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Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War and thebreak-up of the Soviet Union, a guidingparadigm in the discussions concerningpolitical changes in Central and EasternEurope has been a positive and optimis-tic believe in progress towards the vic-tory of a liberal democracy. This view wasclearly expressed by Francis Fukuyama inhis widely discussed book �The End ofHistory and the Last Man�1 . The optimisticview of the political changes was howeverchallenged by Samuel P. Huntington inhis book �The Clash of Civilizations and the

Belarus - A Unique Case in theEuropean Context?

By Peter Kim Laustsen*

Remaking of World Order�2 , where he ex-pressed a more pessimistic view. It wasclaimed that the spreading of liberal de-mocracy had reached its limits and thatoutside its present boundaries (primarilyWestern Europe) this form of governmentwould not be able to take root.

The political development that tookplace in the years after the fall of the Ber-lin Wall and the birth and rebirth of thesuccessor states of the Soviet Union,Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia did nothowever support Fukuyama�s claim. Onthe contrary, the political upheaval in, forinstance, Slovakia, Belarus, the Russian

Federation, Ukraine, Romania, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Croatia, the FormerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia andYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) didsupport Huntington�s theory.

The development in the latest years hasshown progress in all but a few of theabove mentioned states. Reading FreedomHouse�s surveys on the level of politicalrights and civil liberties gives hope.Widely across Europe these rights and lib-erties have been and are still expandingand deepening. One state does clearly sepa-rate itself from the trends in Eastern andCentral Europe: Belarus. According to

* Mr. Peter Kim Laustsen is a Master student of Political Science at the Department of Political Science at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, andis a former Academic Assistant in the Baltic Defence College Institute for Defence Studies. The article is based on a paper from January 2003.

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Freedom House, the political and civilrights and liberties have worsened since1994/1995 and continue to do so. Thepurpose of this article is an attempt toexplain the causes to the specific politicaldevelopments in Belarus and to charac-terize the political regime.

The starting point ofBelarus

Two critical factors can be said to haveexisted in Belarus: modern internal struc-tures and an existing state structure. Ac-cording to a survey conducted byDeutsche Bank in 1990 and repeated byKuzio & Nordberg3 , Belarus had a highscore on the scales of the survey concern-ing industrialization, infrastructure, andlevel of education in the population.Among the republics in the former So-viet Union, Belarus was clearly positionedas number five, while Ukraine was posi-tioned as number one. This evaluation ofBelarus is also supported by the UnitedNations Development Programme�s(UNDP) yearly development reports that

describe Belarus as one of the wealthierrepublics socially as well as economically.

Belarus went through a massive eco-nomic and industrial modernization af-ter the end of the Second World War.The developments in the political spherecould only take place after the death ofJosef Stalin, after which the political eliteobtained a certain degree of autonomyin relation to Moscow and because of thata relatively high degree of internal self-rule.

Another characteristic feature of theBelarusian case is the presence of a crisisof sovereignty. Compared to, for instance,the three Baltic states history shows thatthere de facto has not existed a Belarusianstate before. The first possible state thatcan be said to have existed is the GrandDuchy of Lithuania due to the fact that alarge part of the present Belarusian terri-tory was a part of the state formation, apredominant part of the population wasof Slavic decent and the language used inthe state administration was Belarusian,while the other possible state formationcan be said to have been the short lived

Belarusian National Republic created af-ter German Kaiser�s protection under theFirst World War.

The commonality between these twounits is the absence of an effect on theBelarusian consciousness today. Both Po-land and Lithuania largely possess mo-nopoly on the state continuity from theLithuanian Grand Duchy. The end of thestate was that it was split between the ma-jor powers of the time. The Belarusian partended up under Russian control, and theperiod was characterized by a cultural, re-ligious, and political repression with Rus-sian attempts to erase all traces of aBelarusian identity. This co-optation of theBelarusian nation David Riach describedas de facto destruction of the Belarusian stateand nation. The short time the NationalRepublic existed, its establishment underthe German Kaiser�s protection and thelack of popular support has had an almostnegative effect on the feeling of a stateamong the population. The perception hadbeen that the republic was an attempt toincorporate the Belarusian territory andpopulation under German rule.

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The establishment of Belarus as a So-cialist Soviet Republic in 1919 existsstrongly in the minds of the Belarusianpopulation. The strongest memories forBelarusians are of the time under Sovietrule with the fighting and resistance dur-ing the Second World War, the rebuild-ing, modernization and industrializationafter the war, and the rising standards ofliving that followed these developments.Another important element was the factthat Belarus was accepted as a foundingmember of the United Nations. Thesepositive elements of the incorporation ofBelarus in the Soviet Union led the popu-lation to see itself as Soviet Belarusiansrather than Belarusians. This problem hasprobably been further advanced by thefact that Belarus as well as other republicsin the Soviet Union experienced statebuilding before its nation building, theopposite of the development that tookplace in most of the West, Central andEast European states. The consequence hasbeen that it has not been possible to buildthe national identity within the frame-work of a state.

In contrast to Belarus, the three Balticstates succeeded in maintaining their in-dependence from the end of the FirstWorld War until the beginning of the1940s. In this period the populations ofthe Baltic states built a strong conscious-ness about their independence, the state,the nation, and their cultural heritage. TheSoviet Union�s annexation of the Balticstates, the deportations and the armedstruggle against the occupation until themiddle of the 1950s, all contributed tostrengthen the consciousness. The popu-lation of Belarus stood in an almost op-posite situation at the Independence in1991. In the three Baltic states thepopulation�s memory of the statehoodand nationhood was a positive heritagethat had positive effects during their battlefor independence and nation building.

Another relevant comparison is in re-lation to Ukraine which experienced alonger period as an independent state.Despite the heavy Russian and Soviet sup-pression, a national consciousness did sur-vive. This was partly the effect of the factthat a part of the state came under Aus-

tria-Hungarian rule, where the govern-ment pursued a more liberal policy to-wards ethnic groups within the state�s bor-ders. Despite the fact that the sovereigntywas challenged, the populations in theBaltic states as well as in western part ofUkraine managed to preserve the memoryof a sovereign statehood, and because ofthat the states were more prepared for stateand nation building project by the timeof independence in 1991.

