ettlin harris appt counsel r4f

Dennis Ettlin, Pro Se 27222 Paseo Lomita San Juan Capistrano, CA 92675 310-795-9507

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SOUTHERN DIVISION–SANTA ANA

Case No. 8:14-cv-00324-DOC-(JPR)!Dennis ETTLIN, an individual;

Plaintiff PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND FOR THIS COURT TO DIRECT THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL TO “INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS” UNDER BOTH 18 USC §1964 (A) AND (B)

vs.

Kamala Harris, an individual, James Otero, an individual, Otis D. Wright, III, an individual, George H. King, an individual, Dolly M. Gee, an individual, Jan Levine, an individual, Gloria Molina, an individual, Zev Yaroslavsky, an individual, Don Knabe, an individual, Michael Antonovich, an individual, United States of America, State of California, County of Los Angeles, Chris Ryan Legal, Sr. Does 1-10,

(any judge assigned to this case who received “Judicial Benefits”)

Defendants

DOE #1, Derek Hunt DOE #2, Tani Cantil-Sakauye DOE #3, Kathleen E. O'leary DOE #4, Tim Donnelly

Date:

Time: Ctrm: 9D (Hon. David O. Carter)!

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Request for Appointment of Counsel and for Attorney General RICO Proceedings 1 Ettlin_Harris_Appt-Counsel-r4f.docx

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TABLE OF CONTENTS!

I. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES. ................... 3 A. CRIMINAL CASE PRECEDENT .................................................................... 3 B. CIVIL CASE PRECEDENT ............................................................................. 4 C. FINANCIAL ABILITY .................................................................................... 4

II. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS ............................................................................ 5 A. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS – CJP ANALYSIS CRITICAL ........................... 5 B. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS – RICO ENTERPRISE ....................................... 7 A. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS –I.R.S. INVESTIGATION ................................. 8 B. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS – CAMPAIGN FINANCE FRAUD ................... 8 C. ARTICULATION OF CLAIMS PRO SE ......................................................... 9

1. SCOPE AND INTEGRATION OF SETTLEMENT ....................................... 10 2. SETTLEMENT REQUIRES EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATION .......................... 10 3. SETTLEMENT REQUIRES LIAISON ACTIVITY ........................................ 10 4. SETTLEMENT REQUIRES COST DETERMINATIONS ............................. 11

III. NATIONAL LAW FIRM NEEDED ............................................................ 11

IV. REQUEST FOR COURT TO REQUEST RICO PROCEEDINGS ......... 12 A. RICO ENTERPRISE DESCRIPTION ........................................................... 12 B. CIVIL REMEDIES UNDER 18 U.S. CODE § 1964 ...................................... 16 C. CIVIL REMEDY ARGUMENT ..................................................................... 17

V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 18

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) .................................................................... 6 United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 809-810 (9th Cir. 1999) ................................ 7 Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328 (1986) .......................................................... 4 Wright v. Director of Corrections, Grady, 2011; 07-55988; (9th Cir. 2011) ............ 4

STATUTES

18 U.S.C. §2 ............................................................................................................ 16 18 USC § 1956 ........................................................................................................ 15 18 USC §§1961-1968 ................................................................................................ 7 18 USC §1961(A) .................................................................................................... 15 18 USC §1964 ....................................................................................................... 4, 1 28 U.S.C. §1654 ........................................................................................................ 3 28 USC § 1915 .......................................................................................................... 4 CA Family Law §3651 .............................................................................................. 5 CA Government Code of Courts, Title 8, §68206.6 ................................................ 8

CONSTITUTION

Article I, §9 ................................................................................................................ 5 Article VI, §19 ........................................................................................................... 5

OTHER

California Civil Code section 52(b) ........................................................................ 11

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I. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES.

Precedent is well established for appointment of counsel in both criminal

and civil cases. Plaintiff requests the Court to appoint Counsel for Plaintiff. When

properly presented before an unbiased court, and a jury, the law and the

Constitution clearly favor the Plaintiff. The constitutional issues raised by Plaintiff

are vital to 36 million Californians. The necessary changes in the law could be

minor and the costs to Defendants could be minor. Plaintiff seeks judicial economy

and efficiency for the legal briefs and discovery, forensic analysis, and draft

guidelines and legislation. Additionally, the dispute resolution process is best

conducted among peers. A national firm would place Plaintiff on an equal footing

during a trial or negotiation.

