ethiopia: are the islamists coming?

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2070405

Ethiopia: Are the Islamists Coming?

Alemayehu Fentaw - TRANSCEND Media Service

Ethiopia has been swept by Islamic protests in opposition to what the Muslimcommunity calls government-sponsored propagational activities of the little-knownIslamic sect known as Al-Ahbash throughout the country and the suspension of theAddis Ababa-based Awaliya Islamic Institute on alleged grounds of promoting Salafismor Wahhabism. A large number of protesters have been detained and some have beenmet with deadly force by security forces. The Security forces have reportedly killedfour and injured ten Muslims during a confrontation after Friday prayers in Assassatown.[1]

The protesters also accuse the Government of Ethiopia of hijacking the Islamic AffairsSupreme Council, or the Majlis. For the protesters, the Majlis has been a puppet of thegovernment with striking parallels to the Holy Synod and Patriarch of the EthiopianOrthodox Church, which proved to be totally subservient. They are demanding toreplace the current members of the Majlis by their true representatives through freeand fair elections. They are also demanding that the elections should be held in thecity's mosques rather than in the Kebeles, the lower level local government structure,as suggested by the Government.[2]

Islam in Ethiopia

The historical trajectory of Islam in Ethiopia is interesting. For one thing, Islam has aremarkably long history and as such has co-existed with Christianity for much of thecountry’s history. For another, people converted and reconverted to Islam with muchease in much of Ethiopia for as long as Islam’s history. Islam came to Ethiopia in theyear 615 in virtue of the first Hijra with the arrival of the Suhaba, who were at risk ofpersecution by the Quraysh, on Ethiopian soil following the advice of ProphetMuhammed who instructed them to seek asylum in the Kingdom of Aksum, where a“righteous king would give them protection.”[3] The co-existence and interminglinghas remarkably contributed to the culture of inter-faith tolerance among Muslims,Christians, and Jews, which is absent in other parts of the world.

As one of the oldest recipients of Islam, Ethiopia has a significant Muslim community.Although there is a general culture of inter-faith tolerance, the relation between Stateand Islam had been tenuous. Historically, the Muslim community was disfranchised,particularly in the Christian highlands, as it was excluded from the traditionalland-holding system. The Solomonoid emperors considering themselves aslord-protectors of the monophysite faith, i.e., Orthodox Christianity, ignominiously

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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2070405



marginalized the Muslim community, thereby relegating them to second-classcitizenship.

Despite for a few instances of the rise of Islamic militancy in the 14th, 15th and 16thcenturies led by Ahmad Badlay, Sabradin, and Ahmed Gran, there has been a longtradition of Islam/Christian tolerance and mutual co-existence for much of thecountry’s history. In connection with the Yifat under Sabradin, Harold G. Marcuswrites, “By the late 1320s, exploiting a decade of royal neglect, Sabradin of Yifatconfidently organized a united Muslim front composed of peoples dissatisfied withChristian domination and tired of paying heavy taxes. In 1332, Sabradin declared aholy war against the Solomonic state, invaded its territory, destroyed churches, andforced conversions to Islam.”[4]

The response organized by Amda Siyon to the jihad declared by Sabradin of Yifat wasan all-out war. In the words of Marcus:

Calling up troops from all over his empire, Amda Siyon led a bloody campaign againstYifat and its allies. He even took the battle to the lowlands, where imperial armiesrarely went, and he lost many soldiers to desertion, disease, and thirst. Still, the kingwent on, determined once and for all to end the Muslim threat and to replace localgovernments with imperial officials. He led his forces brilliantly, feinting here, probingthere, attacking the weakest units in the Muslim federation, and never permitting hisenemy to counter in a mass attack. Pushing his army to the limits of its strength, heeven outmaneuvered an enemy that contained units of highly mobile, if fractious,nomads. It was a magisterial effort by a charismatic and resourceful man who also hadmastered and united an empire around him. His great victory carried the frontier ofChristian power into the Awash valley and beyond.[5]

