24CR

studies@24cr.org 08-Mar-17

Euphrates Shield and Safe Zone Challenges

Euphrates Shield and Safe Zone Challenges

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Contents

1 Summary ....................................................................................................................................................... 2

2 The Situation in northern Aleppo’s countryside before the Euphrates Shield ................................................. 3

2.1 Daesh-Controlled Areas .......................................................................................................................................... 3

2.2 The Local Factions Controlled Areas ....................................................................................................................... 4

3 The Relationship between Turkey and Daesh before ‘Euphrates Shield’ ......................................................... 6

3.1 Border almost Opened ........................................................................................................................................... 6

3.2 Rare Crossing Cases: ............................................................................................................................................... 8

3.3 Planting of Landmines on the Border ...................................................................................................................... 8

4 Tension in the Relationship between Turkey and Daesh ................................................................................ 8

4.1 The Enemy-Friends ................................................................................................................................................. 9

4.2 An undeclared War ............................................................................................................................................ 9

4.3 Artillery Shelling targeting the Turkish Territory .......................................................................................... 9

5 Euphrates Shield to wipe out Daesh ...................................................................................................... 9

5.1 Capturing of Jarablus Area............................................................................................................................. 10

5.2 The Battle of Al-Bab.............................................................................................................................................. 11

5.3 The Race to Al-Bab by Assad’s Forces and Euphrates Shield .................................................................................. 12

5.4 The Tension between Euphrates Shield and SDF ................................................................................................... 13

5.5 The Anger of Euphrates Shield forces following the entry of USA Forces. .............................................................. 14

5.6 Civilians Casualties ............................................................................................................................................... 14

6 Challenges of the Safe Zone: ........................................................................................................................ 15

6.1 Administration of the Areas ................................................................................................................................. 16

6.1.1 The Local Council in Jarablus .................................................................................................................................... 16

6.1.2 A Discrimination between the City and the Countryside ......................................................................................... 17 6.1.3 Insufficient Resources and Service for all the Locals ................................................................................................ 18

6.2 Euphrates Shield’s Factions commit Violations against Civilians ........................................................................... 18

6.3 Terror of Daesh continues .................................................................................................................................... 19

6.4 Arab-Kurdish Conflict… a Time Bomb ................................................................................................................... 19

6.5 Infightings between the factions of Euphrates Shield ........................................................................................... 20

6.5.1 The Fighting over the Afrin Road.............................................................................................................................. 20 6.5.2 Showing off of Power in Jarablus ............................................................................................................................. 21

6.6 The Anger of Civilians ........................................................................................................................................... 22

*Cover Page Picture: Euphrates Shield fighters sleeping on streets in Jarablus after the clashes against Daesh

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Euphrates Shield Operation and Safe Zone Challenges

1 Summary

The Aleppo province has witnessed a series of

military phases over the past few months which

led to radical changes related to power and

control. The military changes would not stop at

the capturing of the city of Aleppo by Assad‟s

forces being backed by the sectarian militias and

Russia, or the capturing of Al-Bab city from

Daesh by factions operating under the command

of the Euphrates Shield Operation Room. The

countryside of Aleppo would become a center for

the mobilization of manpower belonging to the

conflicting forces who are racing to gain control

over as many towns and cities as they can.

The conflicting forces in Syria have been rivaling

against each in the northern and eastern

countryside of Aleppo over the past few months,

turning them into a tense area where those

forces are seeking to achieve military and

political gains, which might draw the features of

the upcoming phase of the war in Syria. The

formation of Euphrates Shield Operation Room

was a turning point of the conflict in the region.

The factions operating under its command could

force Daesh out of their main strongholds in

north and east of Aleppo. The Euphrates Shield

have not halted their operations at this point

since they have more aims which are included in

the Turkish plan of forming a safe zone in

northern Syria that will be used to benefit Turkey

in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict in the region.

The racing between the conflicting forces, mainly

Assad‟s forces, the Syrian Democratic Forces

(SDF), and Euphrates Shield forces being

backed by Turkey, on the front lines in rural

Aleppo, have resulted in light battles among

them so far. This might evolve into heavy

confrontations in the upcoming phase. It would

also increase the suffering of the local civilians

and the displaced whose houses and villages

have been ravaged due to the war which has

been ongoing for years now.

Since their capturing of areas in the countryside

of Aleppo, Daesh have sought to capture all

areas along the Turkey-Syria border. They

succeeded in gaining control over 70 km of

those areas. Then, they attempted to keep their

relationship with Turkey as good as possible to

maintain their logistic support, treat their

wounded in Turkish hospitals and control the

export and import of goods entering from Turkey

to Syria, which was a lucrative business for the

organization. The relationship reached its top

that some Daesh affiliates would proudly

announce their affiliation with the organization in

Turkish towns and cities. At the same time, the

organization practiced all kinds of terrorism to

terrorize the locals in areas of its control,

including arrest, displacement and brutal

execution.

After Daesh kidnapped employees of the Turkish

Consulate in Mosul, Iraq, the relationship

between them became tense. This led to the

escalation of tension along Turkey-Syria border

(northern Aleppo). After that, the relationship

turned into a declared enmity between both

parties. Daesh attempted to provoke Turkey by

shelling populated areas in Turkey using mortar

and artillery, in addition to claiming responsibility

for a series of explosions that had rocked the

country. Because Daesh became a serious

danger for Turkey, the latter rushed to form and

support Syrian military factions in rural Aleppo to

expel the organization from areas along its

border. The Turkish Airforce and Turkish army

both participated in those operations. These led

to the launching of the Euphrates Shield

Operation, which was divided into three phases.

In the first, they captured the Jarablus city and

its countryside, in the second, they managed to

expel Daesh from the entire area along Turkey-

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Syria border, while in the third they succeeded in

liberating the city of Al-Bab.

Although Euphrates Shield succeeded in

expelling Daesh from the region, civilians are still

paying the heavy tax of the ongoing conflict in

northern Syria, particularly northern Aleppo. This

could pose a threat to the Turkish-backed safe

zone. The consequences of the war have

negatively affected the civilian life, mainly

because of the poor administration of the

liberated areas. The factions operating in them

are placing their self-interests above the

deteriorating humanitarian conditions of the

locals. The administrations are unable to cover

all services to the civilians, meaning that they

would not afford the new conditions which would

emerge with the creation of a safe zone.

Weapons are still carried in domesticated areas.

Daesh VBIEDs are stilling in action and infighting

between Euphrates Shield factions continue to

occur. The Euphrates Shield Operation has also

resulted in the fueling of the Arabs vs Kurds

conflict in the region. These significant

challenges are hindering the establishment of

the safe zone which would be a home to civilians

fleeing the war and conflicts in Syria. There must

be practical solutions to help the locals in

northern Syria and others restore a part of their

ordinary and safe life.

2 The Situation in northern

Aleppo’s countryside before the

Euphrates Shield

2.1 Daesh-Controlled Areas

After heavy clashes with Assad‟s forces and

allied militias, Free Syrian Army-linked local

factions gained control over the city of Al-Bab in

August 2012. The battles in Al-Bab coincided

with the break out of armed confrontations in the

city of Aleppo. Factions affiliated with the Liwaa

Tawhid Brigade and local factions from Aleppo

took full control over the military, security and

civil areas in the city in a period which did not

last for a couple of days.

After the Liwaa Tawhid captured the city of Al-

Bab, it became a significant commercial center

for civilians residing outside Assad-held areas.

Trade, industry, mechanic, export and import of

goods were booming at that time since Al-Bab is

the entrance to eastern Aleppo. Afterwards, it

became the main road for oil tankers supplying

the entire northern Syria. In addition, basic oil

refinery facilities were established in it, which

made the city an important commercial center

that linked between the eastern region in Deir

Ezzor and Al-Raqqa and the northern and

western areas in Syria, as well as Turkey.