Plaintiff will show that his request for Counsel meets the two primary

criteria often used for indigent criminal cases and that the presence of a RICO

enterprise justifies appointment of a nationally recognized law firm as counsel in

this civil case. Such appointment will further the interests of judicial economy. A

national firm would also be less susceptible to any backlash from Judges through

the California State Bar or Supreme Court. That threat of backlash is evident in

Plaintiff’s inability to retain counsel. Even Judicial Watch, which litigated

Sturgeon I and II, is unwilling to get involved in this extension of their very own

case. Furthermore, the conflicts of interest are so deep that even the federal Pro Se

Clinic in Santa Ana cannot ethically assist Plaintiff in the simplest of legal

practice.

A. CRIMINAL CASE PRECEDENT

Plaintiff is allowed to proceed Pro Se under 28 U.S.C. §1654, which

provides, “In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their

own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are

permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”

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Appointment of Counsel for protection of Civil Rights in criminal cases is

well established in the federal Criminal Courts (Rule 44). Under 28 USC § 1915,

indigent prisoners may request the Court to appoint counsel for their civil rights

cases. In Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328 (1986) and Wright v. Director of

Corrections, Grady, 2011; 07-55988; (9th Cir. 2011) two criteria are consistently

used to evaluate such requests:

1. "(T)he likelihood of success on the merits [and],

2. “(T)he ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved.”

B. CIVIL CASE PRECEDENT

Appointment of counsel in civil cases for non-indigent Plaintiffs is clearly

established under 18 USC §1964 (a) “to prevent and restrain” RICO enterprises.

Plaintiff asserts this also includes determining and establishing civil remedies for

Plaintiff when elected law enforcement officials fail to perform their duties.

Under both 18 USC §1964 (a) and (b) this court may direct the United States

Attorney General to “institute proceedings”. Under 18 USC §1964 (c) this court

may further institute a “satisfactory performance” bond against Defendants. The

“fee” for such a bond could easily cover the up-front legal fees for a national firm.

This case presents important and complex issues of constitutional law, which

impact the entire State. Plaintiff has limited access to the community of national

law firms and thus has no reasonable means to obtain such professional,

unimpeachable and independent counsel.

The Court has broad powers to appoint Counsel for Plaintiff.

C. FINANCIAL ABILITY

Plaintiff, while not indigent and not wealthy, cannot afford the financial

costs of fully prosecuting this case in a timely manner. Plaintiff has already spent

the majority of his separate and marital property in legal and forensic accounting

fees for his divorce case, which now is merely a void order. Plaintiff estimates

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approximately 5,000 hours of legal research, motions, and trial work for a

minimum of $1,500,000 of fees and costs will be needed for trial, determination of

monetary damages and the writing of changes in state and county law.

Furthermore, Plaintiff has requested in his complaint that any award for

damages to Plaintiff be placed in a charitable trust benefitting Plaintiff’s children

and such non-profit organizations as he may designate. Plaintiff is still subject to

CA Family Law §3651 and does not wish to ignite another round of spousal

support divorce litigation over any awards.

II. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS

Plaintiff’s case is built solidly on the analysis and published writings of the

judiciary, the legislature and the executive branch. Plaintiff’s case is founded

firmly in the United States and California Constitutions. Plaintiff will succeed on

the law. All of the Defendants claim the payments are legal and require no action

by anyone. Defendants’ only defenses are various claims to immunity. Therefore,

none of the Defendants address any of the main legal issues central to this case.

A. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS – CJP ANALYSIS CRITICAL

The Defendants and the state Courts continue to evade Plaintiff’s key legal

arguments There is still no response to:

1. The California Constitutions which plainly states that the payment of

judges is a State responsibility in Article VI, §19

2. The Sturgeon I and II cases both clearly re-iterate the state

responsibility

3. SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity clearly violates Article I, §9 against

retroactive immunity

4. The Attorneys General rulings from 1956, 1967, 1976, and 1978

clearly establish the unconstitutionality of the payments

5. The Commission on Judicial Performance analysis invalidating

Section 5 immunity can withstand an unbiased Court’s review

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6. The Commission on Judicial Performance analysis clearly questions

the propriety of judges using operating funds to pay themselves

(Commissioners) additional salary and benefits

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8. The 1995 California Law Revision Commission acknowledgement

that the benefits were probably illegal, the consequences HUGE, and

that no one was likely to object.

