ethics third set

ATTY. ALIMURUNG DIZON | LORESCA | LUMINARIAS | SANTOS, K. | SY | TY | VILCHES 2-D || Ateneo Law School

1 Ad astra per alia fideles

Endaya vs. Oca (09/03/2003) Ponent: Tinga

D: Much is demanded from those who engage in the practice of law because they have a duty not only to their clients, but also to the court, to

the bar, and to the public. The lawyers diligence and dedication to his work and profession is not only to promote the interest of his client, it is

likewise to help attain the ends of justice by contributing to the proper and speedy administration of cases, bring prestige to the bar and maintain

respect to the legal profession Facts:

1. On November 7, 1991, a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed with the MCTC of Taysan, Batangas by Apolonia H. Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez, Santiago Hernandez and Dominador Hernandez against complainant and his spouse Patrosenia Endaya.

2. On December 13, 1991, the complainant and his wife as defendants in the case filed their answer which was prepared by a certain Mr. Isaias Ramirez. A preliminary conference was conducted which complainant and his wife attended without counsel.

3. During the conference, complainant categorically admitted that plaintiffs were the declared owners for taxation purposes of the land involved in the case.

4. Endaya sought the services of the Public Attorney’s Office in Batangas City and Oca was assigned to handle the case for the complainant and his wife.

5. Oca appeared as counsel for complainant and his spouse. He moved for the amendment of the answer previously filed by complainant and his wife but his motion was denied.

6. Thereafter, the court, presided by Acting Trial Court Judge Teodoro M. Baral, ordered the parties to submit their affidavits and position papers within ten days from receipt of the order. The court also decreed that thirty days after receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or upon expiration of the period for filing the same, judgment shall be rendered on the case.

7. Respondent failed to submit the required affidavits and position paper

8. The court dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer principally on the ground that the plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-interest.

9. Endaya received a copy of the Decision on October 7, 1992. Two days later, he confronted Oca with the adverse decision but the latter denied receipt of a copy thereof. Upon inquiry with the Branch Clerk of Court, he found out that Oca received his copy back on September 14, 1992.

10. Having lost the unlawful detainer case, on January 12, 1993 complainant filed the present administrative complaint against the respondent for professional delinquency consisting of his failure to file the required pleadings in behalf of the complainant and his spouse. Complainant contends that due to respondent’s inaction he lost the opportunity to present his cause and ultimately the case itself.

11. The Office of the Bar Confidant found respondent negligent in handling the case of complainant and his wife and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for one month. However, the Bar Confidant did not find complainant entirely faultless for misrepresenting that he could prove his claim through supporting documents, respondent was made to believe that he had a strong leg to stand on.

12. The IBP also concurred with the findings of the Bar Confidant. Issue:

1. WON Oca violated the lawyer’s oath and did not observe due diligence in performing his duties?

Held and Ratio:

1. Yes, the Court is convinced that respondent violated the lawyer’s oath not only once but a number of times in regard to the handling of his clients cause. The repeated violations also involve defilement of several Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The lawyer’s oath embodies the fundamental principles that guide every member of the legal fraternity. From it springs the lawyer’s duties and responsibilities that any infringement thereof can cause his disbarment, suspension or other disciplinary action. Found in the oath is the duty of a lawyer to protect and safeguard the interest of his client. Specifically, it requires a lawyer to conduct himself to the best



of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.

Respondent did not submit the affidavits and position paper when required by the MCTC. With his resolution not to file the pleadings already firmed up, he did not bother to inform the MCTC of his resolution in mockery of the authority of the court. His stubbornness continued at the RTC, for despite an order to file an appeal memorandum, respondent did not file any. Neither did he manifest before the court that he would no longer file the pleading, thus further delaying the proceedings. He had no misgivings about his deviant behavior, for despite receipt of a copy of the adverse decision by the RTC he opted not to inform his clients accordingly. Worse, he denied knowledge of the decision when confronted by the complainant about it.

Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. In this case, evidence abound that respondent failed to demonstrate the required diligence in handling the case of complainant and his spouse. After appearing at the second preliminary conference before the MCTC, respondent had not been heard of again until he commented on the complaint in this case. Without disputing this fact, respondent reasons out that his appearance at the conference was for the sole purpose of obtaining leave of court to file an amended answer and that when he failed to obtain it because of complainants fault he asked the court that he be relieved as counsel. The explanation has undertones of dishonesty for complainant had engaged respondent for the entire case and not for just one incident. The alternative conclusion is that respondent did not know his procedure for under the Rules on Summary Procedure the amended answer is a prohibited pleading. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Respondent’s failure to file the affidavits and position paper at the MCTC did not actually prejudice his clients, for the court nevertheless rendered a decision favorable to them. However, the failure is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.

It was respondent’s failure to file appeal memorandum before the RTC which made complainant and his wife suffer as it resulted in their loss of the case. As found by the Office of the Bar Confidant, in not filing the appeal memorandum respondent denied complainant and his spouse the chance of putting up a fair fight in the dispute. Canon 19 prescribes that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. He should exert all efforts to avail of the remedies allowed under the law. Respondent did not do so, thereby even putting to naught the advantage which his clients apparently gained by prevailing at the MCTC level. Verily, respondent did not even bother to put up a fight for his clients. Clearly, his conduct fell short of what Canon 19 requires and breached the trust reposed in him by his clients. Canon 17 provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. When complainant received the RTC decision, he talked to respondent about it. However, respondent denied knowledge of the decision despite his receipt thereof. Obviously, he tried to evade responsibility for his negligence. In doing so, respondent was untruthful to complainant and effectively betrayed the trust placed in him by the latter. Canon 6 of the Code provides that the canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Respondent should have been more judicious in the performance of his professional obligations. As we held in Vitriola v. Dasig lawyers in the government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Furthermore, a lawyer from the government is not exempt from observing the degree of diligence required in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Jardin v. Villar, Jr. (8/28/2003)

D: Canon 18- A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence



18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable

Facts:

1. Redentor S. Jardin, plaintiff in a civil case, engaged the services of respondent Atty. Deogracias Villar, Jr to represent him. The case went its course, but later despite several extensions of time given by the trial court, the respondent failed to file his formal offer of exhibits

2. Thus, RTC dismissed the case. This dismissal prompted Jardin to file a verified affidavit-complaint for the disbarment of respondent for the latter’s failure to formally offer the documentary exhibits which failure resulted in the dismissal of the case

3. In a Resolution, the court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him. However, respondent failed to file his comment despite 2 extensions of time granted to him. Thus SC dispensed with the filing of respondent’s comment and referred the case to IBP

4. IBP Commissioner found respondent liable for negligence and recommended his suspension from practice of law for 6 months.