Politico-institutionalfactors

Another critical factor was the collapseof the totalitarian rule imposed by the So-viet Union. The collapse became clear inthe late 1980s and in the beginning of the1990s. Two elements strongly contributedto undermining the totalitarian rule. It wasthe meltdown of the nuclear reactor inChernobyl, Ukraine, in 1986 and the dis-covery of the mass graves from the 1930sand 1940s in the Kuropaty Forests northof Minsk in 1988. These events had massiveconsequences for the rule from Moscow.

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The Chernobyl nuclear disaster

The meltdown of the nuclear reactorin Chernobyl occurred on the 26th ofApril 1986, where the explosion causedan immense leak of airborne nuclear ma-terial. The consequences of this pollutionwere a vast relocation of population anda large portion of the Belarusian landkept in quarantine (and therefore it can-not be used to produce agriculturalproducts). The accident had large eco-nomic and human costs as well as conse-quences for the legitimacy of the SovietUnion.

One reason for this event having sucha deteriorating effect on the rule fromMoscow was the reluctance of the authori-ties to reveal the existence of the catastro-phe and, later, also the extent of it. Notuntil 40 hours after the accident did theevacuation begin, and not until two daysafter did Moscow recognize that an acci-dent actually had happened. In fact, Mos-cow until that time deliberately tried tostop any public mentioning of the event.

The catastrophe revealed the inefficiencyand the lack of action from the totalitar-ian state - at the regional level as well as atthe state level. Both Ukraine and Belarusabstained from taking action indepen-dently of the centre in Moscow. The melt-down had a considerable psychological aswell as physical effect on the populationof Belarus, which was caused by the lackof information, help, and action from thelocal as well as the national government.This became obvious in relation to theevacuations, which were only partial anddid not evacuate all the persons to safeand clean areas. This passive behaviourled the population to re-evaluate its atti-tude towards the state and caused a fall inconfidence.

The Kuropaty Graves

The other event that contributed toundermining the Soviet state was the dis-covery of the mass graves in the KuropatyForests north of the Belarusian capitalMinsk. The discoveries were published intwo articles, where eye witnesses� accounts

concerning the events were reported tothe public and where the findings in rela-tion to the excavations were described.David Marples estimates that the discov-ery of the mass graves had a decisive ef-fect on the possibilities for politicalchanges in Belarus.

The reaction from the local govern-ment in Minsk was moderate. It was de-cided to establish a commission whichhad to go deeply into the matter. Theresult of the commission�s work was, forlarge parts of the population, anotherpiece of evidence of the regime�s charac-ter in Belarus. Despite the fact that over-whelming evidence pointed in the direc-tion of Stalin�s secret police as being theperpetrators behind the massacres thatwere conducted in the period between1930 and 1950, the most conservativeelements of the communist party deniedthat these claims were true. The old com-munist nomenklatura tried instead toblame the invasion forces from NaziGermany. The whole matter did howeverfurther undermine the population�s trustin the regime and eroded the legitimacy

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of the Soviet Union. The mistrust wasclear and it was further encouraged bythe regime�s aversion against recogniz-ing the horrors and crimes committedunder Stalin�s rule and its attempt toconceal the clues.

This degree of loyalty to Moscow hasbeen unique for Belarus compared to theother republics in the Soviet Union, andit stands in strong contrast to the devel-opment in the Baltic states. The loyal lead-ership in Minsk and the massiverussification of the Communist Party hadthe effect that a local communist elite wasnot developed, which could have headeda democratic development as it happenedin Estonia. In the Baltic states the localcommunist elites in fact led the liberaliza-tion of the totalitarian systems in con-trast to the development in Belarus.

The revelation of the mass graves inthe Kuropaty Forest initiated popularprotests and the establishment of theBelarus Popular Front. The destiny of theFront was however radically differentfrom what happened to the similar orga-nizations in the other republics in the

Soviet Union. After the euphoria aroundthe establishment, the Front tried to ob-tain representation in the Belarusian par-liament during the parliamentary electionin 1990. The result was only a marginalsuccess, which was better than expectedbeforehand. The consequence was that theold political regime continued to domi-nate the political sphere. Weak supportbehind the Front was further underlinedduring the following parliamentary andpresidential elections. The opposite devel-opment could be observed in the Balticstates and Ukraine. Regarding the electionsin Ukraine, the popular movement suc-ceeded in obtaining over one third ofthe seats in the parliament, and also inEstonia, Latvia, and Lithuania the popu-lar fronts succeeded in winning the elec-tions.

The national identity

There is no doubt that the nationalidentity is decisive for understanding thepolitical change. This can also be seenfrom the massive amount of literature on

the importance of the Belarusian nationalidentity to the nature of the transition.This literature is almost concurrently stat-ing that the national identity and nation-alism have been very weak. This weaknesscontributed to creating the base for astrong ruler taking over the power inBelarus.

The history of the Belarusian state can,as mentioned earlier, only be character-ized as being very limited. The same seemsto be the case with the Belarusian nationbuilding. This is a distinct feature for thelong history, but it is much easier to iden-tify when looking more closely at theshort history, that is the history afterBelarus was incorporated in the SovietUnion.