Defendants do NOT refute any of Plaintiff’s above citations. They totally

ignore the analyses in items 4-7 above. They also totally ignore Plaintiff’s oft-cited

questions from of the Sturgeon decisions.

9. Why did the Fourth Appellate Court foresee and thus encourage

“challenges by taxpayers”?

10. Why did the Judicial Council and the California Judges Association

fail to hold public hearings and rush into law the unnecessary and

redundant SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity?

Defendants also refuse to fully cooperate in discovery and are likely engaged

in violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Plaintiff has clearly

presented the necessary evidence, although it must be presented properly to the

court. It should be noted that Counsel Kevin McCormick flatly refused to provide

any discovery documents, and County Defendants have not replied at all.

Plaintiff’s has provided a Statement of Uncontroverted Facts within the

proceedings of this case. Defendants do not refute and cannot overcome the CJP

analysis; or the “interim” nature of SBX2_11; or the Fourth Appellate’s

encouragement of this challenge to the county payments. PLAINTIFF WILL

PREVAIL.

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B. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS – RICO ENTERPRISE

Plaintiff clearly describes below the criminal RICO enterprise1 and the

various elements required in 18 USC §§1961-1968. Section 1961(1) defines

“racketeering activity” as any crime enumerated in subdivisions A, B, C, D, E, F,

or G of that subsection. No crime can be a part of a RICO “pattern of racketeering

activity” unless it is included in this subsection.

The California Judiciary, Legislature and Executive branches all recognize

the serious cost impacts on the state budget and thus are not likely to act. Local

county officials likewise do not wish to raise the issue. The $33 million spent by

counties in 2009 is probably above $50 million today. Extending equal statewide

benefits to all county Superior Courts would likely top $100 million annually, and

prompt demands for repayment to the counties of easily $400 million. In a state

that cannot even properly house its prison inmates, it is unreasonable for Plaintiff

to expect the Governor, Attorney General, Legislature or the Judicial Council to

each step up to their constitutional responsibilities. Neither the Defendants nor the

Legislature or Judicial Council have resolved the county payments issue on their

own.

The elements of a RICO enterprise clearly exist; Defendants only try to

claim immunity, ignoring the use of bribes in violation of United States v. Frega,

179 F.3d 793, 809-810 (9th Cir. 1999). The judges in Los Angeles County and

Orange County are clearly not County employees2; they have no separate

employment contract; and thus any monies paid as “salary” or “deferred

compensation” in excess of state Controller reimbursements (as provided in Govt

Code 68206.6) are in violation of I.R.S. regulations and campaign finance statutes.

1 CRIMINAL RICO : 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968; A Manual for Federal Prosecutors, Fifth revised edition, October 2009

2 Prior proceedings in this case confirm no contract exists and the county is only partially reimbursed for benefits paid to judges.

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A. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS –I.R.S. INVESTIGATION

The Criminal Investigation-Public Corruption unit of the I.R.S is

investigating the fraudulent application of California Government Code of Courts,

Title 8, §68206.6. That section authorizes a procedure whereby a county payroll

system functions as a third party payroll service to judges and court employees

provided, 1) payment is made by the state in advance of the state’s salary and

benefits authorized by state law, and 2) no increase or decrease in payment is made

by the county. This statute, cited by the County defendants as authorization for the

supplemental payments, expressly forbids any supplemental judicial payments--

“Nothing in this section, and no procedure adopted pursuant to this section,

shall increase or decrease any compensation or benefits available to, or received

by, superior court judges as a result of being paid from a state payroll.”

Willful violation of this statue by Los Angeles County, by Orange County

and by the Superior Court of California, Counties of Los Angeles and Orange

causes the tax obligations of the “supplemental judicial benefits” to be fraudulent,

knowingly incorrect. A national law firm is needed to represent Plaintiff’s claim

and provide a knowledgeable interface between the court and the I.R.S.

