ETHNICITY AND VOTERS’ BEHAVIOUR: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF GHANA AND NIGERIA, 2003-2008

BY

USEH, HAFSAT H. PG/M.Sc/10/52556

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA NSUKKA

AUGUST, 2011

ETHNICITY AND VOTERS’ BEHAVIOUR: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

OF GHANA AND NIGERIA, 2003-2008

BY

USEH, HAFSAT H.

PG/M.Sc/10/ 52556

A PROJECT REPORT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE

REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc) IN

POLITICALSCIENCE (COMPARATIVE POLLITICS) TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA

SUPERVISOR: PROF. M.I.O. IKEJIANI-CLARK

AUGUST, 2011

APPROVAL PAGE

This is to certify that this work has been read and approved for the Department of Political

Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka in Partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of

Master of Science (M.Sc) Degree in Political Science (Comparative Politics)

………………………… …………………………..

Prof. M.I.O. Ikejiani-Clark Prof. Obasi Igwe

(Supervisor) (Head of Department)

……………………………… ………………………………

External Examiner Prof. E.O. Ezeani

(Dean)

DEDICATION

To my mother, Hajia. Mariam Sanni-Useh, who always says to me, you can do it!

ACKNOLEDGEMENT

I give glory to God for his mercies and grace. I benefited greatly from my Supervisor, Prof.

Miriam I.O. Ikejiani-Clark, who taught me and expertly supervised this study, she is a mother

indeed.

I am indebted to the Head of Department, Prof. Obasi Igwe; and my lecturers in the Department

of political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Prof. E. O. Ezeani, Prof. Obasi Igwe, Prof.

Jonah Onuoha, Dr. A.M. Okolie, Dr. Ken Ifesinachi for building me intellectually.

I appreciate my siblings for their love and support always. I am grateful to the following

coursemates, Mr. S.I. Odo, Mr. Sabastine N. Ogbu, Mr. Dominic Apeh, Mr. Clement Oligie,

Ebere, Samuel, Samson, Chinelo, Ifeanyi, Emmalee for their insightful academic debate that

extend the bars of knowledge.

To the rest of the people whose works I cited and others not mention here, I say thank you.

ABSTRACT

This study addresses a paramount factor in the politics of Nigeria and Ghana, i.e., ethnicity and voting behaviour. It traced the incidence to the pre-independence era in both countries and explains its place in the formation of political parties and electoral processes. This study draws attention to how competition for national resources among the various ethnic groups and regions has led to power struggle. Although previous scholars have made immense and insightful contribution on the subject matter, none of these scholars did a comparative study on ethnicity and voting behavoiur of Nigeria and Ghana within the period specified. A gap was located which inform the research question: Did ethnic inclination impact on the voting behaviour of Nigerians and Ghanaians in the 2003/2007 and 2004/2008 general elections? Does uneven distribution of government appointments among ethnic groups influence the voting behaviour of Nigerians and Ghanaians in the 2003/2007 and 2004/2008 general election? Data collection was base on the observation of relevant documents while descriptive analysis was adopted.

Ghanaian and Nigerian voters are aware of the fact that if political leaders of a particular party express disaffection towards their ethnic groups, then they do not expect to receive anything in terms of resource allocation; Clientelistic promises made by political leaders cause ethnic clustering and the division of society along ethnic lines; People tend to align themselves with a group that will provide them a stable means of access to resources that are beneficial to them.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE…………………………………………………………………….………..i

APPROVAL PAGE…………………………………………………………………….....ii

DEDICATION…………………………………………………………………………....iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT…………………………………………………………………..iv

ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………….........v

TABLE OF CONTENTS…………………………………………………………………vi

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION…… …………………………………… …..… .1

1.1. Statement of the Problem………………………………………………………..… .4

1.2. Objectives of the Study………………… ....………………………………...…..6

1.3. Significance of the Study………….………. … ……… ……………………… …6

1.4. Literature Review…………………………… ……… … …………… ……… ...7

1.5. Theoretical Framework…………………………………… …… … ……… …. 15

1.6. Hypotheses………………………………………………………. .. ....... ...............20

1.7. Method of Data Collection…………………………………… … …............ ........21

1.8. Method of Data Analysis…………………............................. .. ...................... ... ..21

CHAPTER TWO: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ETHNICITY IN

NIGERIA AND GHANA (FROM PRE-INDEPENDENCE)

2.1. Ethnicity in Nigerian politics………… ………… ……………… ……. …......... 22

2.2. Ethnicity in Ghana’s Politics……….. ……..……… ……… ……… …… … .. .25

2.3. Ethnicity and Ghana’s Two-Party System .………..……. ……… …….. … ........32

CHAPTER THREE: ETHNICITY AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN GHANA AND

NIGERIA

3.1. The 2003/2007 Nigeria Election Results…… ……… …. …… ……… …. ….36

3.2. Ghana 2004/2008 General Elections………………… … ……………………..50

CHAPTER FOUR: ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT

APPOINTMENTS AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN

NIGERIA AND GHANA

4.1. Ethnic representation in Key offices in Ghana and Nigeria………………………….52

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

5.1. Summary and Conclusion…………………………………………………… ..…..58

BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………..........64

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

‘‘Objectively speaking, both Ghana and Nigeria are characterised by severe

socioeconomic inequalities among their regions, ethnic groups and religion’’ (Langer and

Ukiwo, 2007:3). During the struggle for independence in both countries, ethnicity played a

prominent role in determining political party formation, competition and demands (Nnoli,

1989; Ibeanu, 2000; Frempong, 2006). Chazan in Awua-kyerematem (2011:6) notes that

‘‘ethnicity in Ghanaian politics became pronounced through different regimes and the

different intensities in which they politicized ethnicity through their policies and varying

successes’’. Ghana’s First and Second Republics were also plagued with ethnic tensions, and

the politicization of ethnicity continued to cause separations between ethnic groups; in 1957,

the opposition united to form the United Party (UP), led by Kofi Abrefa Busia (Akan).

Gyamfuaa and Awua-Kyerematem (2011:6) present a vivid picture of Ghana in subsequent

years when they assert that:

In 1966, there was a coup led by Major Afrifa (Ashanti) and Colonel Kotoka (Ewe), however this union was temporary. In 1967, there was an attempted coup that was orchestrated by Akan junior officers during which Kotoka died. That same year Afrifa managed to take over the military government and the National liberation Council without Kotoka which marked the genesis of the separation between the Akans, especially the Ashanti and the Ewe. The separation became more pronounced in 1969 when the NLC handed over to Afrifa. Ewes felt extremely unrepresented in Busia’s cabinet, the leader of the National Alliance for Liberals, K.A. Gbedemah, an Ewe was disqualified, and the removal of 568 public servants under the Transitional Provisions of the 1969 constitution, due to what was said to be the overrepresentation of Ewes as senior public servants; all served to deepen tension

It is estimated that there are about ninety separate ethnic groups in Ghana, however,

they are often reduced to a few large groups, namely, Akan, Mole Dagbam, Ewe , Ga-

Adangbe Gurma, etc. The Akans are further sub-divided into a dozen smaller groups

including, Ashanti, Fanti, Akin, Kwahu, Akwapim, Nzema, etc., (Frempong, 2006). The 2000

Population and Housing Census identified eight (8) major ethnic groups based on language,

four of which accounted for nearly 80% : Akan-40%; Mole Dagbani- 16.5%; Ewe-12.7%; Ga-

Adangbe-8%; Gurma-3.9%; Grusi-2.9% and Man Busanga- 1.1% (Ghana Statistical Service

2000).

The history of Ghana electoral politics shows that ethnic tensions were high in the

1950s in the run-up to independence when ethnic and regional based parties emerged to

contest Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP). Starting from the year 2000,

ethnic rivalry shifted to the Ashanti-Ewe ethnic group because the leading political parties,

the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Parties (NPP) have been

associated with the two ethnic groups (Frempong, 2006).

Although there are laws prohibiting religious and ethnic political parties in Ghana

(see, The Political Parties Law Act 574, 2000), this has not stopped candidate(s) standing for

election from depending greatly on the support of co-ethnics for electoral victory. In fact, the

inability of a presidential candidate to win election in his/her state or region of origin is likely

to generate questions. For example, when former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo

contested for the Presidency in 1999 and lost in Ogun State (his state of origin), it became an

issue of some sort even though he emerged victorious in the over-all election.

Nnoli (1989:90) states that ‘‘by 1953, the major political parties in Nigeria, the

National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), Action Group (AG), and Northern

Peoples Congress (NPC) had become associated with the three major ethnic groups- Igbo,

Yoruba and Hausa-and the three regions of the country-East, West and North respectively’’

Nigeria is a multicultural and multilingual state but the number of ethnic nationalities has

been a debate and lot of confusion about language and dialects abound (Ikejiani and Ikejiani,

1989:39). The number of ethnic groups in Nigeria has been placed somewhere around 250 or

more. Despite this large number, national elections in Nigeria is often considered (and result

sometimes shows that it is) a contest between/ among the three (3) major ethnic groups

namely (but not in any order) Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa-Fulani or between the north and the

south. In the first Republic, the major political parties were of ethnic origin. The Northern

Peoples Congress (NPC) emerged from a Northern based cultural group known as Jam’iyyar

Mutanen Arewa with the support of Hausa-Fulani while the Yoruba cultural organization

Egbe Omo Oduduwa metamorphosed into the Action group with its base in Western Nigeria.

The National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) had its base within the core of

Igboland in Eastern Nigeria. Other smaller parties like Northern Elements Progressive Union

(NEPU), United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) and Niger Delta Congress had their ethnic

support from the Hausa/Fulani peasants, Tiv and Ijaw/Kalabari respectively (Igbuzor, 2011).

It has been argued that the ethnic orientation of the political parties was one of the main

reasons for the collapse of the republic (Abubakar, 1997).

In order to address this pitfall, Section 202 of 1979 Constitution of the Second

Republic prohibited the formation of political parties with ethnic or religious connotation.

This provision was repeated in Section 220 of the 1989 Constitution and section 221 of the

1999 Constitution. In Ghana, The Political Parties Law Act 574 (2000) also makes similar

provision prohibiting religious and ethnically based political parties in the country. Despite

the constitutional prohibition of ethnic parties, previous election results in Nigeria and Ghana

has shown that voting pattern more often than not, coincide with ethnic and regional

boundaries thereby giving credence to ethnic politics. This Paper is principally aim at finding

out the role of ethnicity in the voting behaviour of Nigerians and Ghanaians from 2003-2008.

The scope of this paper covers two separate Presidential elections in both countries; therefore

our focus is the 2003/2007 Nigerian Presidential elections and 2004/2008 Ghanaian

Presidential elections respectively.