The next serious Islamic threat to the Christian Kingdom was posed by Ahmad Badlayof Adal. According to Harold Marcus, “The Adal became particularly worrisome in thelate 1430s under Ahmad Badlay, an ambitious and ardent leader who exemplified theincreasingly militant nature of Ethiopian Islam. Between 1443 and 1445, he directedharsh, if intermittent, campaigns in Ethiopia's largely Muslim-inhabited provincesbefore falling in battle in Dawaro.” [6]

Yet the most serious Islamic threat was not to come until the rise of Ahmad Gran inrespect of whom Marcus writes, “Adal's savior was to be Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi




(1506-1543), known to the Ethiopians as Ahmad “Gran” (the “left-handed”). Hesoldiered for Sultan Jared Abun of Adal (r. ca. 1522-1525), who during his few years ofpower sought to impose Islamic puritanism on his fractious people. The righteous roadappealed to the pious Ahmad, who was raised by his devout kin in Jeldesa, one of themajor oases along the trading route to Zeila. Although his Islam was the most rigorousand doctrinaire, deeply influenced by the discipline of the desert, it was tempered byan understanding of commerce.”[7]

In addition, it is important to note that forced conversion was brought to bear uponthe Muslim community. The post Zemene-Mesafint (Era of Princes) period saw thesame tendency, as the empire -building process started off by Emperor Tewodros.Boru Meda Council is a case in point for which Emperor Yohannes IV had been hailedas a 'saint-hero'. According to Donald Levine, “The spread of Christianity and Islamestablished other kinds of ties. Although conversions were sometimes secured byforce, notably in the reigns of Zera Ya’iqob in the 1450s and Yohannes IV in the 1870sand during the jihad of the 1530s, more typically they came about peacefully, throughchannels opened up by traders and by the need for diplomatic alliances.”[8]Commenting on the Christian/Islam relations, Levine writes, “Relations between thetwo groups of religionists have often been antagonistic, particularly since the sixteenthcentury, but there have been numerous kinds of accommodation between them. Sinceboth Islam and Christianity in Ethiopia have been highly syncretistic, moreover theirfollowers have not found it impossible to join in common religious observances.”[9]The empire-building process called not just for the reconciliation of the prevalentdoctrinal differences within the established Orthodox Christian church, but also forthe unification of faith by stamping Islam out of the face of the Christianempire.[10]Nevertheless, while Emperor Menelik II, following his campaign to Harar,called upon both Muslims and Christians to coexist peacefully, Emperor Haile Selassierecognized Sharia courts.

The Ethiopian Muslim community belongs to Sunni Islam mixed with Sufi tradition,following one of the three Islamic Schools of Jurisprudence (Madh’habs). To wit: (1)the Shafi, (2) Hanafi; and (3) Maliki.[11] Little is known about the 4th Sunni IslamicSchool of Jurisprudence, namely the Hanbali, in Ethiopia to date. The long de factoexistence of Shaira courts in Ethiopia has been accorded legal recognition in 1942with promulgation of the Proclamation for the Establishment of Kadis’ Courts. Thisproclamation legitimized the competence of Islamic courts in matters relating tomarriage, divorce, gifts, succession and will. It provides that "any question regarding




marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship of minors and family relationshipprovided that the marriage to which the question relates was concluded in accordancewith Mohammedan law or when the parties are all Mohammedans shall fall under thejurisdiction of the Shari’a courts." It further stipulates that the government willappoint the judges including the chief Kadi who was invested with a number ofprerogatives ranging from working-out procedures and rendering final decisions in hisappellate jurisdiction to attachment and execution. In 1944, the Kadis and NaibaCouncils Proclamation No. 62/1944 was promulgated, repealing the earlierproclamation. Under the new proclamation, Shari'a courts were re-established and anew set of courts were introduced. Pursuant to this proclamation, there are three setsof Islamic courts: (1) the Naiba Council; (2) Courts of the Kadis’ Council, and (3) theCourts of Shariat.[12]