Issue: WON respondent is negligent and should be suspended from practice of law Held: Yes Ratio:

1. Respondent disregarded the resolution of SC directing him to file his comment on the complaint. He exhibited similar attitude in failing to file his answer when required by IBP. This repeated conduct belies impudence and lack of respect for the authority of the court

2. Respondent has been languid in the performance of his duties as his counsel for complainant and has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every member of the bar: Canon 18- A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence

3. 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable

4. It is indeed dismaying to note the respondent’s patent violation of his duty as a lawyer. He committed serious transgression when he failed to exert his utmost learning and ability to give entire devotion to his client’s cause

5. His client had relied on him to file the formal offer of exhibits among other things. But he failed him. Resulting as it did in the dismissal of the case, his failure constitutes inexcusable default

6. Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

7. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients requires in attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free

8. Certainly, a member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical fashion. A lawyer’s lethargy from the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and unethical

Martinez v. Banogon (4/30/1963)

D: Generally speaking, the written contract between the lawyer and client is what binds them as to the amount of the Attorney’s fees. To render such unreasonable, jurisprudence states eight guiding principles that should be

checked first

Facts: 1. Through a contract for professional services, Atty. Martinez appeared

as counsel for the probate will of Somoza and later for the administration of the estate left by him

2. The amount of his compensation was stated in the contract (P800) 3. Later, the case was not closed and terminated as expected and up to

the filing of Atty. Martinez’s claim for Attorney’s fees, he already received P1320 as compensation for the services he rendered

4. In the case for administration of the estate, Atty. Martinez filed a petition stating that the reasonable value of all the services rendered by him up to the termination of the case is P6,000 and that the amount already paid to him is not a reasonable compensation

Issue: WON the fees for Atty. Martinez were reasonable Held: Yes Ratio:

1. As a general rule, a written contract for professional services controls the amount to be paid therefore unless found by the Court to be unconscionable or unreasonable



2. Whether the fees as provided in the contract was unconscionable or unreasonable will have to be determined, in accordance with some guiding principles:

a. the amount and character of the services rendered; b. labor, time, and trouble involved; c. the nature and importance of the litigation or business in

which the services were rendered; d. the responsibility imposed; e. the amount of money or the value of the property affected

by the controversy or involved in the employment; f. the skill and experience called for in the performance of the

services; g. the professional character and social standing of the

attorney; h. the results secured, it being a recognized rule that an

attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not

Canlas v. CA (08/08/1988)

D: Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice,

eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money”

Facts:

1. Herrera owns 8 parcels of land in QC. From 1977 to 1978, he obtained various loans from L&R Corporation amounting to 420K. As security, he executed deeds of mortgage in favor of L&R

2. For failure to pay his obligation, the lots were foreclosed and were disposed at public auction where L & R Corporation was the highest bidder. Pending redemption, he filed for a complaint for injunction against L&R in which case he was represented by Canlas

3. L&R and Herrera entered into a compromise agreement whereby L&R extended the redemption period to another year. The properties are now priced at 600K. It was also stipulated in the agreement that Canlas is entitled to attorney’s fees of 100K. The court approved the said compromise

4. However, Herrera remained in dire financial straits for which he failed to acquire funding to pay the loans and Canlas’ fees. Canlas then offered that he will redeem the property provided that they execute a “transfer of mortgage” over the properties in his favor

5. Herrera then found out that Canlas registered the properties in is name, which was contrary to their agreement. He then claims that the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption was falsified

6. Thus, Herrera filed a disbarment case against Atty. Canlas for betrayal of trust, as well as a criminal complaint for estafa and falsification of documents. Further, he contends that the attorney’s fee charged by Canlas is unconscionable

Issue: WON the attorney’s fee charged by Canlas against Herrera was reasonable Held: No

Ratio:

1. By Atty. Canlas' own account, he admitted that no financing entity was willing to extend Herrera any loan with which to pay the redemption price of his mortgaged properties and petitioner's 100K attorney's fees. This fact should have tempered his demand for his fees. For obvious reasons, Canlas placed his interests over and above those of his client, in opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to clients”1

2. Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a shakedown of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money

3. It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice of law is not a commercial enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so at the expense of another. Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom

1 From the Lawyer’s Oath



from government interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation

4. The SC did not find petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of 100K reasonable. Further, the extent of the services he had rendered is not impressive to justify payment of such a gargantuan amount. The case itself moreover did not involve complex questions of fact or law that would have required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner to warrant his demands. The fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite handsome prices in the market should not be a measure of the importance or non-importance of the case

5. Thus, the court ordered to reduce the petitioner's fees, on a quantum meruit basis, to P20,000.00

6. However, the court has ordered Herrera to pay Canlas the 600k he paid to redeem the property. Canlas, on the other hand, was ordered to give back the 1M he earned from selling the properties2

Taganas v. NLRC (09/07/95) Justice Francisco

D: The validity of contingent fees largely depends on the reasonableness of the stipulated fees under the circumstances of each case. The reduction of unreasonable attorney’s fees is within the regulatory powers of the courts