1.1. Statement of Problem

Election provides citizens the opportunity to support candidate(s) of their choice. How

this choice is made is a different matter altogether. Pre-election campaigns are designed not

only to educate the electorate politically, but also to woo voters to vote for a particular

candidate. A politician may decide to base his/her campaign on policy issues or decide to

introduce ethnic sentiments and make promises on that ground. Recourse to the latter pattern

of campaign facilitates ethnic politics. Literatures abound on ethnic politics in Africa. The

strength of linkages between ethnicity and party voting has been examined in African

societies by qualitative examination of particular election campaigns, and by comparing

aggregate election results at district level (Christopher, 1996; Ake, 1996; Takougang, 1996;

Burnell, 2002). Posner (2007) observes that the need for a share of the national resources is

likely to influence the voting pattern of members of a given ethnic group. On the other hand,

Horowitz (1985) argues that ethnicity exerts strong direct impact on electoral behaviour in

segmented societies. Fridy (2007) concludes that ethnicity is an extremely significant factor in

Ghanaian elections. Likewise, Erdmann (2007) finds that voter alignment and party affiliation

are largely influenced by ethnicity. Anugwom (2003) is of the opinion that lack of

performance on the part of government creates a fertile ground for ethnic politics as expressed

in election and election campaign.

Ndegwa (1997:54) on the other hand, attributes ethnic voting in Africa to the dual

citizenship that exists in African states. A situation where one has to refer to ones ethnic enclave

to enjoy certain benefits which are not granted elsewhere, this tends to create dual loyalties

within the same country. Lewis (2007) in a study of Nigerian elections argued that ethnic voting

also has its economic and religious implications and that the phenomena vary by region over

time.

(Lindberg & Morrison 2007: 34) attributed little relevance to ethnicity: they concluded that

‘Clientelistic and ethnic predisposed voting are minor features of the Ghanaian electorate’ In like

manner, Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen (2011: 34) believe that elections are not ethnic census or

straightforward economic referenda, that voting behaviour is motivated by unforeseen facts.

However, based on a very similar research design, 600 interviews in three out of 230

constituencies of three out of ten regions, Fridy comes to nearly the opposite conclusion:

‘ethnicity is an extremely significant although not deciding factor in Ghanaian elections’ (Fridy

2007: 302). A great deal of attention has been focus on Nigeria and Ghana electoral experience,

democracy, colonialism, federalism, government performance, etc., and their link to ethnic

politics. Relative to these issues, a comparative study of Nigeria and Ghana vis-a–vis ethnicity

and voters’ behaviour in the 2007 and 2008 election of Nigeria and Ghana seem scarce. The

foregoing has therefore created a gap in the literature which this study aims to fill and has

consequently raised the following research questions:

1. Did ethnic inclination impact on Nigerians and Ghanaians in the 2003/ 2007 and

2004/2008 general elections?

2. Does uneven distribution of government appointments among ethnic groups influence

the voting behaviour of Nigerian and Ghanaian in the 2003/2007 and 2004/2008

general election?

1.2. Objective of the Study

This study has both broad and specific objectives. The broad objective is to examine

ethnicity and voters’ behaviour in Nigeria and Ghana from 2003-2008.

The specific objective is to find out:

1. whether ethnic inclination impacts on the voting behaviour of Nigerians and

Ghanaians in the 2003/2007 and 2004/2008 general elections

2. whether uneven distribution of government appointments among ethnic groups

influence the voting behaviour of Nigerians and Ghanaians

1.3. Significance of the Study

The study has both theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically, the study is a

contribution to earlier studies on ethnicity and voter behaviour in Nigeria and Ghana.

Practically, the study has the potential of serving as a veritable tool for policy makers in terms

of Economic Planning vis-a-vis job creation, government appointments, allocation of

resources, etc. It will also serve as a guide to and motivate students in Political Science and

Comparative Politics to embark on further research on the subject matter.

1.4. Literature Review

The aim here is to review previous literature on ethnicity and voting behaviour . The

literature review is therefore guided by the independent and dependent variable of the

research questions: ethnicity and voting behaviour. Literatures abound on the synergy

between ethnicity and census figure, party formation, voters' behaviour, and others on the

causes of ethnic politics.

Zuckerman, Valentino & Zuckerman (1994:15) assert that no matter how private the

act of voting, an individual’s social and political networks directly and strongly determine the

choice made. Powell (1976) has earlier argues that where a voter's social class, ethnic group,

and religion are associated with consistent political interests, it is likely for that person to be a

strong supporter of one of the political parties. People whose webs of group affiliations

contain numerous reinforcing ties persistently support the same political party (Simmel,

1955). Zuckerman, Valentino and Zuckerman (1994) also argue that weak partisanship results

from a person's location in cleavages that have conflicting political interests, viewing voting

decisions as reflections of the citizen's location in particular social networks. They further

state that:

As individuals interact with their friends, family, co-workers, and neighbours, they learn about politics. The more their social circles align with the political cleavages present, the more likely is the voter to support one of the political parties. No one can vote like their social intimates, when these people hold conflicting political views. No matter how frequently they interact and no matter how much they share, these individuals will vote together only when their social bonds are associated with political cleavages (Zuckerman, Valentino and Zuckerman, 1994: 1010)

Ethnic voting can take different dimension. Wolfinger (1965) remark that ethnic

voting has two manifestations, (1) Members of an ethnic group show an affinity for one party

or the other which cannot be explained solely as a result of demographic characteristics (2)

Members of an ethnic group will cross party lines to vote for or against a candidate belonging

to a particular ethnic group. He argues that several political circumstances are also associated

with the strength of ethnic voting-that ethnicity will be more important in the absence of plain

cues to guide voters’ decision, ethnicity is likely to play a greater role in non-partisan election,

where voters cannot rely on the party label. He however states that while party identification

may impede the free play of ethnic salience, it also stabilizes and prolongs ethnic relevance;

ethnic voting also seems to be less important when some great issue dominates political

perspectives, as the Depression did in the 1930’s. While playing down the ethnic factor in

voting behaviour, Lindbergh and Morrison (2007:34) state thus:

Voting behaviour is not so much ethnic in essence as it is a rational response to the classic information problem for the voter using the parties’ historical affiliation as a key source of evaluation. Clientelistic and ethnic predisposed voting are minor feature of the Ghanaian electorate, and when present, they seem to be nurtured by intense partisan competition

In like manner, Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen (2011) believe that elections are much

more than mere ethnic censuses or straightforward economic referenda, that the complexity of

voting motivations is evidenced by unforeseen facts: contra the stereotype of ethnic voting,

many African heads of government hail from secondary or minority ethnic groups; and

converse to the economic voting thesis, incumbent presidents often gain reelection despite the

poor performance of African economies. They however agree that ethnic sentiments play a

role in shaping vote choice, but noted that rational calculations about material welfare are

apparently at the forefront of voters’ minds (Bratton, Bhavnani and Chen, 2011:14).

For Horowitz (1985) ethnicity exerts a strong direct impact on electoral behaviour in

ethnically-segmented societies, through generating a long term psychological sense of party

loyalty anchoring citizens to parties, where casting a vote becomes an expression of group

identity. By implications, other social divisions become subsumed as secondary to ethnicity.

Horowitz defines ethnic parties as those that derive their support from an identifiable ethnic

group and serve the interests of that group. To be an ethnic party, a party does not have to

command an exclusive hold on the allegiance of group members, it is how that party’s support

is distributed, not how the ethnic group’s support is distributed, that is decisive (Horowitz,

1985:293).

Horowitz quotes the examples of Guyana, Trinidad, and Ghana, where surveys during

the 1960s found that parties often received 80-90 percent of their votes from one ethnic group.

Those voters who crossed ethnic-party lines were subject, not just to the usual group

pressures, but also to actual intimidation and even physical violence. Where ethnic parties

predominate, Horowitz suggests that an election essentially becomes an ‘ethnic census’. Party

systems are defined as ethnic if all parties are ethnically based, as exemplified for Horowitz in

the mid-1980s by the Sudan, Sri Lanka, Chad, Benin, Kenya, and Nigeria. Such party systems

are prone to conflict, exacerbating existing ethnic divisions, Horowitz argues, because holding

the reins of power in state office is often seen as a zero-sum game, rather than a process of

accommodation. Where party systems in Africa are divided by more than one predominant

issue cleavage, for example over issues of economic redistribution, the system can become

multiethnic or non-ethnic, although he regards such cases as relatively rare. Unlike other

social cues, Horowitz regards ethnicity as a particular problem for the usual process of

bargaining and compromise that characterise normal politics in representative democracies,

because he sees ethnicity as ascriptive, and therefore more segmented, pillarised and rigid

than social identities which are more flexible and fluid, or even self-selected, such as those

based on class or shared ideological beliefs. Better-educated and more cognitively

sophisticated citizens, it is argued, have less need to rely upon the traditional social cues of

ethnicity in electoral choices. The mass media allow citizens to compare a range of parties,

leaders, and public policy issues, potentially exposing them to many dissonant values beyond

those shared with family and neighbours in their local.

Fridy (2007:14) for example concludes that ethnicity is an extremely significant factor in

Ghanaian elections. Likewise, Erdmann (2007) finds that voter alignment and party affiliation

are largely influenced by ethnicity. Thus, although not exclusively, political parties in Africa

tend to be dominated by particular ethnic groups rather than being on the basis of ideology.

Ndegwa (1997) explains the observed ethnic voting patterns as due to the fact that Africans

possess “dual citizenship.” That is, Africans are members of two types of political communities

in the same temporal and spatial world. On the one hand, they are members of their civic-

republican community which is often their ethnic or community group and to which they owe

some obligations. At the same time, they are members of the modern national state. Ndegwa

suggests that the membership in the national state is guided by the conception of status and rights

rather than duties. This dual citizenship undermines the democratization process as Africans

continue to show allegiance to their civic republican community.