The Belarusian language has through-out history been under a strong pressure.After having been used as the official statelanguage in the Grand Duchy ofLithuania, the Belarusian co-optation inthe Russian Empire put a strong pressureon the Belarusian language in a very nega-tive direction. The reason was a very sup-pressing policy towards the national lan-

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guages, which led to the name �Belarus�and the prevailing religion - the UniateChurch - being forbidden. The pressureon the national language continued un-der the Soviet Union - though interruptedby a period of relaxation from the co-optation in 1919 until Josef Stalin�s take-over and power consolidation in the late1920s, where the liberal policy towardsthe different nationalities inside the So-viet Union ended very abruptly and dra-matically. The population in Belarus did,in the 1920s, experience a nationalreawakening where the national valuesand symbols were allowed to bloom andgrow. The Belarusian language was intro-duced at the educational institutions andthe intellectual elite was allowed a voice.The immediate impression was that thenational communist elite could functionas the basis for the development and con-solidation of the national identity andalso as a basis for the creation of a na-tional elite. With Stalin�s final and totaltakeover in Moscow a massive purge ofpolitical allies as well as opponents, in-tellectuals, and cultural elite followed. The

Belarusian language was driven out ofthe educational institutions, from themedia, and the public space and its usewas confined to the countryside. Onlyamong a limited number of academicsthat wished to preserve the Belarusiannational identity was the language stillused. Because of that the new generationsof Belarusians were influenced by theRussian language and culture, and thenational language was looked upon as anobstacle to social mobility. Stalin�s goalwas to eradicate all possible alternativesto and all opposition against the centrein Moscow and Stalin�s position as theuncontested leader of the Soviet Union.This eradication of alternative elites hadserious long term consequences for thecourse of political changes in a non-democratic direction.

Perhaps the most important cause forthe absence of national consciousness canbe said to be the integration in the So-viet Union. Belarus was, during that time,exposed to a massive and all-embracingsovjetization and russification. The goal wasto create the Soviet Man - homo sovieticus �

with a common identity for all inhabit-ants from Estonia to Kazakhstan, fromVladivostok to Kaliningrad. The conse-quences of this policy were the installa-tion of Russian public servants in the cen-tral administration in Minsk. At the sametime a massive influx of Russian workerstook place. The reason was an increasingneed for workers to man the positions inthe Belarusian industry because of therepublic�s industrialization and the re-building, which took place after the enor-mous destructions during the SecondWorld War.

Another consequence of Stalin�s take-over was re-drawing of the inter-repub-lican borders, now inside the SovietUnion. These border changes meant thatLatvia lost the Abrene area and that Es-tonia lost the Narva area in the northand the Pskov/Petseri area in the south -all areas that were added to the RussianSocialist Federative Republic. Oppositethese losses Lithuania gained a signifi-cant area, the north eastern part of Po-land as it looked like before the SecondWorld War. Included in this area was

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Vilnius, which was looked upon by someBelarusians as the cultural capital forBelarus. It has been pointed out that withthe loss of this significant cultural, intel-lectual, and national centre, Belarus lostits possibility for a national reawakening.That is why Stalin�s revision of the bor-ders had major effects on the nationbuilding in Belarus. Minsk became thenew capital of Belarus as a consequenceof the loss of Vilnius and became thecentre for the Russian influence, butMinsk never became such a powerful cen-tre for Belarus which Vilnius had beenfor the state previously.

Another relevant development in thiscontext is the growth of the cities after theend of the Second World War. This growthwas significant in Belarus, and the mainreason behind it was partly migration fromthe countryside to the cities and partly theinflow of individuals from other repub-lics, who mainly settled in the cities wherethe industry and the employment were tobe found.

Urbanization could seem like a possi-bility of strengthening the Belarusian

national consciousness because the citieswere natural centres for culture, politics,and education. But the truth is that theBelarusians have never constituted a ma-jority in their own capital. The oppositewas the case in the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv,which was dominated by the Ukrainians.Extensive urbanization, weak nationalconsciousness, large Russian population,continuing inflow of workers from otherrepublics, and strong influence fromMoscow exposed the Belarusian popula-tion to a strong influence from Russianlanguage, culture, and it further weakenedBelarusian consciousness.

Another aspect of nationalism is the�rallying point� that the national symbols- like the coat of arms and the state flag -provide. There are two historical groupsof national symbols for the Belarusians: aflag and a coat of arms from either theshort-lived republic from the end of the1910s, or the Belarusian Soviet-republicfrom the beginning of the 1920s. A pos-sible national rallying point was the coatof arms called the Pahonya. It was deeplyproblematic if it was to be used as a na-

tional symbol. The symbol had beenadopted as the national symbol of theRepublic of Lithuania at its declarationof independence in 1918 and stayed assuch until the Soviet Union occupiedLithuania in 1940. It was kept as the na-tional symbol when Lithuania declared re-establishment of its independence in 1991.The coat of arms had also been used bythe Poles during their rebellion againstRussia in 1863-1864. The symbols werealso inextricably linked with the eventsthat happened during the German occu-pation during the Second World War. Apuppet-regime was established under Nazi-German protection, and the symbols fromthe national republic from the 1910s wereadopted by these collaborators. That iswhy this symbol was looked upon verynegatively. It was linked to the sufferingand destruction that occurred during theSecond World War. Because of the use ofthe symbol by other states, by the short-lived state in 1918, and by the Nazi-Ger-man friendly collaborators it was all butimpossible to use it as a national rallyingpoint.

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There are major differences betweenthe developments in Ukraine and inBelarus on this subject. Ukraine experi-enced cultural re-awakening in its periodof independence after the Russian revo-lution, re-awakening that left permanenttraces. Also the fact that the historicallycultural and political centre of Ukraine,Kyiv, remained the capital for the Ukrai-nian Soviet Socialist Republic and re-mained populated mainly by the Ukrai-nians contributed to a preservation andstrengthening of the Ukrainian nationalconsciousness. The development inUkraine and in Kyiv was very differentfrom what happened in Minsk, becausethe Ukrainian capital became centre ofthe Ukrainian nationalism and not ofthe Russian influence. There were alsomajor differences in the linguistic area.The population as well as the media con-tinued to use Ukrainian, contrary to thesituation in Belarus.

So, all in all, it looked like bothUkraine and the three Baltic states hadmuch stronger national identities andconsciousnesses than Belarus, and because

of that they were in a much strongerposition to build a nation and an inde-pendent state.