Facts:

1. Atty. Taganas represented respondents Escultura et. al. in a labor suit for illegal diamissal , underpayment and non-payment of wages, 13th month pay, attorney’s fees and damages against the latter’s proprietor Ultra Clean Services (Ultra) and the Philippine Tuberculosis Society Inc. (PTSI). Respondents were humble janitors

2. Ultra and PTSI lost and were ordered by the Labor Arbiter to solidarily reinstate the respondents along with payment of their

2 The properties can no longer be reconveyed to Herrerra since an innocent purchaser for value already acquired the properties

backwages, differential etc. However, the Arbiter disallowed the claim for damages due to lack of basis

3. During the execution stage, Atty. Taganas moved to enforce his attorney’s lien

4. Respondents Escultura et al felt aggrieved for receiving a reduced reward due to the attorney’s fees and moved to question the validity of the contingent fee agreement they had with Taganas except for four of the other respondents who expressed their conformity thereto

5. Taganas’s fee was reduced from 50% of judgment award to 10%. Taganas appealed to the NLRC

6. NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter and ordered the amount to be paid by the four other respondents who expressly agreed to the original contingency agreement to also be reduced to 10%.

7. Hence, Taganas petitioned for certiorari claiming that the reduction was without basis especially as regards the 4 who consented to the original arrangement

Issue: WON the reduction of the attorney’s fees was correct Held: The reduction was proper. The contingent fee arrangement was unreasonable Ratio: A contingent fee agreement is an agreement laid doen in an express contract between a lawyer and a client in which the lawyer’s professional fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in an action, is to depend upon the success of the litigation. A contingent fee arrangement is valid in our jurisdiction and, as seen in Canon 133 and Sec. 24 of Rule 1384, is under the supervision and scrutiny of the court to protect clients for unjust charges.

3 Canon 13: A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness. 4 Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.



Therefore, the validity of contingent fees largely depends on the reasonableness of the stipulated fees under the circumstances of each case. The reduction of unreasonable attorney’s fees is within the regulatory powers of the courts The court took into consideration the financial capacity and economic status of the client to be taken account in fixing the reasonableness of the fee. The court took into consideration the fact that respondents were janitors who received miniscule salaries and no benefits. As a matter of fact Art. 111 of the Labor Code imposed a limit as to attoney’s fees but the court refrained from applying this rule. Thus, the reduction was proper. Labor cases call for compassionate justice. Issue: WON the reduction as regard the 4 respondents who consented to the original contingent agreement was proper Held: Yeeeeeees because the contingent fee agreement was unreasonable and unconscionable. Taganas was also reminded by the court as a laywer he is primarily an officer of the court charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering impartial justice between the parties. When he takes the oath, he submits himself to the authority of the court and subjects his professional fees to judicial control.

Traders Royal Bank Employees Union v NLRC (03/14/1997)

Justice Regalado D: Quantum meruit, meaning "as much as he deserves," is used as the

basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract, but recoverable by him from his client. Where a lawyer is

employed without a price for his services being agreed upon, the courts shall fix the amount on quantum meruit basis. In such a case, he would be

entitled to receive what he merits for his services. Facts: 1. Traders Royal Bank Employees Union (the Union) and Atty. Emmanuel

Noel A. Cruz, head of the E.N.A. Cruz and Associates law firm, entered into a retainer agreement on February 26, 1987 whereby the former obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly retainer fee of PhP3,000.00 in consideration of the law firm's undertaking to render the services enumerated in their contract. However, the agreement was terminated by the Union on April 4, 1990.

2. On September 2, 1988, the NLRC rendered a decision in the foregoing case in favor of the employees, awarding them holiday pay differential, mid-year bonus differential, and year-end bonus differential.

3. The Court, in its decision promulgated on August 30, 1990, modified the decision of the NLRC by deleting the award of mid-year and year-end bonus differentials while affirming the award of holiday pay differential.

4. Traders Royal Bank voluntarily complied with such final judgment and determined the holiday pay differential to be in the amount of PhP175,794.32. The Union never contested the amount thus found by the Bank. The latter duly paid its concerned employees their respective entitlement in said sum through their payroll.

5. After Atty. Cruz received the above decision of the Supreme Court, he notified the Union, the Bank management and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorney's lien over the award of holiday pay differential, and thereafter filed a motion before Labor Arbiter Lorenzo for the determination of his attorney's fees. The Labor Arbiter issued an order granting the motion of Atty. Cruz.

6. After appeal by the Union, the NLRC promulgated a resolution affirming the order of the labor arbiter.

Issue: WON Atty. Cruz is entitled to compensation on top of the retainer fee he receives monthly. Held: Yes. The Court modified the amount to be paid by the Union to Atty. Cruz. The amount ordered by the Court was PhP10,000. Ratio: 1. Atty. Cruz is entitled to an additional remuneration for pursuing legal

action in the interest of the Union before the labor arbiter and the NLRC, on top of the PhP3,000.00 retainer fee he received monthly from the Union. The law firm's services are decidedly worth more than such basic fee in the retainer agreement5. Thus, in Part C thereof on "Fee Structure,"

5 A. GENERAL SERVICES 1. Assurance that an Associate of the Law Firm shall be designated and be available on a day-to-day basis depending on the Union's needs; 2. Legal consultation, advice and render opinion on any actual and/or anticipatory situation confronting any matter within the client's normal course of business; 3. Proper documentation and notarization of any or all transactions entered into by the Union in its day-to-day course of business; 4. Review all contracts, deeds, agreements or any other legal document to which the union is a party signatory thereto but prepared or caused to be prepared by any other third party; 5. Represent the Union in any case wherein the Union is a party litigant in any court of law or quasi-judicial body subject to certain fees as qualified hereinafter; 6. Lia(i)se with and/or follow-up any pending application or any papers with any government agency and/or any private institution which is directly related to any legal matter referred to the Law Firm.



it is even provided that all attorney's fees collected from the adverse party by virtue of a successful litigation shall belong exclusively to Atty. Cruz, aside from the Union's liability for appearance fees and reimbursement of the items of costs and expenses enumerated therein.