Ethnic voting in Africa gives credence to Horowitz’s (1985) expressive voting hypothesis

whereby ethnic voters use their votes to register their identity as members of groups. Such voting

implies that voting is not the outcome of a careful evaluation of policy positions or the

performance of leaders; instead, it is identity that matters. Fish (2008:) describes identity politics

as follows:

You are practicing identity politics when you vote for or against someone because of his or her skin color, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or any marker that leads you to say yes or no independently of a candidate’s ideas or policies. In essence, identity politics is An affirmation of tribe against the claims of ideology… An identity politics voter says in effect, I don’t care what views he holds, or even what bad things he may have done, or what lack of ability he may display, he’s my brother, or he’s my kinsman, or he’s my landsman,…

Birnir (2007:35) argues that ethnicity is an especially important element of vote choice

early in the democratization process, when there is little information about the ideological

positions of parties. If individuals from the same group tend to live together, and to be exposed

mostly to members of their own group with little exposure to members of other groups, then it

should be more likely that they will form group-specific viewpoints and interests, and thus that

they vote together with their own ethnic group (Huber, 2010:12). In a study of Nigerian

elections, Lewis (2007) observes that while identity is important in Nigerian politics, ethnicity is

not the only axis of identification. Identity in Nigeria takes many dimensions such as ethnicity,

economic and religion. Furthermore, Lewis finds that identity is not fixed and varies by region

and over time. In other words, identity is rather fluid. Nevertheless, Lewis finds that ethnic

feelings are strongest in the Niger Delta where people feel discriminated and exploited. That

ethnicity does not matter to voters in and of itself, but rather because voters anticipate more

targeted future goods from co-ethnic candidates. Moreover, while a candidate's prior

performance is a crucial determinant of whether his co-ethnics will vote for him, voters are only

sensitive to the

performance of candidates from their own ethnicities. A positive record of performance cannot

overcome the impact of non co-ethnicity, nor do voters hold non-coethnics accountable for poor

performance.

Oji (2008:3) notes that there are two major ways of selecting key political and

bureaucratic officials in Nigeria. They include the use of the federal character and zoning

principles. The office distribution methods work in concert, with the federal character

principle applying more to appointive positions while zoning relates mostly to elective

positions. But unlike the federal character principle, which legally mandates equal

representation of states in federal institutions, zoning is an informal arrangement devised by

the Nigerian political elite in the course of their informal political exchanges. This means that

there is no legal provision compelling politicians to abide by the zoning arrangement.

Even though no part of Ghana is ethnically homogeneous, an overriding feature of the

country’s ethnic polarization is the north–south divide and the dominance of the southern half

of Ghana in general and in particular by the Akan group. This segment of Ghanaian society

has enjoyed relative economic and political dominance in both the colonial and post-colonial

times. In addition, there has been a divide in Ghanaian politics between the populist and the

elite strands in society and between the rural and urban populations. The north–south flow of

migration is emblematic of the ethno-regional inequalities that have developed in Ghana since

colonial times when infrastructural development and productive projects had been

concentrated in the south and left the north relatively underdeveloped.

There are wide disparities with respect to the distribution of medical and health

facilities, access to telephones, consumption of electricity, small-scale industries, schools and

other key social services, particularly between the north and the south, rural-and urban areas.

For example, at independence, having been largely neglected and left relatively

underdeveloped under colonial rule, the northern region declared a social and economic

distance from the rest of the country and its political leaders argued that their people were not

ready to be governed as part of independent Ghana without special protections.

Psaliidas-Perlmutter in Frempong (2006:21) states that ‘‘ethnic activists and political

entrepreneurs often operate by reinforcing groups fear of physical insecurity and cultural

domination and as memories, myths and emotions magnify these fears, they produce a toxic

brew of distrust and suspicion’’ This fear affects public perception of the government and its

appointments pattern. Ashante and Gyimah-Boadi (2004:125-127) lament that there is high

level of deprivation in many rural parts of Ghana and generally in the three northern regions,

they thus remark, that there is a strong belief among Ghanaians that:

Party affiliation, ethnicity and region of origin are highly influential and possibly the most influential factors in public service appointment…this in turn, foster ethno-regional voting patterns and drives political appointments to follow ethnic-regional lines, it also raises the possibility that ethnicity could be used as an instrument of mobilization and for competition particularly in the public service and in politics both at the national and local level

It is often argue that the Ashanti-Ewe divide and the overall dominance of the Akan

group in economic and social life as well as in public sector contribute to ethnic and regional

polarization in Ghana. The two groups have displayed the least flexibility in their voting

behaviour. The voting among Ashantes and Ewes suggest that the country is polarized along

ethnic and political lines. Another slant to this argument is that ethnically-based

discrimination often takes place in the public service and this help to further aggravate the

pre-existing fears of other ethnic groups not in power.

There are instances where people have lost their jobs, or asked to proceed on leave based on where they came from; issues allegedly more related with ethnicity than efficiency, and added perception that most of their replacements have been Ashantis and Akan. In similar vein, the predominance of Ewes as heads of the security agencies changed to people with Akan or Guan sounding names on top (Frempong, 2006:9).

Kwame Nkrumah did not follow any fixed mathematical formula in allocating cabinet

posts among the various ethnic groups.

All major ethnic groups were represented in

Nkrumah’s cabinets from 1952. However, by 1965, Akans were clearly over-represented.

Thus, 13 out of a total of 18 cabinet members in 1965 were Akan, with 3 from his own

Nzimah ethnic sub-group/community, a number quite out of proportion to the number of

Nzimahs in Ghana (Austin and Luckham, 1975; Danso-Boafo, 1996). Even with these figures

Nkrumah was largely considered to be ethnically blind, while Busia and his party were

considered to be ethnocentric.

A great deal of attention has been focus on Nigeria and Ghana electoral experience,

democracy, colonialism, federalism, government performance, etc., and their link to ethnic

politics. Relative to these issues, a comparative study of Nigeria and Ghana vis-a–vis ethnicity

and voters’ behaviour in the 2007 and 2008 election of Nigeria and Ghana seem scarce. The

foregoing has therefore created a gap in the literature which this study aims to fill

1.5. Theoretical Framework

The classic structural theory of voting behaviour developed during 1960s by Seymour

Martin Lipset and Rokkan (1967) emphasized that social identities formed the basic building

blocks of party support in Western Europe. For Lipset and Rokkan, European nation-states were

stamped by social divisions established decades earlier. Unlike Europe, Citizens in agrarian

societies, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa, are commonly believed to be strongly rooted

to local communities through primary ties of ‘ blood and belonging’, including those of kinship,

family, ethnicity and religion, as well as long-standing cultural bonds (Salih and Markakis, 1998;

Palmberg, 1999; Bekker, Dodds, and Khosa. 2001; Daddieh and Fair, 2002). Structural theories

suggest that within this context, in electoral democracies, the basic cleavages within each society

should provide cues linking voters to parties representing each major social sector, whether

divisions of ethnicity, region, class, or religion.

Bwana (2007:13) identifies three theories which try to explain voting trends and

behaviour, namely the Party Identification Model; the Rational Choice Model; and the

Sociological Model. In the party identification model, the act of voting is seen as expressive, not

instrumental, that is, it is a way of expressing a deep-seated loyalty to the party. The party

identification model springs from social psychology and scholars at the University of Michigan

and elsewhere have developed this idea into what is often referred to as the ‘Michigan Model’

(Jeff and Gainous, 2002:23), because it was developed at the University of Michigan in the

1950s. The central argument here is that people will tend to vote for candidates and positions of

parties they have come to identify with.

The concept of party identification denotes the long term feelings of attachment which

many electors develop to a particular political party. The party identification model stresses the

role of the family in the transmission of party loyalties (Harrop and Miller, 1987:58). As for the

rational choice model (also called public choice theory), it makes a number of assumptions about

individual behaviour that is necessary to describe systems of aggregate voting in symbolic terms.

Under this model, individuals are assumed to make orderly choices that reflect their

personal preferences and desires. This debate about the rationality of self-interest in political

behaviour can be traced as far back as works by Machiavelli, Hobbes and Hume (Jeff and

Gainous, 2002). In the rational choice model, voters choose the party, which comes closest to

their own interests, values and priorities (Harrop and Miller, 1987). Three points characterize this

model: voting is considered to be an instrument or means of achieving some further end and

there is no room for citizens who vote for a party because they value such a government for its

own sake; secondly, rational choice model focuses on the voters’ political goals, thus voting is

not for pleasing one’s spouse, impress one’s friends or for any other non-political reason as the

case is in party identification model; lastly, rational choice assumes voters are instrumental in

their approach to political transformation as to the vote itself and acquire as much information as

is needed to make their decision. On the other hand, the sociological model rejects the

individualistic emphasis of both the party identification and rational choice models

(Harrop and Miller, 1987). The sociological model emphasizes the impact of social

structure on political parties. It by-pass the individual electorate altogether and, to the extent that

it does focus on people, it emphasizes the social base of values and interests rather than the

mechanisms by which they translate into voting behaviour. The question then is; to what extent

can these three models be appropriated to suit in the circumstances and political conditions under

which elections have been conducted in Nigeria and Ghana? Previous scholarship on the

electoral politics of Nigeria and Ghana has shown that voters in both countries tend to vote for

parties/candidates that best represent their ethnic/regional interests and election result also

solidifies this north/south divide. The major political parties in Nigeria (PDP, ANPP, ACN and

APGA) appear to garner majority of their votes from the southern, northern, western and eastern

regions respectively; while Ghana’s two major political parties i.e. the New Patriotic Party and

the National Democratic Congress seem to have Ewe and Akan support respectively. Beyond

party identification is the tendency of voters to always check the ethnic background of parties’

presidential flag bearer. To allay fear of ethnic domination, most political parties try to balance

their ethnic card by picking the presidential and vice presidential candidate from different ethnic

groups. Despite this arrangement, voters usually focus on the ethnic make-up of party

presidential candidate who will eventually be at the elm of affairs if victorious at the poll. One

may want to explain ethnic voting pattern in Ghana and Nigeria on the basis of party

identification model because the major ethnic groups in both countries prefer one political party

to another. This notwithstanding, one thing is constant, i.e., the assumed or real ability of a

political party to cater or provide such hope that the political interest of ethnic groups that align

with it are guaranteed. The most appropriate voting theory that best explain this attitude would

be rational choice theory which emphases the instrumentality of vote and not just voting for the

love of a party par se or other factors other than the voter’ personal/group political interest. We

therefore adopt the Rational Choice theory as the framework for our analysis in this paper.

A pioneering figure in establishing rational choice theory is George Homans (1961), who

set out a basic framework of the theory, which he grounded in the assumptions drawn from

behaviourist psychology. Homans argue that human behaviour, like all animal behaviour, is not

free but determined. It is shaped by the rewards and punishments that are encountered and that

no exchange continues unless both parties are making a profit. The person who experiences a

'loss' finds the interaction more costly than rewarding and so will have an incentive to withdraw.

He notes that a sustained social relationship, therefore, rests upon a balance of mutual

profitability. Participants in social interaction engage in a calculus of rewards and costs and the

interaction will continue in a stable form only if all participants are making a profit. Those who

experience a loss will withdraw and will seek out alternative interactions where they are more

likely to earn a profit.