On the basis of the discussion aboveit must be concluded that a number offactors have been contributing to thedevelopments in Belarus in a negativedirection. Modernization of Belarus af-ter massive destructions during the Sec-ond World War, formidable challengesto the sovereignty of the state and thenation, absence of national identity, sup-pression of language and culture, doubt-ful national symbols, and unclear geog-raphy. Other factors have been collapseof the totalitarian rule as well as thegradual pullback leaving an intact, strongstate administration ready to be takenover.

The lack of recent experience withdemocratic governance during the Sovietrule and the social and economic crisis inCentral and Eastern Europe can also beidentified as factors contributing to thebirth and consolidation of the presentrule in Belarus.

Tendencies in Belarus

The state

As all former Soviet republics Belarusfaced the challenge of independence afterthe Soviet Union collapsed. Despite thefact that Belarus de jure did exist as anindependent state, realities were quite dif-ferent. The extent of autonomy underMoscow�s rule was very limited and re-stricted to some areas, and it was furtherdecreased by the fact that the regime inMinsk was considered to be one of themost Moscow-loyal regimes of the Sovietrepublics as well as the fact that heavydominance of the Communist Party un-dermined functioning of the state. Thisabnormal state structure has not been radi-cally changed under the rule of Lukashenka.Almost unanimously the analyses of theBelarusian regime show that the mergerof Lukashenka�s regime and the state isalmost total. Lukashenka has in several casespersonally interfered in the daily manage-ment and functioning of the state�s ad-ministration and has, via his position as

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a president, directly as well as indirectly,via his presidential administration, admin-istered the state as his personal domainand attempted to form the state after hisdesire. This has been made clear throughhis involvement in the abolishment of thelocal administrations.

Another clear example of the concen-tration of power and the attempt to gainfull control over the state is the voter�srejection of a proposal for a direct elec-tion of the regional leaders - a rejectionthat followed the president�s recommen-dation. As a consequence the right to ap-point these regional leaders still rests withthe president. Lukashenka�s fear has beento experience a development similar towhat has happened in the Russian Fed-eration where the opposition against theregime had its basis in the local adminis-trations. Lukashenka�s actions are verymuch alike the actions of Putin tostrengthen the central government vis-à-vis the federal subjects (regions, regionalparliaments and governors). Putin�s ac-tions can be said to be a preventive moveagainst potential disintegration of the fed-

eration, and the centralization and in-creased power of the presidency have beenachieved at the expense of the regionalself-governance.

It is also characteristic that Lukashenkatries to appoint loyal persons for impor-tant positions in the Belarusian adminis-tration. These persons are old friends fromhis childhood, from the area where hewas born and from the area where hispolitical career started. Another exampleof Lukashenka�s expansion of his powerand influence is that the number of posi-tions directly responsible to the presidenthas increased.

All these factors contribute toLukashenka�s construction of a state ad-ministration where all individuals owetheir position to him, but developmentsin Belarus also show that no one is safe. Itis clearly demonstrated by the events con-cerning the former president of theBelarusian National Bank, Ms. TarawaVinnikava, who used to be one ofLukashenka�s closest political allies. She wasappointed by Lukashenka, but subse-quently lost his confidence and trust and

was placed under arrest - a clear exampleof the gratitude that subordinates mustshow towards Lukashenka.

Another example of Lukashenka�sbehaviour is almost total nationalizationof the industry in Belarus. Allprivatization and liberalization initiativeshave been cancelled, and the developmenthas in fact moved in the opposite direc-tion - in the direction of a total state con-trol of business and trade. That makes itdifficult for private corporations to op-erate. The President has clearly managedto place the economic sphere under strictcontrol.

In these areas it is clear that there ex-ists a merger of the state and the regime.It is also possible to observe strong rela-tions between the president and his sub-ordinates, namely dependence of the lat-ter on the president, and his unpredict-able behaviour. Also weak state institu-tions can be identified in Belarus. It wasexemplified by the constitution that col-lapsed under the pressure created byLukashenka. He managed to arrange theexisting power structures according to his

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wishes. Because of that many of the po-litical structures collapsed under the pres-sure of political infighting.

The personality

Lukashenka tries to go out to the pub-lic and present himself as a plain and simpleperson, and he has successfully achievedthis by communicating to the populationclear and distinct messages and visions.On the other hand, there has been noactive attempt at building an image ofLukashenka as a statesman. He has triedto keep his image as a head of a collectivefarm, an administrator. To show his pres-ence, concern, and worries he uses radioand television broadcasts to transmit hisspeeches to the population. He argues thatthere is a need for a strong man to takecontrol, to steer the state through thedifficult times and to manage the prob-lems facing the state. Lukashenka has thussucceeded in establishing an intimate re-lation with the Belarusian population. Therelationship is based on Lukashenka�s cre-ation of a myth about himself as a plain

man fighting for justice and for the well-being of the population. He legitimizeshis decisions on the basis of the supporthe won during his election to the presi-dency as well as on the support that hisproposals received when they were sentto referendum.

Lukashenka�s electoral victory duringthe 1994 presidential election was not basedon a solid and thoroughly prepared po-litical platform that appealed to certainsocial groups in the population. InsteadLukashenka appealed to the resistance inthe population against the elite whichruled Belarus during and immediatelyafter independence and to the nostalgicfeelings many Belarusians had towards thetimes during the Soviet Union, wherelarge parts of the population enjoyed amuch better living standard compared tothe present state. Lukashenka succeededin distancing himself from the politicianswho led Belarus before, during, and afterthe independence and also from the prob-lems that were a consequence of the up-heavals. The nostalgic feelings about theSoviet Union and the Belarusian nation-

alism were also means used by Lukashenka.However, Lukashenka did not at all usethe Belarusian nationalism as a part ofhis political project. He did, on the con-trary, try to de-nationalize Belarus, andthere are many examples showing this.