On January 14, 2014, Daesh took control over

the city of Al-Bab following an onslaught on the

local factions in which they had the support of

massive reinforcements deployed from Al-

Raqqa. A huge convoy belonging to the

organization managed to cross from the Dir

Hafer and Maskana towns, as well as the Jarah

airport as a result of a deal between them and

Abu Khaled al Souri, who was the general

commander of the Ahrar Al-Sham Movement,

which included the not targeting of the convoy.

(Picture 1)

After Daesh controlled the city, they did not

impose their strict rules upon the civilians

immediately. In 2015, Daesh were in their height

due to their success in battles against both,

Assad‟s forces and the local factions. Therefore,

they began executing, arresting and imprisoning

those who violated their rules which forced many

of the locals to flee from Daesh-held areas to

elsewhere. Daesh atrocities in Al-Bab were

followed by an intense air campaign against the

city by the Assad regime (this also coincided

with attempts by Assad‟s forces to advance to

Kuweiriss Airport in order to lift the siege which

was being imposed on it by the organization)

which led to the death of hundreds of civilians

and the injury of several others.

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1 Agreement between Ahrar alSham and Daesh

After that, Al-Bab became one of the main

strongholds of Daesh in Aleppo province.

Operation rooms were established by high-

ranking Daesh commanders who planned

offensives against FSA-held areas in the

province. VBIEDs and suicide bombers that

targeted areas in rural Aleppo all came from Al-

Bab. The city was also known as „The

Small/New London‟ for there were many foreign

Daesh affiliates, mainly British nationals, residing

in it.

On August 2014, Daesh advanced from Al-Bab

to the towns of Akhtarin, Dabiq and Turkmen

Bareh. Despite these, Al-Bab was not the main

center of the „Aleppo Wiliyah‟. Manbij city where

high-ranking administrative, security and military

commanders resided, was the main center of the

Wilayah and it had the control and decision over

all others areas in what the organization calls

„Wilayat Halab‟. Daesh used the Saray of the

Government (A governmental complex

belonging to the Syrian Government known

locally by that name) as a headquarter where

they held meetings and planned their military

operations in the region, as well as a security

base from which they issued orders to other

areas.

Al-Bab city was the main center of Daesh

prisons. Around 100 detainees from what the

organization calls „Wilayat Halab‟ died in those

prisons. The International Coalition targeted the

prison in the Saray on April, 2015, which

destroyed it and killed all detainees held in it.

The Saray Prison was an old prison used by

both, Assad‟s forces and the local factions.

Moreover, dozens of prisoners were killed after

being targeted by airstrikes by the coalition and

artillery shelling by the SDF as they were being

transported from Al-Bab to area in rural Manbij to

do labor work such as digging trenches and

establishing barricades.

Al-Bab was of strategic importance for the

organization since it was the connecting link

between northern and eastern Syria. They even

had the double number of their manpower of

Manbij in Al-Bab for being closer to the front

lines against the local factions and Assad‟s

forces. In addition, the city was the main road for

oil transportation from Daesh-held territory in

eastern Syria to the north, as well as the Coast

areas which were under the control of the

opposition. People would come and go from

Daesh-held areas to the others, which resulted

in the prosperity of Daesh business.

2.2 The Local Factions Controlled Areas

After Daesh captured the city of Al-Bab in

eastern Aleppo, borders were established

between the FSA and the local factions held

areas in Aleppo. The organization was keen on

gaining control over the Akhtarin, Turkmen

Bareh and Qabiq towns since they are linked

with Islamic stories about an epic battle in an

area near Dabiq. They exploited its religious

background to raise the moral of their fighters by

convincing them into believing that they were in

a holy war.

Firefights between all parties continued until

October 2014. Daesh had launched several

violent offensives on positions belonging to the

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local factions which enabled them to capture a

large swath of lands from northern Aleppo along

the Turkish border. Their areas extended from

the Halwaniya in rural Jarablus to Al-Rai in rural

Azaz, as well as the Akhtarin, Turkmen Bareh,

Dabiq and Suran on the outskirts of the strategic

city of Mare‟. At that time, Daesh benefited from

attacks launched by Assad‟s forces in Aleppo

city in which they were attempting to lift the siege

on the loyal towns of Nubl and Zahraa‟. This

reduced the power of the local factions as they

had to fight on different fronts at the same time.

Daesh attempted to capture the Mare city for

several times. Their fighters used to say „Mare

before the Qudss‟ and „Mare‟ is the road to Al-

Qudss‟. This is because the city is the main

stronghold of the local factions and the FSA in

northern Aleppo. It was also the area from which

they advanced to Aleppo. In August 2015, the

organization intensively shelled the city using

even chemical weapons which led to the

suffocation of many people. They also bombed it

with artillery shells and rockets. After the

capturing of the Suran and Tilayn, which

separates between Mare and Azaz, Daesh laid

siege to the city. At that time, the organization

reached the nearest point to the Bab Salama

border crossing. They began their attack on

Mare with the detonation of 6 VBIEDs which

killed dozens of civilians and fighters from the

local factions. But, the severe resistance by the

local factions in Mare prevented the fall of the

city into Daesh‟s hands. At that time, the SDF

were cutting off the roads to the local factions

and exploited the Daesh offensive by the

launching of an assault on Mare which enabled

them to gain control over the Sheikh Aissa town

west of Mare in norther Aleppo.

Daesh gained control over the Shamrin village

which is few km away from the Bab Salam

border crossing with Turkey who closed it

following the advances. However, the local

factions reorganized their ranks and launched

attacks on Daesh during which they succeeded

in lifting the siege on Mare and forcing the

organization to retreat areas they captured near

the strategic border crossing. After that, hit and

run operations dominated the military situation in

the region.

In April 2016, several factions who were

operating in northern Syria announced the

formation of the Huwar Kilis Operation Room

with the aim, as stated by them, fighting and

expelling Daesh from the northern countryside.

The factions consisted of local factions and

others trained by both, USA and Turkey, who

crossed from the Turkish border to Bab Salama

border with their weapons. However, they failed

to make any substantial gains in their battles

against the organization, apart from their

recapturing of the Rai town, which only lasted for

a couple of hours before retreating from it, and

the expelling of Daesh from a distance of 16 km

near along the Turkish border in August 2016.

Then, long battles continued between both

parties. Sometimes, the local factions would

advance by day and Daesh would recapture

areas they lost by night. This occurred amid

confusion dominating the ranks of those factions

who were unable to secure their gains in a small

geographic area. For instance, the Taqali village

near Mare‟ exchanged hands for more than 16

times in a period of three months.

Following the formation of the Euphrates Shield,

Turkish tanks entered into the Syrian territory

from Azaz city and backed the Huwar Kilis

Operation Room in an attempt by them to

capture the Rai town. The offensive by which

they succeeded in the recapturing of the eastern

and southern countryside of Mare and Azaz in

October 2016. Since then, they have advanced

being backed by Turkey until they reached and

expelled Daesh from Al-Bab city and

surrounding areas.

After the Euphrates Shield, local factions being

backed by Turkey again attempted to advance to

the Tel Rifaat town in October 2016 in order to

recapture it from the SDF. But, the offensive was

halted two days after launching it due to the fact

that the factions could not advance at all after

suffering heavy casualties as a result of intense

Russian airstrikes, which were carried out in

support of the SDF, on their controlled areas.

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3 The Relationship between

Turkey and Daesh before

‘Euphrates Shield’

Since the capturing of the first border crossing

with Turkey by the local faction, Turkey has

played a major role in the determination of the

military map of all kinds of conflicts in Syria. The

borders were the door to „Jihadists‟ into Syria

and a supply line for the moderate and other

Islamic factions. However, the border were of

great importance for the importation of food and

medical supplies and other basic needs in order

to help the Syrians living in areas outside Assad-

controlled territory which extended from Deir

Ezzor province to Aleppo and from the latter to

Idlib until reaching the mountains in the northern

countryside of Latikia and the outskirts of Homs

city. The activities on the border were not limited

to the official border but also to illegal crossings.

They were not only utilized for military purposes,

but also as a crossing for the civilians wanting to

leave the country for Turkey.

