europe and the 2030 agenda for sustainable...

Europe and the 2030 Agenda for

Sustainable Development The Future of European Integration

Author: Emma Verleye Rikenberg

Supervisor: Johanna Jormfeldt

Examiner: Daniel Silander

Semester: Spring 20

Subject: Political Science

Course code: 2SK31E

Bachelor Thesis 15 credits

Abstract

This thesis is a theory consuming case study that aims to examine how the Council of

the European Union voted in matters regarding the environment between 2015 and

2019 in order to begin the implementation of the 2030 Agenda’s Sustainable

Development Goal number 13. Moreover, the thesis further examines the impact of

the Council’s voting results on the European integration process by using rational

choice institutionalism and three explanatory factors; ideology, institutional factors

and economical position in the EU. The findings of the thesis show that the member

states in the EU voted diversely and that only four member states constantly voted yes

throughout 2015 to 2019. Despite the diversity in voting, the factors and the theory

utilised here helped explain why it is unlikely that disintegration would occur. As a

result, it is clear that the European integration process will continue even though the

voting results of the Council could impact further integration or even disintegration

due to the member states’ various preferences. The future of European integration

thus continues to be uncertain.

Keywords: Council of the European Union, voting results, 2030 Agenda, Sustainable

Development Goal 13, rational choice institutionalism, European Union, integration,

disintegration.

Table of contents

List of Tables ............................................................................................................ 4

List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................... 5

1. Introduction ....................................................................................... 6

1.1 Aim and Research Questions................................................................................ 8

2. Background ........................................................................................ 8

2.1 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development ................................................... 9

2.2 Sustainable Development Goal number 13 – “Take urgent action to combat

climate change and its impacts” ............................................................................... 10

2.3 Decision-making in the Council of the European Union ..................................... 11

2.4 Voting System in the Council of the European Union ........................................ 14

3. Previous Research and Theory ....................................................... 14

3.1 Previous Research .............................................................................................. 14

3.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism ........................................................................ 17

4. Method and Material ....................................................................... 19

4.1 Method .............................................................................................................. 19

4.2 Material ............................................................................................................. 21

5. Presentation of the Council of the European Union’s Voting

Results 2015 – 2019 .............................................................................. 22

5.1 Voting Results of 2015....................................................................................... 22





6. Analysis of the Impact of the Council of the European Union’s

Voting Results 2015 – 2019 on the European Integration Process.... 36

6.1 Ideology ............................................................................................................. 37

6.2 Institutional factors ............................................................................................ 40

6.3 Economical position in the European Union ....................................................... 43

7. Conclusion ........................................................................................ 44

References ............................................................................................ 47

4

List of Tables

Table 1. Overview of the Voting Results of 2015

Table 2. Summary of the EU Member States’ Position on Environmental Matters in

2015



2016



2017



2018



2019

5

List of Abbreviations

EU European Union

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

RCI Rational Choice Institutionalism

SDGs Sustainable Development Goals

UN United Nation

6

1. Introduction

In today’s politics and media, climate change is one of the most discussed subjects

around the world and it is becoming increasingly important to make sure that

politicians and institutions are taking the necessary measures in order to combat

climate change and its impacts. For instance, the European Union (EU) and the

United Nations (UN) are two key institutions that are fighting climate change through

ambitious policies and goals. At the same time, a large number of agendas and

resolutions have been created over time as a means to achieve a more sustainable

development, such as preventing further environmental damage. These key

institutions have played a significant role in shaping and the implementation of

different resolutions and agendas. As a matter of fact, the General Assembly of the

United Nations adopted on the 25th of September 2015 a universal resolution called

Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in order to

get the world onto a sustainable and resistant pathway. This Agenda contains 17

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets, and is intended to be an

outline for achieving an improved and a more sustainable future for the whole world

by 2030.1 Through the 2030 Agenda, one of the most important pledges that the UN’s

193 member states have made is to ensure a comprehensive and sustained

environmental protection, which is reflected throughout the Agenda with goals that

are intended to combat climate change and environmental damage.2 One particular

goal is especially interesting when examining the effects of the implementation of the

2030 Agenda’s SDGs regarding the environmental protection on the European

integration process. The aforementioned goal is SDG number 13, which encompasses

1 UN General Assembly. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable

Development. A/RES/70/1. 2015.

https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20

Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf (Accessed 2019-12-04) 2 United Nations System Staff College. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

https://www.unssc.org/sites/unssc.org/files/2030_agenda_for_sustainable_development_kcs

d_primer_en.pdf (Accessed 2019-12-04)

https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf


https://www.unssc.org/sites/unssc.org/files/2030_agenda_for_sustainable_development_kcsd_primer_en.pdf


7

taking action against climate change and its impacts.3 This goal, as with all other

goals, is divided into so-called targets, but for the purpose of this thesis, only target

number 13.2 and indicator number 13.2.1 are relevant. This indicator measures the

integration of climate change into national policies, and is defined as the amount of

countries that have reported the existence or creation of a policy, strategy or plan that

is integrated into their system. This will increase or grant their ability to adapt to the

problematic effects of climate change and increase the resilience of the climate, as

well as increase the development of projects and technology that lowers greenhouse

gas emission.4

Even though, the primary global, intergovernmental forum for discussing the

international action to fight climate change is the United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change, another key institution is the European Union in

combatting climate change.5 As a matter of fact, the EU is one of the forerunners

implementing the 2030 Agenda’s SDGs and has taken various environmental

measures to prevent further climate change and environmental damage. However, this

would surely impact the integration process in one way or another, and exactly what

that impact could look like is the main question of this thesis. By examining the

voting results from 2015, when the 2030 Agenda was adopted, to 2019, of the

European member states in the Council of the European Union (i.e. the Council of

Ministers, or Council) regarding issues of environmental policies and sustainability, it

is possible to distinguish the yes-voters, no-voters, abstain-voters and those member

3 UN General Assembly. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable



Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf (Accessed 2019-12-04) 4 Roser, Ritchie and Ortiz-Ospina, Mispy. Measuring progress towards the Sustainable

Development Goals. 2018. https://sdg-tracker.org/climate-change#targets (Accessed 2019-

12-05) 5 UN General Assembly. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A/RES/70/1. 2015.


Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf (Accessed 2019-12-04)



https://sdg-tracker.org/climate-change#targets



8

states not participating in the voting procedure. So, by dividing the votes in this way,

it is possible to examine whether or not certain countries act for or against further

integration within this specific environmental policy area, and by extension, in the

entire European Union since the Council represents the national interests in the

European integration process.6 The impact of the votes in regards to SDG 13 will be

analysed using the integration theory Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI), and

used to explain how the implementation of this goal could impact the European

integration process, a topic that is highly important to the EU’s future.

1.1 Aim and Research Questions

The aim of this thesis is to examine the impact of the implementation of the

Sustainable Development Goal number 13 on the European integration process by

using rational choice institutionalism.

This will be accomplished by answering the following questions:

1. How has the Council of the European Union voted in matters regarding the

environment in order to begin the implementation of the 2030 Agenda’s

Sustainable Development Goal number 13?

2. How could the voting of the Council of the European Union impact the

European integration?

2. Background

In this section, a detailed description of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable

Development and the Sustainable Development Goal number 13 will be given in

order to provide a comprehension of what they stand for. This will be followed by an

6 Lewis, Jeffery. “The European Council and the Council of the European Union”. In

European Union Politics. Cini, Michelle and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, Nieves (ed.), 138–

154. 5th ed. Oxford University Press, 2016.

9

explanation of how the decision-making and voting system in the Council of the EU

function.