Blau (1964), Coleman (1973), and Cook (1977) extended the framework, and they

helped to develop more formal, mathematical models of rational action. The theory was

popularise in the field of Political Science in such diverse areas as theories of voting and

coalition formation by Buchanan and Tullock (1962); Riker (1962). Scott (2000:5) argues that

the basic idea of rational choice theory is that patterns of behaviour in societies reflect the

choices made by individuals as they try to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs. In

other words, people make decisions about how they should act by comparing the costs and

benefits of different courses of action. As a result, patterns of behaviour will develop within the

society from those choices. Rational choice theorists hold that individuals must anticipate the

outcomes of alternative courses of action and calculate that which will be best for them.

Rational individuals choose the alternative that is likely to give them the greatest satisfaction

(Coleman, 1973). An individual has the cognitive ability and time to weigh every choice against

every other choice.

Basically, we predicate our analysis on some of the basic propositions emanating from

the rational choice theory. Within this context, we state the following:

1. All social action can be seen as rationally motivated, as instrumental action, however

much it may appear to be irrational or non-rational.

2. Complex social phenomena can be explained in terms of elementary individual

actions of which they are composed, a standpoint known as methodological individualism

3. Individuals are seen as motivated by wants or goals that express their preferences

4. Individuals must anticipate the outcomes of alternative courses of action and calculate

that which will be best for them

5. Rational individuals choose the alternative that is likely to give them the greatest

satisfaction (Coleman, 1973; Scott, 2000).

In view of the foregoing, we argue that voters are likely to seek ways to maximise the

amount of resources they can secure from the state. The resources in question include benefits

such as jobs, roads, health services, schools, etc., voters assume that the likelihood that the

resources will be channelled to them is directly related to whether or not the politician who

controls those resources is from their ethnic group. Thus, the competition for resources and other

benefits become a struggle among ethnic groups to put one of their own into a position of

political power (Posner, 2007:4). Politicians aware of this assumption, sometimes couch their

appeals in ethnic garbs.

1.6. Hypotheses

This study is guided by the following hypotheses:

1. Ethnic inclination impact on the voting behaviour of Nigerians and Ghanaians in the 2007

and 2008 general elections

2. Uneven distribution of government appointment among ethnic groups influence the voting

behaviour of Nigerians and Ghanaians

1.7. Method of Data Collection

This study adopts the Observation Method of data collection which involves the

observation of documented evidence that serve as a secondary source of data. Secondary

source of data refer to a set of data gathered or authored by another person either in the form

of official document, survey result, books, etc., collected for a purpose other than the present

(Asika, 2006:27). This study relies heavily on secondary source of data like books, official

documents, journals, and internet materials on the subject matter

1.8. Method of Data Analysis

The study relied on qualitative descriptive analysis as a method of analysing data.

Asika (2006:118) describe qualitative descriptive analysis as a method of summarizing the

information in the research verbally so as to further discover relationship among variables.

The use of this analytical method became necessary because the study relied principally on

secondary source of data.

CHAPTER TWO HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ETHNICITY IN NIGERIA

AND GHANA (FROM PRE- INDEPENDENCE)

2.1. Ethnicity in Nigerian Politics

In the past fifty years, Nigeria has been obsessed with fears of domination by one ethnic,

regional or religious group over others. Much of the country’s politics revolves around methods

of preventing or resisting such domination. These fears emerged quite clearly during the 1950s in

the period proceeding independence. In 1953, a motion was moved in the House of

Representatives calling for self-Government in 1956. While politicians from southern regions

were supportive, those from northern regions opposed it, because they believed that their relative

backwardness in education and public service employment would lead to their domination in an

independent Nigeria by southerners. In the discussions that followed, it was agreed to make

Nigeria a federation of three regions, North, East and West, with residual powers vested in the

regions. By 1960, when the country gained independence, the idea of fair representation of all

the regions in federal appointments had become accepted, although without specific quotas.

However, in recruitment into the officer corps of the armed forces and the police, a quota system

was applied. This quota arrangement continued up to 1967, when twelve states were created to

replace the three regions, and the formula was reviewed and applied on the basis of equal

numbers from each state.

The story of Nigerian nationalism has always been told against a background of strong

ethno-regionalism. This has been entrenched by strong inequalities in access to education:

groups in the north, in general, have much lower levels of education than groups in the south.

This translates into higher levels of employment in the public sector for southern groups, which

adds to the tensions surrounding the inequality question. The evolution of western education in

colonial Nigeria was based on the implantation of Christian missionaries. However, the colonial

authorities had an agreement with the Muslim Emirates in the northern part of the country that

they would not allow Christian missions in that zone. The Emirates already had an educational

system based on the Islamic tradition, with numerous schools that taught Arabic and Islamic

education and encouraged reading and writing in the Hausa language. This meant that the

development of Western education in the North was very slow during the colonial period,

leading to education inequalities between the North and the South. In 1957, for example, the

primary school population was just 205,000 in the Northern region, compared with 2,190,000 in

the Southern region (Jibrin, 2006). More importantly, these gaps in education have persisted

through to the present day. They are especially high at the level of tertiary education, with many

more students from the South being admitted into universities, and graduating, than students

from the North.

According to figures released by the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board for the

1995/96 session, there were 43,688 university applications from the southern state of Imo, of

which 7,837 got admissions. By contrast, there were only 784 applications from the Northern

state of Yobe, of which 272 were admitted. Given these wide disparities in access to higher

education, it is not surprising that the number of applicants for posts in the public services is also

much higher among southerners than northerners.

Ethnicity exists only within a political society consisting of diverse ethnic groups; it

involves a common consciousness of being one in relation to the other interacting groups

(Nnoli, 1995:2). Ethnicity is a social phenomenon associated with interactions among

members of different ethnic groups; Ethnic groups are social formations distinguished by

communal character of their boundaries (Nnoli, 1980:5). In Nigeria, the colonial urban setting

constitutes the cradle of contemporary ethnicity. Nnoli argues that contemporary Nigerian

ethnicity is not the result of some barbarous mystique peculiar to the African nor is it

basically the consequence of the pre-colonial pattern of conflict among various pre-colonial

polities. Tribalism or ethnicity is a creature of the colonial or post-colonial order. Historical

record shows that before the British came, the various kingdoms fought disastrous interstate

wars among themselves. On one occasion the Ibadan people were opposed by an alliance of

the Egba, Ijebu, Ekiti, Ijesha and Illorin people over the control of trade in the area.

Similarly, the Igbo were organised into separate and autonomous political societies

conterminous with the village. It was urbanisation that brought these various ethnic groups in

contact. Nnoli (1980: 36) states that:

This colonial and urban origin of ethnicity becomes clearer when it is realised that the phenomenon cannot exist unless individuals from different communal groups are in contact. It is a social and not a biological phenomenon. Such contact is a prerequisite for the emergence of ethnicity.

Apart from the contact among the different ethnic groups which produces ethnicity,

cultural and socio-structural characteristic of the primary groups prior to contact; and the nature

of the initial contact are also significant in creating ethnic consciousness. Colonial urban life was

marked by socioeconomic competition because it offered very little socioeconomic security.

Nnoli (1989); Ibeanu (2000); Nwabueze (2010b); opine that ethnic politics in Africa is traced to

and located within the context of colonialism and the subsequent character of the post-colonial

state which alienate its citizens. Salawu and Hassan (2011:30-31) aver that one of the main

causes of ethnic politics is ethnic nationalism, that is ‘‘a tendency to see one’s self first and

foremost as a member of an ethnic group rather than as a member of a nation’’ Another group of

scholars link ethnic politics in Nigeria to the federal structure which they describe as faulty

(Crawford, 1993; Osadolor, 1998). Posner (2007) on the other hand, observe that the need for a

share of the national resources is likely to influence the voting pattern of members of a given

ethnic group. However, Anugwom (2003); opines that lack of performance on the part of

government create a fertile ground for ethnic politics as expressed in election and election

campaign.

Party Support by Ethnic Group in Nigeria (in %)

Party Hausa Yoruba Ibo Total PDP 39 63 39 51 ANPP 60 9 16 35 AD 0 23 3 6 APGA 0 1 40 7 Source: Huber (2011) 2.2. Ethnicity in Ghana’s Politics

The relative homogeneity of Akan cultures, languages, and authority structures has

not led to political unity among the Akan. The most important conflicts of the Akan in pre-

colonial and colonial times, for example, were with other Akan groups. Political conflicts

were major occurrences in pre-colonial and colonial history of Ghana because the Traditional

African State is seen, not only as the arena of political life, but more importantly, as the

institutions with the power and willingness to protect ethnic identity and to come to the

defense of its component members. Political events of pre-colonial Ghana clearly indicate that

the Akan States were created primarily to form a common defense against belligerent Akan

States. The propensity of belligerent Akan States to subjugate other Akan States led to

frequent conflict. These conflicts led to the creation of dominant traditional states such as the

Asante Kingdom. The development of the Asante Kingdom, for example, was largely at the

expense of the independence of the surrounding Akan States, who were quick to reassert their

autonomy, especially after 1896, when Asante was defeated by the British. In the struggle for

independence and in the period since then, political alignments have followed ethnic interests

rather than any conception of Akan ethnic unity. Just as there is no unity within the Akan

group in Ghana, there is no unity between the various Akan groups and the other ethnic

groups of Ghana. Although there is no Akan unity there is Akan political dominance. The

reality of Akan political dominance since independence, a political status due mainly to its

population, wealth and education, has ignited ethnic nationalism in Ghana, especially ethnic

nationalism by the Ewe ethnic group of the Volta Region of Ghana. The partition of the Land

of the Ewes into Ghana and Togo in 1956 created a politically conscious minority ethnic

group. Ewe nationalism in Ghana has since been a source of disunity in Ghana because of the

fear of permanent political domination by the Akan group. As in the Akan group, there was

no overriding ethnic unity amongst the Ewe ethnic group until the May 1956 plebiscite that

partitioned the Land of the Ewes between the Gold Coast and Togo. After the plebiscite, the

Ewe ethnic group, the dominant ethnic group of the former German colony, was divided

between the Gold Coast proper and Togo. Although a clear majority of the people of British

Togoland voted in favour of union with their western neighbours that absorbed the area into

the Gold Coast, there was vocal opposition to the incorporation from some of the Ewes in

southern British Togoland thus precipitating a history of belligerence between Akan and the

Ewes. The plebiscite created Ewe nationalism and has since been a source of political tensions

between the Ewes and the Akans, especially between the Ewes and the Asantes, a sub-group

of the Akan ethnic group. Ethnic tensions developed after the plebiscite and have grown

rapidly in Ghana, and although subterranean, have periodically burst onto the surface to cause

a series of military coups. Undoubtedly, ethnic tensions has been endemic in Ghana and it is

growing today mainly because each ethnic group in Ghana has a historical tradition of group

identity to protect, are fearful of each other and have a great desire today to acquire a great

measure of political autonomy, not only to protect ethnic identity but also to share equitably

in the political power and the economic wealth of the State of Ghana. The propensity of the

Akan group and the Ewe group to monopolize power to secure maximum protection has

created a history of ethnic belligerence in Ghana and, as the history of Ghana clearly

indicates, the incessant pursuit to acquire ethnic political control of the central government of

Ghana has caused ethnic rivalry, disunity and political tensions in Ghana since independence.