Since their emergence in Syria and their fight

over power and control against the Nusra Front,

which broke out after they split into two different

entities, Daesh fought to capture areas near the

Turkish border following. The organization took

control over Azaz before being forced to retreat

from it following an offensive launched by the

local faction in February 2014. Therefore, areas

of their control were limited to few areas in

northern Aleppo, which led the organization to

switch its goals and launch an offensive aimed at

the capturing of areas in the Raqqa province and

the strategic city of Ain Al-Arab (Kobane) near

the Turkish border. However, the offensive

turned into a failure after being forced to retreat

from areas they captured in rural Ain Al-Arab by

the Kurdish factions being backed by both, small

FSA groups and the Coalition.

3.1 Border almost Opened

The organization was in control of around 70 km

of distance along the Turkish border. The areas

extended from the Jarablus city (the western

bank of the Euphrates River) to areas nearby the

Bab Salama border crossing near Azaz city.

The border between both, Daesh and Turkey,

witnessed constant activities which were

monitored and controlled by the Turkish

authorities in comparison with other frontiers

near local factions controlled areas.

Eyewitnesses confirmed that the number of

Turkish soldiers stationed near Daesh-held

areas was less than those near areas under the

control of the local factions. This led civilians to

choose to cross from Daesh-controlled areas

into Turkey1. After the organization reinforced its

border area, they established one crossing point

area only. At the same time, people continued to

cross from two other points, one of which was

turned into a crossing used by Daesh affiliates

only and the other for civilians. The crossings

were operated by a special security division

whom Daesh calls „border police‟. They were

tasked with monitoring and controlling the

movements at the crossing points and verifying

the permission documents carried by the

passengers willing to cross into the Turkish

territory. (Picture 2)

2 crossing points to Turkey

1 Aleppo24 spotted several cases in which

people attempted to enter Turkey illegally.

Those people said that they preferred Daesh-

held areas to cross into the Turkish territory

because of being less risky compared to FSA-

held areas where people can be shot directly by

Turkish border patrols, which have killed several

people so far.

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A military border crossing point (Halwaniyah

Crossing Point): This point was located west of

the border city of Jarablus, mainly near the

Syrian Halwaniyah village. It is an area

characterized by rough ground and it consists of

a military road used by the Turkish border

guards. The organization relied on that area for

the importation of medical supplies and some

other basic needs to cover their demands. The

areas were supervised by a group of special

units linked with high-ranking Daesh

commanders.

A fighters (individuals) crossing point (Haj

Wali Crossing Point): This area was located

near the Haji Wali village and farms nearby the

Bab Limon village. It is locally known as the Bab

Laymon crossing point. The organization utilized

it for the crossing of individuals and their

elements. Daesh fighters were not allowed to

cross, unless they provided a real justification

such as being in critical need of medical

treatments in Turkey. The fighters needed a

document from their emirs. It was like a

guarantee that those fighters would return after

the ending of their staying in Turkey. After

obtaining the documents from their emirs, they

would have to go to the headquarter of the

„Wilayah‟ from which they would get the

permission paper that contained the signature of

the Wali. The measures of obtaining it would last

only for one day. Next, they would head towards

the border checkpoints responsible of the

crossing point, show them the document and

then cross into Turkey. After returning from

Turkey, the checkpoint would hand back that

document to the fighter who would take it to the

headquarter of the Wialyat in order to confirm his

return. The fighters were highly inspected to

avoid crossing with fake papers which were used

by some Daesh defectors.

3 Admission template for Daesh's fighter

A civilian crossing point (Ayashah Crossing

Point): This point was located in the area

between the villages of Sheikh Yaaqub, Ayasha

and Al-Rai. It was specified for crossing by

ordinary civilians into Turkey. However, for

unclear reasons, the security measures on that

crossing point were intensified by the

organization. Civilians were prevented from

crossing, apart from those who were in an urgent

need to cross into Turkey for receiving medical

treatment. In such a situation, the patient had to

go to medical points from which he or she would

obtain a cross paper for treatment in Turkey.

But, they only gave it to them after making sure

that the patients could not be cured in Syria2.

Relatives of the patients would go to the

headquarter of the Wilayah in order to get the

2 Aleppo24 documented the case of an elderly in

Manbij city who died after Daesh organization

delayed her crossing into Turkey for medical

treatment.

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signed document and show it to the checkpoint

near the border from which they would be

transported to border crossing places devoid of

minefields. After that, they would let them go.

Sometimes, the crossing would fail in case there

were Turkish patrols activities near the crossing

area who would either, arrest or sent them back

to Syria. Civilians were in a difficult situation as

they barely crossed into Turkey for the intense

security measures of the organization which

were imposed in that area. At that time, civilians

shared talks about an agreement between

Turkey and Daesh that the latter should monitor

and control the situation along the border in

exchange of facilitating the crossing of their

affiliates and the use of the Daesh military

crossing point.

3.2 Rare Crossing Cases:

There were some rare crossing cases which

were not subjected to the regular measures of

the organization. They can be divided into three

main cases:

Crossing of the security members: Most of the

time, they were linked with the security

department of the organization. They would

leave for Turkey and return without the need to

undergo any security measures. They would

arrive at the crossing points being accompanied

by the security department officials who would

transport them to the nearest point to the Turkish

territory.

Crossing for visit purposes: Daesh affiliates

would receive visitors from outside Syria,

particularly during summer. People coming from

Europe and other areas would enter into Syria

during that period and stay for 14 days (the

maximum) and then leave again. Daesh affiliates

calls this as „visits to the land of the Caliphate‟.

These visits benefited the organization as they

were as a communication network with their

sleeper cells in areas outside their held areas.

Crossing of people and merchants: People and

merchants were allowed to cross into Turkey

without the need to undergo the same security

measures imposed on the rest of civilians. As

they had direct links with Daesh border guards

whom they would bribe with 500 USD to be

allowed to cross.

3.3 Planting of Landmines on the Border

After retreating from vast areas in Aleppo and

Idlib and suffering a setback in Kobane, despair

and confusion dominated the ranks of Daesh

fighters which led many of them to defect.

Because the Turkish border were of major

importance for the organization since they were

used as supply lines and also for the

transportation of those who were in critical

conditions to hospitals in Turkey. Among the

security measures employed by the organization

was the establishment of landmines along the

Turkish border, except private crossing areas

known to Daesh border guards only.

4 Tension in the Relationship

between Turkey and Daesh

In 2014, the International Coalition being led by

the USA was formed, which was followed by

immediate airstrikes in both, Syria and Iraq. In

the beginning, Turkey did not agree to

participate in the coalition, which prevented the

setting up of an effective strategy, although

Turkey is the closest country to Daesh-held

areas. At that time, Daesh took a number of

Turkish nationals as captives after an attack on

the Turkish consulate in Mosul, Iraq, and

released them in a concealed deal, whose

details have not been released until now, in

September 2014, according to official statements

by the Turkish authorities.

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4.1 The Enemy-Friends

Until that period, there were many questions and

mysteries concerning the relationship between

Turkey and Daesh. Their relationship was

somehow good. The border between them was

almost opened, which facilitated the movement

of Daesh fighters between them. They could

easily cross into the Turkish territory and return

after that without facing any difficulty compared

to the situation in areas controlled by the FSA

and the local factions in northern Aleppo and

western Idlib. In those areas, the Turkish border

guards opened fire on every civilian attempting

to cross into their areas. Turkey and Daesh also

cooperated with each other for several times,

including the military coordination to re-station

their Turkish forces who were protecting the

Suleiman Shah Grave in February 2014. This

coordination had continued until February 21,

2015, after the Turkey relocated the Suleiman

Shah grave.

4.2 An undeclared War

The relationship between Turkey and Dash

became tense in July 2015 after the latter killed

a Turkish officer and wounded two others in the

clashes which occurred between both parties in

the Tel Aisha village between Jarablus and Al-

Rai near the Turkish border. The Turkish army

responded to that with shelling Daesh positions

in that village using heavy artillery, which

resulted in 18 Daesh and 2 civilian casualties.