2. Quantum meruit, meaning "as much as he deserves," is used as the basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract, but recoverable by him from his client. Where a lawyer is employed without a price for his services being agreed upon, the courts shall fix the amount on quantum meruit basis. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services.

3. The Court has laid down guidelines in ascertaining the real worth of a lawyer's services. These factors are now codified in Rule 20.01, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be considered in fixing a reasonable compensation for services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit. These are: (a) the time spent and the extent

B. SPECIAL LEGAL SERVICES

1. Documentation of any contract and other legal instrument/documents arising and/or required by your Union which do not fall under the category of its ordinary course of business activity but requires a special, exhaustive or detailed study and preparation; 2. Conduct or undertake researches and/or studies on special projects of the Union;

3. Render active and actual participation or assistance in conference table negotiations with TRB management or any other third person(s), juridical or natural, wherein the presence of counsel is not for mere consultation except CBA negotiations which shall be subject to a specific agreement (pursuant to PD 1391 and in relation to BP 130 & 227);

4. Preparation of Position Paper(s), Memoranda or any other pleading for and in behalf of the Union; 5. Prosecution or defense of any case instituted by or against the Union; and,

6. Represent any member of the Union in any proceeding provided that the particular member must give his/her assent and that prior consent be granted by the principal officers. Further, the member must conform to the rules and policies of the Law Firm. C. FEE STRUCTURE

In consideration of our commitment to render the services enumerated above when required or necessary, your Union shall pay a monthly retainer fee of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (PHP 3,000.00), payable in advance on or before the fifth day of every month. An Appearance Fee which shall be negotiable on a case-to-case basis.

Any and all Attorney's Fees collected from the adverse party by virtue of a successful litigation shall belong exclusively to the Law Firm.

It is further understood that the foregoing shall be without prejudice to our claim for reimbursement of all out-of-pocket expenses covering filing fees, transportation, publication costs, expenses covering reproduction or authentication of documents related to any matter referred to the Law Firm or that which redound to the benefit of the Union. D. SPECIAL BILLINGS In the event that the Union avails of the services duly enumerated in Title B, the Union shall pay the Law Firm an amount mutually agreed upon PRIOR to the performance of such services. The sum agreed upon shall be based on actual time and effort spent by the counsel in relation to the importance and magnitude of the matter referred to by the Union. However, charges may be WAIVEDby the Law Firm if it finds that time and efforts expended on the particular services are inconsequential but such right of waiver is duly reserved for the Law Firm.

xxx xxx xxx

of services rendered or required; (b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the importance of the subject matter; (d) the skill demanded; (e) the probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; (f) the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which the lawyer belongs; (g) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the services; (h) the contingency or certainty of compensation; (i) the character of the employment,

4. The Court deems it just and equitable to fix in the present recourse a reasonable amount of attorney's fees in favor of Atty. Cruz. For that purpose, the Court has duly taken into account the accepted guidelines therefor and so much of the pertinent data as are extant in the records of this case which are assistive in that regard. On such premises and in the exercise of our sound discretion, the Court holds that the amount of PhP10,000.00 is a reasonable and fair compensation for the legal services rendered by Atty. Cruz to before the labor arbiter and the NLRC.

5. For a discussion regarding the distinctions between attorney's fees in the ordinary and extraordinary concept, refer to the original case. Also refer to the original case, with regard to the differences between general and special retainer.

Padillo v C.A (11/29/2001)

D: Attorney’s fees as part of damages is not meant to enrich the winning party at the expense of the losing litigant.

Ponente: Justice de Leon Jr. Petition filed for the Cause of Action: Petition for declaratory relief and

damages Petition filed When the Case Reached S.C: Petition for Review on certiorari

Facts:

1. Veronica Padillo filed a complaint (SUIT4) for declaratory relief and damages against Tomas Averia and Beato Casilang. Padillo allege: a)that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of land with improvements in Q.C. province covered under TCT which she purchased from Marina M. de Vera-Quicho and Margarita de Vera; b) that Averia and Casilang refuse to turn over the property and c) that Averia filed a suit for recession of the 2 DoS solely for



harassment although said suit established Padillo’s right of ownership of the property.

2. Casilang filed his ANSWER averring that he already vacated the said property

3. Averia, on the other hand, filed his ANSWER with a COUNTERCLAIM and MOTION TO DISMISS, invoking the decision rendered in a suit 6for specific performance (SUIT1) filed against Vera-Quicho.

4. It appears that prior to the institution of the present case, 3 actions were already commenced involving the same property including SUIT1

5. SUIT2 was instituted by Padillo, in view of the restraining order mentioned in SUIT1, praying that court compel RD of Lucena City to register DoS which transferred Margarita de Vera’s ½ pro-indivio share of property( through Vera-Quicho as attorney-in-fact of Margarita de Vera) to Padillo.

6. During the pendency of SUIT2, SUIT3 was instituted by Averia against Spouses de Mesa and Padillo for recession of the 2 DoS. Averia claimed ownership of the property by virtue of an unregistered Contract to sell executed by Vera-Quicho. Case was dismissed for improper venue. Hence, Averia appealed to CA

7. In the meantime, SUIT2 was decided by the court, ordering RD to register the DoS in favor of Padillo. Averia appealed the case but CA sustained RTC’s decision. S.C. affirmed.