B. LIKLIHOOD OF SUCCESS – CAMPAIGN FINANCE FRAUD

The California Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) Form 700 is

used to identify campaign contributions. One category excluded from reporting is

salary. Since judicial benefits are not salary, and are not just gifts of public funds,

the county payments should have been reported as campaign contributions. Since

the judicial elections typically cost only $5,000 - $15,000, the county payments

fully covered all the campaign costs for judges.

The “fictitious wage” tax-deductible campaign contribution scheme used by

the counties, if deemed lawful, is a new campaign finance tool that offers no limits

and can be used for non-judicial offices.

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C. ARTICULATION OF CLAIMS PRO SE

Plaintiff addresses the second criteria for appointment of counsel in two

parts. Plaintiff, however, meets this criteria for appointment of counsel because

any significant resolution of this matter, whether by trial or by negotiated

settlement, will require an amount of effort that is not reasonable for one person to

undertake.

The first portion is, “(T)he ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims

pro se…” Plaintiff has demonstrated his ability to articulate his claims Pro Se,

addressing the immediate legal issues involved, the resulting damages and his

attendant claims. The heavy legal analyses have already been done by previous

Attorneys General, the CJP, the legislative commission, and the Fourth Appellate

Court. The Auditor-Controller has already confirmed that judges do and continue

to receive payments from the County. The two Sturgeon cases also demonstrate

that citizens are aware of the issues and they won critical victories in the effort to

stop this public corruption.

The second portion is, “... in light of the complexity of the legal issues

involved.” While the issues are straightforward and Plaintiff is fully capable of

articulating his claims and violations of his rights, presenting them to a jury and to

the Court in a manner that will survive on appeal is beyond Plaintiff’s experience

and legal skills. This court needs proposed solutions that, to date, have escaped the

executive, legislative and judicial branches of California’s government. Plaintiff is

not qualified to develop and present such legislative proposals to resolve this

dispute. Proposed legislative solutions are equally important to the determination

of remedies of the RICO violations against Plaintiff.

These cases present multiple important issues of constitutional law, which

impact our entire community. Plaintiff does not wish to become a co-conspirator

by simply accepting a cash settlement. Plaintiff’s civil rights are not for sale. Any

redress and remedy must be based on constitutionally compliant laws and related

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government codes. Plaintiff’s success is based on the failures of certain laws.

Those laws must be identified and changed as part of the remedy. A

constitutionally valid scheme for paying judges must be defined and implemented

as part of the remedy in this case to avoid similar cases in the future. That remedy

will also be the foundation for assessing injuries to Plaintiff and to others with void

orders. The Fourth Appellate Court deferred to the other branches of government

and nothing happened in four years.

Plaintiff estimates that 10,000 hours (5 person-years of effort) of legal and

forensic work will be required to fully resolve this case in a reasonable two- or

three-year timeframe. Plaintiff is simply not capable of providing that level of

effort in such a short period. Therefore, Plaintiff has included legal fees as part of

his relief.

1. SCOPE AND INTEGRATION OF SETTLEMENT

Plaintiff’s case will either go to trial or result in complex negotiations. Many

counties will be affected. The 2009 Judicial Council report on county payments is

seriously flawed and incorrect. It must be updated and corrected. Significant state-

wide investigative research and forensic analysis will be required for county

statutes, payments, reimbursements, and tax payments. Only a national law firm

would bring the instant credibility to undertake such work and present it to the

court.

2. SETTLEMENT REQUIRES EXTENSIVE

NEGOTIATION

Research and analysis will be followed by proposals for legislation and

government code modification. Significant negotiation will be take place in order

to reach a settlement. Again, a national law firm can expedite that process.

3. SETTLEMENT REQUIRES LIAISON ACTIVITY

Any permanent settlement must be constitutionally compliant. SBX2_11

must be repealed. New state-wide judicial compensation must be considered and

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“prescribed” by the Legislature. The judiciary must have an input and the

legislative branch must provide adequate funding for any proposed solution. Only

a national law firm can provide the required depth and expertise for this activity.

4. SETTLEMENT REQUIRES COST DETERMINATION

OF VOID ORDERS

The determination of damages for Plaintiff requires a review of Superior

Court interests in several categories of court cases. A new commission can

establish and define county (and related jurisdictional) interests in various classes

of legal proceedings. This class list will allow a tribunal to process the plague of

void orders created by the unconstitutional county payments. A Task Force

approach provides a model for such review.