The tension escalated following the incursion

into the Syrian territory by Turkish forces to

remove landmines and establish a cement Wall,

which led to firefights between both parties since

the organization considered as a threat to its

security and communication networks with the

outside world. Therefore, it began provoking the

Turkish army. The situation evolved after the

landing of the first Daesh shells in the Turkish

Kilis city on January 18, 2016, which was

launched due to the Turkish artillery support for

FSA factions during an offensive on the Gas

Factory and other areas near the border.

4.3 Artillery Shelling targeting the Turkish Territory

Daesh deployed their artillery and missile

battalion, who is linked with the Wilayat Halab

Army, to agricultural lands close to Al-Rai near

the Turkish border. Then, they began targeting

civilian areas in the Turkish territory. The

battalion consisted of dozens of figthers, mostly

Turkish and Kurdish nationals, being led by a

Turkish Daesh commander named „Abdl Qader

Tufan‟ who was responsible for the

determination of the targets in Turkey. He also

called for the targeting of Turkish targets on

charges that the Turkish army is „apostate‟. The

battalion is well experienced due to the fact of

taking part in the intense battles which occurred

in „Ain Al-Arab/Kobane‟. They relied on many

different tactics of camouflage in order not to be

spotted by satellite and reconnaissance drones.

Daesh also used T52 and T72 tanks, as well as

Fuzika artillery and Russian and Korean rocket

launchers, in their targeting of the Turkish

territory. Despite the presence of close Turkish

military targets, the organization deliberately

targeted the Turkish city of Kilis in an attempt by

them to create a civilian pressure on the Turkish

authorities to end the fight against it in the Syrian

territory.

5 Euphrates Shield to wipe out Daesh

Turkey reorganized a number of local military

factions in northern Syria and unified them under

one single commander called „Euphrates Shield‟.

On August 24, 2016, the formation of the

Euphrates Shield operation room was

announced. The date sparked confusion among

the Syrian as it coincides with the yearly

anniversary of the Marj Dabiq Battle between the

Mamalik and the Ottomans which ended by the

victory of the latter and their incursion into the

Sham area (Syria). Several factions took part in

the Euphrates Shield, most notably the Faylaq

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Al-Sham, the Shamiyah Front, the Sultan Murat

Brigade, the Mutassim Brigade, the Nouredine

Zenki Movement and the Northern Division.

Later, it became clear that the formation of

Euphrates Shield was not merely to expel Daesh

from northern Aleppo, but also to block the

Kurdish Self-Rule Administration from advancing

in northern Syria and preventing them from

linking up their Afrin Canton with other cantons

of Ain Al-Arab and Al-Hasakah.

The Euphrates Shield operation was divided into

three phases. The first phase was attained after

the factions, who were backed by Turkish

artillery and coalition air support, succeeded in

gaining control over Jarablus city few hours after

the launching of the operation. Then, they

continued to advance to areas located between

Jarablus and Al-Rai town. The Hiwar Kilis

Operation Room and Euphrates Shield forces

took control over a distance of 90 km along

between Jarablus and Azaz and managed to foil

the attempts of the Kurdish Self-Rule

Administration to link their Afrin canton with Ain

Al-Arab/Kobane.

After forcing Daesh to retreat from Jarablus, the

second phase of Euphrates Shield operation

was launched. In this phase, they focused on

capturing villages surrounding Al-Bab city in

order to surround the organization in the city,

which was its biggest stronghold in eastern

Aleppo after being expelled from Manbij by the

SDF which had been the administrative center of

the so called „ Wilayat Halab‟. This pushed the

organization to relocated its administration to Al-

Bab. Euphrates Shield succeeded in gaining

control over towns and cities in northern Aleppo,

including Akhtarin, Suran and areas on the

outskirts of Al-Bab during the second phase.

Dabiq town, which is of high religious

significance for the organization and a great

motivator to recruit more extremist Daesh

supporters from around the globe, was also

captured by them.

Concerning the third phase, it was aimed at the

capturing of Al-Bab city. However, it needed a

period of 3 months to attain that goal. The

offensives were hampered a lot which forced the

attacking factions to retreat from inside the city

to its outskirts for several times.

5.1 Capturing of Jarablus Area

On Wednesday, August 24, 2016, the operation

to capture the Jarablus area began. Euphrates

Shield forces captured four villages in northern

Syria, including the Kiklijah town which is only 3

km far from Jarablus city. 18 days before the

start of the operation, Daesh had relocated a

large number of families of their commanders

from the Amranah town and Jarablus. The

operation began after minesweepers finished

their duties on the border area near Jarablush

which separates between Syria and Turkey.

Turkish artillery paved the way for Euphrates

Shield by shelling the northern neighbrohoods of

Jarablus and other nearby villages such as

Hajliyah and Turkheim. But, Daesh deployed

more reinforcements to the city as the Turkish

artillery shelling on its center and areas west and

east of it continued regularly.

On August 23, Daesh responded by the shelling

of the Turkish Qarmaqish border crossing with

mortar. It was the crossing at which the factions,

who did not announce officially their affiliation

with Euphrates Shield at that time, mobilized

their manpower and equipment. Following the

start of the operation on August 24, Abu Hafss

Al-Shami, the emir of the Jarablus area, was

wounded along with other commanders their

private operation room was targeted. This

coincided with the entry of more than 3000

fighters from Turkey into Syria, while 2000

others remained in Turkey as they were waiting

for the green light. Euphrates Shield advanced

rapidly south of Jarablus, capturing the Sharia

School after Daesh fighters who were stationed

in it fled to areas east of it after crossing from the

Euphrates River. Then, they gained control over

the northern entrance to Jarablus city, the

security square which consisted of the Saraya

Building, the Military Security and the Cultural

Center. This was followed by the capturing of the

entire city, in addition to surrounding villages

such as the Amrana south of the city, after

Daesh ranks collapsed in it. The organization

lost contact with more than 45 of its affiliates.

The goals of the battle of Jarablus were quickly

attained due to the direct support provided to

Euphrates Shield by the Turkish army and the

coalition who scored direct hits on Daesh targets

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in Jarablus, mainly the targeting of a meeting

between Daesh commanders in the region,

which led to the death of all of them and created

a state of confusion among their affiliates which

pushed many of them to flee towards the

Euphrates River.

4 Euphrates Shield fighters in Jarablus

Euphrates Shield continued to advance against

Daesh in the Jarablus area and captured the

villages of Tel Shair, Qurah Qawi and Tureikhim.

The commander of Turkish Special Units „Zakani

Aq Saqali‟ paid a visit to Euphrates Shield in

Jarablus city (Picture 5). In the beginning of

August, Turkish tanks entered into Al-Rai city in

northern Aleppo to provide support for the

factions of Euphrates Shield in the battle of

linking Azaz with Jarablus. Afterwards,

Euphrates Shield took over several villages east

of Jarablus, including Ghandoura and its silos.

Daesh presence in the border line which extends

from Jarablus to Al-Rai was wiped out after

Euphrates Shield factions in east and west meet

with each other.

5 Visit of commander of TR Special Units in Jarablus

5.2 The Battle of Al-Bab

After Euphrates Shield captured the city of

Jarablus and surrounding areas, they began

planning to advance towards Daesh-held Al-Bab

city. On August 30, the coalition bombed a

vehicle near the city, which resulted in the death

of those inside. Daesh spokesperson, Al-Adnani,

was one of the killed persons in that airstrike.

The organization began planting landmines east

of Al-Bab and prevented civilians from leaving to

Jarablus from which it retreated. It established

check posts in all places of the city. In

September 2016, a new front was opened in the

vicinity of the border town of Al-Rai, which was

still under the control of Daesh at that time. The

aim was to capture it and then advance towards

Al-Bab which is around 75 km far from the

border and a main Daesh stronghold. Turkish

tanks and other vehicles crossed the border in

order to support the offensive. On September

17, the faction operating under the command of

Euphrates Shield announced the start of the

third phase of „Euphrates Shield Operation‟.