The population was, in 1995, asked tovote in a referendum concerning threethemes converging around thepresident�s de-nationalization project.The first theme was whether Russianshould be an official state language onthe same terms as Belarusian. The secondtheme concerned the introduction ofnew state colours and a new state coat ofarms, while the third theme concernedeconomic integration with the RussianFederation. All three proposals were ap-proved in the referendum with 83,1%,75,0% and 82,4% of the votes cast. Theadoption of all three proposals supportedthe president�s political project and hasactively contributed to de-nationalizationof Belarus, closer ties with the RussianFederation, and nostalgic praising of theSoviet Union. Belarus has, as mentionedearlier, all throughout history been char-

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acterized by a very weak national iden-tity. This identity has further been weak-ened during Lukashenka�s regime, andthe period under the Soviet Union hasinstead actively been used as a reference.That is also one of the reasons why theregime has been trying to rewrite thehistory behind the Kuropaty Graves,which is widely perceived as a legacy ofJosef Stalin�s regime of terror. The offi-cial policy of the regime is to blame theinvasion forces from Nazi Germany. An-other aspect of the strategy is tostrengthen the Slavic community betweenthe Russian Federation, Ukraine, andBelarus and tie the three states close to-gether. The most clear attempt that hasbeen made since 1994 is the signing ofseveral political, economic, and militaryagreements between the Russian Federa-tion and Belarus linking the two statestogether.

A part of Lukashenka�s strategy is alsoto use his charisma in order to create acharismatic rule to legitimize his controlover the state. A survey conducted byGille-Belova4 presents the relationship

between the electorate and the presidentas charismatic. There exists a widespreadand general perception of Lukashenka asa competent and understanding ruler. Theelectorate does not consider Lukashenkaas being the cause of the problems. Onthe contrary, the perception is that thebureaucrats and the politicians that areresponsible for the dissolution of theSoviet Union are the main cause of theproblems. There is also a widespread ac-cept of the need for a total delegation ofpower to the president and a non-com-promise seeking approach to the govern-ing of the state. It is however worth not-ing that Lukashenka does not exclusivelyuse his charisma as a legitimizing element.He has also tried to derive legitimacy forthe concentration of power from the ar-gument of necessity - that it is necessaryfor an effective implementation of politi-cal decisions. Thus the arguments are basedon rationality and bureaucratic efficiency.

The characteristics described aboveshow the extent of the delegation of powerto Lukashenka. He is considered to bethe best person capable of solving the

problems and thereby saving the state.That was also what Lukashenka showed tothe population as a head of the parlia-mentary investigations into corruption.But an interesting fact about Belarus isthat Lukashenka is not directly account-able to the electorate. The government,the parliament and the bureaucracy areinstead used as �lightning rod� againstattacks on the regime. That has manifesteditself through the stable supportLukashenka has received over time.

The constitutional hypocrisy

Belarus� first democratic constitutionof March 1994 did in fact create the pos-sibility for a positive political develop-ment in Belarus. A presidency was cre-ated, and an independent ConstitutionalCourt became the supreme judicial power.These institutions created the basis for ademocratic, presidential republic. Thepresident and the parliament were to beelected directly by the population. TheConstitutional Court was created to en-sure �checks and balances� vis-à-vis the

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president. Its members were to be electedby the parliament, while its functions wereto be independent of both the legislativeand executive powers.

The presidency was, according to the1994 Constitution, ascribed significantpowers. In a comparative analysis of thepresidential systems of Europe and Cen-tral Asia, Frye describes the presidentialsystems of Ukraine and Belarus as havingsome of the most powerful presidenciesin the post-Soviet area after the RussianFederation and Georgia. Since that analy-sis, the developments in Belarus have fur-ther increased the president�s power, sothe Belarusian office today is one of themost powerful offices. This claim is fur-ther supported by an account by LarsJohannsen5 , who in a similar analysisreaches the same conclusion.

The first �shots� against the democraticconstitution came from Lukashenka in1995, when he suggested adding furtherpowers to the presidency. According tothe 1994 Constitution it was not withinthe president�s power to dissolve the par-liament. Lukashenka succeeded in winning

a referendum with 77,6% in favour ofthe question regarding the president�sright to dissolve the parliament in case ofcontinued and gross violations of theconstitution. This strengthening of thepresidency lended Lukashenka a toughergrip on power by giving him furthercontrol over the legislative branch, butthe purging of democratic elements wasnot over.

1995 parliamentary elections

The event with the greatest impact onLukashenka assuming full control inBelarus was the parliamentary election in1995. The course of the election as well asthe result was contributing to Lukashenkaobtaining the position as an unchallengedruler. The election was scheduled to takeplace in 1996, but because of politicalpressure from the Belarusian PopularFront, it was hastened.

From the start Lukashenka did every-thing in his power to prevent that theelection was carried through. Lukashenkaencouraged the population to stay at

home, and he tore his ballot apart inpublic in front of the television camerasand tried in every way to discredit theparliament and its members. The strategyof Lukashenka was clear: with the massivebacking he had received during the presi-dential election and the continuing sup-port he enjoyed in the population, ashowdown with the parliament and theConstitutional Court was a step towardstotal control, total consolidation and con-centration of power. If Lukashenka suc-ceeded in obstructing a new election andat the same time, managed to marginalizethe old parliament, he would be unchal-lenged.

An important factor in this uncom-pleted parliamentary election was the Elec-toral Law, which stated that only electionresults from constituencies where theturn-out was over 50% could be declaredvalid. If the turn-out was below thisthreshold, the result was to be declaredinvalid.

The election resulted in a clash betweenLukashenka and the old parliament.Lukashenka was of the opinion that the

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mandate of the incumbent parliament hadexpired with the calling of the election,while the parliament was of the opinionthat it had to carry on until a new parlia-ment was elected - an opinion that wassupported by the Constitutional Court.

The first electoral round was held inMay, and the result was that only 18 Mem-bers of Parliament were elected out of 260seats to be filled. The second round laterin May resulted in the election of further102 members - a total of 120, but still notenough of the required 174 seats (2/3 ofthe total number of seats as quorum).Because of that the Belarusians had toparticipate in a by-election. The firstround of the by-election was held inNovember, and 20 seats were filled, whilethe second round which was conductedin December led to the election of fur-ther 59 Members of Parliament. With thisfourth election the required number ofMembers of Parliament was achieved, andthe new parliament formed a quorum.Thereby the new parliament could assumepowers. Until that time the old parliamenthad been unable to carry out its func-

tions, and Lukashenka used the situationto rule Belarus by decrees from July 1994to January 1996. This meant no checksand balances existing whatsoever.