However, in 1960 a Western-based Civil code was enacted which purports to repealIslamic law.[13] Despite the sweeping thrust of the repeal provision, Shari'a courtsremain intact and kept on functioning and applying their law independent of theregular state court structure. "The Code" Abdulmalik writes, "remained a purelytheoretical work devoid of real value in respect to those matters governed by theSharia rules despite the fact that those matters were supposed to be ruled by the civilcode which automatically would have brought the abrogation of the Sharia'a rules byvirute of Art. 3347 (1)"[14]

Nevertheless, since 1995, the new Ethiopian Constitution has extended recognition tothe independent validity of Islamic law and the competence of Islamic courts toadjudicate cases concerning personal and family law. In order to execute thisconstitutional provision the House of Peoples' Representatives has enactedproclamation No. 188/1999.

Are the Islamists Coming?

So what are the root-causes of the current Islamic upheavals in Ethiopia? Whataccounts for this phenomenon? Are the Islamists coming? If we are going to fullyaccount for this phenomenon, I believe we need to have a full grasp of both theinternal and international factors at play, but that cannot be done within the scope ofsuch a brief paper as this. Given the limitations, what I can do is offer anall-too-sketchy outline of the possible explanations from the viewpoint of domestic aswell as international politics.




In domestic politics, the introduction of ethnic federalism has resulted in what I mightcall, to borrow an expression from Milan Kundera, 'the unbearable lightness of being'Ethiopian. Therefore, the inevitable undesired consequence of theconstitutional enshrinement of Identity Politics, which extended recognition to ethnicand religious identities in that country rooted in historical interpretations about themarginalisation of non-Amharas and non-Christians (esp. Muslims) by the state, gaverise to the radicalization of particularistic identities such as being Oromo and Muslimto the detriment of universalistic identities like being Ethiopian. In Economics there’san apt term for this, i.e., spillover effect. The Islamic revivalism of the past twodecades is nothing but the logical outcome of the rise of identity politics in the politicallandscape, but the radicalization is the spillover effect. According to Jon Abbink, “The'quest for identity' is an expression that can be applied to the efforts of EthiopianMuslims to be recognized, to organize, and to raise their position in the countrytowards parity with the Christians”[15]

In international affairs, the US war on terror, and esp. Ethiopia's position as a keypartner in the war on terror, coupled with its legitimate national security concernsvis-a-vis Al-Shabab in Somalia, has placed Ethiopia not only in the unenviable positionof desiring to keep extremist elements at bay abroad (across its internationalfrontiers), but also of countering the growing influence of Wahabism at home. Mostrecently, fear that the Islamists are coming has spread widely due to the rise ofIslamist groups in the wake of the Arab Spring, thereby creating a further opportunityfor regional leaders such as Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia to play their role in keepingIslamic fundamentalism in check. However, what complicates such efforts at analysesis that given Meles Zenawi's squalid human rights track record, it is hard to rule outthe possibility that he might be capitalizing on his international role and therebyengaging in diversionary tactics from domestic politics, and hence garner Americansupport that he could not otherwise achieve.

Having said that, it has to be noted that different governmental actors have beenengaged in misguided efforts to counter the growing Wahabi influence in Ethiopia. Thefirst actor is the Government of Ethiopia (GoE). GoE through, more particularly, itsMinistry of Federal Affairs, in joint cooperation with the Islamic Affairs SupremeCouncil or Majlis, has launched, since July 2011, nation-wide trainings and workshopson peace and religious tolerance targeting the Muslim community. The first trainingwas delivered on the campus of Haramaya University. The Ministry of the Federal




Affairs is said to have allocated more than 11,000,000 Ethiopian Birr or 800, 000 USD)for the program. The trainers came from the HQs of the Al-Ahbash in Beirut. Worst ofall, the Ministry of Federal Affairs' continued public engagement in promotingAl-Ahbash at the expense of the traditional sects of the Sunni Islam prevalent inEthiopia such as Hannafi and Maliki, in clear contravention of the constitutionalprinciple of secularism, which turned out to be unacceptable to the Muslimcommunity, will be seen as an encroachment.