2.1 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable seeks to take action for planet, prosperity and

people, but also to reinforce the universal peace. These goals and targets are united

and integrated, and they also balance the three dimensions of sustainable development

– the social, environmental and economic. Its main purpose is to eliminate poverty

and to reach global sustainable development by 2030. The SDGs and targets took

effect on 1 January 2016 and over the next 15 years it will be a guideline of the

decision-making.7

The Agenda is built on the successes of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),

which were concluded 2015, but also attempts to achieve those MDGs that were

unfinished. In addition, the 2030 Agenda is also a follow-up from the Rio+20

Conference on Sustainable Development and focuses on issues that appeared in the

Millennium Declaration. However, one thing that differs from these old additions is

the universality of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which means that

the Agenda is applied to every country and every level of development, but it will

take the countries’ different circumstances and capacities into account. A new Global

Partnership will drive the implementation forward that is defined by a mutual

accountability, a shared responsibility and that all countries are committed. The

outline for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda are in the Sustainable

Development Goals and complemented by the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, which is

an essential part. Furthermore, the follow-up and assessment framework will be

7 UN General Assembly. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A/RES/70/1. 2015.





10

stronger in the 2030 Agenda than they were in the MDGs in order to guarantee that

the Agenda is applied for all and that no one will be left behind.8

Nevertheless, this new framework that has been adopted by the UN’s General

Assembly surpasses the MDGs, because at the same time it continues to develop

priorities like health, eradicating poverty, food security and education, it will also

provide an extensive variety of environmental, social and economic goals.9 By

implementing the 2030 Agenda and its goals, it will change the global policies on

development collaboration. When it comes to the European Union, it will implement

the 17 SDGs in its external and internal policies – something that is shown in the

EU’s already begun implementation of the SDGs in the aforementioned development

policy.10

2.2 Sustainable Development Goal number 13 – “Take urgent action to combat

climate change and its impacts”

The Sustainable Development Goal number 13 is called “Take urgent action to

combat climate change and its impacts”.11 It seeks to operationalise the Green Climate

Fund even further and to implement the dedication to the UN’s Framework

Convention on Climate Change. Additionally, the aim of this SDG is to strengthen

nations’ adaptive capacity and resilience to natural disasters and climate-related

8 European Commission. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs.

2019. https://ec.europa.eu/environment/sustainable-development/SDGs/index_en.htm

(Accessed 2019-12-05) 9 UN General Assembly. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable



Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf (Accessed 2019-12-04) 10 European Commission. The Sustainable Development Goals. 2019.

https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/sustainable-development-goals_en (Accessed 2019-

12-09) 11 UN General Assembly. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A/RES/70/1. 2015.



https://ec.europa.eu/environment/sustainable-development/SDGs/index_en.htm



https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/sustainable-development-goals_en



11

threats by incorporating adaption measures and climate change mitigation into

different national policies, planning and strategies. In turn, this also necessitates

awareness-raising, capacity and improved education on climate change adaptation and

mitigation. Considering that the impacts of climate change affects the most vulnerable

and poorest people more severely, the Sustainable Development Goal 13 explicitly

demands for increased capacity for management and planning that are climate

change-related in those countries least developed.12

Moreover, this SDG has five targets and eight indicators. The targets define the goals

and the indicators stand for the measurements, which are used to track if the targets

are accomplished. For the purpose of this thesis, only target number 13.2 called

“Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning”

and indicator 13.2.1 are relevant. This indicator measures the integration of climate

change into national policies and is defined as the amount of countries that have

reported the existence or creation of a strategy that is integrated into their system and

that allows them to adapt to the problematic effects of climate change. It also allows

them to increase the resilience of the climate, as well as increase the development of

projects and technology that lowers greenhouse gas emission, but this development

should not threaten food production.13

2.3 Decision-making in the Council of the European Union

The European Union has worked hard to develop and implement the 2030 Agenda

into the EU, which is a big step towards a sustainable future. Such an important

matter is one that requires countries to vote and participate in the decision-making

process, which most often occurs in the Council of the European Union. Due to the

12 Bley, Simon Johannes, et al. (ed.). Sustainable development in the European Union –

Monitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an EU context, Luxembourg:

Publications Office of the European Union, 2019, p. 253. 13 Roser, Ritchie and Ortiz-Ospina, Mispy. Measuring progress towards the Sustainable

Development Goals. 2018. https://sdg-tracker.org/climate-change#targets (Accessed 2019-

12-05)


12

Council’s heavy role in EU decision-making, it is important to understand how the

Council operates and functions.

In general, the decision-making in the Council is taking place behind doors – meaning

that the procedures are not public records. As a result, it is not fully known what

really occurs in these summits, which could be one reason why there are so few

empirical studies about voting in the Council.14 For this reason, it is essential to

understand the decision-making in the Council of Ministers. The Council of the

European Union is the foremost legislative power in the EU and consists of one

representative of each member state at ministerial level.15 Its most prominent function

is to make binding decisions on new EU legislation, on the initiative of the

Commission and in cooperation with the European Parliament.16 This means that an

adoption of a legislation in the Council is led by a widespread preparatory phase in

different EU bodies.17 In order to ensure that the proposal undergoes technical

scrutiny and political responsibility, the proposal goes through three levels in the

Council. These are the working party, the Permanent Representatives Committee

(COREPER) and the Council configuration.18

First, the proposals are normally discussed in a working party specialised in different

matters (e.g. environmental matters),19 which ensures technical scrutiny of the

14 Mattila, Mikko. “Contested decisions: Empirical analysis of voting in the European Union

Council of Ministers”. European Journal of Political Research. Vol. 43, no. 1, 2004, 29–50.

https://doi-org.proxy.lnu.se/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00144.x (Accessed 2020-01-15) 15 Tallberg, Jonas. EU:s politiska system. 6th ed. Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2016, p. 109–

110. 16 Ibid, p. 119. 17 Mattila, Mikko. “Contested decisions: Empirical analysis of voting in the European Union


https://doi-org.proxy.lnu.se/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00144.x (Accessed 2020-01-15) 18 Council of the European Union. The decision-making process in the Council, 2019.

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/decision-making/ (Accessed 2020-01-15) 19 Mattila, Mikko. “Contested decisions: Empirical analysis of voting in the European Union


https://doi-org.proxy.lnu.se/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00144.x (Accessed 2020-01-15)

https://doi-org.proxy.lnu.se/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00144.x


https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/decision-making/


13

proposal.20 Then, the proposal progressively proceeds through the preparatory bodies

that are closer to the Council. COREPER is the most important preparatory committee

and consists of the permanent representatives from the member states respectively.21

The treatment of the proposal in COREPER depends on what level of agreement that

has been reached at the working party level. So, if an agreement has been reached

without discussion, it appears on Part I of the COREPER agenda. However, if extra

discussions are needed in COREPER because the working party did not reach an

agreement on specific parts of the proposal, it appears on Part II of the COREPER

agenda. Many proposals appear on the COREPER agenda several times since they

attempt to solve the disagreements that the working party has not succeeded to

overcome.22 Moreover, if indeed COREPER has finalised a discussion on a proposal,

it comes to be an A-item on the Council agenda. This means that an agreement is

anticipated without debate. Nonetheless, if one or more member states request to re-

open a discussion on one of these A-items, it will be re-opened. Another section of the

agenda is where the B-items appear and includes points such as what has been left

over from a previous summit, that are too politically sensitive to be resolved at a

lower level or if no agreement has been reached at working party level or in

COREPER. When the Council acts in its function as legislator, the results of the votes

automatically become public.23 These voting results, with focus on environmental

matters, is what this thesis will build on.