The constitutional changes in 1996

Lukashenka was elected as presidentunder the 1994 constitution, and he ac-cepted the constitution in the beginningof his term. But from his election anduntil 1996 Lukashenka�s rule frequentlyclashed with the provisions of the consti-tution. These clashes culminated whenLukashenka introduced a draft for a newconstitution to eliminate any politicalopposition and to ease his centralizationof power. The draft was sent to referen-dum and was passed by 70,5% of the par-ticipating electorate.

The changes included in Lukashenka�sdraft constitution concerned a) the presi-dency, b) the parliament and c) the courts.The main themes were that Lukashenka�sterm was extended by two years, that thepresident was given the right to appointa number of members of the Constitu-

tional Court and the Electoral Commis-sion as well as a number of members ofthe new upper chamber, the Council ofthe Republic of the parliament, the Na-tional Assembly.

a)According to the 1994 constitution,

the Belarusian presidency was already oneof the strongest executive offices in Eu-rope. But with the adoption of the 1996constitution it was further strengthened.The new constitution gave the presidentfurther authority over both the legisla-tive and the judicial branches of govern-ment. It became a right for the presidentto appoint six of the twelve members ofthe Constitutional Court. Thereby the ex-ternal and independent control of thepresident disappeared. The ConstitutionalCourt had overruled Lukashenka�s deci-sions several times and declared his de-crees as unconstitutional and invalid.Lukashenka, however, started to ignorethese rulings. The rulings caused severalconflicts between the Court and the par-liament on one side and the president on

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the other. These conflicts were stoppedwhen Lukashenka brought the Courtunder his control.

The power that was vested with theparliament was also diminished when sig-nificant legislative powers were given tothe president. Article 85 in the new con-stitution gave the president the right toissue decrees corresponding to and on thesame level as laws passed by the parliament.This new power and the control of theConstitutional Court altogether producedmassive distortion of the democratic in-stitutions. The president further got thepower to appoint persons to several pow-erful offices, a right that was a move inthe same direction. The appointmentscould be used by the president to payloyal individuals for their support.

b)A part of the democratic facade in

Belarus was to carry out multi-party elec-tions. The first elections were conductedunder Lukashenka. As mentioned ear-lier, Lukashenka hoped that the man-date of the parliament in session would

expire before a new parliament couldbe elected. This would have created asituation where the president would beable to get full control of the state. Themove did not succeed, and because ofthat the conflict between the two par-ties started.

The constitutional changes dividedthe legislative power between two cham-bers in the parliament. It lies within thepower of the president to appoint oneeight of the members of the upper cham-ber. That corresponds to eight members.The president is also empowered to dis-solve the parliament and has been givenlegislative powers. Lukashenka also usedhis power to influence the establishmentand composition of the lower chamber,the House of Representatives. He picked110 loyal members of the outgoing par-liament to fill the seats in the new lowerchamber and succeeded in creating a loyalparliament. The reality was that Belarusde facto was without an elected parliamentin the period from 1996 to 2000.

The legislative procedures have alsobeen subject to presidential intervention

so that in reality these are under thepresident�s control. The consequence ofthese realities is that parliamentarism inBelarus is an empty shell. This trend isenforced by the fact that the presidentalso has the power to appoint half ofthe members of the Electoral Commis-sion. The Commission has great influ-ence on approval of parties and candi-dates in the elections and on the certi-fication of the results. With that influ-ence the president and his administra-tion gained the possibility to preventpotentially dangerous candidates fromrunning. The president�s increased pow-ers were visible in relation to the sec-ond parliamentary election in Belarus,which produced an ever more pro-presidential parliament. In reality thismeans that the parliament works as arubber stamp on the president�s pro-posals. Evaluations from the Organiza-tion for Security and Co-operation inEurope (OSCE) of the parliamentaryelections have been severely critical, andthe elections have been characterized asneither free, nor fair.

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c)With the constitutional changes

Lukashenka succeeded in taking controlover parts of the judiciary, namely thejudgement of the legality of the decisiontaken by the government. Likewise, thepresidential administration has great in-fluence on the appointment of judges atlocal as well as national levels. The presi-dent is also entitled to dismissing judgesserving in the Constitutional Court aswell as in the Supreme Court. This meansthat the judicial power de facto remainsunder Lukashenka�s control.

Another consequence is that it has be-come impossible to remove the president.Although there is a de jure possibility, thedemands for removing the president areimpossible to fulfil. During less than onemonth the parliament must complete theconsideration regarding a removal andadopt a decision to remove the presidentwith a two-third majority of all membersof parliament, and in both chambers.

There were also areas unrelated to thedivision of power that were affected bythe referendum, which Lukashenka held

in 1995. The last referendum themes con-cerned i) changing the Day of Indepen-dence from the day that independence wasdeclared after the break up of the SovietUnion to the day where the Red Armyliberated Minsk during the Second WorldWar, ii) liberalization of land market, iii)abolishment of the death penalty, iv) di-rect election of regional leaders and v)financing state institutions via the cen-tral government budget or via a fundcontrolled by the president outside par-liamentary supervision. The first and lastproposals were adopted with a large ma-jority of votes (88,2%), while the rest ofthe proposals were rejected, as the presi-dent recommended prior to the referen-dum. All the proposals mentioned abovehave contributed to the continued con-solidation of Lukashenka�s power andposition. They also strengthened denation-alization of Belarus and the praising ofthe years under the Soviet rule, both apart of Lukashenka�s political project. Theproposals concerning regional leaders andfinancing also contributed toLukashenka�s concentration of power.