The involvement of the Ministry of Federal Affairs as well as the Regional StateGovernments has done harm. Both USG and GoE have failed to comply with the ‘DoNo Harm’ principle of conflict prevention and resolution. As a result, the harm hasalready been done. The principle of ‘Do No Harm’ imposes minimum obligations on allactors, including donors, not to do harm during intervention in situations of fragilityand conflicts. Donors must ensure that they “do no harm” and consider both theintended and unintended consequences of their interventions. Therefore, it would bethe responsibility of the governments of both the US and Ethiopia to undo the harmalready done.

Another source of interference is the Government of the United States (USG) if thediplomatic cables that came out of the US embassy in Addis Ababa ending up inwikileaks are credible enough to deserve our attention. Recent wikileaked cables havemade the security concerns crystal-clear and confirmed ongoing public diplomacy aswell as cultural programming efforts sponsored by Embassy Addis Ababa. Threewikileaked diplomatic cables, created on 2009-07-15, and released, on 2011-08-30,originating from Embassy Addis Ababa, entitled, Growing Wahabi Influence in Ethiopia– Amhara Region and the "Jama Negus Mosque", Wahabism in Ethiopia as "CulturalImperialism" and Countering Wahabi Influence in Ethiopia Through CulturalProgramming discuss Wahabism at length.

According to the first cable, “The newly appointed Council [Majlis] is decidedlyanti-Wahabi and speaks openly of their concern about Wahabi missionaries and theirdestabilizing influence in Ethiopia.”[16] The same cable also elucidates on the causesof intra-Muslim conflicts in the following terms, “Conflicts within the Muslimcommunity have also arisen over control of mosques, which imams should be allowedto preach, and over control of Islamic education. The IASC [Majlis] wants to build anEthiopian Muslim theological school so that young Ethiopian men will not have to go tothe Middle East to study in preparation for becoming Imams, as they must now. These




young men are increasingly studying in Saudi Arabia due to the generous scholarshipsand subsidies available there, and when they return to Ethiopia to take up their postsin new Saudi-funded mosques, they continue to receive subsidies from Saudi Arabia orIslamic NGOs. Unfortunately, the Sufi-dominated Muslim community in Ethiopia doesnot have sufficient funds to start their own theological school, nor can they counterthe financial advantage Wahabis have in Ethiopia.”[17] It is also interesting to notethat the same cable attempts to answer the question of why the US should care aboutWahabism in Ethiopia. Elaborating on this question, it takes cognizance of theprevalence of a culture of inter-faith tolerance among the three Abrahamic religions ofthe country, namely Islam, Christianity, and Judaism as a result of mutual co-existenceand the tradition of tolerance in Sufism. The cable claims, however, that “With theadvent of Wahabism in Ethiopia, however, this delicate balance is in danger of beingupset.”[18] It goes on to claim that “Conflicts have begun first within the Muslimcommunity, but have also begun to spread out to include Christian groups as Wahabisseek to assert themselves on college campuses and in smaller towns outside thecapital. The threat of inter-communal conflict in Ethiopia between Muslims andChristians, as well as between Muslims themselves, can only give a foothold andoperating space to Salafist and extremist groups that might seek to exploit thesituation.”[19] The cable asserts that “In a shift from past practice, the IASC is nowcompletely purged of Wahabi members. …the Council members acknowledged that theCouncil is now all Sufi and in their public statements they repeatedly make referenceto Ethiopia’s tradition of religious tolerance and co-existence with the Christiancommunities. As the Ethiopian government appoints the members of the IslamicCouncil, it is clear that the GoE shares this concern about growing Wahabi influenceand is supporting moderate Muslim leaders in trying to counter that influence.”[20]