Ethnic rivalries of the pre-colonial era, variance in the impact of colonialism upon

different regions of the country, and therefore different ethnic groups of Ghana, and the uneven

distribution of social and economic amenities in post-independent Ghana have all contributed to

the growing ethnic tensions in present-day Ghana. Frustration with the governance systems and

irritation from the awareness of gross inequities in Ghana has contributed to these subterranean

tensions that periodically erupt in many different ways. For example, in February 1994, ethnic

anger erupted in the Northern Eastern Region of Ghana resulting in more than 1,000 people

killed and 150,000 others displaced in fighting between Konkomba on one side and Nanumba,

Dagomba, and Gonja on the other. Although the clashes resulted from longstanding grievances

over land ownership and the prerogatives of chiefs, the confrontations were actually the eruption

of pent-up ethnic frustrations and anger towards the governance system in general. The local

ethnic conflicts in North-Eastern Ghana brought to the surface from underneath the seemingly

quite political landscape, a longstanding deep dissatisfaction with a local governance system that

has virtually made one ethnic group subservient to the other. Although it could easily be

interpreted as an exceptional case of ethnic conflict because of the seemingly peaceful

coexistence of ethnic groups in the urban areas of Ghana, this violence was certainly evidence of

ethnic tension emanating from the prevailing unhappiness with the current political structure and

system of governance at the local and national level by an overwhelming number of

disadvantaged and aggrieved ethnic groups especially ethnic groups from the Northern and

Upper Regions of Ghana. The ethnic discontent culminating in the ethnic conflict reflects a

political situation that continues to exacerbate ethnic political rivalry in Ghana.

Ethnic rivalry continues notwithstanding migration to the cities. The presence of major

industrial, commercial, governmental and educational institutions in the cities, as well as

increasing migration of other people into the cities had not created a sense of unity in Ghana all

because of the fear of losing ethnic identity and because of the belief by many ethnic groups of

the prevalence of inequity in the distribution of power even in a democratic Ghana (Gyamfuaa

and Awua-kyerematem, 2011:21). For example, migration to Accra, the capital of Ghana, had

not prevented the Ga people from maintaining aspects of their traditional culture and ethnic

identity, a vivid attestation to the importance of ethnicity to the African and to the great

aspiration of the African to protect ethnic identity no matter what. Because of ethnicity,

migration into the cities and urban areas has not build any sense of shared ties across ethnic lines.

On the contrary, migration has increased the awareness of political and economic inequity across

ethnic lines. The heterogeneous nature of all administrative regions, in rural-urban migration,

although has resulted in professional inter ethnic mixing, in the shared concerns of professionals

and trade unionists that cut across ethnic lines, and in the multi-ethnic composition of secondary

school and university classes, they have not eliminated the ethnic consciousness about political

and economic inequity in Ghana and therefore have not eliminated ethnic frustration of the

current political structure and system of governance. Historic ethnic rivalry continues in Ghana

because of the increasing political and economic inequality between the ethnic groups of Ghana.

Inequality in the distribution of political power and economic wealth of Ghana explains

the propensity for political parties to emerge or continuously evolve along ethnic lines. Political

parties in Ghana have essentially been controlled by ethnic groups competing against each other

to either maintain ethnic monopoly of power and wealth through the control of the central

government or to wrestle political power from other ethnic groups in power. Consequently,

ethnicity continues to be one of the most potent factors affecting political behaviour in Ghana.

Although, ethnically based political parties are unconstitutional under the present republic, ethnic

sentiments in the politics of Ghana have not subsided but is on the increase. Increasing ethnic

sentiment generates increasing ethnic rivalry, which then ignites the flame of political tensions.

Ethnic rivalry continues today because of political and economic inequality in Ghana.

Disguised ethnic struggles to acquire maximum protection from persecutions, injustice,

and economic marginalization has created a coalition of Southern and Northern Ethnic groups

against the Asante sub-ethnic group, the group believed to possess inordinate amount of power in

the current central government. Political demonstrations have intensified political tensions and it

is therefore destroying all opportunities of achieving political unity in Ghana.. Political tensions

have been endemic in Ghana because of the incessant scramble by ethnic groups to grab power

or to dominate the politics of Ghana (Alabi, 2007:5). Political manoeuvrings in Ghana, since

independence, have been indicative of ethnic tensions and the tensions at times have led to

political instability. There seem to exist a fear of perpetual ethnic domination of the politics of

Ghana. It is the fear of ethnic subjugation by another ethnic group. Because of this fear, there has

been no true national political party in Ghana since the demise in 1966 of the Nkrumaist Party,

the Convention Peoples Party - CPP. The New Patriotic Party - NPP and its predecessors since

independence are seen by many as the Akan Party dominated by the Akan sub-ethnic group, the

Asante, while the National Democratic Congress - NDC and its predecessor are seen as the Ewe

Party, The current Nkrumaist Party - CPP and PNC - Peoples National Congress, unlike their

predecessor, also do not reflect a national party ( ).

Like the Nkrumaist Party and the NPP, the internal squabbles of the NDC have much to

do with ethnicity. There is leadership struggles between pro-Akan and pro-Ewe factions in the

party as some party leaders are striving to change the image of the party as an Ewe political

party. While the NPP is perceived as an Akan political party, the NDC is recognized by many

Ghanaians as an Ewe political party because the leadership of NDC predecessor military and

civilian governments that rule Ghana for 19 years were headed predominantly by people from

one ethnic group - the Ewe ethnic group. This ethnic dominance has created a great perception,

rightly or wrongly, that the NDC belongs to the Ewe ethnic group and this deeply entrenched

perception could not be neutralized in the 2004 elections. The notion of NDC as the Ewe

political party was the cause of the loss of the elections to the NPP in 2004 and the loss was

primarily due to ethnicity, to the ethnic fear of perpetual ethnic domination. Indubitably, the

great African fear of ethnic domination was a factor in the loss of the 2004 elections by the

NDC.

Ethnicity is often view as essentially imperative social need to protect the customs, the

traditions, the mores, the identity, the aspiration, the pride and the power of the ethnic group.

That this socio-political need is a major factor in Ghanaian politics was vividly demonstrated by

2004 elections. The loss of the 2004 elections by the NDC was due to ethnicity, not because of

internal ethnic strife for the control of the party, but because of external perception - the

prevailing perception of the Akan ethnic group that the NDC is a party controlled by the Ewe

ethnic group. Ethnicity caused the election defeat of the NDC not because of party disunity but

because of the fear of the powerful and populous Akan ethnic group of the continuation of

political dominance by the Ewe ethnic group. The power of the Akan group and their wariness of

a minority ethnic group dominating Ghanaian politics have made any political party perceived to

be Ewe controlled vulnerable to election defeat. The wariness of the Akan ethnic group, a group

that is disproportionately powerful, wealthy and educated, has made ethnicity a major factor in

Ghanaian politics. It could easily be misconstrued that ethnicity had very little role to play in the

Central Region in the 2004 elections. Ethnicity and the fear of bringing back Ewe domination of

Ghanaian politics resulted in a vote, not necessarily against the NDC presidential candidate who

comes from the region, but against the Ewes who are believed to wield firm control of the

political party. The notion of resurrecting Ewe political dominance after 19 years in power

through the ballot box was too much political risk for the Fantes of the Central Region of Ghana

to accept. The political risk of re-instating Ewe dominance was so much that the Fante, a sub-

ethnic group of the Akan, decided to sacrifice the political career of a native son to maintain

Akan pride and power. Ethnic political consciousness caused the defeat of the NDC in the

Central Region and it was a political event in Ghana that demonstrated the power of ethnicity in

African politics. Contemporary Ghanaian history is replete with ethnicity in politics. Nkrumaist

Asante politicians of the 1960s and an Asante Head of State of Ghana in the 1970s were never

supported by the Asantes of the Akan ethnic group because the governments then were not

controlled by Asantes. Similarly, in the 2004 elections, the Fante presidential candidate of the

NDC could not be supported by the Fantes of the Akan group because the NDC is perceived to

be controlled by non-Akan ethnic group. Because of the fear of ethnic subjugation, the African

tend to vote for a party or support a government, not necessary because of who is at the helm, but

what ethnic group controls the party or the government; In Ghana, as in all Africa, ethnic control

of the party or government is synonymous to attaining maximum social, political and economic

protections against social injustice, political persecution and economic marginalization (Alabi,

2007:16-20).

2.3. Ethnicity and Ghana’s Two-Party System

Ghanaian two-party system is deeply rooted and dates back from the liberation

movements under the colonial power. In 1947, lawyer and journalist Joseph B. Danquah founded

the first political party, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC). It included members of the

African elite (mostly lawyers) and invited a young intellectual settled then in the United

Kingdom: Kwame Nkrumah. The unity of this movement only lasted a year, the time necessary

for six of the main UGCC leaders (the "Big Six") to be imprisoned in what remained as a

milestone episode in the path to independence. But in 1949, Nkrumah broke away from the party

and inaugurated his own party, the Convention People's Party (CPP). The CPP presented a more

radical nationalist programme, calling for "Self-government NOW", while the UGCC appeared

by contrast more compromised with the colonial power. While UGCC leaders were almost all

Ashanti and closely linked with Ashanti traditional chiefs, the CPP leaders appeared selfless and

dedicated solely to the liberation of the people without any connection to a specific ethnic group

(Yaele, 2006:9). The CPP rapidly increased its influence among the people and obtained

overwhelming majorities in the elections held in 1951 and 1956. It defeated the National

Liberation Movement (NLM), created by Danquah and Kofi Busia in 1954 which succeeded to

the UGCC. The rivalry between the CPP and the NLM in the 1950s and 60s crystallized all

major splits in Ghanaian politics (Bogaards, 2008:28). The NLM (also more generally referred to

as "the Busia/Danquah tradition") had its strongholds in the Ashanti region. Its main supports

were to be found among the cocoa growers and the traditional chiefs, whose interests were

defended. It recruited among the educated elite and proposed a rather conservative project for

Ghanaian society. By contrast, the CPP (and later all nkrumahist parties) defended the "masses"

and presented a more radical political position. During his presidency (1957-1966), Kwame

Nkrumah opposed the interests of cocoa growers by raising taxes on exports and contested the

power of Ashanti traditional rulers (particularly by the Chieftancy Act in 1961). He made

socialism the social ideology of the regime and drew his country closer to the Eastern bloc

(although he remained above all as one of the first and most influential pan-africanist leaders).