III. NATIONAL LAW FIRM NEEDED

Plaintiff requests appointment of a national law firm in light of the number

of legal issues and the number of organizations involved, the scope of the RICO

enterprise, the bureaucracy of implementing legislation and judicial rule changes,

and the technical challenges of successfully transferring judicial salaries to a state

payroll system. The selected national law firm must be insulated from excessive

ties to the California legal profession and judiciary. The national civil rights law

firm must possess the range of technical skills identified above as well as the

credibility to engage in the necessary liaison with governmental leaders required

for any implementation.

Plaintiff is not asking for Pro Bono assistance. The remedies in this case

provide multiple avenues to recover attorney fees and costs generated by this case.

Plaintiff has requested reimbursement for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§1988, California Civil Code section 52(b) and section 52.1(h), and California

Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. This case would not diminish the pool of

legal services available to indigent litigants, nor would it otherwise reduce the

caseload of the for-pay legal profession.

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Until the court makes a ruling that supports Plaintiff’s claim, no individual

attorney or small California firm has the stature to withstand the retaliation of the

counties and the California judiciary. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot find his own

counsel to pursue this case and certainly cannot finance his full defense.

The successful outcome of Plaintiff’s case is likely to be followed by claims

from a long list of other plaintiffs seeking a similar settlement. An extended

remedy in this case would greatly enhance judicial efficiency. A Court or 3-Judge

Panel is needed to review the law and a jury is needed to determine the material

issues of fact supporting plaintiff’s claims. Defendants are not indigent and in fact

have very “deep pockets” with which to litigate, “resist”, and “stonewall” this

court.

IV. REQUEST FOR COURT TO REQUEST AG TO INSTITUTE RICO PROCEEDINGS

A. RICO ENTERPRISE DESCRIPTION

Defendants maintain a sophisticated RICO scheme that limits Plaintiff’s

access to legal representation in California, provides Defendants tax-advantaged

tax-deductible campaign contributions, and introduces county biases into the laws

and regulations reviewed by the Judicial Council and other organizations of the

Judicial branch. By litigating and objecting to this scheme, there is great likelihood

that Plaintiff will suffer significant and irreparable harm.

Plaintiff alleges that the individuals of the Los Angeles Superior Court and

of the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County engage in activities that meet

all the elements of a RICO enterprise by Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant’s publicly stated purpose of the RICO enterprise is to INFLUENCE

judicial officers to choose employment in Los Angeles with a supplemental

increase in their salary. In reality, the influence-peddling payments are the

proximate cause for judicial bias and failure of bench officers to recuse when the

county has any interest in the case. Plaintiff further alleges that county biases affect

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the legal reviews of laws by Judges (influenced by county payments) of the

Judicial Council and Administrative Office of the Court, and this has a forseeable

consequence of denying Plaintiff his equal constitutional rights when he entered

the Superior Court system and he was forseeably deprived of his various rights and

property. These interests were injured “by reason of” a violation of RICO’s

substantive racketeering provisions.

The individuals in Los Angeles county began the racketeering conduct in

approximately 1988 when the Zolin memo was sent by the County Counsel to the

Court Counsel, acknowledged the unconstitutionality of County payments to the

State-employee Judges, but nonetheless recommended the county make the

payments. The Superior Court apparently did not object and the payments started

in approximately 1990. The practice continues to the present day and has been

partially copied by 34 other counties.

The racketeering enterprise is comprised of numerous elements and sub-

elements. The participants are associated via governmental organizations in the

judicial and executive branches as well as private associations. These include the

County of Los Angeles (supervisors, CEO, payroll services); the Superior Court,

County of Los Angeles (Presiding Judge, Court Counsel, Auditor); Judicial

Council (executives, Administrative Office of the Courts), the Supreme Court of

California (Justices, State Bar); the State of California (Governor, Attorney

General, Legislature); the private associations of judges (California Judges

Association) and of lawyers (various county Bar Associations), and specialized

groups such as the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers. The members of

this enterprise seek a similar goal of increasing the salaries of certain individuals

and currying the influence (favor or sympathy) of judges. The counties are the

largest single users of the courts and sympathetic judges both reduce litigation

costs and enable the instigating individuals (supervisors) to receive higher salaries.