At the risk of stating the obvious, it has to be emphasized that it is the EthiopianGovernment that has the power to appoint members of the Islamic Council or Majlisthat expelled those members whom it thinks were Wahabis. And nowhere is USsecurity interests in the Horn of Africa made clearer than in the second cable, in whichEmbassy Addis Ababa admits, “Ethiopia’s delicate Muslim/Christian balance andhistoric attitudes between the faith communities regarding tolerance and mutualrespect are being challenged, thereby undermining U.S. interests in the region.”[21]Besides, what can be gathered from the forgoing is the concurrence between USG andGFDRE on the growing Wahabi influence in Ethiopia as not only a national andregional security threat, but also with repercussions to Pax Americana and the need tocounter it. And the first cable concludes “Post believes there are ways to counter this




growing influence through aggressive cultural programming, as will be outlined in thesecond and third parts of this series.” But, what does this “aggressive culturalprogramming” consist in?

The third cable describes the said cultural programming as three-pronged, namely:places, objects, and traditions as they relate to indigenous Muslim communities. Thestrategy centering on conserving Islamic places, objects, and restoring Ethiopia’sunique Islamic traditions is manifested through preserving its shrines, literature, andrituals as well as providing materials written by Muslim authors that support a moreorthodox interpretation of Islam in local languages. This strategy of countering Wahabiinfluence through cultural programming has been done through such grants andprograms as the Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation (AFCP) grant to restorethe Sheikh Hussein Shrine in Bale, the Jama Negus Mosque in Wello, the TeferiMekonnen Palace in Harar, and the Muhammad Ali House in Addis Ababa; PublicAffairs Section (PAS) grant to establish an ‘Islamic Manuscript Preservation Center’ atthe Teferi Mekonnen Palace in Harar, to the Institute of Ethiopian studies (IES) topurchase several Ethiopian Orthodox icons and Islamic manuscripts that were indanger of leaving the country, to the American Friends of the IES to pay for materialsthat will be used for the storage and preservation of Islamic manuscripts in AddisAbaba and for teaching Ethiopian experts how to process them, to a U.S. FulbrightScholar to do an assessment of over 1,000 Islamic manuscripts in Harar and develop awork plan for establishing the Center there; and a PAS grant to send a group of threeHarari experts to the Foxfire Fund in Mountain View, Georgia, to learnabout developing an oral history program for high school students, and finallyproviding two books written by a Muslim-American scholar (‘The Place of Tolerance inIslam’ and ‘The Great Theft,’ both by Khaled Abou el-Fadl) in the local languages ofAmharic, Oromifa, and Somali.[22]

Two earlier wikileaked cables, created on 2008-11-26, and released on 2011-08-26,confirm that the Embassy’s efforts at having Khalid Abou el-Fadl’s books entitled, ‘ThePlace of Tolerance in Islam’ and ‘The Great Theft’, translated into Amharic andOromiffa by Ethiopian Islamic scholars fell through, “because no Muslim translator inEthiopia is willing to do it fearing Wahabi pressure.” Strange enough, however, theOromiya Bureau of Culture offered the services of his office to translate and distributeboth these books.[23]

Recall also that recently wikileaked diplomatic cables expose how Ethiopian security




forces planted 3 bombs that went off in Addis Ababa on September 16, 2006 and thenblamed Eritrea and the Oromo Liberation Front for the blasts in a case that raisesserious questions about the claims made about the abortive terrorist plot targeting theAfrican Union summit to be held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.[24] By extension, it is notas yet clear about the Khawarij killings that took place in Jimma a few years back.Even if conflicts have arisen between the Wahabis and the Sufis, it has only been verymuch localized. What I find to be worrisome is the government’s tendency to blow thethreat out of proportions. Just a few years back, the ‘T’ word was ‘Khawarij’, now it isreplaced by ‘Wahabi’ and ‘Salafi’. It is all the more perplexing to me that in a countrysuch as Ethiopia where the Muslim population is roughly equal with Christians andthere isn’t any advocacy for forming an Islamic political party, let alone an existingorganized Islamic party vying for public office, how demands for autonomy in religiousaffairs and governmental non-interference can be construed as a political movement.The declared disavowal of the Muslim community of violence and adherence tonon-violent means in its protests so far demonstrate that fear of Islamic threats toEthiopia is only a figment of Meles Zenawi’s imagination.