20 Council of the European Union. The decision-making process in the Council, 2019.

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/decision-making/ (Accessed 2020-01-15) 21 Mattila, Mikko. “Contested decisions: Empirical analysis of voting in the European Union


https://doi-org.proxy.lnu.se/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00144.x (Accessed 2020-01-15) 22 Council of the European Union. The decision-making process in the Council, 2019.

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/decision-making/ (Accessed 2020-01-15) 23 Ibid.




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2.4 Voting System in the Council of the European Union

For the carefully selected voting results to be relevant in any way, it is also important

to understand the voting system of the Council of Ministers. The Council can vote

multiple times during the course of the procedure that eventually results in an

approval of a proposal, which depends on the decision-making process.24 For

instance, in this thesis the empirical data used only consists of one vote for each

voting procedure – meaning that this is the vote that the Council of Ministers

determines if the final proposition is rejected or approved. Additionally, the Council

takes its decisions by simple majority, qualified majority and unanimous vote. Simple

majority entails that 15 member states have voted in favour and is used for non-

legislative votes, but when 55% of the member states – representing no less than 65%

of the European Union population – vote in favour of a proposal, it is called qualified

majority and is the most used voting method in the Council of the EU. When all votes

are in favour of the proposal it is called a unanimous vote, but the Council of the EU

can only vote when a majority of the member states are present.25

3. Previous Research and Theory

In the following section, a presentation of previous research will be given regarding

the contemporary research field under investigation. This will be followed by a

description of the theory selected for this thesis, being rational choice institutionalism.

3.1 Previous Research

In order to fully understand the basic theoretical premise of this thesis, namely

rational choice institutionalism, it is necessary to understand the foundation of this

specific integration theory. To do so, we must define exactly what European



https://doi-org.proxy.lnu.se/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00144.x (Accessed 2020-01-15) 25 Council of the European Union. Voting System, 2019.

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/ (Accessed 2020-01-15)


https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/

15

integration is. This is a highly debated topic, and there are a multitude of different

definitions, based on individual understandings of how it functions. For example, one

of the most famous theorists, Ernst Haas, did subscribe to the Neo-functionalist theory

of European integration, and defined integration as the procedure “whereby political

actors in several, distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties,

expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or

demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states”.26 This definition contains

both a social and a political process, which can be defined as the changing of loyalties

and the appearance of newly created institutions of politics that possess some degree

of influence regarding at least a fraction of the affairs of their member states,

respectively. This is just an example of a definition of the term integration, and in

fact, the definition varies depending on the integration theory of the person who does

in fact give the definition in the first place. For example, not all theorists would

include both the social and the political process, and may choose to favour one over

the other. For example, the definition that is preferred by the Intergovernmentalist

theorists places its focus on the political process and explores the creation of political

institutions that member states subscribe to. Nonetheless, regardless of the focus of

the various definitions, they all share one thing in common: an understanding of

integration as a process.27

In order to understand all aspects of integration, it is also important to understand its

counterpart – disintegration. As Hans Vollaard argues, disintegration is not integration

in reverse, meaning that it is not sufficient to just take any integration theory and

reverse its function. It should be noted that disintegration theories barely exist and it is

a very unexplored and neglected topic within European studies. Therefore, how the

26 Diez, Thomas and Wiener, Antje. “Introducing the Mosaic of Integration Theory”, In European Integration Theory. Wiener, Antje, Börzel, A. Tanja and Risse, Thomas (ed.). 1–

24. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 3. 27 Ibid, p. 3–4.

16

EU might disintegrate is an interesting topic in of itself and one that is very important

to the European Union’s future.28

Furthermore, there is an extreme lack of studies and literature regarding disintegration

as a main topic. This is because political scientists that study European integration

have focused on exactly that – integration. Disintegration has never seemed like a

relevant topic, because it is not something that has occurred, and as such, it has not

been examined properly by the scientific community. Perhaps the most important

reason, however, is the explanation that Ernst Haas provided: that the opportunity to

study the ongoing integration process of the European Union was too great to pass up,

and so disintegration was left in the headwind, so to speak. Another reason as to why

disintegration theories are relatively non-existent is the phenomenon called the

institutionalist bias of the mainstream integration theories. Many of the mainstream

theories do not possess an explanation or definition for disintegration because they are

fundamentally biased to work in a situation where disintegration will never occur, and

it is exactly this expectation which constitutes the problem. Otherwise, the

mainstream theories might simply be refusing to acknowledge that disintegration may

very well happen, in one form or another.29

As Ben Rosamond writes in his article Brexit and the Problem of European

Disintegration, the mainstream integration theories are ill equipped to handle

disintegration as a phenomenon, and they all contain some form of reason or concept

to explain that disintegration will not happen. As Rosamond writes, it seems that the

standard antonym for “integration” is not “disintegration” but instead

“differentiation”, according to most of the mainstream European integration theories.

But differentiation – the phenomenon where member states differ in their

participation regarding both policy areas and depth of involvement – is not the same

28 Vollaard, Hans. “Explaining European Disintegration”. Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 52, no. 5, 2014, p. 1–18. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12132 29 Rosamond, Ben. “Brexit and the Problem of European Disintegration”. Journal of

Contemporary European Research. Vol. 12, no. 4, 2016, p. 864–871.

17

thing as disintegration, that is, states and organisations retreating from its involvement

in the European Union across the board of policy areas.30

In this case, the chosen theoretical approach rational choice institutionalism has not

been presented as one of the theories that possesses a direct explanation for

disintegration, however, it does contain a very easy way of reasoning regarding

disintegration. Since the theory bases itself off of the rational behaviour of actors in

institutions, one can reason that disintegration in light of a rational choice

institutionalism system may be the effect of actors who no longer view the institution

as something that maximises their utility, and as such they would withdraw or retreat

in their cooperation and involvement in the institution. This is arguably a very

reasonable explanation for the rational choice institutionalist approach regarding this

specific topic, and it is this hand-crafted definition and understanding of disintegration

that will be used in this thesis.

3.2 Rational Choice Institutionalism

In order to understand how the voting of the Council of the European Union in

matters regarding the environment could impact the European integration process,

rational choice institutionalism (RCI) will be applied.

Rational choice theory relies on a few elementary premises regarding the behaviour of

individual actors and the social world that they inhabit. Rational choice, at its core, is

a methodological approach that explains the outcomes of both collective and

individual nature regarding individual goal-seeking under constraints. This approach

contains three core elements. Firstly, there is the methodological individualism,

secondly, the goal seeking or utility-maximisation, and lastly, the existence of various

institutional or strategic constraints on individual choice.31 The methodological

30 Ibid, p. 866–867. 31 Pollack, A. Mark. “Rational Choice and EU Politics”. In Handbook of European Union

Politics. Jørgensen, Knud Erik, Pollack, A. Mark and Rosamond, Ben (ed.), 31–56. London:

Sage Publications, 2006, p. 32.

18

individualism means that rational choice regards the individual as the rudimentary

units in social analysis. Rational choice approaches seek to use the assemblage of

individual choices to explain the behaviour of both the collective and the individual.