After the fall of Nkrumah, overthrown by a coup in 1966, Kofi Busia came to power in 1969 and

implemented a very different policy. He offered financial support to the revenues of cocoa

growers broke off with communist countries and leaned on the Akan majority group (of which

Ashanti form a sub-group). But the economic crisis accelerated his fall and he was dismissed by

a military coup in 1972. On the political level, military governments and coups attempts

succeeded one another, until a last coup was successfully held by Flight Lieutenant Jerry

Rawlings in 1979. He remained 112 days in power, just the time necessary to enforce a "house

cleaning exercise" (restoring state authority through symbolic and sometimes violent decisions

like executing the former military chiefs) and organize elections. Hilla Limann, a "Northerner"

who professed to represent the inheritance of Nkrumah's CPP, became President but rapidly

faced social unrest and discontent. In 1981 Rawlings came back at the head of the State as the

power was almost left vacant. Jerry Rawlings does not fall into one of the two political

categories that we mentioned above. His presidency thus introduced some modifications in the

two-party system but did not abolish it, quite the contrary. Rawlings tried (and eventually

succeeded) to diminish the influence of the nkrumahist forces and integrate them in his own

camp. According to Bogaards (2008) democratization of African states and multi- party politics

brought about the politicization of ethnicity, which is seen through Ghana’s history and

continues to affect politics today.

In the early years of his presidency, Rawlings made gestures of goodwill towards these

revolutionary forces by creating People' and Worker's Defence Committees seemingly designed

to enforce the revolution. Thereby he kept control on these potentially threatening activists. By

determinedly imposing the economic adjustment during the 1980s, Rawlings sidelined

nkrumahists. In the opposition between nkrumahism and the Busia/Danquah tradition,

nkrumahism was thus progressively replaced by Rawlings and his heirs. This activated the

rivalry between Ashanti and Ewe, this latter group being strongly supportive of his member Jerry

Rawlings, while Ashanti and to a larger extent Akan remained resolute opponents. But since

these two conflicting parties at least agreed upon the broad macroeconomic strategy (adjustment

and international openness), nkrumahist movements represented a radical criticism of this system

and progressively became protest parties under the Fourth Republic.

Party Support by Ethnic Group in Ghana (in %)

NPP NDC Other

Akan 67% 16% 11%

Ashante 83% 4% 13% Fante 51% 28% 22% Other 67% 17% 17% Ewe 19% 59% 22% Ga 32% 48% 20%

Mole 34% 49% 17% Other 35% 37% 26%

Source: Hoffman (2009)

CHAPTER THREE

ETHNICITY AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN NIGERIA AND

GHANA ELCTIONS

3.1. The 2003/2007 Nigeria Elections Results

REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 19 APRIL 2003 ========================================================= Source: Nigerian Independent National Election Commission Parties --------------------------------------------------------- * ANPP - All Nigeria People's Party * APGA - All Progressives Grand Alliance * PDP - People's Democratic Party VOTING BY STATE ========================================================= ABIA ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,285,428 Votes counted: 769,167 59.8% Invalid votes: 21,133 02.7% Valid Votes: 748,034 97.3% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 84,305 11.3 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 386,748 51.7 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 260,899 34.9 17 others 16,082 02.1 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 748,034 --------------------------------------------------------- ADAMAWA ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,280,204 Votes counted: 994,033 77.6% Invalid votes: 38,186 00.4 % Valid Votes: 955,847 99.6% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 285,151 29.8 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 660,780 69.1 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 2,352 00.2 17 others 7,564 00.8 ---------------------------------------- ----------------- Total 955,847 --------------------------------------------------------- AKWA-IBOM ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,624,495

Votes counted: 1,308,326 80.5% Invalid votes: 15,931 01.2% Valid Votes: 1,292,395 98.8% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 162,542 12.6 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 1,084,574 83.9 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 1,077 00.1 17 others 44,202 03.4 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 1,292,395 --------------------------------------------------------- ANAMBRA ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,859,795 Votes counted: 897,245 48.2% Invalid votes: 35,052 03.9% Valid Votes: 862,193 96.1% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 79,476 09.2 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 466,866 54.1 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 279,378 32.4 17 others 36,473 04.2 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 862,193 --------------------------------------------------------- BAUCHI ========================================================= Registered voters: 2,130,557 Votes counted: 1,739,506 81.6% Invalid votes: 58,964 03.5% Valid Votes: 1,680,542 96.5% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 1,043,442 62.1 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 617,291 36.7 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 1,678 00.1 17 others 18,131 01.1 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 1,680,542 --------------------------------------------------------- BAYELSA ========================================================= Registered voters: 765,472 Votes counted: 742,917 97.0% Invalid votes: 4,752 00.6% Valid Votes: 738,165 99.4% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % ---------------------------------------------------------

Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 18,344 02.5 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 708,312 96.0 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 3 00.0 17 others 11,506 01.6 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 738,165 --------------------------------------------------------- BENUE ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,755,528 Votes counted: 1,248,897 71.1% Invalid votes: 35,054 02.8% Valid Votes: 1,213,843 97.2% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 494,804 40.8 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 662,422 54.6 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 6,731 00.5 17 others 49,886 04.1 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 1,213,843 --------------------------------------------------------- BORNO ========================================================= Registered voters: 2,156,019 Votes counted: 1,336,480 62.0% Invalid votes: 216,328 16.2% Valid Votes: 1,120,152 83.8% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 727,595 65.0 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 380,875 34.0 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 3,549 00.3 17 others 8,133 00.7 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 1,120,152 --------------------------------------------------------- CROSS RIVER ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,289,192 Votes counted: 1,238,175 96.0% Invalid votes: 4,854 00.4% Valid Votes: 1,233,321 99.6% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 11,624 00.9 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 1,207,675 97.9 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 2,112 00.2 17 others 11,910 01.0 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 1,233,321

--------------------------------------------------------- DELTA ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,607,337 Votes counted: 1,171,867 72.9% Invalid votes: 29,245 02.5% Valid Votes: 1,142,622 97.5% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 27,492 02.4 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 1,072,527 94.0 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 15,062 01.3 17 others 27,541 02.4 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 1,142,622 --------------------------------------------------------- EBONYI ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,002,771 Votes counted: 807,767 80.5% Invalid votes: 11,141 01.4% Valid Votes: 796,626 98.6% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 16,308 02.0 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 752,823 94.5 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 20,525 02.6 17 others 6,970 00.9 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 796,626 --------------------------------------------------------- EDO ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,432,891 Votes counted: 1,118,322 78.0% Invalid votes: 11,510 01.0% Valid Votes: 1,106,812 99.0% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 109,401 09.9 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 979,775 88.5 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 2,247 00.2 17 others 15,389 01.4 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 1,106,812 --------------------------------------------------------- EKITI ========================================================= Registered voters: 981,753 Votes counted: 424,056 43.2%

Invalid votes: 98,175 23.1% Valid Votes: 325,881 76.9% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 7,500 02.3 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 301,185 92.4 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 1,300 00.4 17 others 15,896 04.9 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 325,881 --------------------------------------------------------- ENUGU ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,479,542 Votes counted: 1,144,887 77.4% Invalid votes: 17,942 01.6% Valid Votes: 1,126,945 98.4% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 18,987 01.7 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 897,721 79.7 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 177,050 15.7 17 others 33,187 02.9 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 1,126,945 --------------------------------------------------------- FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY ========================================================= Registered voters: 628,100 Votes counted: 274,620 43.7% Invalid votes: 13,457 04.9% Valid Votes: 261,163 95.1% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 99,220 38.0 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 130,243 49.9 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 22,481 08.6 17 others 9,219 03.5 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 261,163 --------------------------------------------------------- GOMBE ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,263,287 Votes counted: 1,010,175 80.0% Invalid votes: 34,039 03.4% Valid Votes: 976,136 96.6% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 516,081 52.9

Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 452,328 46.3 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 1,601 00.2 17 others 6,126 00.6 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 976,136 --------------------------------------------------------- IMO ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,630,494 Votes counted: 1,052,885 64.6% Invalid votes: 36,404 03.4% Valid Votes: 1,016,481 96.6% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 53,983 05.3 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 656,861 64.6 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 281,114 27.7 17 others 24,523 02.4 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 1,016,481 --------------------------------------------------------- JIGAWA ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,636,657 Votes counted: 1,147,952 70.1% Invalid votes: 46,043 04.0% Valid Votes: 1,101,909 96.0% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 885,505 80.4 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 202,502 18.4 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 2,136 00.2 17 others 11,766 01.1 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 1,101,909 --------------------------------------------------------- KADUNA ========================================================= Registered voters: 2,620,999 Votes counted: 2,192,248 83.6% Invalid votes: 273,883 12.5% Valid Votes: 1,918,365 87.5% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 870,454 45.4 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 1,025,347 53.4 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 7,800 00.4 17 others 14,764 00.8 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 1,918,365 ---------------------------------------------------------

KANO ========================================================= Registered voters: 4,000,430 Votes counted: 2,339,792 58.5% Invalid votes: 167,610 07.2% Valid Votes: 2,172,182 92.8% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 1,628,085 74.9 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 492,755 22.7 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 10,229 00.5 17 others 41,113 01.9 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 2,172,182 --------------------------------------------------------- KATSINA ========================================================= Registered voters: 2,567,245 Votes counted: 1,711,212 66.6% Invalid votes: 58,051 03.4% Valid Votes: 1,653,161 96.6% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 1,259,789 76.2 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 380,914 23.0 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 2,928 00.2 17 others 9,530 00.6 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 1,653,161 --------------------------------------------------------- KEBBI ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,343,549 Votes counted: 879,826 65.5% Invalid votes: 64,607 07.3% Valid Votes: 815,219 92.7% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 529,512 65.0 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 272,564 33.4 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 3,888 00.5 17 others 9,255 01.1 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 815,219 --------------------------------------------------------- KOGI ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,158,343 Votes counted: 898,692 77.6% Invalid votes: 34,703 03.9%

