regularly consult such groups. This regular con-

sultation, regardless the motives of the government, supports the argument that Turkish politics

during the analyzed period acquired a more democratic profile, mainly due to the socialization

with the EU and following the example of EU member states. The pursuit of alternative courses

of action, based on their appropriateness and legitimacy level confirms therefore the Turkish

politics adjustment in the process of rule transfer and rule adoption.

Even though the civil society has been empowered in Turkey, not least through legal, finan-

cial, and technical support by the EU (Börzel & Soyaltin, 2012, p. 15), there is no coherent legal

framework organising this cooperation (EU Commission, 2008, p. 18). As observed by the EC,

consultations are held:

on an ad hoc basis, with unclear selection criteria, and do not result in tangible policy

outputs. Political pluralism would be enhanced if participation of civil society and other

stakeholders in policy-making were increased. Furthermore, the breadth and scope of civ-

il society organisations needs to be strengthened.

At the same time, the Turkish legislation on the right to association still needs to be improved in

order to be brought in line with EU standards, while legislative and administrative obstacles that

hinder the financial sustainability of civil society organisations should be lifted (European Com-

57

mission, 2014, p. 15). In conclusion, other factors hindering the organizations’ power and limited

their policy-forming role in the past and present are:

their weak organizational capacities … the absence of a strong culture of civic engage-

ment, civil society … [and] the decreasing public support for EU membership [that]

makes it more difficult to mobilize in favor of implementing EU demands for reform.

4.4. International agents other than the European Union

Equally important, as suggested by Grigoriadis (2008, p. 34), it was not only the EU but also a

different international body, “the CoE… [that] exerted pressure in the direction of minority rights

protection and provided an alternative agent of socialisation to European norms”. Undeniably,

just as Kurban (2007, p. 8) states, the adoption of the European Convention of Human Rights

[ECHR] by the CoE gave the long sought effect to ascertain rights stated in the Universal Decla-

ration of Human Rights [UDHR] making them binding for the signatory states. As a conse-

quence the UDHR was made binding for Turkey, with the article 14 of the ECHR prohibiting

discrimination based on inter alia membership to a national minority. At the same time, the Eu-

ropean Court of Human Rights [ECtHR] has also clearly stated that “the protection of minorities

is a basic European principle” (as cited in Kurban, 2007, p. 8) further safeguarding the rights of

the minorities.

Moreover, the recognition of the right to individual petition and the binding judicial compe-

tence of the ECtHR in 1990 were of decisive importance after all. As further observed by Grigo-

riadis (2008, p. 34), resulting from their recognition, Turkey “has been confronted by an increas-

ing number of convictions, many of which referred to violations of minority rights.” Basic pieces

of Turkish legislation were found to be contrary to the ECHR, and Turkey came under pressure

to reform. Furthermore, the Turkish interest in fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria for its

EU membership increased the importance of the Turkish compliance to the recommendations

made by the CoE.

58

Conclusion

Turkey’s EU accession has been a highly fluctuating process. The euphoric Helsinki European

Council decision, although reflecting the EU’s temporary positive view on Turkey, soon to be

amended following domestic political developments in key EU member states, placed Turkey

within the stream of conditionality and EU-induced adjustment pressure, inaugurating a virtuous

cycle of domestic reforms, among others of human and minority rights. Europeanization, under-

stood as the domestic impact of, and adaptation to, European governance found in that sense

application to the Turkish case. Soon reforms were to be further promoted based on AKP’s stra-

tegic allegiance to the EU. Indisputably, this allegiance, although founded on domestic political

expediencies, contributed to the far-reaching reforms introduced in the following years with em-

phasis on progressing towards the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria and the eventu-

al opening of membership negotiations, initiated in 2005. In general, reforms introduced during

the virtuous cycle of the Ecevit coalition and the AKP governments are best explained by the

application of constructivist policy learning and socialization as well as the rational-based condi-

tionality mechanisms that led to adjustment and lesson-drawing results.

In the post-2005 period, AKP has been progressively reluctant to proceed to further reforms,

namely as a result of its electoral support consolidation that undermined the use of the EU as a

legitimation device, the increasingly ambiguous credibility of the EU membership and the fading

EU membership support by the public opinion. However, reforms did not entirely halt. Ephemer-

al political approaches to minorities took place in the meanwhile, resting on domestic and exter-

nal agents other than the EU. The virtuous cycle steadily lost ground and eventually deviated to a

vicious cycle of EU-Turkey relations deterioration, since domestic political developments within

the EU member states promoted a special status for Turkey, namely a ‘privileged partnership’.

Following this tendency, the expected reward of the EU membership and its credibility plunged.

Taking into account the above in conjunction with the results of the consecutive 2011 nation-

al and the 2014 local, and presidential elections, there is no doubt that the crisis in AKP-EU rela-

tions on top of its dominance in Turkish politics led to the loss of the Europeanization momen-

tum. The recent negative developments, among others, the Gezi park protests, corruption charges

against government ministers and the conflict with the Gülen movement, increased the fears of

an AKP drift towards an excessively majoritarian conception of democracy, or even an electoral

authoritarianism of a more markedly Islamic character as argued by Özbudun (2014). Further-

59

more, the EU accession perspective and the political action appropriateness it involves have only

marginally affected the developments’ political management. Nevertheless, it should be stressed

that in spite of the EU-Turkey relations deterioration, as Volkan Bozkir, the Turkish Minister for

EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator stated64, “the fact that Turkey has been engaged with the EU for

40 years shows that we are determined, stubborn, patient, and tolerant”.

Throughout this period, even though it can be safely concluded that in the Turkish case, the

minority rights protection amelioration has been among others caused by the pressure applied in

the framework of Turkey’s EU candidacy as a result of external pressure interpreted by the con-

cept of Europeanization and its conditionality mechanism, it cannot be as well concluded that

this factor has been exclusively responsible for the developments. As observed, Europeanization

although, the most prominent, is only one of the factors that construct a complex puzzle of do-

mestic and international interactions promoting the safeguard and protection of minority rights.

The thesis findings, as a consequence, partly disprove and rather amend the working hypothesis.

As suggested, there is a series of other interdependent factors, such as domestic political expedi-

encies and pressures coming from civil society as well as international agents other than the EU

that contribute to minority rights reforms and to Turkey-EU convergence relevant adjustments.

With the domestic politics resting in the epicenter of the Europeanization of Turkish politics it is

useful to draw the attention to the AKP’s need for domestic political empowerment and promote

an analysis of the incentives provided based on the rational conditionality mechanism.

Being true that in a period when an enlargement fatigue has been exacerbated by Europe’s

recent negative economic projections, Europeanization of Turkish politics may seem to be of

secondary importance. Nevertheless, an analysis of the newer conditions, elaborated on the rele-

vant literature, concerning the focus on power asymmetries, regime type, domestic incentives,

and degrees of statehood has the potential to shed light to the application of the conditionality

mechanism in specific and the Europeanization concept in general and is still valid. Such an at-

tempt of an analysis should take note that, as this thesis disproved for the Turkish case, Europe-

anization and conditionality are not to be used as panacea considering that domestic reform is not

an exclusive effect of a single process or mechanism.

64 Statement made in a Centre for European Policy Studies’ event titled “Turkey & Europe: New Challenges – New

Opportunities” held on Thursday, February 12th 2015.

60

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