It is clear that the referenda have beenused to legitimize Lukashenka�s initiativesand to demonstrate the support his ac-tions enjoy among the population. Sev-eral themes have been put to referendum,and the result has been clear every time -support behind the president and his rec-ommendations. This backing has given thepresident a credible and clear mandatefrom the population. Lukashenka has alsoused these referenda to create an image ofhimself as a person in close contact withthe electorate and as a person who listensto the voice of the people. The president�sdirect contact with the society is used byLukashenka to distance himself from theold power elite.

This can be explained by the weaknessof institutions in Belarus. The constitu-tion, the electoral law, the parliament andthe court system were all weak when cre-ated or were weakened over time, whichpaved the way for a non-democratic re-gime. Contributing to the collapse wasalso the political message Lukashenka pre-sented to the population and the socio-economic crisis in the state, which all in

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all led to the popular support of the totaldelegation of power to Lukashenka.

The social base

Lukashenka does not have a long recordinside the communist nomenklatura. Hewas born in a small village in the VitebskOblast in the north eastern part ofBelarus, and he created his political basein the Mogilev Oblast in the eastern partof the country. Lukashenka�s past careeris not the �traditional� way up throughthe ranks in the Communist Party. In-stead he entered the political stage at arather late point in his life, when he waselected to the Supreme Soviet in 1990.Until that time he headed a collective farm.

Lukashenka has been able to use thesame approach as other rulers through-out history by creating a picture of hischildhood as the poor and humble. Hiscareer and promotion inside the partyhappened without the help of others andsolely by own means. In the presidentialelection in 1994 he was not the Commu-nist Party�s candidate and he did not en-

joy a widespread support in the parlia-ment. Lukashenka created his platform byusing his position as chairman of theparliamentary committee investigatingcorruption in the government and in theparliament. Using that position he suc-ceeded in creating an image of himself asa fair and honest person. The positionalso gave Lukashenka a huge advantagebecause the committee could be used todiscredit his political opponents by ac-cusing them of being involved in cor-ruption. Such accusations contributed toturning the population against these can-didates.

During Lukashenka�s candidacy theinner circle around him were democrati-cally minded persons, who wished to gainpolitical power in the aftermath of thepolitical upheaval in the Soviet Union.They wished to use Lukashenka�s charismato reach that end. But the alliance didnot last, and after Lukashenka took officehe installed loyal persons in key positions.These persons were either friends fromhis native area or friends from his child-hood - all loyal and faithful towards

Lukashenka. Thereby Lukashenka pushedaway his old allies and succeeded in creat-ing a loyal circle of persons around him.

Lukashenka also uses rhetorical meansto maintain his support in the popula-tion. He pointed out several times thathe was the only Member of Parliamentvoting against the dissolution of the So-viet Union and tries to blame the old elitefor the problems of today.

It cannot be ruled out that Lukashenkain fact enjoys a widespread popular sup-port despite the fact that most statisticsfrom Belarus is probably fake. Examin-ing the numbers from the 1994 presiden-tial election one will find a massive sup-port to Lukashenka and, despite a nega-tive and critical evaluation of the 2001presidential election from the OSCE, itseems to remain unchanged. In the firstpresidential election Lukashenka received44,8% of the votes cast in the first round,while he received 80,1% of the votes castin the second round, securing a landslidevictory. OSCE�s comments on the elec-tion were that they only observed minorerrors and difficulties. The second presi-

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dential election showed stable support forLukashenka. The opposition did succeedin nominating a single candidate, butLukashenka still won the election by se-curing 75,7% of the votes cast in the firstround. His main opponent only managedto secure 15,7% of the votes cast.Lukashenka�s popularity has also beendescribed in a statistical analysis byKorosteleva6 , where the findings showeda relatively stable support to him.

The distorted capitalism

During the existence of the SovietUnion, Belarus was one of the wealthiestrepublics apart from the three Baltic states.Massive industrialization was the mainreason of that as described earlier. Butthe collapse of the Soviet Union and theindependence of Belarus meant a formi-dable economic challenge. In the SovietUnion, the system of planned economywas centred on an inter-republican �divi-sion of labour�. Belarus� industry deliv-ered the finished products while raw ma-terials and energy poured into the repub-

lic from e.g. Russia. The system collapsedwith the Soviet Union, and Belarus hadto make radical reordering of its priori-ties due to its heavy dependence on im-ports of raw materials and energy.

All economies in transition experiencedfluctuations and downward trends. TheBelarusian politicians chose gradualism asthe means to handle the pressure fromthe market. However, the reforms carriedout were half-hearted and ineffective. Anegative consequence of these reforms wasthe old nomenklatura attempt to seize as-sets in order to obtain personal gainsduring the transition. This behaviouronly worsened the economic situation inBelarus.

As a result, the population faced ris-ing inflation, devaluation of the savingsand a rising unemployment rate. The pe-riods between 1991 and 1994 and 1994 to2002 are very interesting to observe withregard to total Gross National Productand Gross National Product per Capitaadjusted to Purchasing Power Parity. It ispossible to identify that the populationin 1990-1991 to 1994-1995 experienced a

clear fall in their economic position andprosperity. Inflation peaked in 1994, andthe unemployment rate was increasinguntil 1996, according to numbers fromthe World Bank7 . Despite the fact thatthe statistical numbers look much bettertoday, there are some who claim that thenumbers are hiding the truth about thereal economic situation in Belarus. It isimportant for the regime to present apicture of healthy and growing economyto keep the support of the population.Such numbers increase the likelihood ofthe survival of the regime despite otherpolitical challenges. An illusion of eco-nomic stability is created by presentinghealthy numbers to the population. De-spite the fact that the Belarusian economyis experiencing vast problems, a total col-lapse has probably been avoided due tocheap oil and loans provided by Russia.

Haggard & Kaufman8 have argued thateconomic crisis and challenges not onlyfacilitate political change in a democraticdirection but also the breakdown of de-mocracy. It has also been argued that theeconomic heritage from the former non-

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democratic regime to a large extent deter-mined the possible actions that successorstates had to take. Both claims seem tocarry some weight in the case of Belarus.The politicians governing the state dur-ing the transition had to face the prob-lems of transition, and the consequencesof hard political choices pushed thepopulation into Lukashenka�s arms.