8. At the time that Lwer court resolved SUIT2, the court denied Averia’s Motion to dismiss in SUIT4 (Factno.3).

9. Averia proceeded to appeal the case to CA for SUIT 4. And as such, Court had to suspend SUIT4 to await the final termination of SUIT2 which at that time was pending in CA. Since no appeal was taken, the order to suspend case became final

10. When court in SUIT2 dismissed Averia’s appeal, trial court in SUIT4 rendered decision in favor of Padillo and declaring him as the owner of the property

11. Upon appeal of decision in SUIT4, CA reversed on the ground of res judicata. To this, CA said that Padilla, not having claimed the damages she supposedly suffered despite the trial in SUIT2 and

6 Complaint filed by Averia against Vera-Quicho and RD of Lucena City for SP and/or damages. Court ordered Vera-Quicho to execute necessary documents over property and enjoined the RD to desist from entering any encumbrance/transaction on said certificate except in favor of Averia

SUIT3, she is deemed to have already lost the right to recover the same

Issue: WON Padillo is barred by res judicata for claiming damages Held: NO Ratio:

1. RULE: Bar by prior judgment exists when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. A. It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy, including the

parties and those in privity with tem, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.

2. IN THE CASE, HOWEVER, there is no Res Judicata on the basis of Law of the case. A. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a

former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

B. Zarate v. DIR: A well-known legal principle is that when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case, such declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal. The rule made by an appellate court, while it may be reversed in other cases, cannot be departed from in subsequent proceedings in the same case.

C. Distinction between law of the case and res judicata i. law of the case is akin to that of former adjudication, but is

more limited in its application. It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case.

ii. res judicata is applicable to the conclusive determination of issues of fact, although it may include questions of law, and although it may apply to collateral proceedings in the same action or general proceeding, it is generally concerned with the effect of an adjudication in a wholly independent proceeding.



3. CASE, Due to fact that no appeal was taken, the CA order to suspend trial became final (fact. No. 9) Thus, even if erroneous, the ruling in CA has become of the law of the as between Padillo and Averia. Hence, Padillo cannot be faulted for yielding in GF to the ruling of CA and to continue to pursue her claim for damages in SUIT4

4. Notwithstanding, the court is NOT inclined to sustain the monetary award granted by the TC A. RULE: actual, compensatory and consequential damages must be

proved, and cannot be presumed. If the proof adduced thereon is flimsy and insufficient, as in this case, no damages will be allowed. i. Verily, the testimonial evidence on alleged unrealized income

earlier referred to(150k/year) is not enough to warrant the award of damages. It is too vague and unspecified to induce faith and reliance.

B. There is NO BASIS on the award of moral and exemplary damages in the amounts of P50k and P20k respectively. i. . It cannot be logically inferred that just because Averia

instituted SUIT3 while SUIT 4 was pending, malice or bad faith is immediately ascribable against Averia to warrant such an award

C. With respect to attorney’s fees, RULE : counsel’s fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. i. Attorney’s fees as part of damages is awarded only in the

instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code ii. Attorney’s fees as part of damages is not meant to enrich the

winning party at the expense of the losing litigant. Thus, it should be reasonably reduced P25k

PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan (04/12/2005)

Ponente: Puno D: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept

engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."

Facts:

1. In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial

support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily over drawings on its current account with the Central Bank.

2. As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million.

3. Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes.

4. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation.

5. A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.

6. Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.

7. In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies.

8. The PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan et al. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.

9. Tan, et al. filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG.

10. After the filing of the parties’ comments, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.

11. On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0005 and 0096-0099.9 The motions alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then



Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation.

12. Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank’s officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANK’s liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the CFI of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812.

13. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

14. On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. 7

15. It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division to the Fifth Division.In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza.

ISSUE:

1. WON Mendoza violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility8?

7 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. It further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office. 8 "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."

HELD and RATIO:

No, The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before the Sandiganbayan.

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and substantial. The SC disagrees. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Moreover, we note that the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.

Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 in the then CFI. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and



officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

*Discussion on the history of the canons and integrated bar rules are omitted. Please see original for reference.

Abaqueta v. Florido (1/22/2003)

D: There is a conflict of interest if there is an inconsistency in the interests of two or more opposing parties, and the test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim but it is

his duty to oppose it for the other client D: A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act

as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his former client

Facts:

1. On November 28, 1983, complainant Gamaliel Abaqueta engaged the professional services of respondent Atty. Bernardito A. Florido through his attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Charity Y. Baclig, to represent him in a special proceeding9 before RTC

2. Respondent then entered his appearance in the special proceeding as counsel for complainant and filed complainant’s objections and comment to Inventory and Accounting for the exclusion of certain properties which belong exclusively to complainant

3. Several years later, Milagros Yap Abaqueta filed an action for sum of money against complainant.10 Respondent signed the complaint as counsel for Milagros averring that plaintiff and defendant Gamaliel are the conjugal owners of certain parcels of land. These parcels of

9 The case is entitled, “In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Deceased Bonifacia Abaqueta, Susana Uy Trazo, petitioner” 10 The case is entitled, “Milagros Yap Abaqueta v. Gamaliel Abaqueta and Casiano Gerona”

land referred to as conjugal property are the very same parcels of land in the special proceeding which respondent alleged as the sole and exclusive properties of Gamaliel

4. In short, respondent made allegations in the civil case contrary to and in direct conflict with his averments as counsel for complainant in the special proceeding. Respondent’s representation of Milagros, according to complainant, was done without his consent

5. Thus, Gamaliel filed an administrative complaint against respondent with IBP Commission on Bar Discipline praying that appropriate sanctions be imposed on respondent for representing conflicting interests

6. In respondent’s answer, he claimed that he acted in good faith. He further alleged that the lapse of eight years resulted in the oversight and lapse of respondent’s memory of that complainant was a former client and thus, after discovering that he formerly represented complainant, he immediately filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Milagros

7. The investigating commissioner found that respondent clearly violated the prohibition against representing conflicting interests and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 3 months