Valid Votes: 863,989 96.1% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 314,494 36.4 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 528,778 61.2 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 2,275 00.3 17 others 18,442 02.1 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 863,989 --------------------------------------------------------- KWARA ========================================================= Registered voters: 995,882 Votes counted: 624,695 62.7% Invalid votes: 50,326 08.0% Valid Votes: 574,369 92.0% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 170,325 29.6 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 390,800 68.0 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 2,293 00.4 17 others 10,951 01.9 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 574,369 --------------------------------------------------------- LAGOS ========================================================= Registered voters: 4,558,216 Votes counted: 1,939,191 42.5% Invalid votes: 310,443 16.0% Valid Votes: 1,628,748 84.0% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 116,510 07.1 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 1,129,521 69.3 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 134,764 08.3 17 others 247,953 15.2 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 1,628,748 --------------------------------------------------------- NASSARAWA ========================================================= Registered voters: 852,626 Votes counted: 741,289 86.9% Invalid votes: 12,023 01.6% Valid Votes: 729,266 98.4% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 244,005 33.5 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 470,936 64.6

Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 1,488 00.2 17 others 12,837 01.8 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 729,266 --------------------------------------------------------- NIGER ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,607,730 Votes counted: 1,052,789 65.5% Invalid votes: 69,583 06.6% Valid Votes: 983,206 93.4% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 390,103 39.7 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 486,621 49.5 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 11,849 01.2 17 others 94,633 09.6 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 983,206 --------------------------------------------------------- OGUN ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,576,875 Votes counted: 1,365,367 86.6% Invalid votes: 4,116 00.3% Valid Votes: 1,361,251 99.7% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 680 00.1 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 1,360,170 99.9 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 27 00.0 17 others 374 00.0 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 1,361,251 --------------------------------------------------------- ONDO ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,504,181 Votes counted: 995,084 66.1% Invalid votes: 106,221 10.7% Valid Votes: 888,863 89.3% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 31,994 03.6 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 840,988 94.6 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 4,180 00.5 17 others 11,691 01.3 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 888,863 ---------------------------------------------------------

OSUN ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,367,627 Votes counted: 783,914 57.3% Invalid votes: 172,321 22.0% Valid Votes: 611,593 78.0% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 14,369 02.3 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 582,089 95.2 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 1,424 00.2 17 others 13,711 02.2 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 611,593 --------------------------------------------------------- OYO ========================================================= Registered voters: 2,209,953 Votes counted: 1,083,806 49.0% Invalid votes: 201,253 18.6% Valid Votes: 882,571 81.4% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 25,112 02.8 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 828,725 93.9 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 4,519 00.5 17 others 24,215 02.7 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 882,571 --------------------------------------------------------- PLATEAU ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,391,594 Votes counted: 1,120,931 80.5% Invalid votes: 70,561 06.3% Valid Votes: 1,050,370 93.7% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 324,566 30.9 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 706,432 67.3 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 6,362 00.6 17 others 13,010 01.2 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 1,050,370 --------------------------------------------------------- RIVERS ========================================================= Registered voters: 2,272,238 Votes counted: 2,171,215 95.5% Invalid votes: 11,082 00.5% Valid Votes: 2,160,133 99.5%

--------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 42,346 02.0 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 2,003,521 92.7 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 5,964 00.3 17 others 108,302 05.0 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 2,160,133 --------------------------------------------------------- SOKOTO ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,476,691 Votes counted: 1,017,849 68.9% Invalid votes: 88,764 08.7% Valid Votes: 929,085 91.3% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 681,153 73.3 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 232,258 25.0 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 6,869 00.7 17 others 8,805 00.9 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 929,085 --------------------------------------------------------- TARABA ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,026,950 Votes counted: 923,603 89.9% Invalid votes: 17,534 01.9% Valid Votes: 906,069 98.1% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 198,023 21.9 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 694,527 76.6 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 1,179 00.1 17 others 12,340 01.4 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 906,069 --------------------------------------------------------- YOBE ========================================================= Registered voters: 966,749 Votes counted: 643,388 66.5% Invalid votes: 44,257 06.9% Valid Votes: 599,131 93.1% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 383,583 64.0 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 206,984 34.5 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 3,522 00.6

17 others 5,042 00.8 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 599,131 --------------------------------------------------------- ZAMFARA ========================================================= Registered voters: 1,515,622 Votes counted: 1,106,567 73.0% Invalid votes: 52,716 04.8% Valid Votes: 1,053,851 95.2% --------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % --------------------------------------------------------- Muhammadu Buhari ANPP 843,159 80.0 Olusegun OBASANJO * PDP 200,702 19.0 Odumegwu Ojukwu APGA 4,590 00.4 17 others 5,400 00.5 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 1,053,851 ---------------------------------------------------------

3.2. Ghana’s 2004/2008 Election Results

Ghana 2008, Presidential Run‐off Elections: Number of Valid Votes,

Share of Each Candidate, and Turnout (in per cent) per Region

Source: Ghana Electoral Commission, 2007

FIRST ROUND: 7 DECEMBER 2008 NATIONAL SUMMARY =================================================================== Enrolled voters: 12,472,758

Votes cast: 8,671,272 69.5 Invalid votes: 205,438 02.4 Valid votes: 8,465,834 97.6 ------------------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % ------------------------------------------------------------------- Kwabena Adjei RPD 6,889 00.1 Nana A D Akufo-Addo NPP 4,159,439 49.1 Kwasi Amoafo-Yeboah 19,342 00.2 Emmanuel Ansah-Antwi DFP 27,889 00.3 John Atta-Mills NDC 4,056,634 47.9 Paa Kwesi Nduom CPP 113,494 01.3 Edward Mahama PNC 73,494 00.9 Thomas Ward-Brew DPP 8,653 00.1 ------------------------------------------------------------------- Total 8,465,834 ------------------------------------------------------------------- SECOND ROUND: 28 DECEMBER 2008 NATIONAL SUMMARY =================================================================== Enrolled voters: 12,472,758 Valid votes: 8,979,877 ------------------------------------------------------------------- Candidate Party Votes % ------------------------------------------------------------------- Nana A D Akufo-Add NPP 4,478,411 49.9 John Atta-Mills NDC 4,501,466 50.1 ------------------------------------------------------------------- Total 8,979,877 ------------------------------------------------------------------- 165,375 01.9 --------------------------------------------------------- Total 8,625,785 ---------------------------------------------------------

CHAPTER FOUR

ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT APPOINTMENTS AND VOTING BEHAVIOUR

4.1. Ethnic and Regional Representation in Key offices in Ghana and Nigeria

Table 4.1A: Ethnic/Regional Representation (Nkrumah-CPP) Government. (1952-1965)

Year Akan Ewe Ga Guan Northern Total 1952 3 1 2 1 1 8 1954 6 1 1 1 2 11 1956 8 1 1 1 2 13 1965 13 0 1 2 3 19

(Source: Danso-Boafo Kwaku 1996. The Political Biography of DR. Kofi Abrefa Busia. Ghana Universities Press, Accra)

Table 4.1B : Ethnic/Regional Representation (Nkrumah-CPP) Government (Percentages) (1952-1965)

Year Akan Ewe Ga-Adangbe Guan Northern Total

1952 37.5 12.5 25 12.5 12.5 100 1954 54.5 9 9 9 18 100

1956

61.5 7.6 7.6 7.6 15.3 100

1965 68.4 0 5 10.5 15.7 100

Table 4.2A: Ethnic/Regional Representation (Busia-Progress Party) Government (1969)

Year 1969

Akan Ewe Ga Adangbe Guan Northern Total

14 0 1 1 3 19

Table 4.2B: Ethnic/Regional Representation (Busia-Progress Party) Government (1969)(Percentages)

Year 1969 Akan Ewe Ga Guan Northern Total

Adangbe 73.6 0 5 5 15.7 100

Table 4.3: Ethnic/Regional Representation under Limann-PNP Government (1979) Administration Akan Ewe Ga-Adangbe North Total Limann-PNP 8 2 2 2 14

Table 4.4: Ethnic/Regional Representation under Rawlings-NDC Government (1993)

Administration Akan Ewe Ga-Adangbe

North Total

Rawlings-NDC (1993)

15 3 2 7 27

(percentages) Administra

tion Akan Ewe Ga-Adangbe North Total

Rawlings 55.5 NDC(1993)

11 7.4 25.9 100

Table 4.5: Ethnicity of Chief Directors of the Various Ministries and other Establishments (NDC and NPP) Administrations (percentages)

Administration

Akan Ewe Ga North Total

Rawlings NDC-1993

64 18 12 6 100

Kufuor NPP-2003

53 12 23 12 100

Table 4.6: Service commanders Ghana Armed Forces

Service commanders Ghana Armed Forces (NDC and NPP) / percentages Administration Akan Ewe Ga-Adangbe North Total Rawlings-NDC

(2000) 3

42.8 2

28. 5 1

14. 2 1

14. 2

7 100

Kufuor-NPP-2001

3 42.8

2 28.5

1 14.2

1 14.2

7 100

Table 4.7: The Customs Excise And Preventive Service (Percentages)

Administration Akan

Ewe

Ga-Adangbe

North Total

Rawlings-NDC 2000 (2) 33% (0) 0% (4) 66.6% (0) 0% (6) 100

Kufuor (4) 50% (1)12.5% (3) 37.5% (0) 0% (8)100

Table 4.7. Judicial service (Top Management Team) (NDC and NPP) Administration (percentages)

Administration Akan Ewe Ga North Total Rawlings-NDC-2000

56 11 33 0 100

Kufuor-NPP-2001

56 11 33 0 100

Kufuor-NPP-2002-2004

70 10 10 10 100

Source: Compiled by the Personnel Department, Judicial Service, Ghana, 2003.

The above distribution of key offices suggests that even though politicians have been

quite sensitive to ethno-regional issues and tried to achieve balance in representation in

government and the public service, ethno-regionalism operates largely at the latent level in

Ghanaian politics, competing political parties will find themselves unable to resist playing the

‘sectarian card’ This, in turn, fosters ethno-regional voting patterns and drives political

appointments to follow ethno-regional lines. It also raises the possibility that ethnicity could

be used as an instrument of mobilization and for competition particularly in the public service

and in politics both at the national and local levels

4.2. Geo-Political Representation of Federal Bureaucracies in Nigeria, 1996-2004

Trends in representativeness of federal bureaucracies (all categories) 1996- 2004 in %

ZONE 2005 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2 004

NW 25.56 12.3 10.4 10.4 10.9 10.4 9.5 10.1 9.5

NE 13.55 8.2 8.3 8.6 9.9 8.6 8.1 8.8 8.6

NC 13.47 18.3 18.3 19.3 21.0 19.3 17.1 17.6 17.6

SW 19.7 24.5 24.9 24.7 20.7 24.9 25.9 24.2 24.4

SE 11.7 16.8 16.1 16.2 14.9 16.0 18.8 18.7 19.4

SS 15.0 20.0 22.1 21.0 22.3 20.8 20.6 20.2 20.6 Source: Federal Character Commission.