Over time, conduct of this enterprise has involved increasing numbers of judges

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and now, a large majority of current and past judges and justices have received the

payments, making dis-interested and un-biased justice impossible in California.

The enterprise has assured its own survival and continuation.

The control of the organization is based solidly with the individuals of the

county government units making the unconstitutional payments. In 2010, the

scrutiny of the Sturgeon cases caused the Los Angeles supervisors to further

conceal their control by assigning the amount of increases to be determined by the

Los Angeles County CEO and not by their own line item budget authority. The

same supervisors are: using Los Angeles County legal resources to defend the

unconstitutional payments; and using changes to the Brown Act to conceal

discussions with the Governor; using threats of significant new costs to the state

($100 million annually, $400 million reimbursement) to silence the Governor, the

Attorney General and the Legislature; concealing the Superior Court mis-

appropriation of operating funds to pay Commissioners and Court Counsel by

using the L.A. County payroll system to pay Court employees under the guise of

paying all judges; and relying on key County management personnel such as the

CEO and County Counsel’s Litigation Cost Manager whose reports assess the

effectiveness and real cost savings to the County based on non-jury judicial

decisions (see Complaint A-89); as well as lower level staff (“[T]he [Reves] Court

made clear that RICO liability may extend to those who do not hold a managerial

position within an enterprise, but who do nonetheless knowingly further the illegal

aims of the enterprise by carrying out the directives of those in control.”). Since the

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California was a huge proponent of

increased judicial salaries and the county payments, the State Bar could be counted

on to severely discipline any lawyer who dared to raise the issue of

unconstitutionality or bias.

The pattern of racketeering activity shows continuity of criminal activity.

The multiple predicate acts of bribery, election fraud, tax evasion, and gender

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based discrimination are related to each other. Instead of simple cash payments, the

payments are treated as wages from Los Angeles County. The second payment for

the same work is also classified by the county as a “government” salary and thus

avoids the scrutiny of California’s Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC),

specifically the Form 700. The so-called wages, or “fictional wages” allow Los

Angeles County to allocate money to retirement accounts where the taxes on the

county payments are deferred. The so-called wages also use tax-favored provisions

for medical expenses. This single scheme greatly enhances the value of the

payments to the judges and reduces scrutiny from the public and other agencies.

Over time, the pattern of criminal activity acquires credibility and acceptance as

the normal mode of operation. The laws, which preclude reducing a judge’s pay

during his term are invoked to continue the payments. There is no plan or threat,

even after SBX2_11, to end the payments. After 23 years, there is no obvious

termination point. Since 1990, the enterprise has defeated any external threat to the

continuation of the racketeering activities. There is no known internal threat to the

continuation of this pattern of racketeering activities.

The payments fall under prohibited racketeering activities covered by

designated federal law. Plaintiff alleges the following predicate act violations of

Federal law:

• 18 USC §1961(A) any act or threat involving ... bribery which is chargeable

under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;

any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18,

United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery);... section 1954

(relating to unlawful welfare fund payments)….sections 1581–1592

(relating to peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons);...section 1956

(relating to the laundering of monetary instruments (18 USC § 1956 …. (ii)

with intent to engage in conduct constituting a violation of section

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7201[Attempt to evade or defeat tax] or 7206 [Fraud and false statements] of

the Internal Revenue Code of 1986] ).

• 18 U.S.C. §2, however, one who aids and abets the commission of a federal

crime is treated as if he had committed the crime as a principal and can be

charged under RICO if the crime is one set forth in Section 1961(1)(B)-(G).

B. CIVIL REMEDIES UNDER 18 U.S. CODE § 1964

The civil remedies available to Plaintiff under RICO are limited to treble

damages and attorneys' fees. However, such remedies are dependent upon the AG

proceedings under this section. Plaintiff requests this court to initiate such 18 U.S.

Code § 1964 proceedings.

“(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.

(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.

(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, except that no person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of section 1962. The

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exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an action against any person that is criminally convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case the statute of limitations shall start to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final.

(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall estop the defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States.” (emphasis added)

C. CIVIL REMEDY ARGUMENT

The RICO statutes do not authorize private parties to seek injunctive relief.