Issue: WON respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should be suspended for 3 months Held: Yes Ratio:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that, “A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts”

2. There is a conflict of interest if there is an inconsistency in the interests of two or more opposing parties, and the test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client

3. There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection



4. SC finds the recommendation of the IBP well-taken. Respondent could not have easily forgotten that complainant was his former client. Complainant’s name is not a common name and once he heard, it will surely ring a bell in one’s mind

5. It is also incredible that he could not recall that complainant was his client considering that Mrs. Charito Baclig, who was complainant’s attorney-in fact and the go-between of complainant and respondent in the special proceeding was the same person who brought Milagros Yap Abaqueta to him

6. Lastly, the fact that the subject matter of both cases are the same properties could not have escaped the attention of respondent. He did not forget the past but he had simply chose to ignore them on the assumption that the long period of time spanning his past and present engagement would effectively blur the memories of the parties to such a discrepancy

7. A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his former client

8. The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree

Artezuela v. Maderazo (4/22/2002)

D: 1. To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, it is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his

original client

Facts: 1. Due to an accident, Echavia’s car rammed into Artezuela’s carinderia 2. Artezuela engaged the services of Atty. Maderazo to file a damage

suit against Echavia 3. However, the case was dismissed allegedly due to the instance of

Artezuela 4. Because of that, Artezuela filed a verified complaint for disbarment

against Atty. Maderazo alleging that: a. Atty. Maderazo grossly neglected his duties as a lawyer and

failed to represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm b. The lawyer postponed the pre-trial conference even if all the

parties were present

c. Despite Artezuela’s follow-ups, Atty. Maderazo did not do anything to keep the case moving and withdrew as counsel without obtaining Artezuela’s consent

d. That Atty. Maderazo prepared the Answer of Echavia to the complaint and this was printed in the said lawyer’s office

5. Atty. Maderazo was suspended by the IBP Board of Governors because of this and he appealed

Issue: WON Atty. Maderazo was guilty of representing conflicting interests Held: Yes Ratio:

1. To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party

a. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the adverse party’s conflicting interests of record

b. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original client

2. Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics:

It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of the retainer to disclose to the client the circumstances of his relations to the parties and any interest in or in connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of the counsel. It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this Canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when in behalf of one of the clients, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.

3. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of the attorney-client

relationship, sound public policy dictates that a lawyer be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. So, he should not act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client

4. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:



a. CANON 15- All lawyers shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients

b. Rule 15.03- A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts

5. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified

Abragan v. Rodriguez (04/03/2002)

D: The bar must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealings. To this end, lawyers should refrain from

doing anything that might tend to lessen the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their profession. The obligation to

represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or

employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed

Facts: 1. Sometime in 1986 Abragan et al hired Rodriguez to represent them

in a forcible entry case. Said petitioners won the case. However, Rodriguez sold some of the rights of the petitioners without their consent

2. Upon learning this, petitioners severed their lawyer-client relationship with Rodriguez. They then filed an indirect contempt charged against Sheriff Loncion and were represented by their new counsel, Atty. Salva (allegedly a former law student of Atty. Rodriguez)

3. Lancion, on the other hand, was represented by Atty. Rodriguez, much to the prejudice and dismay of the petitioners. It was alleged that Atty. Rodriguez influenced Atty. Salva to withdraw the case of Indirect Contempt against Loncion

4. To make matters worse, Atty. Rodriguez filed a Motion to Withdraw Plaintiffs’ Exhibits without the consent of the petitioners. Further, Rodriguez even fenced a lot (the subject matter of the forcible entry

case) without the consent of the petitioners and proclaimed possession and ownership of the lot. However, Rodriguez claims that the lot was awarded to him as attorney’s fees

5. The petitioners then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Rodriguez on the ground that he violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Issue: WON Atty. Rodriguez violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Held: Yeeeeeees Ratio:

1. Rodriguez clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that “a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.

2. According to the SC, Rodriguez fell short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers. Lawyers are expected to uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times. The trust and confidence clients repose in them require a high standard and appreciation of the latter’s duty to the former, the legal profession, the courts and the public

3. The bar must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealings. To this end, lawyers should refrain from doing anything that might tend to lessen the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their profession

4. The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed

5. In the case at bar, petitioners were the same complainants in the indirect contempt case and in the Complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 11204. Respondent should have evaluated the situation first before agreeing to be counsel for the defendants in the indirect contempt proceedings. Attorneys owe undivided allegiance to their clients, and should at all times weigh their actions, especially in their dealings with the latter and the public at large. They must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times



6. The Court will not tolerate any departure from the “straight and narrow” path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession

Quiambao v. Bamba (08/25/05)

Chief Justice Davide Jr. D: Conflict of interest is present when the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.

D: Although there are instances where lawyers cannot decline

representation, lawyers cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a present client and a prospective one.

Facts:

1. Felicitas Quiambao is the President and Managinf director of Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. (AIB), a family owned corp. engaged in providing security and investigation services.

2. She procured the services of Atty. Bamba not only for their corporate affairs but also for her personal cases.

3. Atty. Bamaba acted as Quiambao’s counsel in an ejectment case filed by the latter against the Spouses Torroba.

4. Quiambao resigned from AIB. Six months after her resignation, AIB through Atty. Bamba filed a replevin suit against Quiambao for the recovery of an AIB service vehicle assigned to her when she was still working under the company.

5. Thereafter, Quimbao filed a disbarment suit against Atty. Bamaba charging the latter for representing conficting interests when the latter filed a case against her while he was at the time representing her in another case, and for committing other acts if dishonesty and double dealing

6. It appears that Atty. Bamba proposed to Quiambao that she should organize her own security agency and that he would assist her in its organization. This was the reason Quiambao resigned from AIB.