In view of the foregoing and its past practice, it seems to me that most of theallegations made by the Government of Ethiopia don't hold up to scrutiny. Forinstance, cable news came out of Addis Ababa regarding the expulsion of two Arabs bythe AP correspondent and has appeared in many media outlets including WashingtonPost. But nobody seemed to question its accuracy and truthfulness. The news goes onlike this "Ethiopia's government has expelled two Arabs who flew in from the MiddleEast after the pair went to a mosque and tried to incite violence."[25] Neither thenames nor the nationalities of these two Arabs were disclosed in the statement madeby the Government. How can a government that has incarcerated two Swedishjournalists on trumped up charges of terrorism let two Arabs go free while accusingthem of inciting violence or has the criminal law changed in an overnight? Would therebe any reason why they would not be arrested and tried in a court of law if the chargeswere true? No reason has been offered so far. So how do we know whether the saidArabs have not just been ordinary tourists?

This is not to deny the legitimacy of the international and domestic security concernsof the two nations, namely the US and Ethiopia, but to question the legitimacy andefficacy of the means used to achieve a legitimate end. If Washington is implicated inEthiopia’s incursion into Somalia, it is not without good reason. As Terrence Lyons hasrightly observed:




Washington’s support for Ethiopia in the recent past has been justified in part byAddis Ababa’s contributions in the global war on terrorism. While Ethiopia has playeda supportive role, its policies and actions toward Islamist movements such asal-Itihaad are driven by its own national interests and are not undertaken on behalf ofthe United States. If Ethiopia sends its forces into Somalia, it may drag Washingtoninto a conflict that will be framed in many parts of the Muslim world as anotherU.S.-sponsored attack on Islam. Furthermore, the close association of the UnitedStates and Ethiopia complicates relationships between Washington and other regionalactors, notably Eritrea and a range of Somali groups.[26]

The same holds true of the current Islamic upheavals in Ethiopia. Washington has toput Addis Ababa’s problems in the proper context of the wider problem of the rise ofauthoritarianism in domestic politics. Ethiopian Muslims have, for much of theircountry’s history, been peaceful and hence it’d be only be irresponsible to needlesslyengage in activities that disturb the equilibrium of co-existence and tolerancemaintained between Muslims and Christians in that country.

The only way to go about the ongoing problem is for Addis Ababa to take its hands offIslamic affairs and leave it to the Muslim community and faith-basednon-governmental organizations to reach out to the Muslim community. This again isnot to gainsay the right of The Association of Islamic Philanthropic Projects (Jam'iyyatal-Mashari' al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya) or Al Ahbash or whatever Islamic sect to operatein Ethiopia provided that it respects the laws of the land. The solution to the problemcreated by the securitization of Islam and intra-Islamic relations should be nothing butde-securitization of Islam and intra-Islamic relations, not the privileging of one Islamicsect over another and should start out with de-securitization. Except for the fewhistorical instances from the country’s remote past mentioned above, Ethiopia hasnever been a breeding-ground for Sayyed Qutb- or Al Zawahiri-styled Islamism andthere’s little indication that it will ever be, given that the Muslim community continuesto enjoy and exercise its freedom of worship without any interference.