In this case, individuals are understood to act based on specific, changing preferences

that are external. Secondly, the behaviour of individuals is expected to ensure

maximum possible utility, whilst also subjected to constraints and boundaries. This

means that individuals who possess fixed preferences regarding what the world

around them should look like, will act in accordance with the behaviour that

maximises their utility. Thirdly and finally, individuals pick the best option for

maximising their utility whilst under constraints. Despite the fact that this sounds near

identical to the second point, it is actually quite different. It means that individuals

and actors do not directly choose what the world looks like according to their wishes,

but instead weigh the benefits and costs of different alternatives and chooses the best

course of action based on the constraints from their physical and social

surroundings.32

In contrast, RCI focuses on how the formal institutional structures restrict actors and

implies that in order to understand the political actors’ behaviour, it is imperative to

identify the restrictions that are determined by a specific framework of rules that the

actors act within. For instance, the interest groups’ activities highlight the processes

that succeed in passing the legislation that could affect the interest groups, the past

relationships that they have created with central decision makers.33 Therefore, RCI

claims that political institutions contain systems of regulations and incentives, and

that individuals within these systems try to maximise their benefits.34

32 Pollack, A. Mark. “Rational Choice and EU Politics”. In Handbook of European Union Politics. Jørgensen, Knud Erik, Pollack, A. Mark and Rosamond, Ben (ed.), 31–56. London:

Sage Publications, 2006, p. 32. 33 Bache, Ian, Bulmer, Simon, George, Stephen and Parker, Owen. In Politics in the

European Union. 4th ed. Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 26–27. 34 Lowndes, Vivien. “Institutionalism”. In Theory and Methods in Political Science. Lowndes, Vivien. Marsh, David and Stoker, Gerry (ed.), 54–74. 4th ed. London: Palgrave,

2018, p. 60.

19

4. Method and Material

In this section the method used for this study will be explained, which will be

followed by an overview of the materials used in order to lay the foundations for this

thesis.

4.1 Method

Given that this thesis is to examine the impact of the voting results from 2015 to

2019, regarding environmental matters, of the Council of the EU on the European

integration process by applying a theoretical framework called rational choice

institutionalism, it is appropriate to conduct a theory consuming case study. A theory

consuming study refers to the use of a theoretical framework with the intention of

explaining a case. Therefore, the case, the voting results of the Council, will be the

centre of this thesis and the theory, RCI, will be the tool used to analyse the case,

since the theory is used in order to explain why something has developed in the way it

did.35 Furthermore, RCI as a theory is good at explaining general behaviour, as it is

based on a system of self-interest, which greatly aligns with the idea of an anarchic

world stage and the self-interest of national actors. Through this reasoning, the EU

can be seen as a platform for discussion and debate where nations come together to

follow their separate national interests in a cooperative manner. Within this setting,

the RCI theory is good at explaining the particularities of the behaviours of the

various nations, and it is for this reason that RCI has been chosen as the theory of this

thesis.36

As this is a qualitative research study the gathered and analysed empirical data is from

the period between 2015 to 2019, and specifically only the goals regarding

35 Esaiasson, Peter, Gilljam, Mikael, Oscarsson, Henrik and Wängnerud, Lena.

Metodpraktikan - konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad. 3:1 ed. Stockholm:

Norstedts Juridik AB, 2007, p. 42–43. 36 Pollack, A. Mark. “Rational Choice and EU Politics”. In Handbook of European Union



20

environmental policies that are based on goal 13. The results will be divided into two

categories; one positive category (Yes-votes) and one negative (No-votes and abstain-

votes), which means that abstain-votes will be treated as no-votes. This has been done

in order to present how the Council have voted on environmental matters relating to

goal 13. Therefore, various directives and policies, in combination with the voting

results regarding them, have been analysed based on the RCI’s distinctive set of

behavioural speculations – for example, the concept of self-interested, rational actors

within institutions that act in a way that directly benefits themselves, usually, but not

exclusively, in a monetary/economic way. That is why three explanatory factors have

been carefully chosen by the logic of which factors that can influence a rational actor

based on RCI in order to explain the actors’ behaviour towards integration. These

factors have been chosen based on the plausibility of them affecting the behaviour of

a rational, self-interested actor within an institution.

Additionally, the rational school of political theory has a deductive reasoning that

allows it to efficiently capture the large range of reasons as to why actors behave in

the way they do regarding any action, as well as identify structural incentives within

institutions, foresee plausible outcomes, and finally, reveal exceptions in regards to

the actions that are unusual to the general theory that is employed. That said, RCI

struggles to explain these exceptional cases, especially those that remove themselves

from actions motivated by (self-)interest. In addition, there are large and numerous

issues with overgeneralisation due to the theory’s inherent push towards

generalisation on a universal level. This is important to keep in mind because it shows

the inherent strengths and weaknesses of this theory, however, for the task it has been

selected in this thesis, RCI theory is a strong and highly applicable tool, due to its

natural aptitude at analysing the reasoning behind the behaviour of actors regarding

further integration.37

37 Pollack, A. Mark. “Rational Choice and EU Politics”. In Handbook of European Union



21

4.2 Material

The material being utilised for analysis are carefully chosen voting results of the

Council of the European Union on environmental matters retrieved from the website

consilium.europa.eu. The voting results that will be used are from 2015 until 2019.

Furthermore, in this thesis the empirical data used only consists of one vote for each

voting procedure – meaning that this is the vote that the Council of Ministers

determines if the final proposition is rejected or approved. Other material being used

for this study is in the theory section where key integration theorists are used to

discuss the various definitions of integration.

Certain central aspects that are necessary have been considered when selecting the

material for this study in order to present legitimate empirical material. This has been

done by using the following four classical rules when evaluating the collected

material: authenticity, independence, contemporaneity and non-tendency.38 First,

authenticity of the sources has been guaranteed by only collecting the material from

established sources like Onesearch and the EU. This ensures that the material has

been critically assessed and is not fabricated. Second, independence of the material is

guaranteed by primarily utilising material from the institutional files of the Council of

EU and by including complementary material – which decreases the possibility of

biased material since similar information has also been verified by additional sources.

However, the possibility of tendentiousness is the considerable utilisation of the

material from the EU, but this is only done when general information about the

function of the Council of the EU is provided. For this reason, the material utilised in

this thesis has been thoroughly selected and systematically examined for guaranteeing

validity and reliability of the thesis’s results.

38 Esaiasson, Peter, Gilljam, Mikael, Oscarsson, Henrik and Wängnerud, Lena.

Metodpraktikan - konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad, p. 313–314.

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/register/en/content/out?PUB_DOC=%3E0&RESULTSET=1&DOC_SUBJECT=VOTE&i=VT&ROWSPP=25&DOC_LANCD=EN&ORDERBY=DOC_DATE%20DESC&typ=SET&NRROWS=5000&DOC_YEAR=2019

22

5. Presentation of the Council of the European Union’s Voting

Results 2015 – 2019

During these four years since the 2030 Agenda was adopted, the voting results of the

Council have shifted variously regarding environmental matters. The following

section will present a concise explanation of the various voting results of every year

post-2015 until 2019. This has been done in order to understand the relevant actors

and the context of this study.

5.1 Voting Results of 2015

In an overall look at the voting results from 2015, it is clear that many member states

voted yes in different environmental subjects, but there were some no-voters and

abstain-voters during this year as well.39


Year Yes No Abstain Not participating Total members

2015 21 7 0 0 28

2015 22 6 0 0 28

2015 27 0 1 0 28

2015 28 0 0 0 28

2015 25 2 1 0 28

2015 28 0 0 0 28

2015 27 0 1 0 28

2015 27 0 1 0 28

2015 28 0 0 0 28

2015 28 0 0 0 28

2015 28 0 0 0 28

2015 26 0 2 0 28

39 See in a separate document Appendix 1 – Voting Results 2015.

23

2015 24 3 1 0 28

2015 28 0 0 0 28

2015 28 0 0 0 28

As can be seen in table 1, there has been fifteen voting procedures where the Council

voted on environmental matters in 2015, in which all member states participated. The

first column in table 1 had the lowest yes-votes with 21 member states voting yes and

the highest no-votes with as much as 7 no-votes. Those countries that voted no in this

session were Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria and Slovakia.