7. Quiambao made the following allegations: a. She incorporated Quimabao Risk Management

Specialists Inc. (QRMSI) where Atty. Bamba was a “silent

partner” represented by his associate Atty. Hernandez. He allegedly planned to steal some of the client s of AIB for the benefit of QRMSI

b. While serving as legal counsel for AIB and a “silent partner” of QRMSI, he convinced complainant’s brother Leodegario Quiambao to organize another security agency, San Esteban Security Services, Inc. (SESSI) where Atty. Bamba will be SESSI’s incorporator, director, and president. The Atty. Bamba and Leodegario then illegally diverted the funds of AIB to fund the incorporation of SESSI, and likewise planned to eventually close down the operations of AIB and transfer the business to SESSI.

8. On the other hand, Atty. Bamba makes the following admissions and denials:

a. He did represent Quiambao in the aforementioned ejectment case and later represented AIB in the replevin case against her.

b. He, however, denies that he was the “personal lawyer” of the complainant, and avers that he was made to believe that it was part of his function as counsel for AIB to handle even the “personal cases” of its officers.

c. Even assuming that the complainant confided to him privileged information about her legal interests, the ejectment case and the replevin case are unrelated cases involving different issues and parties and, therefore, the privileged information which might have been gathered from one case would have no use in the other. He remained Quiambao’s counsel due to the latter’s insistence.

d. The respondent also denies having agreed to be a “silent partner” of QRMSI through his nominee, Atty. Hernandez.

e. He also denies that he convinced Leodegario to organize another security agency and that the funds of AIB were unlawfully diverted to SESSI. He admits that he serves AIB and SESSI in different capacities: as legal counsel of the former and as president of the latter

9. The investigation Commissioner of the IBP holds Atty. Bamba

guilty of all the charges against him and recommends a penalty



of 1 year suspension from the practice of law 10. The IBP Board of Governor did not adopt the recommended

penalty and jut gave Atty. Bamba as stern reprimand Issue: WON Atty. Bamba was guilty of conflict of interest and double-dealing Held: Yeeeeeees Ratio: Lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose. The tests which determine when a lawyer represents conflicting interests are as follows:

(1) Whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client,

(2) Whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty and

(3) Whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment.

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies

to a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.

At the time Atty. Bamba filed the replevin case on behalf of AIB, he was still the counsel of record of the complainant in the pending ejectment case. Although the ejectment case and the replevin case are unrelated cases with issues, parties, and subject matters, the prohibition is still applicable. His representation of opposing clients in both cases, invites suspicion of double-dealing. While the respondent may assert that the complainant expressly

consented to his continued representation in the ejectment case, the respondent failed to show that he fully disclosed the facts to both his clients and he failed to present any written consent of the complainant and AIB as required under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A lawyer is also not duty-bound to handle all the cases referred to him by his client (i.e. cases for AIB, including the personal cases of its officers which had no connection to its corporate affairs). That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative. Moreover, lawyers are not obliged to act either as an adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become their client. They have the right to decline such employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Although there are instances where lawyers cannot decline representation, lawyers cannot be made to labor under conflict of interest between a present client and a prospective one. Issue: WON Atty. Bamba’s participation in SESSI as its President is a clear case of conflict of interest since he is at the same time the counsel of AIB Held: Yeeeeees Ratio:

Atty. Bamba has pecuniary interest in SESSI, which is engaged in a business competing with AIB, and, more importantly, he is SESSI’s president. One cannot help entertaining a doubt on his loyalty to his client AIB. This kind of situation passes the second test of conflict of interest, which is whether the acceptance of a new relationship would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. The close relationship of the majority stockholders of both companies does not negate the conflict of interest. Neither does his protestation that his shareholding in SESSI is “a mere pebble among the sands.” Atty. Bamba is clearly guilty of serious misconduct for representing conflicting interests. NOTE: Atty. Bamba was also guilty of violating RA Republic Act No. 5487, otherwise known as the Private Security Agency Law, prohibits a person from organizing or having an interest in more than one security agency. This is in violation of Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to promote respect for the law and refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law.



NOTE: The Court imposed a 1-year suspension from the practice of law in view of the grave infractions made by Atty. Bamba (Wawa naman si kohya)

Tiania v Ocampo (08/12/1991)

Per Curiam D: "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written

consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." D: The Court prohibits the representation of conflicting interests not only

because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and

good taste. D: The test of the conflict of interest in disciplinary cases against a lawyer is whether or not the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his

client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof.

Facts: 1. These disbarment proceedings against Atty. Amado Ocampo were filed

by Maria Tiania and by Spouses Felicidad Angel and Alfonso Angel (the Angel Spouses). Both cases were consolidated upon the instance of Atty. Amado Ocampo who, in his answer, denied the imputations.

2. In the first administrative case, Maria Tiania claims that Atty. Ocampo who has been her counsel in all her legal problems and court cases as early as 1966, has always had her unqualified faith and confidence. Tiania claims that she was sued in 1972 by one Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock for ejectment from a parcel of land. Tiana alleges that Ocampo appeared in her behalf and also for Mrs. Blaylock. Tiania then confronted Ocampo, and the latter assured her that everything will be taken care of. Ocampo then made Tiana sign a Compromise Agreement. Two years later, Tiania was shocked to receive an order to vacate the property.

3. On the other hand, Ocampo denies all the allegations thrown against him by Tiania. Ocampo claims that he was counsel only to Mrs. Blaylock. He said that Tiania showed to him a document, but he expressed his doubts regarding its authenticity. This convinced Tiania to sign the compromise agreement.