Number of Nigerian Heads of State/Government by Region and Length of Time in Office (Oct. 1960-May 2007

Region/Ethnic No. of Heads of State/Government

% No. of Months Office

%

North 5 41.6 197 35.1 Middle Belt 3 825 215 38.3 Igbo 1 8.3 6 0.8 Yoruba 3 25 142 25.3 Niger Delta - . - - North 8 66.6 412 73.4 South 4 33.3 148 26.1

Source: Oji 2007:179

Disparities in employment in federal establishments in by state, 1999 (State Zone Total Staff %)

Ogun South West 14,302, (7.5%) Imo South East 122,474 (6.6%)

Plateau North Central 5,399 (2.8%) Yobe North East 1,625 (0.9%)

Bayelsa South South 1,223 (0.6%) Zamfara North West 803 (0.4%)

Source: Jibrin, 2006:3

.Composition of Federal Civil Service By Regions as at 2000 (Consolidated Statistics)

Region No. of Staff % of Total Staff

Total 12 100 560 100

Northern Region 70,966 37.7 North 35,977 19.1 Middle Belt 34,989 18.6

Southern Region 116,992 62.2 Yoruba 47,349 25.2 Igbo 30,490 16.2

Niger Delta 39,153 20.8 Total 187,958 99.9

Source: Orji 2006:174

Clientelism and ethnicity have caused the government to allocate resources more to one

groups of people than sharing the national pie equally, and contributing to the national growth of

the country as a whole. Through promises made by the government to their respective partisans

who are usually co- ethnics, their focus lies on providing this group with an equal share of

resources as a means of maintaining their loyalty in hopes of getting re- elected into power

(Beissinger,2008:87). Clientelistic ties between politicians or the elite and citizen partisans in

these growing democracies, especially in Africa have been linked to causing ethnic disparities.

As citizen partisans anticipate an election, are expectant of resources they will potentially have

access to due to the clientelistic nature of African politics. This anticipation for resources causes

discrimination amongst citizens along partisan cleavages. However, Michelitch (2010) also

argues that citizen partisans are also unsure of the “elite power contestation” and therefore will

align with a more stable group to which they also receive resources- their ethnic groups- making

them more hostile to other groups and causing them to exhibit discriminatory behaviour. People

exhibit more favourable attitudes towards co-ethnics, than against people in a different ethnic

group.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

5.1. Summary and Conclusion

Ethnocentric politics has permeated all institutions in Ghana and Nigeria - political,

professional as well as educational institutions and it has made politics in both countries

needlessly volatile, creating unnecessary suspicions and tensions, even in institutions where

cooperation and a peaceful atmosphere are needed. Ethnocentric voting pattern has been a

feature of Ghanaian and Nigerian politics since independence because people continue to

subscribe to and vote for the political party controlled by their ethnic group and vote against the

political party that even appeals to their political persuasion. Because of the need to protect

ethnicity and avoid economic marginalization and because of the fear of political dominance by

other ethnic group, political ideology hardly transcends ethnic boundaries in Ghana and Nigeria,

consequently making disunity a virtual certainty and unity a virtual impossibility. Ethnic disunity

attest to an African political fact - before the emergence of modern political ideology, there was

African ethnicity, the power of which has not yet been neutralized. Since democracy has been

widely accepted by all Ghanaians and Nigerians, it has become abundantly clear to all ethnic

groups that control of the central government to attain maximum protection for the ethnic group

and to grab the lion’s share of the political power and the economic wealth, can no longer be

achieved through the control of the military but through the control of the political party. The

internal dissension within most political parties is nothing but ethnic manoeuvring for the control

of the political party. As social, political and economic insecurity of the ethnic group increases

because of the prevailing distrust of the government to provide maximum protection to all ethnic

groups, ethnic political plots to control the political party increases as well. African ethnic

groups, including the ethnic groups will continue to fight for equal protection until and unless

freedom and justice flow abundantly across ethnic lines. Like other ethnic groups in other

African States, the ethnic groups in Ghana and Nigeria have been fighting, since independence,

to acquire maximum political control in order to attain maximum political protection from

political subjugation by other ethnic groups, a political pursuit that has greatly contributed to the

perpetuation of ethnic tensions in both countries. The fight to acquire maximum protection has

ignited ethnic rivalries all across Africa, and as a result political tensions has become the norm in

many African States. In Ghana, the Ewes and the Asantes epitomize ethnic rivalry. The Ewe

group and the Asante group, when out of power, have been too quick to react against government

policies they believed to be against their ethnic interest, too quick to mobilize fierce resistance

against the slightest perception of an incipient political domination by other ethnic group and too

quick to express great animosity against people of other ethnic group perceived to dominate

Ghanaian politics. The result of these political reactions is increasing political tensions. The

propensity to react quickly against the central government of the day is due to the deep distrust

of the political structure and the political system. The African ethnic group in Ghana, notably the

Asantes and the Ewes since the 1950s, have been distrustful of the political formation of Ghana

and as a result have been demanding greater degree of political autonomy from the central

government, when they are not in power, mainly to avoid ethnic subjugation, protect ethnic

identity, and share equitably in the political power and the economic wealth of Ghana. Under

such a distrusted political formation, fear of subjugation and marginalization is bound to

predominate and under a feared national environment characterized by fierce protection of ethnic

interest in total disregard of national interest, ethnic polarization is bound to occur and ethnic

sentiment is bound to dominate political discourse and national unity is bound to become

extremely difficult to achieve. Unquestionably, the distrusted political structure and system has

resulted in the endless and needless ethnic political scrambling, scheming, plotting and

manoeuvring since independence. The inappropriate political arrangement in Ghana and Nigeria,

a political arrangement that confers inordinate political power in the central government, which

widely unacceptable to most of the ethnic groups, is one of the source of ethnic tensions in

Ghana and Nigeria and therefore the cause of disunity among the different ethnic groups.

Political tensions in Ghana continue today because the Northern ethnic groups, who are

disproportionately powerless, politically and economically, are aggrieved and the Southern

ethnic groups, who are politically and economically powerful, are fearful of each other and are

therefore constantly manoeuvring to control the central government of Ghana and as a result are

totally oblivious of the political imperative to share political power and economic wealth with

the Northern ethnic groups through the creation of a meaningful political structure and

governance system. The prevailing political manoeuvring within political parties and within

government are clearly indicative of the classical African politics of ethnic aggrandizements

which, African history has done well to tell us, is always pursued at the expense of national

unity. In the pursuit of ethnic aggrandizement through diabolical ethnic scramble for power,

some regions are disregarded in the distribution of social and economic amenities.

Until 2008, the flagbearer chosen to lead the NPP has always been an Ashanti, in 1992 it

was Professor Adu Buahen, and in 1996, 2000 and 2004 it was J.J. Kufuor. However in 2008,

there was stiff competition between an Ashanti, Alan Kyerematen and an Akim, Akuffo- Adoo,

and the Akyem, Akuffo- Addo, won the position as the flag bearer for the party. Although the

NPP has tried to shake off the notion that they are an Akan party in their election campaigns, the

nation that they are deeply rooted in an Akan tradition is manifest in the people that always come

up to contest to be a flag bearer (Gyamfuaa and Awua-kyerematem, 2011: 23-24). The NDC’s

margin of victory in the 2008 presidential election was extremely small, and the electoral

process, which lasted a month and involved three separate votes, was characterized by an

extremely high level of tension in the country. Several incidents in the 2008 elections did test the

independence and strength of the Electoral Commission during the vote tallying. The NDC

claimed malpractices were committed by the NPP in some constituencies in Ashanti Region

because voter turnout statistics were abnormally high, and the NPP accused the NDC of

intimidation and violence against NPP supporters and polling agents in the Volta Region

(Whitfield, 2009: 638).

The situation is almost the same for Nigeria. Elections in Nigeria seem to provide

opportunities to express group/ethnic sentiments and interests. . The 2003 general election results

released by the Independent National Electoral Commission show that the People Democratic

Party

The 2007 general elections were the third such elections to be held since the transition from

military to civilian rule in 1999 and were widely considered to be a crucial test of the

commitment of the Nigerian authorities to strengthening democracy. For the first time since

independence, the elections saw power transferred from one civilian President to another.

Following the problematic conduct of the 2003 elections, the 2007 elections provided an

opportunity to strengthen public confidence in the electoral and wider democratic process.

According to the results announced by INEC by the 7th May 2007, the Peoples Democratic Party

(PDP) won 70 per cent of the presidential election vote, All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) got

19 per cent of the presidential election vote, AC received 7 per cent of the presidential election

vote. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) did not released detailed states

results for the 2007 Presidential election making it difficult for accurate analysis of voting

behaviour. The People Democratic Party presidential candidate Umaru Musa Yar’Adua won the

election with 69.96% of votes in has been regarded as one of Nigerian most controversial

elections. Another notable difference in the 2007 general election is that the major political

parties, perhaps as an attempt to fulfil zoning the presidential seat to the north, systematically

made sure, through their parties primaries, that their presidential flag bearers are from the

northern part of Nigeria. For example, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua of the Peoples Democratic Party,

Atiku Abubakar of the Action Congress, and Muhammadu Buhari of the All Nigerian Peoples

Party were all from the northern part of Nigeria. It is alleged that the need to actualise this

northern dream of the presidential seat account largely for the massive rigging of the 2007

presidential election.

Ethnic and partisan tensions heighten around elections due to the perceived contest for access to

the state apparatus and scarce resources, not just between elites, but between ordinary citizens as well

who have been mobilized for this particular cause to help their faction succeed. Keefer argues in his

paper that political leaders gain political support based on their ability to convince their co-ethnics that

they will go after their requests and concerns at the expense of other ethnic groups. This promise cannot

be made to a limited section of the co- ethnics, but a substantial amount must be made to believe that the

promise made by the politician will reach all of them. Therefore, it becomes easier for the co- ethnic to

support the politician in their ethnic group in hope of receiving the benefits promised. Ethnicity is a

critical, often overriding factor, in the choice of a political party. The correlation of ethnicity and

party is strong in many countries and usually the impact of ethnic status on voting is much more

straightforward than that of socio-economic status (Alabi, 2007: 7).

This study has the following finding:

1 .That people are more likely to form partisan identities with co- ethnic groups than nothing at all.

African voters in clientelistic societies are aware of the fact that if political leaders of a particular party

express disaffection towards their ethnic groups, then they do not expect to receive anything in terms of

resource allocation.

2. Clientelistic promises made by political leaders cause ethnic clustering and the division of

society along ethnic lines.

3. People tend to align themselves with a group that will provide them a stable means of access

to resources that are beneficial to them.

4. In the Nigeria 2003 and Ghana 2008 elections, Ghanaians and Nigerians voted for co-ethnic and not necessary party label

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