Even though it was only 21 member states that voted yes, the directive was still

approved since the voting rule was qualified majority. No member states abstained at

this occasion, but there have been occasions where the EU member states have

abstained. For instance, in 2015 there were six occasions in total where member states

had abstained from voting and on one of those occasions can be displayed in the

twelfth column, where there were two member states that had abstained in the same

session – these were Belgium and Portugal.

Another interesting voting session can be seen in column two where another vote to

combat climate change and its impacts were cast. At this occasion 22 of the member

states voted yes and 6 of them voted no. The countries that voted no were Bulgaria,

Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. By looking at table 1, we can only see two

more voting sessions that resulted with member states voting no for a regulation

regarding the environment. These are displayed in columns five and thirteen. In

column five, we can see that only two member states voted no, being Germany and

Austria, and one country abstained, being Spain. In column thirteen, we can also see

that one country abstained from voting, this was Poland, but there were three

countries that voted no, these were Greece, Cyprus and Malta. This means that there

were four voting procedures in total where the member states voted no. Furthermore,

of these fifteen occasions there were only seven voting sessions in total where all

member states voted yes for different environmental matters. These can be seen in

24

columns four, six, nine, ten, eleven, fourteen and fifteen. Additionally, all voting

procedures had the qualified majority voting rule, which means that these directives

were still approved.

These countries that voted in these different environmental matters that will enable

the European Union and its member states to combat climate change and its impacts,

are of particular interest when interpreting the voting results. So, by creating a table

that summarise what the positions the European member states have on environmental

matters, makes it possible to observe how many times they have voted yes, no or

abstained from voting on these important matters in 2015. Below, table 2 provides

such a summary.


2015

Country Yes No Abstain

Austria 13 2

Belgium 13 1 1

Bulgaria 14 1

Croatia 14 1

Cyprus 13 2

Czech Republic 14 1

Denmark 15

Estonia 14 1

Finland 15

France 15

Germany 14 1

Greece 14 1

Hungary 14 1

Ireland 14 1

Italy 15

25

Latvia 15

Lithuania 15

Luxembourg 15

Malta 12 2 1

The Netherlands 14 1

Poland 13 1 1

Portugal 14 1

Romania 13 1 1

Slovakia 14 1

Slovenia 15

Spain 14 1

Sweden 15

United Kingdom 15

In table 2, it can be observed that Austria, Cyprus and Malta were the ones that voted

no in two different voting procedures. The countries that voted no once in various

voting sessions were Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Greece,

Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. Thus, fifteen of

the member states voted no. However, since some countries voted no twice in various

voting procedures, a total of eighteen no-votes had been cast in 2015 for different

environmental proposals. By looking at table 1, it is clear that most of these no-votes

occurred during four separate voting procedures that can be found in columns one

with 7 no-votes, two with 6 no-votes, five with 2 no-votes and thirteen with 3 no-

votes. Furthermore, some of the member states also abstained from voting in some

sessions and they were Belgium, Czech Republic, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania

and Spain. Therefore, making a total of seven countries that abstained from voting at

various procedures. As a result, only 10 out of 28 member states voted yes in all

voting procedures during 2015. These countries were Denmark, Finland, France,

Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

26


In 2016, there were ten voting procedures where the Council voted on environmental

matters – meaning that there were five less voting procedures in 2016 than in 2015.40

An overall look on table 3 shows that all member states participated in the various

voting sessions and that more countries voted yes for the different environmental

regulations.



2016 27 0 1 0 28

2016 28 0 0 0 28

2016 28 0 0 0 28

2016 28 0 0 0 28

2016 21 6 1 0 28

2016 28 0 0 0 28

2016 27 0 1 0 28

2016 28 0 0 0 28

2016 28 0 0 0 28

2016 28 0 0 0 28

The lowest yes-votes and the highest no-votes during 2016 can be displayed in the

fifth column in table 3, where 21 member states voted yes, 6 voted no and 1

abstained. Those countries that voted no in this session were Denmark, Lithuania,

Hungary, Austria, Poland and Romania. This was the only session that had no-votes.

The country that abstained in this voting procedure was Croatia, but there were two

more occasions where a country abstained. These can be found in columns one, where

Austria abstained, and seven, where the Netherlands abstained. Additionally, of these

ten voting procedures there were only seven voting sessions in total where all member


27

states voted yes for different environmental matters. These can be seen in columns

two, three, four, six, eight, nine and ten. In addition, all voting procedures had the

qualified majority voting rule – meaning that these directives were approved.


2016


Austria 8 1 1

Belgium 10

Bulgaria 10

Croatia 9 1

Cyprus 10

Czech Republic 10

Denmark 9 1

Estonia 10

Finland 10

France 10

Germany 10

Greece 10

Hungary 9 1

Ireland 10

Italy 10

Latvia 10

Lithuania 9 1

Luxembourg 10

Malta 10

The Netherlands 9 1

Poland 9 1

Portugal 10

Romania 9 1

28

Slovakia 10

Slovenia 10

Spain 10

Sweden 10

United Kingdom 10

Furthermore, in table 4 we see that Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland

and Romania voted no for different proposals. None of the member states voted no

twice during this year, which meant that there were six no-votes in total and by

looking at table 3, we see that those six no-votes occurred during one voting

procedure. Nevertheless, there were only three countries that abstained in total this

year and they were Austria, Croatia and the Netherlands, which happened on different

voting occasions. As a result, as much as 20 out of 28 member states voted yes in all

voting procedures during 2016.


In 2017, there were much fewer voting procedures than the previous years with only

four procedures where the Council voted on environmental matters.41 An overall look

on table 5 shows that all member states participated in the various voting sessions.



2017 28 0 0 0 28

2017 25 0 3 0 28

2017 28 0 0 0 28

2017 26 0 2 0 28


29

As can be observed in table 5, no member states voted no in the four voting

procedures that took place in 2017. However, in column two we can see that there

were only three countries that abstained from voting. Thus, making it the lowest yes-

votes and the highest abstain-votes during 2017. Additionally, the fourth column also

had abstain-votes, but only two countries abstained. Of these mere four sessions there

were only two voting sessions in total where all member states voted yes for various

environmental matters. These can be seen in columns one and three. Also, all voting

procedures utilised the qualified majority voting rule, which again resulted in

approved directives.


2017


Austria 4

Belgium 3 1

Bulgaria 3 1

Croatia 4

Cyprus 4

Czech Republic 4

Denmark 4

Estonia 4

Finland 4

France 4

Germany 4

Greece 4

Hungary 3 1

Ireland 4

Italy 4

Latvia 4

Lithuania 4

30

Luxembourg 4

Malta 4

The Netherlands 3 1

Poland 3 1

Portugal 4

Romania 4

Slovakia 4

Slovenia 4

Spain 4

Sweden 4

United Kingdom 4

In table 6, we can see that 23 out of 28 member states voted yes in all voting

procedures during 2017 and that Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Belgium and the

Netherlands were those to abstain from voting in various procedures. None of the

member states voted no this year.


In this year, a total of twenty voting sessions where the Council voted on

environmental matters took place – meaning that this year had the most voting

procedures than the previous years.42An overall look on table 7, displays that all

member states participated and that it was more member states abstaining this year

than the previous years.