Whatever else has been done by Addis Ababa will provide nothing but a recipe forfuture conflicts. The strategy deployed will most likely backfire, thereby sowing theseeds of political Islam that it seeks to keep at bay. It is imperative to bear in mindthat it is the marginalization and suppression of Muslims by the Ethiopian ChristianState in the past that bred extremism. The current interference by the secular tyrant




in the internal affairs of the Muslim community won’t help if not to exacerbate thesituation. As Mustafa Akyol says, even “Islamists will become only more moderatewhen they are not oppressed, and only more pragmatic as they face the responsibilityof governing.”[27]NOTES:

[1] Aaron Maasho, Ethiopian Muslims protest government 'interference', Reuters, May11, 2012, Addis Ababa,http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE84A00W20120511?sp=true

[2] Peter Heinlein, Ethiopian Government, Muslims Clash about Ideology, Voice ofAmerica, May 21, 2012, http://www.voanews.com/articleprintview/837582.html

[3] J. Spencer Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, Oxford University Press (1952), p. 44.

[4] Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia. Berkeley: University of California Press,1994. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft109nb00g/, P .21

[5] Id, P. 22

[6] Id, p. 26




[7] Id, p. 31

[8] Donald N. Levine, Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution a Multiethnic Society (2000),2nd ed, Chicago and London: the University of Chicago Press, 43-44

[9] Id, 44

[10] Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia: 1855-1974 2nd ed.(Addis Ababa:Addis Ababa University Press,2001), p.7

[11] J. Spencer Trimingham’s pathbreaking survey, Islam in Ethiopia, 1952, OxfordUniversity Press

[12] Abdul Wasie Yusuf, "Sharia Courts in Ethiopia: Their Status, Organization andFunctions" (1971) (Unpublished Snr. Thesis on file at Addis Ababa University LawLibrary), p. 21-29; for a discussion of the operation and competence of Sharia Courtsin present-day Ethiopia, see my book, Legal Pluralism in Contemporary Ethiopia: ACritical Introduction, 2010, LAP, Saarbrucken, Germany.




[13] The Civil Code of Ethiopia, Article 3347 (1), 1960.

[14] Abdulmalik Abubeker, "Effects of Divorce in the Civil Code and the Sheria [Sic]Law" (1990) (Unpublished Snr. Thesis on file at Addis Ababa University Law Library),p. 7.

[15] Jon Abbink, An historical-anthropological approach to Islam in Ethiopia: issues ofidentity and politics, Journal of African Cultural Studies, Volume 11, Number 2,December 1998, pp. 109-124, p. 110

[16] Growing Wahabi Influence in Ethiopia – Amhara Region and the "Jama NegusMosque", http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09ADDISABABA1672.html

[17] Id

[18] Id




[19] Id

[20] Id

[21] Wahabism in Ethiopia as "Cultural Imperialism",http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09ADDISABABA1674.html

[22] Countering Wahabi Influence in Ethiopia Through Cultural Programming,http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09ADDISABABA1675.html

[23] Growing Wahabi Influence in Ethiopia Tests the Limits of Tolerance,http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=08ADDISABABA3230; A Sufi and aWahabi Sit Down to Lunch…,http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=07ADDISABABA2781

[24] Ethiopia: Recent Bombings Blamed on Oromos Possibly the Work of GOE,http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06ADDISABABA2708.html#




[25] Ethiopia expels 2 Arabs amid tension with Muslim community; gov’t warns groupdeclared jihad, Washington Post, May 5, 2012,http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/ethiopia-expels-2-arabs-amid-tension-with-muslim-community-govt-warns-group-declared-jihad/2012/05/05/gIQA5gxf3T_story.html

[26] Terrence Lyons, Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: US Policy TowardEthiopia and Eritrea, The Center for Preventive Action, CSR No. 21, Council onForeign Relations, December 2006, p. 29

[27] Mustafa Akyol, Can Islamists Be Liberals? The New York Times, Op-Ed, May 14,2012, A 21

______________________

Alemayehu Fentaw is an Ethiopian-born Horn of Africa Analyst based in the US. He iscurrently a Fellow of the Institute for International Education and an At-Risk-Scholarwith SAR, New York University.

This work is licensed under a CC BY-NC 3.0 United States License.


ethiopia: are the islamists coming?

Documents

teferi mekonnen palace

jama negus mosque

growing wahabi influence

transcend media service

current islamic upheavals

countering wahabi influence

oxford university press

embassy addis ababa