In a normal democracy and parliamen-tarism, the parliament passes the statebudget, but since Lukashenka�s take-over,large parts of the public finances have beenmoved beyond legislative scrutiny and re-vision. In 1996 Lukashenka managed towin the referendum concerning the es-tablishment of a separate budget withoutparliamentary control. Thus Belarus hastwo budgets, the official one, adopted bythe parliament, and the unofficial one,controlled solely by the president. It hasbeen claimed that the latter has been andis being financed through the sales ofmilitary equipment and that one of itspurposes is to pay subjects for their loy-alty and support. There is however noevidence showing that Lukashenka is us-

ing the presidency to enrich himself,which points in the direction of separa-tion between his personal finances andthe states finances even though publicfunds probably are used to pay off sup-porters and allies.

It is also characteristic for theBelarusian economy that Lukashenka triesto gain full control of all economic ac-tivities. It has been exemplified throughthe fact that all economic transactions inBelarus are subject to the president�s ap-proval. This massive control can be seenas an attempt to secure revenues to theunofficial budget as well as an attempt toshield the regime against the establishmentof alternative centres of power.

A threat that Lukashenka is trying toavoid could be one similar to what hasbeen happening in the Russian Federa-tion, where economically strong oligarchswere positioning themselves under theYeltsin administration. They were alliedwith the president and had considerableeconomic as well as political resources,which they were able to expand duringYeltsin�s presidency. The developments

under Putin have showed how these oli-garchs can pose a threat to the centre ofpower - the presidency and the state ad-ministration. The frightening example forLukashenka is Putin�s showdown with twooligarchs, Berezovsky and Gusinskij, bothforced into exile abroad.

Concluding Remarks

The main focus of this article has beenon the political changes that took placeafter Belarus gained her independence. Themain emphasis has been on the periodafter the dissolution of the Soviet Union.It has been necessary to include historicalelements to illustrate significant influencethese elements have had on the develop-ments in Belarus.

In the first part of the article somecritical elements were presented in theBelarusian case that advanced a radicallydifferent political development comparedwith states in a similar situation follow-ing the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Very weak national consciousness canbe identified as the most important fac-

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tor contributing to the particular un-democratic development in Belarus. Theconsequence of this weakness is an unsuc-cessful nation and state building, whichis a very critical factor. Such a situationstands in stark contrast with the situationin other states in Central and EasternEurope. The absence of national feelingsmeant the absence of a rallying point forthe democratic movement, which weak-ened the possibility for a democratic de-velopment in Belarus significantly.

Another factor which contributed tothe developments was the functioning ofthe institutions. The parliament�s adop-tion of the constitution and the creationof a strong presidency created the insti-tutional framework for Lukashenka�s take-over. It supports the claim about the con-stitution being a decisive factor when theresult of political struggle has to be evalu-ated. It is however important to under-line that the constitution alone does notconstitute the complete constitutionalframework. The electoral law is anotherimportant element. But in the Belarusiancase it can be observed that Lukashenka

primarily used the constitution as aweapon in his clashes with the parliamentand the Constitutional Court. Persistentconstitutional changes introduced byLukashenka stand as a further evidence tosuch a claim.

Lukashenka�s entry into the politicalscene and his behaviour has underlinedthe fact that an institutional focus aloneis an inadequate analytical approach. Thepresident�s personality and his charismaticappeal to the population have also beendecisive factors in securing a widespreadsupport to Lukashenka in the population.Another important factor is the politicaleconomy. The transition from plan tomarket economy caused major economicproblems and, in conjunction withLukashenka�s economic and fiscal policy,produced a nostalgic feeling towards thesituation under the Soviet rule. These feel-ings have further bolstered Lukashenka�spowers and advanced a non-democraticdevelopment.

Undoubtedly Belarus is a unique casein the European context. It questions thewidespread perception of an almost uni-

versal and pre-determined development inthe former communist states towards de-mocracy - a perception further justifiedby the developments in e.g. Slovakia,Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia. Butthe recent developments in the Russian Fed-eration and Ukraine can contribute to chal-lenging this perception. It is worth con-sidering if a relapse in the democratizingstates is a real danger that must be addressedpolitically and, if this is the case, whichfactors are behind this development.

1 Fukuyama, Francis (1992), �The End of His-tory and the Last Man�, London: HamishHamilton.

2 Huntington, Samuel P. (1991), �The Clash ofCivilizations and the Remaking of World Or-der�, Norman: Oklahoma University Press.

3 Kuzio, Taras & Marc Nordberg (1999), �Na-tion and State Building, Historical Legacies andNational Identities in Belarus and Ukraine: AComparative Analysis�, Canadian Review of Stud-ies in Nationalism, Volume 26, No. 1-2, pp. 69-90.

4 Gille-Belova, Olga (2002), �The Nature of Rela-tions between Political Leaders and their Sup-porters - The Case of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine�,Paper for the International Conference �Russia,Ukraine and Belarus: Political Leadership, Inter-

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national Society and Public Order�, July 1st 2002,CERI, Paris, France.

5 Johannsen, Lars (2000), �The Constitutionsand Democracy: The Choice and Consequencesof the Constitution in Post-Communist Coun-tries�, PhD Dissertation, Aarhus: Forlaget Politica.

6 Korosteleva, Elena A. (2002), �What Lies Be-hind the Public Support of Leading Politiciansin Belarus? Elaborations from Opinion Polls andFocus Groups�, Paper for the International Con-ference �Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: PoliticalLeadership, International Society and PublicOrder�, July 1st 2002, CERI, Paris, France.

7 World Development Indicators 2002. CD-ROM Query Database, World Bank Group /International Bank for Reconstruction and De-velopment. The conclusions based on these num-bers should be read with some reservations.

8 Haggard, Stephen & Robert R. Kaufman (1997),�The Political Economy of Democratic Transi-tions�, Comparative Politics, Volume 29, No. 3,April, pp. 263-283.