2018 28 0 0 0 28

2018 28 0 0 0 28


31

2018 28 0 0 0 28

2018 28 0 0 0 28

2018 28 0 0 0 28

2018 24 2 2 0 28

2018 28 0 0 0 28

2018 24 1 3 0 28

2018 28 0 0 0 28

2018 25 0 3 0 28

2018 26 1 1 0 28

2018 20 5 3 0 28

2018 27 0 1 0 28

2018 27 0 1 0 28

2018 27 0 1 0 28

2018 26 0 2 0 28

2018 24 2 2 0 28

2018 25 1 2 0 28

2018 25 2 1 0 28

2018 25 0 3 0 28

In table 7, it is clear that the twelfth column contains the lowest yes-votes and the

highest no-votes. At this occasion 20 member states voted yes, 5 voted no and 3

abstained. The five countries that voted no were Czech Republic, Cyprus, Lithuania,

Slovakia and Finland. Those that abstained were Belgium, Hungary and Austria.

Moreover, on six other sessions there were member states that voted no and on some

of these sessions there were two countries that voted no. Those sessions that had two

member states voting no on the same occasion is displayed in columns six, seventeen

and nineteen. Columns eight, eleven and eighteen shows those occasions where one of

the member states voted no. Thus, making it seven voting occasions where member

states had voted no.

32

As can be seen in table 7, many member states abstained on different voting sessions

compared to previous years. At some occasions there were three member states that

abstained – these occasions are displayed in columns eight, ten, twelve and twenty. In

other sessions there were two member states that abstained from voting – these

sessions are displayed on columns six, sixteen, seventeen and eighteen. There were

also some occasions where one country abstained, which are displayed in columns

eleven, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen and nineteen. In total, there were thirteen sessions

where the EU member states abstained and of these twenty voting procedures there

were only seven voting sessions in total where all member states voted yes for

different environmental matters. These can be seen in columns one, two, three, four,

five, seven and nine. In addition, only one voting procedure, in column one, had the

unanimity voting rule when voting and the rest used the qualified majority voting rule.

Even though one procedure used the unanimity voting rule, all regulations were

approved.


2018


Austria 19 1

Belgium 17 1 2

Bulgaria 20

Croatia 17 3

Cyprus 19 1

Czech Republic 17 3

Denmark 19 1

Estonia 20

Finland 19 1

France 20

Germany 19 1

Greece 20

33

Hungary 13 7

Ireland 19 1

Italy 20

Latvia 18 2

Lithuania 18 2

Luxembourg 20

Malta 19 1

The Netherlands 19 1

Poland 17 1 2

Portugal 19 1

Romania 20

Slovakia 16 2 2

Slovenia 20

Spain 20

Sweden 19 1

United Kingdom 18 1 1

Moreover, in table 8 we can see that Czech Republic was the only country that voted

no in three different voting procedures. We can also see that Lithuania and Slovakia

voted no in two procedures and seven other countries voted no once. This brings the

total to ten countries voting no in the voting sessions this year and therefore a total of

fourteen no-votes were cast in 2018. When it comes to the abstain-votes, Hungary

was the only country that had abstained as much as seven times in total. In addition,

there were also one country, Croatia, that abstained three times and four countries that

abstained two times – these were Latvia, Belgium, Poland and Slovakia. So, there

were thirteen countries that abstained in total and twenty-five abstain-votes were cast

this year. As a result, only 9 out of 28 member states voted yes in all voting

procedures during 2018. These countries were Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Greece,

Italy, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia and Spain.

34


In 2019, a total of sixteen voting procedures where the Council voted on

environmental matters took place.43 This means that this year had less procedures than

the previous year. An overall look on table 9 shows that all member states participated

and that not many member states voted no or abstained.



2019 27 0 1 0 28

2019 28 0 0 0 28

2019 28 0 0 0 28

2019 27 0 1 0 28

2019 27 1 0 0 28

2019 28 0 0 0 28

2019 28 0 0 0 28

2019 28 0 0 0 28

2019 28 0 0 0 28

2019 21 4 3 0 28

2019 28 0 0 0 28

2019 28 0 0 0 28

2019 28 0 0 0 28

2019 26 1 1 0 28

2019 26 1 1 0 28

2019 27 0 1 0 28

The lowest yes-votes, the highest no-votes and the highest abstain-votes during 2019

can be displayed in the tenth column in table 9, where 21 member states voted yes, 4

voted no and 3 abstained. Those countries that voted no in this session were Czech


35

Republic, Germany, Poland and Slovakia. The three countries that abstained were

Estonia, Latvia and Austria. Apart from column ten, we can see that in columns one,

four, five, fourteen, fifteen and sixteen all display no- and/or abstain-votes during the

various voting procedures. In total, there were four occasions where member states

voted no, six occasions where the countries abstained and nine occasions where all

countries voted yes. The sessions where all countries voted yes are displayed in

columns two, three, six, seven, eight, nine, eleven, twelve and thirteen. Furthermore,

two voting procedures, in columns one and three, used the unanimity voting rule and

the rest used the qualified majority voting rule. Despite two procedures using the

unanimity voting rule and that one country abstained (column one), all regulations

were once again approved.


2019


Austria 15 1

Belgium 15 1

Bulgaria 14 2

Croatia 16

Cyprus 16

Czech Republic 15 1

Denmark 15 1

Estonia 15 1

Finland 16

France 16

Germany 14 2

Greece 16

Hungary 14 1 1

Ireland 16

Italy 16

36

Latvia 15 1

Lithuania 16

Luxembourg 16

Malta 16

The Netherlands 16

Poland 15 1

Portugal 16

Romania 16

Slovakia 15 1

Slovenia 16

Spain 16

Sweden 16

United Kingdom 15 1

Furthermore, in table 10 we can see that Germany was the only member state that

voted no twice on various occasions, but Germany was not alone in voting no. Czech

Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia all voted no once. In total, there

were six countries that voted no – thus making a grand total of seven no-votes that

were cast during 2019. Moving on to abstain-votes, Bulgaria was the only country

that abstained twice in different sessions and Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Hungary,

Latvia and the UK was the ones that abstained once. This indicates that seven

countries abstained, which means a grand total of eight abstain-votes were cast.

Consequently, 16 out of 28 countries voted yes in all voting procedures during 2019.

6. Analysis of the Impact of the Council of the European Union’s

Voting Results 2015 – 2019 on the European Integration Process

In the following section, the impact of the Council of the EU’s voting results between

2015-2019 on the European integration process will be analysed. The analysis is

divided according to a main set of explanatory factors. This is done in order to

37

provide a clearer overview. Furthermore, the voting results are analysed through

rational choice institutionalism.

6.1 Ideology

When analysing the voting results, we get the opportunity to identify which member

states that could be for or against further integration. For example, governments that

are pro-integration and/or left-wing are unlikely to oppose the majority in the Council

and are therefore more likely to vote yes for various proposals.44 By using rational

choice institutionalism’s distinctive set of behavioural speculations, it is clear that the

member states voting yes could indicate that the individuals within governing

institutions find it more rational to vote in favour of environmental matters, because

of the additional integration that will occur when the proposal is adopted since it

becomes more beneficial in the long run, both economically and environmentally.

Usually, specific policies and reforms are a result of national representatives

pandering to the interests and wishes of key voters, and by extension shaping the

European integration process.45

Only four countries consistently voted yes in total between 2015-2019 – meaning that

they could have different priorities and as such see different proposals as more

rational than those countries that abstained and/or voted no. The countries that

continually voted yes were France, Italy, Luxembourg and Slovenia, which would

imply that these four countries either do not mind spending resources or find greater

value in investing in environmental protection in order to preserve nature and prevent



https://doi-org.proxy.lnu.se/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00144.x (Accessed 2020-01-15) 45 Gabel, Matthew. “European integration, voters and national politics”. West European Politics. Vol. 23, no. 4, 2000, 52–72. https://www-tandfonline-

com.proxy.lnu.se/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402380008425400?needAccess=true (Accessed 2020-

01-17)


https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lnu.se/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402380008425400?needAccess=true


38

climate change. In addition, it could also mean that they are more willing to integrate

further with the EU in environmental policy areas.46

As EU-level and national-level politics probably are interacted, the governments’

voting regarding further integration or not could partially be influenced by national

political circumstances (e.g. the ideology of the current government) and partially by

the EU-level factors (e.g. the numbers of votes the member state has in the Council or

if the member state is a net contributor to the EU budget or is a net beneficiary).47 So,

ideology, institutional conditions and economical position in the EU could be strong

factors on how a member state votes regarding environmental matters and further or

less integration.