4. In the second case, the Angel spouses allege that in 1972, they sold their house in favor of Mrs. Blaylock for the amount of PhP70,000. Ocampo acted as their counsel and prepared the Deed of Sale of a Residential House and Waiver of Rights Over a Lot. With the money paid by Blaylock, the Angel spouses bought another parcel of land. Again, Ocampo prepared the Deed of Sale which was signed by the vendor, Laura Dalanan, and the Angel spouses, as the vendees. In addition, Ocampo allegedly made the Angel spouses sign two more documents which later turned out to be a Real Estate Mortgage of the same property purchased from Dalanan and a Promissory Note, both in favor of Blaylock. The Angel spouses never realized the nature of the said documents until they received a complaint naming them as defendants in a collection suit filed by Ocampo on behalf of the plaintiff, Commercial Corporation of Olongapo, a firm headed by Blaylock. Ocampo reassured them that there was no need to engage the services of a new lawyer since he will take care of everything. However, the Angel spouses received a Notice to Vacate on the basis of the two document they signed.

5. Upon the other hand, Ocampo alleges that Blaylock was his client, who introduced to him the Angel spouses. He maintains that he merely facilitated the transfer of PhP20,000 from Blaylock to the Angel spouses, for the latter's use in repurchasing a property they originally owned in Fendler St., Olongapo. Such property was then to be sold to Blaylock. Since the sale of the Fendler property would render the Angel spouses homeless, they suggested that Blaylock loan them PhP40,000 to purchase from Dalanan another property in Kessing St., Olongapo.

6. The Solicitor General charged Atty. Ocampo with malpractice and gross misconduct.

Issue: WON Atty. Ocampo is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Held: Yes. The Court took into account the advanced age of Ocampo, who was already 73 years, and merely suspended him for a period of one year. Ratio: 1. The specific law applicable in both administrative cases is Rule 15.03 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."

2. The Court prohibits the representation of conflicting interests not only because the relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest



confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused, the entire profession suffers.

3. The test of the conflict of interest in disciplinary cases against a lawyer is whether or not the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof.

4. The Court upheld the findings of the Solicitor. Indeed, acts of Ocampo in representing Blaylock, and at the same time advising Tiania, the opposing party, as in the first administrative case, and once again representing Blaylock and her interest while handling the legal documents of another opposing party as in the second case, whether the said actions were related or totally unrelated, constitute serious misconduct. They are improper to Ocampo's office as attorney.

Dee v CA (8/24/1989)

D: Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing parties with contending positions.HOWEVER, at certain stage of the controversy before

it reaches the court, a lawyer ay represent conflicting interests with the consent of the parties.

Ponente: Justice Regalado

Petition filed for the Cause of Action: collection of attorney’s fees and refund

Petition filed When the Case Reached S.C: Writ of Certiorari

Facts: 1. Dee and his father went to the residence of Atty. Mutuc in order to

seek latter advice regarding the problem of alleged indebtedness of Dee’s brother(Dewey Dee) to Caesar’s Palace in Las Vegas. Bothe brothers’ father was apprehensive for the safety of Dewey Dee, having heard of the link between the mafia and said gambling place

2. Mutuc assured Dee and his father that he would look into the matter and that 100k was the price for his services.

3. Thereafter, Mutuc made several long distance calls and two trips to LA in order to inquire about the status of Dewey Dee’s debts. Upon further investigation, Mutuc found out that the outstanding obligation of $1M was actually incurred by Ramon Sy but Dewey Dee was the one merely signing the chits

4. Pursuant to the agreement that Mutuc had with the president of Caesar’s Palace, Mutuc successfully convinced Ramon Sy to acknowledge his debts so that in effect Dewey Dee would be exculpated from any liability

5. Mutuc showed the acknowledgment letter of Ramon Sy to the casino and the account of Dewey Dee was cleared

6. Having settled the account of Dewey Dee, Mutuc sent demand letters to the other Dee brother for the payment of the remaining balance of P50k as attorney’s fees. Brother Dee, however, ignored the same

7. Thus, Mutuc filed a complaint in court for the collection of attorney’s fees and refund of transport fare and other expenses.

8. Brother Dee, in his ANSWER, denied any attorney-client relationship. He insists that his visit to Mutuc’s house was an informal one and that he never contracted the services of Mutuc to handle the problem. Brother Dee alleges that it was Mutuc himself who volunteered his services as “a friend of the defendant’s family.” The 50k given was not attorney’s fees but merely “pocket money” solicited by Mutuc for his trips to LA

9. TC: rendered decision in favor of Mutuc 10. CA: affirmed. 11. CA: reconsidered its decision stating that 50k paid was already

commensurate to the services made considering that at the time he acted counsel for the Dee’s, Mutuc was also acting as the collecting agent/consultant of Casear’s Palace.

12. CA: reinstated its former decision

Issue: WON a lawyer-client relationship exists Held: Yeeeees Ratio:

1. RULE: Documentary Formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; contract may be express of imlplied. A. To establish relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance

of the attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession.

B. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance of a request from the latter

2. CASE, no question that professional service was rendered. Dewey Dee’s family was freed from the apprehension that Dewey may be harmed by the mafia which is allegedly link to Caesar’s Palace/



3. No conflict of interests present. Mutuc’s representations in behalf of Brother Dee were not in resistance to casino’s claim as creditor but were actually geared toward proving the fact that Dewey Dee was not the debtor but Ramon Sy.

4. Assuming that there was a conflict of interests, such acceptance of Mutuc of employment from Brother Dee was not unenthical A. RULE: Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing

parties with contending positions. B. HOWEVER, at certain stage of the controversy before it reaches

the court, a lawyer ay represent conflicting interests with the consent of the parties.

C. Purpose: a common representation may work to the advantage of said parties since a mutual lawyer, with honest motivations and impartially cognizant of the parties’ disparate positions may well be better situated to work out an acceptable settlement of their differences.

D. CASE: Brother Dee knew of Mutuc’s “other job.” He is now stopped.

ethics third set

Documents

case of complainant

unlawful detainer case

bar confidant

spouse patrosenia endaya

branch clerk of court

practice of law

pedro hernandez

santiago hernandez