Next, they managed to capture Tat Homs village

west of Al-Rai and the villages of Mazaraat Ulah

and Qubtan Shamai east of Akhtarin and then

Akhtarin itself, as well as Ihtimiylat, Duwaybiq

and Kafrah, in addition to several other villages

in northern Aleppo, including Suran Azaz and

Dabiq.

Euphrates Shield continued their advancement

towards Al-Bab, capturing the Abalah, Dir Hawa,

Shawi Kabir and Shawi Saghir. This forced

Daesh to deploy military reinforcements from the

countryside of Homs to Al-Bab city. Afterwards,

Euphrates Shield gained control over Susnbat,

Tarhin and Nuaaman Shamali, which enabled

them to reach an area 9 km far from the city

only. This was also followed by their capturing of

over Qadiran, Hawzan, Sussyan, Dir Mountain

and Al-Hadath to reduce the distance between

them and Al-Bab to 3 km. On February 22,

Euphrates Shield took full control over the

strategic town of Qabasin east of Al-Bab after hit

and run operations against the organization.

However, the had to retreat from it. In the same

month, the coalition and Turkish artillery

intensified their shelling of Al-Bab city and

surrounding villages controlled by Daesh. On

December 09, the offensive to capture Al-Bab

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city began with the launching of more than 20 air

raids by the Turkish Airforce. This paved the way

for Euphrates Shield to attack from north and

west of the city after the capturing of the western

outskirts of it and Alulu Istrahah in the southern

outskirts. In the following day, the forces

advanced into inside the city from the eastern,

southern and western sides of it, enabling them

to control of Zamzam area. This was

accompanied by a wave of civilian displacement

from the city to the eastern countryside of

Aleppo.

Then, Euphrates Shield managed to take over a

Daesh arms depot, in synchronization with

intense Turkish airstrikes on the city. In mid-

September, Euphrates Shield tried to capture

Mount Sheikh Aqeel, Al-Bab/ Aleppo highway

and the court hospital. In the same month, Abu

Hussein Tunissi, a Daesh commander, was

killed in a Turkish airstrike on the Bab area.

Euphrates Shield halted their military operations

for almost two months due to attacks by Assad‟s

regime warplanes, Assad‟s forces and allied

militias, as well as the Russian aircraft, against

different areas, mainly those located in Aleppo‟s

western countryside. One of the other reasons

was the advancement made by the Assad‟s

forces in Aleppo city, where they captured

several neighborhoods, including the Bustan Al-

Qasr. Another factor was the deal between

Assad‟s forces and the factions operating in the

city, in addition to Russia being a mediator,

which dictated the evacuation of civilians and

armed men from those neighborhoods.

With the beginning of the year 2017, Turkish

rocket launchers began shelling the city of Al-

Bab with cluster missiles. Next, clashes erupted

in the northern and western sides of the city

during which Euphrates Shield managed to

control of the Radar Battalion in the Shaalah

village west of Al-Bab. The Turkish „Yani Shafaq

Press‟ stated that 8 thousand Turkish soldiers

were ready to take part in the battle of Al-Bab.

Euphrates Shield carried on their advancement

and captured the Om Aissa town and Maqari hill

east of Bazaah and cut of the road between

Manbij and Al-Bab. Dash returned displaced

families in Arimah, Bazaah and Abu Jabar

villages to Al-Bab city on the pretext that they

were concerned about them being targeted by

airstrikes in those areas.

In the beginning of February 2017, Daesh sent

massive reinforcements, which consisted of

tanks and their artillery battalion, from the

northern vicinity to Al-Bab. This did not prevent

Euphrates Shield from capturing the Ghawz, Abu

Zandin, Ghajran, Awassi and Lawhajah villages

in east of the city. In a heavy blow to the

organization, the forces advanced and gained

control over Bazzah southeast of Al-Bab, which

tightened the siege on Daesh in the city. On the

other hand, Turkish Airforce destroyed the Civil

Defense center and the Youth Complex, as well

as the court hospital and Zamzam Street, in the

city. Daesh had to deploy another reinforcement

consisting of more than 150 fighters. However,

they failed to hinder the advancing forces who

captured the grain silos and the Agricultural High

School and the Automatic over in west of the

city.

On Thursday, February 23, Euphrates Shield

attained their goals of the third phase of the

Euphrates Shield Operation after expelling

Daesh from the city. The victory in Al-Bab came

two months after the fall of Aleppo to Assad‟s

forces who managed to advance into the eastern

neighborhoods. In the battle, the organization

sustained 37 casualties.

After the capturing of Al-Bab, Daesh-held areas

in Aleppo were reduced to Maskana town and

Deer Hafer where Euphrates Shield and Assad‟s

forces are supposed to start racing to them,

mainly because that area consists of the main

water plant which supplies the entire city of

Aleppo.

5.3 The Race to Al-Bab by Assad’s Forces and Euphrates Shield

In September, Assad‟s warplanes hit the city of

Al-Bab with four vacuum missiles, which resulted

in 12 civilian casualties and dozens of injuries.

They were carrying out airstrikes in order to

prove that they were the one who deserve to

take control over the city of Al-Bab. During the

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first month of the year 2017, Assad‟s aircraft

executed more than 15 air raids on the Beerah

village south of Al-Bab. In mid-September,

Assad‟s forces succeeded in gaining control over

the villages of Safah and Abu in eastern Al-Bab

following clashes against Daesh. Then, they

advanced to the village of Barlahin west of the

city, amid attempts to advance to Suran being

backed by intense heavy artillery shelling. They

even captured the village of Sarjah Saghirah and

Sarjah Kabira in the southwestern countryside of

Al-Bab, as well as the Rasm Alem and Haql

Shurtah and Deraa‟ and Khan Hafirah villages

west of the city. Afterwards, they gained control

over the villages of Sarbass, Hussamiyah south

of it, in addition to Madyonah town the Maamon

University, Ain Jahsh, Barij, Mshirfah hill, Aran

and Tuman. In the end of January, Assad‟s

forces captured more than 25 villages in

southern Al-Bab.

In the beginning of February, advancing Assad‟s

forces and Euphrates Shield reached each other

in the eastern countryside of Al-Bab. Assad‟s

forces continued their advanced and gained

control over the villages of Aran and Awishah hill

and the Maazolah south of Al-Bab, as well as the

strategic village of Sabkhat Jaboul and Beerah

near Tadef. These gains were followed by the

capturing of the villages of Deer Daqaq and

Shamawiyah south of the city.

On February 09, the first clashes between

Assad‟s forces and Euphrates Shield broke out

near the Umm Zendine village southwest of Al-

Bab, which led to the wounding of 4 fighters from

Euphrates Shield and the damaging of two of

their vehicles. Turkish artillery targeted Assad‟s

forces positions near Al-Bab and in response to

that, the latter targeted the town Tadef south of

the city with rocket launchers. After capturing the

Abu Taltal village, Assad‟s forces became

around 1500 meters away from Al-Bab.

Despite the military situation was on their

advantage, Assad‟s forces halted their advances

towards Al-Bab. They stopped at the town Abu

Taltal south of Tadif town where firefights

occurred between them and Euphrates Shield

and resulted in the killing of three fighters from

the latter after being targeted by a guided missile

near the Tadef roundabout.

It appears that Assad‟s forces have the intention

to advance to Daesh-held Deer Hafer and

Maskanah towns in eastern Aleppo in an attempt

to secure the water supplies to Aleppo city. In

February 2017, they began advancing to the

eastern countryside and captured dozens of

villages, farms and towns, most significant of

which are the towns of Hamimah, Rass Hurmul,

Imam, Tel Hamimah and the villages of Rass

Sheikh, Mazbourah and Tabarah Madi. Assad‟s

forces are now few km away from Deer Hafir and

the Jarah Military Airport.

The latter want to kill two birds with one stone

since they want to secure the water supplies by

the capturing of the Babiri Water Plant in the

Maskana town and, at the same time, cut off the

road to Euphrates Shield towards Al-Raqqa city.