This could mean that depending on the ideology of the member states’ governments,

they will prioritise and rationalise different topics. For instance, the preferred position

of governments on increased or decreased integration could depend on the

government’s ideology and then depending on the government’s position, the

integration would be prioritised or disregarded. So, if a government supports an

increase in integration, then it is unlikely that it would vote no.48 Additionally,

depending on if the ideologies that exist in the governments are pro-environment, they

will prioritise environmental issues. Hence, France, Luxembourg, Italy and Slovenia

might then have a government that wants increased integration in regards to the

implementation of SDG 13, which is why they continuously voted yes.

When it comes to no-votes and abstain-votes, the member states that voted no or

abstained could have an anti-integration and/or right-wing government – since these

are usually the most active no-voters.49 Three countries voted no four times in total

46 Pollack, A. Mark. “Rational Choice and EU Politics”. In Handbook of European Union Politics. Jørgensen, Knud Erik, Pollack, A. Mark and Rosamond, Ben (ed.), 31–56. London:

Sage Publications, 2006, p. 32. 47 Mattila, Mikko. “Contested decisions: Empirical analysis of voting in the European Union


https://doi-org.proxy.lnu.se/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00144.x (Accessed 2020-01-15) 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid.


39

between 2015-2019 and they were Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia – all of them

abstained as well. Furthermore, significantly more countries voted no three times,

these were Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania and Malta, while four of

them abstained as well. These were Austria, Germany, Hungary and Malta. It is clear

that Hungary, with nine abstains in total, was the only country that had the highest

amount of abstains and Belgium, with five abstains in total, was the second country

that had the second highest amount of abstains. This could mean that these countries

could have a government that opposes an increased integration, which also could

depend on the ideologies existing in their governments. As a result, they could instead

overlook integration in environmental policy areas and in turn prioritise other matters

not relating to climate change at all. All things considered, the member states voting

no or have abstained could have individuals within governing institutions that find it

more rational to vote against various environmental issues, because they do not see

additional integration as a benefit and thus are more unwilling to integrate further

with EU.50 This indicates that the no- and abstain-voters have other priorities and then

consider other proposals more rational than those countries voting yes.

Furthermore, no- and abstain-votes could also be a result of Euroscepticism. For

instance, left-wing governments could also vote no or abstain due to the majority of

their voters being Eurosceptics – meaning that they try to adapt their voting in order

to hold a majority of the voters. In contrast, the same thing could happen to a right-

wing government, but instead the majority of their voters are for further integration

with the EU.51 Another reason as to why a country may vote yes or no in

environmental matters may simply come down to the country’s general position on

climate change. Countries with higher climate scepticism are more likely to vote

50 Pollack, A. Mark. “Rational Choice and EU Politics”. In Handbook of European Union


Sage Publications, 2006, p. 32. 51Mattila, Mikko. “Contested decisions: Empirical analysis of voting in the European Union




40

against environmental policies to begin with.52 This may also be because of a general

opposition against SDGs from Eurosceptic countries, since the new goals constitute a

more integrated system than the former MDGs, a fact that can cause both policy

integration and policy disintegration, depending on a nation’s stance and general

attitude towards both EU integration and environmental integration policy.53

6.2 Institutional factors

In the light of institutional factors, it is clear that the size (population) of the member

states and their political resources could also influence the countries voting

preferences. The dissimilarities in size are reflected in the division of votes, which

indicates that a country with more votes is more likely to be part of the victorious

faction. So, it is unlikely that the countries that have more votes are against the

majority. As a matter of fact, larger member states probably have more authority in

the introductory stage of several decisions, because the officials in the preparatory

work have to consider the large countries’ opinions beforehand to make sure that their

proposals will succeed. Larger countries usually also have larger staffs in Brussels

and their native countries in order to manage the preparatory work of the many

proposals the Commission sends.54 This suggests that depending on how large the

countries are, the larger number of votes they have, which makes it unlikely that they

would oppose the majority in the Council. This could explain the motivation and

interests behind large countries like France and Italy voting yes in all voting

procedures between 2015-2019.

52 McCrea, Rod, Leviston, Zoe and Walker, A. Iain. “Climate Change Skepticism and

Voting Behavior: What Causes What?”. Environment and Behavior. Vol. 48, no. 10, 2016,

1309–1334. https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lnu.se/doi/full/10.1177/0013916515599571

(Accessed 2020-01-17) 53 Le Blanc, David. “Towards Integration at Last? The Sustainable Development Goals as a

Network of Targets”. Sustainable Development. Vol. 23, no. 3, 2015, 176–187.

https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lnu.se/doi/full/10.1002/sd.1582 (Accessed 2020-01-

17) 54 Mattila, Mikko. “Contested decisions: Empirical analysis of voting in the European Union



https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lnu.se/doi/full/10.1177/0013916515599571

https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy.lnu.se/doi/full/10.1002/sd.1582


41

In contrast, the larger countries might vote against the majority more regularly than

the smaller countries, because the smaller countries could recognise their restricted

abilities and resources to affect each decision taken by the EU. That is why they limit

their focus on matters that they regard as more significant. For instance, the reason

why small countries like Luxembourg and Slovenia voted yes in all voting procedures

2015-2019, might be that they limit their focus on proposals that involves more

integration in the environmental policy area and climate change because they regard it

as something significant. This in turn is in alignment with the base ideas of rational

intuitionalist theory; namely, the idea that political outcomes are a product of

individual preferences of actors as well as the separate arrangements of various

institutions.55

Though, this is problematic from an integrative standpoint, as EU environmental

policies, by the extent of their nature, furthers the integrative process.56 Larger

countries, however, might want to express their opinions more strongly if they do not

agree with the majority. In fact, large countries such as the UK and Germany could

have voted no and/or abstained in order to express disagreement with further

integration in areas like the environment and climate change. In addition, it may also

be difficult for the voters in major EU countries to accept EU decisions that is in

opposition to their national interest or the major opinion within the country.57 By

voicing its dissatisfaction, the government of such a country may make it easier on

themselves – a behaviour that shows that countries, regardless of size, are probable to

55 Sullivan, Jonathan. “Political preferences, revealed positions and strategic votes:

explaining decision-making in the EU Council”. Journal of European Public Policy. Vol.

14, no. 7, 2007, 1150–1161. https://www-tandfonline-

com.proxy.lnu.se/doi/full/10.1080/13501760701576643 (Accessed 2020-01-17) 56 Wurzel, K.W. Rüdiger. “The European Council, the Council and the Member States:

changing environmental leadership dynamics in the European Union”. Environmental

Politics. Vol. 28, no. 2, 2019, 248–270. https://www-tandfonline-

com.proxy.lnu.se/doi/full/10.1080/09644016.2019.1549783 (Accessed 2020-01-17) 57 Mattila, Mikko. “Contested decisions: Empirical analysis of voting in the European Union



https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lnu.se/doi/full/10.1080/13501760701576643


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42

vote against the majority in the Council. This also indicates that the no- and abstain-

voters have other priorities and preferences than the yes-voters.