However, Section 1964(a) authorizes courts to enter injunctive relief, and Section

1964(b) authorizes only the Attorney General to bring injunctive actions and to

obtain temporary injunctive relief. Section 1964(c) authorizes private parties to sue

for treble damages and attorneys' fees, but not for any other relief. The structure

of those provisions indicates that Congress intended to vest the Attorney General

with the exclusive authority to bring suit for injunctive relief.

Congress's intent not to authorize a private injunctive action is confirmed by

the treatment of the issue under the antitrust laws. The Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209-

210, created a public injunctive action and a private treble damages action. This

Court interpreted that Act to foreclose a private injunctive action. Because RICO

tracks the language and structure of the Sherman Act, Congress is presumed to

intend that RICO be similarly interpreted.

That presumption is strengthened by comparison of RICO with the Clayton

Act. Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15(a)) carries forward the Sherman

Act's treble damages provision, and Congress added a new provision, Section 16 of

the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 26), that expressly authorizes a private action for

injunctive relief. The fact that Congress used Section 4 of the Clayton Act as the

template for RICO's treble damages provision, 18 U.S.C. 1963(c), without also

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including a counterpart to Section 16 of the Clayton Act, compels the conclusion

that Congress intended no such private injunctive right under RICO.

RICO's purposes are fully consistent with the absence of a private right to

seek injunctive relief. Congress authorized wide-ranging injunctive relief in civil

RICO actions, such as corporate reorganization and dissolution. 18 U.S.C. 1964(a).

Congress logically vested the Attorney General with the exclusive authority to seek

such relief.

V. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s damages are a result of his encounter with the Courts but the

greater damage is the loss of his constitutional rights. Their value is difficult to

discern, cannot be retrieved and thus irreparable. Plaintiff requests appointment of

counsel to redress these violated rights and the Court’s explicit request to the U.S.

Attorney General to institute proceedings to achieve wide-ranging injunctive relief.

Respectfully submitted by,

Dated March 21, 2014

______________________________

Dennis ETTLIN, Pro Se 27222 Paseo Lomita San Juan Capistrano, CA 92675 310-795-9507 [email protected]

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PROOF OF SERVICE

I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am a resident of or employed in the county where the service took place. My residence or business address is

2465 E. Orangethorpe Ave., Fullerton, CA 92831

On March 21, 2014, I served a copy of the following document

PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND FOR THIS COURT TO DIRECT THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL TO “INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS” UNDER BOTH 18 USC §1964 (A) AND (B) by first class mail, on the interested parties in this action (SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST FOR PARTIES), by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as stated on the attached service list. I deposited such envelope in the mail. According to F.R.C.P. Rule 5(b)(2)(C), “…in which event service is complete upon mailing;”

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on March 21, 2014 at Orange County, California,

________________________________ Debbie Peterson

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SERVICE LIST

Case No. 8:14-cv-00324-DOC-(JPR) Kamala Harris Counsel: Douglas E. Baxter, Esq., Deputy Attorney General Office of the Attorney General 110 West A Street, Suite 1100 San Diego, CA 92101 Jan Levine Counsel: Kevin McCormick, Esq. Benton, Orr, Duval, &Buckingham 39 North California Street, Post Office Box 1178 Ventura CA 93001 Gloria Molina, Zev Yaroslavsky, Don Knabe, Michael Antonovich Counsel: Natalie Price, Esq. Lawrence Beach Allen and Choi PC 2677 North Main Street Suite 370 Santa Ana, CA 92705 Chris Ryan Legal, Sr. Counsel: Pro Se Authorized Email : [email protected] P. O. Box 5133, San Pedro, CA 90731 Derek Hunt, Kathleen E. O’leary Counsel: Sarah L. Overton Cummins, McClorey, Davis, Acho & Assoicates, P.C. 3801 Univerity Avenue, Suite 560 Riverside, CA 92501 George King, James Otero, Dolly Gee, Otis Wright II Counsel: Robert Ira Lester AUSA Office of US Attorney Civil Division 300 North Los Angeles Street Room 7516 Los Angeles, CA 90012 Tani Cantil-Sakauye No appearance therefore: c/o Supreme Court of California 350 McAllister Street San Francisco, CA 94102-4797

ettlin harris appt counsel r4f

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