They are approaching SDF-controlled areas in

rural Manbij which will enable them to cut off the

road to Euphrates Shield. If Assad‟s forces reach

SDF-held areas in Manbij, they will be also in a

strategic position which will enable them to

launch offensives towards Al-Raqqa and its

countryside.

5.4 The Tension between Euphrates Shield and SDF

Since the launching of Euphrates Shield

Operation, there has been a tension between

Euphrates Shield forces and SDF, which,

sometimes, has escalated into clashes. Clashes

broke out between both patties in the Amrana

village in rural Jarablus. SDF also expelled

Euphrates Shield from the Baldaq in southern

Jarablus. They also carried out infiltration

operations into the Jarablus town, but they all

were repulsed by Euphrates Shield. Turkish

artillery also shelled SDF positions in the vicinity

of the Minag Airport to prevent them from

advancing into northern Aleppo. Moreover, after

clashes with SDF, Euphrates Shield captured

the Ain Baydah, Amarah, Dabess, Blablan and

Beer Kussi in southern Jarablus. Clashes also

erupted between them in the Um Suss and Duh

Maghara villages.

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In September, SDF officially closed the road

between Manbij and Jarablus and attempted to

advance to the Kal Jabrin village near Mare in

northern Aleppo where there is a supply line for

the local factions which starts from the border

and stretches to Mare. Next, Euphrates Shield

gained control over the Hassiyah, Um Harbal

and Umm Hawsh villages, in addition to Sheikh

Nasser in east of Al-Bab. In January 2017,

Euphrates Shield opened the road between

Manbij and Jarablus. At the same time, Turkish

artillery targeted SDF positions in the Arimah

and Kawfili villages in east of Al-Bab.

Several clashes erupted after the Euphrates

Shield captured the city of Jarablus. Euphrates

Shield retreated from several villages belonging

to the Jarablus area ( Awn Dadat village north of

Manbij). Then, it was followed by mutual

bombardment by both parties. Then, Turkish

forces shelled SDF checkpoints in the vicinity of

the Sajur River for several times on the pretext

that they were abusing civilians at those

checkpoints. According to an Aleppo24 private

source, the shelling occurred due to the opening

of fire on a Turkish patrol which crossed from the

Awn Dadat Bridge. On the other hand, tensen

continued to occur for a lot of times in the vicinity

of Al-Bab, mainly after SDF tried to advance to

the Qabasin town and Arimah in rural Al-Bab, in

addition to Mare area. Therefore, Turkish

Airforce, in addition to Turkish artillery, targeted

SDF targets, causing several SDF casualties.

6 Statment of closing Jarablus-Manbij road

5.5 The Anger of Euphrates Shield forces following the entry of USA Forces.

After Euphrates Shield forces and the Hiwar Kilis

Operation Room entered into Al-Rai town being

backed by Turkish and USA aircover on

September 16n 2016, the factions were

surprised by the entry of the FSA-linked 51

Division being accompanied by around 40 USA

Special Forces to the town. This created a state

of despair among some of the participating

factions, mainly the Ahrar Sharqiyah Brigade

who cut off the road to the USA group and

forced them to return to Turkey. They also

announced in an official statement that they had

halted their participation in the Euphrates Shield

Operation Room. They shouted angry slogan to

express their anger towards those USA forces.

This was linked with the targeting of an USA

airstrike a position belonging to the faction in the

region, which the USA claimed it had been

carried out by mistake due to the absence of any

coordinating USA forces on the ground.

5.6 Civilians Casualties

Like any military operation, the Euphrates Shield Operation caused dozens of civilian casualties. Aleppo24 documented 112 civilian deaths from the start of the Euphrates Shield offensive on Al-Bab city until they reached their outskirts on February 7, 2017. This included the death of 6 entire families, including 27 children and 20 women, as well as 4 volunteers from the Civil Defense who were killed in Turkish airstrikes and random artillery shelling by the Euphrates Shield on Al-Bab. (Infographic)

Apart from the 112 civilian deaths that were caused by Euphrates Shield, Turkish air raids have caused around 309 civilian casualties, including 55 children, 41 women and 4 elderlies, in northern Aleppo and the city of Al-Bab since the launching of their offensives against Daesh on August 24, 2016.

Daesh‟s landmines have also caused 45 civilian casualties, including 7 children and 5 women,

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since the start of the battles against Euphrates Shield forces. The casualties were caused as the deceased civilians were attempting to flee from Daesh-held areas to FSA-controlled territory in northern Aleppo.

Based on what was mentioned above, the civilian death toll has jumped up to 466 deaths until Sunday, February 21, 2017. This includes the death of 80 children, 66 women and 5 elderlies, in addition to 16 civilians who died due to the absence of hospitals, which were rendered unusable by artillery and areal shelling, and 4 volunteers from the Civil Defense. It should be pointed out that the casualties mentioned here also include those recorded in SDF-held Manbij and rural Afrin. The number of the wounded reached 1000, most of whom are facing deteriorating health conditions since most of the hospitals in Daesh-held areas have been knocked out of service.

933 fighters, including 112 foreign affiliates, have been killed since the start of the Euphrates Shield Operation. The Euphrates Shield suffered 250 casualties, most of whom were killed after walking through Daesh‟s landmines in areas attacked by the Euphrates Shield. Since the start of the operation, the Turkish army has sustained 96 deaths, 2 of whom were burned to death by Daesh and their bodies were handed over to Turkey in a prisoner swap deal between the organization and the USA backed-Hamza Brigade, who are affiliated with the Euphrates Shield.

Turkish warplanes perpetrated several massacres in the city of Al-Bab and destroyed the headquarter of the Civil Defense, which resulted in the death of many volunteers. They also destroyed 3 hospitals, 2 of which were rendered out of service.

In addition, tens of VBIEDs hit most of cities and towns in northern Aleppo during clashes between Euphrates Shield and Daesh. This resulted in the death and injury of hundreds of civilians. The VBIEDs were all deployed from Al-BaB, Al-Rai and Jarablus to the targeted towns and cities.

6 Challenges of the Safe Zone:

Turkey is seeking to back the establishment of a

safe zone along its border with the Syrian

territory. However, the plan has not been

accepted and backed by the world. At the same

time, Turkey seems to be unprepared to execute

the plan alone without an international backing.

Their statements had stopped for a while and

then returned in connection with the beginning of

the Euphrates Shield Operation.

The area which extends from north of Aleppo

city to Al-Bab city seems to be an inadequate

area for the established of a safe zone which

Turkey is calling for. According to a recent USA

statement on the establishment of a safe zone in

Syria, USA welcomed the creation of that zone

in areas controlled by the Euphrates Shield. But

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that area faces several challenges that would

obstacle a stable area in which all necessary

goals could be attained. Maybe it would not be a

suitable zone that would attract Syrian civilians

in order that they leave their locations and head

towards it. The difficulties facing its

establishment should be examined so as to

remove all potential dangers in order to secure

the life of the Syrian citizens.

6.1 Administration of the Areas

Euphrates Shield-held areas in northern Aleppo

can be divided into two categories: The first are

areas which have been under the control of the

local factions for a long period. The second are

areas recently captured from Daesh. The first

are characterized by a safe and secure

administrative rule because of the establishment

of various local and Shurah councils, which had

been established with the agreement of the local

factions controlled those areas. Despite the fact

that those councils were not appointed by

civilians and do not reflect the local social

structure, civilians comply with them, mainly

since they are administrated by the factions. The

services they provide are chaotic and insufficient

as they lack administrative competencies. Most

of them are supported by civil social

organization, including foreign ones, in order to

cover and support the humanitarian cause and

some small and medium projects such as the

providing of water, electricity and the backing of

schools.

In the second category, local councils were

immediately established after forcing Daesh to

retreat from them. They are distant from the first

in the fact that Turkey can choose and appoint

the members and cadres to operate them.

Turkey is controlling the border and prevent

members, groups and organization who are

unwanted by Turkey. Turkey has succeeded in

the prevention of chaotic local councils like those

in the first category where several councils are

established in just one village or the existing of

two separate councils in two neighboring

villages, although they are both backed and

supported from one administration. This is why

Turkey has sought to back the establishment of

one local council which was created in Jarablus

and able to administer all areas in Jarablus.