Furthermore, the rotating presidency of the Council could also influence the member

states’ voting since it is unlikely that a county that holds the presidency would vote in

opposition to the majority.58 This position lasts for six months and enforces a variety

of roles for the member state in control.59 For instance, Slovakia had the presidency in

2016 and they voted yes in all ten voting procedures regarding environmental matters,

but in other years when Slovakia did not have the presidency, they abstained or voted

no. Another example of this is when Estonia had the presidency in 2018 and they

voted yes in all twenty voting sessions, but voted no or abstained in other years.60 In

this case when the member states hold the presidency, they gain new preferences –

meaning that they have to partly renounce their mission of endorsing its own opinions

and instead attempt to discover solutions that will be accepted by the majority. So,

instead of trying to maximise their previous preferences, they must now try to

maximise a new common preference.61 If the country holding the presidency takes its

roles as representative and negotiator seriously that is, because if they do, they do not

get much room for independent action and that could be a reason why some member

states still votes no or abstains even if they hold the presidency.62



https://doi-org.proxy.lnu.se/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00144.x (Accessed 2020-01-15) 59 Tallberg, Jonas. EU:s politiska system. 6th ed. Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2016, p. 109–

113. 60 Ibid, p. 109–113. 61 Schmidt, A. Vivien. “Comparative Institutional Analysis”. In The Handbook of

Comparative Politics. Landman, Todd and Robinson, Neil (ed.), 125–143. London: Sage

Publications, 2009, p. 126. 62 Mattila, Mikko. “Contested decisions: Empirical analysis of voting in the European Union





43

6.3 Economical position in the European Union

A member state’s economical position in the EU can also be a factor that can affect a

country’s voting. The EU is both a political and an economic institution, where the

shape of the internal EU market is very likely to lead to an increased economic

welfare in all member countries; at least, over a longer period of time. A key part of

the economic aspect of the EU’s role as an economic institution is the rebalancing of

money within the EU. This is also one of the EU’s most politically controversial

issues; how much money each state pays to the EU budget and how much it receives

in the form of various EU financial and economic aids, also called subsidies.63 It has

been suggested by Carrubba that this function is essentially a transaction, where the

richer EU states, through the EU as an institution, purchase the poorer member

countries’ acceptance of EU policies, furthering the integrative process.64 Something

of great interest regarding Carrubba’s notion is the fact that during the period where

the used data has been collected, one of the smaller member states, Slovenia, voted

yes to every single suggestion that has been listed previously. This plays into

Carrubba’s theory of “integration-purchase”, because Slovenia, like many other

smaller EU member states, receives more money from the EU than it gives.65 Thus,

one can assume that Carrubba’s theory applies. However, there are many other states

that are in the same position regarding financing who did not exclusively vote yes.

Poland is one of these countries. In 2012, Poland was the main receiver of the EU

budget’s benefits and received four times as much money as it gave to the EU in the



https://doi-org.proxy.lnu.se/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00144.x (Accessed 2020-01-15) 64 Carrubba, J. Clifford. “Net Financial Transfers in the European Union: Who Gets What

and Why?”. The Journal of Politics. Vol. 59, no. 2, 1997, 469–496. https://www-jstor-

org.proxy.lnu.se/stable/2998173?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents (Accessed 2020-01-15) 65 Directorate-General for Budget (European Commission). The EU budget in my country – Slovenia. Publications Office of the EU. 2014. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-

/publication/ade1524a-f09d-40dc-859f-4fd0714b49d5/language-en/format-PDF/source-

131427933 (Accessed 2020-01-16)


https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lnu.se/stable/2998173?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents


https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/ade1524a-f09d-40dc-859f-4fd0714b49d5/language-en/format-PDF/source-131427933



44

first place.66 So, it seems to be the economics that primarily determine attitude

towards environmental matters. Despite Poland receiving the most money from the

EU budget in 2012, it still voted yes, the second least amount of times out of any of

the member states within the time frame from which the data has been collected.

Arguably, Poland is following a rational choice approach – in an attempt to preserve

its own massive EU budget subsidiaries, it opposes the environmental suggestions –

because if more money is devoted to that, the less money is devoted to Poland’s

infrastructure. So, by definition of the rational choice theory, Poland (through its

representative individuals within EU institutions) is acting as a rational, self-interested

actor, caring more for its short-term economic wellbeing rather than its long-term

environmental wellbeing.67 But, arguably, this also means that Poland is very unlikely

to leave, unless of course its benefits of EU membership start to disappear. However,

as long as Poland continues to receive its massive economic support, it is difficult to

imagine that it would willingly leave.

7. Conclusion

After viewing the voting results from 2015 to 2019 in the previous chapters, the

Council of Ministers had several voting procedures related to environmental matters.

The different years consisted of various voting sessions where 2017 had the lowest

amount of procedures and 2018 had the highest amount of procedures. Furthermore,

the Council of the EU voted diversely during these four years with primarily positive

votes for these environmental policies. Even though all these directives were passed,

there were still countries that tried to stop these decisions, although this was

impossible to do from the start due to the predetermined nature of these directives.

66 Directorate-General for Budget (European Commission). The EU budget in my country –

Poland. Publications Office of the EU. 2014. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-

/publication/07474b6b-5daa-44d9-863e-1356c72786b0/language-en/format-PDF/source-

131436854 (Accessed 2020-01-16) 67 Schmidt, A. Vivien. “Comparative Institutional Analysis”. In The Handbook of

Comparative Politics. Landman, Todd and Robinson, Neil (ed.), 125–143. London: Sage

Publications, 2009, p. 127.

https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/07474b6b-5daa-44d9-863e-1356c72786b0/language-en/format-PDF/source-131436854



45

However, it is important to note that there could have been impacts on the integration

process had more countries voted no or abstained, but in the long run, that seems

unlikely. By using three explanatory factors to explain how the voting results could

impact the integration process through rational choice institutionalism, we get the

opportunity to identify which member states that could be for or against further

integration. When it comes to ideology, the institutional factors and economical

position in the EU, it is clear that the member states’ preferences regarding these

factors have a large impact on their voting and in turn on the European integration

process depending on their priorities regarding integration and climate change –

meaning that these countries vote according to their priorities and utility-

maximisation tendencies.

It should also be noted that direct no-votes are not necessary to block or reject a

decision – even sufficient amounts of abstain-votes are enough to achieve this. The

reason for this is that abstain-votes, by their very nature, display an uninterest from

the countries that use it, and enough uninterest effectively means the same thing as

direct opposition. This uninterest could also be showing dissatisfaction which could

potentially lead to frustration among the member states due to their perception of the

EU as not providing sufficient benefits compared to the relative cost of membership.

As a result, this could potentially lead to a decreased integration or a possibility for

disintegration, because of this dissatisfaction – which would be a rational, self-

interested decision on their part, in line with RCI theory. However, in the case of this

study, there was an overwhelmingly positive response – with most countries voting

yes regarding most directives. This is in alignment with most of the EU’s processes –

though mostly positive, there are always a few outliers, depending on the topic

discussed. Based on this, it is reasonable to assume that integration will continue to

increase like it has previously. Despite opposition from certain countries, most of

these countries do receive large benefits from the EU budget and would not be keen

on leaving the Union altogether.

46

This thesis is not the first nor the last one to examine disintegration and integration of

the EU. That said, there is definitely room for expansion and further study regarding

the topic of this thesis; specifically, on the topic of disintegration. It has already

begun, in regards to what has come to be known as Brexit, and to ignore further study

of this topic would be an unwise decision, since it may greatly affect the future of the

EU as well as Europe as a whole. So, to conclude this thesis, it seems like the future

of the European integration will proceed to increase in the way it has been doing for

the last few years, although the future is always uncertain.

47

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