6.1.1 The Local Council in Jarablus

After driving Daesh out of Jarablus city and

surrounding areas, small groups made up of

civilians in the city gathered to choose

competent and capable people for administering

a local council in the city and its countryside.

The council was immediately backed by Turkey.

It was established following the visit of the mayor

of the Gaziantep Municipality to Jarablus in the

beginning of September. Those opposing the

council, mainly members from the former council

which was established after Daesh‟s retreat,

accused others of letting the mayor to choose its

members directly3. They even claimed that

Turkey is trying to dominate the civilian life in the

city due to the imposing of a council directly

linked with it and the appointing of some

members and dismissing others.

According to a testimony by a member of the

former council, the accusations were made

„because they prevented an election by the

locals to appoint the members of the new

council‟. Some factions also supported the

claims made by the former council after they

were forced to leave the city and hand over the

administration to a police division trained in

Turkey. Although these difficulties and

challenges, the new council was able to provide

multiple services in a quick period. They

managed to fix service infrastructures and

remove landmines and other bombs previously

planted by Daesh in the neighborhoods of the

city and its vicinity with the help of Turkish

engineering divisions, which elevated the rank of

the council.

3 An interview with a member of the former

local council who spoke on condition of

anonymity.

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7 Local Council of Jarablus

The council was open to all civil organizations

and associations and contrary to many areas

which are outside the control of Assad‟s forces

the council allowed those organizations and

associations to operate freely without any

condition. At the same time, Syrian civil

organizations are accusing Turkey of hindering

their activities and preventing them from

operating in Jarablus city and not letting any

unwanted organization by Turkey to enter it.4

6.1.2 A Discrimination between the City and

the Countryside

As you enter Jarablus, you can see overcrowded

markets and the movement of civilians in the

city. Water is available and there is no power

outage. Hospitals are in good conditions and

they operate according to the rules of the

Turkish hospitals. Most of schools are operated.

Students can study without fear of being

targeted by airstrikes or „Dawaesh‟ patrolling the

city with severed heads. But, the irony is that

most of these services disappear once you head

towards the southern and western countryside

where the situation is completely different.

Poverty dominates the life of the civilians in

4 An exclusive interview with one of the

executive directors of a civil organization who

operates in the city of Idlib. He stated during the

interview that, 'Turkey prevented us from

operating in Jarablus and did not allow us to

cross to Syria'

those areas as there are no plants by the council

of the city and its backers to support those

residing in the countryside.

Aleppo24 managed to interview some civilians

from the countryside. Among them was Abu

Ahmed from the Hamirah village who said, “We

do not deny that we are happy after the

liberation of our areas from Daesh, and that we

are now enjoying our personal freedom, whether

in our homes or in public. We also cannot deny

that we are receiving free medical treatment in

Jarablus. However, we are facing a lack of water

and electricity. Bread and fuel are also

unavailable in our region, and I have to go to

Jarablus in order to bring some loaves of bread

for my family on a regular basis.”

Despite the fact that the local council in Jarablus

is in charge of managing the affairs of civilians in

both, the city and the countryside, not one single

member from the council has visited the

countryside to check on the situation of civilians,

as if the council is only responsible for the city.

The first meeting to discuss the situation in the

city was held after the inviting of some

dignitaries and local personalities from the

countryside who attended it with the head of the

local council in Jarablus. (Picture 9)

Um Firas, a widow, whose husband was killed

by Daesh and is now taking care of her children,

complained about the lack of support from the

council, and said that she has visited the latter

for several times to no avail. She added that, “No

one has come so far to check on our situation.

The FSA expelled Daesh from our areas and

promised us to live a happy life without the

organization. However, we have seen nothing

from them yet. I went to the local council and

applied for a monthly aid which I have not

received until now.” An Aleppo24 correspondent

has documented several cases in which families

living in the countryside moved to the city, in

search of “the missing support in the

countryside”.

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8 Meeting of Jarablus LC with delegation of rural areas

6.1.3 Insufficient Resources and Service for all

the Locals

The local council in Jarablus defends itself

by stating that the resources and services at

hand are insufficient to cover the entire area

and that a large part of the infrastructures are

damaged,5 in addition to a lack of

competency and experience, as well as the

absence of financial resources for the

council, which have made it depended on

foreign sponsors. All of these difficulties

make the achieving of necessary services in

the area a hard task. The situation in

Jarablus is similar to other councils in the

Azaz area who are also facing a lack of

experience and competencies and

5 An interview with a member of the current

local council in Jarablus who spoke on condition

of anonymity

dominance over their affairs by the local

factions. These challenges and issues facing

the local councils make it difficult to provide

services to displaced families willing to

return to their areas. Based on the situation,

it is impossible that those councils will

provide services to other Syrian civilians

willing to move to the safe zone.

6.2 Euphrates Shield’s Factions commit Violations against Civilians

Although the Turkish presence in areas controlled by Euphrates Shield and their direct support to many hospitals and services institutions and the execution of many projects to improve the infrastructures in Jarablus, the suffering of civilians still continues due to violations which are being committed by factions belonging to Euphrates Shield. Those factions began to blackmail civilians at their checkpoints which are spread at the entrances and exits of the city, in addition to the outskirts of some other small villages in the area. Those checkpoints have become like a nightmare for the civilians in the countryside of Jarablus and Al-Rai town. A military faction being led Abu Amsha, a commander in the Sultan Murad-linked Suleiman Shah Battalion, has turned the post center in the village of Al-Ghandoura into a military headquarter for his battalion. He reached that village after the Euphrates Shield factions captured it. He is now leading a group of criminals and thieves who are imposing taxes and committing atrocities against the locals. Many of the locals, mainly those residing in the city of Manbij and its countryside, are complaining about their outrageous aggression. Aleppo24 investigated the matter and talked to some of the locals who preferred to speak on condition of anonymity. In the interview, they stated that they had complained to the court in Jarablus about the atrocities, however, their complains were met by inconsiderate promises. Local sources also confirmed to Aleppo24 that Abu Amsha is looting civilian-owned cars and tractors, as well as imposing taxes on merchants

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and civilian-own trucks passing through his operated checkpoint in the region. Abu Amsha is stationing the looted civilian belongings in his headquarters in order to sell them as spare parts in distant cities and villages later. The latest abuse carried out by Abu Amsha was the looting of a civilian-owned car that costs around 12.000 USD. The human rights abuses are not only restricted to Abu Amsha and his gangs, but there are also some other Euphrates Shield-linked factions who are also imposing taxes. A checkpoint operated by the Ahrar Sharqiyah Brigade, who is linked with Euphrates Shield, arrested a livestock merchant in possession of more than 6000 USA. After that, a video about the brutal execution of a young male after being insulted by another faction was leaked. According to the brother of the executed, his brother always moved between Manbij, Jarablush, northern Aleppo and Al-Bab for trade. One day, as he was returning from northern Aleppo to Jarablus city, a faction arrested him and then he was executed. Areas located near the frontlines between SDF and Euphrates Shield, are not in a better situation either. In northern Manbij‟s countryside, mainly near the Awn Dadt village, Euphrates Shield forces are inspecting civilians and imposing taxes on cars willing to enter SDF-held areas.

6.3 Terror of Daesh continues

Since Daesh captured large swaths of lands in

northern Aleppo, they have attacked many cities

and towns controlled by the local factions using

a range of weapons, including missiles and

artillery. However, VBIEDs have been the most

effective and destructive weapons in the

targeting of both, civilians and combatants.

Hundreds of people have been killed and

wounded since then.

On January 07, 2017, a VBIED exploded near the Central Court and the SARC office, causing more than 60 casualties and the wounding of 100 others, in addition to massive destruction to civilian and private properties. The attack had been preceded by the detonation of a VBIED

between Azaz and the Bab Salama border crossing near the Saju village On October 13, 2016, which resulted in the death of 25 people. On May 25, 2016, another VBIED hit the same area which caused more than 20 deaths, including civilians and combatants, in addition to a large number of injuries.

Because they attempted for several times to storm the Mare‟ city, Daesh VBIEDs were mainly focused on it. On April, 08, 2015, a VBIED targeted the Security Square in the city, causing 10 casualties and the wounding of others. On August 29, 2015, 10 people were killed; others were wounded, due to the explosion of a Daesh VBIED at the entrance to the city. Another VBIED targeted the Hiwar Kilis town on April 08, 2015, which led to the death of 30 and dozens of injuries. In addition, a suicide bomber detonated his motorcycle in the Khalfatli town on September 04, 2016, killing 14 civilians and wounding several others.

After one day of their setback in Al-Bab city, which was their biggest stronghold in rural Aleppo, Daesh returned to their tactic of terrorizing the enemy. On Friday, February 24, and in one of their first response to the fall of Al-Bab, a Daesh suicide bomber targeted the market in the Sussyan town with a VBIED in a time that was crowded with passerby, which led to the death of 71 casualties, including 51 civilians, and the wounding of tens of others. Most of the casualties were displaced families from a town located 10 km west of Al-Bab who were trying to return to their town after Euphrates Shield liberated from the organization.

6.4 Arab-Kurdish Conflict… a Time Bomb

The statements that accompanied the operations

of Euphrates Shield about the Self-Rule

Administration were offensive. Ankara warned

Washington of the inconvenience of the

continuation of their support for the SDF, mainly

the PYD whom Turkey considers to be linked

with the PKK whom they are fighting as a

terrorist organization. For Turkey, both, PYD and

the PKK, are terrorist organizations. This tension

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escalated into clashes against Euphrates Shield

being backed by several Turkish airstrikes that

targeted positions belonging to SDF near Manbij

and the Afrin area west of Aleppo. On the other

hand, commanders and members of the Self-

Rule Administration consider the Turkish

intervention in Syria as an occupation of the

Syrian territory. Turkey‟s presence in Syria

poses a threat to the project of the Self-Rule

Administration such as Federalism.

Turkey could foil the attempt by the Self-Rule

Administration to link their cantons with each

other, putting an end to their hope of connecting

Afrin to their areas in west of it. However, the

most dangerous issue, apart from the tension

between Turkey and the Kurds, was manifested

in the occurrence of local enmity between areas

majority populated by Arabs and those by the

Kurds, which has turned the northern Syria into a

time bomb that might explode and creat a new

crisis in Syria such as a Kurdish and Arab

conflict. The complexity of the issue is that all

areas which extend from Al-Bab, Manbij,

Jarablus to Azaz and Afrin are mixed with Arab

and Kurdish civilians, in addition to some that

area mainly populated by the Kurds (Afrin) and

those by Arabs (Azaz).

6.5 Infightings between the factions of Euphrates Shield

All military factions operating in Syria, mainly

northern Aleppo, could not unify themselves

under one umbrella. But, Euphrates Shield was

the first successful unification of all factions,

despite of their distinct ideologies, under one

command and one operation room being

supervised directly by Turkey.

However, shortly it turned out that the factions

were only unified on their fight against both,

Daesh and SDF, since the commanders were

seeking to share areas of control among each

other by the establishment of checkpoints on

roads which separate villages controlled by each

of those different factions. Their goal was to

control the main roads in Syria from which goods

are transported and impose taxes on trucks

transporting oil and goods, which became an

additional source of income for them. Areas

controlled by them remain full of theft and looting

of civilian homes.

This situation has led to much infighting between

the factions operating in those areas, which

always end by the victory of the most powerful or

by resorting to an independent Sharia committee

to set their dispute.

6.5.1 The Fighting over the Afrin Road

Ahrar Al-Sham and Nouredin Zenki Movement,

in addition to other factions, attacked military

check posts operated by the Shamiyah Front on

the roads leading to the SDF and Self-Rule

Administration held Afrin area. On February

2016, those factions deployed their manpower to

those checkpoints to Azaz and the road leading

to Afrin and, after hours, they captured several

positions. This was followed by a statement in

which the attacking factions attempted to justify

their actions by accusing some commander of

the Shamiyah Front of corruption and that they

were supplying SDF with weapons and

ammunition by the securing of a supply line to

Afrin, as well as the facilitation of selling

weapons and ammunition to them (SDF).

(Picture 10)

After a while, the Shamiyah Front managed to

repulse the attacks by the factions and forced

them to move back to Jarablus. This led both

parties to resort to a Sharia committee named „

the Sharia Court In Azaz‟.

It became obvious based on the agreement

between both parties that the fighting occurred

because of a disagreement over the incomes

collected from the roads to Afrin area. The court

became a mediator between them and set up

checkpoints supervised by it, promising them

that the incomes will be distributed equally.

(Picture 11)

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10 Attack declaration on Shamiya Front

11 Agreement to end clashes and share road incomes

After a short while, the Ahrar Sham Movement attacked the checkpoints supervised by the court and expelled the members operating them. This forced the court to release a statement in which it announced that they were no longer responsible of operating the checkpoint due to that attack by the Ahrar Al-Sham, although the latter were receiving 80 percent of the incomes collected from the checkpoint, according to the statement of the court.

12 Statement of "Azaz Court" about attack of Ahrar alSham

6.5.2 Showing off of Power in Jarablus

After the capturing of Jarablus by Euphrates

Shield, the different factions used some of the

buildings in the city as headquarters. Several

clashes erupted between small groups belonging

to those factions as well.

The most important of those infighting occurred

on January 23 between Nouredine Zenki

Movement and Ahrar Sham, although Turkish

intelligence operatives warned them of the

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necessity of the evacuation of weapons and all

military aspects from the city and handing over

the city to the police division who were trained in

Turkey. The infighting occurred after the killing of

a civilian at the hands of a military commander.

However, it turned out later that it did occur due

to a disagreement over the incomes collected

from the road leading to Manbij.

The headquarter of the court in Jarablus city was

also attacked by a faction who refused to comply

with the decision to hand over some of their

fighters to the court. Furthermore, the Ahrar

Sharqiyah Brigade attacked the headquarter of

the local council due to a disagreement between

an employee and a displaced civilian from Deir

Ezzor province, of which the Ahrar Sharqiyah

come from too.

The military factions have remained in Jarablus

to the very moment, although the security office,

which has been responsible of security in the

area before the formation of the Turkish-trained

police, made it clear that they must relocate all of

their headquarters to areas outside the city. This

also sparked protest by civilians in support of

that decision.

13 Security office statment about weapon free zone in Jarablus

6.6 The Anger of Civilians

The spread of armed men and military

headquarters in areas held by Euphrates Shield

caused a wave of anger among the civilians.

Therefore, they held several protests in the city

of Jarablus in which they called for the

evacuation of all those headquarters and the

stationing of civil police in the city instead. After

the incident of killing a young male civilian from

the city and the abusing of the rest. The

spreading of pictures and Turkish flag in

Jarablus angered the civilian as well since they

considered it as a type of undirect occupation.

Several protests against the local council were

held to protest its links with the Turkish

government. The civilians also blamed Turkey

for overlooking them. Moreover, they also

demanded the re-establishment of the local

council through the holding of new election. The

civilians became angrier after the dismissing of

members of the current local councils from their

headquarter by some old members of the former

council who was administrating the city during

Daesh‟s rule.

14 Demonstrations in Jarablus

Several protests were also held by civilians residing in the Azaz area following a serieves of car bombs and the infighting between factions belonging to the Shamiyah Front and Zenki

Movement. The protests also called for the

banning of carrying weapons in domesticated

areas.

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Several campaigns calling for the banning of carrying arms in public areas and the evacuation of weapons to areas outside them were also held in that area. Most notable campaign is the campaign „No Weapon Syria‟ which is aimed at spreading awareness of the families in the region of the danger of carrying weapons in public areas and demanding from them to resume such negative aspects.

15 'No Weapon Syria' Campaign

Written by 24 Studies

studies@24cr.org

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